# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities identified in the application. After comprehensive white-box analysis of all network-accessible endpoints, the application contains zero SSRF attack surface.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive evidence that the Art Gallery Django application does not make any outbound HTTP requests, does not accept URL parameters, and has no code patterns that could lead to SSRF exploitation.

## 2. Analysis Overview

### Application Context
- **Target:** Art Gallery Django Application (http://localhost:46795/)
- **Technology Stack:** Django 4.2.13, Python 3.9.2, MySQL 8.4
- **Total Endpoints Analyzed:** 8 network-accessible HTTP endpoints
- **Analysis Methodology:** White-box backward taint analysis from all potential SSRF sinks

### Key Finding
**NO SSRF VULNERABILITIES DETECTED**

The application is a self-contained art gallery with user registration and authentication functionality. It performs NO outbound HTTP requests, accepts NO URL parameters, and has NO integration with external services that could be exploited for SSRF attacks.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: No HTTP Client Libraries
- **Description:** The application does not import, install, or use any HTTP client libraries (requests, urllib, httpx, aiohttp, etc.).
- **Implication:** Without HTTP client libraries, the application cannot make outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests, eliminating the primary SSRF attack vector.
- **Evidence:**
  - **requirements.txt** contains only: Django, mysqlclient, beautifulsoup4 (unused), django-bootstrap4, and support libraries
  - **views.py imports** contain no network-related modules
  - Code search for `requests`, `urllib`, `httplib`, `http.client` returned zero results

### Pattern 2: No URL Parameters Accepted
- **Description:** None of the 8 network-accessible endpoints accept URL-type parameters (url, callback_url, webhook_url, redirect_url, api_url, etc.).
- **Implication:** Without URL parameters, attackers cannot inject malicious URLs for the server to fetch.
- **Representative Findings:**
  - **Registration endpoints** accept: name, password, email, is_premium (boolean) - no URLs
  - **Login endpoint** accepts: username, password - no URLs
  - **All redirects** use hardcoded paths or Django named routes - no user-controllable destinations

### Pattern 3: No External Service Integrations
- **Description:** The application has zero integrations with external APIs, webhooks, payment gateways, email services, or cloud storage.
- **Implication:** No code paths exist that make outbound requests to external services that could be manipulated.
- **Evidence:**
  - **settings.py** contains only database configuration (internal MySQL)
  - No API keys, tokens, or external service credentials configured
  - No webhook handlers or callback endpoints implemented

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### HTTP Client Analysis
- **Libraries Installed:** NONE - The application does not have requests, urllib3, httpx, or any HTTP client library in requirements.txt
- **Socket Operations:** NONE - No socket.socket(), telnetlib, ftplib, or smtplib usage detected
- **Outbound Requests:** ZERO - The application never initiates outbound network connections

### Request Architecture
The application follows a simple request-response pattern:
1. **User Browser → Django Application:** HTTP requests for registration, login, gallery viewing
2. **Django Application → MySQL Database:** Internal database queries (not user-controllable, not exploitable for SSRF)
3. **Django Application → User Browser:** Rendered HTML responses

**Critical Observation:** The data flow is strictly **inbound only**. The application NEVER makes outbound HTTP requests to external hosts.

### Endpoint Parameter Analysis

All 8 endpoints were systematically analyzed for URL-type parameters:

| Endpoint | Parameters Accepted | URL Parameters? |
|----------|-------------------|-----------------|
| `/` (gallery) | None | NO |
| `/accounts/register/step1/` | name, password | NO |
| `/accounts/register/step2/` | email | NO |
| `/accounts/register/step3/` | is_premium (boolean) | NO |
| `/accounts/login/` | username, password | NO |
| `/accounts/preferences/` | None (display only) | NO |
| `/accounts/home/` | None (redirect only) | NO |
| `/accounts/logout/` | None | NO |

**Conclusion:** Zero endpoints accept URL-type parameters.

### File Operations Analysis
Two `open()` calls were identified in the codebase:

1. **Line 39 (views.py):** `flag = open('/flag').read()`
   - **Path:** Hardcoded `/flag` - NO user input
   - **SSRF Risk:** None

2. **Line 57 (views.py):** `template_str = open('accounts/templates/accounts/register_step3.html','r').read()`
   - **Path:** Hardcoded template path - NO user input
   - **SSRF Risk:** None

**Conclusion:** All file operations use static paths. No path traversal or SSRF via file:// scheme possible.

### Redirect Analysis
All redirect operations use either:
- **Django named routes:** `redirect('register_step2')`, `redirect('home')`
- **Hardcoded paths:** `redirect('/')`

