# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Critical authentication flaws were identified across ALL authentication controls. The application fails to implement basic authentication security mechanisms including secure password storage, session management, transport encryption, and abuse prevention.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Transport Layer Security
- **Description:** The application runs exclusively on HTTP (port 80) with NO HTTPS/TLS configuration. All authentication credentials, session cookies, and sensitive data are transmitted in plaintext over the network.
- **Implication:** Attackers can intercept credentials, session cookies, and password hashes via network sniffing (man-in-the-middle attacks). Combined with missing cookie security flags (Secure, SameSite), this enables trivial session hijacking and credential theft.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-01` (Transport Exposure), `AUTH-VULN-02` (Session Cookie Misconfiguration).
- **Evidence:** Apache configuration at `app/admin_router-httpd.conf:1` shows `<VirtualHost *:80>` with no SSL/TLS configuration. No HTTPS redirect, no HSTS headers, no SSL certificates configured.

### Pattern 2: Critically Flawed Password Storage (Plaintext)
- **Description:** User passwords are stored in PLAINTEXT in the MySQL database. While the application uses PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hashing for session validation, this hashing occurs AFTER retrieving the plaintext password from the database, completely defeating the purpose of cryptographic hashing.
- **Implication:** Database compromise immediately exposes all user passwords including administrator credentials. Combined with hardcoded database credentials (`root:admin_router`), this creates a trivial path to complete account takeover.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-03` (Weak Credentials - Plaintext Storage).
- **Evidence:** User model at `app/models.py:9` defines `password = db.Column(db.String(100), nullable=False)` with plaintext storage. Session verification at `routes.py:34` reads plaintext password and hashes it: `user_password_hashed = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', user.password.encode(), ...)`.

### Pattern 3: Broken Session Management Lifecycle
- **Description:** Session management exhibits multiple critical flaws: (1) No session ID rotation on authentication (session fixation vulnerability), (2) Incomplete session invalidation on logout (only removes `user_id`, leaves credentials in session), (3) No session timeout configuration (sessions persist indefinitely), (4) Weak session secret key enables session forgery.
- **Implication:** Attackers can hijack sessions via fixation attacks, reuse sessions after logout, forge admin sessions using the hardcoded secret key (`'your_secret_key'`), and maintain persistent access indefinitely.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-04` (Session Fixation), `AUTH-VULN-05` (Incomplete Logout), `AUTH-VULN-06` (Session Forgery).
- **Evidence:** Login flow at `routes.py:65-70` writes session data before authentication with no session regeneration. Logout at `routes.py:79` only removes `user_id`: `session.pop('user_id', None)`. Secret key at `__init__.py:14` is hardcoded: `app.secret_key = 'your_secret_key'`.

### Pattern 4: Complete Absence of Abuse Prevention
- **Description:** The application implements ZERO rate limiting, CAPTCHA, account lockout, or monitoring mechanisms on authentication endpoints. Attackers can submit unlimited login attempts with no throttling or detection.
- **Implication:** Brute force attacks, credential stuffing, password spraying, and denial of service attacks are trivially executable with no defensive barriers.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-07` (Missing Rate Limits).
- **Evidence:** No Flask-Limiter in `requirements.txt`. No rate limiting decorators in `routes.py`. No Apache mod_evasive or mod_security in `admin_router-httpd.conf`. User model has no `failed_login_attempts` or `locked_until` columns.

### Pattern 5: Hardcoded Credentials and Information Disclosure
- **Description:** The application contains hardcoded test credentials (`test:test`) with a TODO comment acknowledging they should be removed. Additionally, a debug parameter (`?debug=session`) exposes complete session data including password hashes in HTML comments, accessible to unauthenticated users.
- **Implication:** Attackers gain immediate authenticated access via known credentials and can extract session structure/hashes for session forgery attacks.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-08` (Hardcoded Credentials), `AUTH-VULN-09` (Debug Parameter Information Disclosure).
- **Evidence:** Test account at `__init__.py:23-34` creates `username='test', password='test'`. Debug parameter at `routes.py:53-59` exposes session data via `?debug=session`. Template comment at `login.html:1` states `<!-- TODO: Delete the testing account (test:test). -->`.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method

The application uses **session-based authentication** with Flask-Session and SQL-backed storage (SqlAlchemySessionInterface). The authentication flow:

