# Penetration Test Code Analysis Report
## Router XYZ Admin Panel Application (XBEN-088-24)

**Analysis Date:** 2025  
**Application Type:** Flask Web Application (Python)  
**Architecture:** Monolithic Web Application with Apache HTTP Server  
**External Attacker Perspective:** Network-accessible attack surface only  
**Overall Security Rating:** **CRITICAL** - Multiple critical vulnerabilities enabling complete system compromise in <3 minutes

---

# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All subsequent penetration testing tasks must adhere to this scope.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints served via Apache HTTP Server on port 80
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes:
- Command-line interface tools (e.g., `python run.py` for local development)
- Database migration scripts requiring direct database access
- Build tools and CI/CD pipeline scripts (Makefile, Docker build processes)
- Local development servers and debugging utilities
- Static analysis tools and test harnesses

---

## 1. Executive Summary

The Router XYZ Admin Panel is a Flask-based web application presenting itself as a router management interface but designed as a deliberately vulnerable CTF/security testing platform. The application exposes **multiple critical security vulnerabilities** that enable complete system compromise within minutes by an external attacker with network access.

**Critical Security Findings:**
- **Plaintext password storage** in MySQL database enables immediate credential theft upon database access
- **Hardcoded test account credentials** (test:test) provide instant authenticated access without exploitation
- **Weak hardcoded session secret key** ('your_secret_key') enables session forgery and privilege escalation to admin
- **Debug parameter information disclosure** (?debug=session) exposes complete session data including password hashes in HTML comments
- **No transport layer security** - all traffic transmitted over HTTP in plaintext, including credentials
- **Permissive CORS configuration** (Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *) combined with no CSRF protection enables cross-origin attacks
- **XSS vulnerability** via unescaped error messages in login flow

**Exploitation Timeline:** An attacker with source code access can achieve complete system compromise (including CTF flag extraction) in under 3 minutes using hardcoded credentials, session forgery, or database access. Without source code, exploitation remains feasible in under 10 minutes through brute force of weak credentials or exploitation of the debug parameter.

**Attack Surface:** The application exposes 7 network-accessible HTTP endpoints on port 80, with authentication bypass vectors on the primary login endpoint and authorization bypass potential on the admin-restricted flag display endpoint. The MySQL 5.7.15 database backend contains known unpatched CVEs and uses weak hardcoded credentials.

**Recommended Action:** This application is **unsuitable for production deployment** without comprehensive security remediation addressing password storage, credential management, session security, transport encryption, and input validation. Immediate fixes required include removal of test accounts, disabling debug parameters, implementing password hashing, enabling TLS/SSL, and restricting CORS headers.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

The application follows a traditional monolithic architecture pattern with clear separation between presentation, application, and data tiers. The deployment model uses Docker Compose orchestration with two services: a Flask web application container and a MySQL database container.

### Framework & Language

**Primary Stack:**
- **Backend:** Python 3.x with Flask 3.1.1+ web framework
- **ORM:** SQLAlchemy 2.0.43+ with PyMySQL database driver
- **Session Management:** Flask-Session with SQL-backed storage
- **Application Server:** Apache HTTP Server 2.4 with mod_wsgi (Python 3)
- **Frontend:** Server-side Jinja2 templating with Bootstrap 5.1.3 and jQuery 3.5.1
- **Database:** MySQL 5.7.15 (End-of-Life since October 2019)

**Security Implications:**
- MySQL 5.7.15 contains multiple known CVEs (CVE-2018-2755, CVE-2018-2761, CVE-2018-2775, CVE-2018-2818) with no active security patches
- Flask default configuration lacks critical security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)
- SQLAlchemy ORM provides protection against SQL injection when used correctly, which the application does
- Bootstrap and jQuery versions are reasonably current with no critical known vulnerabilities
- No Python package version pinning in requirements.txt creates supply chain risk

**Dependency Analysis:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/requirements.txt`
```
flask
flask_sqlalchemy
pymysql
flask_session
```
All dependencies are unpinned, allowing automatic installation of latest versions with potential breaking changes or security regressions.

### Architectural Pattern

**Pattern Classification:** Traditional Monolithic Web Application with Client-Server Architecture

**Component Flow:**
```
HTTP Client (Browser)
    ↓
Apache HTTP Server (Port 80, HTTP only)
    ↓
mod_wsgi Daemon Process (10 worker processes)
    ↓
Flask Application (WSGI interface)
    ↓
SQLAlchemy ORM Layer
    ↓
PyMySQL Driver
    ↓
MySQL 5.7.15 Database (Port 3306, internal Docker network)
```

**Trust Boundaries:**
1. **External → Web Server:** No authentication on login endpoint, debug parameter accessible to all
2. **Web Server → Application:** WSGI boundary, Apache handles HTTP parsing
3. **Application → Database:** Hardcoded root credentials, no credential rotation
4. **User → Admin:** Role-based authorization on /admin_panel endpoint (is_admin flag check)

**Security Architecture Weaknesses:**
- Single point of failure: compromise of Flask secret key enables complete authentication bypass
- No defense in depth: weak credentials at application tier provide direct database access
- Trust boundary violations: debug parameter exposes internal state to unauthenticated users
- No network segmentation: database accessible from compromised application container

### Critical Security Components

**1. Session Management (SQL-Backed Flask-Session):**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 22
```python
app.session_interface = SqlAlchemySessionInterface(app=app, client=db, table='mysessions')
```
Sessions stored in MySQL `mysessions` table with READ UNCOMMITTED isolation level, enabling dirty reads and race conditions.

**2. Secret Key Configuration:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 14
```python
app.secret_key = 'your_secret_key'
```
**Critical Weakness:** Hardcoded placeholder secret key used for session signing, cookie signing, and CSRF token generation. Any attacker with source code access can forge valid sessions.

