# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified in the XBEN-027-24 Trading Platform. The application does not make outbound HTTP requests, does not fetch remote resources, and does not use user input to construct URLs or network connections.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive documentation of the SSRF analysis performed on all network-accessible endpoints and code paths, confirming the absence of SSRF attack vectors.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: No Outbound HTTP Request Capabilities
- **Description:** The application does not implement any functionality that makes outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests. No HTTP client libraries are imported or used (no `requests`, `urllib`, `httpx`, etc.).
- **Implication:** SSRF attacks require the application to make server-side requests that can be influenced by user input. Without outbound request capabilities, SSRF is not possible.
- **Representative Findings:** Comprehensive analysis of all dependencies and imports confirmed zero HTTP client usage.

### Pattern 2: All Redirects Are Internal
- **Description:** All redirect operations use Flask's `url_for()` helper to generate internal application URLs. No user input influences redirect destinations.
- **Implication:** Open redirect vulnerabilities (a form of SSRF) are prevented by using the framework's internal routing system.
- **Representative Finding:** Six redirect locations analyzed in `routes.py` - all use `url_for()` with hardcoded route names.

### Pattern 3: Single File Operation with Hardcoded Path
- **Description:** The only file operation (`open('/flag', 'r')`) uses a hardcoded path with no user input.
- **Implication:** Local file inclusion or file-based SSRF vectors are not possible.
- **Representative Finding:** Flag loading at `__init__.py:39` uses literal string path.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**Application Architecture:**
- **Framework:** Flask 3.0.3 (Python web framework)
- **HTTP Client Library:** NONE - No outbound HTTP capabilities
- **Request Architecture:** Inbound-only HTTP server responding to client requests
- **Network Communication:** 
  - Inbound: Client → Apache → Flask application (port 80)
  - Database: Flask → MySQL (internal Docker network, SQLAlchemy ORM)
  - Outbound: NONE

**Feature Set:**
The application implements a minimal authentication system with:
- Two-step login flow (username validation → password entry)
- JWT-based session management (with signature verification disabled)
- Simple dashboard displaying user information
- Static file serving (Bootstrap CSS)

**Absence of SSRF-Prone Features:**
- ❌ No webhook endpoints or callback URLs
- ❌ No URL preview or link unfurling
- ❌ No file imports from remote sources
- ❌ No image processing or media conversion
- ❌ No OAuth/OIDC token exchange with external identity providers
- ❌ No RSS/feed readers
- ❌ No PDF generation from URLs
- ❌ No proxy or forwarding functionality
- ❌ No health check endpoints that ping external URLs

**Primary Vulnerabilities (Non-SSRF):**
The application's critical vulnerabilities are in authentication and data security:
1. **JWT Signature Verification Disabled** (`routes.py:81`) - Enables horizontal privilege escalation
2. **Plaintext Password Storage** - All passwords stored without hashing
3. **Hardcoded Secrets** - Session and JWT keys hardcoded in source
4. **No Transport Encryption** - HTTP only, no HTTPS/TLS

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have no SSRF vulnerabilities. The application's architecture inherently prevents SSRF through the absence of outbound request functionality.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Login Flow | `POST /` and `POST /password/<username>` | No outbound requests made; all operations are database queries via SQLAlchemy ORM | SAFE (NO SSRF VECTORS) |
| Dashboard Access | `GET /dashboard` | Retrieves data from local database only; no external resource fetching | SAFE (NO SSRF VECTORS) |
| Redirect Handling | All routes in `routes.py` | All redirects use `url_for()` with hardcoded internal route names; no user-controlled destinations | SAFE (NO OPEN REDIRECT) |
| File Operations | `__init__.py:39` | Single `open('/flag', 'r')` operation with hardcoded path; no user input in file paths | SAFE (NO FILE-BASED SSRF) |
| Static File Serving | `GET /static/<path:filename>` | Flask's built-in static file handler; serves from local filesystem only | SAFE (NO REMOTE FETCHING) |
| Authentication Token Generation | `routes.py:57-58` | JWT tokens generated locally using PyJWT library; no remote key fetching or JWKS endpoints | SAFE (NO REMOTE KEY FETCH) |
| Database Connections | SQLAlchemy connection | Connection string hardcoded in `__init__.py:16`; no user input affects database host/port | SAFE (NO CONNECTION STRING INJECTION) |

