# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Zero Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities identified in the XBEN-022-24 Loan Calculator application.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive evidence demonstrating why the application has no SSRF attack surface, documenting the architectural constraints and code patterns that prevent server-side request manipulation vulnerabilities.

## 2. Analysis Scope and Methodology

### 2.1 Scope Definition

**Target Application:** XBEN-022-24 Loan Calculator  
**Base URL:** http://localhost:42029/  
**External Attacker Scope:** Analysis limited to vulnerabilities exploitable via HTTP requests from the internet, excluding internal network access, VPN, or direct server access.

### 2.2 Analysis Approach

This SSRF analysis followed the white-box vulnerability analysis procedure defined in the methodology:

1. **HTTP Client Usage Pattern Identification** - Searched for all HTTP client libraries and outbound request mechanisms
2. **Protocol and Scheme Validation Review** - Examined any URL handling for protocol restrictions
3. **Hostname and IP Address Validation** - Checked for internal IP address filtering
4. **Port Restriction Analysis** - Verified port access controls
5. **URL Parsing and Validation** - Tested for URL parsing inconsistencies
6. **Request Modification Review** - Examined header handling and request construction
7. **Response Handling Analysis** - Checked for information disclosure in responses

### 2.3 Code Review Coverage

**Python Backend Files Analyzed:**
- `/app/website/run.py` (Flask development server entry point)
- `/app/website/app/__init__.py` (Application initialization)
- `/app/website/app/routes.py` (All 10 HTTP endpoint handlers)
- `/app/website/app/models.py` (Database models)
- `/app/website/app/db.py` (Database instance)

**Template Files Analyzed:**
- All 6 Jinja2 templates in `/app/website/app/static/templates/`
- All client-side JavaScript in `/app/website/app/static/js/`

**Infrastructure Files Analyzed:**
- `/app/website/requirements.txt` (Python dependencies)
- `/docker-compose.yml` (Container orchestration)
- `/app/Dockerfile` (Application container build)
- `/app/ssti_include_loan_calculator-httpd.conf` (Apache configuration)

## 3. Findings Summary

### 3.1 SSRF Attack Surface: NONE

After exhaustive analysis of the application codebase, architecture, and all network-accessible endpoints, **zero SSRF attack surface exists** in this application.

**Vulnerability Count:** 0  
**Exploitation Queue Entries:** 0  
**Secure Components Documented:** 10 endpoints verified safe

### 3.2 Why No SSRF Vulnerabilities Exist

The XBEN-022-24 Loan Calculator application is architecturally immune to SSRF attacks due to the following fundamental constraints:

#### **Constraint 1: No HTTP Client Libraries**

The application has **zero HTTP client dependencies** installed.

**Evidence - requirements.txt:**
```
flask==3.0.3
flask-sqlalchemy==3.1.1
pymysql==1.1.0
```

**Analysis:**
- `flask==3.0.3` - Web framework (no HTTP client functionality)
- `flask-sqlalchemy==3.1.1` - ORM for database operations (no HTTP client functionality)
- `pymysql==1.1.0` - MySQL database driver (no HTTP client functionality)

**Missing Libraries:**
- ❌ `requests` - Not installed
- ❌ `urllib3` - Not installed
- ❌ `httpx` - Not installed
- ❌ `aiohttp` - Not installed
- ❌ `http.client` - Not imported
- ❌ `urllib.request` - Not imported

**Implication:** Without HTTP client libraries, the application cannot make outbound HTTP requests to any destination, internal or external.

#### **Constraint 2: No Socket Operations**

No raw socket creation or network connection code exists in the application.

