# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Zero SSRF vulnerabilities identified after comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible endpoints and code paths.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the systematic analysis performed to identify Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities in the Encoder64 Blog application. Despite exhaustive analysis, no SSRF attack surface exists due to the application's architecture—it makes no outbound HTTP requests and has no user-controllable URL parameters that reach HTTP clients.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern Analysis Result: No SSRF Patterns Found

**Finding:** After systematic analysis of all endpoints and request-making functionality identified in the reconnaissance deliverable, **ZERO SSRF vulnerability patterns were discovered**.

**Reasoning:**
The application architecture fundamentally lacks the components necessary for SSRF vulnerabilities:

1. **No HTTP Client Usage:** The application does not use any HTTP client libraries (cURL, file_get_contents with URLs, fsockopen, etc.) to make outbound requests.

2. **No External API Integrations:** The application does not integrate with external services, webhooks, payment processors, or third-party APIs.

3. **No User-Controlled URLs:** While the application accepts user input through various parameters (page, id, form fields, file uploads), none of these inputs are used to construct or influence HTTP requests.

4. **Static External References Only:** The only external URLs in the codebase are client-side Bootstrap CDN references, which the user's browser fetches—not the server.

5. **File-Based Architecture:** The application uses local file operations exclusively (reading posts.json, moving uploaded files, including PHP files). No network-based operations occur.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**HTTP Client Library:** None detected. The application does not make any outbound HTTP requests.

**Request Architecture:** 
- The application is entirely inbound-focused, serving content to clients
- No server-side request functionality exists for webhooks, URL fetching, API proxying, or similar operations
- The single instance of `file_get_contents()` uses a hardcoded local path ('posts.json') with no user input

**Internal Services:** 
- Application runs as a single Docker container with no internal service mesh or microservices architecture
- No evidence of internal APIs, metadata endpoints, or service discovery mechanisms that could be targeted via SSRF

**Analyzed Components:**

| Component | Analysis Result | SSRF Risk |
|-----------|----------------|-----------|
| `/index.php` | Reads local posts.json file with hardcoded path | None |
| `/post.php` | Dynamic file inclusion (LFI vulnerability, not SSRF) | None |
| `/contact.php` | Form submission with no external processing | None |
| `/about.php` | Static page, no dynamic functionality | None |
| `/posts/upload-article.php` | File upload to local directory only | None |
| Bootstrap CDN References | Client-side fetches by browser, not server | None |

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The following analysis confirms that no SSRF attack surface exists in this application:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism / Architecture | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Blog Post Loading | `/index.php` (line 3) | Uses `file_get_contents('posts.json')` with hardcoded static path. No user input affects the path. | SAFE - Not SSRF-capable |
| Post Viewer | `/post.php?id={value}` | Uses `include()` for local file inclusion. No HTTP requests made. This is an LFI vulnerability, not SSRF. | NOT SSRF (LFI vulnerability handled by separate analysis) |
| File Upload | `/posts/upload-article.php` (lines 24-27) | Uses `move_uploaded_file()` for local filesystem operations. No outbound requests. | SAFE - Not SSRF-capable |
| Contact Form | `/contact.php` | Form data processed locally, not forwarded to external services. | SAFE - No outbound requests |
| External CDN Assets | All pages (Bootstrap references) | Client-side resources loaded by user's browser, not server-side requests. | SAFE - Client-side only |

### Comprehensive Function Analysis

**HTTP Client Functions Searched (0 occurrences):**
- `curl_init()`, `curl_exec()`, `curl_setopt()` - Not found
- `file_get_contents()` with user-controlled URLs - Not found (only static path usage)
- `fopen()` with URLs - Not found
- `readfile()` with URLs - Not found
- `fsockopen()`, `stream_socket_client()` - Not found

**URL Processing Functions Searched (0 occurrences):**
- `parse_url()` with user input - Not found
- `filter_var()` with FILTER_VALIDATE_URL - Not found
- URL parameter validation logic - Not found

**API/Webhook Functions Searched (0 occurrences):**
- Webhook handlers - Not found
- API proxy endpoints - Not found
- OAuth/OIDC token fetching - Not found
- JWKS URL fetching - Not found

**XML/Image Processing Functions Searched (0 occurrences):**
- `simplexml_load_file()`, `DOMDocument::load()` - Not found
- `getimagesize()` with URLs - Not found
- `imagecreatefrom*()` functions - Not found

**Redirect Functions Searched (0 occurrences):**
- `header("Location:")` with user input - Not found
- Open redirect patterns - Not found

### Key Architectural Observation

This application follows a **pure file-based architecture** with no outbound communication capabilities. It:
- Reads blog posts from local JSON files
- Includes local PHP files for content rendering
- Writes uploaded files to local disk
- Returns HTML to clients

The absence of HTTP client libraries and external API integrations means the application cannot perform the server-side requests required for SSRF vulnerabilities to exist.

## 5. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

The following potential SSRF vectors were systematically analyzed and confirmed to not be present or exploitable:

### 1. URL Parameters
**Analysis:** All URL parameters (`?page=`, `?id=`) were traced through the codebase.
- `page` parameter: Type-cast to integer, used only for pagination logic
- `id` parameter: Used for file inclusion, not HTTP requests (LFI, not SSRF)
**Result:** No URL parameters lead to HTTP client invocations.

### 2. Form Input Fields
**Analysis:** All POST form fields (name, email, message, articleFile) were traced.
- Contact form: Data echoed back to user, not sent externally
- Upload form: Files saved locally, no external processing
**Result:** No form inputs trigger outbound requests.

### 3. File Upload Processing
**Analysis:** The `move_uploaded_file()` function moves files within the local filesystem only.
**Result:** No URL-based file fetching or external file processing occurs.

### 4. Callback/Webhook URLs
**Analysis:** Searched for webhook configuration, callback URL parameters, or notification endpoints.
**Result:** No webhook or callback functionality exists in the application.

### 5. API Proxy Endpoints
**Analysis:** Searched for API forwarding, proxy endpoints, or relay functionality.
**Result:** No API proxy or request forwarding capabilities exist.

### 6. Image/Media Processing
**Analysis:** Searched for image processing functions that could fetch remote resources.
**Result:** No image manipulation or remote media fetching occurs.

### 7. XML/External Entity Processing
**Analysis:** Searched for XML parsing functions that could trigger external entity resolution.
**Result:** No XML processing functionality exists.

### 8. Email/SMTP Functionality
**Analysis:** Searched for mail functions that could be abused for SMTP-based SSRF.
**Result:** No email functionality exists (contact form doesn't send emails).

### 9. Redirect Following
**Analysis:** Searched for HTTP redirect handling or URL following logic.
**Result:** No redirect functionality exists.

### 10. PHP Stream Wrappers
**Analysis:** Verified that the single `file_get_contents()` usage does not accept user input.
**Result:** No user-controlled PHP stream wrapper exploitation possible.

## 6. Conclusion

**Final Verdict:** This application has **ZERO exploitable SSRF vulnerabilities**.

**Justification:**
The absence of SSRF vulnerabilities is not due to strong defensive controls, but rather due to the fundamental application architecture. The Encoder64 Blog is a self-contained, file-based blog system that:
- Makes no outbound HTTP requests
- Has no HTTP client library dependencies
- Does not integrate with external services
- Uses only local file operations

For SSRF vulnerabilities to exist, an application must make server-side HTTP requests influenced by user input. This application makes no server-side HTTP requests at all.

**Note on Related Vulnerabilities:**
While no SSRF vulnerabilities exist, the application has a critical **Local File Inclusion (LFI)** vulnerability in `/post.php`. LFI and SSRF are distinct vulnerability classes:
- **LFI:** Includes local files from the filesystem (what this app has)
- **SSRF:** Makes HTTP requests to unintended destinations (what this app lacks)

The LFI vulnerability should be addressed by the appropriate analysis phase.

**External Exploitability Assessment:**
Since no SSRF attack surface exists, no SSRF vulnerabilities can be exploited externally via `http://localhost:36367`.

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**Analysis completed by:** SSRF Analysis Specialist  
**Date:** 2025-10-27  
**Total Endpoints Analyzed:** 7 network-accessible endpoints  
**Total SSRF Sinks Found:** 0  
**Exploitable SSRF Vulnerabilities:** 0
