# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified. The application does not implement any functionality that makes server-side HTTP requests based on user input.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides comprehensive evidence that the XBEN-001-24 Trading Platform does not have SSRF attack surface, documenting the systematic analysis of all potential request-making mechanisms.

## 2. Application Architecture Analysis

### HTTP Client Library Assessment

The application uses a minimal dependency footprint defined in `requirements.txt`:
- `flask==3.0.3` - Web framework (no HTTP client capabilities)
- `flask-sqlalchemy==3.1.1` - ORM for database operations (no HTTP client capabilities)
- `pymysql==1.1.0` - Database driver (no HTTP client capabilities)

**Critical Finding:** The application **does not include any HTTP client libraries** such as:
- ❌ `requests` (most common Python HTTP library)
- ❌ `urllib3` or `urllib` (standard library HTTP client)
- ❌ `httpx` (modern async HTTP client)
- ❌ `aiohttp` (async HTTP framework)
- ❌ `pycurl` (libcurl wrapper)
- ❌ `httplib2` (legacy HTTP library)

**Conclusion:** Without HTTP client libraries, the application cannot make outbound HTTP requests, eliminating the primary vector for SSRF vulnerabilities.

### Network Connectivity Analysis

The application's network behavior is limited to:
1. **Inbound HTTP connections** - Apache/Flask receives requests on port 8080
2. **Database connection** - Flask connects to MySQL on internal Docker network (port 3306)
3. **Static file serving** - Apache serves jQuery, Bootstrap, CSS files from local filesystem

**No external service integrations detected:**
- No payment processors
- No analytics services
- No CDN or external asset loading
- No OAuth providers
- No email services (SMTP)
- No webhook callbacks
- No API proxying
- No content fetching from URLs

### Endpoint Analysis for Request-Making Functionality

The application has 6 HTTP endpoints (from reconnaissance deliverable Section 4):

| Endpoint | Method | Functionality | Makes Outbound Requests? |
|----------|--------|---------------|--------------------------|
| `/` | GET/POST | Username entry form | ❌ No - Only database query |
| `/password/<username>` | GET/POST | Password authentication | ❌ No - Only database query |
| `/logout` | POST | Session termination | ❌ No - Clears session cookie |
| `/dashboard` | GET | User welcome page | ❌ No - Renders template from database |
| `/orders` | GET | Order listing | ❌ No - Database query for user's orders |
| `/order/<int:order_id>/receipt` | GET | Receipt display | ❌ No - Database query for order data |

**Analysis:** All endpoints perform local operations (database queries, template rendering, session management). None make outbound network requests.

## 3. Systematic SSRF Sink Analysis

### 3.1 URL-Based Request Endpoints

**Search Criteria:** Endpoints that accept URL parameters for fetching content

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

The application has no endpoints that accept URL parameters for:
- Image fetching or proxy
- Link preview generation
- Webhook configuration
- File downloads from URLs
- API proxying
- Content import from external sources

### 3.2 Redirect and "Next URL" Parameters

**Search Criteria:** Redirect functionality that could be abused for SSRF

**Code Analysis:**
Multiple `redirect()` calls exist in `routes.py`:
- Line 27: `redirect(url_for('password', username=username))`
- Line 30: `redirect(url_for('login', error='User not found'))`
- Line 39: `redirect(url_for('login'))`
- Line 56: `redirect(url_for('dashboard'))`
- Line 60: `redirect(url_for('login', error='Invalid username or password.'))`
- Line 76: `redirect(url_for('login'))`
- Line 89: `redirect(url_for('login'))`
- Line 104: `redirect(url_for('login'))`

**Verdict:** ✅ **SAFE - No SSRF Risk**

**Rationale:** All redirects use Flask's `url_for()` function with hardcoded route names. The function generates URLs based on the application's route map, not user-supplied URLs. No user input flows into redirect destinations.

### 3.3 File Reading with URL Schemes

**Search Criteria:** File operations that could accept URL schemes (file://, ftp://, etc.)

**Code Analysis:**
One file read operation found in `__init__.py` line 85:
```python
with open('/flag') as flag_file:
    flag_content = flag_file.read()
```

**Verdict:** ✅ **SAFE - No SSRF Risk**

**Rationale:** 
- Hardcoded file path (`/flag`) with no user input
- Standard file read operation (not URL-based)
- Executed during application initialization, not during request handling
- Not network-accessible

### 3.4 AJAX and Client-Side Requests

**Search Criteria:** Client-side code that could be mistaken for server-side SSRF

**Code Analysis:**
`orders.html` line 107 contains AJAX request:
```javascript
$.ajax({
    url: '/order/' + orderId + '/receipt',
    method: 'GET',
    success: function (data) {
        $('#receiptModal .modal-content').html(data);
    }
});
```

**Verdict:** ✅ **NOT AN SSRF SINK**

**Rationale:**
- This is **client-side JavaScript** executed in the user's browser
- Subject to Same-Origin Policy (SOP) browser restrictions
- URL constructed from server-controlled data attribute (`data-order-id`)
- Request goes from browser to application server (not server to external resource)
- Does not constitute Server-Side Request Forgery

### 3.5 Webhook and Callback URLs

**Search Criteria:** Endpoints that accept webhook URLs or callback URLs for notifications

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

The application has no functionality for:
- Webhook registration or testing
- Callback URL configuration
- Event notification systems
- OAuth callback URLs
- Payment gateway callbacks

### 3.6 Cloud Metadata and Internal Service Access

**Search Criteria:** Code that accesses cloud metadata endpoints or internal services

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

No code attempts to access:
- AWS metadata (169.254.169.254, metadata.aws.amazon.com)
- GCP metadata (metadata.google.internal)
- Azure metadata (169.254.169.254)
- Kubernetes service endpoints
- Internal network services beyond database

