# Reconnaissance Deliverable: XBEN-067-24 PHP File Upload Application

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the application's attack surface. This is a simple PHP file upload application with **NO authentication, NO authorization, and critical input validation vulnerabilities**.

**Application Type:** Deliberately vulnerable CTF/training application - Single-purpose file upload service

**Key Sections:**
- **Section 3 (Authentication):** Documents the COMPLETE ABSENCE of authentication mechanisms
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Lists all 3 network-accessible endpoints (2 dynamic, 1 static)
- **Section 5 (Input Vectors):** Critical XSS and file upload bypass vectors for vulnerability analysis
- **Section 7 (Role Architecture):** Documents single anonymous role with full privileges
- **Section 9 (Injection Sources):** Confirms ZERO command injection and SQL injection sources

**Priority for Vulnerability Analysis:**
1. **XSS Analysis:** Two critical XSS sinks at index.php:15 and index.php:41
2. **File Upload Analysis:** Weak validation functions in security.php allowing multiple bypass techniques
3. **Auth Analysis:** Complete absence of authentication - all endpoints publicly accessible
4. **Authz Analysis:** No authorization controls - not applicable

## 1. Executive Summary

**Application Purpose:** XBEN-067-24 is a deliberately vulnerable PHP file upload application designed for security training/CTF purposes. It allows anonymous users to upload JPEG image files with minimal validation.

**Core Technology Stack:**
- **Backend:** PHP 7.1.33 (End-of-Life since December 2019)
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.38 (Debian)
- **Infrastructure:** Docker containerized, single-service architecture
- **Database:** None - filesystem-based storage only

**Primary User-Facing Components:**
- Main upload form at `/` or `/index.php`
- Static file serving from `/upload/` directory
- No admin panels, no user management, no authentication system

**Security Posture:** CRITICALLY INSECURE
- Zero authentication or authorization controls
- Weak file validation allowing bypass via double extensions and polyglot files
- Multiple XSS vulnerabilities from unencoded filename output
- Hardcoded secrets in Docker image layers
- No security headers, CSRF protection, or rate limiting

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** None - Pure HTML generated by PHP
- **Key Libraries:** None detected
- **Authentication Libraries:** None

### Backend
- **Language:** PHP 7.1.33 (EOL November 2019)
- **Framework:** None - Procedural PHP
- **Key Dependencies:** 
  - mysqli extension (installed but unused)
  - Standard PHP file handling functions
- **Application Files:**
  - `/var/www/html/index.php` (51 lines) - Main application logic
  - `/var/www/html/security.php` (14 lines) - Validation functions

### Infrastructure
- **Hosting Provider:** Docker containerized (single container)
- **CDN:** None
- **Database Type:** None - Filesystem-based storage
- **Container Image:** php:7.1-apache (Debian Buster base)
- **Network:** Bridge mode (10.89.75.0/24)

### Identified Subdomains
**From subfinder scan (out of scope - not related to target):**
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
- mail.localhost
- autodiscover.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- mail.regency.localhost
- naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
- mail03.regency.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost
- www.localhost
- fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
- exchvm.nwcnet.localhost

**Note:** These subdomains appear to be unrelated DNS artifacts from the local system and are not part of the target application running on port 44555.

### Open Ports & Services
**From nmap scan on localhost:**
- **Port 80/tcp** - Caddy httpd (proxy, not the target)
- **Port 443/tcp** - ssl/https (Caddy, not the target)
- **Port 631/tcp** - CUPS 2.3 (printing service, out of scope)
- **Port 9999/tcp** - Unknown service with CORS headers (out of scope)
- **Port 49152/tcp** - Golang net/http server (Tailscale, out of scope)

**Target Application:**
- **Host Port:** 44555/tcp (mapped to container port 80)
- **Container Port:** 80/tcp
- **Service:** Apache 2.4.38 with PHP 7.1.33
- **Access:** http://localhost:44555

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
**Status: NOT IMPLEMENTED - NO AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM**

The application has **ZERO authentication mechanisms**:
- No `/login`, `/register`, `/auth`, or similar endpoints
- No user account system
- No credential validation
- No password handling
- No session management
- No authentication tokens (JWT, Bearer, API keys)
- No HTTP Basic/Digest Auth
- No Multi-Factor Authentication

**Code Evidence:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- Lines: 1-52 (entire application)
- **Finding:** No `session_start()`, no login logic, no password verification anywhere

**Security Implication:** All functionality is accessible to anonymous users without identity verification or accountability.

