# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Critical authentication flaws were identified across multiple categories including transport security, session management, abuse defenses, and OAuth implementation. The application's authentication mechanisms contain 8 exploitable vulnerabilities requiring immediate remediation before production deployment.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides the strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and key architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Missing Transport Security (CRITICAL)

- **Description:** The application runs exclusively over HTTP with no TLS/SSL encryption, HTTPS enforcement, or HSTS headers. All authentication credentials, session cookies, and OAuth tokens are transmitted in plaintext over the network.
- **Implication:** Attackers on the same network (WiFi, corporate LAN, ISP-level) can intercept credentials, session tokens, and OAuth access tokens through passive network sniffing or Man-in-the-Middle attacks. This enables complete account takeover without any authentication bypass.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-01` (Transport Exposure)

### Pattern 2: Session Cookie Misconfiguration

- **Description:** While WordPress properly sets the HttpOnly flag on session cookies, it fails to set the SameSite attribute, and the Secure flag is disabled due to HTTP-only deployment. This creates multiple attack vectors for session hijacking.
- **Implication:** The absence of SameSite protection enables Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) attacks where malicious sites can trigger authenticated requests. The missing Secure flag exposes cookies to network interception. Combined with Pattern 1, session cookies are trivially stolen.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-02` (Session Cookie Misconfiguration)

### Pattern 3: Missing Abuse Defenses

- **Description:** The application has zero rate limiting, account lockout, or CAPTCHA protection on any authentication endpoint. Failed login attempts, password reset requests, and authentication attempts are processed without any throttling or monitoring.
- **Implication:** Attackers can execute unlimited brute force attacks, credential stuffing, and password spraying without detection or prevention. Testing confirmed 50 consecutive failed login attempts were processed in under 2 seconds with no rate limiting enforced.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-03` (Missing Rate Limiting on Login), `AUTH-VULN-04` (Missing Rate Limiting on Password Reset)

### Pattern 4: OAuth Implementation Failures (Canto Plugin)

- **Description:** The Canto plugin's OAuth 2.0 implementation contains multiple critical security flaws: state parameter is generated but never validated (OAuth CSRF), tokens are stored without validation, and the redirect URI uses an unvalidated third-party intermediary.
- **Implication:** Attackers can link victim WordPress installations to attacker-controlled Canto accounts via OAuth CSRF, inject fake OAuth tokens directly into the database, and bypass the entire OAuth flow through the unvalidated callback mechanism.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-06` (OAuth CSRF), `AUTH-VULN-07` (Missing Token Validation), `AUTH-VULN-08` (Unvalidated Redirect URI)

### Pattern 5: Information Disclosure Enabling Enumeration

- **Description:** Login and author archive endpoints disclose distinct error messages and responses that reveal whether usernames exist. The login endpoint returns "username is not registered" vs "password is incorrect" messages, and author archives redirect to `/author/{username}/` URLs.
- **Implication:** Attackers can enumerate all valid usernames through error message differentiation or author ID iteration, enabling targeted brute force attacks against confirmed accounts with significantly higher success rates.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-05` (User Enumeration)

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Architecture

**Primary Authentication Method:** WordPress uses cookie-based session management with PHPass password hashing (8 iterations, portable mode). Authentication occurs via POST to `/wp-login.php` with credentials validated against bcrypt-inspired hashes stored in the `wp_users` table.

**Session Token Structure:**
- **Format:** `username|expiration|token|hmac`
- **Cookie Names:** 
  - `wordpress_347595ca1e6d07392daf257d354cae00` (auth cookie for plugins and admin paths)
  - `wordpress_logged_in_347595ca1e6d07392daf257d354cae00` (logged-in status)
- **Token Generation:** 43-character alphanumeric tokens with 256-bit entropy, generated using PHP's `random_int()` CSPRNG
- **Token Storage:** SHA-256 hashed in `wp_usermeta` table with session metadata (IP, User-Agent, timestamp)
- **HMAC:** Uses site secret keys (AUTH_KEY, SECURE_AUTH_KEY from wp-config.php) + password fragment for cookie integrity

