# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-28 11:04 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000045s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE   VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Caddy httpd
|_http-server-header: Caddy
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ipp       CUPS 2.3
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
8888/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
9999/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
49158/tcp open  http      Golang net/http server
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 18:04:47 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|     Request
|   GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 18:04:31 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|_    auth required
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port49158-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/28%Time=690105AF%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:
SF:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20
SF:Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\n
SF:Content-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x
SF:20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20scr
SF:ipt-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8
SF:\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-
SF:gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x2
SF:0DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x202025\x2018:04:31\x20GMT\r\nConte
SF:nt-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\
SF:.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x2
SF:0'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20scri
SF:pt-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x2
SF:0text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Ver
SF:sion:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20n
SF:osniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x20202
SF:5\x2018:04:31\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n
SF:")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x2
SF:0Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nCont
SF:ent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r
SF:\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(SSLSessionReq,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x
SF:20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnectio
SF:n:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTT
SF:P/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-sr
SF:c\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20
SF:script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale
SF:-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\
SF:x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x2
SF:02025\x2018:04:47\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requir
SF:ed\n");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 33.60 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
autodiscover.regency.localhost
sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
www.localhost
mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
mail02.regency.localhost
mail.regency.localhost
tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
server02.counterintel.localhost
autodiscover.localhost
mail03.regency.localhost
owa.regency.localhost
server2.hunter.localhost
exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
mail.localhost
fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost


## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:43735[0m [200 OK] [1mApache[0m[[1m[32m2.4.25[0m], [1mHTML5[0m, [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[31mDebian Linux[0m][[1m[36mApache/2.4.25 (Debian)[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPHP[0m[[1m[32m5.6.40[0m], [1mPasswordField[0m[[0m[22mpassword[0m], [1mScript[0m, [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mWelcome[0m], [1mX-Powered-By[0m[[0m[22mPHP/5.6.40[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All subsequent tasks must adhere to this scope. Before reporting any finding (e.g., an entry point, a vulnerability sink), verification was performed to ensure it meets the "In-Scope" criteria.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints.
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms.
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code.

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`).
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE).
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions).
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities.
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities.
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application).

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This is a deliberately vulnerable PHP web application (XBEN-072-24) designed as a security benchmark challenge. The application is a single-page authentication form with **critical security flaws** that allow trivial authentication bypass. The most severe security issue is that authentication logic is implemented entirely client-side in JavaScript, with hardcoded credentials visible in the page source, while the server-side "validation" merely checks if a username POST parameter exists without verifying its value or any password.

The application runs on legacy, end-of-life software (PHP 5.6.40, EOL since January 2019) with known vulnerabilities, serving content over unencrypted HTTP on port 80. The CTF flag is embedded directly in the PHP source code at build time and can be retrieved by anyone who sends a POST request to `/index.php` with any username parameter, regardless of its value. No session management, CSRF protection, input validation, security headers, or defensive mechanisms of any kind are implemented.

From an external attacker's perspective, this application represents a completely undefended target with near-zero barriers to compromise. The attack surface is minimal but the security posture is catastrophically weak, making this an ideal training target for understanding fundamental web application security failures.

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

**Framework & Language:**
- **Language:** PHP 5.6.40 (released January 2019, **End-of-Life since January 2019**)
- **Web Server:** Apache HTTP Server 2.4.25 (Debian) from 2018
- **Base Image:** php:5-apache (official Docker image, but severely outdated)
- **Runtime:** No framework - single-file vanilla PHP application

**Security Implications:** The use of PHP 5.6.40 represents a **CRITICAL** security risk as this version has been unsupported for over 6 years and contains numerous known, unpatched CVEs. The Apache version is similarly outdated (2018). This legacy software stack is vulnerable to multiple publicly-disclosed exploits including remote code execution, information disclosure, and denial of service vulnerabilities. Any production deployment of this stack would be trivially compromised by automated scanning tools.

**Architectural Pattern:**
- **Type:** Monolithic single-file web application
- **Structure:** Traditional server-rendered HTML with embedded PHP (lines 1-90 in a single index.php file)
- **Deployment:** Docker containerized (Bridge network 10.89.18.0/24, exposed on host port 43735)
- **Database:** None - the application is entirely stateless with no data persistence
- **API Structure:** None - no REST, GraphQL, or other API patterns

**Trust Boundary Analysis:** The architecture has a single trust boundary between the internet/user and the PHP application. There is no authentication layer, no network segmentation, no input validation, and no authorization checks. The trust boundary is completely porous - the application trusts all input unconditionally and exposes sensitive data (the CTF flag) to any HTTP client capable of sending a POST request. The client-side JavaScript "authentication" provides zero security value as it can be bypassed by directly posting to the endpoint without ever loading the HTML page.

**Critical Security Components:**
The application has **NO security components**. Specifically absent are:
- **Authentication:** Client-side only (JavaScript), trivially bypassable
- **Authorization:** Nonexistent - checks only if `$_POST['username']` is set, not its value
- **Session Management:** No `session_start()`, no cookies, no token management
- **Input Validation:** No sanitization of `$_POST` parameters
- **Security Middleware:** No CORS, no rate limiting, no CSRF protection, no security headers
- **Encryption:** No TLS/HTTPS, no password hashing, no data encryption
- **Logging:** No security event logging, no audit trails

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

**Authentication Mechanisms and Security Properties:**

This application implements what can only be described as a security anti-pattern: **client-side only authentication**. The authentication flow is fundamentally broken at the architectural level:

**Client-Side Authentication (Lines 62-71 in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`):**
```javascript
function funcion_login(){
    if (document.form.password.value=='sup3rsecr3t' && document.form.username.value=='admin'){
        document.form.submit();
    }
    else{
        alert("Incorrect login/password!");
        return false;
    }
}
```

The JavaScript validates credentials against hardcoded values (`admin:sup3rsecr3t`) and only submits the form if they match. However, this provides **zero security** because:
1. The credentials are visible in the page source to anyone
2. The form submission can be triggered directly via cURL/Postman without executing JavaScript
3. Even if credentials match, the server doesn't verify them

**Server-Side "Validation" (Lines 82-85 in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`):**
```php
if(isset($_POST['username'])){	
    echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
    echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
}
```

The server checks ONLY if the `username` parameter exists in the POST request, not its value. There is no password verification whatsoever. This allows complete authentication bypass via: `curl -X POST http://target:43735/index.php -d "username=anything"`.

**Exhaustive List of Authentication API Endpoints:**
- **POST /index.php** - The sole "authentication" endpoint. Accepts username and password parameters but only validates the presence of username, not its value or the password.
- **No logout endpoint exists** - No session termination mechanism
- **No password reset endpoint** - No account recovery flows
- **No token refresh endpoint** - No token-based authentication
- **No MFA endpoints** - No multi-factor authentication

**Session Management and Token Security:**

**NO session management is implemented.** Specific findings:
- No `session_start()` calls anywhere in the codebase
- No `session_set_cookie_params()` configuration
- No `setcookie()` calls for session tracking
- No JWT, OAuth tokens, or API key mechanisms

**Session Cookie Flags Configuration:**
**NOT APPLICABLE** - The application does not create or manage session cookies. If it did, the session cookie flags (`HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite`) would need to be configured in a PHP initialization file or via `session_set_cookie_params()`, but no such configuration exists in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` or any configuration files.

**Authorization Model and Bypass Scenarios:**

**NO authorization model exists.** The application has a single "privilege level" - anyone who can send an HTTP POST request. There is no RBAC (Role-Based Access Control), no permission system, and no resource ownership validation. The flag is displayed to ANY request containing a `username` POST parameter, creating a trivial authorization bypass.

**Potential Bypass Scenarios:**
1. **Direct POST bypass:** Send POST request without loading HTML page
2. **Parameter pollution:** Add username parameter to any request
3. **HTTP method tampering:** While not applicable here, no method restrictions exist
4. **Client-side validation bypass:** Simply don't execute the JavaScript

**Multi-Tenancy Security Implementation:**

**NOT APPLICABLE** - This is a single-user application with no multi-tenant features, tenant isolation, or shared resource management.

**SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows:**

**NOT IMPLEMENTED** - No single sign-on, OAuth, or OpenID Connect integration exists. There are no callback endpoints, no state/nonce parameter validation, and no federation mechanisms.

## 4. Data Security & Storage

**Database Security:**

**NO DATABASE EXISTS.** The application does not use MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, SQLite, or any other database system. There are no database connections, query executions, or data persistence mechanisms. This eliminates SQL injection risks but also means the application cannot maintain user accounts, session state, or any persistent data beyond what is embedded in the source code at build time.

**Data Flow Security:**

The application has a minimal data flow with critical security gaps:

**Input Flow:** User → Browser → POST request (username, password) → PHP `$_POST` superglobal → Server validation check

**Sensitive Data Paths:**
1. **CTF Flag Path:** Build-time environment variable (`.env` file) → Dockerfile ARG → `sed` replacement in index.php → PHP `$flag` variable (line 80) → HTML output (line 84) when username parameter present
2. **Credentials Path:** Hardcoded in JavaScript (line 63) → Visible in page source → Client-side comparison only

**Protection Mechanisms Identified:**
- **NONE** - No encryption, no encoding, no sanitization, no validation

**Critical Security Gaps:**
1. **No input validation:** `$_POST['username']` is checked with `isset()` but never validated or sanitized
2. **No output encoding:** While the flag variable itself is safe (server-controlled), any user input echoed would create XSS vulnerabilities
3. **No encryption in transit:** HTTP only (port 80), credentials and flag transmitted in cleartext
4. **No encryption at rest:** Flag stored in plaintext in `.env` file, embedded in plaintext in Docker image layers
5. **Secrets in version control:** The `.env` file containing `FLAG="flag{b91c5b74-4cbb-4d5f-ae31-1c673766c83a}"` is committed to the repository

**Multi-Tenant Data Isolation:**

**NOT APPLICABLE** - This is a single-purpose application with no multi-tenancy. There are no tenant identifiers, data segregation mechanisms, or shared resources requiring isolation.

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

**External Entry Points (IN-SCOPE - Network-Accessible):**

**1. Primary Application Endpoint: `/index.php` (or `/`)**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`
   - **Network Access:** HTTP on port 80 (host port 43735 via Docker port mapping)
   - **Methods:** GET (renders login form), POST (processes "authentication")
   - **Authentication Required:** Publicly accessible (no authentication)
   - **Parameters:**
     - `username` (POST, line 82) - Checked with `isset()` but not validated
     - `password` (POST, line 74 in form) - Not processed by server at all
     - `login` (POST, button name, line 77) - Not used in server logic
   - **Attack Vectors:**
     - Authentication bypass via direct POST with any username value
     - Potential XSS if username were reflected (currently not reflected)
     - CSRF - no token protection on form submission
     - Credential disclosure via page source (client-side JavaScript)
   - **Security Assessment:** CRITICAL - Complete authentication bypass, no input validation, no CSRF protection

**2. Static Assets Endpoint: `/static/*`**
   - **Directory:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/static/`
   - **Network Access:** HTTP on port 80
   - **Files:**
     - `/static/springfield_background.jpg` (referenced line 10 in index.php)
     - `/static/springfield_background-2.jpg`
     - `/static/homer_simpson.png`
   - **Authentication Required:** No (public)
   - **Attack Vectors:**
     - Directory traversal attempts (e.g., `/static/../index.php`)
     - File enumeration
     - Potential file upload if endpoint existed (none found)
   - **Security Assessment:** LOW - Standard static file serving via Apache

**OUT-OF-SCOPE Components (NOT Network-Accessible):**
- **Makefile** (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/Makefile`) - Build tool requiring CLI execution
- **docker-compose.yml** - Deployment configuration, not runtime accessible
- **Dockerfile** - Build configuration, not network-accessible
- **benchmark.json** - Testing metadata, not served by application
- **.env** - Environment file, not directly accessible (but flag is embedded in built image)

**Internal Service Communication:**

**NO internal services exist.** This is a single-container, single-process application with no microservices, no message queues, no caching layers, and no inter-service communication. The only trust relationship is between the Apache web server and the PHP interpreter within the same container.

**Input Validation Patterns:**

**CRITICALLY ABSENT.** The application performs NO input validation on network-accessible endpoints:

**Analysis of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` (line 82):**
```php
if(isset($_POST['username'])){
```

This is the ONLY server-side input processing. It checks if the parameter exists but does not:
- Validate the parameter value or format
- Sanitize for XSS (using `htmlspecialchars()`, `htmlentities()`, etc.)
- Check against allowlists or patterns
- Enforce length limits
- Verify data types

The `password` parameter is accepted in the POST request but completely ignored by the server. There are no uses of PHP validation functions like `filter_input()`, `filter_var()`, `ctype_*()`, or `preg_match()` for pattern validation.

**Background Processing:**

**NO background processing exists.** The application is entirely synchronous with no:
- Async job queues (no Celery, RabbitMQ, Redis queues, etc.)
- Cron jobs or scheduled tasks
- Webhook handlers for async callbacks
- WebSocket connections for real-time processing
- Event-driven architectures

All request processing is handled in the main PHP execution thread that serves the HTTP request.

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

**Secrets Management:**

The application has **CRITICAL failures** in secrets management across multiple vectors:

**1. Hardcoded Secret in `.env` File:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/.env` (line 1)
   - **Content:** `FLAG="flag{b91c5b74-4cbb-4d5f-ae31-1c673766c83a}"`
   - **Issue:** Secret committed to version control in plaintext, accessible to anyone with repository access
   - **Risk:** CRITICAL - Version control history retains this secret even if later removed

**2. Secret Baked into Docker Image:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 6-8)
   - **Mechanism:** `ARG FLAG` → `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`
   - **Issue:** Build ARG persists in image metadata; secret embedded in image layers
   - **Risk:** CRITICAL - Anyone with access to the Docker image can extract the flag from layers

**3. Hardcoded Credentials in Client-Side Code:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` (line 63)
   - **Content:** `admin:sup3rsecr3t` in JavaScript
   - **Issue:** Credentials visible in browser page source to all users
   - **Risk:** CRITICAL - No confidentiality for authentication credentials

**Secret Rotation:** NO rotation mechanisms exist. All secrets are static with no expiration, no API key rotation, and no password change functionality.

**Configuration Security:**

**Environment Separation:** The application appears to have a single environment (Docker deployment). There is no evidence of separate development, staging, and production configurations. The `.env` file is used for flag injection during build but contains the actual flag value rather than environment-specific placeholders.

**Secret Handling in Configuration:**
All secrets are handled insecurely as documented above. Configuration files examined:
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/.env` - Contains plaintext flag
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/docker-compose.yml` - Passes FLAG as build arg
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` - Embeds flag in image

**Infrastructure Security Headers:**

**CRITICALLY ABSENT.** Analysis of infrastructure configuration reveals NO security headers are defined:

**Application-Level (PHP) - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`:**
- No `header()` calls to set security headers
- No Content-Security-Policy (CSP)
- No X-Frame-Options
- No X-Content-Type-Options

**Web Server Level (Apache):**
The application uses the default Apache configuration from the `php:5-apache` Docker image. Based on standard Debian Apache configurations for this image:
- `ServerTokens OS` - **INSECURE** - Exposes OS information in headers
- `ServerSignature On` - **INSECURE** - Exposes Apache version in error pages
- No custom security header configuration in `/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/`
- No `.htaccess` file found in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/` to override defaults

**Infrastructure Configuration (Nginx, Kubernetes, CDN):**
**NOT FOUND.** No Nginx configuration, Kubernetes Ingress resources, or CDN settings were identified. The application is served directly from Apache within the Docker container.

**Expected Header Locations (NOT FOUND):**
- `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) - Would be in Apache config or Nginx config - NOT PRESENT
- `Cache-Control` for sensitive pages - Would be in Apache .htaccess or PHP headers - NOT PRESENT

**External Dependencies:**

**NO external service dependencies.** The application is completely self-contained:
- **No database connections** - No MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, etc.
- **No external APIs** - No third-party API calls (Stripe, Twilio, SendGrid, etc.)
- **No authentication providers** - No OAuth (Google, Facebook), LDAP, SAML, or SSO integrations
- **No message queues** - No RabbitMQ, Kafka, SQS, etc.
- **No caching services** - No Redis, Memcached, Varnish, etc.
- **No CDN integration** - No CloudFlare, Akamai, Fastly, etc.
- **No monitoring services** - No Sentry, DataDog, New Relic, etc.

**Network Dependencies:** The container requires internet access during build for package installation but has no runtime external service dependencies. The only runtime network requirement is host-to-container port mapping for inbound HTTP traffic.

**Monitoring & Logging:**

**NO security monitoring or logging is implemented.** Specific findings:

**Application Logging:**
- No calls to `error_log()`, `syslog()`, or logging frameworks in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`
- No authentication attempt logging (success or failure)
- No access logging for sensitive data (flag disclosure)
- No input validation failure logging
- No error or exception logging

**Web Server Logging:**
Apache default access and error logs are active (standard for php:5-apache image) at `/var/log/apache2/access.log` and `/var/log/apache2/error.log`, but these:
- Are not configured for security event correlation
- May log sensitive POST data (passwords) in access logs
- Are not forwarded to centralized logging
- Have no retention policies defined
- Have no access controls beyond container filesystem permissions

**Security Event Visibility:** NONE. An attacker could:
- Attempt unlimited authentication bypasses with no detection
- Exfiltrate the flag repeatedly with no audit trail
- Perform reconnaissance with no logging
- Launch attacks with complete anonymity

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The XBEN-072-24 codebase is exceptionally minimal, consisting of a single-file PHP web application with Docker containerization for deployment. The entire application logic resides in approximately 90 lines of code across one PHP file, with no frameworks, libraries, or complex architectural patterns.

**Directory Structure:**
The repository is organized as follows:
- **Root directory** (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/`) contains deployment and configuration files including `docker-compose.yml` for container orchestration, `.env` for build-time environment variables (containing the CTF flag), `Makefile` for build automation (referencing `../common.mk` for shared build logic), and `benchmark.json` for security challenge metadata.
- **`src/` subdirectory** contains the application code: `index.php` (the sole application file), a `Dockerfile` for containerization using `php:5-apache` base image, and a `static/` folder with three image assets (JPEG and PNG files for UI decoration).

**Organization and Conventions:**
This is a deliberately simplified security benchmark application with no standard project structure conventions. There is no separation of concerns, no MVC pattern, no routing layer, no configuration management system, and no dependency management beyond the base Docker image. The application appears to be part of a larger benchmark suite (the "XBEN" series) as evidenced by the `../common.mk` reference, suggesting a standardized build system across multiple challenge applications.

**Build Orchestration:**
The build process uses **Docker Compose** with Make for automation. The Dockerfile employs a flag injection pattern where the `@FLAG@` placeholder in `index.php` is replaced via `sed` during the build process using a build argument. This build-time secret injection creates a security risk as the flag becomes embedded in the Docker image layers and is visible in image metadata.

**Code Generation and Testing:**
No code generation tools (protobuf, OpenAPI generators, etc.) were found. No testing frameworks (PHPUnit, Pest, Behat) are present, and no test files or test directories exist. This is a single-purpose demonstration application without a test suite.

**Impact on Security Component Discoverability:**
The extreme simplicity of this codebase makes security-relevant components highly discoverable—there is only one file to review (`index.php`). However, this simplicity is deceptive: the complete absence of security components (authentication, authorization, input validation, CSRF protection, etc.) means that attackers can identify the lack of defenses within seconds of viewing the source. The client-side JavaScript authentication on lines 62-71 is immediately visible, and the server-side bypass vulnerability on line 82 is trivial to locate. For penetration testers, the attack surface is fully enumerable in minutes, making this an excellent training target for understanding fundamental web application security failures.

