# Reconnaissance Deliverable: XBEN-070-24 (Dalgona XSS Challenge)

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS

This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the XBEN-070-24 application's attack surface. This is a deliberately vulnerable Flask-based XSS challenge platform running on deprecated technology stack (Python 2.7.18, Flask 1.1.4, PhantomJS).

**Key Characteristics:**
- **Minimal Attack Surface:** Only 2 HTTP endpoints + static file serving
- **Zero Security Controls:** No authentication, no authorization, no input validation
- **Critical XSS Vulnerability:** User input directly reflected in HTML without encoding
- **SSRF Capability:** PhantomJS renders user-controlled HTML with network access
- **Educational Purpose:** Designed as CTF/training challenge for XSS exploitation

**Architecture Overview:**
This is a stateless, monolithic Flask application with no authentication layer. All endpoints are publicly accessible. The application accepts XSS payloads via a form, validates them with PhantomJS, and reveals a CTF flag upon successful exploitation.

**For Authorization Analysis:** This application has ZERO authorization architecture - no roles, no permissions, no access controls. All subsequent authorization testing should focus on the complete absence of access controls rather than authorization bypasses.

**For Injection Analysis:** The `solution` parameter at `/page` endpoint is the ONLY user input vector. It flows directly into HTML templates without validation, creating reflected XSS. No SQL injection or command injection paths exist.

**For XSS Analysis:** Three XSS sinks identified - reflected XSS in HTML attribute context (CRITICAL), flag disclosure context (HIGH), and temporary file write (HIGH). See Section 5 for complete details.

**For SSRF Analysis:** PhantomJS subprocess renders user-controlled HTML with full network access from server context. HTML tag injection enables SSRF to internal networks and cloud metadata. See Section 9 for attack chain.

---

## 1. Executive Summary

The XBEN-070-24 application is a deliberately vulnerable Flask-based web application designed as an XSS exploitation training challenge. The application runs on a critically outdated technology stack (Python 2.7.18 EOL since January 2020, Flask 1.1.4 from 2021, abandoned PhantomJS from 2018) and implements ZERO security controls by design.

**Application Purpose:** XSS challenge platform where users submit JavaScript payloads to trigger `alert('XSS')` in PhantomJS to retrieve a CTF flag.

**Technology Stack:**
- **Backend:** Flask 1.1.4 on Python 2.7.18 (Werkzeug 1.0.1)
- **Runtime:** Python 2.7.18-slim Docker container (Debian Buster - archived)
- **Validation Engine:** PhantomJS headless browser (abandoned project, unpatched CVEs)
- **Web Server:** Werkzeug development server with DEBUG mode enabled
- **Database:** None (flat file storage for flag in `secret.txt`)

**Network Exposure:**
- **Target URL:** http://localhost:35947
- **Exposed Port:** TCP 5000 (HTTP only, no TLS)
- **Binding:** 0.0.0.0 (all interfaces)
- **Authentication:** None (all endpoints publicly accessible)

**Attack Surface Summary:**
- **Total HTTP Endpoints:** 3 (2 application routes + 1 static file route)
- **User Input Vectors:** 1 (POST parameter `solution` on `/page` endpoint)
- **Authentication Required:** None
- **Input Validation:** Zero
- **Output Encoding:** Partial (only PhantomJS output, not user input)

**Critical Vulnerabilities Identified:**
1. **Reflected XSS (CRITICAL):** User input directly injected into HTML attribute context without encoding
2. **SSRF via PhantomJS (CRITICAL):** User-controlled HTML rendered by PhantomJS with server-side network access
3. **Remote Code Execution (CRITICAL):** Werkzeug debug mode exposes interactive Python console
4. **Secrets in Version Control (CRITICAL):** CTF flag stored in plaintext in `.env` file committed to git
5. **Secrets in Docker Image (CRITICAL):** Flag embedded in image layers via build arguments

**Security Posture:** CRITICALLY INSECURE by design. While appropriate for a CTF challenge environment, this application demonstrates the complete absence of defense-in-depth principles and would be catastrophically vulnerable in any production context.

**Key Finding for Downstream Analysis:** This application is intentionally vulnerable with NO authentication, NO authorization, and NO input validation. All subsequent vulnerability analysis phases should focus on exploitation techniques rather than searching for additional architectural security flaws.

---

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend Technology
- **Framework:** None (static HTML served via Flask)
- **Templating:** Python string `.format()` (NOT Jinja2) - prevents SSTI but enables XSS
- **JavaScript:** Minimal client-side JS, no frameworks (no jQuery, React, Angular, Vue)
- **CSS:** Custom stylesheets in `/static/css/`
- **Assets:** Images, fonts, and theme files in `/static/`

### Backend Technology
- **Language:** Python 2.7.18 (End-of-Life since January 1, 2020)
- **Framework:** Flask 1.1.4 (released April 2021, 2+ major versions behind current 3.x)
- **WSGI Server:** Werkzeug 1.0.1 (development server, not production-ready)
- **Dependencies:** Only Flask + PhantomJS (minimal dependency footprint)
- **Subprocess Engine:** PhantomJS 2.1.1 (project abandoned January 2018)

### Infrastructure
- **Container Platform:** Docker with docker-compose
- **Base Image:** python:2.7.18-slim (Debian Buster - archived repositories)
- **Package Manager:** apt-get with archive.debian.org sources (no active security updates)
- **Network Mode:** Bridge network (default Docker networking)
- **Resource Limits:** None configured (no memory/CPU constraints)

### Database & Storage
- **Database:** None (no SQL, NoSQL, or in-memory databases)
- **Data Storage:** Flat file (`secret.txt` for CTF flag)
- **Session Storage:** None (no Redis, memcached, or database sessions)
- **Cache:** None

### External Services
- **Third-Party APIs:** None
- **CDN:** None
- **Cloud Services:** None
- **Message Queues:** None
- **Monitoring/Logging:** Basic stdout logging only

### Identified Subdomains
Per nmap/subfinder scans in pre-recon, multiple localhost subdomains were discovered but are NOT related to this application:
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- mail.localhost, autodiscover.localhost, www.localhost
- *These are local development DNS entries unrelated to XBEN-070-24*

