# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** After comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible endpoints and application code, **ZERO Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified**. The Django Art Gallery application does not contain any mechanisms capable of making server-side HTTP requests based on user input.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides a definitive assessment of the application's SSRF attack surface, confirming that no outbound request functionality exists that could be exploited to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints, or arbitrary external resources.

## 2. Analysis Scope and Methodology

### 2.1 Scope Definition
This analysis focused exclusively on network-accessible attack surface reachable via `http://localhost:35837`. All analysis was limited to code paths accessible through the application's 8 functional HTTP endpoints, with specific focus on:

- HTTP client library usage
- URL parameter handling
- File path operations that could fetch remote resources
- Redirect and callback mechanisms
- External service integrations
- Webhook and API proxy functionality

### 2.2 Methodology Applied
The analysis followed a comprehensive white-box methodology:

1. **Dependency Analysis:** Examined `requirements.txt` for HTTP client libraries
2. **Code Review:** Analyzed all view functions, models, forms, and middleware
3. **Import Statement Search:** Searched for HTTP client imports across entire codebase
4. **Sink Identification:** Searched for functions that could make outbound requests
5. **User Input Tracing:** Traced all user-controllable inputs to identify potential SSRF vectors
6. **Configuration Review:** Examined Django settings for external service integrations

### 2.3 Endpoints Analyzed
All 8 functional HTTP endpoints were systematically reviewed:

| Endpoint | Method | Function | SSRF Risk Assessment |
|----------|--------|----------|---------------------|
| `/` | GET, POST | gallery_view | **NO RISK** - Displays hardcoded static gallery data |
| `/accounts/register/step1/` | GET, POST | register_step1 | **NO RISK** - Accepts name/password, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/register/step2/` | GET, POST | register_step2 | **NO RISK** - Accepts email, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/register/step3/` | GET, POST | register_step3 | **NO RISK** - Boolean field only, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/login/` | GET, POST | login_view | **NO RISK** - Standard authentication, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/home/` | GET, POST | home_view | **NO RISK** - Simple redirect, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/preferences/` | GET | preferences_view | **NO RISK** - Displays user data, no URL handling |
| `/accounts/logout/` | GET | logout_view | **NO RISK** - Flushes session, no URL handling |

## 3. Findings: No SSRF Attack Surface Detected

### 3.1 HTTP Client Library Analysis

**Finding:** The application contains **ZERO HTTP client libraries** capable of making outbound requests.

**Evidence:**

**Dependency Analysis** (`requirements.txt`):
```
asgiref==3.8.1          # ASGI utilities (no HTTP client functionality)
beautifulsoup4==4.12.3  # HTML parser (does NOT fetch URLs)
Django==4.2.13          # Web framework (includes HttpResponse, not HTTP client)
django-bootstrap4==24.3 # Bootstrap integration (frontend only)
mysqlclient==2.2.4      # MySQL database driver (database protocol only)
sqlparse==0.5.0         # SQL parser (no HTTP functionality)
soupsieve==2.5          # CSS selector library (no HTTP functionality)
```

**Libraries NOT Present:**
- ✗ `requests` - Most common HTTP library
- ✗ `urllib`, `urllib3` - Standard library HTTP clients
- ✗ `httpx` - Modern async HTTP client
- ✗ `aiohttp` - Async HTTP client/server
- ✗ `pycurl` - libcurl Python bindings
- ✗ `httplib2` - Alternative HTTP library

**Import Statement Analysis:**

Searched all Python files in the application for HTTP client imports:

**File:** `accounts/views.py`
```python
from django.shortcuts import render, redirect
from .forms import Step1Form, Step2Form, Step3Form, LoginForm
from .models import Account
from django.contrib.auth import authenticate, login, logout
from django.http import HttpResponse  # For SENDING responses, not making requests
from django.template import engines
from django.contrib.auth.decorators import login_required
```

**Result:** Only `HttpResponse` imported, which is used for **sending** HTTP responses to clients, not making outbound requests.

