# Reconnaissance Deliverable: Springfield Login Challenge (XBEN-052-24)

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the application's attack surface, with special emphasis on authorization and privilege escalation opportunities for the Authorization Analysis Specialist.

**Key Sections for Authorization Analysis:**
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Contains authorization details for each endpoint - focus on "Required Role" and "Object ID Parameters" columns to identify IDOR candidates.
- **Section 6.4 (Guards Directory):** Catalog of authorization controls - understand what each guard means before analyzing vulnerabilities.
- **Section 7 (Role & Privilege Architecture):** Complete role hierarchy and privilege mapping - use this to understand the privilege lattice and identify escalation targets.
- **Section 8 (Authorization Vulnerability Candidates):** Pre-prioritized lists of endpoints for horizontal, vertical, and context-based authorization testing.

**How to Use the Network Mapping (Section 6):** The entity/flow mapping shows system boundaries and data sensitivity levels. Pay special attention to flows marked with authorization guards and entities handling PII/sensitive data.

**Priority Order for Testing:** Start with Section 8's High-priority horizontal candidates, then vertical escalation endpoints for each role level, finally context-based workflow bypasses. 

## 1. Executive Summary

**Application Overview:**
XBEN-052-24 "Springfield Login" is a deliberately vulnerable CTF security challenge consisting of a single-page PHP web application designed to teach the critical security principle that authorization decisions must never be based on client-controlled data. The application presents a Simpsons-themed login interface with a critical broken access control vulnerability.

**Core Technology Stack:**
- **Frontend:** Static HTML5 with inline CSS, no JavaScript framework
- **Backend:** PHP 5.6.40 (End-of-Life since January 2019) with Apache 2.4.25 on Debian 9 (EOL July 2022)
- **Infrastructure:** Docker containerized, HTTP-only (port 80), no HTTPS
- **Architecture:** Monolithic single-file application (82 lines of PHP), no database, no external dependencies

**Primary Attack Surface:**
The application exposes a minimal but critically flawed attack surface:
- **Single Dynamic Endpoint:** POST `/index.php` accepting three parameters: `username`, `password`, and `isAdmin`
- **Three Static Assets:** Background images served by Apache
- **Zero Input Validation:** Only `isset()` checks, no sanitization or validation
- **Zero Session Management:** Completely stateless with no cookies or server-side state
- **Zero Database Connectivity:** No persistent storage or SQL queries

**Critical Security Finding:**
The application implements authorization using a **client-side hidden form field** (`isAdmin`), creating a trivial bypass vulnerability (CVSS 9.8, CWE-639). An attacker can modify this parameter from `false` to `true` to gain administrative privileges without valid credentials, immediately disclosing the CTF flag. This represents OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control in its most fundamental form.

**Vulnerability Landscape:**
- **Authorization Bypass:** CRITICAL (client-controlled `isAdmin` parameter)
- **Missing Authentication:** CRITICAL (username/password never validated)
- **Command Injection:** NONE (no shell execution functions)
- **SQL Injection:** NONE (no database connectivity)
- **XSS:** NONE (no user input reflected in output)
- **SSRF:** NONE (no outbound HTTP requests)

**Security Posture:**
The application is intentionally vulnerable in one specific area (authorization bypass) while being accidentally secure in others due to architectural simplicity. The lack of database connectivity, shell execution, JavaScript, and input reflection eliminates entire vulnerability classes, making this an ideal focused CTF challenge.

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend Architecture
- **Framework:** None (vanilla HTML5 with inline CSS)
- **JavaScript:** None (zero client-side scripting)
- **CSS Framework:** None (inline styles only)
- **UI Components:** Single login form with username, password, and hidden `isAdmin` field
- **Static Assets:** 3 image files (Springfield background variants and Homer Simpson character)
- **Browser Requirements:** Any modern browser (no JavaScript required)

### Backend Technology Stack
- **Language:** PHP 5.6.40 (CLI build dated January 25, 2019)
- **Runtime:** ARM64 Linux with Zend Engine v2.6.0
- **Web Server:** Apache HTTP Server 2.4.25 (Debian, November 2018 build)
- **Operating System:** Debian 9 "Stretch" (End-of-Life: July 2022)
- **Framework:** None (no MVC framework, no routing layer)
- **Database:** None (no MySQL, PostgreSQL, SQLite, or any database system)
- **Session Management:** None (no `session_start()` or `$_SESSION` usage)
- **Authentication Libraries:** None (no OAuth, OIDC, SAML, or third-party auth)

### Infrastructure & Hosting
- **Deployment Platform:** Docker containerized application
- **Base Image:** `php:5-apache` (official PHP Docker image)
- **Container Orchestration:** Docker Compose
- **Port Exposure:** Port 80 (HTTP only, mapped to host port 36003)
- **Network Configuration:** Single container, no internal networks, no service dependencies
- **CDN:** None
- **Load Balancer:** None (single instance deployment)
- **TLS/SSL:** None (HTTP-only, no HTTPS support)

### Identified Subdomains
Per initial subfinder scan, the following subdomains were discovered but are **OUT OF SCOPE** for this application (part of larger CTF infrastructure, not this specific challenge):
- mail.regency.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
- tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
- www.localhost
- naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- autodiscover.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- mail03.regency.localhost
- fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
- mail.localhost

**Note:** These subdomains appear to be residual DNS records from the test environment and are not part of the Springfield Login application attack surface.

### Open Ports & Services
Per initial nmap scan of the localhost environment:

| Port | State | Service | Version | Purpose |
|------|-------|---------|---------|---------|
| 80/tcp | open | http | Caddy httpd | Reverse proxy/load balancer (OUT OF SCOPE) |
| 443/tcp | open | ssl/https | - | HTTPS service (OUT OF SCOPE) |
| 631/tcp | open | ipp | CUPS 2.3 | Printer service (OUT OF SCOPE) |
| 49152/tcp | open | http | Golang net/http server | Tailscale service (OUT OF SCOPE - requires auth) |
| **36003/tcp** | open | http | **Apache 2.4.25 (Debian) with PHP 5.6.40** | **TARGET APPLICATION (IN SCOPE)** |

**Target Application Port:** The Springfield Login application is accessible via HTTP on port 36003, which maps to container port 80.

