Sanitize remote execution envs at the boundary (#5325)

## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI agents for zero-human companies
> - Adapters spawn CLIs against local, SSH, and sandbox targets,
threading a runtime env through `runAdapterExecutionTargetProcess` and
the SSH/sandbox runners
> - Host identity vars (HOME, TMPDIR, XDG_*, NVM_DIR, PATH) routinely
leak into the env we send to remote targets — sometimes via test probes,
sometimes via runtime config — and break sandboxed/SSH'd CLIs whose own
profiles set those values correctly
> - The sanitization logic existed but lived alongside other helpers in
`server-utils.ts` and was applied piecemeal at adapter callsites, so it
was easy to bypass
> - This pull request lifts the sanitization into a standalone
`remote-execution-env.ts`, applies it at the SSH and sandbox runtime
boundary so every remote spawn goes through it, and removes the
duplicated callsite-level filtering
> - The benefit is identity-bound host env stops leaking across
SSH/sandbox transports regardless of which adapter calls in

## What Changed

- `packages/adapter-utils/src/remote-execution-env.ts`: new module —
single source of truth for which env keys are identity-bound and how to
strip them when the value matches the host's value
- `packages/adapter-utils/src/server-utils.ts`: remove the inline
sanitization (now in `remote-execution-env.ts`)
- `packages/adapter-utils/src/execution-target.ts`: apply sanitization
at the sandbox runtime boundary
- `packages/adapter-utils/src/ssh.ts`: apply sanitization at the SSH
spawn boundary
- `packages/adapters/opencode-local/src/server/test.ts`: drop
now-redundant callsite filtering
- `packages/adapters/pi-local/src/server/test.ts`: drop now-redundant
callsite filtering
- New tests `execution-target.test.ts` and
`execution-target-sandbox.test.ts` cover the sanitizer flow at both
transports, including positive cases (host-shaped path stripped) and
explicit-override preservation

## Verification

- `pnpm vitest run --no-coverage --project @paperclipai/adapter-utils
--project @paperclipai/adapter-opencode-local --project
@paperclipai/adapter-pi-local`
- `pnpm typecheck` clean

## Risks

Low–medium. The sanitization is now applied at one layer (boundary)
instead of N (callsites), so behavior is more consistent. Any adapter
that previously relied on a leaked host var landing on the remote shell
would now see it stripped — but those reliances were what this change
exists to fix.

## Model Used

Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context)

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [x] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable — new tests at both
transports
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots — N/A (no UI)
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge
This commit is contained in:
Devin Foley
2026-05-05 19:30:14 -07:00
committed by GitHub
parent 36eaf9778f
commit f6bad8f6bf
8 changed files with 306 additions and 72 deletions
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ describe("sandbox adapter execution targets", () => {
const cleanupDirs: string[] = [];
afterEach(async () => {
vi.unstubAllEnvs();
while (cleanupDirs.length > 0) {
const dir = cleanupDirs.pop();
if (!dir) continue;
@@ -141,6 +142,92 @@ describe("sandbox adapter execution targets", () => {
}));
});
it("strips inherited host identity env before sandbox execution", async () => {
vi.stubEnv("PATH", "/host/bin:/usr/bin");
vi.stubEnv("HOME", "/Users/local");
vi.stubEnv("TMPDIR", "/var/folders/local/T");
const runner = {
execute: vi.fn(async () => ({
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
timedOut: false,
stdout: "ok\n",
stderr: "",
pid: null,
startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
})),
};
const target: AdapterSandboxExecutionTarget = {
kind: "remote",
transport: "sandbox",
remoteCwd: "/workspace",
runner,
};
await runAdapterExecutionTargetProcess("run-1b", target, "agent-cli", ["--json"], {
cwd: "/local/workspace",
env: {
PATH: "/host/bin:/usr/bin",
HOME: "/Users/local",
TMPDIR: "/var/folders/local/T",
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
},
timeoutSec: 5,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
});
expect(runner.execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
env: {
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
},
}));
});
it("preserves explicit remote identity env overrides for sandbox execution", async () => {
vi.stubEnv("PATH", "/host/bin:/usr/bin");
vi.stubEnv("HOME", "/Users/local");
const runner = {
execute: vi.fn(async () => ({
exitCode: 0,
signal: null,
timedOut: false,
stdout: "ok\n",
stderr: "",
pid: null,
startedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
})),
};
const target: AdapterSandboxExecutionTarget = {
kind: "remote",
transport: "sandbox",
remoteCwd: "/workspace",
runner,
};
await runAdapterExecutionTargetProcess("run-1c", target, "agent-cli", ["--json"], {
cwd: "/local/workspace",
env: {
PATH: "/custom/remote/bin:/usr/bin",
HOME: "/home/sandbox",
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
},
timeoutSec: 5,
graceSec: 1,
onLog: async () => {},
});
expect(runner.execute).toHaveBeenCalledWith(expect.objectContaining({
env: {
PATH: "/custom/remote/bin:/usr/bin",
HOME: "/home/sandbox",
SAFE_VALUE: "visible",
},
}));
});
it("treats SSH targets as bridge-only", () => {
const target = {
kind: "remote" as const,