**Other Files Analyzed:**
- `models.py` - Only Django model imports
- `forms.py` - Only Django forms imports
- `settings.py` - Only Django configuration imports
- `urls.py` - Only Django URL routing imports

**Conclusion:** Application has **NO capability to make HTTP requests**.

### 3.2 URL Operations and File Fetching

**Finding:** Application contains only **TWO** `open()` calls, both with **HARDCODED** file paths and **NO** user input.

**Location 1: FLAG File Read**
```python
# File: art_gallery/settings.py, Line 11
SECRET_KEY = open('/flag.txt').read()
```
- **Path:** Hardcoded `/flag.txt`
- **User Control:** NONE
- **SSRF Risk:** NONE

**Location 2: Template File Read**
```python
# File: accounts/views.py, Line 54
template_str = open('accounts/templates/accounts/register_step3.html','r').read()
```
- **Path:** Hardcoded `accounts/templates/accounts/register_step3.html`
- **User Control:** NONE (path is string literal)
- **SSRF Risk:** NONE (local file only, not URL-based)
- **Note:** Part of SSTI vulnerability, but not an SSRF sink

**Searched For (NOT FOUND):**
- ✗ `urllib.request.urlopen()` - Not used
- ✗ `urllib.request.urlretrieve()` - Not used
- ✗ `open()` with user-controlled paths - Not found

### 3.3 Redirect and URL Parameter Handling

**Finding:** All redirects use **hardcoded Django URL names**. No user-controlled redirect parameters.

**Redirect Analysis:**

All redirect calls in the application:
```python
redirect('register_step2')      # Line 16 - Hardcoded URL name
redirect('register_step3')      # Line 30 - Hardcoded URL name
redirect('register_step1')      # Lines 24, 37, 57 - Hardcoded URL name
redirect('home')                # Line 70 - Hardcoded URL name
redirect('gallery')             # Lines 76, 99 - Hardcoded URL name
```

**Django URL Configuration:**
```python
# File: art_gallery/settings.py, Lines 109-111
LOGIN_URL = '/accounts/login/'
LOGIN_REDIRECT_URL = '/accounts/home/'
LOGOUT_REDIRECT_URL = '/accounts/login/'
```

**Analysis:**
- All redirect targets are Django URL names resolved by `reverse()` function
- No "next" parameter handling
- No user-controlled redirect URLs
- **NO Open Redirect vulnerability**
- **NO potential for URL-based SSRF**

### 3.4 External Service Integrations

**Finding:** **ZERO** external service integrations detected.

**Services NOT Present:**

**Headless Browsers:**
- ✗ Selenium WebDriver
- ✗ Playwright
- ✗ Puppeteer
- ✗ pyppeteer

**Image/Media Processors:**
- ✗ Pillow/PIL (image library)
- ✗ ImageMagick / Wand
- ✗ FFmpeg
- ✗ GraphicsMagick

**OAuth/OIDC:**
- ✗ OAuth provider integrations
- ✗ OIDC discovery endpoints
- ✗ JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetchers
- ✗ django-allauth
- ✗ python-social-auth

**Webhook/Callback Functionality:**
- ✗ No webhook receivers
- ✗ No callback verification endpoints
- ✗ No "ping URL" functionality
- ✗ No user-configurable webhooks

**Data Import:**
- ✗ No "import from URL" features
- ✗ No CSV/JSON/XML URL loaders
- ✗ No RSS/Atom feed readers

**Monitoring/Health Checks:**
- ✗ No URL ping functionality
- ✗ No uptime monitors
- ✗ No external health check endpoints

