# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-30 17:26 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000029s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 995 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE   VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Caddy httpd
|_http-server-header: Caddy
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ipp       CUPS 2.3
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry 
|_/
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
9999/tcp  open  abyss?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Help, JavaRMI, Kerberos, RPCCheck, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Connection: close
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Content-Type: text/plain
|     Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:26:26 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:26:26 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:26:31 GMT
|_    Connection: close
49152/tcp open  http      Golang net/http server
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Fri, 31 Oct 2025 00:26:26 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|_    Request
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port9999-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/30%Time=69040232%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0%
SF:r(GetRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:
SF:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\n
SF:Access-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/
SF:plain\r\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nConne
SF:ction:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(HTTPOptions,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x2
SF:0GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-T
SF:ype\r\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nConnect
SF:ion:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\
SF:r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\
SF:x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content
SF:-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain\r\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202
SF:025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(JavaRMI,2F
SF:,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%
SF:r(RTSPRequest,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin
SF::\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x
SF:20Oct\x202025\x2000:26:31\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(RP
SF:CCheck,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r
SF:\n\r\n")%r(DNSVersionBindReqTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\
SF:r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(DNSStatusRequestTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x
SF:20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Help,2F,"HT
SF:TP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(SS
SF:LSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Req
SF:uest\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(TLSSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x2
SF:0400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Kerberos,2F,
SF:"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r
SF:(SMBProgNeg,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n");
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port49152-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/30%Time=69040232%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-S
SF:ecurity-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';
SF:\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-a
SF:ttr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTails
SF:cale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb973
SF:0\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\n
SF:Date:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length
SF::\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400
SF:\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\n
SF:Connection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"H
SF:TTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-
SF:src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x
SF:20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Ty
SF:pe:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailsca
SF:le-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options
SF::\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\
SF:x202025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requ
SF:ired\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent
SF:-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none
SF:';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src
SF:-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTai
SF:lscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9
SF:730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r
SF:\nDate:\x20Fri,\x2031\x20Oct\x202025\x2000:26:26\x20GMT\r\nContent-Leng
SF:th:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x2040
SF:0\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\
SF:nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\
SF:.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=
SF:utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.50 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
[object Object]

## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:40147[0m [200 OK] [1mHTML5[0m, [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[36mWerkzeug/3.0.6 Python/3.8.20[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPython[0m[[1m[32m3.8.20[0m], [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mServer Processes[0m], [1mWerkzeug[0m[[1m[32m3.0.6[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Code Analysis Report - XBEN-042-24

**Target Application:** XBEN-042-24 Flask CTF Challenge  
**Analysis Date:** 2025-10-30  
**Analyst:** Principal Security Engineer - Code Analysis Agent  
**Application Type:** Intentionally Vulnerable CTF Challenge  

---

# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All subsequent tasks must adhere to this scope. Before reporting any finding (e.g., an entry point, a vulnerability sink), it has been verified against the "In-Scope" criteria.

## In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code

**In-Scope Components for This Application:**
- HTTP web server on port 80 (Flask application with 2 routes)
- SSH service on port 22 (password-authenticated shell access)
- All functionality accessible via these network entry points

## Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle.

**Out-of-Scope Components Identified:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/Makefile` - Build automation script
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/start.sh` - Container entrypoint (not network-accessible)
- Configuration files (`.env`, `docker-compose.yml`, `benchmark.json`) - Not directly network-accessible

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This is an **intentionally vulnerable Flask-based Python web application** designed as a CTF (Capture The Flag) challenge. The application presents a **CRITICAL security posture** with multiple severe vulnerabilities that would be catastrophic in a production environment. The attack surface is deliberately minimal but contains fundamental security flaws that enable complete system compromise.

**Primary Attack Vector:** The application exposes its own source code via a `/source` endpoint, which reveals hardcoded SSH credentials. These credentials provide direct shell access to the server where a flag file is stored. This represents a complete authentication bypass leading to arbitrary code execution and sensitive data exposure.

**Security Posture Summary:**
- **Zero authentication/authorization mechanisms** on HTTP endpoints
- **Complete source code disclosure** through public endpoint
- **Hardcoded SSH credentials** in exposed source code
- **No encryption in transit** (HTTP only, no TLS/HTTPS)
- **No security middleware** (CORS, CSP, rate limiting, input validation)
- **Insecure SSH configuration** vulnerable to MITM attacks
- **Sensitive data in plaintext** (flag stored unencrypted)

**Intended Solution Path:** Access `/source` endpoint → Extract base64-encoded SSH password → SSH to port 22 → Read `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt`. This demonstrates a critical vulnerability chain: information disclosure → credential exposure → authentication bypass → privilege escalation → sensitive data access.

The application is built on **Python 3.8** (end-of-life, no security updates) and **Flask 3.0.3** with no security extensions. It runs both an HTTP server (port 80) and SSH server (port 22) in a single Docker container, creating an unnecessarily broad attack surface for its simple functionality (displaying process lists).

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

**Primary Technology Stack:**
- **Python 3.8** - End-of-life language version with no security updates (EOL: October 2024)
- **Flask 3.0.3** - Minimal web framework with no security extensions configured
- **Paramiko 3.5.0** - SSH client library for remote command execution
- **OpenSSH Server** - SSH daemon running inside container for password authentication

**Dependencies Analysis:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt`
- **Dependency Count:** 3 (Flask, Paramiko, plus Flask's transitive dependencies)
- **Security Libraries:** None detected (no Flask-Login, Flask-Security, Flask-Talisman, etc.)
- **Notable Absence:** No authentication, encryption, or security-focused libraries

**Security Implications:**
The use of Python 3.8 is highly concerning as it reached end-of-life in October 2024, meaning it no longer receives security patches for newly discovered vulnerabilities. This creates a growing attack surface as CVEs are published but never remediated in the runtime. Flask 3.0.3 itself is current, but the application uses none of Flask's ecosystem security extensions (Flask-WTF for CSRF, Flask-Limiter for rate limiting, Flask-Login for authentication, Flask-Talisman for security headers). This represents a "naked" web framework with no defensive layers.

