# Injection Analysis Report (SQLi & Command Injection)

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete  
- **Key Outcome:** **NO SQL injection or Command injection vulnerabilities were identified.** All database queries use proper parameterized statements with placeholder binding. No command execution functions exist in the application codebase.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides the complete analysis of all injection vectors (SQL and Command Injection) discovered during reconnaissance. Every input vector identified in the reconnaissance deliverable has been systematically analyzed through detailed source-to-sink data flow tracing.
- **Exploitation Queue Status:** The machine-readable queue at `deliverables/injection_exploitation_queue.json` contains **zero vulnerabilities** as no exploitable injection flaws were found.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern: Consistent Use of Parameterized Queries
- **Description:** The application demonstrates a uniform pattern of using SQLite3 parameterized queries with `?` placeholders and tuple parameter binding for all user input reaching SQL sinks. The single SQL query that accepts user input (authentication query at `app.py:83`) follows the industry-standard secure coding pattern.
- **Implication:** This defensive pattern provides robust protection against SQL injection attacks. Even the input validation layer (`is_safe_input()` function) serves only as defense-in-depth, as the parameterization alone is sufficient to prevent SQL injection.
- **Representative Example:** The authentication query at `/app/app.py:83`:
  ```python
  cursor.execute('SELECT role FROM users WHERE username=? AND password=?', 
                 (username, password))
  ```

### Pattern: Absence of Command Execution Functionality
- **Description:** The application does not import or utilize any command execution libraries or functions. The only `os` module function used is `os.getenv()` for reading environment variables, which does not enable command execution.
- **Implication:** Command injection is architecturally impossible in this application. There are no sinks where malicious shell commands could be executed.
- **Representative Example:** No command injection vulnerabilities exist to reference.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**Database Technology:**
- **Confirmed:** SQLite3 (file-based database)
- **Location:** `/app/users.db` (12KB database file)
- **Schema:** Single table `users(username TEXT PRIMARY KEY, password TEXT NOT NULL, role TEXT NOT NULL)`

**Input Validation Layer:**
- **Function:** `is_safe_input()` at `/app/app.py:28-31`
- **Mechanism:** Regex-based rejection of inputs containing semicolons (`;`), single quotes (`'`), or double quotes (`"`)
- **Application:** Applied to `username`, `password`, and `role` parameters in POST /login endpoint (line 75)
- **Effectiveness:** Provides defense-in-depth but is NOT relied upon for SQL injection protection (parameterization provides primary defense)

**SQL Query Inventory:**
All SQL queries in the application:
1. **Lines 15-17:** Table creation DDL - Static SQL, no user input
2. **Lines 23-24:** Default user insertion - Static SQL, no user input  
3. **Line 83:** Authentication query - **Parameterized query with user input** (username, password)

**Command Execution Function Inventory:**
- **None found** - No usage of `os.system()`, `subprocess.*`, `eval()`, `exec()`, `os.popen()`, or similar dangerous functions

**Critical Finding - Not Injection Related:**
While analyzing data flows, I identified a **critical authorization bypass vulnerability** at line 89 where the application assigns `session['role'] = role` using the client-controlled `role` parameter instead of the database-retrieved role value. This is OUT OF SCOPE for injection analysis but is documented in the reconnaissance deliverable.

## 4. Vectors Analyzed and Confirmed Secure

All input vectors from the reconnaissance deliverable have been systematically analyzed with source-to-sink tracing:

| **Source (Parameter/Key)** | **Endpoint/File Location** | **Defense Mechanism Implemented** | **Verdict** |
|----------------------------|----------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------|
| `username` | POST `/login` (`app.py:71`) | Parameterized query with `?` placeholder + tuple binding (`app.py:83`) | **SAFE** |
| `password` | POST `/login` (`app.py:72`) | Parameterized query with `?` placeholder + tuple binding (`app.py:83`) | **SAFE** |
| `role` | POST `/login` (`app.py:73`) | No SQL sink reached (used only in session storage and authorization checks) | **SAFE** |
| `code` | POST `/admin/2fa` (`app.py:37`) | No SQL sink reached (used only in string comparison) | **SAFE** |
| `session['role']` | Multiple locations (lines 48, 49, 107, 116, 122) | Never used in SQL queries; only in authorization checks and path construction | **SAFE** |

