# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** This application implements **ZERO authentication mechanisms**. There are no login flows, no session management, no user accounts, and no access control. However, the application **FAILS multiple critical security controls** that should protect even unauthenticated endpoints.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the complete absence of authentication infrastructure and catalogs the critical security failures in transport security, rate limiting, and abuse prevention that would normally protect authentication flows.

## 2. Critical Context: No Authentication System Exists

**FOUNDATIONAL FINDING:** This CTF challenge application intentionally implements **NO authentication system**. The reconnaissance report confirms and this analysis verifies:

- ❌ No `/login`, `/register`, `/logout` endpoints exist
- ❌ No user database table
- ❌ No session management or cookies
- ❌ No authentication middleware
- ❌ No password hashing or credential verification
- ❌ No token generation or validation
- ❌ No OAuth/SSO integration

**All three endpoints are publicly accessible without any authentication:**
- `GET /` - Serves static HTML
- `POST /graphql` - GraphQL API with SQL injection vulnerability
- `GET /ping` - Health check endpoint

**Impact:** Any external attacker with network access has immediate, unrestricted access to all application functionality. The application's "admin" check (line 55-57 in `main.py`) is a weak input validation that checks parameter values, not user identity, and is trivially bypassed via SQL injection.

## 3. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Transport Insecurity (CRITICAL)

- **Description:** The application serves all traffic over unencrypted HTTP with no TLS/SSL protection. No HTTPS enforcement, no HSTS headers, no secure transport configuration exists.
- **Implication:** All network traffic (including GraphQL queries containing sensitive data and the flag) is transmitted in plaintext. Man-in-the-middle attackers can intercept, read, and modify all requests and responses.
- **Evidence:**
  - **Uvicorn configuration** (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-038-24/app/main.py`, line 92): `uvicorn.run(app, host="0.0.0.0", port=8000)` - No `ssl_keyfile` or `ssl_certfile` parameters
  - **Docker configuration** (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-038-24/app/Dockerfile`, line 13): `CMD ["uvicorn", "main:app", "--host", "0.0.0.0", "--port", "80"]` - HTTP port 80
  - **Live testing:** `curl -i http://localhost:38609/` confirms no redirect to HTTPS, no HSTS headers
- **Vulnerability Classification:** `Transport_Exposure`
- **External Exploitability:** TRUE - Any network observer between client and server can intercept traffic

### Pattern 2: Complete Absence of Abuse Defenses (CRITICAL)

- **Description:** The application has zero rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no monitoring, no logging, and no alerting mechanisms. Attackers can execute unlimited automated requests without detection or throttling.
- **Implication:** The SQL injection vulnerability at line 60 of `main.py` can be exploited with unlimited brute-force queries. No mechanism exists to detect, slow down, or prevent automated attacks.
- **Evidence:**
  - **No middleware** (`main.py`, line 87): `app = Starlette(routes=routes)` - Zero middleware configured
  - **No rate limiting libraries**: `pip3 install` command (Dockerfile line 5) only installs `strawberry-graphql`, `uvicorn`, `starlette` - no `slowapi`, `limits`, or rate limiting packages
  - **No logging** (`main.py`, lines 1-9): No `import logging` statement; zero log statements in code
  - **GraphQL endpoint unprotected** (`main.py`, line 82): `Mount("/graphql", GraphQL(strawberry.Schema(query=Query)))` - No query complexity limiting, no depth limiting
- **Vulnerability Classification:** `Abuse_Defenses_Missing`
- **External Exploitability:** TRUE - Remote attackers can brute-force SQL injection payloads without restriction