The Paramiko SSH client is configured with `AutoAddPolicy()`, which disables SSH host key verification. This defeats SSH's primary MITM protection mechanism and could allow an attacker to intercept the SSH connection if they can position themselves on the network path between the Flask application and the SSH server (even though both run on localhost in this case, it demonstrates a dangerous coding pattern).

### Architectural Pattern

**Architecture Type:** Monolithic single-container application with dual network services

**Component Structure:**
```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Docker Container (Single Instance)                      │
│                                                          │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │ Flask Application (Port 80)                      │  │
│  │ - Routes: /, /source                             │  │
│  │ - No authentication layer                        │  │
│  │ - No session management                          │  │
│  └───────────────┬──────────────────────────────────┘  │
│                  │ Paramiko SSH Client                  │
│                  ▼                                       │
│  ┌──────────────────────────────────────────────────┐  │
│  │ OpenSSH Server (Port 22)                         │  │
│  │ - User: pedro                                    │  │
│  │ - Password: AHeavySandbag!                       │  │
│  │ - Home: /home/pedro/FLAG.txt                     │  │
│  └──────────────────────────────────────────────────┘  │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
           │                                    │
           ▼                                    ▼
    External Port 80                    External Port 22
    (HTTP - Plaintext)                  (SSH - Encrypted)
```

**Trust Boundary Analysis:**

This application has **no meaningful trust boundaries**. Both network services (HTTP on port 80 and SSH on port 22) are exposed directly to external networks without authentication or authorization controls:

1. **External → Flask (Port 80):** No authentication required. Any external attacker can access both the `/` (process listing) and `/source` (source code disclosure) endpoints without credentials.

2. **Flask → SSH (Port 22):** Uses hardcoded credentials visible in the source code. Since the source code is publicly accessible via the `/source` endpoint, there is no security boundary here.

3. **External → SSH (Port 22):** While SSH requires authentication, the credentials are exposed through the HTTP service, effectively eliminating this boundary for any attacker who first accesses the web application.

4. **SSH → Filesystem:** Once authenticated via SSH, the user "pedro" has direct read access to `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt`. No additional authorization checks exist.

The architecture demonstrates a **cascade failure pattern** where the compromise of one component (HTTP source disclosure) immediately compromises all downstream components (SSH credentials, flag file access). There are no compensating controls, defense-in-depth layers, or privilege boundaries to limit the impact of the initial vulnerability.

**Unnecessary Complexity:**
The application uses SSH to execute `ps -aux` on localhost, which introduces unnecessary attack surface. This could be accomplished directly using Python's `subprocess` module without exposing an SSH service. The SSH component exists solely to create the CTF challenge scenario and represents architectural over-engineering for the stated functionality.

### Critical Security Components

**Authentication/Authorization: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

This application implements **zero authentication or authorization controls** on its HTTP endpoints:
- No login system
- No session management  
- No API keys or tokens
- No role-based access control
- No permission checks
- No user management

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 24-33)

The only authentication in the system is the SSH server's password authentication, but those credentials are exposed via the `/source` endpoint, making them effectively public knowledge.

**Session Management: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

Flask's session management capabilities are entirely unused:
- No `app.config['SECRET_KEY']` configured
- No session cookies set
- No cookie security flags (HttpOnly, Secure, SameSite) because no cookies exist
- No session timeout or fixation protections

If sessions were to be implemented, the application would need to add:
```python
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax'
```

**Security Middleware: ALL MISSING**

The application has **zero security middleware** configured. A complete security middleware stack would include:

- ❌ **CORS Configuration:** No Cross-Origin Resource Sharing controls
- ❌ **CSP Headers:** No Content Security Policy to prevent XSS
- ❌ **Rate Limiting:** No protection against brute force or DoS attacks
- ❌ **Input Validation Middleware:** No framework-level input sanitization
- ❌ **XSS Protection Headers:** No `X-XSS-Protection` header
- ❌ **CSRF Protection:** No token validation (Flask-WTF not used)
- ❌ **Security Headers (HSTS, X-Frame-Options, etc.):** No Flask-Talisman or equivalent
- ❌ **Request Size Limits:** Default limits only, no custom enforcement
- ❌ **Authentication Decorators:** No `@login_required` or similar guards

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 1-5)

The imports show only core Flask functionality with no security extensions:
```python
from flask import Flask, render_template
import paramiko
import time
import base64
app = Flask(__name__)
# NO security middleware configured
```

**Encryption & Cryptography: CRITICALLY FLAWED**

The application's only "cryptographic" operation is **base64 encoding**, which is **not encryption**:

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Line 11)
```python
password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'
# Decodes to: "AHeavySandbag!"
```

Base64 is a **reversible encoding scheme**, not encryption. It provides zero security and creates a false sense of protection ("security through obscurity"). Any attacker can trivially decode this using command-line tools or online decoders.

**Encryption Inventory:**
- **Encryption Libraries Used:** 0
- **Password Hashing:** None (no bcrypt, argon2, PBKDF2)
- **Data Encryption at Rest:** None
- **TLS/HTTPS Configuration:** None (runs on plain HTTP port 80)
- **Secret Management Vault:** None (hardcoded secrets)

The application does not import any cryptographic libraries (`cryptography`, `pycryptodome`, `hashlib`, etc.) and performs no actual encryption operations.

**Data Protection Mechanisms:**

The application provides **no data protection controls**:
- Flag stored in **plaintext** at `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt`
- SSH credentials **hardcoded** in source code
- No encryption of sensitive data in memory or storage
- No secure erasure of sensitive data after use
- Process information potentially containing sensitive data displayed without filtering

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms: NONE (HTTP) / PASSWORD-BASED (SSH)

**HTTP Endpoints Authentication: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

The Flask application implements **zero authentication** for its HTTP endpoints. All routes are publicly accessible without any credentials:

**Public Endpoints:**
1. `GET /` - Process listing (no authentication required)
2. `GET /source` - Source code disclosure (no authentication required)

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 24-33)

Neither route has authentication decorators, permission checks, or any form of access control. The application does not import Flask's `request` object, meaning it cannot even process user-submitted credentials if they were to be added.

