# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** After comprehensive white-box analysis of all network-accessible code paths, **NO Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified** in this PHP-based food ordering application.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides detailed evidence demonstrating that the application does not implement any functionality that makes outbound HTTP requests, processes user-controlled URLs, or interacts with external services in ways that could enable SSRF attacks. This assessment confirms the reconnaissance phase findings and provides the SSRF Exploitation specialist with clear justification for why no exploitation targets exist.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern Analysis: NO SSRF ATTACK SURFACE

After systematic analysis of all potential SSRF vectors, **zero vulnerable patterns were identified**. The application's architecture fundamentally prevents SSRF vulnerabilities through:

1. **No HTTP Client Implementation:** The application makes no outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests from server-side code
2. **No URL Parameter Processing:** No endpoints accept or process URL parameters that could be manipulated for SSRF
3. **Hardcoded Redirects Only:** All Location headers use static, hardcoded values without user input
4. **No External Service Integration:** No webhook, callback, API proxy, or external service communication functionality exists
5. **Self-Contained Architecture:** All data processing occurs within the MySQL database and PHP application layer

### Why This Application is Immune to SSRF

The application is a **simple CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) web service** with the following characteristics:

- **Data Flow:** User input → PHP validation/processing → MySQL database → Response rendering
- **External Dependencies:** Only client-side CDN resources (Bootstrap, jQuery) loaded by browsers, not server-side
- **Network Communication:** Inbound HTTP requests only; no outbound requests initiated by server
- **Architecture Pattern:** Traditional LAMP stack with no microservices, webhooks, or external API dependencies

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**HTTP Client Library:** None - The application does not include or use any HTTP client libraries:
- No cURL functions (`curl_init`, `curl_setopt`, `curl_exec`)
- No Guzzle, Requests, or other PHP HTTP client packages
- No `file_get_contents()` with URLs
- No socket functions (`fsockopen`, `stream_socket_client`)

**Request Architecture:** The application is purely request/response based:
- Receives HTTP requests from clients on port 34999
- Processes requests using PHP and MySQL
- Returns HTML pages or JSON API responses
- **Never initiates outbound requests to external services**

**Internal Services:** The application container runs:
- Apache 2.4.41 (web server) on 127.0.0.1:80
- MySQL 8.0.37 (database) on 127.0.0.1:3306
- Both services in same Docker container (localhost networking only)

**Network Segmentation:** Database access is restricted to localhost (127.0.0.1) within the container, preventing external database access. However, this is not an SSRF concern since the application never makes requests that could be manipulated to target the database.

## 4. Comprehensive Analysis Results

### 4.1 HTTP Client Function Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched all 11 PHP files for functions capable of making outbound HTTP requests.

**Functions Searched (All returned ZERO results):**

#### cURL Functions
- `curl_init()` - Not found
- `curl_setopt()` - Not found  
- `curl_exec()` - Not found
- `curl_setopt_array()` - Not found
- `curl_multi_*()` - Not found

#### URL File Access Functions
- `file_get_contents()` - Not found
- `fopen()` - Not found
- `readfile()` - Not found
- `fpassthru()` - Not found

#### Socket Functions
- `fsockopen()` - Not found
- `pfsockopen()` - Not found
- `stream_socket_client()` - Not found
- `socket_create()` - Not found
- `socket_connect()` - Not found

#### Stream Context Functions
- `stream_context_create()` - Not found (would be needed for `file_get_contents()` with URLs)
- `get_headers()` - Not found

#### HTTP Client Libraries
- GuzzleHttp - Not installed (no composer.json)
- Requests library - Not installed
- Symfony HttpClient - Not installed

**Verdict:** The application contains **zero HTTP client implementations**. It is architecturally incapable of making outbound requests.

