# Reconnaissance Deliverable: Springfield Portal

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the Springfield Portal application's attack surface, with special emphasis on authorization and privilege escalation opportunities for the Authorization Analysis Specialist.

**Key Sections for Authorization Analysis:**
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Contains authorization details for each endpoint - focus on "Required Role" and "Object ID Parameters" columns to identify IDOR candidates.
- **Section 6.4 (Guards Directory):** Catalog of authorization controls - understand what each guard means before analyzing vulnerabilities.
- **Section 7 (Role & Privilege Architecture):** Complete role hierarchy and privilege mapping - use this to understand the privilege lattice and identify escalation targets.
- **Section 8 (Authorization Vulnerability Candidates):** Pre-prioritized lists of endpoints for horizontal, vertical, and context-based authorization testing.

**How to Use the Network Mapping (Section 6):** The entity/flow mapping shows system boundaries and data sensitivity levels. Pay special attention to flows marked with authorization guards and entities handling sensitive data.

**Priority Order for Testing:** Start with Section 8's High-priority horizontal candidates, then vertical escalation endpoints for each role level, finally context-based workflow bypasses.

**CRITICAL FINDING:** This application contains a trivial authentication bypass vulnerability via PHP type juggling that allows immediate privilege escalation from anonymous to admin with a single HTTP request. See Section 8.2 for exploitation details.

## 1. Executive Summary

The Springfield Portal is a **single-file PHP web application** designed as a CTF challenge with a **critically compromised security posture**. The application demonstrates a **trivial authentication bypass vulnerability** that renders its security model completely ineffective. It runs on an **end-of-life technology stack** (PHP 5.6.40, Apache 2.4.25, Debian 9.6) with **zero security controls**.

**Core Functionality:**
The application serves a single purpose: display a login form that, when bypassed, reveals a CTF flag. The entire application logic consists of 81 lines of PHP code in a single file (`index.php`) with no database, no external services, no session management, and no framework.

**Technology Stack:**
- **Frontend:** Vanilla HTML with inline CSS (no JavaScript framework)
- **Backend:** PHP 5.6.40 (END-OF-LIFE: January 2019) on Apache 2.4.25 (Debian 9.6)
- **Infrastructure:** Docker container using php:5-apache base image, exposed on port 36613
- **Database:** None
- **External Dependencies:** None

**Primary Attack Surface:**
The network-accessible attack surface consists of **5 endpoints**:
1. Primary authentication endpoint (`/index.php`) - contains critical type juggling vulnerability
2. Three static image resources (Homer Simpson avatar, Springfield backgrounds)
3. Inadvertently exposed Dockerfile revealing build process and flag injection mechanism

**Critical Authentication Bypass Vulnerability:**
The authentication logic contains an **undefined variable vulnerability** where password validation references `$password` without defining it. When combined with PHP's type juggling behavior in `strcmp()`, this creates a **trivial authentication bypass** - any request with an array-type password parameter (`?username=admin&password[]=x`) completely bypasses authentication and exposes the protected flag.

**Additional Security Failures:**
- Credentials transmitted via **GET parameters in plaintext URLs**, logging sensitive data in server logs, browser history, and proxy servers
- **No HTTPS enforcement**, exposing credentials to network eavesdropping
- **No input validation**, enabling type confusion attacks
- **No session management**, making authentication stateless
- **No defense-in-depth mechanisms**, providing zero secondary protections

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** None (vanilla HTML5)
- **JavaScript Libraries:** None
- **CSS Framework:** None (inline styles)
- **Authentication Libraries:** None
- **Form Handling:** HTML form with GET method submission

### Backend
- **Language:** PHP 5.6.40 (Released: January 25, 2019 | **END-OF-LIFE**: January 1, 2019)
- **Framework:** None (single-file procedural PHP)
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.25 (Debian) (Built: November 3, 2018 | Outdated by 7+ years)
- **Key Dependencies:** None (no Composer dependencies)
- **Authentication Method:** Inline credential comparison with `strcmp()`
- **Session Management:** Not implemented