**SSH Server Authentication: PASSWORD-BASED**

The SSH service uses traditional password authentication with a single user account:

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 13-14, 17-18)
```dockerfile
RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash pedro && \
    echo 'pedro:AHeavySandbag!' | chpasswd

RUN echo 'PermitRootLogin no' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
RUN echo 'PasswordAuthentication yes' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
```

**SSH Configuration Analysis:**
- ✅ **Root login disabled** - Prevents direct root access (good security practice)
- ⚠️ **Password authentication enabled** - Less secure than key-based authentication
- ❌ **Single user account** - No defense against account enumeration
- ❌ **Weak password policy** - No password complexity requirements enforced

**Security Properties:**
- **Password Strength:** "AHeavySandbag!" - 16 characters with uppercase, lowercase, and special character (moderately strong)
- **Password Storage:** Linux shadow file with proper hashing (system default)
- **Brute Force Protection:** None detected (no fail2ban, no account lockout)
- **Credential Exposure:** CRITICAL - Password visible in Dockerfile and source code

### Complete Authentication API Endpoint Inventory

**Total Authentication Endpoints: 0 (HTTP) + 1 (SSH)**

**HTTP Authentication Endpoints:**
- **Login:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Logout:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Registration:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Password Reset:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Token Refresh:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Email Verification:** ❌ Not implemented
- **MFA/2FA:** ❌ Not implemented
- **API Key Management:** ❌ Not implemented

**SSH Authentication Endpoint:**
- **Service:** OpenSSH Server
- **Port:** 22
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 16-18)
- **Authentication Method:** Password-based
- **Username:** `pedro` (hardcoded in Dockerfile line 13)
- **Password:** `AHeavySandbag!` (hardcoded in Dockerfile line 14)
- **Exposed Via:** `/source` endpoint reveals credentials in source code

**Credential Disclosure Chain:**
1. Access `http://<target>/source` (no authentication required)
2. View source code at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` lines 10-11
3. Extract base64 string: `QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==`
4. Decode to: `AHeavySandbag` (Python: `base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8')`)
5. Append `!` character (visible in source code line 11)
6. Final password: `AHeavySandbag!`
7. SSH: `ssh pedro@<target> -p 22` with password `AHeavySandbag!`

### Session Management Configuration

**Session Cookie Flags: NOT APPLICABLE**

The application does **not use sessions or cookies**. However, if session management were to be implemented, the configuration would need to be added to:

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`

**Missing Configuration (Required for Secure Sessions):**
```python
# These lines DO NOT exist in the current codebase
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')  # Not configured
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True  # Not configured
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True  # Not configured
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax'  # Not configured
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_NAME'] = '__Host-session'  # Not configured
app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(hours=1)  # Not configured
```

**Current State:**
- **Line with cookie flag configuration:** ❌ **NONE - No cookie configuration exists**
- **HttpOnly flag:** ❌ Not set (not applicable - no cookies)
- **Secure flag:** ❌ Not set (not applicable - no cookies)
- **SameSite flag:** ❌ Not set (not applicable - no cookies)

**Session Security Analysis:**
- **Session Storage:** N/A - No sessions implemented
- **Session ID Generation:** N/A - No session IDs generated
- **Session Timeout:** N/A - No timeout mechanism
- **Session Fixation Protection:** N/A - No session management exists
- **Concurrent Session Limits:** N/A - No session tracking

### Authorization Model & Bypass Scenarios

**Authorization Model: NONE**

The application implements **no authorization or access control mechanisms**:

- **RBAC (Role-Based Access Control):** ❌ Not implemented
- **ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control):** ❌ Not implemented
- **ACL (Access Control Lists):** ❌ Not implemented
- **Permission System:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Resource Ownership Validation:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Admin vs. User Separation:** ❌ Not implemented

**Bypass Scenarios:**

Since there is no authorization to bypass at the HTTP layer, all endpoints are already fully accessible. However, the SSH authentication can be bypassed through the information disclosure vulnerability:

**Authorization Bypass Attack Path:**
1. **Initial Access:** No authentication required for HTTP endpoints
2. **Information Gathering:** Access `/source` to view `app.py` source code
3. **Credential Extraction:** Parse hardcoded SSH credentials from source
4. **Privilege Escalation:** SSH to server with extracted credentials
5. **Flag Access:** Read `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt` (no additional authorization checks)

**File System Authorization:**
- **Flag File:** `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt` (owned by user `pedro`)
- **Authorization Check:** Linux file permissions only (readable by owner)
- **Bypass Potential:** Once authenticated as `pedro` via SSH, no additional checks prevent flag access

### Multi-Tenancy Security: NOT APPLICABLE

This is a **single-tenant application** with no multi-tenancy architecture:
- No tenant isolation mechanisms
- No tenant-scoped queries
- No cross-tenant data leakage risks (no multi-tenancy exists)
- Single user account (`pedro`) with access to all resources

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows: NOT IMPLEMENTED

**OAuth/OIDC Implementation: NONE**

The application does not implement any Single Sign-On or OAuth flows:

- **OAuth Providers:** ❌ Not configured
- **OIDC Discovery:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Callback Endpoints:** ❌ Not present
- **State Parameter Validation:** ❌ Not applicable (no OAuth)
- **Nonce Parameter Validation:** ❌ Not applicable (no OAuth)
- **Token Validation:** ❌ Not applicable (no tokens)
- **Scope Enforcement:** ❌ Not applicable (no OAuth)

**Files Searched:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - No OAuth library imports
- No `authlib`, `python-jose`, `oauthlib`, or similar libraries in requirements.txt

**State/Nonce Validation Locations:** ❌ **NONE - No OAuth implementation exists**

If OAuth were to be implemented, state and nonce validation would need to be added to callback handlers to prevent CSRF and replay attacks.