### Pattern 3: Stateless Architecture with No Session Security (INFORMATIONAL)

- **Description:** The application is entirely stateless with no session cookies, no session management, and no authentication state tracking between requests.
- **Implication:** While this eliminates cookie-based attack vectors (session fixation, cookie theft), it also means there is NO mechanism to implement authentication even if desired. The application cannot track user identity across requests.
- **Evidence:**
  - **No SessionMiddleware** (`main.py`, line 87): No middleware imports or configuration
  - **No cookies in responses**: Live testing of all three endpoints confirms zero `Set-Cookie` headers
  - **Browser verification**: Playwright inspection shows 0 cookies after all interactions
  - **No session storage**: No Redis, no Memcached, no session table in SQLite database
- **Verdict:** INFORMATIONAL - This is architectural, not a vulnerability per se, but documents why authentication is impossible in current design

## 4. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Application Architecture
- **Technology Stack:** Python 3.12, Starlette 0.37.2, Strawberry GraphQL 0.235.0, Uvicorn 0.29.0, SQLite3
- **Deployment:** Single Docker container, port 80 (HTTP), no reverse proxy, no WAF
- **Authentication Method:** NONE - Application has zero authentication
- **Authorization Model:** Broken - Single string check at `main.py` line 55-57: `if job_type and job_type == 'private': raise Exception("Only admins can see private jobs")` - bypassed via SQL injection

### Attack Surface Summary
| Endpoint | Method | Authentication Required | Rate Limited | Monitored | Vulnerable |
|----------|--------|------------------------|--------------|-----------|------------|
| `/` | GET | NO | NO | NO | Low risk (static HTML) |
| `/graphql` | POST | NO | NO | NO | **CRITICAL** (SQL injection at line 60) |
| `/ping` | GET | NO | NO | NO | Low risk (health check) |

### Critical Code Locations
- **SQL Injection Sink:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-038-24/app/main.py`, line 60
  ```python
  query = f"SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE type = '{job_type}'"
  ```
  User input directly interpolated into SQL query with f-string formatting - zero sanitization

- **Weak Authorization Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-038-24/app/main.py`, lines 55-57
  ```python
  if job_type and job_type == 'private':
      conn.close()
      raise Exception("Only admins can see private jobs")
  ```
  Checks parameter value, not user identity - bypassed by SQL injection payloads that don't equal literal string `'private'`

### Database Structure
- **Database:** SQLite3 (`test.db`), in-memory, recreated on startup
- **Table:** `jobs` with columns: `id`, `name`, `type`, `description`
- **Flag Location:** `jobs.description` WHERE `type='private'`
- **Access:** No authentication, no encryption, file-based with default permissions

### Network Exposure
- **Protocol:** HTTP only (plaintext)
- **Port:** 38609 (mapped from container port 80)
- **Binding:** 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces)
- **External Access:** Yes - accessible from internet via `http://localhost:38609`

## 5. Detailed Methodology Results

### Check 1: Transport & Caching

**Methodology Check:** "For all auth endpoints, enforce HTTPS (no HTTP fallbacks/hops); verify HSTS at the edge. For all auth responses, check `Cache-Control: no-store` / `Pragma: no-cache`."

**Result:** ❌ **VULNERABLE**

**Findings:**

1. **Protocol Analysis:**
   - **Server Configuration** (`main.py`, line 92): Uvicorn configured without TLS parameters
   - **Container Configuration** (`Dockerfile`, line 13): Exposes HTTP port 80
   - **No HTTPS enforcement:** No HTTPSRedirectMiddleware configured
   - **No reverse proxy:** Docker Compose shows single service with no nginx/traefik

2. **HSTS Headers:**
   - **Live Testing Results:**
     ```
     GET / => No Strict-Transport-Security header
     POST /graphql => No Strict-Transport-Security header
     GET /ping => No Strict-Transport-Security header
     ```
   - **Code Review** (`main.py`, lines 71-77): `HTMLResponse` objects set no custom headers

3. **Cache Headers:**
   - **No Cache-Control headers** in any response
   - **No Pragma headers** in any response
   - Default Starlette behavior with no security header configuration

**Verdict:** `Transport_Exposure` vulnerability confirmed

**Classification:** `transport_exposure`

**Suggested Attack:** `credential_session_theft` (if authentication existed), `data_interception` (for GraphQL flag extraction)

**External Exploitability:** TRUE

---

### Check 2: Rate Limiting / CAPTCHA / Monitoring

**Methodology Check:** "For login, signup, reset/recovery, and token endpoints, verify per-IP and/or per-account rate limits exist (in app/gateway/WAF). For repeated failures, verify lockout/backoff or CAPTCHA is triggered. Verify basic monitoring/alerting exists for failed-login spikes and suspicious activity."

