# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Zero Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities identified. The application is architecturally immune to SSRF attacks due to the complete absence of user input mechanisms and HTTP client libraries.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive evidence that the application has no SSRF attack surface, documenting all network operations and confirming that none accept user-controllable input.

**Critical Findings:**
- **Total SSRF Vulnerabilities Found:** 0
- **Total Network Operations:** 1 (Paramiko SSH to hardcoded localhost:22)
- **User Input Vectors:** 0 (Flask `request` object not imported)
- **HTTP Client Libraries:** 0 (no requests, urllib, httpx, or similar libraries)
- **Attack Surface:** None

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern Analysis: No Patterns Identified

**Finding:** After systematic analysis of all application endpoints and network operations, **no SSRF vulnerability patterns were discovered**.

**Why This Application Has Zero SSRF Risk:**

1. **No User Input Mechanisms**
   - The Flask `request` object is not imported
   - No URL parameters, POST data, JSON bodies, or form fields are processed
   - Application operates in read-only mode (server → client only)
   - **Code Evidence:** `from flask import Flask, render_template` (Line 1 of app.py)

2. **No HTTP Client Libraries**
   - No `requests`, `urllib`, `httpx`, `aiohttp`, or `http.client` libraries present
   - Application cannot make outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests
   - **Code Evidence:** `requirements.txt` contains only `Flask==3.0.3` and `paramiko`

3. **Single Hardcoded Network Operation**
   - Only network operation: Paramiko SSH connection to `localhost:22`
   - All parameters hardcoded: hostname, port, username, password, command
   - No variable substitution or concatenation with external data
   - **Code Evidence:** Lines 8-12 of app.py show all static string literals

4. **Minimal Application Architecture**
   - Total codebase: 37 lines in single file (`app.py`)
   - Total endpoints: 2 (`/` and `/source`)
   - No external integrations, webhooks, or proxy functionality
   - No URL fetching, image processing, or file download features

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**Application Architecture:**
- **Language:** Python 3.8.20
- **Framework:** Flask 3.0.3 with Werkzeug 3.0.6
- **HTTP Client Library:** None (no HTTP clients present)
- **Network Operations:** Single Paramiko SSH connection to localhost

**Request Flow Analysis:**
```
1. GET / → Renders process list from hardcoded SSH command
   - No user input accepted
   - Calls get_process_list() with no parameters
   - SSH connection parameters: localhost:22 (hardcoded)
   
2. GET /source → Returns application source code
   - No user input accepted
   - Reads local file (__file__)
   - No network operations performed
```

**Network Operation Details:**

**Operation 1: Paramiko SSH Connection**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 7-22)
- **Function:** `get_process_list()`
- **Target:** `localhost:22` (hardcoded)
- **Credentials:** `pedro:AHeavySandbag!` (hardcoded, base64-encoded in source)
- **Command:** `ps -aux` (hardcoded)
- **User Input:** NONE - All parameters are static constants
- **SSRF Risk Assessment:** **SAFE** - No user-controllable parameters

**Code Analysis:**
```python
def get_process_list():
    hostname = 'localhost'           # HARDCODED - no user input
    port = 22                        # HARDCODED - no user input
    username = 'pedro'               # HARDCODED - no user input
    password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'  # HARDCODED
    command = 'ps -aux'              # HARDCODED - no user input
    
    client = paramiko.SSHClient()
    client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
    client.connect(hostname, port=port, username=username, password=password)
    stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command(command)
    # ... rest of function
```

**Why This Is NOT an SSRF Vulnerability:**
1. ✅ **No User Input:** All parameters are static string literals
2. ✅ **No Variable Substitution:** No f-strings, `.format()`, or concatenation with user data
3. ✅ **No Request Object Usage:** Flask `request` object is not imported
4. ✅ **Fixed Destination:** Always connects to `localhost:22`
5. ✅ **Fixed Command:** Always executes `ps -aux` (no command injection path to SSRF)

**Internal Services Discovered:**
- SSH service on localhost:22 (accessible with hardcoded credentials)
- No other internal services exposed through the application

**External Service Integrations:**
- None identified

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

All network operations in this application were analyzed and found to have no SSRF vulnerabilities. The application is secure by architectural design due to the absence of user input processing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| SSH Connection | `/app/app.py:7-22` | All connection parameters hardcoded; no user input pathway exists | SAFE |
| Index Route | `/app/app.py:24-27` | No user input accepted; displays static process list from hardcoded SSH command | SAFE |
| Source Route | `/app/app.py:29-33` | No user input accepted; reads local file only (no network operations) | SAFE |
| Template Rendering | `/app/templates/index.html` | No forms, input fields, or JavaScript; view-only HTML | SAFE |

## 5. Methodology Applied

### Analysis Procedure

**Phase 1: HTTP Client Usage Pattern Identification**
- ✅ Searched for all HTTP client libraries (requests, urllib, httpx, aiohttp, http.client)
- ✅ Result: NONE FOUND - Application has no HTTP client capabilities

**Phase 2: User Input Vector Analysis**
- ✅ Verified Flask `request` object import status: NOT IMPORTED
- ✅ Searched for `request.args`, `request.form`, `request.json`: NONE FOUND
- ✅ Searched for URL parameters, POST bodies, file uploads: NONE FOUND
- ✅ Result: Application accepts ZERO user input

