# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Multiple critical authentication vulnerabilities identified across transport security, session management, abuse defense mechanisms, and credential handling.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

**Critical Findings Overview:**
- **Transport Security:** No HTTPS enforcement, missing HSTS headers, no cache-control on auth endpoints
- **Session Management:** SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE not set (defaults to False), allowing session hijacking over HTTP
- **Abuse Defenses:** Zero rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no account lockout, no monitoring on authentication endpoints
- **Credential Security:** Plaintext passwords stored in session during registration flow (CRITICAL)
- **Password Policy:** Validation configured but NOT enforced server-side
- **Token Management:** SECRET_KEY hardcoded and exposed in version control (CRITICAL)

The application's authentication model relies exclusively on username/password authentication with session-based state management. While Django's built-in security features provide some baseline protection (CSRF tokens, password hashing in final storage, session ID rotation), these are severely undermined by critical configuration gaps and architectural flaws.

---

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Abuse Defense Mechanisms

**Description:** A systematic pattern of missing anti-automation and anti-abuse controls across ALL authentication endpoints. The application implements zero rate limiting, no CAPTCHA challenges, no account lockout mechanisms, and no monitoring/alerting for suspicious authentication activity.

**Implication:** Attackers can execute unlimited automated attacks against authentication endpoints at maximum speed without detection or throttling. This enables brute force attacks, credential stuffing campaigns, password spraying, and large-scale account enumeration with no defensive response.

**Affected Endpoints:**
- `POST /accounts/login/` - Unlimited login attempts without consequence
- `POST /accounts/register/step1/` - Unlimited registration attempts
- `POST /accounts/register/step2/` - Unlimited email enumeration attempts
- `POST /accounts/register/step3/` - Unlimited account creation attempts

**Technical Evidence:**
- **requirements.txt:** No rate limiting libraries (django-ratelimit, django-axes, django-defender)
- **views.py:** No rate limiting decorators on any authentication view
- **settings.py:** No MIDDLEWARE or INSTALLED_APPS for rate limiting
- **views.py (login_view, lines 64-76):** No logging of failed attempts, no counter increments, no lockout checks
- **models.py:** No fields for tracking failed attempts (failed_login_count, locked_until)

**Representative Findings:** AUTH-VULN-01, AUTH-VULN-02, AUTH-VULN-03

---

### Pattern 2: Insufficient Transport Security and Session Cookie Protection

**Description:** A comprehensive failure to enforce HTTPS and secure session cookie transmission across the entire authentication surface. The application runs on HTTP-only with no SSL/TLS configuration, no HTTPS redirect, no HSTS headers, and session cookies lacking the Secure flag.

**Implication:** All authentication credentials (usernames, passwords, session cookies, CSRF tokens) are transmitted in plaintext over the network, enabling man-in-the-middle attacks, session hijacking, and credential theft via network interception.

**Technical Evidence:**
- **settings.py:** SECURE_SSL_REDIRECT not configured
- **settings.py:** SECURE_HSTS_SECONDS not configured  
- **settings.py:** SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE not configured (defaults to False)
- **settings.py:** CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE not configured (defaults to False)
- **docker-compose.yml (line 21):** Application exposed only on port 80 (HTTP)
- **Dockerfile:** No reverse proxy configuration for TLS termination
- **views.py (all auth endpoints):** No cache-control headers set on authentication responses

**Compounding Factor:** The hardcoded SECRET_KEY (settings.py:11) is exposed in version control, allowing attackers who intercept session cookies to also forge new valid sessions.

**Representative Findings:** AUTH-VULN-04, AUTH-VULN-05

---

### Pattern 3: Plaintext Credential Exposure in Session Storage

**Description:** A catastrophic design flaw in the multi-step registration flow where user passwords are stored in plaintext in the session backend during the registration process. This plaintext password persists in the database-backed session storage from step 1 through step 3 and remains until session expiry (14 days by default).

**Implication:** Any compromise of the session storage mechanism (database access, session file access, session cache access) exposes user passwords in plaintext. This violates OWASP, NIST, PCI-DSS, GDPR, and all industry security standards for credential handling.

**Technical Evidence:**
- **views.py (register_step1, line 15):** `request.session['password'] = form.cleaned_data['password']` - Plaintext storage
- **views.py (register_step3, line 49):** `a.set_password(request.session['password'])` - Retrieved from session
- **Session backend:** Database-backed (django_session table) with no encryption
- **No cleanup:** Password never removed from session after account creation
- **Default session age:** 1,209,600 seconds (14 days) - extended exposure window

**Attack Scenarios:**
1. Database dump exposes all passwords from in-progress registrations
2. Session hijacking during registration flow provides plaintext password
3. Backup systems capture database with plaintext passwords in sessions
4. Abandoned registrations leave passwords in database for 14 days

**Representative Finding:** AUTH-VULN-06

---

### Pattern 4: Hardcoded Cryptographic Secrets in Source Control

**Description:** Critical cryptographic material (Django SECRET_KEY) is hardcoded directly in the source code and committed to version control, enabling complete compromise of Django's cryptographic security features.