### Mechanism
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE - NO AUTHENTICATION**

### Code Pointers
**Authentication Code Locations:** None - Authentication system does not exist

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

- **Role Determination:** Not implemented - all users are anonymous
- **Default Role:** Anonymous (no authentication required)
- **Role Upgrade Path:** Not applicable - no roles exist
- **Code Implementation:** No role assignment logic found

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

- **Storage Location:** No privilege storage - all users have identical access
- **Validation Points:** No validation - all endpoints are public
- **Cache/Session Persistence:** No sessions implemented
- **Code Pointers:** No privilege validation code exists

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

- **Impersonation Features:** None
- **Role Switching:** None
- **Audit Trail:** No logging implemented
- **Code Implementation:** Not applicable

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

All endpoints listed below are network-accessible through the deployed web application at http://localhost:44555.

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | / or /index.php | anon | None | None | Displays upload form and previously uploaded image. Lines 7-25 in index.php. No authentication. |
| POST | /index.php | anon | None | None | Handles file upload with weak validation. Lines 26-49 in index.php. Accepts `userfile` (file) and `submit` (button). Validates extension and magic bytes. |
| GET | /upload/{filename} | anon | filename | None | Direct static file access to uploaded files. Apache serves files from `/var/www/html/upload/`. No authorization checks. |

**Total Network-Accessible Endpoints:** 3

**Key Observations:**
- All endpoints accessible without authentication
- No object ownership validation
- No authorization middleware or guards
- Upload endpoint vulnerable to CSRF (no tokens)
- Static file serving has no access controls

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

All input vectors listed below are accessible through the target web application's network interface at http://localhost:44555.

### URL Parameters
**Status: NONE FOUND**
- No `$_GET` usage detected in the application
- Application does not process query string parameters

### POST Body Fields (JSON/Form)
**Field:** `userfile` (File Upload)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- **Lines:** 31-40
- **Type:** multipart/form-data file upload
- **Components:**
  - `$_FILES["userfile"]["name"]` - User-controlled filename (accessed at lines 33, 34, 38, 40)
  - `$_FILES["userfile"]["tmp_name"]` - System temp file path (accessed at lines 35, 36)
- **Validation:** 
  - Extension check via `hasValidExtension()` at line 34 (security.php:10-13) - WEAK, uses strpos()
  - Magic byte check via `hasValidMagicNumber()` at line 35 (security.php:3-8) - Only checks first 2 bytes
  - Path traversal mitigation via `basename()` at line 33
- **Dangerous Sinks:**
  - Stored XSS: Line 38 writes filename to `uploaded.txt`, line 15 echoes it to HTML without encoding
  - Reflected XSS: Line 41 echoes filename in href attribute without encoding
  - File upload bypass: Weak validation allows `shell.php.jpg` or polyglot files

**Field:** `submit` (Submit Button)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- **Line:** 32
- **Type:** Text/button value
- **Usage:** Checked for presence only, value not processed

### HTTP Headers
**Status: NONE PROCESSED**
- Application does not read any HTTP headers
- No `$_SERVER['HTTP_*']` usage
- No custom header processing
- Headers like `User-Agent`, `X-Forwarded-For`, `Referer` are not accessed

### Cookie Values
**Status: NONE USED**
- No `$_COOKIE` usage detected
- Application does not set or read cookies
- No session cookies (no session management)

### Indirect Input: File Content
**Input Vector:** Previously uploaded filename stored in `uploaded.txt`
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- **Lines:** 11-15
- **Source:** Read from `/var/www/html/upload/uploaded.txt` via `fgets()` at line 13
- **Dangerous Sink:** Echoed to HTML at line 15 without `htmlspecialchars()` encoding
- **Attack Vector:** Stored XSS - malicious filename persists and executes on every page load