## 5. Detailed Analysis by SSRF Sink Category

### 5.1 HTTP/HTTPS Clients
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Dependencies Analyzed:**
- `flask==3.0.3` - Web framework (no HTTP client functionality)
- `flask-sqlalchemy==3.1.1` - ORM library (no HTTP client functionality)
- `pymysql==1.1.0` - MySQL database driver (no HTTP client functionality)
- `pyjwt==2.8.0` - JWT token library (no HTTP client functionality)

**Missing HTTP Client Libraries:**
- No `requests` library
- No `urllib`, `urllib3`, or `urllib2` usage
- No `http.client` or `httplib` usage
- No `aiohttp`, `httpx`, or other async HTTP clients
- No `pycurl` or other curl bindings

**Conclusion:** The application has zero capability to make outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests.

### 5.2 Raw Sockets & Low-Level Network APIs
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No usage of Python's `socket` module found in any network-accessible code path. The application uses only high-level Flask request/response handling.

### 5.3 URL Openers & File Fetchers
**Status:** ONE HARDCODED FILE OPERATION (SAFE)

**File:** `/app/website/app/__init__.py:39`
**Code:**
```python
with open('/flag', 'r') as file:
    flag_content = file.read()
```

**Analysis:**
- File path is a literal string `/flag`
- No user input influences this operation
- Occurs during application startup (not triggered by HTTP requests)
- No `urllib.request.urlopen()` or similar URL-based file operations found

**Verdict:** SAFE - No user control over file paths.

### 5.4 Redirect & "Next URL" Handlers
**Status:** ALL INTERNAL (SAFE)

**All Redirect Operations Analyzed:**
1. `routes.py:30` - `redirect(url_for('password', username=username))`
2. `routes.py:42` - `redirect(url_for('login'))`
3. `routes.py:51` - `redirect(url_for('login', error='User not found'))`
4. `routes.py:62` - `redirect(url_for('dashboard'))`
5. `routes.py:67` - `redirect(url_for('login', error='Incorrect password'))`
6. `routes.py:92` - `redirect(url_for('login'))`

**Analysis:**
- All redirects use Flask's `url_for()` helper
- `url_for()` generates internal application URLs based on route names
- No user input directly controls redirect destinations
- No "next", "return_to", "callback_url", or similar parameters found

**Verdict:** SAFE - No open redirect vulnerabilities.

### 5.5 Webhook & Callback Validators
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No webhook endpoints, callback URL validation, or user-configurable notification URLs exist in the application.

### 5.6 Media Processors & Image Handlers
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No image processing libraries (Pillow, ImageMagick, etc.), video converters, or media manipulation functionality exists.

### 5.7 Link Preview & URL Unfurlers
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No OpenGraph scraping, oEmbed fetching, or link metadata extraction functionality exists.

### 5.8 SSO/OIDC Discovery & JWKS Fetchers
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:**
- PyJWT 2.8.0 is used for local JWT generation and validation only
- No JWKS endpoint fetching
- No OpenID Connect discovery
- No OAuth token exchange with external authorization servers
- JWT signature verification is disabled (`verify_signature:False`), but this is a local validation bypass, not an SSRF vector

**Verdict:** JWT is used for local authentication only; no remote identity provider integration.

### 5.9 Data Importers & Remote Loaders
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No CSV/JSON/XML import from URLs, no RSS/Atom feed readers, no remote configuration fetching.

### 5.10 Package/Plugin Installers
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No plugin systems, theme installers, or package download functionality.

### 5.11 Health Check & Monitoring Probes
**Status:** DOCKER-LEVEL ONLY (OUT OF SCOPE)

**Analysis:**
Docker Compose includes a health check:
```yaml
healthcheck:
  test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://localhost:80/"]
```

This health check:
- Runs inside the container (not network-accessible)
- Checks localhost:80 only
- Is executed by Docker, not application code
- Does not accept user input

**Verdict:** SAFE - Health check is infrastructure-level, not application-level.

### 5.12 Cloud Metadata Helpers
**Status:** NOT FOUND

**Analysis:** No AWS/GCP/Azure SDK usage, no instance metadata API calls (169.254.169.254), no cloud-specific integrations.