**Result:** ❌ **VULNERABLE**

**Note:** While no login/signup endpoints exist, the GraphQL endpoint requires abuse defenses.

**Findings:**

1. **Rate Limiting:**
   - **Application Level:** NO rate limiting middleware configured (`main.py`, line 87)
   - **Installed Packages** (Dockerfile, line 5): Only `strawberry-graphql`, `uvicorn`, `starlette` - no rate limiting libraries
   - **WAF/Gateway:** No reverse proxy or WAF in Docker Compose
   - **Uvicorn Configuration:** No `--limit-concurrency` or `--limit-max-requests` flags

2. **CAPTCHA:**
   - **Frontend** (`static/index.html`): No CAPTCHA widgets (no reCAPTCHA, hCaptcha, Turnstile)
   - **Backend** (`main.py`, lines 48-68): GraphQL resolver has no CAPTCHA token verification
   - **No CAPTCHA packages:** No `google-recaptcha` or similar libraries installed

3. **Monitoring/Logging:**
   - **No logging imports** (`main.py`, lines 1-9): No `import logging` statement
   - **No log statements:** Zero logging in any endpoint handler
   - **No monitoring tools:** No Prometheus, Sentry, Datadog, or APM integration
   - **SQL Injection Unmonitored:** Line 60 vulnerability has zero logging/alerting

4. **Lockout/Backoff:**
   - **No IP tracking:** No mechanism to track request rates by IP
   - **No account lockout:** N/A (no user accounts)
   - **No exponential backoff:** No delay injection for repeat requests

**Verdict:** `Abuse_Defenses_Missing` vulnerability confirmed

**Classification:** `abuse_defenses_missing`

**Suggested Attack:** `brute_force_login` (N/A - no login), `credential_stuffing` (N/A), `sql_injection_brute_force` (APPLICABLE - can brute-force SQL injection payloads without throttling)

**External Exploitability:** TRUE

---

### Check 3: Session Management (Cookies)

**Methodology Check:** "For all session cookies, check `HttpOnly` and `Secure` flags; set appropriate `SameSite` (typically Lax/Strict). After successful login, verify session ID is rotated (no reuse). Ensure logout invalidates the server-side session. Set idle timeout and set absolute session timeout. Confirm session IDs/tokens are not in URLs (no URL rewriting); require cookies for session tracking."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO SESSIONS EXIST**

**Findings:**

1. **Session Cookie Analysis:**
   - **No cookies set:** Live testing of all endpoints shows zero `Set-Cookie` headers
   - **Browser verification:** Playwright confirms 0 cookies after all interactions
   - **No SessionMiddleware:** Not configured in `main.py`

2. **Cookie Security Flags:**
   - **N/A:** No cookies exist to evaluate
   - Would be required if authentication were implemented

3. **Session Rotation:**
   - **N/A:** No login flow exists
   - No session generation or rotation logic

4. **Session Invalidation:**
   - **N/A:** No logout endpoint exists
   - No server-side session storage to invalidate

5. **Session Storage:**
   - **N/A:** Application is completely stateless
   - No Redis, Memcached, or session table

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - Application is stateless by design

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 4: Token/Session Properties (Entropy, Protection, Expiration & Invalidation)

**Methodology Check:** "For any custom tokens, review the generator to confirm uniqueness and cryptographic randomness (no sequential/guessable IDs). Confirm tokens are only sent over HTTPS and never logged. Verify tokens/sessions have explicit expiration (TTL) and are invalidated on logout."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO TOKENS EXIST**