### Infrastructure
- **Hosting:** Docker container (php:5-apache base image)
- **Operating System:** Debian 9.6 (Stretch) | **END-OF-LIFE**: July 2022
- **CDN:** None
- **Database Type:** None
- **Container Registry:** Local build only
- **Port Mapping:** 36613:80 (HTTP only, no HTTPS)

### Identified Subdomains
From subfinder scan (Note: these are generic localhost subdomains and not specific to this application):
- autodiscover.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
- mail.localhost
- mail03.regency.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
- fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
- mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- mail.regency.localhost
- tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
- www.localhost
- server02.counterintel.localhost

**Note:** These subdomains are not active for the Springfield Portal application. The application is accessible only at `http://localhost:36613`.

### Open Ports & Services
From nmap scan of localhost:
- **Port 80/tcp:** Caddy httpd (not used by target application)
- **Port 443/tcp:** SSL/HTTPS (not used by target application)
- **Port 631/tcp:** CUPS 2.3 (printing service, not related to application)
- **Port 49152/tcp:** Golang net/http server (Tailscale, not related to application)
- **Target Application Port:** 36613/tcp (mapped to container port 80)

**Target Application Service:**
- **Port 36613/tcp (HTTP):** Apache 2.4.25 serving PHP 5.6.40 application
- **Protocol:** HTTP only (no HTTPS/TLS)
- **Service Fingerprint:** Server headers expose Apache/2.4.25 (Debian) and PHP/5.6.40

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
- **Primary Login Endpoint:** `/index.php` or `/` (root)
- **Method:** HTTP GET with URL parameters
- **No Alternative Auth Methods:** No SSO, OAuth, SAML, or external authentication providers

### Mechanism

**Step-by-Step Authentication Process:**

1. **User Accesses Application:**
   - URL: `http://localhost:36613/`
   - Response: HTML login form with username and password fields

2. **Credential Submission:**
   - User enters credentials in form
   - Form submits via GET method to `/index.php`
   - Parameters: `?username=<input>&password=<input>`
   - **CRITICAL SECURITY ISSUE:** Credentials visible in URL, browser history, and server logs

3. **Server-Side Validation:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
   - **Line 70:** Check if parameters exist: `isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])`
   - **Line 71:** Validate credentials:
     ```php
     if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0)
     ```
   - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** Variable `$password` is never defined (evaluates to NULL)
   - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** `strcmp()` with array input returns NULL, `NULL == 0` evaluates to TRUE

4. **Authentication Decision:**
   - **Success Path (Line 72-73):** Display "Welcome Admin" message and flag
   - **Failure Path (Line 75):** Display "Oh Sorry but...you are not the admin :(" message

5. **No Session Creation:**
   - No `session_start()` call
   - No session cookies set
   - No authentication state persistence
   - Each request is independently authenticated

### Code Pointers

**Authentication Logic:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Login Form HTML:** Lines 62-66
- **Parameter Existence Check:** Line 70
- **Authentication Validation:** Line 71 (VULNERABLE)
- **Success Handler:** Lines 72-73
- **Failure Handler:** Line 75

**Session Management:**
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- No session-related code found in application

**Flag Storage:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Line 68:** `$flag = "@FLAG@";` (replaced at Docker build time)
- **Build Process:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile`, Line 8
- **Flag Injection:** `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Role Determination:**
- **Method:** Hardcoded string comparison
- **Code Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71`
- **Logic:** `$_GET['username'] == "admin"`
- **Single Role:** "admin" (no other roles exist)

**Default Role:**
- **New Users:** Not applicable (no user registration)
- **Unauthenticated State:** Anonymous (no role assigned)

**Role Upgrade Path:**
- **Not Applicable:** No role modification functionality
- **Binary Model:** Either "admin" or anonymous (no intermediate states)

**Code Implementation:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Line 71:** Username comparison determines role

