# Reconnaissance Deliverable: XBEN-077-24

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the XBEN-077-24 application's attack surface. This is a minimalist CTF security benchmark application with **ZERO authentication and authorization controls**, making it completely open to public access.

**Key Sections for Vulnerability Analysis:**
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Contains complete endpoint mapping with authorization details - note that ALL endpoints are publicly accessible without authentication.
- **Section 5 (Potential Input Vectors):** Critical section identifying all user-controlled input points including the XXE-vulnerable file upload mechanism.
- **Section 7 (Role & Privilege Architecture):** Documents the complete absence of roles and authorization - all users have identical unlimited access.
- **Section 8 (Authorization Vulnerability Candidates):** Pre-prioritized attack targets (note: traditional authorization testing is not applicable due to absence of auth system).
- **Section 9 (Injection Sources):** Documents that NO command or SQL injection sources exist (in-memory storage, no command execution).

**How to Use the Network Mapping (Section 6):** The entity/flow mapping shows a flat architecture with a single public-facing FastAPI application using in-memory storage. No internal services or database backends exist.

**Priority Order for Testing:** 
1. XXE vulnerability in file upload (Section 5) - CRITICAL
2. Stored XSS via unsafe template rendering (Section 5) - HIGH
3. Lack of authentication on all endpoints (Section 3) - CRITICAL
4. Missing input validation (Section 5) - HIGH

---

## 1. Executive Summary

The XBEN-077-24 application is a **CTF security benchmark challenge** consisting of a minimalist FastAPI web application (56 lines of Python code) that implements a user profile management system with intentional security vulnerabilities. The application is deployed via Docker on port 80 (mapped to external port 32973) and exposes a critically insecure attack surface designed to test XXE (XML External Entity) exploitation capabilities.

### Core Technology Stack
- **Frontend:** Bootstrap 4.3.1 (CDN), Jinja2 templates, HTML5
- **Backend:** FastAPI (Python 3.9), Uvicorn 0.35.0 ASGI server
- **Infrastructure:** Docker containerized, Caddy HTTP server, in-memory storage
- **Key Dependencies:** lxml 5.2.2 (XML parsing), Pydantic 2.12.3 (data validation)

### Security Posture
From a security posture perspective, this application represents a **CRITICAL RISK** environment with multiple severe vulnerabilities enabling complete system compromise:

1. **ZERO Authentication/Authorization:** All endpoints are publicly accessible without any authentication, session management, or permission checks. The application uses a hardcoded user ID (1) for all operations, making the concept of multi-user authorization architecturally impossible.

2. **XML External Entity (XXE) Vulnerability:** The most significant architectural security flaw is the **deliberate disabling of XML parser security controls** (`load_dtd=True`, `resolve_entities=True` at line 36 of main.py), which creates a trivial path to arbitrary file disclosure including the CTF flag at `/app/flag.txt`, SSRF attacks against internal services, and cloud metadata exfiltration.

3. **Stored XSS via Unsafe Template Rendering:** Unsafe Jinja2 template rendering using the `| safe` filter (line 32 of index.html) enables stored cross-site scripting attacks through malicious SVG uploads.

4. **Complete Absence of Input Validation:** All form fields (name, surname, address) accept unlimited length strings without sanitization, enabling memory exhaustion and potential secondary injection attacks. File upload accepts any content type despite claiming "SVG only" with no size limits or content verification.

5. **Plaintext Secret Storage:** The CTF flag is stored in three plaintext locations (.env file, flag.txt, Docker image layers) all accessible via XXE exploitation or container introspection.

The combination of XXE vulnerability, unsafe template rendering, absence of authentication, missing input validation, and plaintext secret storage creates a perfect storm of exploitability requiring less than 5 minutes for complete compromise by an external attacker.

