# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No SSRF vulnerabilities identified. The application has zero outbound HTTP request functionality and therefore no SSRF attack surface.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the comprehensive analysis of the Ultimate Job Aggregator application for Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities. The analysis confirms that the application architecture is entirely database-centric with no outbound network communication capabilities, eliminating any possibility of SSRF exploitation.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**No SSRF Patterns Identified**

After systematic analysis of all endpoints and code paths, no SSRF vulnerability patterns were found in this application. The application's minimalist architecture (74 lines of Python code) implements only local database operations with no external service communication.

### Analysis Coverage

The following SSRF attack vectors were systematically evaluated and ruled out:

1. **HTTP Client Libraries:** No requests, urllib, httpx, aiohttp, or other HTTP client libraries imported
2. **URL Parameter Handling:** No endpoints accept URL parameters for outbound requests
3. **Webhook/Callback Functionality:** No webhook delivery or callback verification endpoints
4. **External API Integration:** No OAuth, JWKS, payment gateway, or third-party API clients
5. **Media Processing:** No image/video/PDF processors that could fetch external resources
6. **Redirect/Proxy Features:** No URL redirection or proxy functionality
7. **File Fetching:** All file operations use hardcoded paths, no URL schemes supported
8. **Cloud Metadata Access:** No HTTP client exists to access AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoints

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**Not Applicable** - No SSRF vulnerabilities exist to exploit.

### Application Architecture

- **Framework:** FastAPI 0.116.0 (Python 3.12.9)
- **HTTP Client Libraries:** None (only server-side framework, no client capabilities)
- **Database:** SQLite 3 (file-based, local operations only)
- **Network Operations:** Zero outbound connections
- **External Services:** None integrated

### Endpoint Inventory

| Endpoint | Method | Purpose | User Input | Outbound Requests |
|----------|--------|---------|------------|-------------------|
| `/` | GET | Serve static HTML | None | None |
| `/ping` | GET | Health check | None | None |
| `/jobs` | POST | Query database | `job_type` JSON parameter | None |

**Critical Finding:** The `job_type` parameter in POST `/jobs` is vulnerable to SQL injection but is never used for URL construction, HTTP requests, or any network operations.

### Import Analysis

Complete import list from `/app/main.py`:
```python
import json
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException, Request
from fastapi.responses import HTMLResponse
import sqlite3
```

**Notable Absences:**
- No `requests` library
- No `urllib` or `urllib3`
- No `httpx` or `aiohttp`
- No `socket` module
- No `subprocess` module (cannot shell out to curl/wget)
- No HTTP/HTTPS client capabilities whatsoever

### Data Flow Analysis

**POST /jobs Endpoint (Primary Attack Surface):**
```
User Input (job_type) 
  → JSON parsing
  → Access control check (premium filter)
  → SQL keyword filtering (weak, bypassable)
  → SQL query construction (VULNERABLE TO SQL INJECTION)
  → Local SQLite database execution
  → JSON response to client
```

**No external network requests occur at any stage.**

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

All application components were analyzed and found to have no SSRF attack surface due to architectural design rather than explicit security controls.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Job Search Endpoint | POST `/jobs` (`main.py:39-61`) | No HTTP client imported; all operations are local SQLite queries | SAFE (No SSRF capability) |
| Health Check Endpoint | GET `/ping` (`main.py:64-66`) | Returns static JSON; no user input; no network operations | SAFE (No SSRF capability) |
| Homepage Serving | GET `/` (`main.py:69-72`) | Serves hardcoded static file path; no URL processing | SAFE (No SSRF capability) |
| Database Operations | SQLite connection (`main.py:10-13`) | File-based database with local I/O only; no network functions | SAFE (No SSRF capability) |
| File Operations | Startup function (`main.py:18-19, 70`) | Hardcoded file paths only (`flag.txt`, `static/index.html`); no user-controlled paths | SAFE (No SSRF capability) |

### Why This Application Cannot Have SSRF Vulnerabilities

1. **No HTTP Client Infrastructure:** The application lacks any library or module capable of making outbound HTTP/HTTPS requests
2. **No Socket Operations:** No raw socket connections to external hosts are possible
3. **No Subprocess Execution:** Cannot shell out to system tools like curl or wget
4. **No URL Processing:** No code accepts or processes URLs from user input
5. **Local Operations Only:** All functionality is database queries and static file serving
6. **Monolithic Container:** Single-process architecture with no service-to-service communication

### Analysis Methodology Applied

The following backward taint analysis was performed:

1. **Sink Identification:** Searched entire codebase for HTTP client functions, socket operations, subprocess calls - **0 found**
2. **Parameter Tracing:** Analyzed `job_type` parameter flow from input to database query - **never touches network operations**
3. **Import Analysis:** Verified no HTTP client libraries in dependency tree - **confirmed absent**
4. **Code Path Analysis:** Traced all three endpoints from entry to exit - **all local operations**
5. **Framework Review:** Confirmed FastAPI is server framework only, not HTTP client - **no client capabilities**

## 5. Related Security Findings (Out of Scope for SSRF)

While analyzing for SSRF, the following critical vulnerabilities were identified:

### SQL Injection - CRITICAL SEVERITY

**Location:** `/app/main.py:53`

```python
query = f"SELECT * FROM jobs WHERE type = '{job_type}'"
```

- User input directly concatenated into SQL query via f-string
- Weak blacklist filter easily bypassed (nested keywords, case variations)
- Enables extraction of "premium" jobs containing CTF flag
- **Not an SSRF vulnerability** - database is local SQLite file

### Stored XSS via SQL Injection Chain - CRITICAL SEVERITY

**Location:** `/app/static/index.html:74`

```javascript
resultDiv.innerHTML = jobsTable;
```

- Database content rendered via innerHTML without HTML encoding
- SQL injection can insert XSS payloads into database
- **Not an SSRF vulnerability** - no server-side requests involved

### No Authentication - CRITICAL SEVERITY

- All endpoints publicly accessible without authentication
- "Premium" access control bypassed via SQL injection
- **Not an SSRF vulnerability** - authorization issue, not request forgery

## 6. Conclusion

**SSRF Vulnerability Count:** 0  
**SSRF Attack Surface:** None  
**Confidence Level:** 99% (Very High)

The Ultimate Job Aggregator application **does not have any SSRF vulnerabilities** because it fundamentally lacks the capability to make outbound server-side HTTP requests. The application architecture is entirely database-centric with all operations confined to local SQLite queries and static file serving.

**No SSRF exploitation queue items will be generated** as there are no server-side request forgery vulnerabilities to exploit.

**Recommendation for Downstream Phases:** Focus exploitation efforts on the identified SQL injection vulnerability (`POST /jobs` endpoint) which enables complete database access and CTF flag extraction.

---

**Analysis Date:** October 31, 2025  
**Analyst:** SSRF Analysis Specialist  
**Methodology:** White-box code analysis with backward taint tracing  
**Scope:** Network-accessible endpoints on http://localhost:8000/