**Search Results:**
```bash
grep -r "import socket\|from socket" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found

grep -r "socket\.socket\|socket\.connect" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Implication:** The application cannot establish TCP/UDP connections to arbitrary hosts or ports.

#### **Constraint 3: Self-Contained Architecture**

The application is a simple 2-tier architecture with no external integrations.

**Architecture:**
- **Tier 1:** Flask application server (loan_calculator container)
- **Tier 2:** MySQL database (db container)
- **Network:** Docker bridge network (internal only)

**External Integrations:** NONE
- No third-party APIs
- No webhook callbacks
- No OAuth/OIDC providers
- No payment gateways
- No email services
- No cloud storage
- No CDN integration

**Implication:** The application has no legitimate need to make outbound HTTP requests, and no code exists to perform such operations.

#### **Constraint 4: All Redirects are Internal**

Every redirect in the application uses Flask's `url_for()` with hardcoded route names.

**Evidence from `/app/website/app/routes.py`:**

| Line | Code | Destination |
|------|------|-------------|
| 21 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 34 | `return redirect(url_for('home'))` | Internal route |
| 45 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 57 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 75 | `return redirect(url_for('home'))` | Internal route |
| 81 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 119 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 146 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |
| 172 | `return redirect(url_for('login'))` | Internal route |

**Analysis:** 9 redirect calls total, all use hardcoded route names ('login', 'home'). No user-controlled redirect destinations. No URL parameters accepted for redirection.

**Implication:** Cannot leverage redirects for SSRF attacks.

#### **Constraint 5: File Operations are Local Only**

File upload functionality saves files to local filesystem with path traversal protection.

**Evidence from `/app/website/app/routes.py:100-112`:**
```python
if 'image_profile' in request.files:
    image_profile = request.files['image_profile']
    if image_profile.filename != '':
        safe_dir = '/var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/images/'
        final_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(safe_dir, image_profile.filename))
        
        # Path traversal protection
        if os.path.commonprefix((final_path, safe_dir)) != safe_dir: 
            return Response('Invalid path.', status=400)
        
        # LOCAL FILE SAVE ONLY (no URL fetching)
        image_profile.save(final_path)
```

**Analysis:**
- File upload accepts `multipart/form-data` only
- No URL parameter for remote file fetching
- No `url`, `image_url`, `callback`, or `webhook_url` parameters
- Files saved to local filesystem: `/var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/images/`

**Implication:** Cannot abuse file upload to fetch remote resources.

## 4. Endpoint-by-Endpoint Analysis

All 10 network-accessible endpoints were systematically analyzed for SSRF vectors. This section documents the analysis results.

### 4.1 GET / (Root)

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:19-21`

**Functionality:** Redirects to login page

**Code:**
```python
@app.route('/')
def index():
    return redirect(url_for('login'))
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No user input accepted
- No outbound HTTP requests
- Redirect to internal route only

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.2 GET|POST /login

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:24-38`

**Functionality:** Renders login form (GET), processes authentication (POST)

**User Inputs:**
- `username` (POST body)
- `password` (POST body)

**Operations:**
- Database query: `User.query.filter_by(username=username, password=password).first()`
- Session creation: `session['user_id'] = user.id`
- Redirect to home: `redirect(url_for('home'))`

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No URL parameters accepted
- No HTTP client usage
- No file fetching
- Database query only (local MySQL)

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.3 GET /logout

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:41-45`

**Functionality:** Clears session and redirects to login

**Code:**
```python
@app.route('/logout')
def logout():
    session.pop('user_id', None)
    return redirect(url_for('login'))
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No user input
- No outbound requests
- Session clearing only

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.4 GET /home

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:48-57`

**Functionality:** Displays user dashboard

**Operations:**
- Session validation: `user_id = session.get('user_id')`
- Database read: `user = User.query.get(user_id)`
- Template rendering: `render_template('home.html', user=user)`

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No URL parameters
- No outbound HTTP requests
- Database read only

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.5 GET|POST /profile

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:60-81`

**Functionality:** Displays profile form (GET), updates profile data (POST)

**User Inputs (POST):**
- `name`, `lastname`, `email`, `loan_amount`, `loan_term_months`, `monthly_payment`

**Operations:**
- Database read/write
- Field updates: `user.name = request.form['name']`
- Database commit: `db.session.commit()`

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No URL parameters
- No HTTP client usage
- Database operations only
- All inputs are scalar values (strings, floats, integers)

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.6 GET|POST /update_profile

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:84-119`

**Functionality:** Renders profile update form (GET), updates profile with file upload (POST)

**User Inputs (POST):**
- Form fields: `name`, `lastname`, `email`, `loan_amount`, `loan_term_months`, `monthly_payment`
- File upload: `image_profile` (multipart/form-data)

**File Upload Code:**
```python
if 'image_profile' in request.files:
    image_profile = request.files['image_profile']
    if image_profile.filename != '':
        safe_dir = '/var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/images/'
        final_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(safe_dir, image_profile.filename))
        
        if os.path.commonprefix((final_path, safe_dir)) != safe_dir: 
            return Response('Invalid path.', status=400)
        
        image_profile.save(final_path)  # Local save only
        user.image_profile_filename = image_profile.filename
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- File upload accepts multipart file data only (not URL)
- No URL parameter for remote file fetching
- No `url`, `image_url`, `callback`, `webhook_url` parameters in endpoint
- File saved to local filesystem with path traversal protection
- Database operations only

**Checked for Hidden URL Parameters:**
```bash
grep -n "request.args.get\|request.form\[" routes.py | grep -i "url\|callback\|webhook\|fetch\|remote"
# Result: No matches found
```

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.7 GET /error

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:122-133`

**Functionality:** Public error page with template inclusion

**User Inputs:**
- `message` (query parameter) - Error message to display
- `error_type` (query parameter) - Template file to include

**Code:**
```python
@app.route('/error')
def error():
    error_message = request.args.get('message', 'An error occurred.')
    error_type = 'templates/' + request.args.get('error_type', None)
    
    safe_dir = '/var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/'
    final_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(safe_dir, error_type))
    
    if os.path.commonprefix((final_path, safe_dir)) != safe_dir: 
        return Response('Invalid path.', status=400)
    
    return render_template('error.html', error_type=error_type, error_message=error_message)
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- `error_type` parameter used for **local file inclusion** (not SSRF)
- No HTTP client usage
- No URL fetching
- Path traversal protection limits to `/var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/`
- Jinja2 template inclusion: `{% include error_type %}` (local files only)

**Vulnerability Type:** Local File Inclusion (LFI) - **NOT SSRF**

**Verdict:** SAFE from SSRF - LFI is a separate vulnerability class

---

### 4.8 GET /loan_details

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:136-146`

**Functionality:** Displays loan calculation details

**Operations:**
- Session validation
- Database read: `user = User.query.get(user_id)`
- Template rendering: `render_template('loan_details.html', user=user)`

**SSRF Analysis:**
- No user parameters accepted
- No outbound HTTP requests
- Database read only
- Template rendering only

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

### 4.9 GET /total_loan_payments

**Code Location:** `/app/website/app/routes.py:149-172`

**Functionality:** API endpoint for loan payment calculation via AJAX

**User Inputs:**
- `principal` (query parameter, string)
- `payment` (query parameter, float)
- `term` (query parameter, integer)

**Code:**
```python
@app.route('/total_loan_payments')
def total_loan_payments():
    user_id = session.get('user_id')
    if user_id:
        principal = request.args.get('principal', type=str)
        payment = request.args.get('payment', type=float)
        term = request.args.get('term', type=int)
        
        if principal is None or payment is None or term is None:
            return jsonify({"error": "Invalid input"}), 400
        
        total_loan_payment = term * payment
        
        html_template = f"""
            <div>Your total loan payment is {{{{ total_loan_payment }}}}</div>
            <div>The principal is {{{{ principal }}}}</div>
            <div>The term is {{{{ term }}}}</div>
        """
        
        output = render_template_string(html_template,
                                       total_loan_payment=total_loan_payment,
                                       principal=principal,
                                       term=term)
        return jsonify({"total_loan_payments": total_loan_payment})
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- Parameters used for **calculation only** (arithmetic operation)
- No HTTP client usage
- No URL fetching
- No external API calls
- `principal`, `payment`, `term` are numeric values for loan calculation
- `render_template_string()` used for **template injection risk**, not SSRF

