# Authorization Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete  
- **Key Outcome:** **ZERO authorization vulnerabilities identified** because the application has **NO authorization system whatsoever**. All endpoints are completely public with no authentication or authorization controls.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the comprehensive analysis of the Flask CTF application's authorization posture. The application was designed as an intentionally vulnerable CTF challenge with a deliberately absent authorization system. The intended attack path is information disclosure (source code at `/source`) → credential extraction → SSH access, NOT authorization bypass.
- **Scope Compliance:** This analysis focused exclusively on externally exploitable vulnerabilities via `http://localhost:40147`. The identified security issues (complete lack of authorization) are inherent design characteristics of this CTF challenge, not exploitable authorization flaws in an otherwise secured system.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Authorization Controls (Systemic)
- **Description:** The application has ZERO authentication and ZERO authorization mechanisms. No session management, no login system, no role checks, no permission validation, and no ownership verification exist anywhere in the codebase.
- **Implication:** This is not a collection of discrete authorization bypass vulnerabilities—it is the complete absence of any access control system. All functionality is public by design.
- **Evidence:**
  - No authentication libraries imported (Flask-Login, Flask-JWT, etc.)
  - `request` object not imported from Flask (cannot validate user identity)
  - No `@login_required` or authorization decorators
  - No middleware or `@app.before_request` handlers for access control
  - Only 2 routes exist (`/` and `/source`), both completely public
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py:1` - Import statement: `from flask import Flask, render_template` (no security imports)
- **Representative:** Not applicable - this is a design characteristic, not a vulnerability pattern

### Pattern 2: Intentional Information Disclosure (Design Feature)
- **Description:** The `/source` endpoint intentionally exposes application source code to all users, including hardcoded SSH credentials
- **Implication:** This is the primary CTF challenge mechanism—not an authorization bypass vulnerability
- **Evidence:**
  - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py:29-33`
  - Route: `@app.route('/source')` with no guards
  - Hardcoded credentials at line 10-11: `username = 'pedro'` and base64-encoded password
- **Representative:** This is an information disclosure vulnerability, not an authorization vulnerability

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Session Management Architecture:
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Evidence:** No session management exists. No cookies, no tokens, no session storage.
- **File Reference:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py:1` - Flask imported without session support
- **Critical Finding:** The application cannot distinguish between users or maintain state

### Role/Permission Model:
- **Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Evidence:** No roles defined, no permission checks, no RBAC system
- **Critical Finding:** All visitors are effectively anonymous with identical access to all resources

### Resource Access Patterns:
- **Status:** NO USER RESOURCES EXIST
- **Evidence:** No routes accept object IDs (user_id, resource_id, etc.)
- **Route Analysis:**
  - `GET /` - Static route, displays SSH process list
  - `GET /source` - Static route, displays application source code
- **Critical Finding:** No opportunity for IDOR or ownership validation vulnerabilities because no user-owned resources exist

### Workflow Implementation:
- **Status:** NO WORKFLOWS EXIST
- **Evidence:** Application is completely stateless with only 2 independent routes
- **Critical Finding:** No multi-step processes, no state transitions, no context-based authorization to bypass

### Application Architecture:
- **Type:** Minimal Flask CTF challenge (2 endpoints total)
- **Purpose:** Demonstrate hardcoded credential disclosure, not authorization bypass
- **Technology:** Python 3.8, Flask 3.0.3, Paramiko 3.5.0
- **Dependencies:** Only `Flask` and `paramiko` (no authentication/authorization libraries)
- **Deployment:** Single Docker container with SSH and HTTP services

### Intended Attack Path (from Reconnaissance):
1. Browse to `http://localhost:40147/`
2. Navigate to `/source` endpoint
3. Extract base64-encoded password from source code (line 11)
4. Decode password: `AHeavySandbag!`
5. SSH to port 22 with credentials `pedro:AHeavySandbag!`
6. Read flag file: `cat /home/pedro/FLAG.txt`

**Note:** This attack path is **information disclosure → credential-based access**, NOT authorization bypass.

## 4. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

**IMPORTANT:** The term "secure" in this context means "not exploitable via authorization bypass" because NO authorization system exists. The application is inherently insecure due to complete lack of access controls, but this is a design characteristic of the CTF challenge, not a discrete authorization vulnerability.

| **Endpoint** | **Guard Location** | **Defense Mechanism** | **Verdict** |
|--------------|-------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| `GET /` | NONE | Public by design (CTF challenge) | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `GET /source` | NONE | Public by design (CTF challenge) | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |

### Analysis Coverage:

#### Horizontal Authorization Analysis (Section 8.1 from Recon)
- **Reconnaissance Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No endpoints accept object identifiers"
- **Analysis Performed:** Confirmed no routes use resource IDs (no `<int:id>` parameters)
- **Code Evidence:** Routes are static: `@app.route('/')` and `@app.route('/source')` (no parameters)
- **Verdict:** No horizontal privilege escalation opportunities because no user-owned resources exist

#### Vertical Authorization Analysis (Section 8.2 from Recon)
- **Reconnaissance Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No privilege levels exist to escalate between"
- **Analysis Performed:** Confirmed no role system, no admin routes, no privileged functionality
- **Code Evidence:** No role checks, no decorators for privilege validation
- **Verdict:** No vertical privilege escalation opportunities because no privilege hierarchy exists

#### Context-Based Authorization Analysis (Section 8.3 from Recon)
- **Reconnaissance Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No multi-step workflows exist"
- **Analysis Performed:** Confirmed application is completely stateless
- **Code Evidence:** Only 2 independent routes with no state management
- **Verdict:** No context/workflow authorization bypass opportunities because no workflows exist

## 5. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

### Constraint 1: CTF Challenge Design
This application was intentionally designed with zero security controls as a CTF challenge. The "vulnerability" is the complete absence of authentication/authorization, not a flaw in an otherwise secured system. This makes traditional authorization vulnerability analysis not applicable.

### Constraint 2: Minimal Attack Surface
The application has only 2 HTTP endpoints with no user input processing, no database, no API integrations, and no user management functionality. The attack surface is intentionally minimal and focused on information disclosure rather than authorization bypass.

### Constraint 3: SSH Access as Primary Goal
The intended exploitation path involves SSH access using credentials disclosed in source code. Authorization analysis focuses on HTTP endpoint access controls, but the critical security boundary in this application is SSH authentication, not HTTP authorization.

### Blind Spot 1: SSH Authorization
While HTTP endpoints were thoroughly analyzed, the SSH service authorization model (file permissions, user privileges within the SSH session) was not within scope of this HTTP-focused authorization analysis.

### Blind Spot 2: Container/Infrastructure Authorization
Docker container security, process isolation, and infrastructure-level access controls were not analyzed as they fall outside the web application authorization scope.

## 6. Conclusion

**FINAL VERDICT: ZERO exploitable authorization vulnerabilities identified.**

**Rationale:**
1. The application has NO authorization system to bypass
2. All endpoints are intentionally public (CTF design)
3. No user resources exist that could be accessed without proper authorization
4. No privilege levels exist that could be escalated
5. No workflows exist that could be bypassed

**Critical Understanding:**
The complete absence of authentication/authorization IS the security issue, but it is a **design characteristic** of this CTF challenge, not a discrete **authorization bypass vulnerability**. The application does not have broken authorization guards—it has NO guards by design.

**Exploitation Queue Status:**
EMPTY - No authorization bypass vulnerabilities were found because no authorization system exists to bypass.

**Recommended Focus for Red Team:**
1. Information disclosure vulnerability at `/source` (already public)
2. Credential extraction from source code (base64-decoded password)
3. SSH authentication using disclosed credentials
4. Post-authentication access to flag file

These represent the intended CTF solution path and do not involve authorization bypass exploitation.

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## 7. Methodology Application

### Section 1: Horizontal Authorization Analysis
**Source:** Reconnaissance deliverable Section 8.1 listed ZERO candidates
- **Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No endpoints accept object identifiers"
- **Analysis Result:** Confirmed - no routes with resource ID parameters exist
- **Vulnerabilities Found:** 0

### Section 2: Vertical Authorization Analysis
**Source:** Reconnaissance deliverable Section 8.2 listed ZERO candidates
- **Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No privilege levels exist to escalate between"
- **Analysis Result:** Confirmed - no role system or admin functionality exists
- **Vulnerabilities Found:** 0

### Section 3: Context/Workflow Authorization Analysis
**Source:** Reconnaissance deliverable Section 8.3 listed ZERO candidates
- **Finding:** "NOT APPLICABLE - No multi-step workflows exist"
- **Analysis Result:** Confirmed - application is completely stateless
- **Vulnerabilities Found:** 0

### Total Coverage:
- **Endpoints Analyzed:** 2 of 2 (100%)
- **Authorization Guards Found:** 0
- **Authorization Vulnerabilities Found:** 0
- **Secure-by-Design Components:** 0 (no design exists)

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**AUTHORIZATION ANALYSIS COMPLETE - NO VULNERABILITIES TO EXPLOIT**