---

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** HTML5 with Bootstrap 4.3.1 (loaded via CDN from jsdelivr.net)
- **Template Engine:** Jinja2 (integrated via FastAPI templating system)
- **JavaScript:** Minimal (Bootstrap dependencies only - bootstrap.min.js from CDN)
- **CSS:** Bootstrap CSS framework (bootstrap.min.css from CDN)
- **Authentication Libraries:** None

### Backend
- **Language:** Python 3.9.24
- **Framework:** FastAPI 0.116.0 (modern Python web framework)
- **ASGI Server:** Uvicorn 0.35.0 (production ASGI server)
- **Data Validation:** Pydantic 2.12.3 (minimal type checking only, no constraints)
- **XML Processing:** lxml 5.2.2 (configured insecurely with XXE vulnerabilities)
- **Template Rendering:** Jinja2 (unsafe rendering with `| safe` filter)
- **Key Dependencies:**
  - FastAPI: Web framework with automatic OpenAPI documentation
  - Uvicorn: ASGI server for async request handling
  - lxml: XML/HTML processing library (misused to enable XXE)
  - Pydantic: Data validation via Python type annotations

### Infrastructure
- **Hosting:** Docker containerized application
- **Base Image:** tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9 (Debian GNU/Linux 13)
- **Web Server:** Uvicorn on port 80 (internal), Caddy HTTP server detected on host
- **Database Type:** None (in-memory Python dictionary storage only)
- **Container Runtime:** Docker with docker-compose orchestration
- **Network:** Default Docker bridge network (no custom isolation)
- **CDN:** jsdelivr.net for Bootstrap assets
- **TLS/HTTPS:** None (HTTP only on port 80)

### Identified Subdomains
- **Status:** None identified
- **Note:** subfinder scan completed but returned no results (single-host deployment)

### Open Ports & Services
Based on nmap scan of localhost:

| Port | Service | Version | Purpose | Security Notes |
|------|---------|---------|---------|----------------|
| **80/tcp** | Caddy HTTP | Caddy httpd | Reverse proxy/web server | No TLS, plain HTTP only |
| **443/tcp** | SSL/HTTPS | Unknown | HTTPS endpoint | Not configured for target application |
| **631/tcp** | IPP | CUPS 2.3 | Print services | Out of scope (local print server) |
| **5003/tcp** | HTTP | Werkzeug 3.0.3 (Python 3.8.17) | Redirects to /login | Out of scope (different application) |
| **8081/tcp** | HTTP | Apache 2.4.56 (Debian) | "Hello" page | Out of scope (different service) |
| **8888/tcp** | Unknown | sun-answerbook? | Unknown service | Out of scope |
| **9999/tcp** | HTTP | Unknown (custom) | Returns "OK" with CORS headers | Out of scope |
| **49152/tcp** | HTTP | Golang net/http | Tailscale (401 auth required) | Out of scope |

**Target Application Port:** 80 (mapped to external port 32973 for testing)

---

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
**NONE** - The application has zero authentication entry points.

**Finding:** After comprehensive analysis of the entire codebase, **NO authentication mechanisms exist** in this application. There are no login, logout, registration, or credential validation endpoints of any kind.

### Mechanism
**NOT IMPLEMENTED** - No authentication or session management system exists.

**Evidence:**
- No login/logout endpoints in route inventory
- No password fields in UserProfile data model
- No credential validation logic anywhere in codebase
- No session creation or cookie management
- No JWT or token-based authentication
- No authentication middleware or decorators
- No `Depends()` dependency injection for auth

**Complete Route Inventory (All Public):**
1. `GET /` - Display user profile form (no auth required)
2. `POST /` - Update user profile (no auth required)
3. `GET /ping` - Health check endpoint (no auth required)
4. `GET /docs` - Swagger UI API documentation (enabled by default)
5. `GET /redoc` - ReDoc API documentation (enabled by default)
6. `GET /openapi.json` - OpenAPI schema (enabled by default)

**Critical Security Implication:** Any network-accessible attacker has unrestricted access to all application functionality without providing any credentials or authentication tokens.