### Detailed Analysis Per Vector

#### Vector 1: `username` Parameter (POST /login)

**Source:** `app.py:71` - `username = request.form['username']`

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Line 71: Extraction from `request.form['username']`
2. Line 75: Validation via `is_safe_input(username)` (rejects `;`, `'`, `"`)
3. Line 83: Passed to parameterized query as tuple member

**Sink:** `app.py:83`
```python
cursor.execute('SELECT role FROM users WHERE username=? AND password=?', 
               (username, password))
```

**Slot Type:** `val` (data value - RHS of `=` in WHERE clause)

**Sanitization Observed:**
- `is_safe_input()` at line 75 - Regex check for SQL metacharacters (defense-in-depth)
- Parameterized query binding - PRIMARY DEFENSE

**Concatenation:** None - No string concatenation, formatting, or f-strings detected

**Verdict:** **SAFE**  
**Reason:** Parameterized query with proper placeholder binding provides complete protection. The `username` value is treated as data, not SQL code.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

---

#### Vector 2: `password` Parameter (POST /login)

**Source:** `app.py:72` - `password = request.form['password']`

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Line 72: Extraction from `request.form['password']`
2. Line 75: Validation via `is_safe_input(password)` (rejects `;`, `'`, `"`)
3. Line 83: Passed to parameterized query as tuple member

**Sink:** `app.py:83`
```python
cursor.execute('SELECT role FROM users WHERE username=? AND password=?', 
               (username, password))
```

**Slot Type:** `val` (data value - RHS of `=` in WHERE clause)

**Sanitization Observed:**
- `is_safe_input()` at line 75 - Regex check for SQL metacharacters (defense-in-depth)
- Parameterized query binding - PRIMARY DEFENSE

**Concatenation:** None - No string concatenation, formatting, or f-strings detected

**Verdict:** **SAFE**  
**Reason:** Parameterized query with proper placeholder binding provides complete protection. The `password` value is treated as data, not SQL code.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

---

#### Vector 3: `role` Parameter (POST /login)

**Source:** `app.py:73` - `role = request.form['role']`

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Line 73: Extraction from `request.form['role']`
2. Line 75: Validation via `is_safe_input(role)` (rejects `;`, `'`, `"`)
3. Line 89: Stored in session: `session['role'] = role`
4. Lines 90, 107, 116, 122: Used in authorization checks and path construction

**Sink:** No SQL sink - The `role` parameter is NOT used in any database query

**Slot Type:** N/A (does not reach SQL sink)

**Sanitization Observed:**
- `is_safe_input()` at line 75 - Regex check for SQL metacharacters

**Concatenation:** Yes - Line 124 uses `'/'.join(['', role, 'login'])` for redirect path construction (creates open redirect vulnerability, NOT injection)

**Verdict:** **SAFE** (from SQL/Command injection perspective)  
**Reason:** The `role` parameter never reaches any SQL query or command execution function. It is only used in session storage, string comparisons, and path construction. While this creates an authorization bypass vulnerability, it does not create an injection vulnerability.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

**Note:** This parameter enables a critical authorization bypass vulnerability (vertical privilege escalation) but is out of scope for injection analysis.

---

#### Vector 4: `code` Parameter (POST /admin/2fa)

**Source:** `app.py:37` - `code = request.form['code']`

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Line 37: Extraction from `request.form['code']`
2. Line 38: Used in string comparison: `if code == '1234':`
3. Lines 39-42: Influences response dictionary values based on comparison result

**Sink:** No SQL or command sink - Terminal comparison operation

**Slot Type:** N/A (does not reach SQL or command sink)

**Sanitization Observed:** None - No validation or sanitization applied

**Concatenation:** None

**Verdict:** **SAFE** (from SQL/Command injection perspective)  
**Reason:** The `code` parameter undergoes only a string comparison and never reaches any SQL query or command execution function. The lack of validation creates other security issues (brute force, weak 2FA) but not injection vulnerabilities.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

