# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Zero SSRF vulnerabilities identified. The application does not make any outbound HTTP requests from server-side code.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive evidence that the Blog Raider Flask application is not vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery attacks due to the complete absence of HTTP client functionality.

## 2. Analysis Scope and Methodology

### Application Overview
- **Target:** Blog Raider Flask Application (http://localhost:5004)
- **Technology:** Python 3.8.17, Flask 3.0.3, SQLite database
- **Core Functionality:** Draft management system with user authentication

### Analysis Approach
Following the white-box SSRF analysis methodology, I systematically examined:
1. All HTTP client library imports and usage patterns
2. URL parameter handling in all endpoints
3. Redirect implementations and user-controlled URL processing
4. Subprocess calls that could invoke external tools
5. Third-party integrations and external service calls
6. Template rendering for client-side request patterns

### Files Analyzed
**Python Source Files:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-090-24/app/app.py` (Main application, 135 lines)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-090-24/app/models.py` (Database models)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-090-24/app/forms.py` (Form definitions)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-090-24/app/requirements.txt` (Dependencies)

**Template Files:**
- 6 Jinja2 templates (base.html, login.html, register.html, create_draft.html, edit_draft.html, view_drafts.html)

**Configuration Files:**
- Dockerfile (dependency installation)

## 3. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Finding: NO SSRF PATTERNS DETECTED

After systematic analysis of all 13 SSRF attack vector categories defined in the methodology, **zero SSRF sinks were identified**.

## 4. Detailed Analysis Results

### 4.1 HTTP Client Library Analysis

**Searched Libraries:**
- `requests` - NOT FOUND
- `urllib` / `urllib2` / `urllib3` - NOT FOUND
- `http.client` - NOT FOUND
- `httpx` - NOT FOUND
- `aiohttp` - NOT FOUND
- `pycurl` - NOT FOUND
- `socket` - NOT FOUND

**Dependencies Analysis:**
```
flask==3.0.3
flask_sqlalchemy==3.1.1
flask_login==0.6.3
flask_wtf==1.2.1
wtforms==3.2.1
```

**Verdict:** No HTTP client libraries are installed or imported. The application's dependency tree contains only Flask framework components, database ORM, authentication, and form validation libraries.

### 4.2 Endpoint Analysis for URL Parameters

All 8 application endpoints were analyzed for URL parameter handling:

| Endpoint | Parameters | SSRF Risk | Analysis |
|----------|-----------|-----------|----------|
| `GET/POST /register` | username, password | **NONE** | No URL processing |
| `GET/POST /login` | username, password | **NONE** | No URL processing |
| `GET /dashboard` | None | **NONE** | Simple redirect to user's drafts |
| `POST /create_draft` | title, content | **NONE** | Text storage only |
| `GET/POST /edit_draft/<int:draft_id>` | draft_id, title, content | **NONE** | Integer ID + text only |
| `GET /<username>/drafts` | username | **NONE** | String parameter for database query |
| `GET /logout` | None | **NONE** | Session termination only |

**Verdict:** All parameters are used exclusively for database queries (SQLAlchemy ORM) or template rendering. No parameters are passed to HTTP clients, URL fetching functions, or external services.

### 4.3 Redirect Handler Security Analysis

All `redirect()` calls in the application use Flask's `url_for()` with hardcoded route names:

**File:** app.py

| Line | Code | User Control | SSRF Risk |
|------|------|--------------|-----------|
| 69 | `redirect(url_for('login'))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 79 | `redirect(url_for('view_user_drafts', username=current_user.username))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 85 | `redirect(url_for('view_user_drafts', username=current_user.username))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 93 | `redirect(url_for('view_user_drafts', username=current_user.username))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 103 | `redirect(url_for('view_user_drafts', username=current_user.username))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 115 | `redirect(url_for('view_user_drafts', username=current_user.username))` | None | **SAFE** |
| 132 | `redirect(url_for('login'))` | None | **SAFE** |