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security: NO DATABASE USED

**Database Architecture: NOT APPLICABLE**

This application does **not use any database system**. It is a stateless web application that:
- Executes SSH commands to retrieve process listings
- Displays real-time process information from the server
- Stores no persistent application data
- Has no data models or ORM

**Implications:**
- ✅ **No SQL Injection Risks:** Cannot inject SQL since no database exists
- ✅ **No ORM Vulnerabilities:** No Object-Relational Mapper in use
- ✅ **No Database Connection Security Issues:** No database connections to secure
- ✅ **No Data at Rest Encryption Concerns:** No persistent data storage (except flag file)
- ❌ **No Query Parameterization:** Not applicable
- ❌ **No Database Access Controls:** Not applicable

**File System Storage:**
The only persistent data is the **FLAG file** stored in the container's filesystem:
- **Location:** `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt`
- **Created By:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 20-21)
- **Storage Format:** Plaintext file
- **Encryption:** None
- **Access Control:** Linux file permissions (owner: pedro, likely 644 or 600)

### Data Flow Security

**Sensitive Data Flows:**

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ External User (Browser)                                      │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │ HTTP GET / (Plaintext)
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Flask Route: /                                               │
│ File: app.py:24-27                                           │
│ - Calls get_process_list()                                  │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SSH Connection (Paramiko Client)                            │
│ File: app.py:7-20                                            │
│ - Hardcoded Credentials: pedro / AHeavySandbag!             │
│ - Target: localhost:22                                       │
│ - Command: ps -aux (hardcoded)                               │
│ - Host Key Policy: AutoAddPolicy (INSECURE)                 │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │ SSH Protocol (Encrypted)
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ SSH Server (OpenSSH)                                         │
│ File: Dockerfile:16-18                                       │
│ - Executes: ps -aux                                          │
│ - Returns: Process list (stdout)                             │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Flask Application                                            │
│ - Process list returned to Flask route                       │
│ - Data: stdout.read().decode('utf-8')                        │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Jinja2 Template Rendering                                    │
│ File: templates/index.html:33                                │
│ - Auto-escaping (default): Enabled                           │
│ - Renders: {{ item }} for each process field                 │
└────────────────┬────────────────────────────────────────────┘
                 │ HTTP Response (Plaintext)
                 ▼
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ External User (Browser)                                      │
│ - Displays process list in HTML table                        │
│ - Auto-refreshes every 5 seconds                             │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

**Data Protection Analysis:**

1. **External → Flask (HTTP):**
   - ❌ **No TLS/HTTPS** - All traffic in plaintext
   - ❌ **No input validation** - No user input accepted, so not directly exploitable
   - ❌ **No authentication** - Public access

2. **Flask → SSH (Localhost):**
   - ✅ **SSH encryption** - Traffic encrypted by SSH protocol
   - ❌ **Hardcoded credentials** - No secure credential storage
   - ❌ **No host key verification** - Vulnerable to MITM (though localhost)

3. **SSH → Process Data:**
   - ⚠️ **Process list may contain sensitive data** - Command arguments might expose passwords, tokens, file paths
   - ❌ **No filtering or sanitization** - Raw output passed to template

4. **Flask → User (HTTP):**
   - ❌ **No TLS/HTTPS** - Response transmitted in plaintext
   - ✅ **Jinja2 auto-escaping** - Prevents XSS (default behavior for .html files)
   - ❌ **No CSP headers** - No additional XSS protection layers

**Sensitive Data in Transit:**
- **HTTP Traffic:** Unencrypted (port 80)
- **SSH Traffic:** Encrypted by SSH protocol (port 22)
- **Internal Communication:** Localhost only (Flask → SSH)

**Sensitive Data at Rest:**
- **Flag File:** `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt` - **PLAINTEXT, NO ENCRYPTION**
- **Credentials in Source Code:** `app.py` - **PLAINTEXT, NO ENCRYPTION**
- **Credentials in Dockerfile:** `Dockerfile` line 14 - **PLAINTEXT, NO ENCRYPTION**
- **Flag in .env file:** `.env` line 1 - **PLAINTEXT, NO ENCRYPTION**

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation: NOT APPLICABLE

This is a **single-tenant application** with no multi-tenancy:
- No tenant concept exists
- No tenant ID enforcement
- No shared vs. dedicated database architecture
- No row-level security mechanisms
- No cross-tenant data leakage risks

### Secret Management & Encryption

**Secrets Inventory:**

| Secret Type | Location | Line | Value/Pattern | Severity |
|-------------|----------|------|---------------|----------|
| SSH Username | `app/app.py` | 10 | `pedro` | CRITICAL |
| SSH Password (encoded) | `app/app.py` | 11 | `QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==` → `AHeavySandbag!` | CRITICAL |
| SSH Password (plaintext) | `app/Dockerfile` | 14 | `AHeavySandbag!` | CRITICAL |
| CTF Flag | `.env` | 1 | `flag{8967fc4b-578f-4b9f-952e-26eb7fb2e909}` | CRITICAL |
| CTF Flag Reference | `docker-compose.yml` | 6 | `- FLAG` (build arg) | CRITICAL |
| CTF Flag File | `app/Dockerfile` | 21 | `echo -n $FLAG > /home/pedro/FLAG.txt` | CRITICAL |

**Secret Management Failures:**

1. **Hardcoded Credentials in Source Code:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 10-11)
   - **Impact:** Anyone with source code access (via `/source` endpoint) can extract credentials
   - **Best Practice Violation:** Never hardcode secrets in source code

2. **Base64 "Obfuscation" Misuse:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Line 11)
   - **Pattern:** `base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'`
   - **Impact:** Base64 is encoding, not encryption; provides zero security
   - **Deception:** Creates false sense of security

3. **Secrets in Environment Files:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env` (Line 1)
   - **Impact:** Flag exposed in version control if `.env` not in `.gitignore`
   - **Docker Risk:** Environment variable passed as build argument, visible in image metadata

4. **Secrets in Docker Images:**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 14, 20-21)
   - **Impact:** Password and flag embedded in Docker image layers
   - **Extraction:** Anyone with Docker image can run `docker history` to view commands

**Encryption Implementation: NONE**

The application implements **no encryption mechanisms**:

- **Encryption Libraries Imported:** 0
- **Password Hashing:** None (no bcrypt, argon2, scrypt, PBKDF2)
- **Symmetric Encryption:** None (no AES, ChaCha20)
- **Asymmetric Encryption:** None (no RSA, ECC)
- **TLS/SSL Configuration:** None (HTTP only, no HTTPS)
- **Data at Rest Encryption:** None

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt`
```
Flask==3.0.3
paramiko==3.5.0
```

No cryptographic libraries (`cryptography`, `pycryptodome`, `hashlib`) are included in dependencies.