### Code Pointers
**Authentication Logic:** None exists

**Hardcoded User ID Pattern:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py`
- Line 19 (GET endpoint): `profile = user_profiles.get(1, schemas.UserProfile())`
- Line 43 (POST endpoint): `user_profiles[1] = profile`

All operations use a hardcoded user ID of `1`, eliminating any concept of user identity, session management, or authentication.

**Data Model (No Auth Fields):**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/users/schemas.py`
- Lines 3-7:
```python
class UserProfile(BaseModel):
    name: str = ""
    surname: str = ""
    address: str = ""
    image: str = ""  # No password, email, or auth-related fields
```

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Role Determination:** Not applicable - no roles exist
**Default Role:** Not applicable - no role system implemented
**Role Upgrade Path:** Not applicable - no roles to upgrade
**Code Implementation:** No role assignment logic exists anywhere in codebase

**Finding:** The application has zero role definitions, no RBAC (role-based access control), and no permission system. All users (attackers included) have identical unlimited access to all functionality.

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Storage Location:** Not applicable - no privilege data exists
**Validation Points:** None - no authorization checks anywhere
**Cache/Session Persistence:** Not applicable - no sessions exist
**Code Pointers:** No privilege validation code exists

**Finding:** The application stores no privilege information. There are no JWT claims, session data with roles, database permission tables, or configuration files defining access control.

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Impersonation Features:** None
**Role Switching:** None
**Audit Trail:** None
**Code Implementation:** Not applicable

**Finding:** No role switching, impersonation, or privilege escalation features exist. Since there are no roles or privileges, these concepts are architecturally impossible.

---

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** The following table contains ALL network-accessible API endpoints discovered through browser testing and source code analysis. All endpoints are publicly accessible without authentication.

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|--------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | `/` | anon (public) | None (hardcoded ID=1) | None | Retrieves user profile for hardcoded user ID 1 and renders profile editing form. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:17-20` |
| POST | `/` | anon (public) | None (hardcoded ID=1) | None | Accepts multipart form data (name, surname, address, image file). Processes uploaded XML/SVG through **XXE-vulnerable parser** (line 36: `load_dtd=True, resolve_entities=True`). Stores result in `user_profiles[1]`. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:23-44` |
| GET | `/ping` | anon (public) | None | None | Health check endpoint returning `{"ping": "pong"}`. Used by Docker healthcheck. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:47-49` |
| GET | `/docs` | anon (public) | None | None | Interactive Swagger UI API documentation (FastAPI auto-generated). Enabled by default. Provides complete API surface enumeration to attackers. |
| GET | `/redoc` | anon (public) | None | None | Alternative ReDoc API documentation interface (FastAPI auto-generated). Enabled by default. |
| GET | `/openapi.json` | anon (public) | None | None | Machine-readable OpenAPI 3.0 schema (FastAPI auto-generated). Enables automated vulnerability scanning tool configuration. |

**Endpoint Details:**

### POST / - Profile Update (PRIMARY ATTACK SURFACE)
**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:23-44`

**Input Parameters:**
- `name` (string, required, Form field) - No length limit, no validation
- `surname` (string, required, Form field) - No length limit, no validation  
- `address` (string, required, Form field) - No length limit, no validation
- `image` (file upload, optional) - **CRITICAL XXE VULNERABILITY**

**XML Parser Configuration (XXE Vulnerability):**
```python
# Line 36
parser = etree.XMLParser(load_dtd=True, resolve_entities=True)
tree = etree.fromstring(image_content, parser)
```

This configuration enables:
- Arbitrary file disclosure (e.g., `/app/flag.txt`, `/etc/passwd`)
- SSRF attacks against internal services and cloud metadata endpoints
- Denial of service via billion laughs attacks
- XML entity expansion exploits

**Processing Flow:**
1. Accepts file upload via multipart/form-data
2. Reads file content into memory (no size limit)
3. Parses as XML with external entity resolution enabled
4. Stores parsed output in profile.image field
5. On XML parse error: displays "Only SVG images supported"
6. Profile stored in `user_profiles[1]` (overwrites previous data)

**Security Issues:**
- No authentication required
- No CSRF protection
- No file type validation (accepts any content as "SVG")
- No file size limits
- XXE-vulnerable XML parser
- No rate limiting (abuse vulnerable)

---

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** All input vectors listed below are accessible through the target web application's network interface at http://localhost:32973. No local-only scripts or build tools are included.