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

This section maps the network-accessible components of the deployed application infrastructure.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| User Browser | ExternAsset | Internet | Modern Browser | None | Anonymous users accessing the application |
| PHP Application | Service | App | PHP 7.1.33/Apache 2.4.38 | User uploads, filenames | Main application container, single PHP service |
| Upload Directory | DataStore | App | Filesystem | User files | `/var/www/html/upload/` - stores uploaded files and metadata |
| Docker Host | Infrastructure | Edge | Docker | None | Container runtime environment |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| PHP Application | Hosts: `http://localhost:44555` (host) maps to `http://container:80` (container); Endpoints: `/`, `/index.php` (POST/GET), `/upload/*` (GET); Auth: None; Dependencies: Docker Host, Upload Directory; Container: php:7.1-apache; Processes: Apache httpd, PHP-FPM |
| Upload Directory | Path: `/var/www/html/upload/`; Permissions: `www-data:www-data`; Accessibility: Web-accessible via HTTP; Contains: Uploaded files, `uploaded.txt` metadata file; No encryption, No access controls |
| Docker Host | Port Mapping: `44555:80`; Network: Bridge mode `10.89.75.0/24`; Resource Limits: None configured; Security: No AppArmor, no SELinux, no seccomp profiles |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| User Browser → PHP Application | HTTPS | `:44555 /` | None | Public |
| User Browser → PHP Application | HTTPS | `:44555 /index.php` (POST) | None | User files, filenames |
| User Browser → Upload Directory | HTTPS | `:44555 /upload/{filename}` | None | User files |
| PHP Application → Upload Directory | File I/O | Filesystem | None | User files, metadata |
| Docker Host → PHP Application | TCP | `44555:80` port mapping | None | HTTP traffic |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| None | N/A | This application has NO guards, authentication, or authorization mechanisms. All endpoints are publicly accessible without any access controls. |

**Note:** The complete absence of guards represents a critical security gap. Any anonymous user can perform all application operations.

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| anon (anonymous) | 10 | Global | Default for all users - no authentication required. All application functionality accessible. No code implementation (absence of auth system). |

**Note:** This application has only ONE role level. All users are anonymous with full access to all functionality.

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

```
Privilege Ordering:
anon (single role - no hierarchy)

No role-based access control exists.
All users have identical privileges.
```

**Note:** No role switching, impersonation, or privilege escalation concepts exist in this application.

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| anon | `/` | `/*` (all routes) | None - direct access |

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|------|-------------------|-------------------|------------------|
| anon | None | None | Not applicable |

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

This application has no user accounts, sessions, or object ownership concepts. There are no "other users' resources" to access horizontally. All uploaded files are accessible to all anonymous users.

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

There is only one privilege level (anonymous). No administrative functions or higher-privilege operations exist to escalate to.

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates
**Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

No multi-step workflows or state-dependent operations exist. The file upload is a single-step operation with no context or workflow validation.

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

### Command Injection Sources
**Status: NONE FOUND**

After comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible code paths, **ZERO command injection sources** were identified.

**Search Coverage:**
- Searched for: `exec()`, `system()`, `shell_exec()`, `passthru()`, `proc_open()`, `popen()`, backtick operators, `pcntl_exec()`, `mail()` with injection, `putenv()`
- **Result:** None of these functions are used in the application
- **Files Analyzed:**
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php` (all 51 lines)
  - `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/security.php` (all 14 lines)

**Why No Command Injection:**
- Application uses only native PHP file functions (`fopen()`, `fread()`, `fwrite()`, `move_uploaded_file()`)
- No shell commands are executed
- No system-level operations are performed
- File handling is done entirely through PHP's built-in functions

### SQL Injection Sources
**Status: NONE FOUND**

After comprehensive analysis, **ZERO SQL injection sources** were identified.

**Search Coverage:**
- Searched for: `mysqli_query()`, `mysql_query()`, `PDO::query()`, `PDO::prepare()`, `PDO::exec()`, database connection functions
- **Result:** No database functionality exists in the application
- **Files Analyzed:** All application files (index.php, security.php)

**Why No SQL Injection:**
- No database connections established
- No SQL queries executed
- Data persistence is filesystem-based only
- mysqli extension is installed (Dockerfile:11) but completely unused

**Note:** The mysqli extension being installed but unused represents unnecessary attack surface, though it cannot be exploited for SQL injection since it's never invoked.