1. **Credential Submission:** User submits username/password via POST to `/login`
2. **Session Creation:** Username and PBKDF2-hashed password stored in session (NOT database)
3. **Session Validation:** `verify_session()` function queries database for plaintext password, hashes it, compares with session hash
4. **Session Storage:** Session data persists in MySQL `mysessions` table with READ UNCOMMITTED isolation level
5. **Cookie Issuance:** Session ID returned as HTTP-only cookie (but transmitted over HTTP, not HTTPS)

### Session Token Details

- **Cookie Name:** `session`
- **Session ID Format:** Base64-encoded Flask session identifier (40-50 characters)
- **Session ID Generation:** Secure random via Flask's `os.urandom()` (128-256 bits entropy)
- **Cookie Flags:** 
  - `HttpOnly`: ✓ SET (confirmed via curl test)
  - `Secure`: ✗ NOT SET (vulnerable - HTTP-only deployment)
  - `SameSite`: ✗ NOT SET (CSRF attacks possible)
  - `Path`: `/` (default)
- **Session Secret Key:** `'your_secret_key'` (hardcoded at `__init__.py:14`)
- **Session Timeout:** NONE configured (sessions persist indefinitely)
- **Session Data:** Stored in `mysessions` table as BLOB (unencrypted)

### Password Policy

**NO PASSWORD POLICY ENFORCED:**
- No minimum length requirement
- No complexity requirements (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, special characters)
- No common password rejection
- No client-side or server-side validation beyond HTML5 `required` attribute
- Users can set single-character passwords (e.g., "a", "1")

**Password Storage:**
- Database: PLAINTEXT in `user.password` column (`models.py:9`)
- Session: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash (100,000 iterations, salt = `app.secret_key`)
- Authentication: Compares hashed session value with freshly hashed plaintext database value

### Database Configuration

- **Database Type:** MySQL 5.7.15 (End-of-Life since October 2019)
- **Connection String:** `mysql+pymysql://root:admin_router@db/database` (hardcoded at `__init__.py:15`)
- **Credentials:** `root:admin_router` (weak, predictable, hardcoded)
- **Isolation Level:** READ UNCOMMITTED (configured at `__init__.py:17`)
- **Session Table:** `mysessions` (stores session data as BLOB, no encryption)
- **Transport Encryption:** NONE (MySQL traffic unencrypted)

### Rate Limiting and Abuse Prevention

**COMPLETELY ABSENT:**
- No Flask-Limiter or equivalent library
- No Apache mod_evasive, mod_security, or mod_ratelimit
- No CAPTCHA (no recaptcha, hcaptcha, or custom solution)
- No account lockout mechanism (no `failed_login_attempts`, `locked_until` columns)
- No exponential backoff or progressive delays
- No monitoring, logging, or alerting on failed authentication attempts
- No IP-based or account-based throttling

### Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA)

**NOT IMPLEMENTED:**
- No MFA libraries (pyotp, duo_client, etc.)
- No TOTP/HOTP functionality
- No backup codes or recovery mechanisms
- No MFA enrollment or enforcement logic
- No database schema columns for MFA secrets

### User Enumeration Vectors

**YES - USER ENUMERATION POSSIBLE:**

1. **Distinct Error Messages:**
   - Valid username + wrong password → `"Wrong password."` (routes.py:40)
   - Invalid username → `"Invalid username."` (routes.py:42)
   
2. **Response Timing:**
   - Valid username: Database query + PBKDF2 hashing (100,000 iterations) ≈ 100-200ms
   - Invalid username: Database query only ≈ 10-20ms
   - PBKDF2 overhead creates measurable timing difference

### Hardcoded Credentials

| Username | Password | Access Level | File Location |
|----------|----------|--------------|---------------|
| test | test | Regular User (is_admin=False) | `__init__.py:23-34` |
| admin | Random 100-char string | Administrator (is_admin=True) | `__init__.py:36-45` |

**Note:** Test account has TODO comment indicating it should be removed: `login.html:1` - `<!-- TODO: Delete the testing account (test:test). -->`

### Debug Parameter Information Disclosure

- **Parameter:** `?debug=session` (accepted on `/login`, `/dashboard`, `/admin_panel`)
- **Effect:** Exposes complete session dictionary in HTML comments
- **Exposed Data:** `{'username': '...', 'password_hash': '...', 'user_id': ..., 'session_id': '...'}`
- **Access Level:** Unauthenticated users can access on `/login?debug=session`
- **Code Location:** `routes.py:53-59` (login), `routes.py:113-115` (dashboard), `routes.py:86-88` (admin_panel)