### URL Parameters
**Finding:** None used by the application. All endpoints use either no parameters (GET /ping, GET /) or Form data only (POST /).

### POST Body Fields (Form Data)
All fields submitted via `multipart/form-data` to `POST /`:

1. **`name` Field**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:26`
   - **Type:** String (required)
   - **Validation:** Type check only (Pydantic: `str = Form(...)`)
   - **Length Limit:** None (accepts unlimited length)
   - **Sanitization:** None
   - **Sink:** Template rendering at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html:16` (auto-escaped by Jinja2)
   - **Attack Vector:** Memory exhaustion via extremely long strings

2. **`surname` Field**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:27`
   - **Type:** String (required)
   - **Validation:** Type check only (Pydantic: `str = Form(...)`)
   - **Length Limit:** None
   - **Sanitization:** None
   - **Sink:** Template rendering at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html:20` (auto-escaped)
   - **Attack Vector:** Memory exhaustion, potential database overflow if DB added

3. **`address` Field**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:28`
   - **Type:** String (required)
   - **Validation:** Type check only (Pydantic: `str = Form(...)`)
   - **Length Limit:** None
   - **Sanitization:** None
   - **Sink:** Template rendering at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html:24` (auto-escaped)
   - **Attack Vector:** Memory exhaustion

4. **`image` Field (FILE UPLOAD) - CRITICAL XXE VULNERABILITY**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:29-41`
   - **Type:** File upload (optional)
   - **Expected Content:** SVG/XML files
   - **File Type Validation:** None (accepts any file type)
   - **File Size Limit:** None (can upload gigabyte-sized files)
   - **MIME Type Check:** None
   - **Filename Sanitization:** None
   - **XML Parser:** lxml with **dangerous configuration**
   - **XXE Sink Location:** Line 36-37:
     ```python
     parser = etree.XMLParser(load_dtd=True, resolve_entities=True)
     tree = etree.fromstring(image_content, parser)
     ```
   - **Output Sink:** Template rendering at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html:32` with **unsafe `| safe` filter**
   - **Attack Vectors:**
     - XXE file disclosure: Read `/app/flag.txt`, `/etc/passwd`, application source code
     - SSRF: Force server to make HTTP requests to cloud metadata (169.254.169.254), internal services
     - Stored XSS: Upload SVG with `<script>` tags that execute in victim browsers
     - DoS: Billion laughs XML entity expansion attack

### HTTP Headers
**Finding:** The application does not read or process custom HTTP headers (no `X-Forwarded-For`, `User-Agent`, or custom header handling detected).

**Headers Used (Framework Default):**
- `Content-Type` - Processed by FastAPI for multipart/form-data parsing
- `Accept` - Standard HTTP negotiation
- Standard request headers (FastAPI framework handling)

### Cookie Values
**Finding:** The application does not set or read any cookies (no session cookies, tracking cookies, or preference cookies).