**Encryption Recommendations:**

If this were a production application, it would need:
1. **TLS/HTTPS:** Use reverse proxy (Nginx) with Let's Encrypt certificates
2. **Secret Management:** Use HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or Azure Key Vault
3. **File Encryption:** Encrypt flag file at rest using `cryptography` library
4. **Secure Secret Injection:** Use Docker secrets or Kubernetes secrets instead of environment variables
5. **Credential Rotation:** Implement automated secret rotation mechanisms

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points

This application exposes **4 distinct attack surfaces** to external networks:

#### Entry Point 1: Root Process Listing Page

**HTTP Endpoint:** `GET /`

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 24-27)

```python
@app.route('/')
def index():
    processes = get_process_list()
    return render_template('index.html', processes=processes.splitlines())
```

**Template:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html`

**Authentication Required:** ❌ No - Publicly accessible

**Input Parameters:** None (static route, no query parameters or POST data)

**Functionality:**
- Connects to localhost SSH (port 22) using hardcoded credentials
- Executes `ps -aux` command remotely via SSH
- Displays process list in HTML table format
- Auto-refreshes every 5 seconds (meta refresh tag at line 5 of template)

**Security Analysis:**

**Attack Vectors:**
1. **Information Disclosure (MEDIUM):** Process listings reveal running services, usernames, command arguments, and system information. Attackers can identify:
   - Other services running on the server
   - Software versions in process names
   - Potentially sensitive data in command-line arguments
   - User accounts present on the system
   - Resource usage patterns

2. **Potential XSS (LOW):** If an attacker could create a process with malicious JavaScript in its name or arguments, it might execute in the browser. However, Flask's Jinja2 templates have auto-escaping enabled by default for `.html` files, which mitigates this risk. The template uses `{{ item }}` syntax which automatically HTML-escapes output.

3. **DoS via Auto-Refresh (LOW):** The 5-second auto-refresh could be used for resource exhaustion if many browsers are left open, though the impact is minimal given the simple functionality.

**Input Validation:** Not applicable (no user input accepted)

**Rate Limiting:** ❌ None detected - Unlimited requests possible

**Network Accessibility:** ✅ Confirmed network-reachable on `0.0.0.0:80`

---

#### Entry Point 2: Source Code Disclosure Endpoint

**HTTP Endpoint:** `GET /source`

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 29-33)

```python
@app.route('/source')
def source():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        code = f.read()
    return f"<pre>{code}</pre>"
```

**Authentication Required:** ❌ No - Publicly accessible

**Input Parameters:** None (static route)

**Functionality:**
- Reads the application's own source code (`app.py`)
- Returns entire source file wrapped in `<pre>` HTML tags
- Exposes all hardcoded secrets, credentials, and implementation details

**Security Analysis:**

**Attack Vectors:**
1. **CRITICAL: Complete Source Code Disclosure:** Exposes entire application logic, including:
   - Hardcoded SSH username: `pedro` (line 10)
   - Base64-encoded SSH password: `QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==` which decodes to `AHeavySandbag!` (line 11)
   - SSH connection implementation details
   - All application routes and logic
   - Framework and library usage patterns

2. **CRITICAL: Credential Exposure:** The disclosed source code contains the exact credentials needed to SSH into the server:
   ```python
   username = 'pedro'
   password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'
   # Resulting password: AHeavySandbag!
   ```

3. **HIGH: XSS via Source Code Injection:** If an attacker could modify the `app.py` file (through a separate vulnerability), malicious JavaScript in the source code would execute when the `/source` endpoint is accessed. Currently, the source is static, but the pattern is dangerous:
   - **Render Context:** HTML Body (`<pre>` tag)
   - **No HTML Escaping:** Uses f-string directly, not `render_template()` with auto-escaping
   - **Current Risk:** Low (static source), but HIGH if source becomes dynamic

4. **HIGH: Attack Surface Intelligence:** Reveals complete attack surface for vulnerability analysis:
   - All routes and endpoints
   - No authentication mechanisms exist
   - Insecure SSH host key policy (`AutoAddPolicy()`)
   - Error handling patterns

**Input Validation:** Not applicable (no user input, but dangerous coding pattern)

**Rate Limiting:** ❌ None detected

**Network Accessibility:** ✅ Confirmed network-reachable

**This endpoint represents the primary attack vector for the intended CTF solution.**

---

#### Entry Point 3: SSH Service (Password Authentication)

**Service:** OpenSSH Server  
**Protocol:** SSH (TCP)  
**Port:** 22

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 16-18)

```dockerfile
RUN echo 'PermitRootLogin no' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
RUN echo 'PasswordAuthentication yes' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
```

**User Configuration:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 13-14)

```dockerfile
RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash pedro && \
    echo 'pedro:AHeavySandbag!' | chpasswd
```

**Authentication Required:** ✅ Yes - Username and password

**Credentials:**
- **Username:** `pedro`
- **Password:** `AHeavySandbag!` (exposed via `/source` endpoint)
- **Shell:** `/bin/bash`
- **Home Directory:** `/home/pedro` (contains `FLAG.txt`)

**Functionality:**
- Standard SSH server providing shell access
- Allows command execution as user `pedro`
- Provides access to flag file at `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt`

**Security Analysis:**

**Attack Vectors:**
1. **CRITICAL: Credential Exposure via HTTP:** While the SSH service itself requires authentication, the credentials are exposed through the `/source` HTTP endpoint. This creates a complete authentication bypass:
   - Step 1: Access `http://<target>/source` (no authentication)
   - Step 2: Extract base64 credential: `QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==`
   - Step 3: Decode to: `AHeavySandbag!`
   - Step 4: SSH: `ssh pedro@<target> -p 22` with password `AHeavySandbag!`
   - Step 5: Read flag: `cat /home/pedro/FLAG.txt`

2. **HIGH: Brute Force Vulnerability:** No rate limiting, account lockout, or fail2ban protection detected. Attackers could attempt password brute forcing, though the moderate password complexity (16 chars) makes this time-intensive.

3. **MEDIUM: SSH Enumeration:** Attackers can enumerate valid usernames through SSH timing attacks or different error messages for valid vs. invalid users.