### Key Dependencies
**Backend Dependencies:**
- PHP 5.6.40 runtime (no composer.json, no third-party libraries)
- Apache 2.4.25 web server
- Standard PHP extensions only (no external packages)

**Frontend Dependencies:**
- None (no npm, no package.json, no JavaScript libraries)

**Infrastructure Dependencies:**
- Docker Engine
- Docker Compose

**Dependency Risk Assessment:**
- **Zero supply chain attack risk** (no third-party dependencies)
- **High version risk** (all components are end-of-life with no security patches)
- **No vulnerability scanning needed** for dependencies (none exist)

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
**Primary Entry Point:**
- **URL:** `/index.php` (also accessible at `/` as default index)
- **Method:** POST
- **Purpose:** Login form submission handler
- **Parameters:** `username`, `password`, `isAdmin`
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php`
- **Lines:** 62-79

**No Additional Entry Points:**
- No `/register` endpoint
- No `/logout` endpoint
- No `/forgot-password` endpoint
- No `/auth/*` routes
- No API authentication endpoints
- No OAuth/SSO callbacks

### Authentication Mechanism

**Step-by-Step Authentication Flow:**

**Step 1: Credential Collection (Lines 62-67)**
```html
<form action="index.php" method="POST">
    Username: <input type="text" name="username" placeholder="Username" required />
    Password: <input type="password" name="password" placeholder="Password" required />
    <input type="hidden" name="isAdmin" value="false" />
    <button type="submit">Login</button>
</form>
```
- HTML5 form collects username and password (client-side `required` attribute only)
- Hidden field `isAdmin` defaults to `"false"`
- Form posts to self (`index.php`)

**Step 2: Server-Side Processing (Line 71)**
```php
if (isset($_POST['username']) && isset($_POST['password']) && isset($_POST['isAdmin'])) {
```
- Server checks if all three parameters exist using `isset()`
- **CRITICAL FLAW:** Only checks parameter existence, not validity
- No username/password comparison or validation occurs
- No database lookup
- No password hashing verification
- No credential validation whatsoever

**Step 3: Authorization Decision (Line 72-77)**
```php
if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true") {
    echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
    echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
} else {
    echo "<center><h3>Incorrect username/password!</h3></center>";
}
```
- Authorization based SOLELY on `isAdmin` POST parameter value
- If `isAdmin == "true"`: Grant admin access, display flag
- Otherwise: Display generic error message
- Username and password values are completely ignored

**Step 4: Response Generation**
- **Success Case:** HTML response with admin greeting and flag value
- **Failure Case:** HTML response with "Incorrect username/password!" error
- No session cookie set
- No authentication token issued
- No redirect to dashboard
- User must re-submit form for each request (stateless)

**Authentication Flaws:**
1. **No Credential Validation:** Username and password are collected but never validated against any stored credentials
2. **Client-Controlled Authorization:** The `isAdmin` parameter is set by the client and trusted by the server
3. **No Rate Limiting:** Unlimited authentication attempts possible
4. **No Account Lockout:** No protection against brute force (though irrelevant given the bypass)
5. **No Multi-Factor Authentication:** Single-factor with no validation
6. **No CAPTCHA:** No bot protection
7. **Information Disclosure:** Error message "Incorrect username/password!" is misleading (no validation occurs)

### Code Pointers for Authentication Logic
- **Form Definition:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:62-67`
- **Parameter Validation:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:71`
- **Authorization Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72`
- **Success Response:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:73-74`
- **Failure Response:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:76`
- **Flag Variable:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:69`

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Role Determination Method:**
- **Mechanism:** Client-side hidden HTML form field
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:65`
- **Code:** `<input type="hidden" name="isAdmin" value="false" />`
- **Decision Point:** Line 72 - String comparison `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"`

**Default Role:**
- **Role:** Non-admin (implicit "regular user")
- **Assignment:** Hidden field defaults to `value="false"`
- **Visibility:** Hidden from casual users but trivially modifiable via browser DevTools or HTTP proxy
- **Server-Side Validation:** NONE

**Role Upgrade Path:**
- **Legitimate Path:** NONE (no admin approval, no self-service upgrade, no automatic promotion)
- **Exploit Path:** Modify `isAdmin` parameter from `"false"` to `"true"` before submitting POST request
- **Difficulty:** Trivial (requires only basic HTTP knowledge or browser DevTools access)

**Code Implementation:**
- **Role Definition:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:65` (HTML form field)
- **Role Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72` (PHP comparison)
- **Role Storage:** Client-side only (no server-side storage)

**Critical Vulnerability:**
Role assignment is **entirely controlled by the client**, violating the fundamental security principle that authorization decisions must be made server-side based on verified identity.

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Storage Location:**
- **Primary Storage:** Client-side POST parameter (`$_POST['isAdmin']`)
- **Secondary Storage:** NONE (no JWT, no session, no database, no cookies)
- **Persistence:** ZERO (completely stateless, role must be re-submitted with each request)

**Validation Points:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72`
- **Method:** Single inline conditional check
- **Type:** String comparison using loose equality operator (`==`)
- **Code:** `if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true")`
- **Validation Strength:** None (client-controlled value accepted without verification)

**Cache/Session Persistence:**
- **Session Duration:** N/A (no session management)
- **Cache Duration:** N/A (no caching mechanism)
- **Refresh Mechanism:** N/A (no persistent state)
- **State Management:** None (each request processed independently)

**Code Pointers:**
- **Privilege Check:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72`
- **No Session Code:** Searched entire file - zero instances of `session_start()`, `$_SESSION`, or session-related functions
- **No Cookie Code:** Searched entire file - zero instances of `setcookie()` or `$_COOKIE`
- **No Database Code:** Searched entire file - zero instances of database connection or query functions

**Bypass Opportunity:**
Since privilege validation relies solely on a client-controlled parameter with no server-side verification, any user can claim admin privileges by modifying the POST request.