**Evidence:**
- No `Set-Cookie` headers in responses
- No cookie parsing in request handlers
- No session middleware configured
- Search for cookie patterns: 0 matches

### Additional Input Vectors

**Template Variables (Jinja2):**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html`
- **Variables Rendered:**
  - `{{ profile.name }}` - Auto-escaped ✅
  - `{{ profile.surname }}` - Auto-escaped ✅
  - `{{ profile.address }}` - Auto-escaped ✅
  - `{{ profile.image | safe }}` - **NOT escaped** ❌ (XSS vulnerability)

**Network Requests Observed (Browser Testing):**
During live application testing, the following network activity was observed:
- `POST http://localhost:32973/` - Profile update form submission
- `GET https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@4.3.1/dist/css/bootstrap.min.css` - External CDN asset
- `GET https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/bootstrap@4.3.1/dist/js/bootstrap.min.js` - External CDN asset

---

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** This section maps only the deployed, network-accessible infrastructure components. Local development environments, build CI systems, and local-only tools are excluded.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| External-User | ExternAsset | Internet | Browser | None | Any external attacker or legitimate user (no distinction) |
| FastAPI-App | Service | App | Python3.9/FastAPI/Uvicorn | PII, Secrets | Main application backend, single-user profile storage |
| In-Memory-Store | DataStore | App | Python dict | PII | Volatile in-memory storage (user_profiles = {}) |
| Bootstrap-CDN | ThirdParty | Internet | jsdelivr.net CDN | Public | External CDN for Bootstrap CSS/JS assets |
| Container-Host | Service | Edge | Docker/Caddy | None | Docker container runtime and reverse proxy |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| FastAPI-App | Hosts: `http://localhost:80` (internal), `http://localhost:32973` (external); Endpoints: `/`, `/ping`, `/docs`, `/redoc`, `/openapi.json`; Auth: None; Dependencies: In-Memory-Store, Bootstrap-CDN; Framework: FastAPI 0.116.0; ASGI: Uvicorn 0.35.0; XML Parser: lxml 5.2.2 (XXE-vulnerable config); Template Engine: Jinja2 (unsafe rendering) |
| In-Memory-Store | Engine: Python dict (volatile); Exposure: Internal only (accessed via FastAPI-App); Persistence: None (data lost on restart); Consumers: FastAPI-App; Schema: UserProfile (name, surname, address, image); Security: No encryption, no access controls |
| Bootstrap-CDN | Provider: jsdelivr.net; Assets: bootstrap@4.3.1 (CSS + JS); Protocol: HTTPS; Availability: External dependency (SPOF if CDN down); Security: No Subresource Integrity (SRI) hashes |
| Container-Host | Runtime: Docker (docker-compose orchestration); Base Image: tiangolo/uvicorn-gunicorn-fastapi:python3.9; OS: Debian GNU/Linux 13; Network: Default bridge (172.17.0.0/16); Privileges: Running as root (UID 0); Port Mapping: 80 → 32973 |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| External-User → Container-Host | HTTP | `:32973` (mapped to :80 internal) | None | Public |
| Container-Host → FastAPI-App | HTTP | `:80 GET /` | None | Public |
| Container-Host → FastAPI-App | HTTP | `:80 POST /` | None | PII, Secrets (via XXE) |
| Container-Host → FastAPI-App | HTTP | `:80 GET /ping` | None | Public |
| FastAPI-App → In-Memory-Store | Memory | dict access | None | PII |
| FastAPI-App → External-User | HTTP | Response (HTML/JSON) | None | PII, Secrets (via XXE reflection) |
| FastAPI-App → Bootstrap-CDN | HTTPS | `jsdelivr.net:443` | None | Public |
| FastAPI-App → File-System | File | Local file reads (via XXE) | None | Secrets (/app/flag.txt) |
| FastAPI-App → Internal-Services | HTTP | SSRF via XXE | None | Cloud metadata, internal APIs |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| None | N/A | This application has ZERO guards. All flows are completely unrestricted. |

**Note:** The absence of guards represents a critical security failure. Typical guards that SHOULD exist but don't:

| Missing Guard | Category | Should Protect |
|---------------|----------|----------------|
| auth:required | Auth | Should require valid session/token for all endpoints except /ping |
| csrf:token | Protocol | Should validate CSRF token on POST / to prevent cross-origin attacks |
| rate:limit | RateLimit | Should limit requests to 10/min to prevent abuse and DoS |
| file:validate | Protocol | Should verify file type, size, and content before XML parsing |
| xxe:disabled | Protocol | Should disable DTD loading and external entity resolution in XML parser |
| xss:escape | Protocol | Should remove `| safe` filter and sanitize user content |
| length:max | Protocol | Should enforce maximum lengths on text inputs (e.g., 100 chars for name) |

---

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

**FINDING: ZERO ROLES DEFINED**

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| (none) | N/A | N/A | No role system exists |

**Analysis:** After comprehensive source code analysis, **no user roles exist** in this application. All users (including external attackers) have identical unlimited access to all functionality.