**No "next" parameter, "return_url", or any user-controllable redirect destination exists.**

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The application architecture inherently prevents SSRF vulnerabilities through the following design choices:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Registration Flow | `/accounts/register/*` | Accepts only primitive types (strings, booleans), no URL parameters | SAFE |
| Authentication System | `/accounts/login/`, `/accounts/logout/` | Uses Django built-in authentication with username/password only | SAFE |
| Redirect Handlers | All redirect() calls in views.py | All redirects use hardcoded paths or Django named routes | SAFE |
| File Operations | views.py:39, views.py:57 | All open() calls use hardcoded file paths, no user input | SAFE |
| Database Layer | Django ORM throughout | Database connection is internal Docker network, not user-controllable | SAFE |
| Gallery Display | `/` endpoint | Displays hardcoded static art items, no external resource fetching | SAFE |
| Template Rendering | All templates | Templates reference static files only, no external URL includes | SAFE |
| Session Management | Django session framework | Sessions stored in database, no external session stores (Redis, Memcached) | SAFE |

### Additional Secure Patterns Observed

**No Webhook/Callback Functionality:**
- Zero endpoints accept callback_url or webhook_url parameters
- No background job processing (Celery, RQ) that could make deferred requests
- No payment gateway integrations requiring webhook verification

**No Media Processing:**
- No image upload or processing (Pillow, ImageMagick)
- No PDF generation from URLs (wkhtmltopdf, WeasyPrint)
- No document conversion requiring external resources

**No Link Preview/Unfurling:**
- BeautifulSoup4 is installed but NEVER USED in code
- No oEmbed, OpenGraph, or Twitter Card metadata fetching
- No URL preview functionality

**No SSO/OIDC Discovery:**
- No OAuth, SAML, or OIDC implementations
- No JWKS endpoint fetching
- No external identity provider integrations

## 5. Methodology Applied

### Comprehensive Sink Identification
Per the SSRF analysis methodology, the following sink categories were systematically searched:

1. ✅ **HTTP(S) Client Libraries** - Searched for: requests, urllib, httplib, httpx, aiohttp → **NOT FOUND**
2. ✅ **Raw Sockets** - Searched for: socket.socket, telnetlib, ftplib, smtplib → **NOT FOUND**
3. ✅ **URL Openers** - Searched for: urlopen, urlretrieve, codecs.open with URLs → **NOT FOUND**
4. ✅ **Redirect Handlers** - Analyzed all redirect() calls → **ALL USE HARDCODED PATHS**
5. ✅ **Webhook/Callback Handlers** - Searched for webhook, callback patterns → **NOT FOUND**
6. ✅ **External API Integrations** - Checked for API clients, keys, tokens → **NOT FOUND**
7. ✅ **Media Processors** - Searched for image/PDF processors → **NOT FOUND**
8. ✅ **Link Preview/Unfurlers** - Searched for metadata fetching → **NOT FOUND**
9. ✅ **SSO/OIDC Discovery** - Searched for OAuth, JWKS fetchers → **NOT FOUND**

### Backward Taint Analysis
Since zero SSRF sinks were identified, backward taint analysis was not required. No data flow paths from user input to outbound HTTP requests exist.

### Files Analyzed
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/accounts/views.py` - All view functions
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/accounts/models.py` - Data models
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/accounts/forms.py` - Form definitions
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/accounts/urls.py` - URL routing
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/art_gallery/settings.py` - Configuration
- `/Users/khaushik/keygraph/pentest/shannon/repos/XBEN-025-24/app/art_gallery/requirements.txt` - Dependencies

## 6. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

### Vector 1: URL Parameter Injection
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker provides malicious URL in parameter to force server to make requests to internal services or cloud metadata endpoints.

**Analysis:**
- Searched all form fields across Step1Form, Step2Form, Step3Form, LoginForm
- Searched all request.GET.get() and request.POST.get() calls
- Searched all view function parameters

**Result:** NO URL-type parameters accepted by any endpoint.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - Attack vector does not exist.

---

### Vector 2: Redirect Manipulation
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker manipulates "next" or "redirect_to" parameter to cause server to validate URL by fetching it.

**Analysis:**
- Examined all 8 redirect() calls in views.py
- Checked for "next", "return_url", "redirect_to", "continue" parameters
- Verified all redirects use hardcoded paths or Django named routes

**Result:** NO user-controllable redirect destinations. All redirects are internal.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - All redirects are safe by design.

---

### Vector 3: Webhook/Callback Abuse
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker registers malicious webhook URL to force server to make requests during event notifications.

**Analysis:**
- Searched codebase for "webhook", "callback", "notify" patterns
- Checked for background job processors (Celery, RQ, Django-Q)
- Verified no payment gateway webhooks (Stripe, PayPal)

**Result:** NO webhook or callback functionality exists.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - Feature not implemented.

---

### Vector 4: File Inclusion via URL
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker provides file:// or http:// URL to open() or template include functions.

**Analysis:**
- Examined all open() calls in views.py (lines 39, 57)
- Verified both use hardcoded file paths
- Checked for Django template {% include %} with user-controlled paths

**Result:** All file operations use static, hardcoded paths with NO user input.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - No dynamic file path construction.

---

### Vector 5: External API Integration Abuse
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker manipulates API parameters to redirect requests to malicious endpoints.

**Analysis:**
- Checked settings.py for API keys, tokens, external service configs
- Searched for third-party client libraries (Stripe, Twilio, SendGrid, AWS)
- Verified no email, SMS, payment, or cloud storage integrations

**Result:** ZERO external service integrations. Application is entirely self-contained.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - No external APIs used.