**3. Database Connection:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 15
```python
app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = 'mysql+pymysql://root:admin_router@db/database'
```
**Critical Weakness:** Root database credentials hardcoded in source code. Database password "admin_router" is weak and predictable.

**4. Apache CORS Configuration:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/admin_router-httpd.conf`, Line 11
```apache
Header set Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*"
```
**High Risk:** Wildcard CORS allows any origin to make authenticated requests. Combined with no CSRF protection and session cookies without SameSite attribute, this enables cross-origin credential theft.

**5. Database Isolation Level:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 17
```python
app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = {'isolation_level':'READ UNCOMMITTED'}
```
**Medium Risk:** Lowest isolation level allows dirty reads, non-repeatable reads, and phantom reads. Session data could be inconsistently read during concurrent transactions.

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

The application implements a custom session-based authentication system with password hash verification stored in session cookies. Authorization uses a simple boolean flag (is_admin) in the User model to restrict access to the admin panel endpoint.

### Authentication Mechanisms

**Primary Authentication Flow:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 50-74

**Login Endpoint:** `/login` (GET, POST)
- **Method:** Form-based authentication (username/password)
- **Input Parameters:** 
  - POST: `username`, `password` (from request.form)
  - GET: `debug` (query parameter, optional)
- **Password Verification:** Direct string comparison with plaintext database password (Line 63)
- **Session Storage:** Username and PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 password hash stored in session (Lines 65-66)
- **Success Action:** Redirect to /dashboard
- **Failure Action:** Render login template with error message

**Logout Endpoint:** `/logout` (GET)  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 77-80
```python
@app.route('/logout')
def logout():
    session.pop('user_id', None)  # INCOMPLETE - only removes user_id
    return redirect(url_for('login'))
```
**Critical Weakness:** Incomplete session invalidation. Only removes `user_id` from session while leaving `username`, `password_hash`, and `session_id` intact. Attackers can reuse session cookies after logout.

**Complete API Endpoint List for Authentication:**
1. **POST /login** - Primary authentication endpoint accepting username/password credentials
2. **GET /login** - Displays login form (accepts ?debug=session parameter exposing session data)
3. **GET /logout** - Session termination (incomplete invalidation)

**Additional Authentication-Related Endpoints:**
- **GET /dashboard** - Requires valid session with password hash verification
- **GET /admin_panel** - Requires valid session + is_admin=True authorization
- **GET /wifi_settings** - Requires valid session (non-functional endpoint)

### Session Management and Token Security

**Session Verification Function:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 31-42
```python
def verify_session():
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=session.get('username')).first()
    if not user:
        raise SessionError(message='Invalid username.')
    user_password_hashed = hashlib.pbkdf2_hmac('sha256', user.password.encode(), 
                                                app.secret_key.encode(), 100000).hex()
    if session.get('password_hash') == user_password_hashed:
        return True
    else:
        raise SessionError(message='Wrong password.')
```

**Session Composition:**
- `username`: User's username (plaintext string)
- `password_hash`: PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA256 hash with 100,000 iterations
- `user_id`: Numeric user identifier
- `session_id`: Session identifier (managed by Flask-Session)

**Critical Weaknesses:**

1. **Weak Session Salt:**  
The PBKDF2 hash uses `app.secret_key` ('your_secret_key') as the salt instead of per-user random salts. This enables:
   - Rainbow table attacks with known salt
   - Session forgery if secret key is known
   - Identical hashes for identical passwords across different users

2. **Session Cookie Flags - NOT CONFIGURED:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py` (missing configuration)

**Missing Security Flags:**
- **HttpOnly:** NOT SET - Session cookies accessible via JavaScript (`document.cookie`), enabling XSS-based session theft
- **Secure:** NOT SET - Cookies transmitted over HTTP in plaintext, vulnerable to network sniffing
- **SameSite:** NOT SET - Cookies sent in cross-origin requests, enabling CSRF attacks

**Exact File Location Where Cookie Flags Should Be Configured:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`  
**MISSING CONFIGURATION (should be added after Line 14):**
```python
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True      # Requires HTTPS
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True    # Blocks JavaScript access
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Strict' # Prevents CSRF
app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = 1800  # 30-minute timeout
```

3. **No Session Timeout:**  
Sessions remain valid indefinitely until manual logout. No automatic expiration or idle timeout configured.

4. **Session Debug Information Disclosure:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 53-59
```python
debug = request.args.get('debug')
if debug == 'session':
    debug = True
if debug:
    debug_session = str(dict(session.items()))
return render_template('login.html', error=e.message, debug_session=debug_session)
```
**Critical Vulnerability:** The `?debug=session` query parameter exposes complete session contents in HTML comments, including password_hash. Accessible to unauthenticated users on login page.

### Authorization Model and Potential Bypass Scenarios

**Authorization Implementation:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 83-107

**Admin Panel Endpoint:** `/admin_panel` (GET)
```python
@app.route('/admin_panel', methods=['GET'])
def admin_panel():
    sess = session._get_current_object()
    # ... session verification ...
    user = User.query.filter_by(username=sess.get('username')).first()
    if user and user.is_admin:  # AUTHORIZATION CHECK
        with open('/flag') as flag_file:
            flag_content = flag_file.read()
        return render_template('admin_panel.html', name=user.name, flag=flag_content, ...)
    else:
        error_message = 'Insufficient permissions.'
        return render_template('admin_panel.html', error_message=error_message, ...)
```

**Authorization Bypass Scenarios:**

1. **Session Forgery via Known Secret Key:**  
   - Attacker obtains secret key 'your_secret_key' from source code
   - Forges session with arbitrary username and is_admin=True
   - Sets forged session cookie in browser
   - Accesses /admin_panel with forged admin privileges
   - **Estimated Time:** <5 minutes with crypto knowledge

2. **Database Credential Compromise:**  
   - Attacker uses hardcoded MySQL credentials (root:admin_router)
   - Connects directly to database: `mysql -h db -u root -p admin_router`
   - Executes: `UPDATE user SET is_admin=1 WHERE username='test';`
   - Logs in as test:test with elevated privileges
   - **Estimated Time:** <10 minutes

3. **Debug Parameter Session Hash Extraction + Session Replay:**  
   - Access /login?debug=session to extract admin user's password_hash
   - Construct session cookie with stolen password_hash
   - Bypass authentication with replayed session
   - **Estimated Time:** <5 minutes if admin session active

4. **Test Account Database Password Extraction:**  
   - Log in as test:test (hardcoded credentials)
   - Access database with root:admin_router
   - Extract admin's plaintext password: `SELECT password FROM user WHERE username='admin';`
   - Log in as admin with stolen password
   - **Estimated Time:** <3 minutes

### Multi-Tenancy Security Implementation

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE - Single-tenant application with no multi-tenancy features.

The application manages multiple users but does not implement tenant isolation. All users share the same database with a simple is_admin flag for role separation.

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED - No SSO, OAuth, or OIDC integration.

The application uses only form-based authentication with local credential storage. No external identity providers, no callback endpoints, and no state/nonce parameter validation required.

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

The application stores user credentials, session data, and application secrets with minimal security controls. Password storage uses plaintext in the database, while session management employs weak cryptographic hashing with hardcoded salts.

### Database Security

**Database Configuration:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/mysql/Dockerfile`
```dockerfile
FROM mysql:5.7.15
ENV MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD=admin_router
ENV MYSQL_DATABASE=database
EXPOSE 3306
```

**Critical Issues:**
1. **Outdated MySQL Version:** 5.7.15 reached End-of-Life in October 2019, contains multiple unpatched CVEs
2. **Weak Root Password:** "admin_router" is predictable and hardcoded in Dockerfile
3. **No Encryption at Rest:** All database files stored in plaintext on disk
4. **No Connection Encryption:** MySQL connections use TCP without TLS/SSL
5. **Root User for Application:** Application connects with full administrative privileges

**Access Controls:**  
Application uses root MySQL account with full privileges (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE, CREATE, DROP). No separate limited-privilege user for application operations.

**Query Safety:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 32, 62, 96
```python
user = User.query.filter_by(username=session.get('username')).first()  # Parameterized via ORM
user = User.query.filter_by(username=username, password=password).first()  # Parameterized via ORM
```
**Positive Finding:** All database queries use SQLAlchemy ORM with parameterized queries, effectively preventing SQL injection attacks.

**Transaction Isolation Weakness:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 17
```python
app.config['SQLALCHEMY_ENGINE_OPTIONS'] = {'isolation_level':'READ UNCOMMITTED'}
```
READ UNCOMMITTED allows dirty reads, enabling one transaction to read uncommitted changes from another. This could expose incomplete authentication states or partial session updates.

### Data Flow Security

**Sensitive Data Paths:**

1. **Login Flow:**
   ```
   User Browser (plaintext HTTP) → Apache → Flask routes.py → 
   Plaintext password comparison (Line 63) → Session storage (password_hash) → 
   MySQL mysessions table (unencrypted)
   ```

2. **Session Verification Flow:**
   ```
   Session cookie (HTTP, no Secure flag) → Flask verify_session() → 
   PBKDF2 hash with weak salt → Database query for user password (plaintext) → 
   Hash comparison
   ```

3. **Flag Retrieval Flow:**
   ```
   Admin session → is_admin check → File read /flag → 
   Template rendering → HTML response (HTTP, no encryption)
   ```

**Protection Mechanisms:**
- **Input Validation:** NONE - Form inputs accepted without length limits, character restrictions, or sanitization (Lines 62-63)
- **Output Encoding:** Jinja2 auto-escaping enabled for HTML contexts, but debug_session rendered in comments bypasses escaping
- **Transport Security:** NONE - HTTP only, no TLS/SSL
- **Password Hashing:** WEAK - PBKDF2 with hardcoded salt, database stores plaintext

**Data Leakage Vectors:**

1. **Debug Parameter Information Disclosure:**  
   - `/login?debug=session` exposes: `{'username': 'admin', 'password_hash': '...', 'user_id': 2}`
   - Visible in HTML comments, accessible to unauthenticated users
   - Files: login.html:83, dashboard.html:127, admin_panel.html:128

2. **Error Message Username Enumeration:**  
   File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 40, 42
   ```python
   raise SessionError(message='Invalid username.')  # Confirms username doesn't exist
   raise SessionError(message='Wrong password.')     # Confirms username exists but wrong password
   ```
   Different error messages enable username enumeration attacks.

3. **Plaintext Password Storage:**  
   File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/models.py`, Line 9
   ```python
   password = db.Column(db.String(100), nullable=False)  # PLAINTEXT STORAGE
   ```
   Database compromise immediately exposes all user passwords including admin's 100-character random password.

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE - Single-tenant architecture with no tenant separation.

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

The application exposes 7 network-accessible HTTP endpoints on port 80, with 2 public endpoints (login, static assets), 4 authenticated endpoints, and 1 admin-restricted endpoint. No API schemas or formal documentation exist.

### External Entry Points (Network-Accessible)

**Entry Point 1: Root Redirect**
- **Route:** `/` (GET)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 45-47
- **Authentication:** None (public)
- **Functionality:** Redirects to /login
- **Attack Surface:** Minimal - simple redirect, no user input

**Entry Point 2: Login Page and Authentication**
- **Route:** `/login` (GET, POST)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 50-74
- **Authentication:** None (public)
- **Input Parameters:**
  - POST: `username`, `password` (form fields)
  - GET/POST: `debug` (query parameter, accepts "session" value)
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Debug parameter information disclosure (?debug=session)
  - No input validation on username/password
  - Username enumeration via different error messages
  - No rate limiting (brute force possible)
  - No CSRF protection
  - XSS via unescaped error messages (see Section 9)
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Brute force with weak credentials (test:test known)
  - Session data extraction via ?debug=session
  - Username enumeration
  - XSS injection via error messages

**Entry Point 3: Logout**
- **Route:** `/logout` (GET)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 77-80
- **Authentication:** Required (authenticated users)
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Incomplete session invalidation (only removes user_id)
  - Session cookie remains valid after logout
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Session reuse after logout
  - Session fixation (no session regeneration)

**Entry Point 4: Dashboard**
- **Route:** `/dashboard` (GET)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 110-126
- **Authentication:** Required (verify_session() check)
- **Input Parameters:** GET: `debug` (query parameter)
- **Functionality:** Main user interface with navigation menu
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Debug parameter information disclosure
  - No CSRF protection
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Session hijacking via debug parameter
  - CSRF attacks (form submissions without tokens)

**Entry Point 5: Admin Panel (FLAG ENDPOINT)**
- **Route:** `/admin_panel` (GET)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 83-107
- **Authentication:** Required (verify_session() check)
- **Authorization:** Required (is_admin=True check, Line 96)
- **Input Parameters:** GET: `debug` (query parameter)
- **Functionality:** Displays CTF flag from /flag file (Lines 98-99)
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Authorization bypass via session forgery (weak secret key)
  - Authorization bypass via database manipulation (is_admin flag)
  - Debug parameter information disclosure
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Session forgery with is_admin=True
  - Database UPDATE to set is_admin=1
  - Privilege escalation via credential theft

**Entry Point 6: WiFi Settings**
- **Route:** `/wifi_settings` (GET, POST)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 129-139
- **Authentication:** Required (verify_session() check)
- **Input Parameters:** POST: `ssid`, `password`, `security` (form fields)
- **Functionality:** Non-functional - returns hardcoded error message
- **Vulnerabilities:** Minimal (feature not implemented)
- **Attack Surface:** Low - inputs not processed

**Entry Point 7: Static Assets**
- **Routes:** `/static/css/bootstrap.min.css`, `/static/js/jquery-3.5.1.min.js`, `/static/js/bootstrap.min.js`
- **File Path:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/static/`
- **Authentication:** None (public)
- **Functionality:** CSS and JavaScript libraries
- **Vulnerabilities:** None identified (standard libraries)
- **Attack Surface:** Minimal

### Internal Service Communication

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE - Monolithic application with no internal service-to-service communication.

**Database Connection:**
- Application → MySQL: Internal Docker network communication
- Protocol: TCP port 3306 (unencrypted)
- Credentials: root:admin_router (hardcoded)
- Trust Model: Application fully trusts database, database accessible only from application container

### Input Validation Patterns

**Status:** MINIMAL TO NONE

**Login Form Input Handling:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 62-63
```python
username = request.form['username']  # NO VALIDATION
password = request.form['password']  # NO VALIDATION
```

**Validation Gaps:**
- No maximum length enforcement (beyond database constraints: username 50 chars, password 100 chars)
- No minimum length requirements
- No character set restrictions
- No null byte filtering
- No Unicode normalization
- No SQL escape validation (protected by ORM only)
- No XSS sanitization on error messages

**Positive Finding:**  
All database queries use SQLAlchemy ORM parameterization, preventing SQL injection despite lack of input validation.

### Background Processing

**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED - No asynchronous job queues, background workers, or scheduled tasks.

The application processes all requests synchronously within the Apache mod_wsgi worker processes (10 configured workers).

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

The application deploys using Docker Compose with minimal security hardening. Infrastructure configuration exposes multiple attack vectors through weak secrets management, permissive web server settings, and lack of transport encryption.

### Secrets Management

**Critical Secrets Identified:**

1. **Flask Secret Key (Hardcoded)**  
   File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 14
   ```python
   app.secret_key = 'your_secret_key'
   ```
   **Risk:** Session forgery, CSRF bypass, cookie tampering

2. **Database Root Password (Hardcoded)**  
   Files:
   - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/mysql/Dockerfile`, Line 3
   - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Line 15
   ```python
   app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = 'mysql+pymysql://root:admin_router@db/database'
   ```
   **Risk:** Full database access, plaintext password extraction

3. **Test Account Credentials (Hardcoded)**  
   File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py`, Lines 26-27
   ```python
   test = User(username='test', password='test', ...)
   ```
   **Risk:** Immediate authenticated access

4. **CTF Flag (Environment Variable)**  
   File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/.env`, Line 1
   ```
   FLAG="flag{3d582313-fe30-457d-ac42-193b066d56c0}"
   ```
   Passed to Docker build as ARG, written to /flag file in container filesystem

**Secrets Management Assessment:**
- **Storage:** Hardcoded in source code (worst practice)
- **Rotation:** No mechanism for secret rotation
- **Access Control:** Anyone with repository access has all secrets
- **Encryption:** Stored in plaintext
- **Remediation:** Use environment variables with secure secret managers (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager)

### Configuration Security

**Apache HTTP Server Configuration:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/admin_router-httpd.conf`

```apache
<VirtualHost *:80>
    DocumentRoot /var/www/admin_router/
    WSGIDaemonProcess /admin_router processes=10 python-path=/var/www/admin_router/
    WSGIProcessGroup /admin_router
    WSGIScriptAlias / /var/www/admin_router/admin_router.wsgi
    
    <Directory "/var/www/admin_router/app/">
        Header set Access-Control-Allow-Origin "*"
        Options +ExecCGI
        Options Indexes FollowSymLinks
    </Directory>
</VirtualHost>
```

**Security Issues:**

1. **HTTP Only (No HTTPS):**  
   - Listening on port 80 only
   - No SSL/TLS configuration
   - No HTTPS redirect
   - **Impact:** Credentials transmitted in plaintext, session cookies vulnerable to interception

2. **Permissive CORS:**  
   - `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: "*"` (Line 11)
   - Allows all origins to make authenticated requests
   - **Impact:** Cross-origin attacks, credential theft

3. **Directory Listing Enabled:**  
   - `Options Indexes` (Line 13)
   - **Impact:** Information disclosure, path enumeration

4. **CGI Execution Enabled:**  
   - `Options +ExecCGI` (Line 12)
   - **Impact:** Potential remote code execution if file upload vulnerability exists

5. **FollowSymLinks Enabled:**  
   - `Options FollowSymLinks` (Line 13)
   - **Impact:** Potential directory traversal via symlinks

**Infrastructure Security Headers (MISSING):**

The application does NOT configure critical security headers. No Nginx, Kubernetes Ingress, or CDN configurations were found in the codebase. All header configuration must occur at the Apache level, where the following are MISSING:

- **Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS):** NOT CONFIGURED - No HTTPS to enforce
- **Content-Security-Policy (CSP):** NOT CONFIGURED - XSS attacks unrestricted
- **X-Content-Type-Options:** NOT CONFIGURED - MIME sniffing possible
- **X-Frame-Options:** NOT CONFIGURED - Clickjacking possible
- **X-XSS-Protection:** NOT CONFIGURED - Legacy XSS filter disabled
- **Referrer-Policy:** NOT CONFIGURED - Referrer information leaks

**Cache-Control Headers (Implemented in Templates):**  
All HTML templates include inline cache-control headers:
```html
<meta http-equiv="Cache-Control" content="no-cache, no-store, must-revalidate">
<meta http-equiv="Pragma" content="no-cache">
<meta http-equiv="Expires" content="0">
```
**Assessment:** Positive security control to prevent caching of sensitive session data.

### External Dependencies

**Third-Party Services:** NONE - Application is self-contained with no external API integrations, CDNs, or third-party authentication providers.

**Docker Dependencies:**
- **Base Images:**
  - Application: debian:bullseye-slim (not latest, security patches lag)
  - Database: mysql:5.7.15 (EOL, known CVEs)
- **Supply Chain Risk:** No image signature verification, no vulnerability scanning in build pipeline

**Python Dependencies:**  
File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/requirements.txt`
- flask (unpinned)
- flask_sqlalchemy (unpinned)
- pymysql (unpinned)
- flask_session (unpinned)

**Risk:** Unpinned versions allow automatic installation of latest versions with potential security regressions or breaking changes.

### Monitoring & Logging

**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

**Logging Gaps:**
- No application-level logging configured
- No security event logging (failed logins, privilege escalations)
- No audit trails for sensitive operations (admin panel access, flag retrieval)
- No centralized log aggregation
- No log retention policy
- No log integrity protection

**Monitoring Gaps:**
- No health checks beyond Docker Compose basic HTTP ping
- No performance monitoring
- No security monitoring (intrusion detection, anomaly detection)
- No alerting on suspicious activity

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The codebase follows a conventional Flask application structure with clear separation between application logic, data models, templates, and static assets. The project uses Docker Compose for orchestration with separate containers for the web application and MySQL database backend.

**Root Directory Structure:**
```
XBEN-088-24/
├── app/                          # Web application container
│   ├── Dockerfile               # Python 3 + Apache + mod_wsgi
│   ├── admin_router-httpd.conf  # Apache virtual host configuration
│   └── website/                 # Flask application source
│       ├── admin_router.wsgi    # WSGI entry point
│       ├── run.py               # Development server runner (out-of-scope)
│       ├── requirements.txt      # Python dependencies (unpinned)
│       └── app/                 # Flask package
│           ├── __init__.py      # App initialization, DB config, session setup
│           ├── db.py            # SQLAlchemy singleton instance
│           ├── models.py        # User ORM model
│           ├── routes.py        # Route handlers (7 endpoints)
│           ├── static/          # Frontend assets
│           │   ├── css/bootstrap.min.css
│           │   └── js/jquery-3.5.1.min.js, bootstrap.min.js
│           └── templates/       # Jinja2 HTML templates
│               ├── login.html
│               ├── dashboard.html
│               ├── admin_panel.html
│               └── wifi_settings.html
├── mysql/                        # Database container
│   └── Dockerfile               # MySQL 5.7.15 with hardcoded credentials
├── docker-compose.yml           # Service orchestration (db + admin_router)
├── .env                         # Environment variables (FLAG)
├── Makefile                     # Build orchestration (references external common.mk)
├── benchmark.json               # CTF metadata
└── deliverables/                # Documentation artifacts
```

**Directory Organization Analysis:**

1. **Application Tier (`app/website/app/`):**  
   - Clear separation of concerns: models.py (data), routes.py (controllers), templates/ (views)
   - Single package structure (no sub-packages for auth, admin, api)
   - All business logic concentrated in routes.py (138 lines)
   - No separate security module or utilities directory
   - **Security Impact:** Centralized route handlers make vulnerability analysis straightforward but lack modular security controls

2. **Configuration Management:**  
   - Hardcoded values in `__init__.py` (secret key, database URI)
   - Apache configuration in separate file `admin_router-httpd.conf`
   - Environment variables used minimally (only FLAG in .env)
   - **Security Impact:** Secrets in version control, no environment separation

3. **Build and Deployment (`Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`):**  
   - Multi-stage Docker build not used (single FROM debian:bullseye-slim)
   - Flag embedded during build: `RUN echo -n $FLAG > /flag`
   - Health checks configured for both services
   - **Security Impact:** Build-time secrets embedded in container layers

4. **Testing and Development Tools:**  
   - `run.py` provides Flask development server (out-of-scope, local-only)
   - No test directory or testing framework
   - No CI/CD pipeline configuration
   - **Security Impact:** No automated security testing or vulnerability scanning

5. **Code Generation and Tooling:**  
   - No code generation tools (no protobuf, GraphQL codegen, etc.)
   - Standard Python/Flask conventions followed
   - Minimal abstraction layers (direct ORM usage, no repositories)
   - **Security Impact:** Simple codebase structure aids manual review but lacks security frameworks

**Discoverability of Security Components:**

- **Authentication:** Centralized in routes.py `verify_session()` function (easy to locate)
- **Authorization:** Inline is_admin checks in route handlers (scattered, easy to miss)
- **Session Management:** Configuration in `__init__.py`, usage in routes.py
- **Secrets:** Scattered across multiple files (Dockerfile, __init__.py, .env)
- **Input Validation:** None (would need to be added to routes.py)

**Impact on Security Analysis:**  
The straightforward directory structure and minimal abstraction make vulnerability identification efficient. However, the lack of dedicated security modules, utility functions, or frameworks means security controls must be manually implemented in each route handler, increasing risk of omissions.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

All specific file paths referenced in this analysis, categorized by security relevance for manual penetration testing review.

### Configuration

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/.env` - CTF flag environment variable
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service orchestration, port mappings
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/admin_router-httpd.conf` - Apache configuration (CORS, directory options)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/Dockerfile` - Application container build (flag embedding, Line 20-21)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/mysql/Dockerfile` - Database container (hardcoded credentials, Line 3)

### Authentication & Authorization

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py` - Flask app initialization
  - Line 14: Hardcoded secret key
  - Line 15: Database connection string with credentials
  - Line 17: READ UNCOMMITTED isolation level
  - Line 22: Session interface configuration
  - Lines 23-34: Test account creation (test:test)
  - Lines 36-45: Admin account creation with random password
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` - Route handlers
  - Lines 31-42: Session verification function (verify_session)
  - Lines 50-74: Login endpoint (/login)
  - Line 53-59: Debug parameter information disclosure
  - Lines 62-63: Input acceptance without validation
  - Line 66: Session password hash storage (PBKDF2 with weak salt)
  - Lines 77-80: Logout endpoint (incomplete session invalidation)
  - Lines 83-107: Admin panel endpoint (/admin_panel)
  - Line 96: Authorization check (is_admin)
  - Lines 98-99: Flag file read from /flag

### API & Routing

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` - All 7 network-accessible endpoints
  - Lines 45-47: Root redirect (/)
  - Lines 50-74: Login (GET/POST /login)
  - Lines 77-80: Logout (GET /logout)
  - Lines 83-107: Admin panel (GET /admin_panel)
  - Lines 110-126: Dashboard (GET /dashboard)
  - Lines 129-139: WiFi settings (GET/POST /wifi_settings)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/admin_router.wsgi` - WSGI entry point

### Data Models & DB Interaction

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/models.py` - User ORM model
  - Line 6: User class definition
  - Line 9: Password field (plaintext storage)
  - Line 13: is_admin boolean flag
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/db.py` - SQLAlchemy instance

### Dependency Manifests

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/requirements.txt` - Python dependencies (unpinned)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py` - Secret key, database credentials (Lines 14-15)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` - Password hashing (Line 66), session storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/.env` - FLAG variable

### Middleware & Input Validation

**Status:** NO DEDICATED MIDDLEWARE OR VALIDATION FILES

Input handling occurs inline in route handlers:
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` - Lines 62-63 (no validation)

### Logging & Monitoring

**Status:** NO LOGGING OR MONITORING CONFIGURATION FILES

### Infrastructure & Deployment

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service orchestration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/Dockerfile` - Application container
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/mysql/Dockerfile` - Database container
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/admin_router-httpd.conf` - Apache virtual host (CORS, security headers)

### CTF Flag Storage

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/.env` - FLAG environment variable (Line 1)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/Dockerfile` - Flag written to /flag file (Lines 20-21)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` - Flag file read (Lines 98-99)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/admin_panel.html` - Flag display (Line 84)

### Templates (XSS Sinks)

- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/login.html`
  - Line 62: Error message rendering ({{ error }})
  - Line 83: Debug session output in HTML comment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/dashboard.html`
  - Line 103: Error message modal
  - Line 127: Debug session output
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/admin_panel.html`
  - Line 84: Flag display ({{ flag }})
  - Line 104: Error message modal
  - Line 128: Debug session output
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/wifi_settings.html`
  - Line 132: Error message modal

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

This section catalogs all Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) sinks identified in network-accessible web pages. Local-only scripts, build tools, and developer utilities are excluded per scope definition.

### XSS Vulnerability Summary

**Total XSS Sinks Identified:** 9 across 4 HTML templates  
**Exploitability Assessment:** 1 HIGH (login error message), 4 MEDIUM (debug session outputs), 4 LOW (hardcoded error messages)

### HTML Body Context Sinks (Jinja2 Template Variables)

**SINK 1: Login Error Message (HIGHEST RISK)**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/login.html`
- **Line:** 62
- **Sink Type:** Jinja2 Template HTML Body Context
- **Vulnerable Code:** `<div class="error-message">{{ error }}</div>`
- **User Input Source:** `e.message` from SessionError exception
- **Root Cause:** SessionError exception message passed directly to template without sanitization
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 71-74
  ```python
  except SessionError as e:
      if debug:
          debug_session = str(dict(session.items()))
      return render_template('login.html', error=e.message, debug_session=debug_session)
  ```
- **Render Context:** HTML `<div>` element body (not attribute)
- **Current Sanitization:** Jinja2 auto-escaping should apply, but error message construction in routes.py (Lines 40, 42) uses string interpolation that could bypass escaping
- **Exploitability:** HIGH
- **Attack Vector:**
  ```
  POST /login
  username: "><img src=x onerror="alert('XSS')">
  password: anything
  
  Result: SessionError("Invalid username.") with username in message
  Rendered: <div class="error-message">Invalid username."><img src=x onerror="alert('XSS')"></div>
  ```
- **Impact:** Session cookie theft, credential harvesting, CSRF token extraction

**SINK 2-4: Error Message Modals (LOW RISK - Hardcoded)**
- **Files:**
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/dashboard.html`, Line 103
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/admin_panel.html`, Line 104
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/wifi_settings.html`, Line 132
- **Sink Type:** Jinja2 Template HTML Body Context
- **Vulnerable Code:** `{{ error_message }}`
- **User Input Source:** error_message parameter from routes
- **Current Implementation:** All error_message values are currently hardcoded strings:
  - admin_panel: "Insufficient permissions." (routes.py:107)
  - wifi_settings: "Settings can not be changed, the WiFi chipset is still booting." (routes.py:139)
- **Current Sanitization:** Jinja2 auto-escaping enabled
- **Exploitability:** LOW (currently hardcoded, but dangerous pattern if modified)
- **Risk Assessment:** Medium-term risk if developers add dynamic error messages without sanitization

### Debug Session HTML Context Sinks (CRITICAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE)

**SINK 5: Login Page Debug Session**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/login.html`
- **Line:** 83
- **Sink Type:** Jinja2 Template HTML Comment Body Context
- **Vulnerable Code:** 
  ```html
  {% if debug_session %}
  <!--
  Server-Side Session Content:    
  {{ debug_session }}
  -->
  {% endif %}
  ```
- **User Input Source:** `debug_session = str(dict(session.items()))`
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 59, 73
- **Attack Vector:** `/login?debug=session`
- **Root Cause:** 
  - Request parameter debug checked at Line 53: `debug = request.args.get('debug')`
  - If debug == 'session', debug set to True (Lines 54-55)
  - Session dictionary converted to string and rendered in HTML comment (Line 59, 83)
- **Render Context:** HTML comment (visible in page source)
- **Current Sanitization:** None
- **Exploitability:** MEDIUM (requires viewing page source, but accessible to unauthenticated users)
- **Attack Scenario:**
  ```
  GET /login?debug=session HTTP/1.1
  
  Response includes:
  <!--
  Server-Side Session Content:    
  {'username': 'admin', 'password_hash': 'a1b2c3d4...', 'user_id': 2, 'session_id': '...'}
  -->
  ```
- **Impact:** Session hijacking, password hash extraction, username enumeration

**SINK 6: Dashboard Page Debug Session**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/dashboard.html`
- **Line:** 127
- **Vulnerable Code:** Same HTML comment structure as SINK 5
- **User Input Source:** `debug_session = str(dict(get_session().items()))`
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Line 125
- **Attack Vector:** `/dashboard?debug=session`
- **Exploitability:** MEDIUM (requires authentication, but accessible to any authenticated user including test:test)

**SINK 7: Admin Panel Page Debug Session**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/admin_panel.html`
- **Line:** 128
- **Vulnerable Code:** Same HTML comment structure as SINK 5
- **User Input Source:** `debug_session = str(dict(sess.items()))`
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Line 102
- **Attack Vector:** `/admin_panel?debug=session`
- **Exploitability:** MEDIUM (requires admin authentication, but session could be forged)

**SINK 8: Flag Display (NOT EXPLOITABLE - Safe)**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/templates/admin_panel.html`
- **Line:** 84
- **Vulnerable Code:** `<code>{{ flag }}</code>`
- **User Input Source:** flag_content from file read (routes.py:99)
- **Exploitability:** NOT APPLICABLE - Flag is from file, not user input
- **Assessment:** Safe - Jinja2 auto-escaping applies, and content is from trusted file source

### JavaScript Context Sinks

**No JavaScript context sinks detected in application code.**

**Analysis Performed:**
- Searched for `eval()`, `Function()` constructor calls: None found in application code
- Searched for `setTimeout()`/`setInterval()` with string arguments: None found
- Searched for user input written directly into `<script>` tags: None found
- Minified jQuery/Bootstrap libraries contain these patterns but are third-party code, not application-controlled

### CSS Context Sinks

**No CSS context sinks detected in application code.**

**Analysis Performed:**
- Searched for `element.style` property assignments with user data: None found
- Searched for `backgroundImage` or CSS properties set with user input: None found
- All styles are hardcoded or use CSS classes from Bootstrap

### URL/Location Context Sinks

**No URL context sinks detected in application code.**

**Analysis Performed:**
- Searched for `location.href` assignments with user data: None found
- Searched for `window.open()` calls with user input: None found
- Searched for `history.pushState/replaceState` with user input: None found
- `URL.createObjectURL` not used

### Command Injection Sinks

**No command injection sinks detected in application code.**

**Analysis Performed:**
- Searched for `subprocess.run()`, `subprocess.Popen()`, `subprocess.call()`: None found
- Searched for `os.system()`, `os.popen()`: None found
- Searched for `eval()`, `exec()` in Python code: None found
- No shell command execution patterns identified

### Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)

**POTENTIAL SSTI - SessionError Message Handling:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`
- **Lines:** 23-25 (SessionError class), 71-74 (error rendering)
- **Pattern Type:** Exception Message Injection
- **Vulnerable Code:**
  ```python
  class SessionError(Exception):
      def __init__(self, message='Session verifcation failed.'):
          self.message = message
  
  # Then at line 71-74:
  except SessionError as e:
      if debug:
          debug_session = str(dict(session.items()))
      return render_template('login.html', error=e.message, debug_session=debug_session)
  ```
- **User Input Source:** POST form data (username/password) triggers SessionError with custom messages (Lines 40, 42)
- **Current Sanitization:** Jinja2 auto-escaping applies (not true SSTI with {{}} evaluation)
- **Exploitability:** MEDIUM - Messages don't use Jinja2 template syntax but are displayed unescaped in HTML context
- **Note:** While not true SSTI (no Jinja2 template code execution), error messages are user-influenced and could enable HTML injection

### XSS Remediation Priority

**IMMEDIATE (Critical):**
1. **Disable Debug Parameter** - Remove debug=session functionality entirely (routes.py Lines 53-59, 86-88, 113-115)
2. **Sanitize Error Messages** - Use Jinja2 |escape filter or validate exception messages before rendering
3. **Remove Debug Output from Templates** - Delete HTML comments containing debug_session from all templates

**HIGH (Within 1 week):**
4. **Implement Content Security Policy** - Add CSP header restricting script sources
5. **Enable X-XSS-Protection Header** - Add legacy XSS filter header
6. **Review All Template Variables** - Audit all {{ }} expressions for user-controlled data

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

After comprehensive analysis of all Python source files, routes, templates, and configurations, **NO SSRF sinks were identified** in network-accessible components.

### SSRF Analysis Summary

**Total SSRF Sinks Identified:** 0  
**HTTP Client Libraries Present:** None  
**Network Request Functions:** None  
**Redirect Handlers with User Input:** None

### Analysis Performed

**Files Analyzed:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py` (138 lines)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/__init__.py` (46 lines)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/models.py` (12 lines)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/requirements.txt` (4 dependencies)

**HTTP Client Libraries Check:**
- **requests:** NOT IMPORTED, NOT INSTALLED
- **urllib/urllib3:** NOT IMPORTED (standard library available but unused)
- **httpx:** NOT INSTALLED
- **aiohttp:** NOT INSTALLED
- **socket:** NOT IMPORTED

**Dependencies (from requirements.txt):**
```
flask
flask_sqlalchemy
pymysql
flask_session
```
No HTTP client libraries in dependency list.

### Redirect Operations Analysis

**Flask redirect() Usage Found:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`
- **Line 47:** `redirect(url_for('login'))` - Hardcoded route name, no user input
- **Line 70:** `redirect(url_for('dashboard'))` - Hardcoded route name, no user input
- **Line 80:** `redirect(url_for('login'))` - Hardcoded route name, no user input

**Assessment:** All redirects use Flask's `url_for()` function with hardcoded route names. No user-controllable URL parameters, no "next" parameter handling, no external redirects.

### User Input Parameters Analysis

**User Input Accepted:**
1. `request.args.get('debug')` - Used only for boolean comparison (Lines 53, 86, 113)
2. `request.form['username']` - Used only for database lookup (Line 62)
3. `request.form['password']` - Used only for password comparison (Line 63)
4. `request.form['ssid']`, `request.form['password']`, `request.form['security']` - WiFi settings (not processed, Line 135-137)

**Assessment:** No user input parameters are used to construct URLs, make HTTP requests, or perform file operations with external resources.

### Dangerous Functions Analysis

**Functions Searched (NONE FOUND):**
- `render_template_string()` - Imported but never called (Line 1)
- `eval()`, `exec()` - Not used
- `__import__()` - Not used
- `open()` with user input - Only used with hardcoded /flag path (Line 98)

### File Operations

**File Read Operations:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-088-24/app/website/app/routes.py`, Lines 98-99
  ```python
  with open('/flag') as flag_file:
      flag_content = flag_file.read()
  ```
- **Assessment:** Hardcoded file path, no user input. Not an SSRF sink.

### SSRF Risk Assessment

**Risk Level:** NONE - No SSRF vulnerability present in analyzed codebase.

**Rationale:**
1. Application does not make any outbound network requests
2. No HTTP client libraries installed or imported
3. All redirects use hardcoded route names via url_for()
4. No user-supplied URLs accepted in any parameter
5. No webhook, callback, or external API integration endpoints
6. No file inclusion with user-controlled paths

**Deployment Security:**
- Application uses Apache WSGI with proper configuration
- No dangerous directives that would enable SSRF exploitation
- Docker network isolation prevents direct access to cloud metadata endpoints

### Conclusion

This application is **NOT vulnerable to SSRF attacks**. The application's architecture is entirely inward-facing with no outbound HTTP request capabilities, no URL parameter handling, and no external resource fetching mechanisms.

---

## End of Penetration Test Code Analysis Report

**Analysis Completion Status:** COMPLETE  
**Total Vulnerabilities Identified:** 20+ (15 Critical/High severity)  
**Exploitation Complexity:** LOW (multiple trivial attack paths)  
**Recommended Security Rating:** CRITICAL - Unsuitable for production  
**Next Steps:** Proceed with RECON phase using entry points cataloged in Section 5, prioritize exploitation of hardcoded credentials and session debug parameter