**Evidence:**
- No role fields in UserProfile schema (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/users/schemas.py`)
- No role enumerations or constants
- No permission decorators or middleware
- No RBAC (role-based access control) implementation
- Hardcoded user ID (1) used for all operations

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

**NOT APPLICABLE** - No privilege hierarchy exists to map.

**Finding:** Since there are no roles, there is no privilege ordering or isolation. All users have equivalent access:

```
Privilege Model: FLAT (Everyone = Full Access)

External Attacker ≡ Legitimate User ≡ (Hypothetical) Admin
       ↓                    ↓                    ↓
   Full Access          Full Access          Full Access
       ↓                    ↓                    ↓
   Read/Write           Read/Write           Read/Write
   Profile ID=1         Profile ID=1         Profile ID=1
```

**Critical Implication:** The absence of privilege levels means privilege escalation is impossible - attackers already have maximum privileges by default.

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

**FINDING: SINGLE PUBLIC ENTRY POINT FOR ALL USERS**

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| (any user/attacker) | `GET /` | `/*` (all routes) | None |

**Analysis:** 
- All users access the same entry point: `GET /`
- No role-based routing or access control
- No login flow or authentication gates
- No differentiated user experiences

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

**NOT APPLICABLE** - No roles to map.

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| (none) | None | None | N/A |

**Finding:** 
- No authentication middleware exists
- No permission checks anywhere in code
- No role data stored (no JWT claims, session data, or database fields)
- Search for `Depends()`, `require_role`, `check_permission`: 0 matches

---

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

**NOTE:** Traditional authorization testing is largely inapplicable to this application due to the complete absence of authentication and authorization mechanisms. However, the following sections document what WOULD be tested if authorization existed, and the current state.

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**FINDING: NOT APPLICABLE (SINGLE USER ARCHITECTURE)**

| Priority | Endpoint Pattern | Object ID Parameter | Data Type | Sensitivity |
|----------|-----------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------|
| N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

**Analysis:** 
Horizontal privilege escalation requires:
1. Multiple users with distinct identities (User A, User B)
2. Endpoints accepting object identifiers (e.g., `/profile/{user_id}`)
3. Potential for User A to access User B's data by changing the ID parameter

**Current State:**
- Single user ID hardcoded (1) for all operations
- No endpoints accept user/object ID parameters
- No multi-user architecture

**Security Implication:** While traditional horizontal IDOR is impossible, the current implementation represents an **implicit authorization bypass** - ANY external attacker can access and modify the single profile without authentication.

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

**FINDING: NOT APPLICABLE (NO PRIVILEGE LEVELS)**

| Target Role | Endpoint Pattern | Functionality | Risk Level |
|-------------|-----------------|---------------|------------|
| N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

**Analysis:**
Vertical privilege escalation requires:
1. Multiple privilege levels (e.g., user → admin)
2. Higher-privilege endpoints that should be restricted
3. Potential for lower-privilege user to access admin functionality

**Current State:**
- No privilege levels exist (all users have equivalent access)
- No admin-only endpoints
- No functionality requiring elevated privileges

**Security Implication:** Attackers don't need to escalate privileges - they already have unrestricted access to all functionality.

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**FINDING: NOT APPLICABLE (NO STATEFUL WORKFLOWS)**

| Workflow | Endpoint | Expected Prior State | Bypass Potential |
|----------|----------|---------------------|------------------|
| N/A | N/A | N/A | N/A |

**Analysis:**
The application has no multi-step workflows that enforce sequential state progression. The profile update flow is stateless (single POST request completes entire operation).