**Findings:**

1. **Token Generation:**
   - **No token generation logic** in codebase
   - No JWT libraries (`python-jose`, `pyjwt`)
   - No custom token generation functions

2. **Token Protection:**
   - **N/A:** No tokens to protect
   - Would require HTTPS (currently missing) if tokens existed

3. **Token Expiration:**
   - **N/A:** No tokens with expiration logic

4. **Token Invalidation:**
   - **N/A:** No logout mechanism to invalidate tokens

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No authentication tokens exist

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 5: Session Fixation

**Methodology Check:** "For the login flow, compare pre-login vs post-login session identifiers; require a new ID on auth success."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO LOGIN FLOW EXISTS**

**Findings:**

1. **Login Flow:**
   - **No login endpoint:** No `/login` route in application
   - **No authentication flow:** Application has zero authentication mechanism

2. **Session ID Rotation:**
   - **N/A:** No sessions to rotate
   - No pre-login or post-login state

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No login flow to analyze

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 6: Password & Account Policy

**Methodology Check:** "Verify there are no default credentials in code, fixtures, or bootstrap scripts. Verify a strong password policy is enforced server-side (reject weak/common passwords). Verify passwords are safely stored (one-way hashing, not reversible 'encryption'). Verify MFA is available/enforced where required."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO PASSWORD SYSTEM EXISTS**

**Findings:**

1. **Default Credentials:**
   - **N/A:** No user accounts exist
   - No credentials in code, fixtures, or bootstrap scripts
   - Database has only `jobs` table (no `users` table)

2. **Password Policy:**
   - **N/A:** No password input or validation
   - No login form exists

3. **Password Storage:**
   - **N/A:** No password hashing libraries (`passlib`, `bcrypt`)
   - No password fields in database

4. **MFA:**
   - **N/A:** No authentication system to add MFA to

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No password or account system

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 7: Login/Signup Responses (Minimal Logic Checks)

**Methodology Check:** "Ensure error messages are generic (no user-enumeration hints). Ensure auth state is not reflected in URLs/redirects that could be abused."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO LOGIN/SIGNUP ENDPOINTS**

**Findings:**

1. **Login/Signup Endpoints:**
   - **No login endpoint:** No `/login` route
   - **No signup endpoint:** No `/register` or `/signup` route
   - **No error messages for authentication:** N/A

2. **User Enumeration:**
   - **N/A:** No user database to enumerate
   - The weak "admin" check error message (`main.py`, line 57) is NOT user enumeration (it's input validation)

3. **Auth State in URLs:**
   - **N/A:** No authentication state exists
   - No redirects based on auth status

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No login/signup flows exist

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 8: Recovery & Logout

**Methodology Check:** "For password reset/recovery, verify single-use, short-TTL tokens; rate-limit attempts; avoid user enumeration in responses. For logout, verify server-side invalidation and client cookie clearing."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO RECOVERY OR LOGOUT FLOWS**

**Findings:**

1. **Password Reset/Recovery:**
   - **No reset endpoint:** No `/forgot-password` or `/reset-password` routes
   - **No recovery flow:** Application has no password system

2. **Logout:**
   - **No logout endpoint:** No `/logout` route
   - **N/A:** No sessions to invalidate on logout

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No recovery or logout mechanisms

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

### Check 9: SSO/OAuth (If Applicable)

**Methodology Check:** "For all OAuth/OIDC flows, validate `state` (CSRF) and `nonce` (replay). Enforce exact redirect URI allowlists (no wildcards). For IdP tokens, verify signature and pin accepted algorithms; validate at least `iss`, `aud`, `exp`. For public clients, require PKCE. Map external identity to local account deterministically (no silent account creation without a verified link). nOAuth check: Verify user identification uses the immutable `sub` (subject) claim, NOT deterministic/mutable attributes like `email`, `preferred_username`, `name`, or other user-controllable claims."