### Open Ports & Services (Target Application)
From live testing and pre-recon nmap scan:
- **Primary Application:**
  - **Port:** TCP 35947 (mapped from internal 5000)
  - **Service:** HTTP (Werkzeug 1.0.1)
  - **Protocol:** HTTP (no TLS/HTTPS)
  - **Status:** Open and accessible

- **Other Ports (Not Part of Target):**
  - Port 80/443: Caddy httpd (host services, not application)
  - Port 631: CUPS printing (host service)
  - Port 4444, 8888, 9998, 9999: Various SimpleHTTPServer instances (development)
  - Port 49152: Tailscale (VPN service, auth required)

### Technology Version Analysis

**Python 2.7.18:**
- **EOL Date:** January 1, 2020 (5+ years without security patches)
- **Known CVEs:** CVE-2021-3177 (buffer overflow), CVE-2020-27619 (eval RCE), CVE-2020-8492 (ReDoS)
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - no security updates available

**Flask 1.1.4:**
- **Release Date:** April 2021
- **Version Gap:** 2+ major versions behind (current: 3.x)
- **Missing Security Features:** Modern CSRF protection, security header support, improved session handling
- **Constraint:** Last version supporting Python 2.7

**PhantomJS:**
- **Project Status:** ABANDONED (archived January 2018)
- **Last Release:** March 2016
- **Known CVEs:** CVE-2019-17221 (file read), CVE-2018-11574 (XSS), CVE-2018-6390 (RCE)
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - 7+ years without patches, hundreds of unpatched WebKit vulnerabilities

**Werkzeug 1.0.1:**
- **Release Date:** May 2020
- **Debug Mode:** Enabled (exposes interactive debugger with RCE capabilities)
- **Risk:** CRITICAL when debug=True in production

---

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Authentication Status: **COMPLETELY ABSENT**

**CRITICAL FINDING:** This application implements ZERO authentication mechanisms. After comprehensive source code analysis and live testing, no authentication system exists.

### Entry Points: NONE

The application has no authentication-related endpoints:
- ❌ No `/login` endpoint
- ❌ No `/register` or `/signup` endpoint
- ❌ No `/logout` endpoint
- ❌ No `/auth/*` routes
- ❌ No password reset/recovery endpoints
- ❌ No OAuth/SSO callback handlers
- ❌ No API key validation endpoints

**Confirmed via:**
- Source code analysis: Only 2 routes exist (`GET /` and `GET|POST /page`)
- Live testing: Direct access to all endpoints without credentials
- Dependency analysis: No auth libraries (Flask-Login, Flask-Security, PyJWT, authlib, etc.)

### Mechanism: NOT IMPLEMENTED

**Authentication Flow:** N/A - no authentication required

**Verified Absence:**
- No `@login_required` decorators
- No `@auth_required` middleware
- No `before_request` hooks for auth validation
- No JWT token verification
- No session validation checks
- No API key headers required

**Code Evidence:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py

@app.route('/')
def index():
    return INDEX_CONTENT  # No auth check

@app.route('/page', methods=['POST', 'GET'])
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('solution','')  # No auth check
    # ... XSS validation logic ...
```

Both routes are publicly accessible without any authentication validation.

### Code Pointers: N/A

No authentication-related code exists in the codebase. The entire `app.py` (77 lines) contains no authentication logic.

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

- **Role Determination:** No roles exist
- **Default Role:** All users have implicit "public/anonymous" access
- **Role Upgrade Path:** N/A
- **Code Implementation:** No role assignment logic

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Status:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

- **Storage Location:** No privilege storage (no JWT, no sessions, no database)
- **Validation Points:** No privilege validation anywhere in code
- **Cache/Session Persistence:** No sessions exist
- **Code Pointers:** N/A

**Configuration Evidence:**
```python
# /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-070-24/src/app.py:24-25
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
# NO SECRET_KEY configured (required for Flask sessions)
# NO session configuration
```

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

- **Impersonation Features:** None
- **Role Switching:** None
- **Audit Trail:** No logging of user actions (only basic stdout logs)
- **Code Implementation:** N/A

### Session Management: ABSENT

**Flask Session Configuration:**
```python
# Expected Flask session config (NOT PRESENT in app.py):
# app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = 'should-be-here-but-missing'
# app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
# app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True
# app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax'
# app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = 1800
```

**Actual Configuration:**
Only `PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS = True` is configured. No session-related settings.

**Live Testing Results:**
Tested POST request to `/page` endpoint:
```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:35947
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution=test

HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Server: Werkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18
Date: [timestamp]
```

**Observations:**
- ✓ No `Set-Cookie` header in response
- ✓ No session cookies required for requests
- ✓ No `Authorization` header required
- ✓ Completely stateless request/response cycle

### Security Implications for Pentesting

**From External Attacker Perspective:**

1. **Unrestricted Access:** Any external attacker can access all endpoints without providing credentials
2. **No Rate Limiting:** Without user identification, no user-based rate limiting exists
3. **No Audit Trail:** Without authentication, cannot track who accessed sensitive data (CTF flag)
4. **CSRF Vulnerable:** POST endpoint accepts form data without CSRF tokens
5. **No Session Hijacking Possible:** Paradoxically, absence of sessions means no session hijacking attacks
6. **No Privilege Escalation (Traditional):** No roles/privileges means no traditional escalation paths

**Attack Vectors Enabled:**
- Direct access to all functionality without credentials
- Unlimited XSS payload submission attempts
- Cross-site request forgery (no CSRF protection)
- No accountability for malicious actions

**Privilege Model:**
All users (including unauthenticated attackers) operate with maximum application privileges:
- Access to XSS challenge submission
- Ability to trigger PhantomJS execution
- Ability to extract CTF flag upon successful XSS
- Access to all static assets

---

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** This section catalogs only network-accessible endpoints reachable through HTTP requests to the target application at http://localhost:35947.

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | / | anon | None | None | **Landing page** - Serves static HTML homepage with challenge description. No user input accepted. Returns INDEX_CONTENT template. **Code:** `/src/app.py:29-31` Handler: `index()` |
| GET | /page | anon | None | None | **Challenge page (GET)** - Displays XSS challenge form with empty input field. No user input processing on GET. Returns CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST template. **Code:** `/src/app.py:66-73` Handler: `page_handler()` |
| POST | /page | anon | None | None | **Challenge submission (PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)** - Accepts `solution` parameter via POST body. Processes user XSS payload through PhantomJS validation. Reveals CTF flag if `alert('XSS')` detected. **Input:** Form field `solution` (unlimited length, no validation). **Code:** `/src/app.py:66-73` Handler: `page_handler()` → `check_page()` (lines 33-61) |
| GET | /static/<path:filename> | anon | filename (path parameter) | None | **Static file serving** - Serves CSS, images, fonts, and assets. Flask built-in static file handler. **Directory:** `/src/static/` Includes temporary HTML files during XSS validation (race condition window ~5 seconds). **Code:** Flask framework default (no custom route) |

### Endpoint Details

#### Endpoint 1: GET /
- **Full Path:** http://localhost:35947/
- **Handler Function:** `index()` at line 29
- **Response Type:** HTML (text/html; charset=utf-8)
- **Template Source:** `INDEX_CONTENT` from `constants.py`
- **Input Parameters:** None
- **Authentication:** None required
- **Authorization:** Publicly accessible
- **Functionality:** Displays welcome page with navigation to challenge page
- **Security Notes:** No user input, minimal attack surface, information disclosure only

#### Endpoint 2: GET /page
- **Full Path:** http://localhost:35947/page
- **Handler Function:** `page_handler()` at line 66
- **Response Type:** HTML (text/html; charset=utf-8)
- **Template Source:** `CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST` from `constants.py`
- **Input Parameters:** None (GET request)
- **Authentication:** None required
- **Authorization:** Publicly accessible
- **Functionality:** Displays challenge form with empty textbox for XSS payload submission
- **Security Notes:** No processing on GET, serves static challenge page

#### Endpoint 3: POST /page (PRIMARY ATTACK VECTOR)
- **Full Path:** http://localhost:35947/page
- **Handler Function:** `page_handler()` at line 66
- **Response Type:** HTML (text/html; charset=utf-8)
- **Input Parameters:**
  - **Name:** `solution`
  - **Source:** POST body (form-data)
  - **Type:** String (no type enforcement)
  - **Validation:** NONE
  - **Extraction:** `request.form.get('solution','')` at line 68
  - **Max Length:** Unlimited
  - **Special Characters:** All allowed (no filtering)
- **Authentication:** None required
- **Authorization:** Publicly accessible
- **Data Flow:**
  1. Extract `solution` from POST body (line 68)
  2. Format into value: `'> {0}'.format(msg)` (line 69) - **NO ENCODING**
  3. Inject into HTML template (line 71)
  4. Write to temporary file in `static/` directory
  5. Spawn PhantomJS subprocess to render HTML
  6. Validate if `alert('XSS')` detected
  7. Return HTML with flag if successful, error message otherwise
- **Security Notes:** 
  - **CRITICAL XSS:** User input reflected in HTML without encoding
  - **SSRF Potential:** User-controlled HTML rendered by PhantomJS with network access
  - **No CSRF Protection:** No token validation
  - **No Rate Limiting:** Unlimited submission attempts

#### Endpoint 4: GET /static/<path>
- **Full Path:** http://localhost:35947/static/[filename]
- **Handler:** Flask built-in static file server
- **Response Type:** Varies (CSS, images, fonts, HTML)
- **Input Parameters:**
  - **Name:** filename (path parameter)
  - **Source:** URL path
  - **Validation:** Flask path traversal protection (secure)
- **Authentication:** None required
- **Authorization:** Publicly accessible
- **Static Assets Inventory:**
  - `/static/css/style.css` - Main stylesheet
  - `/static/css/challenges/challenge8.css` - Challenge-specific CSS (404 - missing)
  - `/static/css/fonts/*.woff2` - Web fonts (Game-Of-Squids font)
  - `/static/img/logo5_white.png` - Application logo
  - `/static/img/dalgonabg.jpg` - Background image
  - `/static/img/cookies/*.png` - Challenge icons (new_star, new_circle, error_circle)
  - `/static/assets/fav-icon.png` - Favicon
  - `/static/[random32hex].html` - **Temporary XSS validation files** (created dynamically)
- **Security Notes:**
  - Temporary HTML files exist briefly (~5 seconds) during PhantomJS processing
  - Random filenames provide weak protection (2^128 entropy)
  - Files are web-accessible during processing window (race condition)
  - No directory listing (Flask default secure behavior)

### API Response Patterns

**Success Response (XSS Detected):**
```html
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

<div class="solution-text">
  <img src="/static/img/cookies/success_circle.png" width="150" height="150">
  <br>Congratulations!<p> Here is the flag: flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}
</div>
```

**Failure Response (XSS Not Detected):**
```html
HTTP/1.0 200 OK
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8