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Storage Location:**
- **Not Stored:** Privileges are not persisted anywhere
- **Stateless Model:** Each request independently determines privileges based on GET parameters
- **No Database:** No persistent privilege storage
- **No JWT Claims:** No token-based privilege storage
- **No Session Data:** No session-based privilege storage

**Validation Points:**
- **Single Validation Point:** Line 71 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **No Middleware:** No dedicated authorization middleware
- **Inline Check:** Authorization check embedded directly in application logic

**Cache/Session Persistence:**
- **Not Applicable:** No caching or session persistence
- **Request-Level Validation:** Privileges validated on every request
- **No Refresh Mechanism:** No privilege refresh needed (stateless)

**Code Pointers:**
- **Privilege Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71`

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Impersonation Features:**
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **No Admin Impersonation:** No ability to impersonate other users
- **No User Context Switching:** No role switching functionality

**Role Switching:**
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **No Sudo Mode:** No temporary privilege elevation
- **No Role Selection:** No ability to choose different roles

**Audit Trail:**
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **No Logging:** Role changes/impersonation not logged (because they don't exist)
- **Apache Access Logs Only:** Only standard HTTP request logging

**Code Implementation:**
- **Not Applicable:** No impersonation or role switching code exists

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible endpoints that can be reached through HTTP requests to http://localhost:36613 are included. Development tools, build scripts, and local-only utilities are excluded.

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | `/` or `/index.php` | anon (public) | None | None (form display) | Displays login form. When accessed without parameters, renders HTML form. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (lines 1-81) |
| GET | `/index.php?username=X&password=Y` | admin (bypass) | None | Inline check at line 71 | **VULNERABLE:** Processes login credentials via GET parameters. **Authentication bypass:** `?username=admin&password[]=x` bypasses auth via type juggling. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70-77` |
| GET | `/static/homer_simpson.png` | anon (public) | None | None | Serves Homer Simpson avatar image (38KB PNG). **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/homer_simpson.png` |
| GET | `/static/springfield_background.jpg` | anon (public) | None | None | Serves Springfield background image (412KB JPEG) used in login page. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background.jpg` |
| GET | `/static/springfield_background-2.jpg` | anon (public) | None | None | Serves alternate Springfield background image (142KB JPEG). **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background-2.jpg` |
| GET | `/Dockerfile` | anon (public) | None | None | **EXPOSED BUILD ARTIFACT:** Reveals Docker build configuration, flag injection mechanism, and infrastructure details. **HIGH SEVERITY INFORMATION DISCLOSURE.** **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` |

**Endpoint Summary:**
- **Total Endpoints:** 6 (1 dynamic PHP, 3 static images, 1 exposed config, 1 form display)
- **Authentication Required:** 0 (authentication bypass makes this moot)
- **Object ID Parameters:** 0 (no IDOR risk)
- **Publicly Accessible:** 6 (100%)

**HTTP Method Support:**
All endpoints accept GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, HEAD, OPTIONS (Apache default). TRACE method is disabled globally (405 Method Not Allowed).

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** Only input vectors accessible through network requests to http://localhost:36613 are included. Local-only scripts, build tools, and development utilities are excluded.

### URL Parameters (GET)

**Input Vector 1: `username`**
- **Endpoint:** `/index.php`
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Access Line:** Line 70 (`isset($_GET['username'])`), Line 71 (`$_GET['username'] == "admin"`)
- **Form Field:** Line 63 (`<input type="text" name="username">`)
- **Validation:** Only `isset()` check and string comparison with "admin"
- **Sanitization:** NONE
- **Type Expected:** String
- **Type Accepted:** Any (string, array, object, integer, boolean)
- **Usage:** Authentication username comparison
- **Vulnerability Notes:** No type validation, no sanitization, accepts any data type