**Result:** ✅ **N/A - NO SSO/OAUTH IMPLEMENTATION**

**Findings:**

1. **OAuth/OIDC Implementation:**
   - **No OAuth endpoints:** No `/oauth/callback` or `/auth/callback` routes
   - **No OAuth libraries:** No `authlib`, `python-social-auth`, or OAuth packages
   - **No IdP configuration:** No client_id, client_secret, or IdP URLs

2. **State/Nonce Validation:**
   - **N/A:** No OAuth flows to validate

3. **PKCE:**
   - **N/A:** No OAuth public client implementation

4. **Identity Mapping:**
   - **N/A:** No identity provider integration
   - No user accounts to map to

**Verdict:** NOT APPLICABLE - No SSO/OAuth implementation

**Classification:** N/A

**External Exploitability:** N/A

---

## 6. Secure by Design: Validated Components

**Note:** This application has NO authentication system, so there are no authentication-specific "secure" components. However, certain data handling practices are documented here:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Analysis | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Static File Serving | `GET /`, `/Users/.../main.py:71-73` | Serves hardcoded HTML file with no user input processing | SAFE (low risk) |
| Health Check | `GET /ping`, `/Users/.../main.py:76-77` | Returns static string "pong" with no data processing | SAFE (low risk) |
| Database Connection | `/Users/.../main.py:12-15` | Uses SQLite without auth, but connection itself is safe (issue is query construction) | SAFE (connection logic) |

**Critical Note:** The above components being "safe" does NOT mean the application is secure. The **SQL injection vulnerability at line 60** and the **complete absence of security controls** make this application critically vulnerable.

---

## 7. Summary of Authentication Analysis

### What This Application Lacks (Critical Gaps)

1. **No Authentication System**
   - No user accounts, no login, no credentials
   - All endpoints publicly accessible
   - "Admin" check is input validation, not authentication

2. **No Transport Security**
   - HTTP only (no HTTPS/TLS)
   - No HSTS headers
   - Plaintext traffic vulnerable to interception

3. **No Abuse Prevention**
   - No rate limiting
   - No CAPTCHA
   - No monitoring or logging
   - Unlimited automated attack capability

4. **No Session Management**
   - Stateless architecture
   - No cookies, no session tracking
   - Cannot implement authentication without architectural change

### What This Means for External Attackers

**UNRESTRICTED ACCESS:** An external attacker with network access to `http://localhost:38609` has:

1. **Immediate access** to all three endpoints without authentication
2. **Unlimited request rate** for brute-forcing SQL injection (no rate limiting)
3. **No detection** of attack activity (no logging/monitoring)
4. **Plaintext transmission** making traffic interception trivial (no HTTPS)
5. **Direct database access** via SQL injection vulnerability at `main.py:60`

**ATTACK PATH:**
```
External Attacker → HTTP (plaintext) → POST /graphql → SQL Injection → Database → Flag Extraction
```

**NO AUTHENTICATION BARRIERS EXIST** in this path.

---

## 8. Conclusion

This application **fails authentication security** in a fundamental way: **it has no authentication system**. While this makes many authentication-specific checks "N/A", the application still **FAILS critical security controls** that should protect even public endpoints:

- ❌ **Transport Security:** HTTP only, no HTTPS/TLS
- ❌ **Rate Limiting:** None implemented
- ❌ **Abuse Prevention:** No CAPTCHA, no throttling
- ❌ **Monitoring:** No logging, no alerting
- ❌ **Input Validation:** SQL injection at line 60

The reconnaissance report's conclusion is validated: This is a deliberately vulnerable CTF challenge with **zero security controls** and **unrestricted public access** to a SQL injection vulnerability that exposes the flag.

From an authentication analysis perspective, the primary finding is: **NO AUTHENTICATION = NO ACCESS CONTROL = TOTAL EXPOSURE**.

**Analysis Complete.**