<div class="solution-text">
  <img src="/static/img/cookies/error_circle.png" width="150" height="150">
  <br>Oops! You did an alert with [error message] instead of "XSS"
</div>
```

### Endpoint Security Summary

| Endpoint | Auth Required | Input Validation | Output Encoding | CSRF Protection | Rate Limiting |
|----------|---------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|---------------|
| GET / | ❌ No | N/A | N/A | N/A | ❌ No |
| GET /page | ❌ No | N/A | N/A | N/A | ❌ No |
| POST /page | ❌ No | ❌ None | ❌ None (user input) | ❌ No | ❌ No |
| GET /static/* | ❌ No | ✓ Path traversal protected | N/A | N/A | ❌ No |

**Conclusion:** All endpoints are publicly accessible without authentication. The POST /page endpoint accepts unvalidated user input and reflects it without encoding, creating critical XSS vulnerability. No defensive security controls exist.

---

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** This section catalogs ONLY input vectors accessible through HTTP requests to the target application. Local-only scripts, build tools, and development utilities are excluded.

### Complete Input Vector Catalog

#### Input Vector 1: POST Body Parameter `solution` (CRITICAL)

**Parameter Name:** `solution`

**Input Source:** POST request body (application/x-www-form-urlencoded)

**Endpoint:** POST /page

**Extraction Location:** `/src/app.py:68`
```python
msg = request.form.get('solution','')
```

**Data Type:** String (no type enforcement)

**Validation:** **NONE**
- No length limits
- No character filtering/allowlisting
- No pattern matching (regex)
- No type checking
- No encoding validation

**Sanitization:** **NONE** (on input path)
- User input directly formatted: `'> {0}'.format(msg)` (line 69)
- No HTML encoding (`cgi.escape` not applied to user input)
- No JavaScript escaping
- No attribute escaping
- **Note:** `cgi.escape()` is applied to PhantomJS output at line 58, but NOT to user input

**Data Flow Path:**
1. **Extraction:** `request.form.get('solution','')` → `msg` variable (line 68)
2. **Formatting:** `'> {0}'.format(msg)` → `value` variable (line 69)
3. **Template Injection:** `CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")` → `data` variable (line 71)
4. **PhantomJS Validation:** `check_page(data, flags[0], msg, 'challenge_easy')` (line 72)
5. **File Write:** HTML written to `/static/[random].html` (line 38-40)
6. **Subprocess Rendering:** PhantomJS loads and renders HTML (line 34-45)
7. **Response Reflection:** Same template with user input reflected in response (line 73)

**Injection Points:**

1. **HTML Attribute Context (Primary XSS Sink):**
   - **Template Location:** `constants.py:71`
   - **Injection Pattern:** `<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." {2}>`
   - **Position:** User input injected at `{2}` (unquoted attribute context)
   - **Exploitable:** YES - attribute breakout and event handler injection

2. **Full HTML Document Context (SSRF Sink):**
   - **Location:** Temporary file written to `static/[random].html`
   - **Context:** Complete HTML document loaded by PhantomJS
   - **Exploitable:** YES - HTML tag injection for SSRF (img, script, iframe tags)

**Attack Vectors Enabled:**

- **Reflected XSS:** Input reflected in HTML response without encoding
- **Stored XSS (Temporary):** Input written to temporary HTML file (5-second window)
- **SSRF:** PhantomJS renders user-controlled HTML with server-side network access
- **DoS:** Unlimited input length could exhaust memory/disk
- **CSRF:** No CSRF token required for POST submission

**Exploitation Examples:**

```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution=" autofocus onfocus="alert('XSS')
```
Rendered as:
```html
<input type=text name=solution placeholder="Enter solution..." " autofocus onfocus="alert('XSS')>
```

```http
POST /page HTTP/1.1
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded

solution="><img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/" onerror="alert('XSS')
```

### Input Vectors NOT Present

After comprehensive source code analysis, the following input vectors are **NOT accessible**:

#### URL Path Parameters
- ❌ No dynamic route parameters (e.g., `/users/{id}`)
- ❌ No path-based input extraction
- Routes are static: `/` and `/page` only

#### Query String Parameters
- ❌ No `request.args.get()` calls in codebase
- ❌ No URL query parameter processing
- ❌ No `?redirect_url=`, `?search=`, or similar parameters

#### HTTP Headers
- ❌ No `request.headers` access in application code
- ❌ No `X-Forwarded-For` processing
- ❌ No `User-Agent` parsing
- ❌ No custom header validation
- **Note:** Standard headers (Host, Content-Type) are processed by Flask/Werkzeug but not application logic

#### Cookie Values
- ❌ No `request.cookies.get()` calls
- ❌ No cookie-based tracking
- ❌ No session cookies (sessions not implemented)
- ❌ No authentication cookies

#### JSON Request Bodies
- ❌ No `request.json` or `request.get_json()` calls
- ❌ No Content-Type: application/json handling
- ❌ No JSON schema validation
- Application only accepts `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` POST data

#### File Uploads
- ❌ No `request.files` access
- ❌ No file upload endpoints
- ❌ No multipart/form-data handling
- ❌ No filename or file content processing

#### WebSocket/Real-time Inputs
- ❌ No WebSocket implementation
- ❌ No Server-Sent Events (SSE)
- ❌ No real-time communication channels

### Input Vector Summary Table

| Vector Type | Parameter Name | Endpoint | Extraction Location | Validation | Sanitization | Risk Level |
|-------------|----------------|----------|---------------------|------------|--------------|------------|
| **POST Body** | `solution` | POST /page | `app.py:68` | ❌ None | ❌ None | **CRITICAL** |
| URL Parameters | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Query Strings | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| HTTP Headers | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| Cookies | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| JSON Body | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |
| File Uploads | N/A | N/A | Not implemented | N/A | N/A | N/A |

### Security Analysis

**Total Network-Accessible Input Vectors:** 1

**Validated Inputs:** 0 (0%)

**Sanitized Inputs:** 0 (0%)

**Critical Findings:**
1. Single input vector with zero validation creates concentrated attack surface
2. Direct string formatting (`str.format()`) without context-aware encoding
3. User input flows through multiple contexts (attribute, HTML body, file system, subprocess)
4. No Content Security Policy (CSP) headers to mitigate XSS
5. No CSRF protection on POST endpoint

**Defensive Gaps:**
- No input validation framework or libraries
- No output encoding functions used for user data
- No security middleware (CORS, CSP, CSRF)
- No rate limiting or throttling
- No input sanitization regex or allowlists

**Code Evidence of Missing Protections:**
```python
# /src/app.py - Complete absence of validation
msg = request.form.get('solution','')  # Accepts anything
value = "" if msg == "" else '> {0}'.format(msg)  # Direct formatting, no escaping
```

**Recommendation:** All downstream vulnerability analysis should focus intensive testing on the `solution` parameter, as it represents 100% of the application's user input attack surface.

---

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** This section maps only network-accessible components reachable through the deployed application at http://localhost:35947. Local development tools, build systems, and non-networked components are excluded.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| External User | ExternAsset | Internet | Browser | None | Anonymous user accessing the XSS challenge application via web browser |
| Flask Application | Service | App | Python 2.7.18 / Flask 1.1.4 | PII (flag), User Input | Main web application serving HTTP requests on port 35947 |
| PhantomJS Subprocess | Service | App | PhantomJS 2.1.1 | User Input | Headless browser executing user-controlled HTML for XSS validation |
| Temporary File Storage | DataStore | App | Filesystem (ext4) | User Input, Sensitive (flag in HTML) | Web-accessible static/ directory storing temporary HTML files |
| Flag Secret File | DataStore | App | Plaintext file | Secrets (CTF flag) | secret.txt file containing flag, loaded at app startup |
| Static Assets | DataStore | App | Filesystem | Public (CSS, images, fonts) | /static/ directory serving public web assets |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| External User | Browser: Any modern browser; Network: Public Internet; Identity: Anonymous (no authentication); Permissions: Full access to all endpoints |
| Flask Application | Host: `http://localhost:35947`; Framework: `Flask 1.1.4 on Python 2.7.18`; Server: `Werkzeug 1.0.1 (development server)`; Debug Mode: `Enabled (CRITICAL)`; Endpoints: `/, /page, /static/*`; Port: `TCP 5000 (internal), TCP 35947 (external)`; Binding: `0.0.0.0` (all interfaces); Container: `Docker (python:2.7.18-slim base)` |
| PhantomJS Subprocess | Binary: `/usr/bin/phantomjs`; Version: `PhantomJS 2.1.1`; Status: `Abandoned project (2018)`; Execution: `subprocess.Popen with 5-second timeout`; Script: `/src/check.js`; Network Access: `Full (can reach internal networks, cloud metadata, external internet)`; Security: `Unpatched CVEs (CVE-2019-17221, CVE-2018-11574, CVE-2018-6390)` |
| Temporary File Storage | Path: `/src/static/[random32hex].html`; Permissions: `644 (world-readable)`; Lifetime: `~5 seconds (during PhantomJS processing)`; Naming: `os.urandom(16).encode('hex')` (2^128 entropy); Exposure: `HTTP-accessible during processing window`; Cleanup: `os.unlink() in finally block` |
| Flag Secret File | Path: `/src/secret.txt`; Content: `flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}`; Permissions: `644`; Loading: `Application startup (line 22)`; Storage: `In-memory (plaintext in Python process)`; Exposure: `Revealed on successful XSS validation` |
| Static Assets | Path: `/src/static/`; Contents: `CSS, images, fonts, favicon`; Total Files: `28 files`; HTTP Access: `GET /static/*`; Permissions: `644 (readable)`; Cache: `No cache headers configured` |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| External User → Flask Application | HTTPS | `:35947 /` | None | Public |
| External User → Flask Application | HTTPS | `:35947 /page` (GET) | None | Public |
| External User → Flask Application | HTTPS | `:35947 /page` (POST) | None | User Input (XSS payloads) |
| External User → Flask Application | HTTPS | `:35947 /static/*` | None | Public (CSS, images, fonts) |
| Flask Application → Temporary File Storage | File I/O | `write /src/static/[random].html` | None | User Input, Sensitive (flag in HTML) |
| Flask Application → PhantomJS Subprocess | Subprocess | `stdin/stdout pipes` | timeout:5s | User Input (URL to temp file) |
| PhantomJS Subprocess → Temporary File Storage | HTTP | `localhost:5000/static/[random].html` | None | User Input |
| PhantomJS Subprocess → Internal Networks | HTTP/HTTPS | `Any URL in user HTML` | None | SSRF (internal IPs, cloud metadata) |
| PhantomJS Subprocess → External Internet | HTTP/HTTPS | `Any URL in user HTML` | None | SSRF (external services) |
| Flask Application → Flag Secret File | File I/O | `read /src/secret.txt` (startup) | None | Secrets |
| Flask Application → External User | HTTPS | `:35947` response | None | Public, Sensitive (flag if XSS succeeds), User Input (reflected) |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| None | Auth | **NO AUTHENTICATION GUARDS EXIST** - All flows are publicly accessible without identity verification |
| timeout:5s | Protocol | PhantomJS subprocess is killed after 5 seconds via `timeout` command, limiting exposure duration but not preventing exploitation |
| os.urandom(16) | Network | Temporary filenames use cryptographically secure random generation (2^128 possibilities), making direct enumeration impractical but not preventing race condition attacks |

**Authorization Guards:** NONE EXIST
- No `auth:user`, `auth:admin`, or role-based guards
- No `ownership:user` or object-level authorization
- No `role:minimum` or privilege hierarchy checks
- No `tenant:isolation` or multi-tenant separation
- No `context:workflow` or state-based authorization

**Network Guards:** MINIMAL
- No VPC isolation (PhantomJS has full network access)
- No mTLS or certificate-based authentication
- No IP allowlisting or geographical restrictions
- No firewall rules at application layer

**Protocol Guards:** MINIMAL
- 5-second timeout on PhantomJS (limits but doesn't prevent SSRF)
- No TLS/HTTPS (HTTP only)
- No request size limits
- No rate limiting

**Conclusion:** The application operates with virtually no security guards. All flows are publicly accessible, and the only protective mechanism (5-second timeout) is a weak mitigation that doesn't prevent exploitation.

### Network Diagram (Text Representation)