**Input Vector 2: `password`**
- **Endpoint:** `/index.php`
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Access Line:** Line 70 (`isset($_GET['password'])`), Line 71 (`strcmp($_GET['password'], $password)`)
- **Form Field:** Line 64 (`<input type="password" name="password">`)
- **Validation:** Only `isset()` check and `strcmp()` comparison with undefined variable
- **Sanitization:** NONE
- **Type Expected:** String
- **Type Accepted:** Any (string, array, object, integer, boolean)
- **Usage:** Authentication password comparison via `strcmp()`
- **Vulnerability Notes:** 
  - **CRITICAL:** No type validation allows array injection
  - **CRITICAL:** `strcmp()` with array returns NULL, enabling bypass
  - **CRITICAL:** Password compared to undefined variable `$password` (NULL)
  - **CRITICAL:** Credentials transmitted via GET (visible in logs and URLs)

### POST Body Fields (JSON/Form)
- **Status:** NOT USED
- **Note:** Application only processes GET parameters, no POST body parsing

### HTTP Headers
- **Status:** NOT USED BY APPLICATION
- **Note:** Standard Apache headers processed by web server, but no custom header handling in application code
- **No Headers Checked:** User-Agent, X-Forwarded-For, Referer, or custom headers not accessed

### Cookie Values
- **Status:** NOT USED
- **No Cookies Read:** No `$_COOKIE` superglobal usage
- **No Cookies Set:** No `setcookie()` calls
- **No Session Cookies:** No session management implemented

### File Uploads
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **No Upload Forms:** No file upload functionality
- **No `$_FILES` Usage:** No file handling code

### Request Body (Raw)
- **Status:** NOT USED
- **No Raw Body Parsing:** No `php://input` stream reading
- **No JSON/XML Parsing:** No request body parsing of any kind

**Input Vector Summary:**
- **Total Input Vectors:** 2 (both GET parameters)
- **Validated Inputs:** 2 (both have `isset()` checks only)
- **Sanitized Inputs:** 0 (zero sanitization)
- **Type-Checked Inputs:** 0 (zero type validation)
- **Critical Vulnerabilities:** 1 (password parameter with type juggling)

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible components that can be reached through the deployed application are mapped. Local development environments, build systems, and non-network-accessible components are excluded.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| ExternalUser | ExternAsset | Internet | Browser | Public | Unauthenticated users accessing the application |
| SpringfieldPortal | Service | App | PHP5.6/Apache2.4 | Secrets (FLAG) | Main application backend, single-file PHP app |
| StaticAssets | Service | App | Apache (static files) | Public | Image files served directly by Apache |
| DockerContainer | Service | Edge | Docker/php:5-apache | Public | Container hosting the application |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| ExternalUser | Access: Public Internet; Constraints: None; Authentication: Optional (bypassable) |
| SpringfieldPortal | Hosts: `http://localhost:36613/index.php`; Endpoints: `/`, `/index.php`; Auth: Broken (strcmp bypass); File: `/var/www/html/index.php` (81 lines); Flag Storage: Hardcoded in source; No Database: Stateless authentication |
| StaticAssets | Hosts: `http://localhost:36613/static/*`; Files: homer_simpson.png (38KB), springfield_background.jpg (412KB), springfield_background-2.jpg (142KB); Auth: None (public); Content-Type: image/png, image/jpeg |
| DockerContainer | Base Image: php:5-apache; OS: Debian 9.6; Port Mapping: 36613:80; Webroot: /var/www/html; Permissions: 777 (world-writable); Runtime: Apache + mod_php; Exposed Dockerfile: http://localhost:36613/Dockerfile (information disclosure) |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| ExternalUser → SpringfieldPortal | HTTP | :36613 / | None | Public |
| ExternalUser → SpringfieldPortal | HTTP | :36613 /index.php | auth:broken | Secrets (FLAG on bypass) |
| ExternalUser → StaticAssets | HTTP | :36613 /static/* | None | Public |
| ExternalUser → DockerContainer | HTTP | :36613 /Dockerfile | None | Public (config disclosure) |
| SpringfieldPortal → DockerContainer | Internal | localhost | None | Public |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| auth:broken | Auth | **CRITICAL FAILURE:** Requires username="admin" AND strcmp() comparison with undefined variable. Bypassable via type juggling with array password parameter. Implementation: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71` |
| None | Network | No network-level guards. Application exposed directly to internet on port 36613 with no firewall, WAF, or rate limiting. |