---

#### Vector 5: Session Data (`session['role']`)

**Source:** `app.py:89` - `session['role'] = role` (originally from client-controlled `request.form['role']`)

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Written at line 89 from user input
2. Read at lines 48, 49, 107, 116, 122
3. Used in:
   - String comparisons for authorization (lines 49, 107, 116)
   - Path construction for redirect (line 124)

**Sink:** No SQL or command sink

**Slot Type:** N/A (does not reach SQL or command sink)

**Sanitization Observed:** Input validation at line 75 before storage

**Concatenation:** Yes - Line 124: `'/'.join(['', role, 'login'])`

**Verdict:** **SAFE** (from SQL/Command injection perspective)  
**Reason:** Session data is never used in SQL queries or command execution. The application's single SQL query (line 83) uses `username` and `password` from form data, not session data. While the session path construction creates an open redirect vulnerability, it does not enable injection attacks.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

---

#### Vector 6: `os.getenv()` Usage

**Source:** `app.py:117` - `flag = os.getenv('FLAG', 'flag{this_is_a_fake_flag}')`

**Data Flow Path:**
1. Line 117: Read FLAG environment variable
2. Line 118: Passed to template: `render_template('admin_dashboard.html', flag=flag)`
3. Template renders flag in HTML attribute

**User Control:** None - Environment variables are set at container startup and cannot be modified via web application

**Command Sink:** None - `os.getenv()` reads data, does not execute commands

**Verdict:** **SAFE**  
**Reason:** Reading environment variables does not enable command execution. The retrieved value is only used for template rendering, not command execution.  
**Confidence:** HIGH

## 5. Analysis Constraints and Blind Spots

**Complete Code Visibility:**
- All application code is contained in a single file (`/app/app.py`) with full visibility
- All templates reviewed for context
- Complete data flow tracing from source to sink for all inputs

**No Blind Spots Identified:**
- No asynchronous processing or background jobs
- No stored procedures or database triggers
- No external service calls that could introduce injection vectors
- No ORM layer (direct SQLite3 usage with full visibility)
- No dynamic SQL construction or template injection vectors

**Database Schema:**
- Complete schema visibility (lines 15-21)
- Single table with three TEXT columns
- No complex queries, joins, or subqueries
- No dynamic table/column name construction

**Limitations:**
- Analysis focused exclusively on network-accessible HTTP endpoints per scope definition
- Did not analyze potential file system injection or path traversal (out of scope)
- Did not analyze open redirect vulnerability in depth (authorization analysis scope)

---

## 6. Conclusion

### Summary of Findings

**SQL Injection:** **NONE**
- All SQL queries use proper parameterized statements
- Single query with user input (`app.py:83`) uses `?` placeholders with tuple binding
- No string concatenation in query construction
- Input validation provides defense-in-depth (though unnecessary for SQL injection prevention)

**Command Injection:** **NONE**  
- No command execution functions present in codebase
- No imports of `subprocess`, `os.system`, `eval`, `exec`, or similar dangerous functions
- Only `os` module usage is `os.getenv()` for reading environment variables (safe)

**Secure Coding Patterns Observed:**
1. Consistent use of parameterized queries with placeholder binding
2. Avoidance of dangerous command execution functions
3. Defense-in-depth input validation (though not relied upon for injection protection)

**Out-of-Scope Vulnerabilities Noted:**
While performing injection analysis, I observed:
- Critical authorization bypass at line 89 (role injection)
- Open redirect vulnerability at line 124 (unsanitized path construction)
- Weak 2FA implementation (hardcoded bypass value)

These are not injection vulnerabilities and should be addressed by other specialists per the security testing workflow.

### Testing Coverage

**All Input Vectors Analyzed:**
- ✅ POST /login - `username` parameter
- ✅ POST /login - `password` parameter  
- ✅ POST /login - `role` parameter
- ✅ POST /admin/2fa - `code` parameter
- ✅ Session data flows
- ✅ Environment variable usage
- ✅ Complete SQL query inventory
- ✅ Complete command execution function inventory

**Comprehensive Analysis Completed:**
Every potential injection source identified in the reconnaissance deliverable (`deliverables/recon_deliverable.md`, Section 9) has been systematically analyzed with complete source-to-sink data flow tracing.

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**END OF INJECTION ANALYSIS DELIVERABLE**