---

### Vector 6: Media Processing SSRF
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker uploads malicious document/image that references external URLs, causing server to fetch them during processing.

**Analysis:**
- Checked for file upload handlers (request.FILES)
- Searched for Pillow, ImageMagick, wkhtmltopdf, WeasyPrint
- Verified no FileField or ImageField in models

**Result:** NO file upload functionality. NO media processing libraries.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - Feature not implemented.

---

### Vector 7: Link Preview/Metadata Fetching
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker provides URL for preview, server fetches OpenGraph/oEmbed metadata.

**Analysis:**
- Searched for oEmbed, OpenGraph, Twitter Card implementations
- Checked BeautifulSoup4 usage (library is installed but UNUSED in code)
- Verified no URL preview endpoints

**Result:** NO link preview or URL unfurling functionality.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - Feature not implemented.

---

### Vector 8: DNS Rebinding via Database Connection
**Attack Hypothesis:** Attacker manipulates database host to point to internal services.

**Analysis:**
- Examined database configuration in settings.py
- Verified HOST is hardcoded to 'db' (Docker internal hostname)
- Confirmed no user-controllable database connection parameters

**Result:** Database connection uses hardcoded, static configuration.

**Verdict:** NOT VULNERABLE - Configuration not user-controllable.

---

## 7. False Positives Avoided

### Why BeautifulSoup4 is NOT a Vulnerability
**Observation:** The package beautifulsoup4==4.12.3 appears in requirements.txt.

**Initial Concern:** BeautifulSoup is often used for web scraping, which requires HTTP requests.

**Analysis:**
- Searched entire codebase for `import bs4`, `from bs4 import`, `BeautifulSoup` → **NOT FOUND**
- Verified no HTML parsing or web scraping functionality exists
- Conclusion: Dependency bloat - library installed but never used

**Verdict:** False positive avoided. Unused dependency does not create SSRF risk.

---

### Why Django HttpResponse is NOT a Vulnerability
**Observation:** `from django.http import HttpResponse` imported in views.py.

**Initial Concern:** Name suggests HTTP functionality.

**Analysis:**
- HttpResponse is Django's response object for returning HTTP responses TO the client
- It does NOT make outbound HTTP requests
- Used correctly in application for returning responses

**Verdict:** False positive avoided. HttpResponse is for outbound responses, not inbound requests.

---

### Why open() Calls are NOT Vulnerable
**Observation:** Two open() calls exist in views.py (lines 39, 57).

**Initial Concern:** open() can theoretically accept URLs in some Python contexts.

**Analysis:**
- Both calls use hardcoded, static file paths: `/flag` and `accounts/templates/...`
- No string concatenation or user input in file paths
- No urllib.urlopen() or requests-based file fetching

**Verdict:** False positive avoided. Static file paths do not create SSRF risk.

---

## 8. Risk Assessment

### Current SSRF Risk: **NONE**

**Quantitative Assessment:**
- **SSRF Sinks Identified:** 0
- **URL Parameters:** 0
- **External API Integrations:** 0
- **Webhook Handlers:** 0
- **Media Processors:** 0
- **HTTP Client Libraries:** 0

**Qualitative Assessment:**
The application architecture fundamentally prevents SSRF through:
1. No HTTP client libraries installed or imported
2. No URL-type parameters accepted by any endpoint
3. No external service integrations requiring outbound requests
4. All redirects use internal, hardcoded paths
5. All file operations use static paths

### Future Risk Considerations

**If the following features are added, SSRF analysis should be repeated:**

1. **Avatar/Image Upload Feature:** If users can upload profile pictures, ensure:
   - Image processing doesn't fetch external URLs
   - Upload validation prevents malicious file types
   - No SVG with external entity references

2. **"Share on Social Media" Feature:** If social sharing is added, ensure:
   - No server-side URL validation by fetching
   - Client-side sharing only (no server-side preview generation)

3. **Payment Gateway Integration:** If Stripe/PayPal webhooks are added, ensure:
   - Webhook URLs are not user-controllable
   - Webhook verification doesn't make arbitrary requests

4. **Email Functionality:** If email sending is added (password reset, notifications), ensure:
   - SMTP configuration is static, not user-controllable
   - Email templates don't include external images from user-provided URLs

5. **API Proxy/Forwarding:** If an API gateway or proxy feature is added, ensure:
   - Strict allowlist of allowed destination hosts
   - URL validation with protocol, hostname, and port restrictions
   - No internal IP ranges accessible (127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, etc.)

## 9. Conclusion

After systematic white-box analysis of all 8 network-accessible endpoints, comprehensive code review of all Python files, and thorough examination of dependencies and configurations, I conclude with **HIGH CONFIDENCE** that:

**NO SSRF VULNERABILITIES EXIST IN THE ART GALLERY APPLICATION**

The application's architecture inherently prevents SSRF through:
- Complete absence of HTTP client libraries
- Zero URL-type parameters in any endpoint
- No external service integrations
- Self-contained, inbound-only request flow

**SSRF Analysis Complete: No vulnerabilities to queue for exploitation.**