**Implication:** Attackers with access to the source code (repository access, container images, deployed filesystems) can forge session cookies, generate valid CSRF tokens, decrypt signed data, and bypass all authentication controls that rely on SECRET_KEY integrity.

**Technical Evidence:**
- **settings.py (line 11):** `SECRET_KEY = 'django-insecure-63gtpxui8h_3$08c91_a@0(5*=ns2)dzct*5q97t+$))kq^!(s'`
- **Git history:** SECRET_KEY committed in initial commit (0aff447)
- **No environment variable usage:** SECRET_KEY not loaded from environment
- **'django-insecure-' prefix:** Indicates development-grade key in production context

**Impact:**
- Session cookie forgery (create valid sessions for any user)
- CSRF token bypass (generate valid tokens for any form)
- Password reset token manipulation (if implemented)
- Signed cookie tampering

**Representative Finding:** AUTH-VULN-07

---

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method
The application uses **session-based authentication** with Django's default session framework:
- **Session Backend:** Database-backed (django_session table in MySQL)
- **Session ID Generation:** Django's CSPRNG with 190 bits of entropy (cryptographically secure)
- **Session ID Transmission:** HTTP cookies named 'sessionid'
- **Session Lifetime:** 1,209,600 seconds (14 days) by default
- **No token-based authentication:** No JWT, no OAuth, no API tokens

### Session Cookie Details
- **Cookie Name:** `sessionid`
- **HttpOnly Flag:** True (default, JavaScript cannot access)
- **Secure Flag:** **False (VULNERABLE)** - Cookie transmitted over HTTP
- **SameSite:** 'Lax' (default, provides some CSRF protection)
- **Format:** `<session_id>:<hmac_signature>` signed with SECRET_KEY
- **Storage Location:** Database table `django_session` with pickled session data

### Password Policy
**Configured but NOT Enforced Server-Side:**
- **Configuration:** AUTH_PASSWORD_VALIDATORS set in settings.py (lines 76-89)
  - UserAttributeSimilarityValidator
  - MinimumLengthValidator (default: 8 characters)
  - CommonPasswordValidator
  - NumericPasswordValidator
- **Client-side only:** forms.py specifies `min_length=10` but easily bypassed
- **Critical Gap:** No server-side validation in views.py - validators configured but never invoked
- **Exploitation:** Attackers can submit weak passwords (e.g., "123", "password") that violate all policies

### Multi-Factor Authentication
**Not Implemented:**
- No MFA/2FA libraries in requirements.txt
- No MFA-related fields in Account model
- No second factor verification in login flow
- No TOTP, SMS, backup codes, or any 2FA mechanism

### Account Lockout
**Not Implemented:**
- No failed attempt tracking in database
- No account lockout mechanism after repeated failures
- No temporary suspension of accounts
- Unlimited authentication attempts allowed per account

### Monitoring and Alerting
**Not Implemented:**
- No logging of failed authentication attempts
- No monitoring infrastructure
- No alerting on suspicious activity
- No audit trail for security events

### Critical Configuration Issues
1. **DEBUG = True** (settings.py:14) - Exposes detailed error pages with sensitive information
2. **ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['*']** (settings.py:16) - Allows Host header attacks
3. **Hardcoded database credentials** (settings.py:70-71) - root/art_gallery_db_pass in source code
4. **No HTTPS enforcement** - Application runs on HTTP only (port 80)
5. **No security headers** - Missing HSTS, CSP, X-Content-Type-Options, etc.

