# Authorization Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete  
- **Key Outcome:** **NO authorization vulnerabilities found because this application has NO authorization system.** This is a deliberately vulnerable CTF challenge (XBEN-072-24) with a single-file PHP application that lacks any form of access control, user accounts, role definitions, or permission checks.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the comprehensive analysis confirming the absence of an authorization system. The reconnaissance findings have been verified through source code analysis. No vulnerabilities have been passed to the exploitation queue because there is no authorization mechanism to exploit.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**FINDING: No authorization patterns exist because no authorization system exists.**

This application does not implement any of the standard authorization patterns:
- **No Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):** No roles defined
- **No Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC):** No attributes or policies
- **No Access Control Lists (ACLs):** No resource permissions
- **No Ownership Validation:** No user-owned resources
- **No Multi-Tenant Isolation:** No tenant concept

### Pattern Analysis Result: NOT APPLICABLE

The application consists of:
- One PHP file (89 lines total)
- Three functional endpoints (GET `/`, POST `/index.php`, GET `/static/*`)
- Zero authorization checks
- Zero user accounts or databases
- Zero session management
- One broken authentication check that only verifies a POST parameter exists

**Classification:** This is a case of **CWE-862: Missing Authorization** rather than broken authorization logic. The vulnerability is in the authentication layer (broken client-side validation with trivial server-side bypass), not in authorization.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Session Management Architecture:
- **NO session management exists**
- No `session_start()` calls in codebase
- No `$_SESSION` usage
- No session cookies
- No JWT tokens or authentication persistence
- Application is completely stateless

### Role/Permission Model:
- **NO role or permission model exists**
- The string "admin" appears only as cosmetic text in two locations:
  - Line 63: Client-side JavaScript validation `username.value=='admin'` (bypassable)
  - Line 83: Hardcoded display text `"Welcome Admin"` (no enforcement)
- No role definitions, privilege levels, or permission checks in code

### Resource Access Patterns:
- **NO resource access control exists**
- Application has no user-specific resources (no posts, files, comments, etc.)
- No object identifiers in URLs or parameters
- No database to store resources
- Single-purpose application: display a CTF flag if ANY username parameter exists in POST request

### Workflow Implementation:
- **NO multi-step workflows exist**
- Application flow: Display form → Receive POST → Display flag (if username parameter present)
- No state transitions, no workflow validation, no step-by-step processes

### Critical Finding: Authentication Bypass (Not Authorization)

While this application doesn't have authorization vulnerabilities, it has a **critical authentication bypass** that renders the entire concept of access control moot:

**Vulnerable Code (Line 82-85):**
```php
if(isset($_POST['username'])){	
    echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
    echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
}
```

**Analysis:**
- Check only verifies parameter existence with `isset()`, not its value
- Any POST request with `username=anything` (including empty values) displays the flag
- Password parameter `$_POST['password']` is never validated server-side
- Client-side JavaScript validation (lines 62-71) can be bypassed by direct POST request

**This is an authentication failure, not an authorization failure.** The application never authenticates users, so it never reaches the point of authorizing access to resources.

## 4. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

**NOTE:** The following analysis confirms that no authorization checks exist, which is documented here for completeness. These are NOT "secure by design" - they are **missing authorization entirely**.

| **Endpoint** | **Analysis Result** | **Authorization Mechanism** | **Verdict** |
|--------------|-------------------|---------------------------|-------------|
| `GET /` | Analyzed | None - Public access | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `GET /index.php` | Analyzed | None - Public access | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `POST /index.php` | Analyzed | `isset($_POST['username'])` only (broken auth, not authz) | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `GET /static/springfield_background.jpg` | Analyzed | None - Public static asset | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `GET /static/springfield_background-2.jpg` | Analyzed | None - Public static asset | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |
| `GET /static/homer_simpson.png` | Analyzed | None - Public static asset | NO AUTHZ SYSTEM |

### Horizontal Authorization Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

**Per reconnaissance deliverable section 8.1:**
> "**NOT APPLICABLE** - No object ownership, no user-to-user access control, no object ID parameters."