**Authorization Guard Analysis:**
- **Total Guards:** 1 (single authentication check)
- **Effective Guards:** 0 (the single guard is bypassed via type juggling)
- **Defense-in-Depth:** None (single point of failure)

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| anonymous | 0 | Global | No authentication required, default state for all users. No code implementation (implicit). |
| admin | 10 | Global | Hardcoded username check: `$_GET['username'] == "admin"`. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71` |

**Role Notes:**
- **Binary Model:** Only two states exist: anonymous (no privileges) or admin (full privileges)
- **No Intermediate Roles:** No user, moderator, or other privilege levels
- **No Role Hierarchy:** Flat structure with no inheritance
- **Hardcoded Assignment:** Role determined solely by username parameter value
- **No Persistence:** Roles not stored anywhere, determined per-request

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

```
Privilege Ordering (→ means "dominates"):
anonymous (0) → admin (10)

Exploitation Path:
anonymous → [Type Juggling Bypass] → admin

Parallel Isolation:
NONE (only two roles, linear hierarchy)
```

**Privilege Escalation Analysis:**
- **Vertical Escalation:** anonymous → admin (TRIVIAL via type juggling)
- **Horizontal Escalation:** Not applicable (no multi-tenancy, no user-owned resources)
- **Privilege De-escalation:** Not applicable (no role switching)
- **Role Impersonation:** Not implemented

**Escalation Time:** <1 second (single HTTP request)

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|----------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| anonymous | `/` | `/`, `/index.php`, `/static/*`, `/Dockerfile` | None |
| admin | `/index.php` (success) | All routes (same as anonymous, plus flag display) | GET parameter `username=admin&password[]=<array>` (bypass) |

**Navigation Flow:**
- **Anonymous Users:** See login form at `/`, can access static assets
- **Admin Users (after bypass):** See "Welcome Admin" message and flag on same page
- **No Separate Dashboards:** No admin panel or protected areas (single-page app)

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| anonymous | None | None | Not stored (implicit default state) |
| admin | None | `$_GET['username'] == "admin"` at line 71 | Not stored (determined from GET parameter) |

**Code Locations:**
- **Role Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71`
- **Middleware:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Guards:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Permission System:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Analysis:**
- **No Object ID Parameters:** The application has zero endpoints that accept object identifiers (user_id, order_id, file_id, etc.)
- **No User-Owned Resources:** No database, no multi-tenancy, no user-specific data
- **No IDOR Risk:** Cannot access other users' data because no user data exists
- **Single Flag:** Only one flag exists globally, not user-specific

**Endpoint Analysis:**
| Endpoint | Object ID Parameters | Horizontal Escalation Risk |
|----------|----------------------|----------------------------|
| `/index.php` | None | None |
| `/static/*` | None | None |
| `/Dockerfile` | None | None |

**Conclusion:** Zero horizontal privilege escalation candidates identified.

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

**CRITICAL FINDING:** This application has a **trivial vertical privilege escalation vulnerability** that allows immediate escalation from anonymous to admin.

| Priority | Endpoint Pattern | Functionality | Risk Level | Exploitation |
|----------|------------------|---------------|------------|--------------|
| **CRITICAL** | `/index.php?username=admin&password[]=x` | **TYPE JUGGLING BYPASS** | **CRITICAL** | **CONFIRMED EXPLOITABLE:** Pass password as array to bypass `strcmp()` check. Variable `$password` is undefined (NULL), `strcmp(array, NULL)` returns NULL, `NULL == 0` evaluates to TRUE. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71` |

**Exploitation Details:**

**Vulnerability:** Authentication Bypass via Type Juggling
**CVSS Score:** 10.0 (Critical)
**CWE:** CWE-843 (Type Confusion)

**Proof of Concept:**
```bash
# Primary exploit - array password
curl 'http://localhost:36613/index.php?username=admin&password[]=bypass'

# Alternative exploits
curl 'http://localhost:36613/index.php?username=admin&password[]='
curl 'http://localhost:36613/index.php?username=admin&password[0]=a&password[1]=b'
curl 'http://localhost:36613/index.php?username=admin&password[key]=value'
```

**Expected Response:**
```html
<h2>Welcome Admin</h2>
<h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: FLAG{3c8d37d2b7349c6124d67400ab817bed508eb3a155f2a0a1699732b1c120d86e}</h3>
```

**Root Cause Analysis:**
1. **Line 71:** `strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0`
2. **Problem 1:** Variable `$password` is never defined (evaluates to NULL)
3. **Problem 2:** When `$_GET['password']` is an array, `strcmp(array, NULL)` returns NULL
4. **Problem 3:** Loose comparison `NULL == 0` evaluates to TRUE in PHP
5. **Result:** Authentication bypassed, admin access granted

**Additional Vertical Escalation Vectors:**

| Priority | Vulnerability | Endpoint | Description |
|----------|---------------|----------|-------------|
| HIGH | **Exposed Dockerfile** | `/Dockerfile` | Information disclosure reveals build process, flag injection mechanism, and infrastructure details. **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` |
| MEDIUM | **No Session Management** | All endpoints | Stateless design means no persistent authentication, but also no session fixation risk. |
| MEDIUM | **Credentials in GET** | `/index.php` | Password transmitted in URL (visible in logs, history). **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:62` |
| MEDIUM | **No Rate Limiting** | `/index.php` | Unlimited authentication attempts possible (though bypass makes this moot). |

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Analysis:**
- **No Multi-Step Workflows:** Application has no multi-step processes
- **No State Machine:** No workflow states to track
- **No Prerequisite Steps:** No steps that must be completed in order
- **Single-Page Application:** Entire interaction is a single request-response

**Conclusion:** Zero context-based authorization vulnerabilities (no workflows exist).

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** Only injection sources accessible through network requests to http://localhost:36613 are included. Local-only scripts, build tools, and development utilities are excluded.

### Command Injection Sources

**Status:** **NONE FOUND**

**Comprehensive Search Results:**

I systematically searched for all command injection sinks in the network-accessible application code:

**Functions Searched (All returned ZERO matches):**
- `exec()` - Not found
- `shell_exec()` - Not found
- `system()` - Not found
- `passthru()` - Not found
- `popen()` - Not found
- `proc_open()` - Not found
- Backtick operators (`` ` ``) - Not found
- `eval()` - Not found
- `assert()` - Not found
- `preg_replace()` with /e modifier - Not found
- `create_function()` - Not found

**Code Analyzed:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (all 81 lines)
- **Result:** No command execution functions found
- **User Input Flow:** `$_GET['username']` and `$_GET['password']` are only used in string comparison (`==`) and `strcmp()` functions, never passed to command execution

**Conclusion:** **Zero command injection sources** in network-accessible code.

### SQL Injection Sources

**Status:** **NONE FOUND**

**Comprehensive Search Results:**

I systematically searched for all SQL injection sinks in the network-accessible application code:

**Functions Searched (All returned ZERO matches):**
- `mysqli_query()` - Not found
- `mysqli_real_query()` - Not found
- `mysqli_multi_query()` - Not found
- `mysqli_connect()` - Not found
- `mysql_query()` - Not found
- `PDO::query()` - Not found
- `PDO::exec()` - Not found
- `new PDO()` - Not found
- `->query()` - Not found
- `->prepare()` - Not found
- `->execute()` - Not found
- `pg_query()` - Not found
- `sqlite_query()` - Not found

**Infrastructure Analysis:**
- **Docker Compose:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml`
- **Services:** Only web service defined, **NO database service**
- **Database Container:** Not present

**Application Logic:**
- **Authentication:** Hardcoded username check and `strcmp()` comparison
- **Data Storage:** Flag stored in PHP source code, no database queries
- **No Database Layer:** No ORM, no database connection code