---

### 4.2 URL Parameter Analysis

**Methodology:** Examined all input vectors (GET, POST, Cookie, Header) for parameters that could contain URLs.

**All Parameters Identified:**

#### GET Parameters (2 total)
1. **`/api/search_restaurants.php?query=...`**
   - Purpose: Restaurant text search term
   - Data Type: String (search query)
   - Usage: SQL LIKE clause (`WHERE name LIKE :name_query OR category LIKE :category_query`)
   - **SSRF Risk:** None - Used only for database queries, never as URL
   - Code Location: Line 6: `$query = $_GET['query'] ?? '';`

2. **`/api/get_favorite_restaurants.php?userId=...`**
   - Purpose: User ID for favorites retrieval
   - Data Type: Integer (user identifier)
   - Usage: SQL query parameter (`WHERE users.id = :user_id`)
   - **SSRF Risk:** None - Integer parameter used for database queries
   - **Security Issue:** IDOR (authorization bypass), not SSRF
   - Code Location: Line 14: `$userId = $_GET['userId'];`

#### POST Parameters (9 total)
- `username` - Authentication credential
- `password` - Authentication credential
- `email` - User registration field
- `oldPassword` - Password change field
- `newPassword` - Password change field
- `confirmPassword` - Password change field
- `userId` - User ID (IDOR vulnerability, not SSRF)

**Parameters NOT Found (Common SSRF Vectors):**
- No `url`, `uri`, `link`, `src`, `href` parameters
- No `callback`, `webhook`, `webhook_url` parameters
- No `redirect`, `redirect_url`, `return`, `continue` parameters
- No `target`, `destination`, `goto`, `next` parameters
- No `file`, `path`, `image_url`, `avatar_url` parameters

**Verdict:** No URL-accepting parameters exist in any endpoint.

---

### 4.3 Redirect and Location Header Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for all `header('Location:` usages to identify potential open redirect vulnerabilities.

**All Redirect Locations Found:**

1. **`/app/website/profile.php` Line 6**
   ```php
   header('Location: login.php');
   ```
   - **Context:** Authentication enforcement redirect
   - **User Input:** None - hardcoded relative path
   - **SSRF Risk:** None

2. **`/app/website/logout.php` Line 4**
   ```php
   header('Location: login.php');
   ```
   - **Context:** Post-logout redirect
   - **User Input:** None - hardcoded relative path
   - **SSRF Risk:** None

**Client-Side Redirects (JavaScript):**
- `/register.php:105` - `window.location.href = 'login.php';` (hardcoded)
- `/login.php:100` - `window.location.href = 'profile.php';` (hardcoded)

**Verdict:** All redirects use hardcoded values. No open redirect vulnerability. No user-controlled Location headers.

---

### 4.4 XML/External Entity Processing Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for XML parsing functions that could be exploited for SSRF via XXE (XML External Entity) attacks.

**Functions Searched (All returned ZERO results):**
- `simplexml_load_file()` - Not found
- `simplexml_load_string()` - Not found
- `SimpleXMLElement` class - Not found
- `DOMDocument::load()` - Not found
- `DOMDocument::loadXML()` - Not found
- `XMLReader::open()` - Not found
- `xml_parse()` - Not found

**Verdict:** No XML processing functionality exists. XXE-based SSRF is not possible.

---

### 4.5 Image/Media Processing Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for image processing functions that could fetch remote resources.

**Functions Searched (All returned ZERO results):**
- `getimagesize()` - Not found
- `imagecreatefromjpeg()` - Not found
- `imagecreatefrompng()` - Not found
- `imagecreatefromgif()` - Not found
- `exif_read_data()` - Not found
- ImageMagick (`Imagick` class) - Not found
- GraphicsMagick - Not found

**File Upload Functionality:** None - No `$_FILES` processing anywhere in codebase

**Verdict:** No image processing from URLs. No file upload functionality.

---

### 4.6 Webhook/Callback Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for webhook registration, callback verification, or event notification functionality.

**Functionality Searched:**
- Webhook registration endpoints - Not found
- Callback URL storage - Not found
- Event notification systems - Not found
- "Ping URL" or "Test webhook" features - Not found

**Verdict:** No webhook or callback infrastructure exists.

---

### 4.7 SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flow Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for federated authentication flows that fetch remote metadata or JWKS endpoints.

**Functions/Patterns Searched:**
- OpenID Connect discovery (`.well-known/openid-configuration`) - Not implemented
- JWKS fetching (`jwks_uri`) - Not implemented
- OAuth authorization server metadata - Not implemented
- SAML metadata fetchers - Not implemented
- `SoapClient` with WSDL URLs - Not found

**Authentication Method:** Username/password only (PHP sessions with bcrypt)

**Verdict:** No SSO/federated authentication. No remote metadata fetching.

---

### 4.8 Data Import/Export Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for functionality that imports data from remote URLs or exports to external services.

