Chris Farhood
1d817d3e2d
Mirrors the groombook/org and privilegedescalation/org pattern: extract company-wide policy that's currently inlined across each agent's AGENTS.md (plus auxiliary HEARTBEAT.md / GITHUB.md / SOUL.md / TOOLS.md / INFRASTRUCTURE.md files) into three shared skills. Agents will reference these via one-line invocation reminders in their Wake additions section once the AGENTS.md files are rewritten.
3.5 KiB
name, description
| name | description |
|---|---|
| safety | Non-negotiable safety rules for all CartSnitch agents. Covers secret handling, destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, the canonical tool list (vs. the alternatives we don't use), the no-Dependabot policy, and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is uncertain. |
Safety
The following rules apply to every CartSnitch agent without exception.
Non-negotiable rules
-
Never exfiltrate secrets or private data. This includes API keys, tokens, PEM files, database credentials, kubeconfig contents, and any value sourced from a secret reference in your adapter config. Never log, comment, or return these values in any output — including PR descriptions, Paperclip / GitHub issue comments, discussions, and chat responses.
-
Seek board approval before destructive actions. "Destructive" means: deleting resources, dropping tables, wiping namespaces, force-pushing branches, resetting git history, removing secrets, or any operation that cannot be undone without restoring from backup. Use
request_board_approvaland set the source issue toblockeduntil approved. -
Never commit plaintext secrets. Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (
kubeseal). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded in source. -
Never
kubectl applyagainst production (cartsnitch) or UAT (cartsnitch-uat). Both are Flux-managed. Manifest changes go through a PR tocartsnitch/infraand are reconciled by Flux. Thecartsnitch-devnamespace permits direct kubectl use for iteration; secrets there should still follow the SealedSecrets pattern when sensitive. -
Never
kubectl create secretin production. All secrets — at every environment — go through SealedSecrets, encrypted withkubeseal, committed asSealedSecretresources tocartsnitch/infra. -
Never bypass the merge gate. No self-merging PRs. No pushing directly to
dev,uat, ormain. Every change goes through a PR with the reviews required by thesdlcskill. -
Never run
tofudirectly. Terraform goes through the Flux OpenTofu Controller via a PR tocartsnitch/infra.
Tools (canonical, not alternatives)
These are the only acceptable choices — alternatives are policy violations:
- Secret management: Bitnami Sealed Secrets Controller — no plain Kubernetes secrets.
- Database: CloudNativePG Operator (Postgres) — no SQLite, MariaDB, or MySQL.
- Cache / pub-sub: DragonflyDB Operator — no Redis.
- Authentication: Better-Auth + OAuth2 via Authentik. Auth0, Okta, Entra-ID are also supported when required. Never build custom authentication.
- Dependency updates: Mend Renovate. Dependabot is not used and will not be used. Do not configure it. If you encounter Dependabot configuration anywhere, treat it as a policy violation and flag it.
- Container registry:
ghcr.io/cartsnitch/<service>— no Docker Hub for first-party images. - Browser automation: the
playwrightMCP server (http://playwright:8931/mcp). Never run Playwright locally or install browser binaries. Target dev (cartsnitch.dev.farh.net) — never test production.
If a task requires deviating from any of the above, treat it as a destructive action: stop, file an issue with rationale, request board approval.
If you are unsure
If you are unsure whether an action is safe, stop. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to blocked, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess.