# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified in the XBEN-043-24 Trading Platform application.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive documentation of the systematic SSRF analysis performed on all network-accessible endpoints and confirms that the application does not make any outbound HTTP requests influenced by user input.

## 2. Analysis Scope and Methodology

### Application Overview
The XBEN-043-24 Trading Platform is a deliberately vulnerable Flask-based web application with a classical three-tier architecture:
- **Backend:** Python 3.x with Flask 3.0.3, SQLAlchemy 3.1.1 ORM, PyMySQL 1.1.0
- **Web Server:** Apache HTTP Server 2.4.65 (Debian) with mod_wsgi
- **Database:** MySQL 5.7.15
- **Target URL:** http://localhost:33611

### Network-Accessible Endpoints Analyzed
The application exposes 4 primary HTTP endpoints:
1. **`/` (GET, POST)** - Login/username entry page
2. **`/password/<username>` (GET, POST)** - Password authentication page
3. **`/dashboard` (GET)** - Protected user dashboard
4. **`/logout` (POST)** - Session termination

### Methodology Applied
Following the white-box SSRF analysis methodology, the following checks were performed:

1. **HTTP Client Usage Pattern Analysis** - Searched for all HTTP client libraries (requests, urllib, aiohttp, httpx, etc.)
2. **Protocol and Scheme Validation Review** - Analyzed URL processing and protocol handling
3. **Hostname and IP Address Validation** - Checked for URL parameter validation
4. **Port Restriction Analysis** - Reviewed service access controls
5. **URL Parsing Analysis** - Examined redirect and URL processing logic
6. **Request Modification Analysis** - Checked for proxy or forwarding functionality
7. **Response Handling Analysis** - Reviewed error messages and response processing

## 3. Comprehensive Analysis Results

### 3.1 HTTP Client Library Analysis
**Finding:** NO HTTP CLIENT LIBRARIES DETECTED

**Dependencies Reviewed (requirements.txt):**
```
flask==3.0.3
flask-sqlalchemy==3.1.1
pymysql==1.1.0
```

**Libraries Searched (None Found):**
- ✗ `requests` - Not imported or used
- ✗ `urllib`, `urllib2`, `urllib3` - Not imported or used  
- ✗ `http.client`, `httplib` - Not imported or used
- ✗ `aiohttp`, `pycurl`, `httpx` - Not in dependencies or code
- ✗ `socket` operations for external connections - Not used

**Code Files Analyzed:**
- `app/website/app/routes.py` (77 lines) - No HTTP client imports
- `app/website/app/__init__.py` (55 lines) - No HTTP client imports
- `app/website/app/models.py` (11 lines) - No HTTP client imports
- `app/website/app/db.py` (3 lines) - No HTTP client imports

**Verdict:** SAFE - No HTTP client libraries means no outbound HTTP requests possible.

### 3.2 URL Parameter Analysis
**Finding:** NO URL PARAMETERS ACCEPTING EXTERNAL URLS

**Parameters Analyzed:**
| Parameter | Endpoint | Type | Usage | SSRF Risk |
|-----------|----------|------|-------|-----------|
| `username` | `POST /` | Form field | Database query (SQLAlchemy) | None |
| `error` | `GET /?error=` | Query param | Template rendering only | None |
| `username` | `GET/POST /password/<username>` | URL path | Database query (SQLAlchemy) | None |
| `password` | `POST /password/<username>` | Form field | Database query (SQLAlchemy) | None |
| `user_id` | `POST /password/<username>` | Hidden form field | Database query (SQLAlchemy) | None |

**Verdict:** SAFE - All user input is used exclusively for database queries via SQLAlchemy ORM. No parameters accept URLs or influence outbound requests.

### 3.3 Redirect and URL Processing Analysis
**Finding:** ALL REDIRECTS USE INTERNAL ROUTE NAMES ONLY

**Redirect Analysis (routes.py):**
All redirects use Flask's `url_for()` helper with hardcoded internal route names:

```python
redirect(url_for('password', username=username))           # Line 28
redirect(url_for('login', error='User not found'))          # Line 49
redirect(url_for('dashboard'))                               # Line 57
redirect(url_for('login'))                                   # Line 59, 78
redirect(url_for('login', error='Incorrect password'))      # Line 64
```

**Analysis:** Flask's `url_for()` generates internal application URLs based on route names, not external URLs. The `username` parameter in `url_for('password', username=username)` becomes a URL path component, not a destination URL. This is NOT user-controlled URL redirection.