**Critical Session Weaknesses:**
1. Cookies transmitted over HTTP (no Secure flag due to HTTP-only deployment)
2. SameSite attribute not set (WordPress core limitation)
3. No idle timeout (sessions valid for full 2-14 day duration regardless of activity)
4. Session cookies visible to network sniffers due to HTTP transmission

### Password Reset Flow

**Token Generation:** 20-character tokens (119-bit entropy) generated via `wp_generate_password()` using CSPRNG
**Token Storage:** Hashed with PHPass (256 iterations) + timestamp in `user_activation_key` field
**Token Lifetime:** 24 hours (configurable via `password_reset_expiration` filter)
**Token Validation:** Requires both `login` and `key` parameters, validated with timing-safe comparison
**Security Strength:** Reset tokens are cryptographically secure with proper single-use enforcement and short TTL
**Critical Weakness:** No rate limiting - attackers can spam unlimited password reset requests for email bombing/DoS

### OAuth Configuration (Canto Plugin)

**OAuth Provider:** Canto Digital Asset Management (oauth.canto.com:443)
**Flow Type:** Authorization Code Flow (OAuth 2.0)
**Authorization Endpoint:** `https://oauth.canto.com:443/oauth/api/oauth2/authorize`
**Callback Mechanism:** Uses Canto-controlled intermediary (`oauth.canto.com/oauth/api/callback/wordress`) that redirects to WordPress
**Token Storage:** Plaintext in `wp_options` table (`fbc_app_token`, `fbc_refresh_token`, `fbc_flight_domain`, `fbc_app_api`)
**Token Type:** Opaque bearer tokens (not JWT)

**Critical OAuth Flaws:**
1. **State parameter:** Generated (line 276) but NEVER validated on callback (lines 482-513)
2. **Redirect URI:** Uses third-party intermediary with no origin validation
3. **Token validation:** Zero validation - no signature check, no issuer verification, no expiration check
4. **Storage:** Tokens stored in plaintext in database options table
5. **PKCE:** Not implemented (though less critical as Canto handles token exchange)

**File Location:** `/app/html/wp-content/plugins/canto/includes/class-canto-settings.php`

### Default Credentials

**Default User Exists:**
- **Username:** `wordpress_admin`
- **User ID:** 1 (administrator role)
- **Email:** `wp_admin@localhost.com`
- **Password:** Hashed as `$P$BciNd4uGn3FTI4r2nadWO9NLMTJwr21` in bootstrap SQL
- **Note:** Password hash cannot be directly reversed, but default username is highly predictable for brute force

**Database Credentials (wp-config.php):**
- **User:** `wp_user`
- **Password:** `ThisIsNotPartOfTheChallenge!` (plaintext in config file)
- **Host:** `127.0.0.1` (localhost-only binding)

### Password Policy

**Server-Side Enforcement:** NONE - WordPress core only validates:
1. Password is not empty
2. Password does not contain backslash `\`
3. Password is not all spaces
4. Passwords match (pass1 === pass2)

**Client-Side Only:**
- JavaScript strength meter using zxcvbn library
- Weak password bypass checkbox allows users to set passwords like "a" or "password"
- No minimum length, no complexity requirements, no common password blocking

**Security Impact:** Users can create 1-character passwords or use "password" as their password, dramatically weakening authentication security despite strong token generation and storage mechanisms.

