security: enforce JWT audience + require sub in token verification
Closes the audience-binding gap (RFC 9068): tokens minted by the issuer for a different resource are now rejected at /mcp, and subject-less tokens are refused. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
@@ -40,16 +40,17 @@ class AuthentikTokenVerifier:
|
||||
|
||||
try:
|
||||
key = self._jwks.get_signing_key_from_jwt(token).key
|
||||
# Validate issuer + signature + expiry strictly. Audience is checked
|
||||
# softly below: this is a single-resource server behind a dedicated
|
||||
# authorization server, and DCR clients have dynamic ids, so a valid
|
||||
# signature + our issuer already establishes the token is for us.
|
||||
# Validate issuer + signature + expiry strictly, and bind the token to
|
||||
# this resource server (RFC 9068): PyJWT enforces that the ``aud``
|
||||
# claim contains at least one of our accepted audiences. ``sub`` is
|
||||
# required so subject-less tokens are rejected outright.
|
||||
claims = jwt.decode(
|
||||
token,
|
||||
key,
|
||||
algorithms=_ALGORITHMS,
|
||||
issuer=self._issuer,
|
||||
options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "iss"], "verify_aud": False},
|
||||
audience=self._audience,
|
||||
options={"require": ["exp", "iat", "iss", "aud", "sub"]},
|
||||
)
|
||||
except Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 - any failure means unauthenticated
|
||||
logger.debug("Token verification failed: %s", exc)
|
||||
@@ -57,13 +58,6 @@ class AuthentikTokenVerifier:
|
||||
|
||||
aud = claims.get("aud")
|
||||
auds = aud if isinstance(aud, list) else ([aud] if aud else [])
|
||||
if auds and not any(a in self._audience for a in auds):
|
||||
logger.warning(
|
||||
"Token audience %s not in accepted %s; accepting (single resource).",
|
||||
auds,
|
||||
self._audience,
|
||||
)
|
||||
|
||||
resource = auds[0] if auds else self._audience[0]
|
||||
return AccessToken(
|
||||
token=token,
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user