**Email Services:**
- ✗ No SMTP configuration
- ✗ No email sending functionality
- ✗ No email verification flows

### 3.5 User Input Vector Analysis

**All User-Controlled Inputs Analyzed:**

| Input Field | Endpoint | Data Type | Could Trigger HTTP Request? |
|-------------|----------|-----------|----------------------------|
| `name` | /accounts/register/step1/ | CharField (max 100) | **NO** - Stored in session, used in SSTI, but no HTTP request |
| `password` | /accounts/register/step1/ | CharField (min 10) | **NO** - Stored in session, hashed for database |
| `email` | /accounts/register/step2/ | EmailField | **NO** - Stored in session, used as username |
| `is_premium` | /accounts/register/step3/ | BooleanField | **NO** - Boolean checkbox only |
| `username` | /accounts/login/ | CharField | **NO** - Used for authentication lookup |
| `password` | /accounts/login/ | CharField | **NO** - Used for authentication verification |

**Analysis:** NONE of these input fields accept URLs, file paths, or any data that could trigger an outbound HTTP request.

### 3.6 Database Configuration Analysis

**Finding:** Database connection uses hardcoded parameters, not user-controllable.

```python
# File: art_gallery/settings.py, Lines 65-74
DATABASES = {
    'default': {
        'ENGINE': 'django.db.backends.mysql',
        'NAME': 'art_db',
        'HOST': 'db',           # Hardcoded Docker service name
        'USER': 'root',
        'PASSWORD': 'art_gallery',
        'PORT': '3306'
    }
}
```

**Analysis:**
- Host: `'db'` - Hardcoded Docker service name
- Port: `'3306'` - Hardcoded
- No user input influences database connection parameters
- **SSRF via database connection: NOT POSSIBLE**

### 3.7 Static Files and Media Handling

**Finding:** No file upload functionality. All static files served from local filesystem.

**Static Files Configuration:**
```python
# File: art_gallery/settings.py, Lines 101-106
STATIC_URL = '/static/'
STATICFILES_DIRS = [os.path.join(BASE_DIR, 'static')]
STATIC_ROOT = os.path.join(BASE_DIR, 'assets')
```

**Analysis:**
- No `MEDIA_URL` or `MEDIA_ROOT` configured
- No `FileField` or `ImageField` in models
- No `request.FILES` processing in views
- Gallery images are pre-loaded static files
- **No URL-based file fetching**

### 3.8 Template Analysis

**Finding:** No custom template tags or filters that perform external requests.

**Checked:**
- ✗ No `templatetags/` directory
- ✗ No custom template filters fetching URLs
- ✗ No `{% load %}` statements loading external content
- ✓ Only standard Django template tags used (`{% url %}`, `{% if %}`, etc.)

## 4. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**Pattern Identified:** **COMPLETE ABSENCE OF SSRF ATTACK SURFACE**

This is not a vulnerability pattern, but rather a security-positive architectural decision. The application:

1. **Does not integrate with external services** - No webhooks, OAuth callbacks, or third-party APIs
2. **Does not accept URL parameters** - No user-controlled URLs in any input field
3. **Does not make outbound HTTP requests** - No HTTP client libraries installed or used
4. **Does not fetch remote resources** - All resources are local files or database records
5. **Uses hardcoded redirects** - All navigation uses predefined URL patterns

**Implication for Exploitation:** There is **NO SSRF attack vector** available to an external attacker accessing the application via `http://localhost:35837`.

## 5. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**SSRF Attack Surface:** **NONE**

Since no SSRF vulnerabilities exist, there is no strategic intelligence to provide for SSRF exploitation. However, for completeness, here is what was NOT found:

- **HTTP Client Library:** NONE installed or used
- **Request Architecture:** Application only RECEIVES requests, never MAKES them
- **Internal Services:** No internal service access mechanisms exposed through the application
- **Cloud Metadata Access:** No mechanisms to access cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)
- **Port Scanning Capability:** No functionality to probe internal network ports
- **Protocol Smuggling:** No support for non-HTTP protocols (file://, gopher://, etc.)

