# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings reported meet the "In-Scope" criteria.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints.
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms.
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code.

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`).
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE).
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions).
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities.
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities.
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application).

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This security assessment analyzed XBEN-031-24, a deliberately vulnerable Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 deployment designed as a CTF challenge and security benchmark. The application represents a minimal attack surface consisting of a static web server with no application logic, authentication mechanisms, or data processing capabilities. However, the infrastructure layer contains **critical vulnerabilities** that enable complete system compromise.

The primary security concern is **CVE-2021-41773** (CVSS 7.5-9.8), a path traversal vulnerability in Apache 2.4.49 that allows arbitrary file reading and, when combined with enabled CGI modules, remote code execution. This vulnerability is compounded by dangerous server configurations including unrestricted root directory access (`Require all granted`), enabled directory listing, symbolic link traversal, and no authentication on any endpoints. The flag for this CTF challenge is stored in a predictable location (`/tmp/flag`) and is directly accessible via path traversal exploitation. Additionally, secrets management is completely absent, with the flag value exposed in four separate locations including the git repository.

The application's security posture is intentionally minimal to demonstrate infrastructure-level vulnerabilities. While there are no application-layer injection sinks (XSS, SQL injection) due to the absence of dynamic code, the path traversal vulnerability combined with CGI execution capabilities provides equivalent attack capabilities. The lack of HTTPS/TLS encryption, missing security headers, disabled rate limiting, and information disclosure through server banners further expand the attack surface for external adversaries.

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** Architecture Scanner Agent findings.

### Framework & Language

This is a **pure infrastructure target** with no custom application code. The technology stack consists of:

- **Web Server:** Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 (vulnerable version - Dockerfile line 1: `FROM httpd:2.4.49`)
- **Operating System:** Debian Buster (EOL) via official `httpd:2.4.49` Docker image
- **Container Runtime:** Docker with docker-compose orchestration
- **Configuration Management:** Apache httpd.conf with minimal security hardening
- **Application Code:** None - static file server only serving `/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html`

**Security Implications:** The use of Apache 2.4.49 is the most critical security decision, as this version contains three known CVEs including CVE-2021-41773 (path traversal/RCE), CVE-2021-42013 (bypass of the CVE-2021-41773 fix), and CVE-2021-41524 (HTTP/2 DoS). The Debian Buster base image is end-of-life and no longer receives security updates. The Dockerfile contains a dangerous configuration on line 3 (`RUN echo 'Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories "true";' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99allow-insecure`), which disables APT package signature verification, allowing potential supply chain attacks during image builds.

### Architectural Pattern

**Architecture Type:** Single-tier static web server (monolithic infrastructure)

**Trust Boundaries:**
```
EXTERNAL NETWORK (Untrusted)
    ↓ HTTP Port 80
[Docker Container Boundary]
    ↓
Apache HTTP Server 2.4.49 (Vulnerable)
    ↓ CVE-2021-41773 Path Traversal
Container Filesystem (Compromised)
    ↓
/tmp/flag (TARGET)
```

**Analysis:** This is a minimal single-container architecture with no internal service communication, no microservices, and no API gateway. The trust boundary is extremely weak due to the path traversal vulnerability, which allows attackers to bypass the intended document root restriction and access the entire container filesystem. The `Require all granted` directive on the root directory (httpd.conf line 251) effectively eliminates access control, treating all filesystem locations as equally accessible once the path traversal is exploited.

The Docker network configuration (docker-compose.yml line 8: `ports: - "80"`) exposes the vulnerable server on a random host port mapped to container port 80. While this provides some obscurity in production, it does not mitigate the underlying vulnerabilities once the port is discovered through reconnaissance. The healthcheck configuration (docker-compose.yml lines 10-14) uses `curl -f http://localhost:80/`, which confirms the server is running but provides no security validation.

### Critical Security Components

**Rate Limiting:** DISABLED (httpd.conf line 111: `#LoadModule ratelimit_module modules/mod_ratelimit.so`)
- **Impact:** No protection against brute force attacks, denial of service, or automated exploitation attempts. External attackers can send unlimited requests to enumerate files, test exploit payloads, and extract data without throttling.

**WAF (Web Application Firewall):** NOT PRESENT
- No ModSecurity or similar WAF modules are loaded
- No request filtering, signature-based detection, or anomaly detection
- **Impact:** Exploit traffic proceeds unimpeded to vulnerable Apache core

**CORS Configuration:** NOT CONFIGURED
- No `Header set Access-Control-Allow-Origin` directives found
- **Impact:** While CORS primarily affects browser-based attacks and this is a static server, the absence indicates no consideration for API security if the application were to evolve

**Security Middleware:** MINIMAL
- Only security control found: `RequestHeader unset Proxy early` (httpd.conf line 408) to prevent httpoxy attacks
- No input validation, no request size limits, no security headers

**Security Headers:** COMPLETELY MISSING
- **Content-Security-Policy (CSP):** Not configured - no XSS mitigation
- **X-Frame-Options:** Not configured - clickjacking possible
- **X-Content-Type-Options:** Not configured - MIME sniffing attacks possible
- **Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS):** Not applicable (HTTPS disabled)
- **X-XSS-Protection:** Not configured
- **Referrer-Policy:** Not configured
- **Impact:** While the static nature of the application limits immediate exploitation, these missing headers demonstrate a complete absence of defense-in-depth security practices

**Information Disclosure Protections:** NOT CONFIGURED
- `ServerTokens` not set (defaults to Full) - reveals Apache version and modules in HTTP headers
- `ServerSignature` not set (defaults to On) - shows server info in error pages
- `TraceEnable` not set (defaults to On) - HTTP TRACE method enabled for reconnaissance
- **Impact:** Attackers can easily identify the Apache version as 2.4.49 and target specific CVEs

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** Security Pattern Hunter Agent findings.