**Functionality Searched:**
- "Import from URL" features - Not implemented
- RSS/Atom feed readers - Not implemented
- CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders - Not implemented
- API synchronization - Not implemented
- Backup to external storage - Not implemented

**Verdict:** No remote data import/export functionality.

---

### 4.9 API Proxy/Gateway Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for endpoints that proxy requests to backend services or external APIs.

**Patterns Searched:**
- API gateway endpoints - Not found
- Proxy endpoints (`/proxy`, `/api/proxy`) - Not found
- Forwarding headers to backends - Not found
- Service mesh communication - Not found

**Architecture:** Monolithic application with direct database access (no microservices)

**Verdict:** No API proxy or gateway functionality.

---

### 4.10 Database-Triggered SSRF Analysis

**Methodology:** Examined database queries for operations that could trigger outbound requests.

**MySQL Features That Could Enable SSRF:**
- `LOAD DATA INFILE` with URLs - Not used
- `SELECT ... INTO OUTFILE` - Not used
- User-Defined Functions (UDFs) making HTTP requests - Not found
- `LOAD_FILE()` function - Not used

**Query Pattern:** All queries use PDO prepared statements with parameter binding:
- No dynamic query construction
- No string concatenation of user input into SQL
- `PDO::ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES => false` ensures true prepared statements

**Verdict:** Database layer cannot be exploited for SSRF.

---

### 4.11 Cloud Metadata Access Analysis

**Methodology:** Searched for code that accesses cloud provider metadata endpoints.

**Cloud Metadata Endpoints (None Found):**
- AWS EC2 Instance Metadata (`http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`) - Not accessed
- GCP Metadata Server (`http://metadata.google.internal/`) - Not accessed
- Azure Instance Metadata Service (`http://169.254.169.254/metadata/`) - Not accessed
- Kubernetes API Server - Not accessed

**Deployment Context:** Docker container (localhost:34999), no cloud-specific code

**Verdict:** No cloud metadata access attempts.

---

### 4.12 External Resource References Analysis

**CDN Resources (Client-Side Only):**
- Bootstrap CSS/JS: `https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@5.3.3/` - Loaded by browser, not server
- jQuery: `https://code.jquery.com/jquery-3.6.0.min.js` - Loaded by browser, not server

**Static File References:**
- Restaurant images: `static/images/restaurant1.jpg` through `restaurant10.jpg` - Local filesystem paths
- All `<img src>` tags use relative paths or data URIs

**Email Links:**
- `mailto:support@foodapp.local` - Email protocol (not HTTP)

**Verdict:** All external resources are client-side references. Server never fetches these resources.

---

## 5. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The application's architecture inherently prevents SSRF vulnerabilities through the absence of outbound request functionality. The following components were analyzed and confirmed to have no SSRF risk:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Restaurant Search | `/api/search_restaurants.php` | Search query used only for SQL LIKE clause with prepared statements. No URL processing. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |
| User Favorites Retrieval | `/api/get_favorite_restaurants.php` | userId parameter used only for database queries. No external requests. | SAFE - No SSRF sink (IDOR vulnerability is separate issue) |
| Password Change | `/api/change_password.php` | Accepts user IDs and passwords only. No URL parameters. No external communication. | SAFE - No SSRF sink (IDOR vulnerability is separate issue) |
| Authentication | `/api/login.php` | Username/password authentication with session creation. No external identity providers. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |
| User Registration | `/api/register.php` | Creates local user accounts in MySQL. No email verification service calls. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |
| Session Management | All pages using `session_start()` | PHP native sessions with file-based storage. No external session store. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |
| Static Asset Serving | Apache serving `/static/*` | Direct file serving from filesystem. No dynamic URL resolution. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |
| Database Access | PDO connection in `/include/config.php` | Localhost connection (127.0.0.1:3306). No remote database access. | SAFE - No SSRF sink |

---

## 6. Out-of-Scope Items

The following items were identified during analysis but are out of scope for SSRF analysis:

### Docker Health Check (Correctly Excluded)
- **Location:** `/docker-compose.yml` Line 10
- **Code:** `test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://127.0.0.1:80/"]`
- **Reason:** Container orchestration health check, not network-accessible application functionality. Cannot be triggered or manipulated by user requests.