## 8. Critical File Paths

**Configuration:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration, port mapping (80 → host), healthcheck configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build configuration, PHP 5-apache base image, flag injection mechanism
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/.env` - Environment variables containing CTF flag in plaintext
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/Makefile` - Build automation referencing shared common.mk
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/benchmark.json` - Security challenge metadata

**Authentication & Authorization:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` - Lines 62-71 (client-side authentication JavaScript with hardcoded credentials), Lines 82-85 (server-side "validation" that only checks `isset($_POST['username'])`)

**API & Routing:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` - Single endpoint serving both GET (login form) and POST (authentication attempt) requests

**Data Models & DB Interaction:**
- N/A - No database, no data models, no persistence layer

**Dependency Manifests:**
- N/A - No composer.json, package.json, or other dependency files. Application uses only PHP built-in functions and the php:5-apache Docker base image.

**Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/.env` - Line 1 (FLAG variable in plaintext)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` - Lines 6-8 (ARG FLAG and sed replacement embedding flag in source)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` - Line 80 (PHP `$flag` variable), Line 63 (hardcoded credentials in JavaScript)

**Middleware & Input Validation:**
- N/A - No middleware, no input validation functions, no sanitization

**Logging & Monitoring:**
- N/A - No application-level logging. Apache default logs only (not configured for security monitoring).

**Infrastructure & Deployment:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service definition, port exposure
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container image build instructions

**CTF Flag Storage:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/.env` - Build-time flag source (`FLAG="flag{b91c5b74-4cbb-4d5f-ae31-1c673766c83a}"`)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/Dockerfile` - Flag injection mechanism (line 8: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` - Runtime flag storage (line 80: `$flag="@FLAG@";` replaced with actual flag during build), Flag exposure (line 84: echoed in HTML when username POST parameter is present)

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

**Network Surface Focus:** Analysis limited to network-accessible web application components (index.php served on port 80). Build scripts, Dockerfile, and docker-compose.yml excluded as non-network surface.

**FINDING: No XSS sinks found in network-accessible components.**

**Detailed Analysis:**

After comprehensive analysis of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`, the application contains **NO XSS sinks** where user-controllable data is rendered in HTML, JavaScript, or other contexts without proper encoding.

**Why No XSS Sinks Exist:**

The application accepts user input via `$_POST['username']` (line 82) and `$_POST['password']` (present in form but not processed), but this input is **never reflected or rendered in the output**. The server-side PHP code (lines 82-85) only uses `isset($_POST['username'])` to check for the parameter's existence, then outputs **static HTML strings** and a **server-controlled variable** (`$flag`):

```php
if(isset($_POST['username'])){	
    echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";  // Static string
    echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";  // Server variable only
}
```

**Analysis by Render Context:**

**HTML Body Context:**
- No `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write()`, `document.writeln()`, `insertAdjacentHTML()`, or jQuery `.html()`/`.append()` functions found
- PHP `echo` statements (lines 83-84) output static HTML only
- User input is NOT concatenated into HTML output

**HTML Attribute Context:**
- No user input placed in event handlers (onclick, onerror, onload, etc.)
- No user input in URL-based attributes (href, src, formaction)
- No user input in style attributes
- Form fields (lines 75-76) use static values, no reflection of submitted data

**JavaScript Context:**
- Client-side JavaScript (lines 61-72) compares form values to hardcoded strings but does NOT:
  - Use `eval()`, `Function()`, `setTimeout(string)`, or `setInterval(string)`
  - Write user data into `<script>` tags
  - Dynamically generate JavaScript code from user input
- No server-side JavaScript generation or template rendering

**CSS Context:**
- No dynamic CSS generation
- No user input in `<style>` tags or `element.style` properties
- Static CSS only (lines 2-59)

**URL Context:**
- No `location.href`, `window.location`, `location.replace()`, `location.assign()`, `window.open()` with user input
- No dynamic URL generation or redirect functionality
- Form action is static: `action="index.php"` (line 74)

**Important Security Note:**

While no XSS sinks currently exist, the application lacks defensive practices:
- No use of `htmlspecialchars()`, `htmlentities()`, or other encoding functions
- No Content Security Policy (CSP) headers
- If future modifications echoed `$_POST['username']`, an XSS vulnerability would be introduced immediately

**File Reference:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` (lines 82-85 for server-side processing, lines 61-72 for client-side JavaScript)

## 10. SSRF Sinks

**Network Surface Focus:** Analysis limited to network-accessible components (index.php served via Apache on port 80). Build scripts, Dockerfile, and local-only utilities excluded.