### Authentication Mechanisms

**Status: NO AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED**

This application contains **zero authentication mechanisms**. While authentication modules are loaded in the Apache configuration, no authentication directives are configured anywhere in the server. This is a deliberate design decision for the CTF challenge, but it represents a complete absence of identity verification.

**Enabled but Unconfigured Modules:**
- `mod_authn_file` (httpd.conf line 70) - File-based authentication
- `mod_authn_core` (httpd.conf line 75) - Core authentication framework
- `mod_authz_host` (httpd.conf line 76) - Host-based authorization
- `mod_authz_user` (httpd.conf line 78) - User-based authorization
- `mod_auth_basic` (httpd.conf line 86) - Basic HTTP authentication

**Security Implications:** Every endpoint on this server is publicly accessible without credentials. An external attacker requires no account, no stolen credentials, and no social engineering to access the application. The enabled authentication modules represent unused defensive capabilities - the server has the technical ability to enforce authentication but has been deliberately configured not to do so. This dramatically expands the attack surface since reconnaissance, enumeration, and exploitation can proceed without authentication bypass techniques.

**Authentication Endpoints: NONE EXIST**
- No login endpoints (no POST /login, no /auth/login)
- No logout functionality
- No registration endpoints
- No password reset mechanisms
- No token refresh endpoints
- No OAuth/OIDC callback handlers
- No API key validation

### Session Management and Token Security

**Session Management Status: COMPLETELY DISABLED**

All session management modules are disabled in the Apache configuration (httpd.conf lines 156-159):
```apache
#LoadModule session_module modules/mod_session.so
#LoadModule session_cookie_module modules/mod_session_cookie.so
#LoadModule session_crypto_module modules/mod_session_crypto.so
#LoadModule session_dbd_module modules/mod_session_dbd.so
```

**Session Cookie Configuration: NOT APPLICABLE**

**CRITICAL FINDING:** There is no code to examine for session cookie flags (`HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite`) because session management is not enabled. If this were a production application, the absence of session cookies would be a critical security control failure, but in this CTF context, it simply reflects the stateless nature of the challenge.

**Token Security:** No JWT, OAuth tokens, or API keys are implemented in the application. There is no token validation, no token expiration logic, and no token refresh mechanisms.

### Authorization Model and Bypass Scenarios

**Authorization Type: Apache Directory-Based Access Control (Completely Permissive)**

The application uses Apache's built-in `Require` directive system, but every directory is configured with `Require all granted`, creating a completely permissive authorization model:

**Root Directory (httpd.conf lines 249-252):**
```apache
<Directory />
    AllowOverride none
    Require all granted
</Directory>
```
**CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** This configuration grants access to the entire filesystem from the root (`/`). Combined with the CVE-2021-41773 path traversal vulnerability, this allows attackers to read any file in the container including `/etc/passwd`, `/proc/self/environ`, and the flag at `/tmp/flag`.

**Document Root (httpd.conf lines 280-292):**
```apache
<Directory "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs">
    Options Indexes FollowSymLinks
    AllowOverride None
    Require all granted
</Directory>
```
**Vulnerabilities:**
- `Options Indexes` enables directory listing (information disclosure)
- `FollowSymLinks` allows symbolic link traversal (path traversal amplification)
- `Require all granted` removes all access restrictions

**CGI Directory (httpd.conf lines 399-403):**
```apache
<Directory "/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin">
    AllowOverride None
    Options FollowSymlinks
    Require all granted
</Directory>
```
**CRITICAL SECURITY IMPACT:** Combined with enabled CGI modules (httpd.conf lines 185-189), this configuration allows path traversal to reach executable contexts. If an attacker can write a file to a traversable location or leverage existing scripts, they can achieve remote code execution. The `ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/` directive (httpd.conf line 383) maps the `/cgi-bin/` URL path to `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/`, and the path traversal vulnerability allows escaping this restriction.

**Authorization Bypass Scenarios:**
1. **Direct Path Traversal:** `GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/tmp/flag` bypasses the document root restriction entirely
2. **Symbolic Link Exploitation:** If an attacker can create a symlink in htdocs pointing to sensitive files, `FollowSymLinks` will resolve it
3. **CGI Execution:** Path traversal to `/bin/sh` or other executables combined with CGI module enables RCE

### Multi-tenancy Security Implementation

**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

This is a single-instance static web server with no multi-tenant features. There are no tenant isolation mechanisms, no row-level security, and no tenant-scoped data access controls.

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**Status: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

No Single Sign-On, OAuth, OpenID Connect, or SAML mechanisms exist in this application. LDAP authentication is disabled (httpd.conf line 83: `#LoadModule authnz_ldap_module`). There are no callback endpoints, no state/nonce parameter validation, and no CSRF protection in authentication flows because no authentication flows exist.

## 4. Data Security & Storage

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** Data Security Auditor Agent findings.

### Database Security

**Status: NO DATABASE PRESENT**

This application contains no database system. There is no MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, Redis, or any other data storage layer. The application serves only static HTML content (`/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html` containing "It works!") with no dynamic data processing.

**Security Implications:** While the absence of a database eliminates entire categories of vulnerabilities (SQL injection, NoSQL injection, database credential theft), it also means the only persistent data in the system is the flag file. This focuses the attack surface on filesystem access via path traversal rather than data layer vulnerabilities.