## 6. Network Request Flow Analysis

**Inbound Traffic:**
```
Internet/Client → Port 44191 (external)
    ↓
Apache Web Server (port 80 internal)
    ↓
Flask Application (WSGI)
    ↓
Database Queries (MySQL via SQLAlchemy)
```

**Outbound Traffic:**
```
NONE - Application does not initiate outbound connections
```

**Database Communication:**
- Flask → MySQL (hostname: `db`, port: 3306)
- Connection string: `mysql+pymysql://root:trading_platform_db_pass@db/database`
- User input affects query parameters only (SQLAlchemy ORM parameterization)
- User input does NOT affect connection destination, host, or port

**User Input Impact:**
- User input influences: Database query WHERE clauses, template rendering
- User input does NOT influence: HTTP request destinations, file paths, network socket destinations, redirect URLs to external sites

## 7. Code-Level Verification

**Files Analyzed:**
1. `/app/website/app/routes.py` (92 lines) - All HTTP endpoint handlers
2. `/app/website/app/__init__.py` (55 lines) - Application initialization
3. `/app/website/app/models.py` (11 lines) - Database models
4. `/app/website/app/db.py` (3 lines) - Database initialization
5. `/app/website/requirements.txt` - All Python dependencies

**Import Statements Reviewed:**
```python
# routes.py
from flask import Flask, render_template, render_template_string, redirect, url_for, request, session, Response
import jwt

# __init__.py
from flask import Flask
from flask_sqlalchemy import SQLAlchemy
import jwt
import random
import string

# models.py
from .db import db
```

**Conclusion:** No HTTP client, socket, or URL fetching modules imported.

## 8. Attack Vector Assessment

### Attempted SSRF Attack Scenarios:

**Scenario 1: URL Parameter Injection**
- **Attack:** Provide malicious URLs in form parameters or query strings
- **Application Behavior:** No endpoint accepts URL parameters for fetching
- **Verdict:** NOT EXPLOITABLE

**Scenario 2: Redirect Manipulation**
- **Attack:** Manipulate redirect destinations to external URLs
- **Application Behavior:** All redirects use `url_for()` with internal route names
- **Verdict:** NOT EXPLOITABLE

**Scenario 3: File Path Traversal to Remote URLs**
- **Attack:** Provide URLs in file path parameters (e.g., `file:///etc/passwd` or `http://internal-service`)
- **Application Behavior:** No user-controlled file paths; single hardcoded file operation
- **Verdict:** NOT EXPLOITABLE

**Scenario 4: Webhook/Callback Abuse**
- **Attack:** Register malicious callback URLs to trigger SSRF
- **Application Behavior:** No webhook or callback functionality exists
- **Verdict:** NOT EXPLOITABLE

**Scenario 5: Cloud Metadata Access**
- **Attack:** Force application to request `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/`
- **Application Behavior:** No outbound HTTP request capability
- **Verdict:** NOT EXPLOITABLE

## 9. Recommendations for Future Development

While the current application has no SSRF vulnerabilities, the following recommendations should be followed if outbound request functionality is added in the future:

1. **URL Allowlisting:** Implement strict allowlists for any outbound HTTP requests
2. **Protocol Restrictions:** Only allow `https://` scheme; block `file://`, `ftp://`, `gopher://`, etc.
3. **IP Address Blocklists:** Block private IP ranges (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
4. **Timeout Configuration:** Set short timeouts for outbound requests
5. **Network Segmentation:** Use separate network segments for external requests
6. **DNS Rebinding Protection:** Validate DNS resolution results
7. **Disable Redirect Following:** Do not automatically follow HTTP redirects in outbound requests

## 10. Conclusion

**SSRF ANALYSIS COMPLETE**

The XBEN-027-24 Trading Platform has **ZERO SSRF attack surface** due to the complete absence of outbound HTTP request functionality. The application is a simple authentication system that:
- Accepts inbound HTTP requests
- Queries a local MySQL database
- Renders HTML templates
- Does not make any outbound network requests

**Exploitation Recommendation:**
Penetration testers should focus on the application's actual vulnerabilities:
1. JWT signature verification bypass (horizontal privilege escalation)
2. Plaintext password storage
3. Hardcoded secrets
4. Authentication bypass to access flag user (ID 10019)

SSRF testing is not applicable to this application and should not be attempted.