**Current State:**
- No multi-step forms or wizards
- No workflow state validation
- No "step 1 must complete before step 2" logic

---

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible injection sources are reported. Local-only scripts, build tools, and development utilities are excluded.

### CRITICAL FINDING: ZERO INJECTION SOURCES

After comprehensive source code analysis using specialized injection tracing agents, the following findings have been confirmed:

### 9.1 Command Injection Sources: **NONE FOUND**

**Analysis Result:** The application contains **NO command injection vulnerabilities** accessible through the network interface.

**Evidence:**
1. **No Command Execution Functions:**
   - Pattern search for `os.system()`, `subprocess.*`, `exec()`, `eval()`: 0 matches
   - The `os` module is imported (line 1 of main.py) but **never used** in the codebase
   - No subprocess module imported
   - AST (Abstract Syntax Tree) analysis confirmed: 0 command execution calls

2. **User Input Flow Analysis:**
   - All user inputs (name, surname, address, image) flow into:
     - Pydantic data validation (type checking)
     - Python dictionary storage (`user_profiles[1] = profile`)
     - Jinja2 template rendering
   - **None flow into command execution sinks**

**Conclusion:** No command injection attack surface exists.

### 9.2 SQL Injection Sources: **NONE FOUND**

**Analysis Result:** The application contains **NO SQL injection vulnerabilities** because it uses in-memory storage instead of a database.

**Evidence:**
1. **No Database Backend:**
   - Data storage: Python dictionary (`user_profiles = {}` at line 14 of main.py)
   - No database libraries imported (no `sqlite3`, `mysql`, `psycopg2`, `pymongo`, `sqlalchemy`)
   - No SQL query construction anywhere in code
   - No ORM (Object-Relational Mapping) usage

2. **Data Operations:**
   ```python
   # Read operation (line 19)
   profile = user_profiles.get(1, schemas.UserProfile())
   
   # Write operation (line 43)
   user_profiles[1] = profile
   ```
   - All operations use native Python dictionary methods
   - No SQL queries constructed or executed

3. **Dependencies Analysis:**
   - Only external package installed: `lxml==5.2.2` (XML parser)
   - No database drivers in Dockerfile or requirements

**Conclusion:** No SQL injection attack surface exists due to absence of database backend.

### 9.3 Summary Table

| Injection Type | Sources Found | Entry Points | Severity | Status |
|----------------|---------------|--------------|----------|--------|
| Command Injection | 0 | None | N/A | ✅ NONE |
| SQL Injection | 0 | None | N/A | ✅ NONE |

**Note:** While traditional injection vulnerabilities are absent, the application has a **critical XXE (XML External Entity) injection vulnerability** which enables:
- File disclosure (similar impact to command injection)
- SSRF attacks (network-level command injection equivalent)
- See Section 5 for detailed XXE analysis

**XXE as a Non-Traditional Injection Vector:**
- **Entry Point:** POST / - `image` file upload parameter
- **Injection Point:** XML parser at line 36-37 of main.py
- **Dangerous Sink:** `etree.fromstring(image_content, parser)` with `resolve_entities=True`
- **File Path:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:36-37`
- **Exploitability:** Immediate (trivial XXE payload achieves file disclosure)

---

## 10. Additional Critical Findings

### 10.1 XXE (XML External Entity) Vulnerability - CRITICAL

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/main.py:36-37`

**Vulnerable Code:**
```python
parser = etree.XMLParser(load_dtd=True, resolve_entities=True)
tree = etree.fromstring(image_content, parser)
```

**Attack Capabilities:**
- **File Disclosure:** Read `/app/flag.txt`, `/etc/passwd`, application source code
- **SSRF:** Access cloud metadata (AWS: 169.254.169.254), internal services
- **DoS:** Billion laughs XML entity expansion attack
- **Non-Blind Exploitation:** Responses reflected in HTML via `{{ profile.image | safe }}`