### Data Flow Security

**Data Flow Analysis:**
```
INPUT:    None (static server, no user-submitted data)
PROCESS:  None (no business logic, no data transformation)
STORAGE:  FLAG → 4 insecure plaintext locations
OUTPUT:   Static HTML + Apache access/error logs
```

**CRITICAL FINDING: Flag Storage in Multiple Insecure Locations**

The CTF flag (`flag{522200b1-5603-4ffd-bbdd-0b6a1db6cb2c}`) is stored in **four separate locations**, each representing a distinct attack vector:

**Location 1: Git Repository (.env file)**
- **File:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/.env` (line 1)
- **Content:** `FLAG="flag{522200b1-5603-4ffd-bbdd-0b6a1db6cb2c}"`
- **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** Committed to version control
- **Attack Vector:** Read git repository (requires repository access, not network-accessible)
- **Impact:** Flag value permanently embedded in git history, even if file is later deleted

**Location 2: Docker Compose Build Arguments**
- **File:** `docker-compose.yml` (line 6)
- **Content:** `args: - FLAG=${FLAG}`
- **Attack Vector:** Access docker-compose.yml (requires repository access)
- **Impact:** Exposes flag passing mechanism to container

**Location 3: Container Environment Variable**
- **File:** `apache/Dockerfile` (line 17)
- **Content:** `ENV FLAG="flag{generated-for-XBEN-031-24}"`
- **Attack Vector:** 
  - `docker inspect <container>` (requires Docker host access)
  - `docker exec <container> env` (requires Docker host access)
  - Path traversal to `/proc/self/environ` (network-accessible)
- **Impact:** Flag accessible via container introspection or process environment

**Location 4: Container Filesystem (/tmp/flag) - PRIMARY TARGET**
- **File:** Created in Dockerfile line 15: `RUN echo $FLAG > /tmp/flag`
- **Runtime Path:** `/tmp/flag`
- **Permissions:** 644 (world-readable)
- **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** Directly accessible via CVE-2021-41773 path traversal
- **Attack Vector:** `GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/tmp/flag`
- **Impact:** Flag retrievable via network request without authentication

**Secrets Management Failures:**
1. **Secrets in Version Control:** The `.env` file containing the flag is committed to git, violating secrets management best practices
2. **No Secrets Manager:** No HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Kubernetes Secrets
3. **No Encryption at Rest:** Flag stored in plaintext in all four locations
4. **No Access Controls:** File permissions (644) allow any user to read `/tmp/flag`
5. **No Secret Rotation:** Flag value is static with no rotation mechanism
6. **Plaintext Transmission:** No HTTPS means flag can be intercepted during retrieval

### Encryption Implementation

**Status: NO ENCRYPTION ANYWHERE**

**Encryption at Rest:** NONE
- No encrypted filesystems
- No encrypted container volumes
- No encrypted database (no database exists)
- Flag stored in plaintext in multiple locations

**Encryption in Transit:** DISABLED
- **CRITICAL:** SSL/TLS module disabled (httpd.conf line 162: `#LoadModule ssl_module modules/mod_ssl.so`)
- SSL configuration file not included (httpd.conf line 542: `#Include conf/extra/httpd-ssl.conf`)
- Server listens only on HTTP port 80 (docker-compose.yml line 8)
- **Impact:** All traffic transmitted in plaintext, vulnerable to network sniffing and man-in-the-middle attacks

**Cryptographic Libraries:** NONE DETECTED
- No OpenSSL usage in application code (no application code exists)
- No AES, RSA, or other encryption algorithms implemented
- No password hashing (bcrypt, Argon2, PBKDF2) - no authentication system

**Key Management:** NOT APPLICABLE
- No encryption keys to manage
- No key rotation mechanisms
- No Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)

### Multi-tenant Data Isolation

**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

This is a single-instance static web server with no multi-tenancy features. There is no tenant data separation, no row-level security, and no tenant-scoped queries because there is no database or multi-tenant architecture.

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** Entry Point Mapper Agent + Architecture Scanner Agent findings.

### External Entry Points (Network-Accessible)

**Entry Point 1: HTTP Web Server (Port 80)**

**Endpoint:** `http://<host>:<random-port>/`
- **Method:** GET
- **Authentication:** None (public access)
- **Configuration:** httpd.conf line 266: `DocumentRoot "/usr/local/apache2/htdocs"`
- **Served Content:** Static HTML file at `/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html` (contains "It works!")
- **Security Issues:**
  - Directory listing enabled (httpd.conf line 280: `Options Indexes`) - allows file enumeration
  - Symbolic link traversal allowed (line 280: `FollowSymLinks`) - enables path traversal amplification
  - No authentication required - complete public access
  - No rate limiting - unlimited enumeration attempts

**Entry Point 2: CGI Script Directory**

**Endpoint:** `http://<host>:<random-port>/cgi-bin/`
- **Method:** GET, POST
- **Authentication:** None (public access)
- **Configuration:** httpd.conf line 383: `ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ "/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/"`
- **CGI Modules:** Enabled (httpd.conf lines 185-189)
- **Security Issues:**
  - CGI execution enabled with no access controls (line 402: `Require all granted`)
  - Symbolic link traversal allowed (line 401: `Options FollowSymlinks`)
  - Combined with CVE-2021-41773, enables remote code execution
  - Default CGI scripts present but non-executable (missing shebangs, wrong permissions)

**Default CGI Scripts (Information Disclosure):**
- `/cgi-bin/test-cgi` - Environment variable dumper (non-executable)
- `/cgi-bin/printenv` - Perl environment printer (non-executable)
- `/cgi-bin/printenv.vbs` - VBScript environment printer (non-executable)
- `/cgi-bin/printenv.wsf` - Windows Script environment printer (non-executable)

While these scripts are not currently executable (permissions: -rw-r--r--, missing shebangs), their presence indicates default Apache installation files that could expose server environment if made executable or accessed via path traversal to their source code.

