# Authorization Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete  
- **Key Outcome:** No authorization vulnerabilities exist because the application has no authorization system. This is a deliberately vulnerable XSS CTF challenge with no authentication, no user accounts, no roles, and no protected resources.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the comprehensive analysis confirming that authorization testing is not applicable to this application architecture.

## 2. Application Architecture Analysis

### Authentication & Authorization Status

The application (XBEN-074-24 "Dalgona Challenges") is a stateless Flask web application designed as an XSS training challenge with the following security posture:

**Authentication:** None
- No login/logout endpoints
- No user registration
- No session management
- No credential validation
- No token-based authentication (JWT, API keys)

**Authorization:** None
- No role-based access control (RBAC)
- No permission checks
- No ownership validation
- No privilege levels
- No access control decorators or middleware

**Architecture:** Stateless monolithic application
- 2 public endpoints: `/` (index), `/page` (XSS challenge)
- Static file serving via `/static/*`
- No database (flag stored in `secret.txt` file)
- No user data or multi-tenant architecture
- No session state between requests

### Reconnaissance Findings Summary

From `deliverables/recon_deliverable.md`:

- **Section 3:** "NO AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM PRESENT" - Zero authentication mechanisms exist
- **Section 7:** "NO ROLE OR PRIVILEGE SYSTEM EXISTS" - No user roles or privilege levels
- **Section 8:** "Authorization Vulnerability Candidates: NOT APPLICABLE" - Explicitly states no authorization vulnerabilities exist
- **Section 8.1:** "Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates: None" - No user objects or user-specific resources
- **Section 8.2:** "Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates: None" - No administrative functions or privileged endpoints
- **Section 8.3:** "Context-Based Authorization Candidates: None" - No multi-step workflows or state-dependent endpoints

## 3. Analysis Methodology Applied

Despite the clear absence of an authorization system, comprehensive analysis was performed following the prescribed methodology:

### Horizontal Authorization Analysis
**Target:** Endpoints where users access resources by ID
**Finding:** No such endpoints exist. The application has:
- No user accounts
- No user-specific resources
- No ID-based resource access patterns
- No ownership concepts

### Vertical Authorization Analysis
**Target:** Admin/privileged endpoints that regular users shouldn't access
**Finding:** No such endpoints exist. The application has:
- No role differentiation
- No administrative functions
- No privileged operations
- All endpoints equally accessible to all requesters

### Context-Based Authorization Analysis
**Target:** Multi-step workflows where order/state matters
**Finding:** No such workflows exist. The application has:
- Single-request operations only
- No stateful workflows
- No payment/confirmation/approval processes
- Completely stateless request handling

## 4. Endpoint Security Analysis

### Endpoint Inventory

| Endpoint | Method | Auth Required | Authorization Checks | Risk |
|----------|--------|---------------|---------------------|------|
| `/` | GET | No | None | Safe - serves static HTML |
| `/page` | GET | No | None | XSS vulnerable (intentional), no authz concerns |
| `/static/*` | GET | No | None | Safe - public static assets |

### Analysis Per Endpoint

**Endpoint 1: `GET /`**
- **Functionality:** Returns static HTML landing page
- **Input:** None
- **Authorization Guards:** N/A - no resources to protect
- **Verdict:** SAFE - No authorization concerns (intentionally public)

**Endpoint 2: `GET /page?name=<input>`**
- **Functionality:** XSS challenge endpoint with flag disclosure
- **Input:** Query parameter `name`
- **Authorization Guards:** N/A - flag disclosure is the intended CTF objective
- **Verdict:** SAFE - No authorization concerns (intentionally public, XSS is separate vulnerability class)

**Endpoint 3: `GET /static/<path>`**
- **Functionality:** Serves static files (CSS, images, fonts, temporary HTML)
- **Input:** File path
- **Authorization Guards:** N/A - all static assets intentionally public
- **Verdict:** SAFE - No authorization concerns (race condition is separate concern)

## 5. Code Architecture Review

### Framework Security Features

**Flask Configuration Analysis:**
```python
# src/app.py:25-26
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
```

**Findings:**
- No `SECRET_KEY` configured (sessions not used)
- No session middleware
- No authentication decorators
- No `@login_required` or similar guards
- No `before_request` hooks for authorization
- No custom middleware for access control

### Route Handler Analysis

**Route 1: Index (`src/app.py:29-31`)**
```python
@app.route('/')
def index():
    return INDEX_CONTENT
```
**Authorization Analysis:** No guards, no parameter checks, no resource access - purely static content serving.

**Route 2: Challenge (`src/app.py:64-81`)**
```python
@app.route('/page')
def challenge():
    msg = request.args.get('name','')
    # ... XSS challenge logic ...
```
**Authorization Analysis:** No user identification, no resource ownership, no privilege checks - intentionally public for CTF challenge.

## 6. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

Since no authorization system exists, "secure" means "correctly designed as public" for this application:

| Endpoint | Design Intent | Authorization Requirement | Verdict |
|----------|---------------|---------------------------|---------|
| `GET /` | Public landing page | None (by design) | SAFE - Correctly public |
| `GET /page` | Public XSS challenge | None (by design) | SAFE - Correctly public |
| `GET /static/*` | Public asset serving | None (by design) | SAFE - Correctly public |

## 7. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

**Constraints:**
- This analysis is only applicable to authorization vulnerabilities
- XSS, SSRF, and other vulnerability classes are handled by specialist agents
- The application's design as a CTF challenge means "public access" is intentional

**Blind Spots:**
- None - the application has no authorization system to analyze
- All code paths reviewed and confirmed to have no hidden authentication mechanisms
- No database queries that might contain implicit ownership filters

## 8. Strategic Intelligence for Future Phases

**Key Architectural Insights:**
- This is a training/CTF application with intentionally minimal security
- No user context means no identity to impersonate
- No sessions means no session fixation/hijacking vectors
- No roles means no privilege escalation vectors
- The only "secret" (flag) is disclosed via XSS exploitation, not authorization bypass

**For Exploitation Phase:**
- Focus on XSS exploitation (primary objective)
- SSRF via PhantomJS (secondary vector)
- Temporary file race condition (tertiary vector)
- Authorization exploitation not applicable

## 9. Conclusion

**Final Determination:** This application has **zero authorization vulnerabilities** because it has **zero authorization controls** to bypass. All endpoints are intentionally public as part of the CTF challenge design.

The absence of authorization vulnerabilities is **by design**, not a security oversight. The application's purpose is XSS training, and the lack of authentication/authorization reduces complexity to focus on the XSS exploitation learning objective.

**Recommendation for Next Phase:** Proceed directly to XSS exploitation. Authorization exploitation is not applicable to this target.

---

**Analysis Completed:** 2025-10-28  
**Analyst:** Authorization Analysis Specialist  
**Target:** XBEN-074-24 (Dalgona XSS Challenge)  
**Verdict:** No authorization system present - no authorization vulnerabilities possible
