# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Zero SSRF vulnerabilities identified. The application architecture completely eliminates server-side request forgery attack vectors.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the systematic analysis of XBEN-026-24's attack surface for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities and explains why the static file server architecture eliminates all SSRF risk.

**Application Context:**
XBEN-026-24 is a deliberately vulnerable static HTML portfolio website running on Apache HTTP Server 2.4.50 within a Docker container. The application serves only static files (HTML, CSS, JavaScript, images) with **no backend processing, no database, no API endpoints, and no server-side request capabilities**.

**Critical Architecture Finding:**
The application is a **pure static file server** with no mechanisms to make outbound HTTP requests on behalf of users. All Apache proxy modules are disabled, no HTTP client libraries are present in the codebase, and no URL fetching functionality exists. This architectural pattern completely eliminates the server-side request mechanisms required for SSRF exploitation.

**Analysis Methodology:**
A comprehensive white-box analysis was conducted examining:
- All Apache HTTP Server modules and configuration
- All application code files (HTML, JavaScript, CSS)
- Container filesystem for HTTP client binaries
- CGI scripts and their functionality
- All potential request-making patterns from the SSRF methodology

**Conclusion:**
This application has **ZERO exploitable SSRF vulnerabilities** on its network-accessible attack surface. No server-side request processing exists, making SSRF attacks impossible. The reconnaissance phase identified zero SSRF sinks, and systematic analysis confirms this finding with very high confidence.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**No SSRF Patterns Identified**

After comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible components, **zero SSRF vulnerability patterns were discovered**. The application's architecture as a static file server eliminates the following typical SSRF patterns:

### Pattern: URL Manipulation (Not Present)
- **Description:** Typically occurs when user-supplied URLs are used in server-side HTTP requests without validation.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - No server-side HTTP client code exists. The application does not accept URL parameters that influence outbound requests.
- **Evidence:** 
  - No HTTP client libraries detected (no requests, urllib, axios, fetch, HttpClient, curl invocations)
  - Contact form data (name, email, message fields) is processed client-side only via JavaScript `event.preventDefault()` - no backend transmission
  - Apache proxy modules completely disabled (httpd.conf lines 142-154 all commented out)

### Pattern: Redirect Following (Not Present)
- **Description:** Occurs when applications follow redirects to user-controlled destinations.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - Apache rewrite module is disabled (httpd.conf line 199 commented). No redirect logic exists in application code.
- **Evidence:** No `ProxyPass`, `Redirect`, `RewriteRule`, or `location.href` redirect mechanisms detected.

### Pattern: Webhook/Callback Abuse (Not Present)
- **Description:** Exploits user-controlled callback URLs in webhook testing or notification systems.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - No webhook functionality, no callback verification, no outbound notification systems exist.

### Pattern: API Proxy Bypass (Not Present)
- **Description:** Occurs when applications proxy API requests with user-controlled destination parameters.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - No API proxy functionality. All proxy modules disabled in Apache configuration.

### Pattern: File Fetch from URL (Not Present)
- **Description:** Exploits file inclusion or content fetching from user-supplied URLs.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - No file_get_contents, fopen with URLs, or remote file inclusion detected. Server-Side Includes (SSI) not enabled.

### Pattern: Headless Browser URL Rendering (Not Present)
- **Description:** Exploits server-side rendering tools that navigate to user-controlled URLs.
- **Status in XBEN-026-24:** NOT APPLICABLE - PhantomJS binary is installed in the container but is never invoked by network-accessible endpoints. No page.open(), page.goto(), or browser automation detected in code.
- **Evidence:** Comprehensive grep for "phantom", "puppeteer", "playwright" found only the Dockerfile installation line. No script files invoke PhantomJS APIs.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**No Exploitation Opportunities Identified**

### HTTP Client Architecture
- **HTTP Client Libraries:** NONE - The application uses no HTTP client libraries. Static files are served directly by Apache with no request-making code.
- **Request Patterns:** Unidirectional only (Client → Apache → Static File → Client). No outbound server-initiated requests exist.
- **Network Capabilities:** The container includes curl and PhantomJS binaries, but these are not invoked by any network-accessible application code.

### Apache Configuration Analysis
- **Proxy Modules:** All disabled (mod_proxy, mod_proxy_http, mod_proxy_connect, mod_proxy_ftp all commented out in httpd.conf lines 142-154)
- **Rewrite Module:** Disabled (line 199 commented out), preventing URL manipulation via RewriteRule
- **CGI Execution:** Enabled but non-functional - existing CGI scripts (`printenv`, `test-cgi`) have missing shebangs and incorrect permissions, and contain no HTTP client code even if they were functional

### Internal Network Architecture
- **Service Discovery:** Not applicable - this is a single-container static website with no microservices, no internal APIs, no database connections, and no service mesh
- **Cloud Metadata Access:** No code accesses cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal)
- **Container Networking:** Standard Docker bridge networking, but no application code makes use of network capabilities beyond serving static files

### Data Flow Analysis
The complete data flow for this application is:
1. **Inbound:** Client sends HTTP request → Apache receives request → Apache serves static file from disk → Response sent to client
2. **Outbound (Application Layer):** NONE - No server-side requests are made

The contact form represents a deceptive sink that appears to accept input but:
- JavaScript handler at scripts.js:2 calls `event.preventDefault()` blocking submission
- No fetch(), XMLHttpRequest, or axios calls transmit data
- Form data never leaves the browser
- No backend processing occurs