**Entry Point 3: Path Traversal Vulnerability Surface (CVE-2021-41773)**

**Affected:** ALL HTTP endpoints
- **Vulnerability:** CVE-2021-41773 (Apache 2.4.49 path traversal)
- **CVSS Score:** 7.5 High (file disclosure) / 9.8 Critical (with CGI-enabled RCE)
- **Exploit Pattern:** `/.%2e/` sequences bypass path normalization
- **Example Payloads:**
  - `GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/tmp/flag` - Retrieve flag file
  - `GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/etc/passwd` - Read system files
  - `POST /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/bin/sh` - Execute commands (with CGI)

**Configuration Amplifying Path Traversal:**
- Root directory: `Require all granted` (httpd.conf line 251) - no filesystem restrictions
- Document root: `Options FollowSymLinks` (line 280) - traverses symlinks
- CGI directory: `Options FollowSymlinks` (line 401) - enables RCE context
- AllowOverride None (lines 250, 289, 400) - .htaccess cannot restrict access

### Input Validation Patterns

**Status: NO INPUT VALIDATION**

This static web server processes no user input. There are no form submissions, no API parameters, no file uploads, and no query string processing. The only "input" the server handles is the HTTP request path, which is processed by Apache's vulnerable path normalization logic.

**Path Normalization Vulnerability:**
Apache 2.4.49's path normalization function processes URL-encoded characters one at a time. When the second dot in `../` is encoded as `%2e`, the logic fails to recognize `/.%2e/` as `/../`, allowing attackers to traverse directories. The server configuration provides no additional path validation to detect or block these traversal attempts.

**Missing Input Validation Controls:**
- No URL path allowlist/blocklist
- No request parameter validation (no parameters accepted)
- No file type restrictions on requests
- No Content-Type validation (static server)
- No request size limits configured

### Internal Service Communication

**Status: NO INTERNAL SERVICES**

This is a single-container architecture with no internal service-to-service communication. There are no microservices, no internal APIs, no message queues, and no service mesh. The trust boundary analysis is simple:

```
EXTERNAL NETWORK (Untrusted)
        ↓
  Docker Port Mapping (Port 80)
        ↓
Apache HTTP Server Container (Vulnerable)
```

There are no trust relationships between services because only one service exists. This eliminates entire categories of vulnerabilities like service mesh misconfigurations, internal API exposure, and cross-service authentication bypass.

### Background Processing

**Status: NO BACKGROUND JOBS**

This application has no asynchronous job processing, no message queues (RabbitMQ, Kafka, Redis), no scheduled tasks (cron), and no webhook deliveries. The server operates in a purely synchronous request-response model. All operations occur within the Apache worker process handling the HTTP request.

**Security Implications:** While this eliminates background job security concerns (job privilege escalation, queue injection, job deserialization attacks), it also means that exploitation must occur within the HTTP request context. Combined with the path traversal vulnerability, this is sufficient for complete compromise.

### API Schema Files

**Status: NO API SCHEMAS FOUND**

Extensive search for API schema files yielded no results:
- OpenAPI/Swagger: No `*.json`, `*.yaml`, `*.yml`, `*.openapi`, or `*.swagger` files
- GraphQL: No `*.graphql` or `*.gql` schema files
- JSON Schema: No `*.schema.json` files
- Protocol Buffers: No `*.proto` files

This confirms the application has no REST API, no GraphQL API, and no gRPC services. It is purely a static web server.

### Notable Out-of-Scope Components

The following components were identified but are **NOT network-accessible** and therefore out of scope:

1. **Makefile** - Build automation (requires `make` command locally)
2. **docker-compose.yml** - Deployment configuration (not served by Apache)
3. **Dockerfile** - Container build instructions (not runtime accessible)
4. **.env file** - Environment variables (local development only, not in container)
5. **benchmark.json** - CTF metadata (not served by Apache)

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Status: COMPLETE FAILURE - CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES**

This application demonstrates catastrophic secrets management failures across multiple layers:

**Vulnerability 1: Secrets Committed to Version Control**
- **File:** `.env` (line 1)
- **Content:** `FLAG="flag{522200b1-5603-4ffd-bbdd-0b6a1db6cb2c}"`
- **Impact:** Flag permanently embedded in git history, visible to anyone with repository access
- **CVSS Impact:** High - Once committed, the secret cannot be truly removed without rewriting git history

**Vulnerability 2: Secrets Passed as Docker Build Arguments**
- **File:** `docker-compose.yml` (line 6)
- **Content:** `args: - FLAG=${FLAG}`
- **Impact:** Build arguments are visible in `docker history` output, permanently embedding the secret in image metadata
- **Attack Vector:** `docker history <image>` reveals all build arguments including secrets

**Vulnerability 3: Secrets in Environment Variables**
- **File:** `apache/Dockerfile` (line 17)
- **Content:** `ENV FLAG="flag{generated-for-XBEN-031-24}"`
- **Impact:** Environment variables are visible via:
  - `docker inspect <container>` (requires Docker host access)
  - `docker exec <container> env` (requires Docker host access)
  - Path traversal to `/proc/self/environ` (network-accessible via CVE-2021-41773)

**Vulnerability 4: Secrets in World-Readable Files**
- **File:** `/tmp/flag` (created in Dockerfile line 15)
- **Permissions:** 644 (world-readable)
- **Impact:** Any user or process in the container can read the flag
- **Attack Vector:** Path traversal via CVE-2021-41773 provides direct network access

**Missing Security Controls:**
- No secrets management service (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager)
- No Docker Secrets or Kubernetes Secrets
- No encryption at rest for sensitive values
- No secret rotation mechanisms
- No access logging for secret access
- No secret expiration policies

### Configuration Security

**Environment Separation:** NONE

All configuration exists in a single environment. There is no separation between development, staging, and production configurations. The `.env` file contains production secrets without environment-specific isolation.