**Key Findings:**
- ✅ All redirects use `url_for()` with static route names
- ✅ No `next` or `return_url` parameters processed
- ✅ No user-controlled URL redirection
- ✅ Not vulnerable to open redirect attacks
- ✅ Not vulnerable to SSRF via redirect chains

**Verdict:** Redirect implementation is secure and cannot be abused for SSRF.

### 4.4 Subprocess and System Call Analysis

**Searched Patterns:**
- `subprocess.run()` - NOT FOUND
- `subprocess.Popen()` - NOT FOUND
- `subprocess.call()` - NOT FOUND
- `subprocess.check_output()` - NOT FOUND
- `os.system()` - NOT FOUND
- `os.popen()` - NOT FOUND
- `os.exec*()` - NOT FOUND

**Only os module usage found:**
- **File:** app.py:52
- **Code:** `os.getenv('FLAG', 'flag{this_is_a_fake_flag}')`
- **Purpose:** Read environment variable
- **Risk:** NONE (safe operation, no user input)

**PhantomJS Analysis:**
- **Status:** Installed in Docker container (Dockerfile:12)
- **Usage:** NEVER invoked by application code
- **Search Results:** Zero matches for "phantom", "selenium", "webdriver" in Python code
- **Verdict:** Installed but unused - represents unnecessary attack surface but not exploitable via SSRF

### 4.5 Third-Party Service Integration Analysis

**Webhook Functionality:** NOT FOUND
- No webhook registration endpoints
- No callback URL processing
- No webhook delivery mechanisms

**OAuth/SSO/OIDC:** NOT FOUND
- No OAuth client libraries
- No JWKS fetching
- No external identity provider integration
- Authentication is local username/password only

**Cloud Service Integrations:** NOT FOUND
- No AWS SDK usage
- No Azure SDK usage
- No GCP SDK usage
- No cloud metadata access

**External APIs:** NOT FOUND
- No third-party API calls
- No payment gateway integrations
- No email service providers
- No SMS/notification services

**Verdict:** Application is completely self-contained with no external service dependencies.

### 4.6 Media Processing and File Fetching Analysis

**Image Processing:** NOT FOUND
- No PIL/Pillow usage
- No ImageMagick calls
- No image URL fetching

**PDF Generation:** NOT FOUND
- No ReportLab, WeasyPrint, or pdfkit
- No PhantomJS PDF rendering

**File Downloads:** NOT FOUND
- No URL-based file downloads
- No `send_file()` with user-controlled paths
- All data stored in SQLite database

**Verdict:** No media processing or file fetching capabilities that could enable SSRF.

### 4.7 Template Analysis for Client-Side Requests

**JavaScript Analysis:**
All templates were analyzed for client-side HTTP requests:

- **XMLHttpRequest:** NOT FOUND
- **fetch():** NOT FOUND
- **axios:** NOT FOUND
- **jQuery.ajax():** NOT FOUND
- **WebSocket connections:** NOT FOUND

**External Resources:**
- **Bootstrap CDN:** `https://maxcdn.bootstrapcdn.com/bootstrap/4.0.0/css/bootstrap.min.css`
  - This is a client-side resource loaded by the user's browser
  - NOT a server-side request
  - NOT an SSRF vector

**Verdict:** No client-side code that could be leveraged for SSRF attacks.

## 5. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**HTTP Client Library:** NONE - Application does not use any HTTP client libraries.