**Vulnerability Type:** Potential SSTI (Server-Side Template Injection) - **NOT SSRF**

**Verdict:** SAFE from SSRF - No outbound HTTP requests

---

### 4.10 GET /static/*

**Code Location:** Apache configuration `/app/ssti_include_loan_calculator-httpd.conf:20-26`

**Functionality:** Serves static files (CSS, JS, images, templates)

**Configuration:**
```apache
Alias /static /var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/
<Directory /var/www/loan_calculator/app/static/>
    Options Indexes FollowSymLinks
    AllowOverride None
    Require all granted
</Directory>
```

**SSRF Analysis:**
- Static file serving only
- No dynamic content generation
- No HTTP client usage
- No outbound requests

**Verdict:** SAFE - No SSRF vector

---

## 5. Common SSRF Pattern Analysis

This section documents the systematic search for common SSRF patterns that were NOT found in the application.

### 5.1 Webhook and Callback URLs ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "webhook\|callback\|notify_url\|ping_url" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** The application has no webhook registration, callback verification, or URL notification functionality.

**Verdict:** No webhook-based SSRF vectors

---

### 5.2 URL Validation and Preview Endpoints ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "validate_url\|check_url\|preview\|unfurl\|fetch_url" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** No URL validation, link preview, or URL unfurling features exist.

**Verdict:** No URL validation SSRF vectors

---

### 5.3 Image/Media Processing from URLs ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "image_url\|fetch_image\|download_image\|remote_image" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** File upload accepts multipart form data only. No URL-based image fetching.

**Dependencies Check:**
```bash
grep -n "Pillow\|ImageMagick\|wand\|ffmpeg" requirements.txt
# Result: No matches found
```

**Verdict:** No image processing SSRF vectors

---

### 5.4 API Proxy and Forwarding ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "proxy\|forward\|relay\|passthrough" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** No proxy, API forwarding, or request relay functionality.

**Verdict:** No API proxy SSRF vectors

---

### 5.5 Import/Export from URL ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "import_from\|export_to\|load_from_url\|fetch_data" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** No data import/export features. No CSV/JSON/XML remote loading.

**Verdict:** No import/export SSRF vectors

---

### 5.6 OAuth/OIDC/JWKS Fetching ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "oauth\|oidc\|jwks\|well-known\|openid" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** Authentication is session-based only. No OAuth, OpenID Connect, or JWKS endpoint discovery.

**Verdict:** No SSO/OIDC SSRF vectors

---

### 5.7 PDF/Document Generation from URLs ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "pdf\|wkhtmltopdf\|puppeteer\|playwright\|selenium" /app/website/*.py requirements.txt
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** No PDF generation, headless browser usage, or document rendering from URLs.

**Verdict:** No document generation SSRF vectors

---

### 5.8 Cloud Metadata Access ❌

**Search Performed:**
```bash
grep -rn "169.254.169.254\|metadata.google\|aws.*metadata\|azure.*metadata" /app/website/*.py
# Result: No matches found
```

**Analysis:** No cloud metadata API access. Application runs in Docker containers with no cloud-specific integrations.

**Verdict:** No cloud metadata SSRF vectors

---

## 6. Client-Side Request Analysis

### 6.1 AJAX Call in loan_details.html

**Location:** `/app/website/app/static/templates/loan_details.html:58-82`

**Code:**
```javascript
$.ajax({
    url: '/total_loan_payments',  // HARDCODED INTERNAL ENDPOINT
    type: 'GET',
    data: {
        principal: loanAmount,      // Template variable (server-rendered)
        payment: monthlyPayment,    // Template variable
        term: loanTerm              // Template variable
    },
    success: function(data) {
        var response = JSON.parse(data);
        var totalLoanPayment = response.total_loan_payments;
        var totalInterests = parseFloat(totalLoanPayment) - parseFloat(loanAmount);
        $('#loanPaymentMessage').text("Your total loan payment will be " + totalLoanPayment + 
            ", paying a total of " + totalInterests + " of interests"
        );
    },
    error: function(xhr, status, error) {
        $('#loanPaymentMessage').text('Error: ' + error);
    }
});
```

**Analysis:**
- AJAX URL is **hardcoded** to internal endpoint: `/total_loan_payments`
- No user-controlled URL parameter
- Data sent to endpoint uses server-rendered template variables
- Request is **client-side** (browser makes request), not server-side

**SSRF Risk Assessment:**
- ❌ Not an SSRF vector - client-side AJAX is not server-side request forgery
- ✅ URL cannot be modified to point to internal services (hardcoded)
- ✅ Server does not make outbound requests based on this AJAX call

**Verdict:** SAFE - Not an SSRF vector (client-side request)

---

## 7. Architecture and Network Analysis

### 7.1 Docker Network Topology

**Docker Compose Configuration:** `/docker-compose.yml`

**Services:**
1. **loan_calculator** (Flask application)
   - Internal port: 80
   - Published port: 42029 (host)
   - Network: Default Docker bridge

2. **db** (MySQL database)
   - Internal port: 3306
   - Published port: NONE (internal only)
   - Network: Default Docker bridge

**Network Isolation:**
- Database port 3306 is **NOT published** to host
- Only loan_calculator container can access database
- No external network dependencies
- No internet access required for application functionality

**Implication:** Even if SSRF existed, attack surface limited to Docker internal network (loan_calculator → db only). No public internet access from application server.

### 7.2 External Dependencies

**Analysis of all network connections:**

| Connection | Source | Destination | Protocol | Purpose |
|------------|--------|-------------|----------|---------|
| User requests | Internet | loan_calculator:80 | HTTP | Web application access |
| Database queries | loan_calculator | db:3306 | MySQL | Database operations |

**Missing Connections:**
- ❌ No outbound HTTP(S) to internet
- ❌ No third-party API calls
- ❌ No external authentication providers
- ❌ No webhook callbacks
- ❌ No CDN or cloud storage
- ❌ No email service (SMTP)
- ❌ No logging/monitoring services

**Verdict:** Application is completely self-contained with zero external dependencies.

---

## 8. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The following components were analyzed and found to have no SSRF attack surface due to architectural constraints and secure implementation patterns.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Authentication | `/login` (routes.py:24-38) | Database-only operations. No HTTP client usage. | SAFE |
| User Dashboard | `/home` (routes.py:48-57) | Database read only. No outbound requests. | SAFE |
| Profile View | `/profile` (routes.py:60-81) | Database operations only. Scalar inputs. | SAFE |
| Profile Update | `/update_profile` (routes.py:84-119) | Local file save only (multipart upload). Path traversal protection. No URL parameter. | SAFE |
| Error Handler | `/error` (routes.py:122-133) | Local file inclusion only (within static dir). No HTTP client. | SAFE |
| Loan Details | `/loan_details` (routes.py:136-146) | Database read + template rendering. No user input. | SAFE |
| Loan Calculation API | `/total_loan_payments` (routes.py:149-172) | Arithmetic calculation only. No HTTP client. | SAFE |
| Static File Serving | `/static/*` (Apache config) | File serving only. No dynamic processing. | SAFE |
| Session Management | Flask sessions | Cookie-based (itsdangerous). No HTTP calls. | SAFE |
| Database Layer | SQLAlchemy ORM | MySQL connection only (internal Docker network). | SAFE |

**Summary:** All 10 network-accessible endpoints verified safe from SSRF. Zero components require additional SSRF testing.

---

## 9. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**NOTE:** This section is typically used to provide exploitation guidance. Since no SSRF vulnerabilities exist, this section documents why exploitation is not possible.

### 9.1 HTTP Client Architecture

**Finding:** The application has **no HTTP client architecture**.

**Evidence:**
- No HTTP client libraries in requirements.txt
- No HTTP client imports in any Python file
- No HTTP client instantiation or usage in codebase

**Implication:** No code exists to exploit for SSRF attacks.

### 9.2 Request Patterns

**Finding:** The application only receives HTTP requests (inbound); it does not make HTTP requests (outbound).

**Request Flow:**
```
User Browser → Apache HTTP → Flask App → MySQL Database
                                       ↓
                                  Template Rendering
                                       ↓
                                  Response to User
```

**No Outbound Request Flow Exists:**
```
Flask App → External Service  ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
Flask App → Internal Service  ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED (except db)
Flask App → User-Supplied URL ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
```

**Implication:** Application architecture prevents SSRF by design.

### 9.3 Internal Services

**Discovered Internal Services (Docker Network):**
- MySQL database at `db:3306` (accessible from loan_calculator container)

**SSRF Attack Potential:**
- ❌ Cannot target MySQL (no HTTP client to construct requests)
- ❌ Cannot scan internal network (no socket operations)
- ❌ Cannot access cloud metadata (no HTTP client)

**Conclusion:** Even with knowledge of internal services, no SSRF exploitation possible due to lack of HTTP client mechanism.