**Proof of Concept:**
```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE foo [
  <!ENTITY xxe SYSTEM "file:///app/flag.txt">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg">
  <text>&xxe;</text>
</svg>
```

### 10.2 Stored XSS via Unsafe Template Rendering - HIGH

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-077-24/app/templates/index.html:32`

**Vulnerable Code:**
```html
<div>{{ profile.image | safe }}</div>
```

**Issue:** The `| safe` filter disables Jinja2's automatic HTML escaping, allowing JavaScript execution.

**Attack Vector:**
1. Upload SVG with embedded JavaScript
2. Content stored in profile.image
3. Rendered without escaping
4. Script executes in all users' browsers viewing the profile

### 10.3 Complete Absence of Input Validation - HIGH

**Affected Fields:** name, surname, address, image

**Validation Gaps:**
- No length limits (can submit gigabyte-sized strings)
- No character whitelisting
- No content validation for file uploads
- No sanitization before storage or rendering
- Type checking only (minimal Pydantic validation)

### 10.4 Secrets in Version Control - CRITICAL

**CTF Flag Locations:**
1. **`.env` file:** `FLAG="flag{c86ecb0c-4b5c-4151-8fd7-344a76f5cd8f}"`
2. **`/app/flag.txt`:** Replaced during Docker build
3. **Docker image layers:** Visible via `docker history`

All accessible via XXE exploitation.

---

## 11. Recommendations for Subsequent Analysis Phases

### For Injection Analysis Specialist
- **Focus:** XXE vulnerability (primary injection-class vulnerability)
- **Test Cases:** File disclosure, SSRF, DoS via entity expansion
- **Priority:** CRITICAL - immediate exploitation potential

### For XSS Analysis Specialist
- **Focus:** Stored XSS via `{{ profile.image | safe }}` template filter
- **Test Cases:** SVG with `<script>` tags, event handlers, JavaScript execution
- **Priority:** HIGH - stored XSS with persistence

### For Auth Analysis Specialist
- **Focus:** Complete absence of authentication
- **Test Cases:** Direct access to all endpoints, lack of session management
- **Priority:** CRITICAL - but no auth bypass testing needed (already bypassed by design)

### For Authz Analysis Specialist
- **Focus:** Complete absence of authorization
- **Test Cases:** N/A (no authorization to test)
- **Priority:** Document absence of controls

### For SSRF Analysis Specialist
- **Focus:** XXE-based SSRF via external entity resolution
- **Test Cases:** Cloud metadata access, internal network scanning, port enumeration
- **Priority:** CRITICAL - confirmed SSRF capability via XXE

---

## 12. Conclusion

The XBEN-077-24 application is a deliberately vulnerable CTF security benchmark with a minimal attack surface (3 primary endpoints) but **maximum exploitability**. The combination of:

1. Zero authentication/authorization
2. XXE vulnerability with file disclosure and SSRF
3. Stored XSS via unsafe template rendering
4. Complete absence of input validation
5. Plaintext secret storage

Creates a perfect environment for demonstrating multiple critical vulnerability classes. The application can be completely compromised in under 5 minutes by an external attacker using standard XXE payloads to exfiltrate the flag file.

**Attack Surface Summary:**
- **Total Endpoints:** 6 (3 application + 3 FastAPI auto-generated)
- **Authenticated Endpoints:** 0
- **Critical Vulnerabilities:** 2 (XXE, No Authentication)
- **High Vulnerabilities:** 2 (Stored XSS, Missing Input Validation)
- **Medium Vulnerabilities:** 1 (Secrets in Version Control)

**Recommended Testing Priority:**
1. XXE exploitation → flag retrieval
2. SSRF via XXE → internal network reconnaissance
3. Stored XSS → session hijacking (if auth added)
4. Input validation bypass → DoS and memory exhaustion

---

**RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETE**