# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** CRITICAL FINDING - The application has **ZERO authentication mechanisms**. Every endpoint is publicly accessible without any login, session management, or access controls. This represents a complete breakdown of authentication security.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the complete absence of authentication controls and provides strategic context for exploiting the unprotected endpoints identified in the exploitation queue.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Authentication System

- **Description:** The application has no authentication system whatsoever. No login endpoints, no session management, no cookies, no tokens, no password validation. Every endpoint from homepage to administrative functions is publicly accessible to anonymous users.
- **Implication:** Any attacker from the public internet can:
  - View all SKU records (information disclosure)
  - Add arbitrary SKU records (data manipulation)
  - Delete any SKU record (data destruction)
  - Trigger SSRF attacks to internal services
  - Upload malicious files via SSRF-proxied internal endpoints
  - Execute arbitrary code via Phar deserialization
  - Access the CTF flag at `/flag.txt`
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-01` - Complete absence of authentication enables all attack vectors.

### Pattern 2: Missing Transport Security for Sensitive Operations

- **Description:** The application runs over plain HTTP with no HTTPS enforcement, no HSTS headers, and no transport security controls. Combined with the absence of authentication, this means all operations (including destructive actions like deletion) are transmitted in cleartext.
- **Implication:** Network attackers can intercept and replay requests, though authentication is not needed since the endpoints are already public.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-02` - Missing HTTPS and transport security controls.

### Pattern 3: Zero Abuse Prevention Mechanisms

- **Description:** No rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no account lockouts, no monitoring for suspicious activity. The absence of authentication means there are no "accounts" to lock out, making the application vulnerable to unlimited automated attacks.
- **Implication:** Attackers can perform unlimited brute-force attempts on SSRF endpoints, mass deletion operations, or database pollution attacks without any throttling or detection.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-03` - Missing rate limiting and abuse defenses.

### Pattern 4: Cosmetic "Security Theater" Elements

- **Description:** The application displays a randomly-generated "session ID" on the homepage (`RandomHash` class in `/app/index.php` lines 13-23), creating the false impression that session management exists. However, this value is never stored, never validated, and serves no security purpose.
- **Implication:** This misleading element may create false confidence in the application's security posture while providing zero actual protection.
- **Code Evidence:**
```php
// /app/index.php lines 13-23
class RandomHash {
    private $secret;
    public function __construct() {
        $this->secret = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));
    }
    public function getValue() {
        return $this->secret;
    }
}
// Displayed in template: "Hello, your temporally session id is {random}"
// BUT: Never validated, stored, or used for access control
```

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method
**NONE** - The application has zero authentication mechanisms.

### Session Token Details
**NONE** - Despite displaying a cosmetic "session id" value, no actual session management exists:
- No `session_start()` calls anywhere in codebase
- No `$_SESSION` variable usage
- No cookies created (`setcookie()` never called)
- No token validation or verification

### Publicly Accessible Endpoints (No Authentication Required)

**Main Application (Port 8081) - Externally Accessible:**
1. `GET/POST /index.php` - Homepage
2. `GET /sku_system.php` - List all SKU records
3. `GET /sku_search.php` - Search interface
4. `POST /sku_search.php` - Execute search query
5. `GET /sku_add.php` - Add SKU form
6. `POST /sku_add.php` - Insert new SKU record (no validation, no CSRF protection)
7. `GET /sku_product_detail.php?id={id}` - View any SKU by ID (IDOR)
8. `POST /sku_delete.php` - **CRITICAL:** Delete any SKU record (no confirmation, no CSRF protection)
9. `GET /sku_url.php` - SSRF form
10. `POST /sku_url.php` - **CRITICAL:** SSRF endpoint (bypasses network isolation to reach port 4455)

**Internal Service (Port 4455) - Accessible via SSRF:**
11. `POST /sku_transfer` - Mock transfer endpoint
12. `POST /sku_validation` - Mock validation endpoint
13. `POST /sku_process` - **CRITICAL:** File upload endpoint (accepts base64-encoded data)
14. `POST /sku_read` - **CRITICAL:** Phar deserialization with eval() gadget → RCE
15. `GET /backup/` - Directory listing with backup.zip

### Password Policy
**N/A** - No password authentication exists. No password hashing, no credential validation, no user accounts.

### Network-Level Access Controls (Minimal)
The only "authentication" is network-level isolation of the internal service (port 4455):
- **Nginx ACL:** Restricts port 4455 to Docker internal network (172.0.0.0/8)
- **Bypass Method:** SSRF endpoint at `/sku_url.php` proxies requests from webapp (trusted source) to internal service
- **Verdict:** Network isolation is intentionally bypassed by design

### Attack Chain Enabled by Missing Authentication
Since no authentication exists, an external attacker can:
1. **Access SSRF endpoint:** `POST /sku_url.php` with `url=http://service:4455/sku_process`
2. **Upload malicious Phar:** Base64-encode Phar with serialized `CustomTemplate` object containing `eval()` payload
3. **Trigger deserialization:** `POST /sku_url.php` with `url=http://service:4455/sku_read` and `file_path=/tmp/{hash}.jpg`
4. **Achieve RCE:** `CustomTemplate::__wakeup()` executes `eval($this->data)` → arbitrary code execution
5. **Exfiltrate flag:** `system("cat /flag.txt")`

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

**CRITICAL NOTE:** This section is typically for components with robust defenses. However, since **NO AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM EXISTS**, there are no authentication components to validate as secure.

The only defensible components are those unrelated to authentication:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection Prevention | All database queries (multiple files) | Uses PDO prepared statements with parameterized queries | SAFE (from SQL injection only) |
| Twig Sandbox | `/app/index.php` lines 31-40 | Twig sandbox security policy enabled (but bypassed in multiple endpoints) | PARTIALLY SAFE (SSTI prevented, but XSS possible via `\|raw` filter) |

### Why These Components Are Documented Here
While SQL injection is prevented and SSTI is mitigated by Twig's sandbox, these defenses are **completely irrelevant** when authentication is missing. An attacker doesn't need SQL injection when they can directly access all database operations via unauthenticated endpoints.

## 5. Critical Authentication Vulnerabilities Identified

### AUTH-VULN-01: Complete Absence of Authentication System
- **Severity:** CRITICAL (CVSS 10.0 for business impact)
- **Scope:** All 15 endpoints (7 public + 8 internal via SSRF)
- **Finding:** Zero authentication mechanisms exist. No login, no sessions, no tokens, no credentials.
- **Evidence:**
  - Code analysis: 0 occurrences of `session_start()`, `setcookie()`, `password_verify()`, JWT libraries
  - Database schema: No `users`, `accounts`, or authentication tables
  - Live testing: Direct access to all endpoints without credentials
  - Web server config: No HTTP Basic Auth or other authentication directives

### AUTH-VULN-02: Missing Transport Security
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Scope:** All endpoints
- **Finding:** No HTTPS enforcement, no HSTS headers, no cache control for sensitive operations
- **Evidence:**
  - HTTP response headers lack `Strict-Transport-Security`
  - HTTP response headers lack `Cache-Control: no-store`
  - Application runs on HTTP only (port 8081)
  - Sensitive operations (deletion, SSRF) transmitted in cleartext

### AUTH-VULN-03: Zero Abuse Prevention Mechanisms
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Scope:** All state-changing endpoints
- **Finding:** No rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no account lockouts, no monitoring
- **Evidence:**
  - Code analysis: 0 rate limiting implementations
  - No CAPTCHA or challenge-response mechanisms
  - No monitoring/alerting for suspicious activity
  - Tested: Can perform unlimited deletion operations without throttling

### AUTH-VULN-04: Missing Session Management
- **Severity:** CRITICAL
- **Scope:** Entire application
- **Finding:** No session state management exists
- **Evidence:**
  - 0 occurrences of `session_start()`, `session_destroy()`, `session_regenerate_id()`
  - No cookies created (`setcookie()` never called)
  - No `$_SESSION` variable usage
  - "Session ID" displayed in UI is purely cosmetic (never validated)

### AUTH-VULN-05: No Token/Credential Management
- **Severity:** CRITICAL  
- **Scope:** Entire application
- **Finding:** No token generation, validation, or management
- **Evidence:**
  - No JWT, OAuth, or API key implementations
  - No password hashing (`password_hash()`, `bcrypt` not found)
  - No credential validation logic
  - No token expiration or rotation

### AUTH-VULN-06: Missing CSRF Protection
- **Severity:** HIGH
- **Scope:** All state-changing endpoints (add, delete, SSRF)
- **Finding:** No CSRF tokens on any forms or state-changing operations
- **Evidence:**
  - File `/app/sku_delete.php`: Accepts POST requests without CSRF validation
  - File `/app/sku_add.php`: Form submission without CSRF token
  - File `/app/sku_url.php`: SSRF endpoint accepts POST without CSRF protection
  - Combined with missing authentication, enables trivial mass deletion/pollution attacks

## 6. Exploitation Strategy

### Primary Attack Vector: Direct Unauthenticated Access
Since no authentication exists, exploitation requires no bypass techniques. Simply access any endpoint directly.

### High-Value Targets (Prioritized for Exploitation Phase):
1. **SSRF Endpoint** (`POST /sku_url.php`) - Gateway to internal service
2. **File Upload** (via SSRF to `POST /sku_process`) - Upload malicious Phar
3. **Deserialization** (via SSRF to `POST /sku_read`) - Trigger RCE
4. **Mass Deletion** (`POST /sku_delete.php`) - Denial of service via data destruction

### Recommended Exploitation Sequence:
1. Verify unauthenticated access to all public endpoints
2. Test SSRF to confirm access to internal service (port 4455)
3. Upload malicious Phar via SSRF proxy
4. Trigger deserialization to achieve RCE
5. Exfiltrate CTF flag from `/flag.txt`

## 7. Recommendations for Remediation (Out of Scope for This Phase)

While remediation is not our responsibility, the following would be required to establish basic authentication security:

1. **Implement Authentication System:**
   - Add user registration and login endpoints
   - Implement session management with secure cookies
   - Hash passwords with `password_hash()` (bcrypt/Argon2)
   - Require authentication for ALL endpoints except login/register

2. **Add Session Security:**
   - Use `session_start()` with secure configuration
   - Set `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, `SameSite=Strict` flags on session cookies
   - Implement session regeneration after login
   - Add session timeouts (idle and absolute)

3. **Transport Security:**
   - Enforce HTTPS for all endpoints
   - Add HSTS headers with appropriate max-age
   - Add `Cache-Control: no-store` for sensitive responses

4. **Abuse Prevention:**
   - Implement rate limiting on all authentication endpoints
   - Add CAPTCHA for login/registration
   - Implement account lockout after failed attempts
   - Add logging and monitoring for suspicious activity

5. **CSRF Protection:**
   - Generate and validate CSRF tokens for all state-changing operations

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**END OF AUTHENTICATION ANALYSIS REPORT**