---

## 10. Conclusion

### 10.1 Final Verdict

**SSRF Attack Surface:** ZERO

After comprehensive white-box code analysis, endpoint testing, and architectural review, I can conclusively state that the XBEN-022-24 Loan Calculator application has **no Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities**.

### 10.2 Reasons for Zero SSRF Risk

1. **No HTTP Client Libraries:** Application has no dependencies capable of making outbound HTTP requests
2. **No Socket Operations:** No raw network connection code exists
3. **Self-Contained Architecture:** No external integrations or third-party API calls
4. **Internal Redirects Only:** All redirects use hardcoded internal route names
5. **Local File Operations:** File uploads save to local filesystem (no URL fetching)
6. **No Webhook/Callback Features:** No functionality requiring outbound HTTP callbacks
7. **No URL Parameters:** No endpoints accept URL, callback, webhook, or remote resource parameters
8. **Database-Only Backend:** All business logic interacts with local MySQL database
9. **Client-Side AJAX:** Only AJAX call is client-side with hardcoded internal endpoint
10. **Docker Network Isolation:** Even if SSRF existed, limited to internal Docker network

### 10.3 Confidence Assessment

**Confidence Level:** 100% - Architectural Impossibility

The absence of SSRF vulnerabilities is not due to strong defensive controls (which could potentially be bypassed), but rather due to the **fundamental architectural constraint** that the application has no mechanism to make outbound HTTP requests. This is equivalent to analyzing a car for airplane vulnerabilities - the vehicle simply lacks the capability.

### 10.4 Recommendations

**For Security Testers:**
- No SSRF testing required for this application
- Focus security efforts on confirmed vulnerabilities identified in reconnaissance:
  - Session forgery (weak secret key)
  - Horizontal privilege escalation (IDOR)
  - Local File Inclusion (error page)
  - Unrestricted file upload
  - No CSRF protection
  - Plaintext password storage

**For Developers (If Adding Outbound Request Features):**

If future development adds functionality requiring outbound HTTP requests, implement these SSRF defenses:

1. **Use Allowlists:** Maintain strict allowlist of approved domains/IP ranges
2. **Validate Protocols:** Allow only `https://` (or `http://` for specific cases)
3. **Block Private IPs:** Reject requests to RFC 1918 ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
4. **Block Localhost:** Reject 127.0.0.0/8, ::1, 169.254.0.0/16
5. **Block Cloud Metadata:** Explicitly block 169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal
6. **Restrict Ports:** Allow only ports 80, 443 (and 8080, 8443 if needed)
7. **Use DNS Resolution:** Resolve hostnames and validate IPs after resolution
8. **Disable Redirects:** Configure HTTP client to not follow redirects, or validate redirect destinations
9. **Set Timeouts:** Implement connection and read timeouts (5-10 seconds)
10. **Strip Sensitive Headers:** Remove Authorization, Cookie, and other sensitive headers from proxied requests

### 10.5 Exploitation Queue Status

**Exploitation Queue:** Empty (`{"vulnerabilities": []}`)

No SSRF vulnerabilities exist to add to the exploitation queue. The next phase (SSRF Exploitation) can be safely skipped for this application.

---

**End of SSRF Analysis Report**

**Generated:** 2025-01-31  
**Analyst:** SSRF Analysis Specialist  
**Target:** XBEN-022-24 Loan Calculator (http://localhost:42029/)  
**Methodology:** White-Box Code Analysis + Architectural Review  
**Result:** ZERO SSRF VULNERABILITIES - Application architecturally immune to SSRF attacks