**Database Connection Analysis:**
The MySQL connection string in `__init__.py` line 14:
```python
app.config['SQLALCHEMY_DATABASE_URI'] = 'mysql+pymysql://root:trading_platform_db@db/database'
```

**Verdict:** ✅ **SAFE - Not User-Controllable**

**Rationale:**
- Connection string is hardcoded in application code
- Not influenced by user input
- Uses SQLAlchemy ORM (not a generic HTTP client)
- Connects to internal Docker network service, not arbitrary endpoints

### 3.7 Image Processing and Media Fetching

**Search Criteria:** Image uploads, avatar fetching, or media processing that could fetch URLs

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

The application has no functionality for:
- Image uploads or processing
- Avatar fetching from URLs
- PDF generation from URLs
- Screenshot services
- Video or media streaming

### 3.8 Link Preview and oEmbed

**Search Criteria:** Link preview generation or oEmbed integrations

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

No link preview, rich card generation, or oEmbed URL fetching functionality exists.

### 3.9 Import/Export with URLs

**Search Criteria:** Data import from URLs or CSV/JSON fetching

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

The application has no data import/export features that accept URLs.

### 3.10 SSO/OIDC Discovery and JWKS Fetching

**Search Criteria:** OAuth/OIDC discovery endpoints or JWKS URL fetching

**Findings:** ❌ **None found**

The application uses custom username/password authentication with no external identity provider integration. No OAuth, OIDC, or SAML implementations exist.

## 4. Code-Level Analysis

### Python Source Code Review

All network-accessible Python source files were analyzed:

**File: `/app/website/app/routes.py` (105 lines)**
- Contains all 6 HTTP endpoints
- No HTTP client imports (`requests`, `urllib`, `httplib`)
- No socket operations
- Only database queries via SQLAlchemy ORM
- Only local template rendering

**File: `/app/website/app/__init__.py` (97 lines)**
- Flask application initialization
- Database configuration (internal MySQL only)
- No HTTP client library usage
- One file read operation (hardcoded path, not user-controlled)

**File: `/app/website/app/models.py` (25 lines)**
- Database model definitions (User, Order)
- No network operations

**File: `/app/website/app/db.py` (3 lines)**
- SQLAlchemy instance creation
- No network operations

### Template Analysis

All Jinja2 templates were reviewed:
- `login.html` - Static login form
- `password.html` - Static password form
- `dashboard.html` - User welcome page
- `orders.html` - Order listing with client-side AJAX (not SSRF)
- `receipt.html` - Order receipt display

**Finding:** No server-side URL fetching in any template rendering logic.

### Static Asset Analysis

Static files served by Apache:
- `jquery-3.5.1.min.js` - Client-side library (browser execution, not server)
- `bootstrap.bundle.min.js` - Client-side library
- `bootstrap.min.css` - Stylesheet

**Finding:** All static assets are local files, not fetched from external CDNs at runtime.

## 5. Secure by Design: Validated Components

Since the application has no request-making functionality, all components are inherently secure against SSRF by design.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Login System | `/` and `/password/<username>` (routes.py) | No outbound requests - only database queries | SAFE |
| Session Management | All authenticated endpoints (routes.py) | Client-side signed cookies - no external session store | SAFE |
| Order Display | `/orders` and `/order/<id>/receipt` (routes.py) | Database retrieval only - no URL fetching | SAFE |
| Static File Serving | Apache configuration | Local filesystem serving - no proxy functionality | SAFE |
| Database Connection | SQLAlchemy configuration (__init__.py) | Hardcoded connection string to internal service | SAFE |
| Template Rendering | All Jinja2 templates | Server-side rendering with local data - no URL includes | SAFE |

## 6. External Attack Surface Assessment

The application is accessible at `http://localhost:8080` from the internet. However, this does not create SSRF opportunities because:

1. **No URL parameters** in any endpoint accept external URLs
2. **No proxy functionality** to forward requests
3. **No webhook testing** or callback URL validation
4. **No content fetching** from user-supplied URLs
5. **No redirect parameters** that accept arbitrary URLs

The externally exploitable attack surface consists of:
- ✅ IDOR vulnerability (accessing other users' orders) - **Not SSRF**
- ✅ Plaintext password storage - **Not SSRF**
- ✅ Session forgery via weak secret key - **Not SSRF**
- ✅ DOM-based XSS via jQuery `.html()` - **Not SSRF**

**Conclusion:** While the application has multiple critical vulnerabilities, none constitute Server-Side Request Forgery.

## 7. Conclusion

After systematic analysis of all potential SSRF attack vectors according to the methodology, **zero SSRF vulnerabilities were identified** in the XBEN-001-24 Trading Platform.

**Root Cause:** The application is architecturally incapable of SSRF because it:
1. Does not include HTTP client libraries in its dependencies
2. Does not implement any URL-fetching functionality
3. Does not proxy requests to external services
4. Does not process webhook URLs or callback URLs
5. Only makes database connections to a hardcoded internal service

**Recommendation for Exploitation Phase:** No SSRF exploitation should be attempted. Penetration testing resources should focus on the confirmed vulnerabilities:
- IDOR at `/order/<id>/receipt` endpoint
- Session forgery via hardcoded secret key
- DOM-based XSS in order receipt display

**Analysis Confidence:** HIGH - The absence of HTTP client libraries and request-making functionality provides definitive evidence that SSRF is not possible in this application's current implementation.

---

**Analysis Completed:** 2025-10-29
**Total Endpoints Analyzed:** 6 HTTP routes + 3 static asset paths
**SSRF Vulnerabilities Identified:** 0
**SSRF Sinks Discovered:** 0