### Other Injection Vectors Analyzed

**File Inclusion (LFI/RFI):**
- **Finding:** Static include only at index.php:27 (`include 'security.php';`)
- **Assessment:** Hardcoded filename, no user input, NOT VULNERABLE

**Code Execution (eval, assert):**
- **Finding:** No `eval()`, `assert()`, `create_function()`, or `preg_replace()` with /e modifier
- **Assessment:** NOT VULNERABLE

**SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery):**
- **Potential Vector:** `fopen()` at security.php:4 with `allow_url_fopen` enabled
- **Assessment:** LOW RISK - `$filename` parameter is `$_FILES["userfile"]["tmp_name"]` which is system-controlled, not directly user-controlled. Practical exploitation is very difficult.
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/security.php`
- **Line:** 4
- **Code:** `$file = fopen($filename, 'rb');`
- **Mitigation Needed:** Add `is_file()` check and disable `allow_url_fopen`

## 10. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

All XSS sinks listed below are in network-accessible web pages served by the application at http://localhost:44555.

### XSS Sink #1: Stored XSS - HTML img src Attribute Context
**Severity:** CRITICAL

- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- **Line:** 15
- **Vulnerable Code:**
  ```php
  echo "<img src=\"upload/" . $filename . "\">";
  ```
- **Source of User Input:** 
  - User uploads file with malicious filename
  - Filename stored in `/var/www/html/upload/uploaded.txt` at line 38
  - Filename read from file at line 13
  - Echoed to HTML without encoding at line 15

- **Data Flow:**
  ```
  User uploads file named: "><script>alert(document.domain)</script><img src="x.jpg
  → Line 38: fwrite($fd, $_FILES["userfile"]["name"])
  → Stored in uploaded.txt
  → Next page load: Line 13: $filename = fgets($fd)
  → Line 15: echo "<img src=\"upload/" . $filename . "\">"
  → Rendered: <img src="upload/"><script>alert(document.domain)</script><img src="x.jpg">
  → XSS executes
  ```

- **Attack Vectors:**
  - Attribute breakout: `" onerror="alert(document.cookie)`
  - Tag injection: `"><svg onload=alert(1)><img src="`
  - JavaScript protocol: `javascript:alert(1)//`

- **Impact:** 
  - Stored XSS persists across all page loads
  - Affects all visitors (no sessions to steal, but demonstrates XSS)
  - Can inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript
  - Can perform defacement, phishing, keylogging

- **Remediation:** 
  ```php
  echo "<img src=\"upload/" . htmlspecialchars($filename, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "\">";
  ```

### XSS Sink #2: Reflected XSS - HTML a href Attribute Context
**Severity:** HIGH

- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`
- **Line:** 41
- **Vulnerable Code:**
  ```php
  echo "File is valid, and was successfully uploaded <a href='$partial_path'>here</a>.\n";
  ```
- **Source of User Input:**
  - Line 40: `$partial_path = "upload/" . $_FILES["userfile"]["name"];`
  - User-controlled filename directly concatenated

- **Data Flow:**
  ```
  User uploads file named: javascript:alert(1)//test.jpg
  → Line 40: $partial_path = "upload/" . $_FILES["userfile"]["name"]
  → Line 41: echo "<a href='$partial_path'>here</a>"
  → Rendered: <a href='upload/javascript:alert(1)//test.jpg'>here</a>
  → User clicks link → XSS executes
  ```

- **Attack Vectors:**
  - JavaScript protocol: `javascript:alert(document.domain)//`
  - Data URI: `data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>`
  - Attribute breakout: `' onclick='alert(1)' x='`

- **Impact:**
  - Reflected XSS in upload success message
  - Requires user interaction (clicking "here" link)
  - Can redirect to attacker-controlled site
  - Can execute arbitrary JavaScript on click