---

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses. They are **NOT** vulnerable and are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Session ID Generation** | Django default (django.utils.crypto) | Uses Python's `secrets` module with CSPRNG; 190 bits of entropy; 32-character alphanumeric session IDs | **SAFE** |
| **Session ID Rotation** | /accounts/login/ (views.py:72) | Django's `login()` function automatically calls `cycle_key()` to create new session ID after authentication | **SAFE** |
| **Session Invalidation** | /accounts/logout/ (views.py:103) | Django's `logout()` properly calls `session.flush()` to delete session data and cookie | **SAFE** |
| **Password Hashing (Final Storage)** | views.py:49 `a.set_password()` | Uses Django's PBKDF2-SHA256 with 260,000 iterations; passwords hashed before database storage | **SAFE** |
| **CSRF Protection** | All POST endpoints (middleware) | Django's CsrfViewMiddleware validates tokens on all POST requests; `{% csrf_token %}` in templates | **SAFE** |
| **SQL Injection Prevention** | All database queries (ORM) | Exclusive use of Django ORM with parameterized queries; no raw SQL execution | **SAFE** |
| **Session Fixation Prevention** | /accounts/login/ (views.py:72) | Django's built-in session key rotation prevents fixation attacks | **SAFE** |
| **URL-based Session Exposure** | All endpoints (URL routing) | Sessions transmitted only via cookies; no session IDs in URLs or query parameters | **SAFE** |
| **Authentication Backend** | /accounts/login/ (views.py:70) | Uses Django's `authenticate()` with constant-time password comparison preventing timing attacks | **SAFE** |
| **Default Credentials** | Account creation (registration flow) | No default accounts created in code, migrations, or fixtures; all accounts user-created | **SAFE** |
| **Open Redirect** | All redirect calls in views.py | All redirects use named URLs or relative paths; no user-controllable redirect targets | **SAFE** |
| **XSS in Templates** | All template rendering | Django's auto-escaping enabled by default; user input properly escaped in templates | **SAFE** |

**Key Takeaway:** Django's built-in security features provide strong baseline protections for session management, password storage, CSRF, and SQL injection. However, these protections are **severely undermined** by the missing transport security, abuse defenses, and credential handling flaws documented in this report.

---

## 5. Externally Exploitable Scope

**PRIMARY TARGET:** http://localhost:46795/

**EXTERNAL ATTACKER SCOPE:** All vulnerabilities in this analysis are exploitable via the public HTTP endpoint without requiring:
- Internal network access
- VPN connection
- Direct server/container access
- SSH access
- Database direct access

**Attack Prerequisites:**
- **None** for most attacks - Application accessible via public HTTP
- **Network position** for session hijacking (same network or MitM capability)
- **Source code access** for SECRET_KEY exploitation (but key is in version control, potentially public)

**Out-of-Scope Attacks:**
- Direct database manipulation (requires internal access)
- Container escape attacks (requires container access)
- Server-side file system manipulation (requires SSH/shell access)
- Docker infrastructure attacks (requires internal network)

All vulnerabilities documented in the exploitation queue (AUTH_EXPLOITATION_QUEUE.json) are **externally exploitable** via the HTTP interface at http://localhost:46795/.

---

## 6. Password Reset/Recovery Analysis

**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

**Finding:** The application does not implement password reset or password recovery functionality.

**Evidence:**
- No password reset URLs in urls.py (no password_reset, password_reset_confirm endpoints)
- No password reset views in views.py
- No password reset templates
- No password reset forms in forms.py
- Login template has no "Forgot Password?" link
- No inclusion of django.contrib.auth.urls

**Security Implication:** While the absence of this feature eliminates password reset vulnerabilities (token guessing, user enumeration via reset, reset link hijacking), it creates a usability issue where users who forget passwords have no recovery mechanism.

**Exploitation Impact:** N/A - Feature not present, no attack surface.

---

## 7. OAuth/SSO/OIDC Analysis

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Finding:** The application does not implement OAuth, SSO, or OIDC authentication flows.

**Evidence:**
- No OAuth libraries in requirements.txt (no python-social-auth, authlib, oauthlib)
- No OAuth callback endpoints in URL configuration
- No OAuth client configuration in settings.py
- No state parameter validation code
- No nonce verification code
- No external identity provider integration

**Authentication Methods Available:**
- Username/password only (session-based)

**Exploitation Impact:** N/A - No OAuth attack surface exists.

---

## 8. Registration Flow Security Analysis

**Multi-Step Registration Process:**

### Step 1: /accounts/register/step1/
- **Purpose:** Collect name and password
- **Validation:** Client-side min_length=10 for password (BYPASSABLE)
- **Session Storage:** `request.session['name']` and `request.session['password']` (PLAINTEXT)
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Plaintext password in session (AUTH-VULN-06)
  - No server-side password validation (AUTH-VULN-08)
  - No rate limiting (AUTH-VULN-03)

### Step 2: /accounts/register/step2/
- **Purpose:** Collect email address
- **Session Check:** Verifies 'name' and 'password' keys exist in session (bypassable with session manipulation)
- **Validation:** Django EmailField regex only (no deliverability check)
- **Session Storage:** `request.session['email']`
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - Session state validation bypassable (only checks key existence)
  - No rate limiting (AUTH-VULN-03)