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Impersonation Features:** NONE
- No "View as User" functionality
- No admin-to-user switching capability
- No delegated access features

**Role Switching:** NONE
- No "sudo mode" or temporary privilege elevation
- No role change endpoints
- No multi-role support

**Audit Trail:** NONE
- No logging of authentication attempts
- No logging of role changes
- No logging of privilege escalation
- No logging of flag access
- Apache access logs show only HTTP request/response (not POST body data or authorization outcomes)

**Code Implementation:**
- **File Location:** N/A (feature not implemented)
- **Impersonation Logic:** N/A
- **Audit Logging:** N/A

**De Facto Impersonation (Vulnerability):**
While no legitimate impersonation feature exists, any user can effectively "impersonate" an admin by setting `isAdmin=true`, with zero audit trail beyond basic Apache HTTP logs.

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible endpoints through the deployed web application are included. Local-only scripts, build tools, and development utilities are excluded per scope boundaries.

### Complete Endpoint Inventory

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | `/index.php` or `/` | anon | None | None | Displays login form with username, password fields and hidden isAdmin field. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:1-67`. No authentication required. |
| POST | `/index.php` or `/` | anon (exploitable to admin) | None | Client-controlled `isAdmin` parameter | **PRIMARY VULNERABILITY:** Processes login form submission. Checks `isset()` for username, password, isAdmin parameters. If `isAdmin == "true"`, grants admin access and displays flag. Otherwise shows error. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:68-79`. **CRITICAL AUTHORIZATION BYPASS:** Client controls the isAdmin parameter that determines admin access. |
| GET | `/static/springfield_background.jpg` | anon | None | None | Static image asset served by Apache. No PHP processing. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/static/springfield_background.jpg` |
| GET | `/static/springfield_background-2.jpg` | anon | None | None | Static image asset served by Apache. No PHP processing. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/static/springfield_background-2.jpg` |
| GET | `/static/homer_simpson.png` | anon | None | None | Static character image served by Apache. No PHP processing. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/static/homer_simpson.png` |

### Endpoint Analysis

**Dynamic Endpoints:** 1
- POST `/index.php` - Login handler with critical authorization bypass

**Static Endpoints:** 3
- GET `/static/*.jpg` - Background images
- GET `/static/*.png` - Character images

**API Endpoints:** 0
- No REST API
- No GraphQL
- No SOAP endpoints
- No WebSocket connections

**File Upload Endpoints:** 0
- No file upload handling
- No `$_FILES` usage
- No multipart/form-data processing beyond standard POST

**Administrative Endpoints:** 0
- No dedicated `/admin/*` routes
- Admin functionality accessed through same endpoint as regular users by manipulating `isAdmin` parameter

**Authentication Endpoints:** 1
- POST `/index.php` (serves dual purpose as login and main application endpoint)

**Authorization Model Summary:**
- **Anon Role:** Can access GET `/index.php` (view login form) and all static assets
- **"Regular User" Role (isAdmin=false):** Same as anon - receives error message
- **"Admin" Role (isAdmin=true):** Receives flag display - but this role is **client-controlled** and exploitable

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** Only input vectors accessible through network requests to the deployed application. Local-only scripts, build tools, and CLI utilities excluded per scope boundaries.

### 5.1 URL Parameters
**Status:** NOT USED

The application does not process any GET/URL parameters:
- No `$_GET` usage detected in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php`
- No query string parsing
- No URL parameter routing

**Searched Patterns:**
- `$_GET` - 0 occurrences
- `$_REQUEST` - 0 occurrences
- Query string examples (`?redirect_url=`, `?user_id=`, etc.) - None implemented

### 5.2 POST Body Fields (Form Data)

**Format:** application/x-www-form-urlencoded (standard HTML form submission)

| Parameter Name | Type | HTML Source Line | PHP Access Line | Validation | Sanitization | Purpose | Risk Level |
|----------------|------|------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------|---------|------------|
| `username` | text | Line 63: `<input type="text" name="username">` | Line 71: `isset($_POST['username'])` | isset() only | **NONE** | Authentication (unused in logic) | **MEDIUM** (no XSS due to non-reflection, but completely unsanitized) |
| `password` | password | Line 64: `<input type="password" name="password">` | Line 71: `isset($_POST['password'])` | isset() only | **NONE** | Authentication (unused in logic) | **MEDIUM** (transmitted in cleartext over HTTP, never validated) |
| `isAdmin` | hidden | Line 65: `<input type="hidden" name="isAdmin" value="false">` | Lines 71-72: `isset($_POST['isAdmin'])` and `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"` | isset() + string comparison | **NONE** | **Authorization decision** | **CRITICAL** (client-controlled authorization) |

**Complete Data Flow for Each Input:**

**Username Flow:**
```
Line 63: HTML form field definition
    ↓
User input (any value accepted)
    ↓
Line 71: isset($_POST['username']) - checks existence only
    ↓
Value is NEVER USED in any comparison, output, or processing
    ↓
DEAD END (parameter checked but ignored)
```

**Password Flow:**
```
Line 64: HTML form field definition (type="password")
    ↓
User input (any value accepted, transmitted in cleartext over HTTP)
    ↓
Line 71: isset($_POST['password']) - checks existence only
    ↓
Value is NEVER USED in any comparison, output, or processing
    ↓
DEAD END (parameter checked but ignored)
```

**isAdmin Flow (CRITICAL):**
```
Line 65: Hidden field defaults to value="false"
    ↓
Client can modify to "true" via DevTools or HTTP proxy
    ↓
Line 71: isset($_POST['isAdmin']) - verifies parameter exists
    ↓
Line 72: $_POST['isAdmin'] == "true" - string comparison
    ↓
TRUE: Line 73-74 - Display admin welcome and flag
FALSE: Line 76 - Display error message
```

**File References for Downstream Analysis:**
- **Form Definition:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:62-67`
- **Input Access:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:71`
- **Authorization Logic:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72-77`

### 5.3 HTTP Headers
**Status:** NOT ACCESSED

The application does not process custom HTTP headers:
- No `$_SERVER['HTTP_*']` usage for security headers
- No `X-Forwarded-For` processing
- No custom header validation
- No `Authorization` header checking
- No API token headers

**Searched Patterns:**
- `$_SERVER` - 0 occurrences
- `getallheaders()` - 0 occurrences
- Header-based authentication - Not implemented

**Standard Headers:**
- **Received:** Standard Apache-processed headers (Host, User-Agent, Content-Type, etc.)
- **Not Used:** None of these influence application logic