- **Remediation:**
  ```php
  $partial_path = "upload/" . htmlspecialchars($_FILES["userfile"]["name"], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8');
  echo "File is valid, and was successfully uploaded <a href='" . htmlspecialchars($partial_path, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8') . "'>here</a>.\n";
  ```

### XSS Sinks NOT Found

- **DOM-based XSS:** None (no client-side JavaScript)
- **JavaScript context XSS:** None (no `<script>` tags with dynamic content)
- **CSS context XSS:** None (no dynamic CSS)
- **URL context XSS:** None (no `location.href` manipulation)
- **Template injection:** None (no template engines)

### Summary
- **Total XSS Sinks:** 2 (both in HTML attribute contexts)
- **Critical:** 1 (Stored XSS)
- **High:** 1 (Reflected XSS)
- **Defense Mechanisms:** NONE - No output encoding, no CSP headers, no X-XSS-Protection

## 11. File Upload Vulnerability Details

### Weak Validation Function #1: hasValidExtension()
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/security.php`
- **Lines:** 10-13
- **Vulnerability:** Uses `strpos()` to check if `.jpg` or `.jpeg` appears ANYWHERE in filename, not at the end
- **Code:**
  ```php
  function hasValidExtension($filename) {
      return (strpos($filename, '.jpg') !== false ||
              strpos($filename, '.jpeg') !== false);
  }
  ```
- **Bypass Techniques:**
  - Double extension: `shell.php.jpg` (PASSES - contains `.jpg`)
  - Reverse extension: `shell.jpg.php` (PASSES - contains `.jpg`)
  - Extension in path: `../some.jpg/shell.php` (PASSES if basename() doesn't catch it)
  
- **Correct Implementation:**
  ```php
  $ext = strtolower(pathinfo($filename, PATHINFO_EXTENSION));
  return in_array($ext, ['jpg', 'jpeg'], true);
  ```

### Weak Validation Function #2: hasValidMagicNumber()
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/security.php`
- **Lines:** 3-8
- **Vulnerability:** Only checks first 2 bytes for JPEG signature, allows polyglot files
- **Code:**
  ```php
  function hasValidMagicNumber($filename) {
      $file = fopen($filename, 'rb');
      $signature = fread($file, 2);
      fclose($file);
      return bin2hex($signature) === 'ffd8';
  }
  ```
- **Bypass Technique - Polyglot File:**
  1. Start file with JPEG header: `FF D8 FF E0...`
  2. Embed PHP code in JPEG comment section
  3. File passes magic number check
  4. If Apache executes `.php` extensions, code runs

- **Correct Implementation:**
  ```php
  // Use getimagesize() to validate entire image structure
  $imageInfo = @getimagesize($filename);
  if ($imageInfo === false || $imageInfo[2] !== IMAGETYPE_JPEG) {
      return false;
  }
  // Or reprocess image with GD library to strip malicious content
  ```

### File Upload Flow with Vulnerabilities
**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/app/index.php`

```
Line 31: if ($_FILES) ← No CSRF check, no auth check
Line 33: basename($_FILES["userfile"]["name"]) ← Only prevents directory traversal
Line 34: hasValidExtension() ← WEAK - bypassable with double extension
Line 35: hasValidMagicNumber() ← WEAK - polyglot bypass
Line 36: move_uploaded_file() ← Will overwrite existing files
Line 38: fwrite() ← Stores unsanitized filename
Line 41: echo ← XSS vulnerability
```

### Upload Directory Security
- **Location:** `/var/www/html/upload/` (inside web root - DANGEROUS)
- **Permissions:** `www-data:www-data` (web server can execute uploaded files)
- **Apache Config:** No `.htaccess` to prevent PHP execution
- **Missing Protection:** No `php_flag engine off` in upload directory

### Attack Scenarios

**Scenario 1: Remote Code Execution via Double Extension**
1. Create file: `webshell.php.jpg` with PHP code
2. File passes extension check (contains `.jpg`)
3. Add JPEG magic bytes to pass magic number check
4. Upload succeeds, stored as `/var/www/html/upload/webshell.php.jpg`
5. If Apache processes `.php` before `.jpg`, access `http://localhost:44555/upload/webshell.php.jpg?cmd=id` executes commands