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses. They are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Password Hashing | `/app/html/wp-includes/pluggable.php` lines 2536-2611 | PHPass with 256 iterations, timing-safe comparison via `hash_equals()`, auto-rehash legacy MD5 | SAFE |
| Session Token Generation | `/app/html/wp-includes/class-wp-session-tokens.php` line 150 | 43-char tokens (256-bit entropy) via PHP `random_int()` CSPRNG | SAFE |
| Session Fixation Protection | `/app/html/wp-includes/pluggable.php` lines 1031-1034 | New token always generated on login, no attacker-supplied token path exists | SAFE |
| Session ID Rotation | `/app/html/wp-includes/class-wp-session-tokens.php` create() method | Fresh token generated on every successful authentication | SAFE |
| Logout Session Invalidation | `/app/html/wp-includes/pluggable.php` lines 656-672 | Server-side token destruction + client cookie clearing with nonce protection | SAFE |
| Token Storage | `/app/html/wp-includes/class-wp-session-tokens.php` lines 70-77 | Tokens hashed (SHA-256) before database storage | SAFE |
| Absolute Session Timeout | `/app/html/wp-includes/pluggable.php` lines 982-993 | 2-day default, 14-day with Remember Me, enforced on every request | SAFE |
| Password Reset Token Generation | `/app/html/wp-includes/user.php` lines 2887-2955 | 20-char tokens (119-bit entropy) via CSPRNG, single-use, 24-hour TTL | SAFE |
| Password Reset Token Storage | `/app/html/wp-includes/user.php` lines 2936-2947 | PHPass hashed (256 iterations) + timestamp | SAFE |
| Tokens in URLs | `/app/html/wp-login.php` entire file | Session tokens NEVER exposed in URLs, only cookies with HttpOnly | SAFE |
| SQL Injection Protection | `/app/html/wp-includes/class-wpdb.php` | Prepared statements via `$wpdb->prepare()` throughout core | SAFE |

## 5. Architectural Context for Exploitation

### Network Accessibility

**Target Application:** http://localhost:35995
**Infrastructure:** Single Docker container (WordPress + MySQL + Apache)
**Exposed Services:**
- Port 35995: Apache 2.4.41 serving WordPress 6.5.4
- No other WordPress-related ports exposed
- REST API: Disabled/inaccessible (returns 404)

**Attack Surface:**
- `/wp-login.php` - Primary authentication endpoint (no rate limiting)
- `/wp-login.php?action=lostpassword` - Password reset (no rate limiting)
- `/wp-admin/*` - Admin area (requires authentication, redirects to login)
- `/?author={id}` - Author archives (reveals usernames via redirect)
- `/wp-content/plugins/canto/includes/lib/*.php` - Unauthenticated endpoints (LFI/SSRF vulnerabilities, out of scope for auth analysis but relevant for privilege escalation)

### Cookie Handling Specifics

**Cookie Paths:**
- `/wp-content/plugins` - Auth cookie for plugin area
- `/wp-admin` - Auth cookie for admin area  
- `/` - Logged-in cookie for entire site

**Cookie Lifetime:**
- Default (no "Remember Me"): 2 days (172,800 seconds)
- With "Remember Me": 14 days (1,209,600 seconds)
- Browser cookie grace period: 12 hours beyond token expiration

**Cookie Domain:** Not set (defaults to current host)
**Cookie Security Flags:**
- HttpOnly: ✅ Always set
- Secure: ❌ Not set (HTTP deployment)
- SameSite: ❌ Not set (WordPress limitation)

### Error Messages for Enumeration

**Login Endpoint:**
- Invalid username: "Error: The username {username} is not registered on this site. If you are unsure of your username, try your email address instead."
- Valid username + wrong password: "Error: The password you entered for the username {username} is incorrect. Lost your password?"

**Password Reset Endpoint:**
- Invalid user: "Error: There is no account with that username or email address."
- Valid user: "Check your email for the confirmation link" OR "Error: The email could not be sent..." (different error confirms existence)

**Author Archives:**
- Valid author ID: 302 redirect to `/index.php/author/{username}/`
- Invalid author ID: 404 error
- **Exploitation:** Iterate `?author=1` through `?author=1000` to enumerate all usernames

### Application State Dependencies

**Database Tables Critical for Auth:**
- `wp_users` - User credentials (user_login, user_pass, user_activation_key)
- `wp_usermeta` - Session tokens (meta_key='session_tokens'), roles (meta_key='wp_capabilities')
- `wp_options` - OAuth tokens (fbc_app_token, fbc_refresh_token, fbc_flight_domain, fbc_app_api)