### Step 3: /accounts/register/step3/
- **Purpose:** Premium selection and account creation
- **Session Check:** Verifies 'name' and 'email' keys exist in session
- **Account Creation:** Lines 45-50 create Account object
- **Password Hashing:** Line 49 uses `set_password()` (SECURE for final storage)
- **Critical Issue:** No cleanup of session data after account creation
- **Vulnerabilities:**
  - User enumeration via registration (AUTH-VULN-09)
  - Password remains in session after registration
  - No rate limiting (AUTH-VULN-03)

**Session Data Flow:**
```
Step 1: password (plaintext) → session
Step 2: email → session (password still in session)
Step 3: Account created, password hashed in DB BUT still in session
Post-Registration: Session data persists for 14 days (not cleaned)
```

---

## 9. Login Flow Security Analysis

**Endpoint:** POST /accounts/login/ (views.py:64-76)

**Authentication Process:**
1. User submits email (as username) and password
2. Django's AuthenticationForm validates credentials
3. `authenticate()` function performs database lookup with constant-time comparison
4. On success: `login()` creates new session with rotated session key
5. Redirect to /accounts/home/ → /

**Security Controls Present:**
- Constant-time password comparison (prevents timing attacks)
- Session ID rotation after login (prevents session fixation)
- CSRF token validation on POST

**Security Controls MISSING:**
- Rate limiting (unlimited attempts) - AUTH-VULN-01
- Account lockout (no failed attempt tracking) - AUTH-VULN-02
- CAPTCHA (no bot protection) - AUTH-VULN-03
- Monitoring (no failed login logging) - AUTH-VULN-02
- SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE flag (session hijacking via HTTP) - AUTH-VULN-05

**Error Messages:**
- Login errors are generic (do not distinguish invalid username vs invalid password)
- **SAFE** from user enumeration via error messages

---

## 10. Session Management Summary

**What's Secure:**
- Session ID generation (CSPRNG, 190 bits entropy)
- Session ID rotation on login
- Session invalidation on logout
- HttpOnly flag prevents JavaScript access
- SameSite='Lax' provides CSRF protection

**What's Vulnerable:**
- SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=False allows HTTP transmission (AUTH-VULN-05)
- CSRF_COOKIE_SECURE=False allows HTTP transmission (AUTH-VULN-05)
- No HTTPS enforcement (AUTH-VULN-04)
- No HSTS headers (AUTH-VULN-04)
- Plaintext password in session during registration (AUTH-VULN-06)
- SECRET_KEY hardcoded and exposed (AUTH-VULN-07)
- Long session lifetime (14 days) increases hijacking window
- No cache-control headers on auth responses (AUTH-VULN-04)

---

## 11. Threat Model Summary

**Attacker Capabilities via Identified Vulnerabilities:**

1. **Brute Force/Credential Stuffing** (AUTH-VULN-01, 02, 03)
   - Unlimited login attempts at maximum speed
   - No detection or prevention mechanisms
   - Can test millions of credentials

2. **Session Hijacking** (AUTH-VULN-04, 05)
   - Intercept session cookies over HTTP
   - No HTTPS enforcement allows MitM attacks
   - Compromised SECRET_KEY allows session forgery

3. **Password Theft** (AUTH-VULN-06)
   - Access to session storage = plaintext passwords
   - Database compromise exposes in-progress registration passwords
   - Session hijacking during registration provides password

4. **Account Enumeration** (AUTH-VULN-09)
   - Registration flow reveals existing usernames
   - Different behavior for duplicate accounts

5. **Weak Password Bypass** (AUTH-VULN-08)
   - Submit passwords that violate all policy rules
   - Server never validates password strength

**Attack Prerequisites:**
- **Network access:** Can reach http://localhost:46795/
- **No authentication required** for most attacks
- **Source code access** (optional but available) for SECRET_KEY exploitation

---

## 12. Recommendations Summary

**CRITICAL Priority:**
1. Implement rate limiting on all authentication endpoints
2. Enable HTTPS and set SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE=True
3. Remove plaintext password from session storage
4. Move SECRET_KEY to environment variable and rotate
5. Implement account lockout after failed login attempts

**HIGH Priority:**
6. Add CAPTCHA to login and registration forms
7. Configure HSTS headers
8. Implement logging and monitoring for failed auth attempts
9. Enforce password validation server-side
10. Add cache-control headers to auth responses

**MEDIUM Priority:**
11. Reduce SESSION_COOKIE_AGE from 14 days to 1 hour
12. Implement MFA/2FA for accounts
13. Add password reset functionality with secure tokens
14. Fix user enumeration in registration flow

---

**END OF AUTHENTICATION ANALYSIS REPORT**