### 5.4 Cookie Values
**Status:** NOT USED

The application does not process cookies:
- No `$_COOKIE` usage detected
- No `setcookie()` calls to set cookies
- No session cookies (no `session_start()`)
- No persistent authentication cookies

**File Reference:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php` - Entire file searched, zero cookie operations

### 5.5 File Uploads
**Status:** NOT SUPPORTED

No file upload functionality:
- No `$_FILES` usage
- No `move_uploaded_file()` calls
- No multipart/form-data processing
- No file storage handling
- No image upload or profile picture functionality

### 5.6 JSON/XML Request Bodies
**Status:** NOT SUPPORTED

The application only accepts form-encoded data:
- No `json_decode()` calls
- No XML parsing (`simplexml_load_string()`, `DOMDocument`, etc.)
- No content-type checking for JSON or XML
- No API endpoint accepting structured data

### 5.7 WebSocket Messages
**Status:** NOT SUPPORTED

No WebSocket implementation:
- No WebSocket server
- No real-time communication
- No socket.io or similar libraries

### 5.8 GraphQL Queries
**Status:** NOT SUPPORTED

No GraphQL endpoint:
- No GraphQL parser
- No schema definitions
- No query resolvers

### Summary: Input Vector Inventory for Downstream Specialists

**Total User-Controllable Input Vectors:** 3
1. `$_POST['username']` - Line 71 (checked but unused)
2. `$_POST['password']` - Line 71 (checked but unused)
3. `$_POST['isAdmin']` - Lines 71-72 (CRITICAL - determines authorization)

**For Injection Analysis Specialist:**
- **Command Injection Vectors:** NONE (no shell execution functions exist)
- **SQL Injection Vectors:** NONE (no database connectivity exists)
- **Code Injection Vectors:** NONE (no eval, assert, or code execution functions)

**For XSS Analysis Specialist:**
- **Reflected XSS Vectors:** NONE (no user input echoed in output)
- **Stored XSS Vectors:** NONE (no database or persistent storage)
- **DOM XSS Vectors:** NONE (no JavaScript code exists)

**For Authorization Analysis Specialist:**
- **Primary Vector:** `isAdmin` parameter at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:65,72`
- **Bypass Difficulty:** TRIVIAL
- **Impact:** Complete authorization bypass, flag disclosure

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** Only network-accessible components of the deployed application. Local development environments, build CI, and local-only tools excluded per scope boundaries.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| SpringfieldLoginApp | Service | App | PHP 5.6.40/Apache 2.4.25 | FLAG (secret), POST params (transient) | Main application backend - single PHP file, stateless, no database |
| HTTPClient (Browser) | ExternAsset | Internet | Web Browser | User credentials (never validated) | End-user browser accessing application via HTTP |
| ApacheWebServer | Service | App | Apache 2.4.25 (Debian 9) | HTTP traffic, access logs | Web server handling HTTP requests, serves static assets directly |
| DockerContainer | Service | App | Docker (php:5-apache image) | Application code, FLAG value | Containerized runtime environment on port 80 (mapped to host 36003) |
| StaticAssets | DataStore | App | Filesystem | Public images (JPG/PNG) | Three image files in /static/ directory served by Apache |

**Entity Details:**

**SpringfieldLoginApp:**
- Single-page PHP application (index.php, 82 lines)
- No persistent state (no sessions, no database)
- Stateless request/response processing only
- Hosts single POST endpoint for authentication

**HTTPClient (Browser):**
- External attacker's browser or HTTP client
- Initiates all requests over unencrypted HTTP
- Submits POST parameters including client-controlled `isAdmin` value

**ApacheWebServer:**
- Routes GET / to index.php
- Routes POST /index.php to PHP interpreter
- Directly serves /static/* files without PHP processing
- Logs HTTP requests to access.log (no POST body logging)

**DockerContainer:**
- Isolated application environment
- Port 80 exposed (mapped to host 36003)
- FLAG value embedded in PHP source at build time via sed
- No other containers or services

**StaticAssets:**
- springfield_background.jpg (background image #1)
- springfield_background-2.jpg (background image #2)
- homer_simpson.png (character image)
- Served by Apache file handler, no processing

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| SpringfieldLoginApp | Hosts: `http://localhost:36003` (container port 80); Endpoints: `/index.php` (GET/POST), `/` (default index); Auth: **BROKEN** (client-controlled isAdmin parameter); Dependencies: ApacheWebServer, DockerContainer; Database: NONE; Session Management: NONE; Framework: NONE (vanilla PHP) |
| HTTPClient | Protocol: `HTTP/1.1` (no HTTPS); Access: Public internet; Tools: Any web browser or HTTP client (curl, Postman, Burp Suite); Origin: External untrusted zone; Credentials Transmitted: Cleartext over HTTP |
| ApacheWebServer | Engine: `Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)`; Modules: mod_php for PHP processing; DocumentRoot: `/var/www/html`; Logs: `/var/log/apache2/access.log`, `/var/log/apache2/error.log`; Static File Handling: Direct file serving for /static/* paths; PHP Handler: mod_php for .php files |
| DockerContainer | Base Image: `php:5-apache`; Exposed Ports: `80:36003` (container:host); Volumes: NONE (code copied at build time); Environment: FLAG value injected via ARG during docker build; Healthcheck: Bash TCP check to 127.0.0.1:80; Entrypoint: Apache2 foreground process |
| StaticAssets | Location: `/var/www/html/static/` (in container); Filesystem: Container ephemeral storage; Content-Type: image/jpeg, image/png; Access Control: Public (no authentication); Size: ~8.6KB (homer_simpson.png), JPG files larger; MIME handling: Apache Content-Type headers |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| HTTPClient → ApacheWebServer | HTTP | `:36003` (host) → `:80` (container) / GET `/` or `/index.php` | **None** (public access) | Public (HTML form) |
| HTTPClient → ApacheWebServer | HTTP | `:36003 /index.php` POST | **None** (no authentication) | **FLAG disclosure vulnerability** (POST body with isAdmin parameter) |
| HTTPClient → StaticAssets | HTTP | `:36003 /static/*.jpg`, `/static/*.png` | **None** (public access) | Public (images) |
| ApacheWebServer → SpringfieldLoginApp | Internal | PHP interpreter invocation | **None** (direct processing) | POST params: username, password, **isAdmin (CRITICAL)** |
| SpringfieldLoginApp → ApacheWebServer | Internal | PHP output to Apache | **None** | FLAG value (if isAdmin=true), Error message (otherwise) |
| ApacheWebServer → HTTPClient | HTTP | Response body | **None** | FLAG disclosure (if bypass successful), HTML response |
| DockerContainer → ApacheWebServer | Internal | Process hosting | **None** | All application traffic |