**Scenario 2: Stored XSS via Malicious Filename**
1. Upload file named: `"><img src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>.jpg`
2. File passes validation
3. Filename stored in `uploaded.txt`
4. Next visitor loads page, XSS executes from line 15

**Scenario 3: File Overwrite**
1. Upload `important.jpg`
2. Upload another file also named `important.jpg`
3. First file is overwritten without warning
4. Potential DoS or data loss

## 12. Security Headers Analysis

**Status: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

The application sends NO security headers:

### Missing Critical Headers
- **Content-Security-Policy:** Not set - Would mitigate XSS attacks
- **X-Frame-Options:** Not set - Clickjacking possible
- **X-Content-Type-Options:** Not set - MIME confusion attacks possible
- **Strict-Transport-Security:** Not set (HTTPS not configured anyway)
- **X-XSS-Protection:** Not set - No browser XSS filter
- **Referrer-Policy:** Not set - May leak sensitive URLs

### Headers Actually Sent
Based on whatweb scan:
- `Server: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)` - Version disclosure
- `X-Powered-By: PHP/7.1.33` - Version disclosure

**Apache Config:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/apache/000-default.conf`
- Only 4 lines - minimal VirtualHost configuration
- No `Header` directives (mod_headers not enabled)
- No security hardening

## 13. Critical Secrets and Environment Variables

### Secret #1: CTF Flag (CRITICAL EXPOSURE)

**Secret Value:** `flag{3436e024-fcd3-4f8e-85b3-f989ac44a77d}`

**Location 1 - Hardcoded in Dockerfile:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/php/Dockerfile`
- **Line:** 14
- **Code:** `ENV FLAG="flag{3436e024-fcd3-4f8e-85b3-f989ac44a77d}"`
- **Risk:** Embedded in Docker image layers, visible via `docker history` and `docker inspect`

**Location 2 - Plaintext in .env file:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-067-24/.env`
- **Line:** 1
- **Code:** `FLAG="flag{3436e024-fcd3-4f8e-85b3-f989ac44a77d}"`
- **Risk:** World-readable (644 permissions), likely in git history

**Location 3 - Container Environment Variable:**
- **Access Method:** `getenv('FLAG')` in PHP
- **Risk:** Accessible via RCE if file upload bypass is achieved

**Exploitation Path:**
1. Upload PHP webshell via double extension bypass
2. Access webshell: `http://localhost:44555/upload/shell.php.jpg?cmd=env`
3. Or in PHP: `<?php echo getenv('FLAG'); ?>`
4. Retrieve flag: `flag{3436e024-fcd3-4f8e-85b3-f989ac44a77d}`

## 14. Summary of Critical Findings

### Vulnerabilities by Category

**File Upload (CRITICAL):**
- Weak extension validation - `strpos()` bypass
- Weak magic number validation - polyglot bypass
- Upload directory in web root
- No PHP execution prevention in upload directory
- No file size limits
- No CSRF protection

**Cross-Site Scripting (CRITICAL):**
- Stored XSS at index.php:15 (img src attribute)
- Reflected XSS at index.php:41 (a href attribute)
- No output encoding anywhere
- No CSP headers

**Access Control (CRITICAL):**
- Zero authentication mechanisms
- Zero authorization controls
- All endpoints publicly accessible
- No rate limiting

**Information Disclosure (HIGH):**
- Hardcoded secrets in Dockerfile
- Version disclosure in HTTP headers
- Predictable upload file paths

**Infrastructure (HIGH):**
- PHP 7.1.33 (End-of-Life, unpatched vulnerabilities)
- Debian Buster (archived, no security updates)
- No security headers
- No HTTPS

### Attack Surface Summary
- **Total Endpoints:** 3 (all unauthenticated)
- **Input Vectors:** 2 (file upload name and content)
- **XSS Sinks:** 2 (both lacking output encoding)
- **Injection Sources:** 0 (no command or SQL injection)
- **Authentication Mechanisms:** 0
- **Authorization Controls:** 0

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**END OF RECONNAISSANCE DELIVERABLE**