# Authorization Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete  
- **Key Outcome:** Nine (9) high-confidence authorization vulnerabilities identified and documented. The most critical finding is complete unauthenticated access to 8 internal API endpoints via Host header manipulation, including direct flag disclosure. All exploitable findings have been passed to the exploitation phase via the machine-readable exploitation queue.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides the strategic context, dominant patterns, and architectural intelligence necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the queue. It is intended to be read alongside the JSON deliverable.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Authentication on Internal API (Vertical)
- **Description:** The internal router Flask application (`/app/internal/app/routes.py`) has zero authentication or authorization middleware. All 8 endpoints are accessible without any form of credential validation.
- **Root Cause:** Architectural trust boundary failure - the internal API assumes it's isolated but is exposed via HAProxy Host header routing.
- **Implication:** External attackers can access privileged internal device APIs including flag disclosure by simply manipulating the Host header.
- **Representative Vulnerabilities:** AUTHZ-VULN-01 (flag endpoint), AUTHZ-VULN-02 (device listing), AUTHZ-VULN-03 through AUTHZ-VULN-08 (device status endpoints)

### Pattern 2: Missing Role-Based Authorization Checks (Vertical)
- **Description:** The external website has authentication via `verify_session()` but completely fails to implement role-based access control despite having an `is_admin` field in the User model.
- **Root Cause:** The `verify_session()` function returns `True` instead of the user object, making it impossible for route handlers to check privileges. No `@admin_required` decorator pattern exists.
- **Implication:** Administrative functionality (WiFi configuration) is accessible to any authenticated user, enabling privilege escalation.
- **Representative Vulnerabilities:** AUTHZ-VULN-09 (/wifi_settings missing admin check)

### Pattern 3: No Horizontal Authorization Issues
- **Description:** The application is a single-dashboard router interface with no user-owned resources or object ID parameters.
- **Finding:** ZERO horizontal privilege escalation vulnerabilities exist due to architectural design - all users share the same global WiFi settings and device status.

### Pattern 4: No Context-Based Authorization Issues
- **Description:** The application has no multi-step workflows, state machines, or approval processes.
- **Finding:** ZERO context-based authorization vulnerabilities exist - all endpoints are stateless beyond session authentication.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Session Management Architecture
- **Sessions use server-side storage** via SqlAlchemySessionInterface in MySQL `mysessions` table
- **Flask session cookies** are signed with hardcoded secret key `'your_secret_key'` (enabling forgery)
- **Session structure:** Contains `username`, `password_hash` (PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256), `user_id`, and `session_id`
- **Critical Finding:** Incomplete logout implementation leaves credentials in session after logout

### Role/Permission Model
- **Two roles defined:** `user` (is_admin=False) and `admin` (is_admin=True)
- **Database storage:** User model at `models.py:13` contains `is_admin` boolean field
- **Critical Finding:** Despite role infrastructure existing, NO ENDPOINT checks the `is_admin` flag
- **Authentication function:** `verify_session()` at `routes.py:31-46` returns `True` instead of user object, preventing privilege checks

### Network Architecture & Trust Boundaries
- **Multi-proxy chain:** External → mitmproxy:8002 → HAProxy:8001 → Apache:80
- **Virtual host routing:** Apache serves two Flask apps based on ServerName
  - Default VHost: Public admin router (`/var/www/admin_router/`)
  - Named VHost (`internal.router`): Internal device API (`/var/www/internal_router/`)
- **Critical Finding:** HAProxy routes based solely on Host header without authentication
- **Attack Vector:** `curl -H "Host: internal.router" http://localhost:38539/devices/flag/status`

### HAProxy Routing Configuration
- **ACL at haproxy.cfg:16:** `acl ACL_router_internal hdr(host) -i internal.router`
- **Backend routing:** `use_backend router_internal if ACL_router_internal`
- **No security validation:** No IP restrictions, no client certificates, no shared secrets
- **Headers added:** `X-Forwarded-Host: internal.router`, `X-Upstream-Proxy: mitmproxy (6.0.2)`, `Via: haproxy (2.0.5)`

### Credential & Access Information
- **Test account:** `test:test` (created at `__init__.py:42`, is_admin=False)
- **Admin account:** username=`admin`, password=100-character random string (created at `__init__.py:54`, is_admin=True)
- **HTML comment disclosure:** Login template contains `<!-- TODO: Delete the testing account (test:test). -->`
- **Password storage:** PLAINTEXT in database (catastrophic but enables exploitation via DB access)

### Flag Location & Access
- **Flag file:** `/flag` in container filesystem (created in Dockerfile:29)
- **Primary access:** `GET /devices/flag/status` via Host header manipulation
- **Secondary access (broken):** `/admin_panel` endpoint always fails regardless of privileges
- **Content format:** Flag embedded in response at line 147 of `/app/internal/app/routes.py`

## 4. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

These authorization checks were traced and confirmed to have no exploitable authorization flaws (though they may have other security issues).

| **Endpoint** | **Guard Location** | **Defense Mechanism** | **Verdict** |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| `GET /` | routes.py:48-50 | Simple redirect to /login, no functionality | SAFE (no authorization needed) |
| `GET /login` | routes.py:61-64 | Public authentication endpoint by design | SAFE (intentionally public) |
| `POST /login` | routes.py:65-78 | Authentication endpoint, credentials validated via verify_session | SAFE (authentication logic, not authorization) |
| `GET /dashboard` | routes.py:113 | verify_session() check present, accessible to all authenticated users by design | SAFE (correct behavior for user dashboard) |
| `GET /logout` | routes.py:81-85 | Missing authentication check, but performs no privileged action and only affects caller's session | SAFE (poor design but not exploitable) |
| `GET /admin_panel` | routes.py:97, 101 | verify_session() present; always renders error without granting access | SAFE (broken UX but not authorization bypass - renders dashboard.html with error, never exposes admin_panel.html) |

**Note on /admin_panel:** The reconnaissance report incorrectly assessed this as vulnerable ("grants access anyway"). Code analysis confirms it renders `dashboard.html` with an error message, NOT the actual `admin_panel.html` template containing privileged content. While poorly designed, this does NOT constitute an authorization bypass.

## 5. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

### Constraints Encountered

- **HAProxy vulnerability unclear:** HAProxy 2.0.5 is noted as intentionally vulnerable, but specific CVEs weren't analyzed. Request smuggling or other HAProxy-specific attacks may exist beyond authorization analysis scope.

- **Admin account inaccessible:** The admin user has a 100-character random password making direct login impossible for testing. Authorization analysis focused on code paths rather than live exploitation with admin credentials.

- **WiFi settings implementation incomplete:** The `/wifi_settings` POST handler returns "chipset is still booting" error rather than actually modifying configuration. Full impact of missing admin check will materialize when implementation is completed.

### Blind Spots

- **Dynamic configuration loading:** No evidence of runtime configuration that might add authentication at the infrastructure level (e.g., Apache .htaccess, middleware not visible in code).

- **Network-level restrictions:** Cannot verify from code alone whether firewalls, VPNs, or network segmentation provide defense-in-depth against Host header manipulation.

- **Session fixation vulnerabilities:** While incomplete logout was analyzed, full session lifecycle attacks (fixation, hijacking, prediction) require runtime testing beyond static code analysis.

### Assumptions Made

- **Host header manipulation is externally accessible:** Assumes mitmproxy and HAProxy preserve Host headers from external requests without filtering.

- **Flask default behaviors apply:** Assumes no non-standard Flask security extensions or middleware configured outside the visible codebase.

- **Docker network assumptions:** Internal router accessibility via HAProxy assumes Docker networking doesn't add unexpected isolation.