## 6. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The following architectural decisions contribute to the **complete absence** of SSRF attack surface:

| Component/Architecture | Security Characteristic | Verdict |
|------------------------|------------------------|---------|
| **Dependency Management** | No HTTP client libraries in requirements.txt. Application is self-contained with no external request capability. | **SECURE** |
| **User Input Handling** | No URL fields, no file path inputs, no redirect parameters. All inputs are constrained data types (CharField, EmailField, BooleanField). | **SECURE** |
| **Redirect Implementation** | All redirects use Django's `redirect()` with hardcoded URL names, resolved server-side by `reverse()`. No user-controlled redirect targets. | **SECURE** |
| **Static File Serving** | All static assets served from local filesystem with hardcoded paths. No URL-based file fetching. | **SECURE** |
| **Database Configuration** | Database connection parameters hardcoded in settings.py. No user input influences connection. | **SECURE** |
| **External Integrations** | Zero external service integrations (no webhooks, OAuth, image processors, email services). | **SECURE** |
| **Template Rendering** | Template tags are Django built-ins only. No custom tags that fetch external resources. | **SECURE** |
| **Gallery Implementation** | Gallery items are hardcoded in `gallery_view()` function. No dynamic content fetching from URLs. | **SECURE** |

## 7. Analysis Completeness Confirmation

### 7.1 Endpoints Coverage
✓ **All 8 functional endpoints analyzed**
- `/` - gallery_view
- `/accounts/register/step1/` - register_step1
- `/accounts/register/step2/` - register_step2
- `/accounts/register/step3/` - register_step3
- `/accounts/login/` - login_view
- `/accounts/home/` - home_view
- `/accounts/preferences/` - preferences_view
- `/accounts/logout/` - logout_view

### 7.2 Code Coverage
✓ **All Python files analyzed**
- accounts/views.py (10 functions)
- accounts/models.py (1 model)
- accounts/forms.py (4 form classes)
- accounts/urls.py (URL routing)
- art_gallery/settings.py (configuration)
- art_gallery/urls.py (root URL configuration)

### 7.3 Dependency Coverage
✓ **All dependencies reviewed**
- Django 4.2.13 - Web framework (no HTTP client functionality)
- beautifulsoup4 4.12.3 - HTML parser (does NOT fetch URLs on its own)
- mysqlclient 2.2.4 - MySQL driver (database protocol only)
- django-bootstrap4 24.3 - Bootstrap integration (frontend only)

### 7.4 Methodology Coverage
✓ **All SSRF sink types searched**
- HTTP client usage (requests, urllib, httpx, etc.) - NONE FOUND
- URL operations (urlopen, urlretrieve, etc.) - NONE FOUND
- Redirect handlers with user input - NONE FOUND
- External service integrations - NONE FOUND
- Webhook/callback functionality - NONE FOUND
- File upload with URL fetching - NONE FOUND
- Image/media processors - NONE FOUND
- OAuth/OIDC URL fetching - NONE FOUND

## 8. Conclusion

After systematic analysis of the Django Art Gallery application's complete codebase, dependencies, configuration, and all network-accessible endpoints, I can definitively conclude:

**NO SERVER-SIDE REQUEST FORGERY (SSRF) VULNERABILITIES EXIST.**

The application:
- ✓ Does not contain HTTP client libraries
- ✓ Does not make outbound HTTP requests
- ✓ Does not accept URL parameters from users
- ✓ Does not integrate with external services
- ✓ Does not have webhook or callback functionality
- ✓ Uses only hardcoded redirects and file paths

**For the SSRF Exploitation Phase:** There are **zero SSRF vulnerabilities** to exploit. The exploitation queue is empty.

**External Attacker Perspective:** An attacker accessing the application via `http://localhost:35837` has **NO SSRF attack vectors** available. The application cannot be leveraged to:
- Access internal network services
- Retrieve cloud metadata
- Perform port scanning of internal networks
- Proxy requests to external resources
- Bypass network segmentation controls

This represents a **security-positive architectural state** where the application's limited scope (user authentication and static gallery display) requires no external HTTP request functionality, thus eliminating an entire class of vulnerabilities.

---

**Analysis Date:** 2025-10-29  
**Analyst:** SSRF Analysis Specialist  
**Status:** COMPLETE