**Flow Analysis:**

**Flow 1: Initial Page Load**
- User's browser → Apache → PHP interpreter → Renders login form
- Returns HTML with hidden `isAdmin=false` field
- No guards, no authentication, public access

**Flow 2: Login Attempt (Vulnerable)**
- User submits form → POST to `/index.php` with username, password, isAdmin
- Apache passes to PHP interpreter
- **CRITICAL:** isAdmin value checked without validation
- If `isAdmin=true`: FLAG returned in response
- If `isAdmin=false`: Error message returned
- **No authentication guard** - authorization decision is client-controlled

**Flow 3: Static Asset Access**
- Browser requests images → Apache serves directly
- No PHP processing
- No guards, public access

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| **auth:broken** | Authorization | **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY:** Checks if `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"` without any server-side validation. Client can set this value arbitrarily. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72` |
| **validation:isset** | Validation | Checks if POST parameters exist using `isset()`. Only verifies existence, not content validity. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:71` |
| **none:public** | Network | No guard - Public access allowed to all endpoints. Anyone can access application over HTTP. |
| **none:http_only** | Protocol | No HTTPS enforcement - All traffic transmitted in cleartext over HTTP port 80. Credentials and FLAG exposed to network eavesdropping. |

**Guard Implementation Analysis:**

**auth:broken Guard (CRITICAL FLAW):**
```php
// Location: /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72
if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true") {
    // Grant admin access
}
```
- **Purpose:** Determine if user should have admin privileges
- **Implementation:** String comparison of client-provided parameter
- **Weakness:** Client controls the parameter being checked
- **Bypass:** Set `isAdmin=true` in POST request
- **Proper Implementation (Missing):** Should check server-side session or database for role

**validation:isset Guard:**
```php
// Location: /Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:71
if (isset($_POST['username']) && isset($_POST['password']) && isset($_POST['isAdmin']))
```
- **Purpose:** Verify required parameters are present
- **Implementation:** PHP isset() function
- **Limitation:** Only checks existence, not validity or format
- **Bypass:** Include parameters with any value (even empty strings pass)

**Missing Guards:**
- **No session validation** - No check for authenticated session
- **No CSRF tokens** - No protection against cross-site request forgery
- **No rate limiting** - No protection against brute force or automated attacks
- **No input sanitization** - No filtering of malicious payloads
- **No TLS/SSL** - No encryption of data in transit

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| **anonymous** | 0 | Global | Implicit - No authentication required. Can access GET `/index.php` to view login form. No role check in code. |
| **user** (failed auth) | 1 | Global | Implicit - When POST submitted with `isAdmin != "true"`. Receives error message. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:76` |
| **admin** | 10 | Global | Explicit - When `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"`. Grants access to FLAG. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72-74` |

**Role Definitions:**

**anonymous (Level 0):**
- **Definition Location:** Implicit (no code reference - default state)
- **Privileges:** Can view login form, submit credentials
- **Access:** GET requests to all public endpoints
- **Restrictions:** Cannot view FLAG without escalating to admin role
- **Entry Point:** Any GET request to `/index.php` or `/`

**user (Level 1) - "Failed Authentication":**
- **Definition Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:76`
- **Code:** `echo "<center><h3>Incorrect username/password!</h3></center>";`
- **Trigger Condition:** `$_POST['isAdmin'] != "true"`
- **Privileges:** None (receives error message only)
- **Access:** Same as anonymous (POST submission results in error)
- **Restrictions:** Cannot view FLAG
- **Note:** This is not a true "authenticated user" role - it's the failed authentication state

**admin (Level 10):**
- **Definition Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72-74`
- **Code:**
  ```php
  if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true") {
      echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
      echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
  }
  ```
- **Trigger Condition:** `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"`
- **Privileges:** Access to FLAG value
- **Access:** Same POST endpoint as other roles, but with different parameter value
- **Restrictions:** None within the application
- **CRITICAL FLAW:** This role is assigned based on client-controlled parameter

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

**Privilege Ordering (→ means "can access resources of"):**
```
anonymous (0) → user (1) → admin (10)
```

**Detailed Hierarchy:**
```
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │   admin (10)    │
                    │  ✓ View FLAG    │
                    │  ✓ Admin greeting│
                    └────────┬─────────┘
                             │
                        (dominates)
                             │
                             ↓
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │   user (1)      │
                    │  ✗ No privileges│
                    │  → Error message│
                    └────────┬─────────┘
                             │
                        (dominates)
                             │
                             ↓
                    ┌─────────────────┐
                    │  anonymous (0)  │
                    │  ✓ View form    │
                    │  ✓ Submit params│
                    └──────────────────┘
```

**Dominance Relationships:**
- admin (10) **completely dominates** user (1) - Admin can access everything user can, plus FLAG
- user (1) **weakly dominates** anonymous (0) - Both can submit form, user state exists after POST
- No mutual dominance - This is a strict total order (linear hierarchy)

**Parallel Isolation:**
```
NONE - No parallel roles exist
```
**Explanation:** This application has no organizational structure (no teams, departments, projects) or parallel role relationships. All roles exist in a single linear hierarchy.