**Phase 3: Network Operation Inventory**
- ✅ Identified all network operations in codebase: 1 (Paramiko SSH)
- ✅ Traced data flow from source to sink for SSH connection
- ✅ Verified all parameters are hardcoded: hostname, port, username, password, command
- ✅ Result: No user-controllable network parameters exist

**Phase 4: Protocol and Scheme Validation**
- ✅ Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE (no user-supplied URLs exist)
- ✅ Result: No URL parsing or validation code required

**Phase 5: Hostname and IP Address Validation**
- ✅ Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE (hostname is hardcoded to 'localhost')
- ✅ Result: No hostname validation required

**Phase 6: Port Restriction Analysis**
- ✅ Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE (port is hardcoded to 22)
- ✅ Result: No port restriction code required

**Phase 7: Backward Taint Analysis**
- ✅ Traced SSH connection parameters backward to source
- ✅ Result: All parameters originate from static string literals in source code
- ✅ No user input pathway exists from any source to the SSH sink

### Comprehensive Search Results

**HTTP Client Libraries Searched:**
- ❌ `requests.get`, `requests.post` - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `urllib.request`, `urlopen` - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `httpx`, `aiohttp` - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `http.client` - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `fetch` (JavaScript) - NOT FOUND (no JavaScript in application)

**User Input Patterns Searched:**
- ❌ `request.args` (URL parameters) - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `request.form` (form data) - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `request.json` (JSON body) - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `request.data` (raw body) - NOT FOUND
- ❌ `request.files` (file uploads) - NOT FOUND

**SSRF Sink Patterns Searched:**
- ❌ URL parameters used in HTTP requests - NOT FOUND
- ❌ Webhook URLs - NOT FOUND
- ❌ Callback URLs - NOT FOUND
- ❌ File fetch from URLs - NOT FOUND
- ❌ Image processing from URLs - NOT FOUND
- ❌ Redirect following - NOT FOUND
- ❌ API proxying - NOT FOUND
- ❌ XML/XXE external entities - NOT FOUND

## 6. Endpoints Analyzed

**Total Endpoints Analyzed:** 2 (100% coverage)

### Endpoint 1: `GET /`
- **Purpose:** Display server process list
- **User Input:** None
- **Network Operations:** SSH to localhost:22 (hardcoded)
- **SSRF Risk:** None
- **Verdict:** SAFE

### Endpoint 2: `GET /source`
- **Purpose:** Display application source code
- **User Input:** None
- **Network Operations:** None (local file read only)
- **SSRF Risk:** None
- **Verdict:** SAFE

## 7. False Positive Avoidance

**No false positives were generated** because:
1. Analysis focused exclusively on server-side code (no client-side assumptions)
2. All findings verified through direct source code inspection
3. No assumptions made based on documentation or configuration comments
4. Complete codebase visibility (single 37-line file)
5. No timeout-based inference (direct code analysis used)

## 8. External Exploitability Assessment

**External Attack Surface:** NONE

The application is accessible via `http://localhost:40147` from the public internet, however:
- No user input mechanisms exist to inject malicious URLs
- No HTTP client functionality exists to make outbound requests
- The single network operation (SSH to localhost) uses entirely hardcoded parameters
- No path exists for an external attacker to influence server-side requests

**Conclusion:** Zero externally exploitable SSRF vulnerabilities exist.

## 9. Recommendations

### For Exploitation Phase
**No SSRF exploitation is possible.** The exploitation queue is empty because:
1. Application does not accept user input via any HTTP mechanism
2. Application cannot make outbound HTTP requests (no HTTP client libraries)
3. The single network operation uses hardcoded parameters with no user influence

### If Application Is Extended
If this application is modified to add features in the future, SSRF vulnerabilities could be introduced. Developers should implement these protections:

**URL Validation (if URL parameters added):**
```python
# RECOMMENDED if app accepts URLs in the future
ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS = ['http', 'https']
BLOCKED_IPS = ['127.0.0.0/8', '10.0.0.0/8', '172.16.0.0/12', '192.168.0.0/16', '169.254.0.0/16']

def validate_url(url):
    parsed = urlparse(url)
    if parsed.scheme not in ALLOWED_PROTOCOLS:
        raise ValueError("Invalid protocol")
    # Check against blocked IPs
    # Implement allowlist for domains
    return True
```

**SSH Connection Protection (if SSH parameters become dynamic):**
```python
# RECOMMENDED if SSH targets become user-controllable
ALLOWED_SSH_HOSTS = ['localhost', 'internal-server.local']

def validate_ssh_target(hostname):
    if hostname not in ALLOWED_SSH_HOSTS:
        raise ValueError("SSH target not allowed")
    return True
```

## 10. Conclusion

**SSRF Analysis Status:** COMPLETE

**Summary:**
- ✅ All endpoints systematically analyzed
- ✅ All network operations traced and verified
- ✅ Zero SSRF vulnerabilities identified
- ✅ Application is architecturally immune to SSRF attacks

**Key Takeaway:** This application has **zero SSRF attack surface** due to its minimal design, complete absence of user input mechanisms, and lack of HTTP client functionality. The single network operation (Paramiko SSH to localhost) uses entirely hardcoded parameters with no pathway for user influence.

**Handoff to Exploitation Phase:** No SSRF vulnerabilities exist for exploitation. The exploitation queue is empty (0 vulnerabilities).

---

**Analysis Completed By:** SSRF Analysis Specialist  
**Analysis Date:** 2025  
**Confidence Level:** 100% (Definitive - Complete codebase visibility)  
**Total Vulnerabilities Found:** 0  
**Externally Exploitable Vulnerabilities:** 0