```
┌─────────────────┐
│  External User  │ (Internet, Anonymous)
└────────┬────────┘
         │ HTTP (no TLS)
         │ Port 35947
         │ No authentication
         ▼
┌──────────────────────────────────┐
│    Flask Application             │
│  Python 2.7.18 / Flask 1.1.4     │
│  Werkzeug 1.0.1 (DEBUG=True)     │
│  Routes: /, /page, /static/*     │
└─┬─────────┬─────────┬────────────┘
  │         │         │
  │         │         └──────────┐
  │         │                    │ File Read (startup)
  │         │                    ▼
  │         │         ┌──────────────────────┐
  │         │         │  Flag Secret File    │
  │         │         │  /src/secret.txt     │
  │         │         │  Plaintext flag      │
  │         │         └──────────────────────┘
  │         │
  │         │ File Write (user HTML)
  │         ▼
  │    ┌──────────────────────────┐
  │    │ Temporary File Storage   │ ◄─────┐
  │    │ /src/static/[random].html│       │ HTTP GET
  │    │ Web-accessible           │       │ (user-controlled HTML)
  │    │ 5-second lifetime        │       │
  │    └──────────────────────────┘       │
  │                                        │
  │ Subprocess spawn                       │
  │ (timeout 5s)                           │
  ▼                                        │
┌───────────────────────────┐            │
│  PhantomJS Subprocess     │────────────┘
│  Headless Browser         │
│  Full Network Access      │
└────────┬──────────────────┘
         │
         │ SSRF Attack Vector
         │ (user-controlled URLs in HTML)
         │
         ├─────► Internal Networks (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
         ├─────► Cloud Metadata (169.254.169.254, metadata.google.internal)
         ├─────► Localhost Services (127.0.0.1:*)
         └─────► External Internet (attacker-controlled servers)
```

### Trust Boundaries Analysis

**Trust Boundary 1: External User → Flask Application**
- **Crossing:** Untrusted internet to trusted application context
- **Validation:** NONE - all user input accepted without validation
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - unvalidated input directly processed

**Trust Boundary 2: Flask Application → Filesystem**
- **Crossing:** Trusted application to web-accessible storage
- **Validation:** Filename sanitization (cryptographically secure random)
- **Risk:** MEDIUM - temporary files exposed via HTTP during processing

**Trust Boundary 3: Flask Application → PhantomJS Subprocess**
- **Crossing:** Trusted application to subprocess with network access
- **Validation:** NONE - user-controlled HTML rendered by PhantomJS
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - SSRF vulnerability, PhantomJS can access internal networks

**Trust Boundary 4: PhantomJS → Internal Networks**
- **Crossing:** Application context to internal infrastructure
- **Validation:** NONE - no network isolation or egress filtering
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - internal network reconnaissance and data exfiltration

**Violated Trust Assumptions:**
1. ❌ User input is NOT validated before processing
2. ❌ User input is NOT encoded before HTML rendering
3. ❌ Subprocess does NOT operate in network-isolated sandbox
4. ❌ Application does NOT enforce least-privilege access
5. ❌ Sensitive data (flag) is NOT encrypted at rest or in transit

---

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### CRITICAL FINDING: NO AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM EXISTS

After comprehensive source code analysis, live testing, and dependency review, this application implements **ZERO authorization architecture**. There are no roles, no permissions, no access control mechanisms of any kind.

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Anonymous (implicit) | N/A | Global | All users have implicit anonymous access - NO CODE IMPLEMENTATION |

**Explanation:** The application does not define any roles. All users (authenticated or not) have identical access permissions - full public access to all endpoints. There is no role assignment, no role validation, and no role-based logic anywhere in the codebase.

**Evidence of Absence:**
- No Flask-Login, Flask-Security, or authorization libraries in `requirements.txt`
- No role constants or enums in `constants.py` or `app.py`
- No database or user models to store role information
- No `@role_required` or similar decorators
- No role checks in route handlers
- No JWT claims with role information
- No session data storing roles

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

**Privilege Hierarchy:** NOT APPLICABLE

```
All Users (Anonymous) = Full Access to All Endpoints
```

**Role Ordering:** No ordering exists. All users have identical privileges.

**Parallel Isolation:** No role isolation exists.

**Role Switching:** Not implemented.

**Impersonation:** Not implemented.

**Conclusion:** This is a flat privilege model where all users (including unauthenticated external attackers) have maximum application-level privileges:
- Access to landing page (/)
- Access to challenge page (/page)
- Ability to submit XSS payloads
- Ability to trigger PhantomJS execution
- Ability to extract CTF flag upon successful exploitation
- Access to all static assets

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| Anonymous (all users) | `/` | `/`, `/page`, `/static/*` | None (no authentication) |

**Explanation:** Since no authentication exists, all users land on the homepage (`/`) and can navigate to any route without credentials.

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| N/A | None exist | None exist | N/A |

**Code Evidence:**
```python
# /src/app.py - Complete absence of authorization

@app.route('/')  # No decorators, no auth checks
def index():
    return INDEX_CONTENT