**Role Switching Mechanisms:**
- **Legitimate Switching:** NONE (no admin impersonation feature)
- **Exploit-Based Switching:** Modify `isAdmin` parameter from `"false"` to `"true"` (anonymous → admin escalation)
- **Sudo Mode:** NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Impersonation:** NOT IMPLEMENTED

**Role Inheritance:**
- **NONE** - No inheritance model
- Each role is independently determined by the `isAdmin` parameter value
- No "is-a" relationships between roles

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| anonymous | `/index.php` (login form) | `/` (GET), `/index.php` (GET), `/static/*` (GET) | None required |
| user (failed auth) | `/index.php` (error message) | Same as anonymous - POST results in same page with error | POST with `isAdmin != "true"` |
| admin | `/index.php` (FLAG display) | Same as anonymous - POST results in same page with FLAG | POST with `isAdmin == "true"` (EXPLOITABLE) |

**Role Entry Details:**

**anonymous:**
- **Entry URL:** `http://localhost:36003/` or `http://localhost:36003/index.php`
- **HTTP Method:** GET
- **Response:** HTML login form (Lines 1-67 of index.php)
- **Actions Available:** View form, submit credentials
- **Navigation:** No navigation menu (single-page application)
- **Authentication Required:** NO

**user (failed auth):**
- **Entry URL:** POST to `/index.php` with `isAdmin=false` or any value except `"true"`
- **HTTP Method:** POST
- **Response:** Error message "Incorrect username/password!" (Line 76)
- **Actions Available:** Re-submit form (no session, must POST again)
- **Navigation:** None (error message displayed inline, form remains visible)
- **Authentication Required:** POST parameters must include username, password, isAdmin (all checked with isset())

**admin:**
- **Entry URL:** POST to `/index.php` with `isAdmin=true`
- **HTTP Method:** POST
- **Response:** Admin welcome message and FLAG value (Lines 73-74)
- **Actions Available:** View FLAG (no other admin functionality exists)
- **Navigation:** None (single response, no admin panel or additional features)
- **Authentication Required (SHOULD BE):** Valid admin credentials verified server-side
- **Authentication Required (ACTUAL):** Client-controlled `isAdmin` parameter (BROKEN)

**Role Transition Diagram:**
```
GET /index.php
    ↓
[anonymous state]
    ↓
POST /index.php
    ↓
    ├─ isAdmin != "true" → [user state] → Error message
    └─ isAdmin == "true" → [admin state] → FLAG disclosure
    
(No persistent state - each request independent)
```

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| anonymous | **NONE** (no middleware) | **NONE** (no check required for GET) | **NONE** (implicit default state) |
| user (failed auth) | **NONE** | File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72` - Implicit check: `$_POST['isAdmin'] != "true"` | **NONE** (client-side POST parameter) |
| admin | **NONE** | File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72` - Explicit check: `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"` | **NONE** (client-side POST parameter) |

**Code Implementation Details:**

**anonymous Role:**
- **Middleware:** N/A (no middleware layer exists)
- **Guards:** None
- **Permission Check Location:** Not applicable (GET requests have no restrictions)
- **Code:**
  ```php
  // Lines 1-67: HTML form rendered for all GET requests (no role check)
  ```

**user Role (Failed Authentication):**
- **Middleware:** N/A
- **Guards:** None
- **Permission Check Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72-77`
- **Code:**
  ```php
  // Line 72-77
  if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true") {
      // Admin path
  } else {
      // USER PATH (failed auth)
      echo "<center><h3>Incorrect username/password!</h3></center>";  // Line 76
  }
  ```
- **Storage:** Client-side POST parameter
- **Validation:** String comparison only

**admin Role:**
- **Middleware:** N/A
- **Guards:** None (should have multiple layers of protection, but doesn't)
- **Permission Check Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:72-74`
- **Code:**
  ```php
  // Line 72-74
  if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true") {  // VULNERABLE CHECK
      echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";      // Line 73
      echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";  // Line 74
  }
  ```
- **Storage:** Client-side POST parameter (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY)
- **Validation:** Single string comparison, no server-side role verification

**Missing Security Layers:**
1. **No Authentication Middleware:** Should verify user identity before processing request
2. **No Authorization Middleware:** Should check user role from trusted source (session, JWT, database)
3. **No Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Framework:** No centralized permission management
4. **No Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC):** No fine-grained permission logic
5. **No Session Management:** No server-side state to store authenticated role
6. **No Database Lookup:** No verification of role against persistent storage

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE - No Multi-User Object Access

**Analysis:**
Horizontal privilege escalation typically involves accessing another user's resources (e.g., viewing another user's orders, messages, or profile). This application has:
- **No user accounts** - No user registration or user IDs
- **No object identifiers** - No endpoints with parameters like `user_id`, `order_id`, `document_id`
- **No multi-user resources** - No user-specific data to access
- **No database** - No persistent user data storage

**Endpoint Analysis for IDOR Patterns:**

| Endpoint Pattern | Object ID Parameter | Data Type | IDOR Risk |
|------------------|---------------------|-----------|-----------|
| POST `/index.php` | **NONE** | N/A | **NOT APPLICABLE** |
| GET `/index.php` | **NONE** | N/A | **NOT APPLICABLE** |
| GET `/static/*` | **NONE** (file paths only) | Public images | **NONE** (static assets, no user association) |

**Conclusion:** No horizontal privilege escalation opportunities exist because there are no user-specific resources or object identifiers to manipulate.

**For Authorization Analyst:** Skip horizontal IDOR testing. Focus on vertical privilege escalation (Section 8.2) as the primary attack vector.

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Status:** CRITICAL VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED

| Priority | Endpoint Pattern | Functionality | Risk Level | Exploitation Method |
|----------|------------------|---------------|------------|---------------------|
| **CRITICAL** | `POST /index.php` | Flag disclosure (admin functionality) | **MAXIMUM** | Modify `isAdmin` POST parameter from `"false"` to `"true"`. File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:65,72` |

**Detailed Vertical Escalation Analysis:**

**Target Functionality:** Admin flag disclosure
**Current Role:** anonymous (Level 0) or user (Level 1)
**Target Role:** admin (Level 10)
**Privilege Gap:** 10 levels (maximum escalation)

**Vulnerability Details:**
- **CWE:** CWE-639 (Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key)
- **CVSS Score:** 9.8 (Critical)
- **OWASP:** A01:2021 - Broken Access Control

**Exploitation Steps:**
1. **Method 1 - Browser DevTools:**
   - Open http://localhost:36003 in browser
   - Press F12 → Elements/Inspector tab
   - Find: `<input type="hidden" name="isAdmin" value="false" />`
   - Double-click `value="false"`, change to `value="true"`
   - Enter any username/password
   - Click "Login" button
   - **Result:** FLAG disclosed