**Verification Results:**
- No user accounts exist (no database, no user storage)
- No user-owned resources exist (no posts, files, comments, etc.)
- No object ID parameters in any endpoint (no `/users/{id}`, `/posts/{id}`, etc.)
- No horizontal privilege escalation possible (no users to escalate between)

**Endpoints Analyzed:** All 6 endpoints listed above
**Ownership Checks Found:** 0
**User-to-Resource Relationships:** 0

**Conclusion:** Horizontal authorization vulnerabilities cannot exist in an application without user accounts or user-owned resources.

### Vertical Authorization Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

**Per reconnaissance deliverable section 8.2:**
> "**NOT APPLICABLE** - No privilege levels to escalate between."

**Verification Results:**
- No role definitions in code (no admin, user, moderator roles)
- No permission checks before privileged operations
- No privileged operations exist (no user management, system config, etc.)
- The string "admin" is cosmetic only - not enforced by any authorization logic
- All endpoints are equally accessible to anyone (no privilege hierarchy)

**Endpoints Analyzed:** All 6 endpoints
**Role Checks Found:** 0
**Privilege Levels Found:** 0

**Conclusion:** Vertical privilege escalation vulnerabilities cannot exist in an application without roles or privilege levels.

### Context/Workflow Authorization Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

**Per reconnaissance deliverable section 8.3:**
> "**NOT APPLICABLE** - No multi-step workflows or state-dependent operations."

**Verification Results:**
- No multi-step processes (registration → verification → activation, etc.)
- No workflow state tracking (no status fields, stage tokens, or nonces)
- No state-dependent operations (payment flows, approval processes, etc.)
- Application flow is linear: Display form → Receive POST → Display flag

**Workflows Analyzed:** 0 (none exist)
**State Transition Checks Found:** 0

**Conclusion:** Context-based authorization vulnerabilities cannot exist in a stateless single-step application.

## 5. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

### Constraints Encountered:

1. **No Authorization System to Analyze:**
   The fundamental constraint is that authorization analysis requires an authorization system to examine. This application lacks the basic building blocks:
   - No user identity management
   - No role or permission definitions
   - No resource access controls
   - No ownership validation logic

2. **Static Analysis Limitations:**
   While the codebase is small (89 lines in a single file), confirming the *absence* of security controls is more challenging than finding *broken* controls. This analysis verified:
   - Searched for authorization keywords: `role`, `permission`, `privilege`, `authorize`, `access`, `ACL` → No matches
   - Searched for session management: `session_start`, `$_SESSION`, `setcookie` → No matches
   - Searched for database queries: `mysqli`, `PDO`, `mysql_`, `SELECT`, `INSERT` → No matches
   - Manual code review of all 89 lines confirmed no authorization logic

3. **Single-File Application:**
   With only one PHP file, there's no middleware layer, no shared authorization utilities, and no separation of concerns that might hide authorization logic.

### Blind Spots:

**NONE IDENTIFIED.** 

The application is small enough and simple enough that comprehensive analysis was possible:
- Full codebase reviewed: 1 PHP file (89 lines)
- All endpoints traced: 6 endpoints (3 application routes, 3 static assets)
- All input parameters analyzed: 2 POST parameters (username, password)
- All code paths examined: Linear flow with one conditional branch

**No external services to analyze:**
- No microservices or API gateways that might enforce authorization externally
- No reverse proxies with auth middleware (Nginx, Apache reverse proxy)
- No authentication/authorization services (OAuth providers, LDAP, SAML)
- No database with row-level security policies

**No dynamic permission systems:**
- No database-driven permissions loaded at runtime
- No policy engines (Open Policy Agent, Casbin, etc.)
- No attribute-based access control (ABAC) with external attribute providers

### What Was NOT Analyzed (Out of Scope):

The following were confirmed to be out of scope for this authorization analysis:

1. **Network-Level Access Controls:** Docker network isolation, firewall rules, cloud security groups (infrastructure security, not application authorization)

2. **Build-Time Security:** Flag injection in Dockerfile, secrets in `.env` file (configuration security, not runtime authorization)

3. **Authentication Bypass Vulnerability:** While documented in this report for context, the authentication bypass (`isset($_POST['username'])` check) is an **authentication** failure, not an **authorization** failure. This vulnerability belongs in the authentication analysis phase, not authorization analysis.