### CDN Resources (Client-Side Only)
- Bootstrap and jQuery loaded from CDNs
- **Reason:** These are `<script>` and `<link>` tags in HTML. The browser (client) fetches these resources, not the PHP server. Supply chain security concern, but not SSRF.

---

## 7. Comparison with Other Vulnerability Classes

This SSRF analysis confirms that the application is **NOT vulnerable to SSRF**, consistent with the reconnaissance findings that also found:

**✅ Protected Against:**
- SQL Injection - All queries use PDO prepared statements with `ATTR_EMULATE_PREPARES => false`
- Command Injection - No system command execution functionality exists
- SSRF - No outbound HTTP request functionality exists (this analysis)

**❌ Vulnerable To (Other Specialists' Domains):**
- IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference) - Critical vulnerabilities in `/api/change_password.php` and `/api/get_favorite_restaurants.php`
- XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) - DOM-based XSS in `/index.php` and `/profile.php` via unsafe jQuery `.append()`
- Session Security Issues - No session regeneration, no HttpOnly/Secure flags, no CSRF protection
- Missing HTTPS/TLS - All traffic transmitted in cleartext

The application demonstrates **strong injection protection** (SQL, Command, SSRF) through architectural choices (PDO prepared statements, no system calls, no HTTP clients), but suffers from **broken authorization** and **client-side security issues**.

---

## 8. Methodology Validation

This analysis followed the methodology defined in the SSRF Analysis Specialist instructions:

1. ✅ **Identify HTTP Client Usage Patterns** - Searched all files for cURL, file_get_contents, sockets → None found
2. ✅ **Protocol and Scheme Validation** - N/A (no URL parameters exist)
3. ✅ **Hostname and IP Address Validation** - N/A (no URL parameters exist)
4. ✅ **Port Restriction and Service Access Controls** - N/A (no outbound requests)
5. ✅ **URL Parsing and Validation Bypass Techniques** - N/A (no URL processing)
6. ✅ **Request Modification and Headers** - N/A (no proxied requests)
7. ✅ **Response Handling and Information Disclosure** - N/A (no external request responses)
8. ✅ **Backward Taint Analysis** - N/A (no SSRF sinks identified to trace backward from)

**Conclusion:** The methodology was applied comprehensively, but no SSRF sinks exist to analyze. The absence of HTTP client code means SSRF is architecturally impossible in this application.

---

## 9. Risk Assessment

**SSRF Risk Level:** **NOT APPLICABLE**

The application does not implement any functionality that could lead to Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities. It is a self-contained web service with:

- ✅ No outbound HTTP/HTTPS request capability
- ✅ No URL parameter processing
- ✅ No external service integrations
- ✅ No webhook/callback systems
- ✅ No SSO/OAuth remote metadata fetching
- ✅ No import/export from URLs
- ✅ No image processing from URLs
- ✅ No XML external entity processing
- ✅ Hardcoded redirects only (no open redirect)

**Exploitation Potential:** Zero - No attack surface exists for SSRF exploitation.

**Recommended Action:** No SSRF remediation required. Focus security efforts on:
1. IDOR vulnerabilities (Critical)
2. XSS vulnerabilities (Critical)
3. Session security (Critical)
4. HTTPS/TLS implementation (High)

---

## 10. Conclusion

After systematic white-box analysis of all 11 PHP files and 10 network-accessible endpoints, **NO Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified**. The application's architecture fundamentally prevents SSRF through the complete absence of:

- HTTP client implementations
- URL parameter processing
- External service communication
- Webhook/callback functionality
- Remote resource fetching

This finding is consistent with the reconnaissance phase analysis (Section 10 of pre_recon_deliverable.md) which also concluded "NO SSRF VULNERABILITIES EXIST."

The SSRF exploitation queue is empty (no vulnerabilities to exploit). The SSRF Exploitation specialist can proceed with confidence that no SSRF attack vectors exist in this application.

---

**Analysis Completed:** All potential SSRF vectors systematically evaluated and confirmed absent.
**Deliverable Status:** Complete
**Exploitation Queue Status:** Empty (no vulnerabilities found)