**WordPress Core Version:** 6.5.4 (relatively recent, no known auth bypass CVEs in this version)
**PHP Version:** 7.4.3 (end-of-life, but not directly exploitable for auth bypass)
**Theme:** Rock Tune (music theme, not security-relevant)
**Active Plugins:** Canto DAM v3.0.4 (vulnerable OAuth implementation)

## 6. Exploitation Coordination Notes

### For Session Hijacking Exploits

1. **Network Position:** MitM attacks require attacker on same network as victim or upstream (ISP, router compromise)
2. **Cookie Extraction:** Use Wireshark filter `http.cookie contains "wordpress"` to capture session cookies from HTTP traffic
3. **Cookie Replay:** Extract full cookie value (username|expiration|token|hmac), replay in attacker browser
4. **Session Validity:** Stolen sessions remain valid for 2-14 days unless user logs out or changes password

### For Brute Force Attacks

1. **Username Enumeration First:** Use author archive iteration (`?author=1` to `?author=100`) to identify all usernames
2. **Target Selection:** Focus on administrator accounts (typically user_id=1, username visible in author archives)
3. **Rate Limiting Reality:** Zero rate limiting confirmed through 50+ consecutive attempts - attack speed only limited by network latency
4. **Password Policy:** No minimum length/complexity - include single-char and common passwords in wordlist

### For OAuth CSRF

1. **Prerequisites:** Victim must be authenticated as WordPress administrator and have access to Canto settings page
2. **Attack Vector:** Social engineering to visit malicious callback URL or XSS injection on admin pages
3. **Callback URL Format:** `/wp-admin/options-general.php?page=canto_settings&token=ATTACKER_TOKEN&domain=attacker.canto.com&refreshToken=ATTACKER_REFRESH&app_api=canto.com`
4. **Persistence:** Once linked, attacker's Canto account remains connected until administrator manually disconnects
5. **Impact:** Attacker gains ability to import media from attacker-controlled Canto account into victim's WordPress

### Timing Considerations

- **Session Timeout:** Exploitation must occur within 2-14 days of session token theft
- **Reset Token:** Password reset attacks must occur within 24 hours of token generation
- **OAuth State:** OAuth CSRF attack has no time limit once callback URL is crafted
- **Brute Force:** No lockout mechanism means attacks can run indefinitely

### Detection Evasion

- **Rate Limiting:** None exists - attackers don't need to throttle requests
- **Logging:** WordPress core doesn't log failed login attempts to database (only Apache access.log)
- **Monitoring:** No built-in security monitoring or alerting
- **CAPTCHA:** None implemented - automated attacks trivial to execute

## 7. Summary Statistics

**Total Authentication Flaws Identified:** 8 exploitable vulnerabilities
**Critical Severity:** 5 vulnerabilities (Transport Exposure, Session Cookie Misconfiguration, OAuth CSRF, Token Validation, Redirect URI)
**High Severity:** 3 vulnerabilities (Rate Limiting Login, Rate Limiting Reset, User Enumeration)
**Medium Severity:** 0 vulnerabilities
**Low Severity:** 0 vulnerabilities (only minor findings like missing Pragma header)

**Attack Vectors Validated:**
- Network-based session hijacking (HTTP sniffing) ✅
- CSRF via missing SameSite attribute ✅
- Brute force without rate limiting ✅
- Username enumeration via error messages ✅
- Username enumeration via author archives ✅
- OAuth CSRF via missing state validation ✅
- Token injection via unvalidated OAuth callback ✅

**Endpoints Analyzed:** 18 authentication-related endpoints
**Files Analyzed:** 25+ WordPress core and plugin files
**Code Reviews:** Deep analysis of session management, password hashing, OAuth flow, token generation
**Live Testing:** Confirmed vulnerabilities through HTTP requests to http://localhost:35995