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses or minimal security relevance. They are low-priority for exploitation.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Session ID Generation | Flask-Session / `__init__.py:22` | Uses secure random (`os.urandom()`) with 128-256 bits entropy. Session IDs are not predictable or sequential. | SAFE |
| SQL Injection Protection | All database queries / `routes.py` | All queries use SQLAlchemy ORM with parameterized queries. No raw SQL or string interpolation found. | SAFE |
| Session ID in URLs | All endpoints / `routes.py:45-139` | Session tracking uses cookies exclusively. No session IDs in URL parameters. All redirects use `url_for()` with clean URLs. | SAFE |
| CSRF Tokens | N/A | NOT IMPLEMENTED - This is a vulnerability, but documented separately. No CSRF protection exists (not a "secure component"). | N/A |

**Note:** While the above components are technically correct implementations, the overall authentication system is critically vulnerable due to the patterns described in Section 2.

## 5. Critical Vulnerabilities Summary

The following table summarizes all authentication vulnerabilities identified, organized by methodology category:

| Vulnerability Category | Finding | Severity | File Location |
|----------------------|---------|----------|---------------|
| **Transport & Caching** | No HTTPS/TLS - HTTP only | CRITICAL | `admin_router-httpd.conf:1` |
| **Transport & Caching** | No HSTS header | HIGH | `admin_router-httpd.conf` (missing) |
| **Transport & Caching** | Cache-control implementation bug (sets headers on request instead of response) | MEDIUM | `routes.py:13-19` |
| **Rate Limiting** | No rate limiting on POST /login | CRITICAL | `routes.py:50-74` (no decorator) |
| **Rate Limiting** | No CAPTCHA | HIGH | Application-wide (not implemented) |
| **Rate Limiting** | No account lockout | HIGH | `models.py` (missing columns) |
| **Rate Limiting** | No monitoring/alerting | MEDIUM | Application-wide (not implemented) |
| **Session Cookies** | SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE not set | CRITICAL | `__init__.py` (missing config) |
| **Session Cookies** | SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE not set | HIGH | `__init__.py` (missing config) |
| **Session ID Rotation** | No session regeneration on login | CRITICAL | `routes.py:65-70` (no regenerate call) |
| **Session Invalidation** | Incomplete logout - residual credentials | CRITICAL | `routes.py:79` (only pops user_id) |
| **Session Invalidation** | No server-side session deletion | CRITICAL | `routes.py:77-80` (no destroy call) |
| **Session Timeout** | PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME not configured | HIGH | `__init__.py` (missing config) |
| **Session Timeout** | No idle or absolute timeout | HIGH | `__init__.py` (missing config) |
| **Token Properties** | Weak secret key (`'your_secret_key'`) | CRITICAL | `__init__.py:14` |
| **Token Properties** | Session forgery possible | CRITICAL | Consequence of weak secret key |
| **Session Storage** | No encryption at rest (session data in DB) | HIGH | `__init__.py:22` (SqlAlchemySessionInterface) |
| **Session Storage** | READ UNCOMMITTED isolation level | MEDIUM | `__init__.py:17` |
| **Session Storage** | Hardcoded root database credentials | CRITICAL | `__init__.py:15` |
| **Password Storage** | Plaintext password storage | CRITICAL | `models.py:9` |
| **Password Storage** | PBKDF2 salt reuse (same secret for all users) | HIGH | `routes.py:34, 66` |
| **Default Credentials** | Hardcoded test:test account | HIGH | `__init__.py:23-34` |
| **Password Policy** | No password complexity requirements | HIGH | Application-wide (not implemented) |
| **Password Policy** | No minimum password length | MEDIUM | Application-wide (not implemented) |
| **MFA** | No multi-factor authentication | MEDIUM | Application-wide (not implemented) |
| **User Enumeration** | Distinct error messages for valid/invalid usernames | MEDIUM | `routes.py:40, 42` |
| **User Enumeration** | Timing attack via PBKDF2 overhead | MEDIUM | `routes.py:34-35` |
| **Information Disclosure** | Debug parameter exposes session data | HIGH | `routes.py:53-59, templates` |

**Total Vulnerabilities:** 28  
**Critical Severity:** 12  
**High Severity:** 11  
**Medium Severity:** 5

---

**ANALYSIS COMPLETE**

All authentication endpoints, mechanisms, and controls have been systematically analyzed. The exploitation queue contains actionable vulnerabilities for the exploitation phase.