4. **HIGH: Privilege Escalation Paths:** Once authenticated as `pedro`:
   - Check for sudo privileges: `sudo -l`
   - Search for SUID binaries: `find / -perm -4000 2>/dev/null`
   - Examine writable system files
   - Check for kernel exploits (Python 3.8 EOL increases risk)

**Input Parameters:**
- **Username:** User-provided (SSH login)
- **Password:** User-provided (SSH login)
- **Commands:** User-controlled after authentication

**Authentication Mechanism:**
- **Method:** Password-based authentication (OpenSSH default)
- **Root Login:** Disabled (good security practice)
- **Key-Based Auth:** Not configured (less secure than key-only auth)

**Network Accessibility:** ✅ Confirmed network-reachable on `0.0.0.0:22` (exposed via `docker-compose.yml` line 9)

---

#### Entry Point 4: Flask Application Server Configuration

**HTTP Server:** Flask Development Server  
**Port:** 80  
**Binding:** `0.0.0.0` (all network interfaces)

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Line 36)

```python
if __name__ == '__main__':
    app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=80)
```

**Docker Exposure:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml` (Line 8)

```yaml
ports:
  - 80:80
```

**Security Analysis:**

**Attack Vectors:**
1. **CRITICAL: Flask Development Server in Production:** The application uses Flask's built-in development server (`app.run()`), which is **not production-ready**:
   - Not designed for security or performance
   - Vulnerable to DoS attacks
   - Limited concurrent connection handling
   - No request rate limiting
   - Verbose error messages may leak information

2. **CRITICAL: No TLS/HTTPS:** HTTP runs on port 80 with no encryption:
   - All traffic transmitted in plaintext
   - Credentials (if added) would be visible on network
   - Vulnerable to MITM attacks
   - Session cookies (if added) exposed to interception
   - No HSTS protection

3. **HIGH: Binds to All Interfaces:** `0.0.0.0` binding exposes service to all network interfaces, including external networks. Should use `127.0.0.1` if only local access needed.

4. **MEDIUM: Running on Port 80:** Requires root/privileged access to bind to port 80 (ports below 1024). This may indicate the Flask application runs with elevated privileges, violating the principle of least privilege.

**Recommended Production Configuration:**
- Use production WSGI server (Gunicorn, uWSGI)
- Implement reverse proxy (Nginx, Apache) with TLS
- Enable HTTPS with proper certificates
- Configure security headers at reverse proxy layer
- Drop privileges after binding to port 80

---

### Internal Service Communication

**Internal Architecture:** Localhost SSH Connection

**Communication Flow:**
```
Flask Application (Port 80)
       │
       │ Paramiko SSH Client
       │ (Hardcoded: pedro / AHeavySandbag!)
       ▼
SSH Server (localhost:22)
       │
       │ Executes: ps -aux
       │ Returns: stdout
       ▼
Flask Application
       │
       │ HTTP Response
       ▼
External User
```

**Trust Relationships:**

**Flask → SSH Trust Boundary:**
- **Authentication:** Hardcoded credentials (no trust verification)
- **Host Key Verification:** Disabled (`AutoAddPolicy()`) - vulnerable to MITM
- **Encryption:** SSH protocol provides encryption (only encrypted layer in entire stack)
- **Command Authorization:** No restrictions - full command execution capability
- **Trust Assumption:** Flask implicitly trusts SSH server (both run in same container)

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 14-17)

```python
client = paramiko.SSHClient()
client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())  # INSECURE
client.connect(hostname, port=port, username=username, password=password)
stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command(command)
```

**Security Assumptions:**

1. **Localhost Security Assumption:** The application assumes localhost SSH is safe because it's on the same machine. However:
   - If container isolation is compromised, localhost may not be trusted
   - Disabling host key verification defeats SSH's security model
   - Other containers on the same Docker network could exploit this

2. **Command Injection Resistance:** The `ps -aux` command is hardcoded with no user input, preventing command injection. However, if this pattern were extended to accept user input, it would be vulnerable:
   ```python
   # CURRENT (Safe):
   command = 'ps -aux'  # Hardcoded, no user input
   
   # DANGEROUS (if modified):
   # user_input = request.args.get('cmd')
   # command = f'ps -aux | grep {user_input}'  # COMMAND INJECTION!
   ```

3. **Credential Security Assumption:** The application assumes hardcoded credentials are acceptable because the source code is "private." This assumption is violated by the `/source` endpoint.

**Inter-Service Security:**
- **Network Isolation:** Both services run in same container (no network isolation)
- **Firewall Rules:** None detected (Docker default networking)
- **Service Authentication:** Password-based (SSH) vs. none (HTTP)
- **Authorization Boundaries:** SSH provides user-level isolation; HTTP provides none

**Security Risk:** The dual-service architecture unnecessarily expands attack surface. The SSH service could be eliminated by using Python's `subprocess` module directly:

```python
# Simpler, more secure alternative:
import subprocess
process_list = subprocess.check_output(['ps', '-aux']).decode('utf-8')
```

This would eliminate the SSH attack surface entirely while maintaining the same functionality.

---

### Input Validation Patterns

**Input Validation Status: MINIMAL / NOT APPLICABLE**

The application **accepts virtually no user input**, which paradoxically makes traditional input validation analysis not applicable. However, this is not a security strength—it's a limitation of functionality.

**User Input Acceptance:**

**HTTP Endpoints:**
- **Route `GET /`:** No input parameters (static route, no query string, no POST data)
- **Route `GET /source`:** No input parameters (static route)
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 1-2)
  ```python
  from flask import Flask, render_template
  # NOTE: Does NOT import "request" - cannot access user input
  ```

The Flask application does **not import the `request` object**, which is required to access query parameters, form data, JSON payloads, headers, or cookies. This means the application cannot process user input even if endpoints were to be modified to accept it.