**Verdict:** SAFE - No user-controlled redirects to external URLs. All redirects are internal to the application.

### 3.4 External Service Integration Analysis
**Finding:** NO EXTERNAL SERVICE INTEGRATIONS

**Services Checked (None Found):**
- ✗ Webhook delivery endpoints
- ✗ API callback mechanisms
- ✗ OAuth/OIDC discovery endpoints
- ✗ JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetchers
- ✗ SAML metadata fetchers
- ✗ RSS/Atom feed readers
- ✗ Remote configuration fetching
- ✗ Third-party API integrations

**Verdict:** SAFE - Application is self-contained with no external service communication.

### 3.5 File and Media Processing Analysis
**Finding:** NO USER-CONTROLLED FILE OR MEDIA OPERATIONS

**File Operations Analyzed:**
- Single file operation: `open('/flag')` in `__init__.py:37` - **Hardcoded absolute path**, not user-controlled
- No `urlopen()` or `urllib.request` usage
- No remote file loading
- No image processing from URLs
- No PDF generation from URLs
- No media conversion with remote sources

**Verdict:** SAFE - The only file operation uses a hardcoded path with no user input.

### 3.6 Socket and Network Operations Analysis
**Finding:** NO RAW SOCKET OPERATIONS WITH USER INPUT

**Operations Checked (None Found):**
- ✗ `socket.socket()` with user-controlled destinations
- ✗ `socket.connect()` with user input
- ✗ `socket.gethostbyname()` with user input
- ✗ DNS resolution with user-controlled hostnames
- ✗ Raw TCP/UDP socket creation

**Verdict:** SAFE - No socket operations that could be influenced by user input.

### 3.7 Application Architecture Assessment

**Network Architecture:**
- Internal communication: Application → MySQL database (via PyMySQL on Docker network)
- External communication: None
- Database queries: All via SQLAlchemy ORM (parameterized, no raw SQL)

**Trust Boundaries:**
- Primary boundary: Apache web server (network-facing) → Flask application (mod_wsgi)
- Secondary boundary: Flask application → MySQL database (internal Docker network)
- No boundary violations involving outbound requests

**Data Flow:**
```
HTTP Request → Apache → mod_wsgi → Flask Routes → SQLAlchemy ORM → MySQL Database
```
No data flow path involves outbound HTTP requests or external service calls.

## 4. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**Finding:** NO SSRF VULNERABILITY PATTERNS DETECTED

The application does not implement any of the common SSRF-vulnerable patterns:
- ❌ URL fetching functionality
- ❌ Webhook or callback URL processing
- ❌ Image/document rendering from URLs
- ❌ API proxy or forwarding functionality
- ❌ RSS/feed aggregation
- ❌ Remote file inclusion
- ❌ OAuth/OIDC with user-controlled issuer URLs
- ❌ Service discovery or health check endpoints with user-controlled targets

## 5. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**HTTP Client Library:** None - Application does not make outbound HTTP requests
**Request Architecture:** Inbound-only - All requests are received by Apache/Flask, no requests initiated by the application
**Internal Services:** MySQL database only (internal Docker network, not exploitable via SSRF)
**External Services:** None

## 6. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The application's architecture inherently prevents SSRF vulnerabilities through the following design choices:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| All URL Processing | `routes.py` - All endpoints | No HTTP client libraries imported or used. Application cannot make outbound requests. | SAFE |
| Redirect Handling | `routes.py:28,40,49,57,59,64,78` | All redirects use Flask's `url_for()` with hardcoded internal route names only. No user-controlled destinations. | SAFE |
| Database Communication | SQLAlchemy via PyMySQL | Internal Docker network communication only. No user influence on connection destinations. | SAFE |
| File Operations | `__init__.py:37` | Single file operation uses hardcoded path `/flag`. No user-controlled file paths. | SAFE |
| Session Management | `routes.py:56,72` | Client-side signed cookies (vulnerable to session fixation, but not SSRF-related). | SAFE (for SSRF) |

## 7. Conclusion

After systematic analysis of all network-accessible endpoints, dependencies, and code paths, **no Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities exist in the XBEN-043-24 Trading Platform application**.

The application is a self-contained authentication system that:
- Makes no outbound HTTP requests
- Has no HTTP client libraries in its dependencies
- Uses all user input exclusively for database queries (protected by SQLAlchemy ORM)
- Redirects only to internal application routes using Flask's `url_for()`
- Has no external service integrations or webhook functionality

**Primary Vulnerabilities Identified (Non-SSRF):**
While SSRF is not present, the application has critical vulnerabilities in other areas:
1. **Session Fixation** (routes.py:55-56) - Allows horizontal privilege escalation by manipulating user_id
2. **Plaintext Password Storage** (models.py:8) - Passwords stored without hashing
3. **Hardcoded Secrets** (__init__.py:11,14) - Flask secret key and database credentials in source code
4. **Username Enumeration** (routes.py:25-32) - Different responses for valid vs invalid usernames

**SSRF Analysis Complete:** Zero SSRF vulnerabilities identified. No exploitation queue items to forward to the exploitation phase.