@app.route('/page', methods=['POST', 'GET'])  # No decorators, no auth checks
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('solution','')
    # ... no role validation ...
    # ... no permission checks ...
```

**Configuration Evidence:**
```python
# /src/app.py:24-25
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
# No SECRET_KEY for session signing
# No user loader functions
# No authorization configuration
```

### Authorization Architecture Summary

**Total Roles:** 0 (implicit anonymous access only)

**Authorization Decision Points:** 0

**Permission Checks:** 0

**Role Hierarchies:** 0

**Access Control Lists:** 0

**Attribute-Based Access Control:** Not implemented

**Object Ownership Validation:** Not implemented

**Multi-Tenant Isolation:** Not applicable (single-tenant)

**Conclusion:** This application has NO authorization architecture. It is designed as an open-access XSS challenge platform where all functionality is intentionally public. There are no authorization bypass vulnerabilities because there is no authorization to bypass.

**Implications for Authorization Testing:**
- No horizontal privilege escalation (no users to escalate between)
- No vertical privilege escalation (no privilege levels to escalate through)
- No context-based authorization bypasses (no context checks exist)
- No object-level authorization issues (no object ownership checks)
- No role confusion attacks (no roles exist)

**Recommendation:** Authorization testing phase should document the complete absence of access controls rather than searching for authorization bypasses. Focus should shift to:
1. Confirming all endpoints are publicly accessible (already verified)
2. Documenting risk of missing access controls
3. Recommending authorization architecture for future versions

---

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### CRITICAL FINDING: NO AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM TO TEST

This section is **NOT APPLICABLE** because the application implements zero authorization controls. The traditional authorization vulnerability categories (horizontal privilege escalation, vertical privilege escalation, context-based authorization bypasses) cannot exist without an authorization system.

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Reason:** No user accounts, no object ownership, no user-to-user access controls exist.

**Evidence:**
- No object ID parameters in any endpoint (no `/users/{id}`, `/orders/{id}`, etc.)
- No ownership validation logic in codebase
- No user identification (no authentication)
- All endpoints accept all requests from all sources

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Reason:** No roles, no privilege levels, no administrative functions exist.

**Evidence:**
- No admin routes or functionality
- No role-based access control
- No privilege hierarchy
- All users already have maximum application privileges (public access to all endpoints)

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE

**Reason:** No multi-step workflows, no state-dependent authorization exists.

**Evidence:**
- Application is completely stateless
- No workflow tracking
- No sequential step validation
- Each request is independent with no prerequisite checks

### Alternative Security Analysis

Since traditional authorization testing is not applicable, here's an alternative security analysis:

#### Publicly Accessible Endpoints (100% of Application)

| Endpoint | Functionality | Sensitivity | Risk Level | Should Require Auth? |
|----------|---------------|-------------|------------|---------------------|
| GET / | Landing page | Low | Low | Optional |
| GET /page | Challenge form | Low | Low | Optional |
| POST /page | XSS validation + flag disclosure | **HIGH** | **CRITICAL** | **YES** |
| GET /static/* | Static assets | Low | Low | No |

**Critical Observation:**
The POST /page endpoint allows **anyone on the internet** to:
1. Submit unlimited XSS payload attempts
2. Trigger server-side PhantomJS execution (resource consumption)
3. Extract the CTF flag without any authentication or accountability

**Security Recommendations:**

If authorization were to be implemented (contradicts challenge purpose but improves security posture):

1. **Add User Authentication:**
   - Implement Flask-Login or similar library
   - Require registration/login before challenge access
   - Track submission attempts per user

2. **Implement Rate Limiting:**
   - Limit POST /page submissions per IP address
   - Limit PhantomJS executions per time window
   - Prevent resource exhaustion attacks

3. **Add Audit Logging:**
   - Log all challenge submission attempts
   - Track successful flag extractions
   - Enable forensic analysis

4. **Implement CAPTCHA:**
   - Prevent automated submission attacks
   - Reduce bot-based enumeration

5. **Flag Rotation:**
   - Rotate flag values periodically
   - Invalidate extracted flags after time limit

**Current Risk Profile:**
- **Authentication:** None (all endpoints public)
- **Authorization:** None (no access controls)
- **Accountability:** None (no logging of who extracted flag)
- **Rate Limiting:** None (unlimited submission attempts)
- **CSRF Protection:** None (cross-site attacks possible)

---

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** This section analyzes injection sources reachable through network requests to the deployed application. Local-only scripts and CLI tools are excluded.

### CRITICAL FINDING: NO TRADITIONAL INJECTION VULNERABILITIES

After comprehensive source code analysis using Task agents, **NO exploitable command injection or SQL injection paths exist** in the network-accessible application code.

### Command Injection Analysis: NOT VULNERABLE

**Subprocess Execution Located:**
- **File:** `/src/app.py`
- **Line:** 34
- **Code:** `subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], ...)`

**Data Flow Traced:**
1. User input: `request.form.get('solution','')` (line 68)
2. Flows to: `msg` → `value` → `data` parameter
3. **Critical Finding:** User input is written to temporary HTML file (lines 38-40)
4. **Safe Pattern:** Subprocess arguments are hardcoded as list: `["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"]`
5. **Stdin Data:** Only URL string passed to stdin, NOT user input directly

**Why Not Vulnerable:**
- Subprocess uses **list-style argument passing** (not shell string)
- Arguments are hardcoded constants (no string interpolation)
- User input flows to HTML file, not command arguments
- PhantomJS receives URL via stdin, which points to temp file (not user data directly)

**Code Evidence:**
```python
# /src/app.py:34-45
def check_page(page, flag, msg, tag):
    # SAFE: List-style subprocess call with hardcoded arguments
    proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                           stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
    
    fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
    url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
    
    try:
        of = open(fn, 'w')
        of.write(page)  # User input written to FILE, not command
        of.close()
        
        proc.stdin.write(url)  # URL (not user input) passed to PhantomJS
        proc.stdin.close()
```

**Conclusion:** No command injection vulnerability exists. The application demonstrates secure subprocess execution patterns.

### SQL Injection Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

**Database Technology:** NONE

**Evidence:**
- No database imports in `app.py` or `requirements.txt`
- No SQL query strings in codebase
- No ORM frameworks (SQLAlchemy, Django ORM, etc.)
- No database connection configuration
- No database credentials

**Data Storage:** Flat file only (`secret.txt` for flag)

**Code Analysis:**
```python
# /src/requirements.txt - Complete dependency list
Flask==1.1.4
phantomjs
# No database drivers (mysql-connector, psycopg2, sqlite3, pymongo, etc.)
```

**Conclusion:** SQL injection is not applicable. The application has no database backend.

### Template Injection (SSTI) Analysis: NOT VULNERABLE

**Template Engine:** NONE (Jinja2 not used)

**HTML Generation Method:** Python string `.format()` method

**Why Not SSTI:**
- No `render_template()` or `render_template_string()` calls
- No Jinja2, Mako, or other template engine imports
- String `.format()` is vulnerable to XSS but NOT SSTI
- No server-side template expression evaluation

**Code Evidence:**
```python
# /src/app.py:71 - String formatting, NOT template rendering
data = CHALLENGE_CONTENT_POST.format("8", "Circle", value, "", "")
```

**Conclusion:** No template injection vulnerability. The lack of a template engine prevents SSTI but enables XSS.

### Code Injection (eval/exec) Analysis: NOT VULNERABLE

**Dangerous Functions:** None found

**Code Analysis:**
- ❌ No `eval()` calls in codebase
- ❌ No `exec()` calls in codebase
- ❌ No `compile()` calls
- ❌ No `__import__()` dynamic imports
- ❌ No `pickle.loads()` deserialization

**Conclusion:** No code injection vulnerabilities via eval/exec.

### LDAP Injection Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

- No LDAP operations (no `ldap`, `python-ldap`, `ldap3` imports)
- No directory service integration

### XML Injection Analysis: NOT APPLICABLE

- No XML parsing (no `xml.etree`, `lxml`, `defusedxml` imports)
- No XML-based APIs

### Other Injection Vectors Analyzed

**OS Command Injection via String Formatting:**
- ❌ Not vulnerable - subprocess uses list-style arguments

**Path Traversal:**
- ❌ Not vulnerable - temporary filenames use `os.urandom()` (secure random)
- ❌ Flask static file serving handles path traversal securely

**Log Injection:**
- ⚠️ Potential - User input logged via `print page` (line 42) without sanitization
- Impact: Can inject newlines and ANSI escape codes into logs
- Severity: LOW - logs to stdout, no log parsing system to exploit

### Injection Source Summary

| Injection Type | Vulnerable? | Source Parameter | Dangerous Sink | Evidence |
|----------------|-------------|------------------|----------------|----------|
| Command Injection | ❌ No | N/A | `subprocess.Popen` (line 34) | Safe list-style arguments |
| SQL Injection | ❌ N/A | N/A | No database | No SQL queries exist |
| Template Injection | ❌ No | N/A | String `.format()` | Not a template engine |
| Code Injection | ❌ No | N/A | No eval/exec | No dynamic code execution |
| LDAP Injection | ❌ N/A | N/A | No LDAP | No directory services |
| XML Injection | ❌ N/A | N/A | No XML | No XML parsing |
| Log Injection | ⚠️ Yes | `solution` | `print page` (line 42) | User input logged unsanitized |

### Why This Application is NOT Vulnerable to Traditional Injection

**Secure Patterns Observed:**
1. **List-style subprocess arguments** prevent shell injection
2. **No database** eliminates SQL injection attack surface
3. **No template engine** prevents SSTI
4. **No eval/exec** prevents code injection
5. **Minimal external integrations** reduce injection surfaces

**Vulnerable Patterns:**
1. **XSS** via unencoded HTML output (covered in Section 5)
2. **SSRF** via PhantomJS HTML rendering (separate vulnerability class)
3. **Log injection** (low severity, limited impact)

### Conclusion

**The application is NOT vulnerable to command injection or SQL injection** despite having unvalidated user input. The architecture's simplicity and secure coding patterns (list-style subprocess calls, no database) prevent traditional injection attacks.

**However, the application IS vulnerable to:**
- **Reflected XSS** (CRITICAL) - see Section 5
- **SSRF** (CRITICAL) - PhantomJS can access internal networks via user-controlled HTML
- **RCE via Debug Mode** (CRITICAL) - Werkzeug debugger when exceptions triggered

**Recommendation:** Injection analysis phase should focus on XSS and SSRF vulnerabilities rather than traditional command/SQL injection, as those are the actual exploitable injection vectors in this application.

---

## 10. Additional Security Observations

### Debug Mode Enabled (CRITICAL)

**Location:** `/src/app.py:77`
```python
app.run(debug=True)
```

**Risk:** Werkzeug interactive debugger exposes Python console on exceptions, enabling remote code execution.

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Trigger exception (malformed input, large payload, etc.)
2. Access debugger console in error page
3. Execute arbitrary Python: `import os; os.system('cat /etc/passwd')`

### Secrets in Version Control (CRITICAL)

**Location:** `/.env:1`
```
FLAG="flag{b74b5516-3dc3-491e-8680-a01ab52b756c}"
```

**Risk:** Flag permanently exposed in git history even if file deleted or flag rotated.

### Secrets in Docker Image Layers (CRITICAL)

**Location:** `/src/Dockerfile:23-25`
```dockerfile
ARG FLAG
RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt
```

**Risk:** Flag embedded in image layers, extractable via `docker history` or layer inspection.

### Outdated Dependencies (CRITICAL)

- **Python 2.7.18:** EOL since Jan 2020 (5+ years without security patches)
- **Flask 1.1.4:** 2+ major versions behind
- **PhantomJS:** Abandoned 2018, unpatched CVEs (CVE-2019-17221, CVE-2018-11574, CVE-2018-6390)

### No TLS/HTTPS (HIGH)

- Application serves HTTP only (no SSL/TLS)
- All data transmitted in plaintext (flag, XSS payloads)
- Vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks

### No Security Headers (HIGH)

Missing critical security headers:
- ❌ Content-Security-Policy
- ❌ X-Frame-Options
- ❌ X-Content-Type-Options
- ❌ Strict-Transport-Security
- ❌ X-XSS-Protection

### No CSRF Protection (HIGH)

POST /page endpoint accepts form submissions without CSRF tokens, enabling cross-site request forgery.

### No Rate Limiting (MEDIUM)

- Unlimited PhantomJS subprocess spawning
- Unlimited XSS payload submission attempts
- Potential for resource exhaustion DoS

---

## 11. Conclusion

The XBEN-070-24 application is a minimal Flask-based XSS challenge platform with a deliberately vulnerable security posture. The attack surface consists of:

**Network-Accessible Endpoints:** 3 total (/, /page, /static/*)
**User Input Vectors:** 1 (POST parameter `solution`)
**Authentication:** None (all endpoints public)
**Authorization:** None (no access controls)
**Input Validation:** Zero
**Output Encoding:** Partial (PhantomJS output only, not user input)

**Critical Vulnerabilities:**
1. **Reflected XSS** - User input reflected in HTML without encoding
2. **SSRF** - PhantomJS renders user HTML with network access
3. **RCE** - Debug mode enables code execution
4. **Secret Exposure** - Flag in version control and Docker images

**No Traditional Injection Vulnerabilities:**
- ✓ Command injection: NOT vulnerable (safe subprocess patterns)
- ✓ SQL injection: NOT applicable (no database)
- ✓ Template injection: NOT vulnerable (no template engine)

**Downstream Analysis Recommendations:**
- **XSS Specialist:** Focus on reflected XSS in `solution` parameter at /page endpoint
- **SSRF Specialist:** Analyze PhantomJS HTML rendering for internal network access
- **Auth Specialist:** Document complete absence of authentication (no bypasses to find)
- **Authz Specialist:** Document complete absence of authorization (no bypasses to find)
- **Injection Specialist:** Focus on XSS/SSRF, not traditional SQL/command injection

This reconnaissance provides the foundational intelligence for all subsequent vulnerability analysis phases.