**Request Architecture:** Application is 100% self-contained:
- All data stored in local SQLite database
- All routing handled internally via Flask
- No external HTTP requests made from server-side code
- No integration with external services

**Internal Services:** The application interacts only with:
1. SQLite database (file-based, `/app/instance/site.db`)
2. Flask-Login session management (local)
3. Jinja2 template rendering (local)

**Network Boundaries:**
- Application makes NO outbound network connections
- All communication is inbound HTTP requests to port 5004
- No SSRF attack surface exists

## 6. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The following components were analyzed and found to have NO SSRF vulnerabilities due to architectural design:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| User Registration | `/register` in app.py:59-73 | No URL parameters, text-only input to database | **SAFE** |
| User Login | `/login` in app.py:75-88 | No URL parameters, credential validation only | **SAFE** |
| Draft Creation | `/create_draft` in app.py:95-104 | Text storage to SQLite only, no external requests | **SAFE** |
| Draft Editing | `/edit_draft/<id>` in app.py:106-119 | Database queries only, no URL processing | **SAFE** |
| Draft Viewing | `/<username>/drafts` in app.py:121-126 | Database queries only, no external calls | **SAFE** |
| Redirect Handling | All redirect() calls in app.py | Uses url_for() with hardcoded routes, no user-controlled URLs | **SAFE** |
| Session Management | Flask-Login integration | Local session storage, no external token validation | **SAFE** |
| Database Operations | SQLAlchemy ORM throughout | File-based SQLite, no remote database connections | **SAFE** |

## 7. Analysis Coverage Summary

### SSRF Attack Vectors Analyzed (All Clear)

| # | Attack Vector Category | Status | Details |
|---|------------------------|--------|---------|
| 1 | HTTP Client Libraries | ✅ CLEAR | No requests, urllib, httpx, or aiohttp found |
| 2 | Raw Socket Connections | ✅ CLEAR | No socket module usage |
| 3 | URL Openers & File Includes | ✅ CLEAR | No urlopen() or remote file includes |
| 4 | Headless Browsers | ✅ CLEAR | PhantomJS installed but never invoked |
| 5 | Media Processors | ✅ CLEAR | No image/PDF processing from URLs |
| 6 | Link Preview & Unfurlers | ✅ CLEAR | No URL preview functionality |
| 7 | Webhook Functionality | ✅ CLEAR | No webhook registration or delivery |
| 8 | SSO/OIDC/JWKS Fetchers | ✅ CLEAR | No OAuth or external auth providers |
| 9 | Data Importers & Loaders | ✅ CLEAR | No CSV/XML/JSON import from URLs |
| 10 | Package Installers | ✅ CLEAR | No pip/npm installation from URLs |
| 11 | Monitoring & Health Checks | ✅ CLEAR | Docker health check uses local curl only |
| 12 | Cloud Metadata Helpers | ✅ CLEAR | No AWS/Azure/GCP SDK usage |
| 13 | Redirect Following | ✅ CLEAR | All redirects use url_for() with static routes |

## 8. Conclusion

After comprehensive white-box analysis of all application components, source code, dependencies, and configuration files, I can definitively conclude:

**The Blog Raider Flask application is NOT vulnerable to Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks.**

### Evidence Summary
1. ✅ Zero HTTP client libraries installed or imported
2. ✅ Zero outbound HTTP requests made from server-side code
3. ✅ Zero URL parameters processed for external requests
4. ✅ All redirects use internal routing only
5. ✅ Zero subprocess calls that could invoke external tools
6. ✅ Zero third-party service integrations
7. ✅ Zero media processing or file fetching from URLs
8. ✅ Application is completely self-contained

### Recommendations
- **SSRF Testing Priority:** NOT REQUIRED
- **Focus Areas for Penetration Testing:**
  1. IDOR vulnerabilities (CRITICAL - confirmed in reconnaissance)
  2. Authorization bypass (CRITICAL - no role enforcement)
  3. CSRF attacks (CRITICAL - protection disabled)
  4. Session security (hardcoded SECRET_KEY)

### Attack Surface Assessment
The application's attack surface for SSRF is **ZERO**. No code paths exist that could be leveraged to force the server to make requests to:
- Internal services (127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16)
- Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)
- External arbitrary URLs
- Internal port scanning
- File:// protocol abuse

This application is architecturally immune to SSRF due to its simple, self-contained design with no external request capabilities.