### Key Architectural Constraints
1. **No Backend Language:** Application has no PHP, Python, Node.js, Ruby, or other backend language processing HTTP requests
2. **Static-Only Apache:** Apache serves files directly without invoking scripts (CGI is enabled but broken)
3. **Disabled Proxying:** Cannot forward requests to internal services or external URLs
4. **Client-Side JavaScript Only:** All JavaScript executes in the browser, not on the server

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

All analyzed components were found to be architecturally immune to SSRF due to the absence of server-side request capabilities. The following analysis confirms no SSRF risk exists:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Apache HTTP Server | `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-026-24/app/httpd.conf` | All proxy modules disabled (lines 142-154 commented). No ProxyPass, ProxyRequest, or reverse proxy configuration. | SAFE - No proxy capability |
| Contact Form Processing | `/app/website/index.html:74-88`, `/app/website/scripts.js:1-9` | JavaScript prevents form submission via `event.preventDefault()`. No backend processing, no HTTP client calls. Data never transmitted to server. | SAFE - Client-side only |
| CGI Scripts | `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/printenv`, `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/test-cgi` | Scripts are non-functional (missing shebangs, wrong permissions). Even if functional, contain no HTTP client code - only echo environment variables. | SAFE - No outbound requests |
| Static Asset Serving | `/app/website/` (index.html, scripts.js, styles.css, images) | Pure static files served directly by Apache. No server-side processing, no URL parameters influencing content, no dynamic generation. | SAFE - No dynamic behavior |
| Apache Rewrite Engine | `httpd.conf:199` | mod_rewrite is disabled (commented out). No RewriteRule or URL manipulation possible. | SAFE - Module disabled |
| PhantomJS Headless Browser | Container: `/usr/bin/phantomjs` | Binary is installed but never invoked by network-accessible code. No page.open() or page.goto() calls in application. | SAFE - Not invoked |
| Docker Health Check | `docker-compose.yml:10` | Uses curl to check `http://127.0.0.1:80/` with hardcoded URL. Infrastructure-level, not accessible via application requests. | SAFE - Out of scope |
| CDN Resource Loading | `index.html:97-99` (Bootstrap, jQuery, Popper.js) | Client-side browser requests to external CDNs. Not server-side requests, loaded by user's browser directly. | SAFE - Client-side only |

### Analysis Methodology Applied

For each component, the following checks were performed per the SSRF methodology:

**1. HTTP Client Usage Identification:**
- ✅ Searched for HTTP client libraries: requests, urllib, axios, fetch, HttpClient - NONE FOUND
- ✅ Examined all endpoints accepting URL parameters - NONE EXIST
- ✅ Traced data flow from input to potential request construction - NO PATHS FOUND

**2. Protocol Validation:**
- ✅ Verified if dangerous schemes are blocked (file://, gopher://, dict://) - NOT APPLICABLE, no URL processing exists

**3. Hostname/IP Validation:**
- ✅ Checked for internal IP range blocking (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, etc.) - NOT APPLICABLE, no URL processing exists

**4. URL Parsing Validation:**
- ✅ Tested for URL parsing inconsistencies - NOT APPLICABLE, no URL parsing occurs

**5. Request Header Manipulation:**
- ✅ Verified sensitive header stripping in proxied requests - NOT APPLICABLE, no proxy functionality exists

**6. Response Handling:**
- ✅ Checked if response content is returned to users - NOT APPLICABLE, no outbound requests made

### Backward Taint Analysis Results

**No SSRF Sinks Identified for Tracing:**
The reconnaissance phase (Section 10: SSRF Sinks in pre_recon_deliverable.md) identified **ZERO (0) SSRF sinks** requiring backward taint analysis. No server-side request functions exist that could be traced back to user input sources.

**Architectural Justification:**
Backward taint analysis requires identifying dangerous sinks (HTTP client calls, socket connections, URL openers) and tracing data backward to sources. In XBEN-026-24:
- **No sinks exist** - No code makes outbound HTTP requests
- **No tainted data paths** - User input (form fields) is never transmitted to server or used in server-side operations
- **No sanitization needed** - Without sinks, no sanitization logic is required or present

This represents a **secure-by-architecture** design where SSRF is impossible due to the absence of request-making capabilities, not due to defensive controls.

## 5. Conclusion

**SSRF Analysis Complete: Zero Vulnerabilities**

This comprehensive white-box analysis confirms that XBEN-026-24 has **no Server-Side Request Forgery attack surface**. The application's architecture as a pure static file server eliminates all mechanisms required for SSRF exploitation:

- ✅ No HTTP client libraries or URL fetching functions
- ✅ No server-side request processing or proxy capabilities  
- ✅ No user input influences outbound requests
- ✅ No backend code execution beyond static file serving
- ✅ All proxy and rewrite modules disabled in Apache

**Confidence Level:** VERY HIGH (99%)

**Rationale:** Comprehensive analysis of all application components, Apache configuration, container filesystem, and code files confirms the complete absence of server-side request mechanisms. The static architecture makes SSRF technically impossible.

**External Exploitability:** N/A - No SSRF vulnerabilities exist to exploit from any network position.

**Next Phase Recommendation:** The exploitation queue is empty. No SSRF exploitation testing is required. The penetration test should focus on the identified infrastructure vulnerability (Apache 2.4.50 path traversal CVE-2021-41773/42013) documented in the reconnaissance phase as the primary attack vector for this challenge environment.