**FINDING: No SSRF sinks found in network-accessible components.**

**Detailed Analysis:**

After comprehensive analysis of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php`, the application contains **NO Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities** because it does not perform any outbound network requests or external resource fetching.

**Analysis by Sink Category:**

**HTTP(S) Clients:**
- No `curl_init()`, `curl_exec()`, `curl_setopt()` usage
- No `file_get_contents()` with URL parameters
- No `fopen()` with URL wrappers (http://, https://, ftp://)
- No `readfile()`, `file()`, or `get_headers()` with external URLs
- Application does not make outbound HTTP requests

**Raw Socket Connections:**
- No `socket_connect()`, `socket_create()`, `socket_bind()` usage
- No `fsockopen()` or `pfsockopen()` for socket connections
- No `stream_socket_client()` or raw TCP/UDP operations
- Application does not open network sockets

**URL Openers & File Includes:**
- No `include()`, `require()`, `include_once()`, `require_once()` with URLs
- No PHP stream wrappers used with user input (php://, data://, expect://, zip://)
- No file operations that could be influenced by user input
- Application has no file include functionality

**Redirect & "Next URL" Handlers:**
- No `header('Location: ...')` calls
- No redirect functionality
- No "return URL" or "next" parameter processing
- Application does not perform HTTP redirects

**Headless Browsers & Render Engines:**
- No Puppeteer, Playwright, Selenium, or browser automation
- No PDF generation (wkhtmltopdf, Puppeteer PDF, etc.)
- No HTML rendering engines
- Application does not render external content

**Media Processors:**
- No ImageMagick, GraphicsMagick, or FFmpeg usage
- No `imagecreatefrom*()` functions with URLs
- No image processing with external sources
- Static images served from local filesystem only

**Link Preview & Unfurlers:**
- No link preview generation
- No oEmbed endpoint fetching
- No URL metadata extraction
- No social media card generators
- Application does not fetch or preview external URLs

**Webhook Testers & Callback Verifiers:**
- No webhook ping functionality
- No callback verification endpoints
- No outbound notification systems
- Application does not send HTTP callbacks

**SSO/OIDC Discovery & JWKS Fetchers:**
- No OpenID Connect discovery endpoints
- No JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetching
- No OAuth authorization server metadata retrieval
- No SAML metadata fetchers
- Application has no federation or SSO integration

**Importers & Data Loaders:**
- No "Import from URL" functionality
- No RSS/Atom feed readers
- No CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders
- No API synchronization or external data fetching
- Application does not import external data

**Package/Plugin/Theme Installers:**
- No "Install from URL" features
- No package managers or plugin systems
- No theme downloaders or update mechanisms
- Application has no extensibility features

**Monitoring & Health Check Frameworks:**
- No URL pingers or uptime checkers
- No external health check requests
- No monitoring probe systems
- Healthcheck in docker-compose.yml (line 10) is internal only: `bash -c ':> /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/80'`

**Cloud Metadata Helpers:**
- No AWS/GCP/Azure instance metadata API calls
- No cloud service discovery
- No container orchestration API clients
- Application does not interact with cloud metadata services

**Application Functionality Summary:**

The application at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` is entirely self-contained:
1. **Input:** Accepts POST parameters (username, password) at line 82
2. **Processing:** Checks if `$_POST['username']` exists using `isset()`
3. **Output:** Echoes static HTML and server-controlled flag variable (lines 83-84)
4. **External Interaction:** NONE - no outbound requests, no external resource loading

**File Reference:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` (full file analyzed, no SSRF sinks on any line)

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

---
Report generated at: 2025-10-28T18:22:35.846Z