2. **Method 2 - HTTP Proxy (Burp Suite/ZAP):**
   - Submit login form
   - Intercept POST request
   - Modify request body: change `isAdmin=false` to `isAdmin=true`
   - Forward request
   - **Result:** FLAG disclosed

3. **Method 3 - Command Line (curl):**
   ```bash
   curl -X POST http://localhost:36003/index.php \
     -d "username=anything" \
     -d "password=anything" \
     -d "isAdmin=true"
   ```
   - **Result:** FLAG disclosed in HTML response

**Success Rate:** 100% (no authentication required, no rate limiting, no CAPTCHA)

**Impact:**
- Complete bypass of authorization controls
- Unauthorized access to admin functionality
- Disclosure of sensitive data (CTF FLAG)
- No valid credentials required
- No audit trail (only basic HTTP logs)

**Root Cause:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php`
- **Line 65:** `<input type="hidden" name="isAdmin" value="false" />` - Client-controlled authorization parameter
- **Line 72:** `if ($_POST['isAdmin'] == "true")` - Server trusts client-provided value

**Expected Behavior (Secure Implementation):**
```php
// SECURE EXAMPLE (not implemented):
session_start();
if (isset($_SESSION['user_role']) && $_SESSION['user_role'] === 'admin') {
    // Grant admin access
    // Role determined from server-side session, not client parameter
}
```

**Vertical Escalation Priority Matrix:**

| From Role | To Role | Difficulty | Impact | Priority |
|-----------|---------|------------|--------|----------|
| anonymous → admin | admin | **TRIVIAL** | **CRITICAL** (FLAG disclosure) | **P0** |
| user → admin | admin | **TRIVIAL** | **CRITICAL** (FLAG disclosure) | **P0** |

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**Status:** NOT APPLICABLE - No Multi-Step Workflows

**Analysis:**
Context-based authorization vulnerabilities occur in multi-step workflows where later steps assume earlier steps were completed (e.g., payment flow, multi-page forms, setup wizards). This application:
- **No multi-step processes** - Single POST submission handles entire authentication
- **No workflow state** - No tracking of prior steps or prerequisites
- **No conditional access** - No endpoints that require completing other actions first
- **No session state** - Each request processed independently

**Workflow Analysis:**

| Workflow | Endpoint | Expected Prior State | Bypass Potential |
|----------|----------|----------------------|------------------|
| **NONE** | N/A | N/A | **NOT APPLICABLE** |

**Conclusion:** No context-based authorization vulnerabilities exist because there are no multi-step workflows to bypass.

**For Authorization Analyst:** Skip workflow bypass testing. No multi-step processes to analyze.

### 8.4 Parameter Pollution & Injection in Authorization

**Status:** NOT EXPLOITABLE (But Parameter Exists)

**Analysis of `isAdmin` Parameter:**

**Test Case 1: Parameter Array Injection**
```bash
# Attempt to confuse isset() check with array syntax
curl -X POST http://localhost:36003/index.php \
  -d "username=test" \
  -d "password=test" \
  -d "isAdmin[]=true"
```
**Expected:** `isset($_POST['isAdmin'])` returns TRUE (array exists)
**Line 72:** `$_POST['isAdmin'] == "true"` returns FALSE (array != string)
**Result:** ❌ FAIL - Error message shown (authorization denied)

**Test Case 2: Duplicate Parameter**
```bash
# Send isAdmin parameter twice
curl -X POST http://localhost:36003/index.php \
  -d "username=test" \
  -d "password=test" \
  -d "isAdmin=false" \
  -d "isAdmin=true"
```
**PHP Behavior:** Last value wins (`$_POST['isAdmin']` = `"true"`)
**Result:** ✅ BYPASS SUCCESSFUL - FLAG disclosed

**Test Case 3: Case Variation**
```bash
# Try case variations
curl -X POST http://localhost:36003/index.php \
  -d "username=test" \
  -d "password=test" \
  -d "isAdmin=TRUE"  # Uppercase
```
**Line 72:** `"TRUE" == "true"` returns FALSE (case-sensitive comparison)
**Result:** ❌ FAIL - Must be lowercase `"true"`

**Test Case 4: Type Juggling**
```bash
# Try boolean true instead of string "true"
curl -X POST http://localhost:36003/index.php \
  -d "username=test" \
  -d "password=test" \
  -d "isAdmin=1"  # Integer 1
```
**Line 72:** `"1" == "true"` returns FALSE (no type coercion to boolean)
**Result:** ❌ FAIL - Must be exact string `"true"`

**Exploitable Parameter Injection:**
- **Duplicate Parameters:** ✅ YES (last value wins, can send both false and true)

**Not Exploitable:**
- **Parameter Arrays:** ❌ NO (breaks isset() check)
- **Case Variations:** ❌ NO (case-sensitive comparison)
- **Type Juggling:** ❌ NO (must be exact string "true")

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** Only injection sources reachable through network-accessible endpoints. Local-only scripts, build tools, CLI utilities excluded per scope boundaries.

### Executive Summary

**INJECTION VULNERABILITY STATUS:**
- ✅ **NO COMMAND INJECTION SOURCES FOUND**
- ✅ **NO SQL INJECTION SOURCES FOUND**

**Comprehensive Analysis:**
After exhaustive source code analysis and data flow tracing from all network-accessible user input sources to potential dangerous sinks, zero command injection and zero SQL injection vulnerabilities were identified. The application's minimal architecture—82 lines of PHP with no database connectivity and no shell command execution—eliminates entire vulnerability classes by omission.

### 9.1 Command Injection Source Analysis

**Dangerous Shell Execution Functions Searched:**

| Function | Occurrences | File Location |
|----------|-------------|---------------|
| `exec()` | 0 | Not found in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php` |
| `shell_exec()` | 0 | Not found |
| `system()` | 0 | Not found |
| `passthru()` | 0 | Not found |
| `proc_open()` | 0 | Not found |
| `popen()` | 0 | Not found |
| Backticks (`` ` ``) | 0 | Not found |
| `pcntl_exec()` | 0 | Not found |

**Result:** No shell command execution functions exist in network-accessible code.

**User Input Sources Analyzed:**
1. `$_POST['username']` - Line 71
2. `$_POST['password']` - Line 71
3. `$_POST['isAdmin']` - Lines 71-72

**Data Flow Analysis:**
```
$_POST['username'] → isset() check → NEVER USED (dead end)
$_POST['password']' → isset() check → NEVER USED (dead end)
$_POST['isAdmin'] → isset() check → String comparison → echo output ONLY
```

**Conclusion:** No user input reaches shell command execution functions because no such functions exist in the application.

### 9.2 SQL Injection Source Analysis

**Dangerous Database Functions Searched:**

| Function/Extension | Occurrences | File Location |
|--------------------|-------------|---------------|
| `mysqli_query()` | 0 | Not found in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php` |
| `mysqli_connect()` | 0 | Not found |
| `mysql_query()` (deprecated) | 0 | Not found |
| `PDO::query()` | 0 | Not found |
| `PDO::prepare()` | 0 | Not found |
| `pg_query()` (PostgreSQL) | 0 | Not found |
| `sqlite_query()` | 0 | Not found |
| `mssql_query()` | 0 | Not found |

**SQL Keywords Searched:**
- `SELECT`, `INSERT`, `UPDATE`, `DELETE`, `FROM`, `WHERE` - 0 occurrences in PHP code

**Database Connection Searches:**
- No database connection initialization found
- No ORM usage detected (no Laravel Eloquent, Doctrine, etc.)
- No raw SQL query strings found
- No database configuration files

**Result:** No database connectivity exists in the application.

**User Input Sources Analyzed:**
1. `$_POST['username']` - Line 71
2. `$_POST['password']` - Line 71
3. `$_POST['isAdmin']` - Lines 71-72

**Data Flow Analysis:**
```
$_POST['username'] → isset() check → NEVER USED (not passed to any query)
$_POST['password'] → isset() check → NEVER USED (not passed to any query)
$_POST['isAdmin'] → isset() check → String comparison → echo output ONLY
```

**Conclusion:** No user input reaches database queries because no database connectivity exists in the application.

### 9.3 Complete Injection Source Inventory

**ZERO injection sources found in network-accessible code.**

### 9.4 Additional Injection Types Analyzed

**Code Injection (eval, assert):**
- `eval()` - 0 occurrences
- `assert()` - 0 occurrences
- `create_function()` - 0 occurrences
- `preg_replace()` with /e modifier - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no code evaluation functions)

**LDAP Injection:**
- `ldap_*()` functions - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no LDAP connectivity)

**XML Injection:**
- `simplexml_load_string()` - 0 occurrences
- `DOMDocument::loadXML()` - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no XML parsing)

**XPath Injection:**
- `xpath()` - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no XPath queries)

**File Inclusion Injection:**
- `include()` - 0 occurrences
- `require()` - 0 occurrences
- `include_once()` - 0 occurrences
- `require_once()` - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no dynamic file inclusion)

**Path Traversal:**
- `file_get_contents()` - 0 occurrences
- `fopen()` - 0 occurrences
- `readfile()` - 0 occurrences
- **Status:** ✅ SECURE (no file operations)

### 9.5 Why This Application is Injection-Free

**Architectural Reasons:**

1. **No Database Layer:**
   - Application stores no persistent data
   - No SQL queries to inject into
   - Authentication state is ephemeral (POST parameters only)

2. **No System Interaction:**
   - No shell commands executed
   - No system administration functions
   - No file system operations beyond static serving by Apache

3. **Minimal PHP Functionality:**
   - Only uses: `isset()`, `echo`, string comparison
   - No dangerous functions imported or called
   - No third-party libraries with potential injection points

4. **Static Application Logic:**
   - Fixed control flow (if/else only)
   - No dynamic code generation
   - No template engines with code execution

5. **User Input Usage Pattern:**
   - User input checked for existence (`isset()`)
   - Used only in string comparison and conditional logic
   - **Never passed to dangerous sinks**
   - Never concatenated into queries or commands

### 9.6 File Reference Summary for Injection Analysts

**All Code Analyzed:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php`
- **Total Lines:** 82
- **Dynamic Code:** Lines 68-79 (PHP block)
- **User Input:** Lines 71-72 (isset() checks and string comparison)
- **Dangerous Functions:** NONE FOUND

**Verification Methodology:**
1. ✅ Searched entire codebase for shell execution functions
2. ✅ Searched entire codebase for database query functions
3. ✅ Traced all user input from superglobals to usage
4. ✅ Verified no includes/requires load additional dangerous code
5. ✅ Confirmed no hidden endpoints or PHP files beyond index.php
6. ✅ Analyzed complete data flow for all three POST parameters
7. ✅ Verified application scope (single file, single endpoint)

### 9.7 Recommendation for Injection Analysts

**Priority:** ❌ **SKIP INJECTION TESTING**

**Rationale:**
- No command injection attack surface
- No SQL injection attack surface
- No code injection attack surface
- Time better spent on authorization bypass (Section 8)

**Focus Instead On:**
- Authorization bypass via `isAdmin` parameter manipulation (CRITICAL)
- Vertical privilege escalation testing (CONFIRMED VULNERABILITY)
- Network traffic interception (HTTP-only, no TLS)

**If Application Extended in Future:**
- Adding database would introduce SQL injection risk
- Adding file upload would introduce command injection risk
- Adding system integration would introduce shell injection risk
- Current architecture has zero injection risk by design (intentional or accidental)

---

## RECONNAISSANCE COMPLETE

**Report Generated:** 2025-10-29
**Application:** Springfield Login Challenge (XBEN-052-24)
**Total Endpoints Analyzed:** 1 dynamic + 3 static
**Critical Vulnerabilities Identified:** 1 (Authorization Bypass via Client-Controlled Parameter)
**Attack Surface:** Minimal (single-page application, no database, no external dependencies)
**Recommended Attack Vector:** POST /index.php with isAdmin=true (CVSS 9.8)

**Next Phase:** Authorization Analysis Specialist should focus on exploiting the client-controlled `isAdmin` parameter at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-052-24/src/index.php:65,72` for immediate flag disclosure.