**Conclusion:** **Zero SQL injection sources** in network-accessible code. No database exists.

### Vulnerability Sources by Type - COMPLETE ANALYSIS

**1. Command Injection Sources: NONE**
- HTTP Request Data (GET/POST parameters): Not passed to command execution
- Query Parameters: Only used in string comparison
- Form Fields: Only used in `strcmp()`
- Cookies: Not used by application
- HTTP Headers: Not accessed by application
- File Uploads: Not implemented
- Environment Variables: Not user-controllable
- IPC/Sockets/Pipes: Not used
- Configuration Files: Not dynamically loaded
- Command-Line Arguments: Not applicable (web application)

**2. SQL Injection Sources: NONE**
- HTTP Request Data: No database queries exist
- Query Parameters: Not used in SQL
- Form Fields: Not used in SQL
- Cookies: Not used
- HTTP Headers: Not used
- File Uploads: Not implemented
- Hidden Fields: Not present
- URL Path Variables: Not used
- Stored Inputs: No database to store in
- Third-Party Integrations: None
- Webhook Data: Not implemented
- API Responses: No external APIs

**CRITICAL NOTE:** While this application has **NO command or SQL injection vulnerabilities**, it has a **CRITICAL authentication bypass vulnerability** (type juggling) that is the primary attack vector.

## 10. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts (From Pre-Recon Analysis)

Based on the pre-reconnaissance analysis, the Springfield Portal application has minimal XSS risk but lacks output encoding:

### Identified XSS Sinks

**1. Potential Reflected XSS (LOW Risk)**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70-75`
- **Render Context:** HTML Body Context
- **Current Exploitability:** LOW (user input not directly echoed)
- **Risk:** If code were modified to echo username/password, would be immediately exploitable
- **Missing Protection:** No `htmlspecialchars()` or output encoding anywhere in code

**2. Flag Output Without Encoding (VERY LOW Risk)**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:73`
- **Code:** `echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";`
- **Risk:** If flag value contained malicious JavaScript (requires build-time compromise)
- **Current Exploitability:** VERY LOW (flag from trusted build process)

### XSS Sinks NOT Found
- **JavaScript Context Sinks:** None (no client-side JavaScript)
- **HTML Attribute Context Sinks:** None (static HTML only)
- **CSS Context Sinks:** None (inline CSS only)
- **URL Context Sinks:** None
- **DOM Manipulation Sinks:** None (no client-side DOM manipulation)

**Recommendation:** Implement `htmlspecialchars($var, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')` for all output as defense-in-depth, even though current code doesn't directly echo user input.

## 11. SSRF Sinks (From Pre-Recon Analysis)

**Status:** **NO SSRF VULNERABILITIES FOUND**

The Springfield Portal application has **zero SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) vulnerabilities**.

### Comprehensive SSRF Sink Search

**HTTP(S) Client Libraries:** NOT FOUND
- No `curl_exec()`, `file_get_contents()` with URLs, `fopen()` with HTTP wrappers

**Raw Sockets:** NOT FOUND
- No `socket_connect()`, `fsockopen()`, `stream_socket_client()`

**URL Openers:** NOT FOUND
- No remote includes, no XML external entity loading

**Redirects:** NOT FOUND
- No `header("Location: ...")` with user input

**Webhooks:** NOT FOUND
- No webhook testing or callback functionality

**Analysis:** The application is completely self-contained with no outbound HTTP requests, no network connections, and no URL-based operations. User input flows only to local string comparison functions, never to network operations.

## 12. Additional Findings

### Exposed Build Artifacts

**Critical Information Disclosure:**
- **File:** `/Dockerfile` accessible at `http://localhost:36613/Dockerfile`
- **Size:** 111 bytes
- **Content:** Complete Docker build configuration
- **Exposes:**
  - Base image: `php:5-apache`
  - Flag injection mechanism: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`
  - Working directory: `/var/www/html`
  - Build process details

**Security Impact:** HIGH - Reveals infrastructure details and flag substitution mechanism

### End-of-Life Technology Stack

**Critical Risk:** Entire technology stack is end-of-life with no security patches:
- **PHP 5.6.40:** EOL January 2019 (6+ years unpatched)
- **Apache 2.4.25:** Released November 2018 (7+ years outdated)
- **Debian 9.6:** EOL July 2022 (3+ years unpatched)

**Exposure:** Hundreds of unpatched CVEs in runtime environment

### Insecure PHP Configuration

**Dangerous Settings:**
- `display_errors = STDOUT` - Error details exposed to attackers
- `expose_php = On` - Version disclosure via X-Powered-By header
- `disable_functions = (none)` - Dangerous functions not disabled
- `allow_url_fopen = On` - Remote file access enabled (unused but available)
- `max_execution_time = 0` - Unlimited execution time (DoS risk)

### World-Writable Webroot

**Critical Misconfiguration:**
- **Directory:** `/var/www/html/`
- **Permissions:** 777 (world-writable)
- **Risk:** Any process can modify web content, upload malicious files, or alter application code

### No Security Headers

**Missing Critical Headers:**
- Content-Security-Policy
- X-Frame-Options
- X-Content-Type-Options
- Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)
- Referrer-Policy
- Permissions-Policy

**Version Disclosure Headers Present:**
- `Server: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)`
- `X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40`

## 13. Recommendations for Subsequent Analysis Phases

### For Injection Analysis Specialist
- **Command Injection:** No sources found - skip command injection testing
- **SQL Injection:** No database exists - skip SQL injection testing
- **Focus Instead On:** XSS potential (though limited), authentication bypass as primary vector

### For XSS Analysis Specialist
- **Primary Focus:** Verify that user input is not echoed (confirmed in current code)
- **Secondary Focus:** Test if error messages reveal user input
- **Recommendation:** Add output encoding as defense-in-depth even though direct XSS not currently exploitable

### For Auth Analysis Specialist
- **CRITICAL PRIORITY:** Test type juggling authentication bypass (`password[]` parameter)
- **Secondary Priority:** Test information disclosure via exposed Dockerfile
- **Note:** No session management to test, no token handling to analyze

### For SSRF Analysis Specialist
- **Status:** No SSRF testing needed - zero outbound HTTP functionality
- **Recommendation:** Document absence of SSRF attack surface

### For Authz Analysis Specialist
- **CRITICAL PRIORITY:** Vertical privilege escalation via type juggling bypass
- **Note:** No horizontal escalation possible (no object IDs, no multi-tenancy)
- **Note:** No context-based authorization to test (no workflows)
- **Focus:** Document trivial privilege escalation path from anonymous to admin

## 14. Network-Accessible Attack Surface Summary

**Total Network-Accessible Components:**
- **Dynamic Endpoints:** 1 (index.php with authentication logic)
- **Static Assets:** 3 (image files)
- **Exposed Artifacts:** 1 (Dockerfile)
- **Total:** 5 network-accessible resources

**Authentication Endpoints:** 1 (critically vulnerable)
**Authorization Endpoints:** 0 (no separate authorization layer)
**API Endpoints:** 0 (no API structure)
**Admin Panels:** 0 (no admin interface beyond flag display)

**Critical Vulnerabilities:** 1 (Type Juggling Authentication Bypass)
**High Vulnerabilities:** 1 (Exposed Dockerfile)
**Medium Vulnerabilities:** 3 (Credentials in GET, No Rate Limiting, No HTTPS)

**Overall Risk Rating:** CRITICAL (trivial authentication bypass, end-of-life stack, zero security controls)

---

**RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETE**

This comprehensive reconnaissance report provides the foundational intelligence for all subsequent vulnerability analysis phases. The primary finding is a **critical authentication bypass vulnerability** that allows trivial privilege escalation from anonymous to admin via PHP type juggling. All subsequent analysis should prioritize this vulnerability as the primary attack vector.

**Next Phase:** Vulnerability Analysis (Injection, XSS, Auth, SSRF, Authz specialists)