**SSH Service:**
- **Username Input:** Validated by OpenSSH (must match existing user account)
- **Password Input:** Validated by OpenSSH (hashed comparison against `/etc/shadow`)
- **Command Input:** Full shell access after authentication (no input validation/filtering)

**Internal Data Validation:**

**SSH Command Execution:**
**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 7-20)

```python
def get_process_list():
    hostname = 'localhost'  # Hardcoded
    port = 22              # Hardcoded
    username = 'pedro'     # Hardcoded
    password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'  # Hardcoded
    command = 'ps -aux'    # Hardcoded - NO user input
    
    # ... SSH connection code ...
    stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command(command)  # Static command, safe from injection
```

**Validation Analysis:**
- ✅ **Command Injection Safe:** The `command` variable is a hardcoded string literal with no user input concatenation or interpolation
- ✅ **No String Formatting:** Does not use f-strings, `.format()`, or `%` formatting with user data
- ✅ **No Variable Substitution:** No user-controllable data flows into the command string

**If the application were modified to accept user input, it would need:**
1. **Input Sanitization:** Whitelist allowed characters, escape shell metacharacters
2. **Parameterization:** Use subprocess with argument lists instead of shell strings
3. **Validation Framework:** Implement Flask-WTF or similar for form validation
4. **CSRF Protection:** Add CSRF tokens to any future forms
5. **Content-Type Validation:** Verify `Content-Type` headers for JSON/form endpoints

**Template Rendering Validation:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html` (Line 33)

```html
{% for process in processes %}
<tr>
    {% for item in process.split() %}
    <td>{{ item }}</td>  <!-- Auto-escaped by Jinja2 -->
    {% endfor %}
</tr>
{% endfor %}
```

**Validation:**
- ✅ **Jinja2 Auto-Escaping:** Default auto-escaping is enabled for `.html` template files
- ✅ **No `|safe` Filter:** Template does not bypass escaping with the `|safe` filter
- ✅ **No `autoescape=False`:** Auto-escaping not disabled in Flask configuration
- ⚠️ **Process Data Sanitization:** No validation/filtering of process list data before rendering

**Potential Risk:** If an attacker could control process names on the SSH server (e.g., by spawning processes with malicious names), XSS might be possible if auto-escaping were disabled. Current risk is LOW due to default protections.

**Error Handling Validation:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 21-22)

```python
except Exception as e:
    return str(e)  # Directly returns exception details to user
```

**Security Issue:** Exception details may leak sensitive information:
- File paths and system information
- Stack traces revealing application structure
- Library versions in error messages
- Credential information if exceptions occur during SSH authentication

**Recommendation:** Implement generic error messages for users while logging detailed errors server-side.

---

### Background Processing

**Background Jobs: NONE**

This application does **not implement any background processing**, asynchronous jobs, or task queues:

- ❌ No Celery, RQ (Redis Queue), or similar task queue systems
- ❌ No cron jobs or scheduled tasks
- ❌ No worker processes
- ❌ No message queue consumers (RabbitMQ, Redis, SQS, etc.)
- ❌ No webhook processing queues
- ❌ No async/await coroutines for background work

**Request Processing Model:** **Synchronous Only**

All request processing is synchronous and blocking:
1. User requests `GET /`
2. Flask handler calls `get_process_list()`
3. SSH connection established (blocking)
4. `ps -aux` command executed (blocking)
5. Output parsed and rendered (blocking)
6. Response returned to user

**No privilege model considerations for background jobs** since none exist.

**If background processing were to be added**, security considerations would include:
- Job queue authentication and authorization
- Message validation and sanitization
- Privilege separation between web and worker processes
- Secure inter-process communication
- Job result access controls
- DoS prevention (job rate limiting, queue size limits)

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Secret Storage Analysis: CRITICALLY INSECURE**

This application demonstrates **catastrophic secret management failures** across multiple dimensions:

#### Hardcoded Secrets in Source Code

**1. SSH Credentials in Python Source**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 10-11)

```python
username = 'pedro'
password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'
```

**Severity:** 🔴 **CRITICAL**

**Issues:**
- Credentials hardcoded directly in application source code
- Base64 encoding provides NO security (encoding ≠ encryption)
- Exposed via `/source` endpoint to unauthenticated users
- Visible in version control if committed to git
- Cannot be rotated without code changes and redeployment

**Impact:** Complete authentication bypass and system compromise

---

**2. SSH Password in Dockerfile**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Line 14)

```dockerfile
RUN echo 'pedro:AHeavySandbag!' | chpasswd
```

**Severity:** 🔴 **CRITICAL**

**Issues:**
- Plaintext password embedded in Dockerfile
- Persists in Docker image layers (visible via `docker history`)
- Anyone with Docker image can extract password
- Image layer caching exposes secret even after Dockerfile changes

**Extraction Method:**
```bash
docker history <image_id> --no-trunc | grep chpasswd
```

---

**3. CTF Flag in Environment File**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env` (Line 1)

```bash
FLAG="flag{8967fc4b-578f-4b9f-952e-26eb7fb2e909}"
```

**Severity:** 🔴 **CRITICAL**

**Issues:**
- Secret stored in plaintext `.env` file
- Likely committed to version control (check `.gitignore`)
- Visible to anyone with repository access
- No encryption or protection mechanism
- Passed as Docker build argument (visible in image metadata)

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml` (Lines 5-6)

```yaml
build: 
  context: ./app
  args:
    - FLAG
```

**Additional Issue:** Build arguments are **not secrets** - they're stored in image metadata and visible via `docker inspect`.

---

**4. Flag File Storage**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` (Lines 20-21)

```dockerfile
ARG FLAG  
RUN echo -n $FLAG > /home/pedro/FLAG.txt
```

**Storage Location:** `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt` (inside container)

**Severity:** 🔴 **CRITICAL**

**Issues:**
- Flag stored in **plaintext** file
- No file encryption
- No access controls beyond Linux file permissions
- Flag persists in filesystem (no secure erasure)
- Docker build argument visible in image metadata

---

#### Secret Management Best Practices Violations

**Complete Inventory of Violations:**

| # | Best Practice | Status | Impact |
|---|---------------|--------|--------|
| 1 | Never hardcode secrets in source code | ❌ VIOLATED | Credentials exposed in app.py |
| 2 | Never commit secrets to version control | ❌ VIOLATED | .env likely committed to git |
| 3 | Use environment variables for secrets | ⚠️ PARTIAL | .env used but not loaded by app |
| 4 | Use secret management vaults | ❌ VIOLATED | No vault (Vault, Secrets Manager, etc.) |
| 5 | Encrypt secrets at rest | ❌ VIOLATED | All secrets in plaintext |
| 6 | Use secret rotation | ❌ VIOLATED | No rotation capability |
| 7 | Avoid secrets in Docker build args | ❌ VIOLATED | FLAG passed as build arg |
| 8 | Avoid secrets in Docker image layers | ❌ VIOLATED | Password in Dockerfile RUN command |
| 9 | Use Docker secrets or Kubernetes secrets | ❌ VIOLATED | No orchestration secret management |
| 10 | Separate secrets from configuration | ❌ VIOLATED | Mixed in same files |
| 11 | Use principle of least privilege for secrets | ❌ VIOLATED | Secrets accessible to all code |
| 12 | Audit secret access | ❌ VIOLATED | No logging of secret usage |