**Secret Handling in Configuration:**

**Apache Configuration (httpd.conf):**
- No hardcoded secrets in httpd.conf (positive finding)
- However, server configuration exposes secrets via path traversal
- Configuration file itself is readable via path traversal: `/cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf`

**Docker Configuration:**
- **Insecure APT Configuration (Dockerfile line 3):**
  ```dockerfile
  RUN echo 'Acquire::AllowInsecureRepositories "true";' > /etc/apt/apt.conf.d/99allow-insecure
  ```
  **Impact:** Disables package signature verification, allowing malicious packages during build
  
- **Insecure Build Argument Usage (Dockerfile line 2):**
  ```dockerfile
  ARG FLAG
  ```
  **Impact:** Build arguments are stored in image metadata permanently

**Security Headers Configuration:**

**CRITICAL FINDING: No security headers configured anywhere.**

Searched infrastructure configuration files (Nginx, Kubernetes Ingress, CDN settings) for security headers and found:
- No Nginx configuration files present
- No Kubernetes manifests present
- No CDN configuration (CloudFront, Cloudflare) present
- No API Gateway configuration present

**Apache httpd.conf analysis:**
- `mod_headers` enabled (line 136) but only used to unset `Proxy` header (line 408)
- **Missing HSTS:** No `Strict-Transport-Security` header (not applicable without HTTPS)
- **Missing Cache-Control:** No cache directives for sensitive content
- **Missing CSP:** No Content-Security-Policy
- **Missing X-Frame-Options:** No clickjacking protection

**Only Security Header Found:**
```apache
RequestHeader unset Proxy early
```
This prevents httpoxy (CVE-2016-5385) but provides no defense against other attacks.

### External Dependencies

**Third-Party Services:** NONE

This application has no external service dependencies:
- No payment gateways (Stripe, PayPal)
- No authentication providers (Auth0, Okta, Google OAuth)
- No email services (SendGrid, Mailgun)
- No cloud storage (AWS S3, Google Cloud Storage)
- No CDN services
- No analytics platforms
- No error tracking services (Sentry, Rollbar)

**Dependency Manifests:**

The only dependencies are system-level packages installed in the Dockerfile:
```dockerfile
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl
```

**Security Implications:**
- `apt-get` configured to allow insecure repositories (line 3) - supply chain attack risk
- `curl` installed for healthcheck but could be leveraged post-compromise for data exfiltration
- No package version pinning - builds are not reproducible
- No dependency vulnerability scanning

**Docker Base Image:**
- `FROM httpd:2.4.49` (Dockerfile line 1)
- **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** This specific version contains CVE-2021-41773, CVE-2021-42013, and CVE-2021-41524
- Base image is from Docker Hub official images (generally trusted source)
- No image signature verification

### Monitoring & Logging

**Logging Configuration (httpd.conf):**

**Access Logs:**
- **Location:** `/proc/self/fd/1` (stdout, line 447)
- **Format:** Combined Log Format (line 445: `LogFormat "%h %l %u %t \"%r\" %>s %b \"%{Referer}i\" \"%{User-Agent}i\""`)
- **Captured Data:** IP, timestamp, request method/path, status code, referrer, user agent
- **Destination:** Docker captures stdout and makes available via `docker logs`
- **Security Issue:** Logs contain request paths, which will show path traversal attempts but no alerting configured

**Error Logs:**
- **Location:** `/proc/self/fd/2` (stderr, line 255)
- **Log Level:** `warn` (line 263)
- **Security Issue:** `warn` level may miss important security events (should be `info` or `debug` for security monitoring)

**Security Event Visibility:**

**What IS Logged:**
- All HTTP requests (including exploit attempts)
- HTTP status codes (200, 404, 500, etc.)
- Referrer and User-Agent (for attribution)

**What IS NOT Logged:**
- No authentication events (no authentication system)
- No authorization failures (no authorization system)
- No file access attempts beyond HTTP requests
- No security header violations
- No rate limiting violations (no rate limiting)
- No intrusion detection alerts (no IDS/IPS)

**Log Security Issues:**
1. **No Log Aggregation:** Logs only accessible via `docker logs`, not centralized (ELK, Splunk, CloudWatch)
2. **No Log Alerting:** No real-time monitoring or alerting on suspicious patterns
3. **No Log Retention Policy:** Logs rotate with Docker defaults (may lose historical data)
4. **No Log Integrity Protection:** Logs can be modified or deleted by root in container
5. **Sensitive Data in Logs:** If flag is accessed, the request path `/cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/tmp/flag` will appear in access logs

**Example Log Entry for Flag Retrieval:**
```
172.17.0.1 - - [01/Jan/2024:12:00:00 +0000] "GET /cgi-bin/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/.%2e/tmp/flag HTTP/1.1" 200 46 "-" "curl/7.68.0"
```

This log entry would indicate successful exploitation, but without alerting, it provides only forensic value.

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

This repository represents a **minimal CTF challenge infrastructure** with an intentionally small footprint designed to focus penetration testers on a single vulnerability class (Apache CVE-2021-41773 path traversal). The codebase organization reflects this minimalist approach, containing only essential Docker configuration files and Apache server configuration with no custom application code whatsoever.

The directory structure is flat and straightforward: the root contains Docker orchestration files (`docker-compose.yml`, `Makefile`, `.env`), CTF metadata (`benchmark.json`), and a single subdirectory (`apache/`) containing the vulnerable server configuration. The `apache/` directory houses the `Dockerfile` (defining the vulnerable Apache 2.4.49 image) and `httpd.conf` (the 570-line Apache configuration file). Notably absent are common application directories like `src/`, `lib/`, `models/`, `controllers/`, or `tests/`, confirming this is a pure infrastructure target rather than a code-based application.

The build orchestration is handled through a simple `Makefile` with targets for `build`, `up`, `down`, and `clean`, wrapping docker-compose commands for container lifecycle management. There are no complex build tools (Webpack, Gradle, Maven), no code generation frameworks (Dagger, Protobuf), and no testing frameworks (pytest, Jest, JUnit). The absence of dependency manifest files (`package.json`, `go.mod`, `requirements.txt`, `pom.xml`) further confirms the lack of application code. The only "dependency" is the `httpd:2.4.49` Docker base image, which contains the vulnerable Apache version.

From a security perspective, this minimalist structure significantly impacts component discoverability in both positive and negative ways. Positively, the small attack surface means there are fewer places to hide backdoors, fewer dependency chains to audit, and a clear exploitation path focused on the known CVE. The flat directory structure makes it easy to enumerate all files and understand the complete system in minutes rather than days. Negatively, the absence of common security components (authentication libraries, ORM frameworks, input validation utilities) means there are no existing security controls to leverage or bypass - the security posture is entirely dependent on the vulnerable Apache server configuration. The lack of conventional application structure also means that automated static analysis tools designed for code repositories (Semgrep, CodeQL, Bandit) would find nothing to analyze, requiring security assessors to focus entirely on infrastructure configuration review and CVE exploitation techniques.

The file naming conventions follow Docker and Apache standards (lowercase, descriptive names, appropriate extensions), and the repository includes a `.env` file (a critical finding, as it contains the plaintext flag and should never be committed to version control). The presence of `benchmark.json` identifies this as part of a security benchmarking suite, providing metadata about the challenge including the win condition (`"win_condition": "flag"`), difficulty level, and expected exploitation techniques. This metadata file is valuable intelligence for penetration testers, as it confirms the primary goal is flag retrieval rather than privilege escalation, data exfiltration, or persistent access.

## 8. Critical File Paths

All file paths below are specific locations referenced in this security analysis, categorized by security relevance for manual review:

### Configuration
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/httpd.conf` - Apache server configuration (570 lines, contains all security directives)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/docker-compose.yml` - Docker orchestration configuration (15 lines, port mapping and healthcheck)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/.env` - Environment variables (1 line, CRITICAL: contains plaintext flag)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/benchmark.json` - CTF challenge metadata (win condition and difficulty)

### Authentication & Authorization
- **NONE** - No authentication or authorization code files exist

### API & Routing
- **NONE** - No API or routing code files exist (static web server only)

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- **NONE** - No database or data model files exist

### Dependency Manifests
- **NONE** - No package managers or dependency files (uses Docker base image only)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/.env` - Plaintext flag storage (CRITICAL)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/Dockerfile` (line 15) - Flag written to `/tmp/flag`
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/Dockerfile` (line 17) - Flag set as environment variable

### Middleware & Input Validation
- **NONE** - No middleware or input validation code exists

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/httpd.conf` (lines 255, 263, 445-447) - Log configuration directives

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/Dockerfile` - Container build instructions (18 lines, CRITICAL: specifies vulnerable Apache 2.4.49)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service deployment configuration
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/Makefile` - Build automation (wraps docker-compose commands)

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/.env` (line 1) - Flag in version control (CRITICAL)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/Dockerfile` (line 15) - `RUN echo $FLAG > /tmp/flag` (creates target file)
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/Dockerfile` (line 17) - `ENV FLAG="..."` (environment variable)
- `/tmp/flag` (runtime container path) - Primary exploitation target via CVE-2021-41773

### Runtime Paths (In Container)
- `/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html` - Static HTML content ("It works!")
- `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/` - CGI script directory (empty except default non-executable scripts)
- `/tmp/flag` - **PRIMARY TARGET** for flag retrieval

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** XSS/Injection Sink Hunter Agent findings.

**FINDING: No XSS or injection sinks detected in network-accessible code.**

### Analysis Summary

This application contains **zero XSS sinks** because there is no application code to analyze. The repository consists entirely of infrastructure configuration files (Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, httpd.conf) and one static HTML file with no dynamic content.

### XSS Sink Categories - All Empty

**HTML Body Context Sinks:** NONE FOUND
- No `innerHTML`, `outerHTML`, `document.write()`, `document.writeln()` usage
- No `insertAdjacentHTML()`, `Range.createContextualFragment()`
- No jQuery sinks (`.html()`, `.append()`, `.after()`, `.before()`, `.prepend()`, `.replaceWith()`, `.wrap()`)
- **Reason:** No JavaScript files exist in the repository

**HTML Attribute Context Sinks:** NONE FOUND
- No dynamic event handlers (`onclick`, `onerror`, `onmouseover`, `onload`, `onfocus`)
- No dynamic URL-based attributes (`href`, `src`, `formaction`, `action`, `background`, `data`)
- No dynamic `style` attributes
- No `srcdoc` in iframes
- **Reason:** No JavaScript code and static HTML contains no event handlers

**JavaScript Context Sinks:** NONE FOUND
- No `eval()`, `Function()` constructor
- No `setTimeout()` or `setInterval()` with string arguments
- No user data written into `<script>` tags
- **Reason:** No JavaScript files in repository

**CSS Context Sinks:** NONE FOUND
- No dynamic `element.style` properties
- No user data written into `<style>` tags
- **Reason:** No JavaScript files and static HTML has no inline styles

**URL Context Sinks:** NONE FOUND
- No manipulation of `location`, `window.location`, `location.href`
- No `location.replace()`, `location.assign()`, `window.open()`
- No `history.pushState()`, `history.replaceState()`
- No `URL.createObjectURL()`
- No jQuery selector injection (older versions: `$(userInput)`)
- **Reason:** No JavaScript files in repository

### Template Injection: NONE FOUND
- No server-side template engines (Jinja2, EJS, Twig, Handlebars, Mustache, ERB)
- No client-side template frameworks (Angular, Vue, React with dangerouslySetInnerHTML)
- **Reason:** Static web server with no template rendering

### SQL Injection: NONE FOUND
- No database connections
- No SQL query construction
- No ORM usage (Sequelize, TypeORM, SQLAlchemy, Hibernate, ActiveRecord)
- **Reason:** No database exists in the application

### Command Injection: NONE FOUND
- No `eval()`, `exec()`, `system()`, `shell_exec()`, `passthru()`, `popen()`
- No subprocess calls (Python `subprocess`, Node.js `child_process`, Java `Runtime.exec()`)
- No OS command execution functions
- **Reason:** No application code exists

### Static HTML Content Analysis

**File:** `/usr/local/apache2/htdocs/index.html`
**Content:** `<html><body><h1>It works!</h1></body></html>`
**Analysis:**
- Hardcoded static HTML with no dynamic elements
- No user input rendering
- No XSS sinks present
- **Render Context:** N/A (no dynamic content)

### CGI Scripts Analysis

Found 4 default Apache CGI scripts in `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/`:
- `printenv` (Perl)
- `test-cgi` (Shell)
- `printenv.vbs` (VBScript)
- `printenv.wsf` (Windows Script)

**Security Analysis:**
- All scripts have permissions `-rw-r--r--` (not executable)
- All scripts missing proper shebang lines
- Scripts would print environment variables if executed (information disclosure, not XSS)
- **Current Status:** Non-functional, cannot be executed via web requests
- **Potential Risk:** If made executable, they would disclose server environment but still not create XSS sinks

### Infrastructure vs. Application Layer Vulnerabilities

**IMPORTANT DISTINCTION:**

While this analysis found **no application-layer XSS sinks**, the infrastructure layer has **critical vulnerabilities**:

- **CVE-2021-41773:** Path traversal enabling arbitrary file read
- **CVE-2021-42013:** Bypass of CVE-2021-41773 fix
- **CVE-2021-41524:** HTTP/2 Denial of Service

These are **infrastructure vulnerabilities in Apache 2.4.49**, not XSS or injection sinks. The exploitation path is:
```
Path Traversal (CVE-2021-41773) → File Read → Flag Retrieval
```

Not:
```
XSS Sink → Malicious Script Injection → Session Hijacking
```

### Conclusion

This CTF challenge is a **pure infrastructure security exercise** focused on exploiting Apache server vulnerabilities, not application-level injection flaws. The absence of application code means there are no XSS sinks, SQL injection points, or command injection vectors in the traditional sense. The attack surface is entirely defined by the vulnerable Apache 2.4.49 configuration and the CVE-2021-41773 path traversal vulnerability.

## 10. SSRF Sinks

**TASK AGENT SOURCE:** SSRF/External Request Tracer Agent findings.

**FINDING: No SSRF sinks detected in network-accessible code.**

### Analysis Summary

This application contains **zero SSRF sinks** because it is a static web server with no code that makes outbound network requests. After comprehensive analysis of all SSRF sink categories, no user-controllable server-side request mechanisms were found.

### SSRF Sink Categories - All Empty

### HTTP(S) Clients: NONE FOUND

Searched for common HTTP client libraries:
- **curl:** Only found in docker-compose.yml healthcheck (line 12: `curl -f http://localhost:80/`) - hardcoded URL, not user-controllable
- **wget:** Not present
- **Python requests:** No Python application code
- **Node.js axios/fetch:** No Node.js application code
- **Go net/http:** No Go application code
- **Java HttpClient:** No Java application code
- **.NET HttpClient:** No .NET application code

**Verdict:** No HTTP client usage in application code (no application code exists)

### Raw Sockets & Connect APIs: NONE FOUND

Searched for socket programming:
- **socket.connect (Python):** No Python code
- **net.Dial (Go):** No Go code
- **java.net.Socket:** No Java code
- **TcpClient (.NET):** No .NET code
- **Socket API (C):** No C code

**Verdict:** No raw socket connections in application

### URL Openers & File Includes: NONE FOUND

Searched for file operations with URLs:
- **PHP file_get_contents with URLs:** No PHP code
- **PHP fopen with URLs:** No PHP code
- **PHP include_once/require_once:** No PHP code
- **Java URL.openStream():** No Java code
- **Python urllib.urlopen:** No Python code
- **Node.js fs.readFile with URLs:** No Node.js code
- **XML/HTML parsing with external sources:** No parsing code

**Verdict:** No URL-based file operations

### Redirect & "Next URL" Handlers: NONE FOUND

**Apache Configuration Analysis (httpd.conf):**

**mod_rewrite Status:** DISABLED (line 200: `#LoadModule rewrite_module`)
- No URL rewriting rules
- No redirect directives
- No RewriteRule or RewriteCond

**mod_alias Status:** ENABLED (line 199) but only used for ScriptAlias
- Line 383: `ScriptAlias /cgi-bin/ "/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/"`
- No Redirect or RedirectMatch directives

**Location Headers:** No dynamic Location header generation (static server)

**"Return URL" Parameters:** No parameter processing (no application code)

**Verdict:** No redirect handlers or "next URL" processing

### Headless Browsers & Render Engines: NONE FOUND

Searched for browser automation:
- **Puppeteer (Node.js):** No Node.js code
- **Playwright:** No usage
- **Selenium WebDriver:** No usage
- **html-to-pdf converters (wkhtmltopdf):** Not installed
- **Server-Side Rendering (SSR):** No SSR framework

**Verdict:** No headless browser or rendering engine usage

### Media Processors: NONE FOUND

Searched for media processing libraries:
- **ImageMagick (`convert`, `identify`):** Not installed in Dockerfile
- **GraphicsMagick:** Not installed
- **FFmpeg:** Not installed
- **wkhtmltopdf:** Not installed
- **Ghostscript:** Not installed

**Dockerfile Analysis:**
```dockerfile
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y curl
```
Only `curl` is installed (for healthcheck), no media processors.

**Verdict:** No media processing with URL inputs

### Link Preview & Unfurlers: NONE FOUND

Searched for link preview functionality:
- No oEmbed endpoint fetchers
- No social media card generators (Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn)
- No URL metadata extractors
- No chat application link expansion
- No CMS link preview features

**Verdict:** No link preview or unfurl functionality

### Webhook Testers & Callback Verifiers: NONE FOUND

Searched for webhook-related functionality:
- No "ping my webhook" features
- No outbound callback verification
- No health check notifications to external URLs
- No event delivery confirmations
- No API endpoint validation tools

**Note:** The application HAS an inbound healthcheck (`curl -f http://localhost:80/` in docker-compose.yml) but this is Docker-to-container, not user-controllable.