4. **PHP/Apache Vulnerabilities:** EOL PHP 5.6.40 and Apache 2.4.25 with known CVEs (software vulnerability analysis, not authorization logic flaws)

5. **Missing Security Headers:** No CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options (HTTP security, not authorization)

## 6. Methodology Application Summary

The authorization analysis methodology was applied systematically, but each category returned "NOT APPLICABLE" as documented below:

### Methodology Step 1: Horizontal Authorization Analysis
- **Target Identification:** Checked reconnaissance section 8.1 for horizontal candidates
- **Finding:** Reconnaissance stated "NOT APPLICABLE - No IDOR candidates"
- **Verification:** Confirmed no user accounts, no object IDs, no user-owned resources
- **Result:** No horizontal authorization analysis possible
- **Coverage:** N/A (no endpoints to test for horizontal authorization)

### Methodology Step 2: Vertical Authorization Analysis
- **Target Identification:** Checked reconnaissance section 8.2 for vertical candidates
- **Finding:** Reconnaissance stated "NOT APPLICABLE - No privilege levels"
- **Verification:** Confirmed no roles, no privilege checks, no admin endpoints
- **Result:** No vertical authorization analysis possible
- **Coverage:** N/A (no privileged operations to test)

### Methodology Step 3: Context/Workflow Authorization Analysis
- **Target Identification:** Checked reconnaissance section 8.3 for context candidates
- **Finding:** Reconnaissance stated "NOT APPLICABLE - No workflows"
- **Verification:** Confirmed stateless application with no multi-step processes
- **Result:** No workflow authorization analysis possible
- **Coverage:** N/A (no workflows to test)

### Methodology Step 4: Proof Obligations
- **Obligation:** Find endpoints where side effects occur without sufficient authorization guards
- **Finding:** The only side effect is displaying the flag (line 84)
- **Guard Analysis:** No authorization guard exists (only broken authentication check)
- **Classification:** This is MISSING AUTHORIZATION (CWE-862), not broken authorization logic
- **Verdict:** Not an authorization vulnerability; this is an authentication/access control architecture failure

### Methodology Step 5: Exploitation Queue Preparation
- **Vulnerabilities Found:** 0 authorization vulnerabilities
- **Queue Contents:** Empty array `{"vulnerabilities": []}`
- **Reason:** No authorization system exists to have vulnerabilities

### Methodology Step 6: Confidence Scoring
- **Not Applicable:** No vulnerabilities to score

### Methodology Step 7: Documenting Findings
- **Verdict:** SAFE from authorization vulnerabilities (because no authorization system exists)
- **Exploitation Queue:** Empty (no vulnerabilities to pass to exploitation phase)
- **This Report:** Documents the absence of authorization mechanisms

## 7. Recommendations for Developers (Out of Scope for Pentesting)

While not part of the authorization vulnerability analysis, the following recommendations would be needed if this were a real application requiring security hardening:

**Critical Missing Components:**
1. Implement server-side authentication with password hashing (bcrypt/argon2)
2. Add session management with secure session cookies
3. Create user accounts with database storage
4. Define role-based access control (admin vs. user roles)
5. Add authorization checks before displaying sensitive data (the flag)
6. Implement ownership validation for user-specific resources
7. Add CSRF protection to forms
8. Upgrade from EOL PHP 5.6.40 to supported PHP version (8.x)
9. Enable HTTPS/TLS for encrypted transport
10. Add security headers (CSP, HSTS, X-Frame-Options)

**Note:** This application is a deliberately vulnerable CTF challenge, so these recommendations are expected to be missing by design.

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## Conclusion

**AUTHORIZATION ANALYSIS COMPLETE**

**Summary:**
- **Endpoints Analyzed:** 6 (all endpoints in application)
- **Authorization Checks Found:** 0
- **Authorization Vulnerabilities Found:** 0
- **Reason:** No authorization system exists

**Key Finding:**
This application does not have authorization vulnerabilities because it does not have an authorization system. The security failure is at the authentication layer (broken client-side validation with trivial server-side bypass) and architectural level (no user accounts, no roles, no permissions).

**Deliverables:**
1. ✅ Authorization Analysis Report (this document)
2. ✅ Exploitation Queue: Empty `{"vulnerabilities": []}` (no authorization vulnerabilities to exploit)

**Handoff to Exploitation Phase:**
No authorization exploitation required. The authentication bypass vulnerability (if exploited) would be handled in the authentication exploitation phase, not authorization exploitation.

---

**File Analyzed:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-072-24/src/index.php` (complete application)

**Analysis Completed:** 2025-10-28