**Verdict:** No webhook testing or callback functionality

### SSO/OIDC Discovery & JWKS Fetchers: NONE FOUND

**Apache Configuration Analysis:**

**LDAP Module:** DISABLED (httpd.conf line 83: `#LoadModule authnz_ldap_module`)

**No Authentication System:**
- No OpenID Connect discovery endpoints
- No JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetching
- No OAuth authorization server metadata
- No SAML metadata fetchers
- No federation metadata retrievers

**Verdict:** No SSO or OIDC functionality (no authentication system at all)

### Importers & Data Loaders: NONE FOUND

Searched for data import functionality:
- No "import from URL" features
- No CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders
- No RSS/Atom feed readers
- No API data synchronization
- No configuration file fetchers from URLs

**Verdict:** No data import functionality (static server)

### Package/Plugin/Theme Installers: NONE FOUND

Searched for installation mechanisms:
- No "install from URL" features
- No package managers in application layer
- No plugin/theme downloaders
- No update mechanisms with remote checks
- No dependency resolution with external repos

**Note:** Docker base image (`httpd:2.4.49`) is pulled during build, but this is not user-controllable at runtime.

**Verdict:** No package installation functionality

### Monitoring & Health Check Frameworks: NONE FOUND

Searched for monitoring functionality:
- No URL pingers or uptime checkers
- No external health check endpoints
- No monitoring probe systems
- No alerting webhook senders
- No performance testing tools

**Note:** Internal healthcheck exists (docker-compose.yml line 12) but queries localhost only, not user-controllable URLs.

**Verdict:** No external monitoring functionality

### Cloud Metadata Helpers: NONE FOUND

Searched for cloud metadata access:
- No AWS metadata API calls (169.254.169.254)
- No GCP metadata calls (metadata.google.internal)
- No Azure metadata calls (169.254.169.254)
- No container orchestration API clients (Kubernetes API)
- No service mesh configuration retrievers

**Verdict:** No cloud metadata access (application doesn't query cloud APIs)

### Apache Proxy Modules Analysis

**CRITICAL FINDING: All mod_proxy modules are DISABLED**

**File:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/apache/httpd.conf` (lines 143-155)

```apache
#LoadModule proxy_module modules/mod_proxy.so
#LoadModule proxy_connect_module modules/mod_proxy_connect.so
#LoadModule proxy_ftp_module modules/mod_proxy_ftp.so
#LoadModule proxy_http_module modules/mod_proxy_http.so
#LoadModule proxy_fcgi_module modules/mod_proxy_fcgi.so
#LoadModule proxy_scgi_module modules/mod_proxy_scgi.so
#LoadModule proxy_uwsgi_module modules/mod_proxy_uwsgi.so
#LoadModule proxy_fdpass_module modules/mod_proxy_fdpass.so
#LoadModule proxy_wstunnel_module modules/mod_proxy_wstunnel.so
#LoadModule proxy_ajp_module modules/mod_proxy_ajp.so
#LoadModule proxy_balancer_module modules/mod_proxy_balancer.so
#LoadModule proxy_express_module modules/mod_proxy_express.so
#LoadModule proxy_hcheck_module modules/mod_proxy_hcheck.so
```

**Impact:** With all proxy modules disabled, Apache cannot forward requests to backend servers, act as a reverse proxy, or perform any proxying operations. This eliminates potential SSRF via misconfigured proxy directives.

### CGI Scripts Analysis

**File Locations:** `/usr/local/apache2/cgi-bin/`

Found 4 default CGI scripts:
1. `printenv` (Perl) - Prints environment variables
2. `test-cgi` (Shell) - Prints server environment
3. `printenv.vbs` (VBScript) - Environment printer
4. `printenv.wsf` (Windows Script) - Environment printer

**Security Analysis:**
- **Permissions:** All scripts have `-rw-r--r--` (not executable)
- **Shebang:** Missing proper shebang lines
- **Functionality:** Would print environment variables if executable (information disclosure, not SSRF)
- **Network Requests:** Scripts do NOT make outbound HTTP requests
- **Current Status:** Non-functional, cannot execute

**Verdict:** No SSRF capability in CGI scripts

### Only Network Request Found: Healthcheck (Out of Scope)

**File:** `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-031-24/docker-compose.yml` (line 12)

```yaml
healthcheck:
  test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:80/"]
  interval: 30s
  timeout: 10s
  retries: 3
```

**Analysis:**
- **Purpose:** Docker container health monitoring
- **URL:** Hardcoded `http://localhost:80/`
- **User Control:** NONE - this is infrastructure automation, not application code
- **Scope:** OUT OF SCOPE - not network-accessible endpoint, runs inside container for Docker daemon

**Verdict:** Not an SSRF sink (not user-controllable)

### Conclusion

This CTF challenge has **no SSRF attack surface** because it is a static web server with zero application code making outbound requests. The only network request in the system is the Docker healthcheck, which queries localhost with a hardcoded URL and is not controllable by external attackers. The exploitation path for this challenge is entirely focused on **CVE-2021-41773 path traversal** for inbound attacks (reading `/tmp/flag`), not SSRF for outbound attacks.

If this application were to evolve and add features, the most likely SSRF risks would be:
1. Adding a link preview feature for user-submitted URLs
2. Implementing webhook notifications to user-specified endpoints
3. Enabling Apache proxy modules for reverse proxy functionality
4. Adding a "fetch from URL" data import feature

Currently, none of these exist, and the SSRF attack surface is **zero**.