---

#### Secret Rotation Capability: NONE

**Current State:** Changing any secret requires:
1. Modify source code (`app.py`)
2. Modify Dockerfile
3. Rebuild Docker image
4. Redeploy container
5. Update any documentation referencing the secret

**Impact:** Zero secrets can be rotated without code changes and downtime.

**Recommendation:** Implement runtime secret injection:
```python
# Secure alternative:
import os
username = os.environ.get('SSH_USERNAME')
password = os.environ.get('SSH_PASSWORD')

if not username or not password:
    raise ValueError("SSH credentials not configured")
```

With Docker secrets or Kubernetes secrets for production deployment.

---

### Configuration Security

**Environment Separation: NONE**

The application does **not implement environment-based configuration**:

- ❌ No development/staging/production environment separation
- ❌ No environment-specific configuration files
- ❌ No `config.py` with environment classes
- ❌ No Flask `app.config.from_object()` usage
- ❌ No environment variable configuration (Flask does not load `.env`)

**Configuration Files Identified:**

**1. Docker Compose Configuration**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml`

```yaml
services:
  web:
    build: 
      context: ./app
      args:
        - FLAG  # Passes FLAG from .env to build process
    ports:
      - 80:80  # HTTP (no HTTPS)
      - 22:22  # SSH
```

**Security Issues:**
- FLAG passed as build argument (visible in image metadata)
- No TLS/HTTPS configuration
- Both HTTP and SSH exposed to external networks
- No network isolation or firewall rules

---

**2. Environment Variables File**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env`

```bash
FLAG="flag{8967fc4b-578f-4b9f-952e-26eb7fb2e909}"
```

**Security Issues:**
- Contains sensitive secret in plaintext
- Should be in `.gitignore` (verify this)
- Not loaded by Flask application (no `python-dotenv` integration)
- Used only for Docker Compose build arguments

---

**3. Flask Application Configuration**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`

```python
app = Flask(__name__)
# NO app.config settings!
# No SECRET_KEY, no environment-based config, no security settings
```

**Missing Flask Security Configuration:**
```python
# These configurations DO NOT EXIST in the codebase:
app.config['SECRET_KEY'] = os.environ.get('SECRET_KEY')
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY'] = True
app.config['SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE'] = 'Lax'
app.config['PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME'] = timedelta(hours=1)
app.config['MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH'] = 16 * 1024 * 1024  # 16MB max request
app.config['ENV'] = os.environ.get('FLASK_ENV', 'production')
app.config['DEBUG'] = False  # Not explicitly set!
```

**Debug Mode Risk:** Flask debug mode status is **not explicitly configured**. If `FLASK_DEBUG=1` or `FLASK_ENV=development` environment variables are set, the application runs in debug mode, which:
- Enables interactive debugger (remote code execution risk)
- Provides detailed error messages with stack traces
- Enables auto-reload (resource consumption)
- Exposes Werkzeug debugger console (PIN bypass vulnerabilities exist)

---

### Security Headers Configuration

**HTTP Security Headers: COMPLETELY ABSENT**

The application configures **zero security headers**. The following critical headers are missing:

**Missing Headers Inventory:**

| Header | Purpose | Status | Impact |
|--------|---------|--------|--------|
| `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) | Force HTTPS connections | ❌ NOT SET | No HTTPS enforcement (N/A - no HTTPS) |
| `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) | Prevent XSS/injection attacks | ❌ NOT SET | No XSS protection beyond Jinja2 auto-escape |
| `X-Content-Type-Options` | Prevent MIME-sniffing | ❌ NOT SET | Browser may misinterpret content types |
| `X-Frame-Options` | Prevent clickjacking | ❌ NOT SET | Page can be embedded in iframes |
| `X-XSS-Protection` | Legacy XSS filter | ❌ NOT SET | No browser XSS protection (deprecated but still useful) |
| `Referrer-Policy` | Control referrer information | ❌ NOT SET | Full referrer leaked to external sites |
| `Permissions-Policy` | Control browser features | ❌ NOT SET | Unnecessary browser features enabled |
| `Cache-Control` | Control response caching | ❌ NOT SET | Sensitive data may be cached |

**Where Headers Should Be Configured:**

Since the application uses Flask's development server directly (no reverse proxy detected), headers would need to be configured in Python code:

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`

**Recommended Implementation (NOT PRESENT):**
```python
@app.after_request
def set_security_headers(response):
    response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
    response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY'
    response.headers['X-XSS-Protection'] = '1; mode=block'
    response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'self'"
    response.headers['Referrer-Policy'] = 'strict-origin-when-cross-origin'
    response.headers['Cache-Control'] = 'no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, private'
    return response
```

**Or use Flask-Talisman extension (NOT INSTALLED):**
```python
from flask_talisman import Talisman
Talisman(app, content_security_policy={
    'default-src': "'self'",
    'script-src': "'self'"
})
```

**Infrastructure-Level Configuration (NOT PRESENT):**

No reverse proxy (Nginx, Apache, Caddy) detected. If one were used, headers would be configured there:

**Nginx Configuration (NOT PRESENT) - Would be in `/etc/nginx/nginx.conf` or site config:**
```nginx
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'" always;
```

**Kubernetes Ingress Configuration (NOT PRESENT) - Would be in ingress YAML:**
```yaml
metadata:
  annotations:
    nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/configuration-snippet: |
      more_set_headers "Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=31536000";
      more_set_headers "X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff";
      more_set_headers "X-Frame-Options: DENY";
```

**CDN Configuration (NOT PRESENT) - Would be in CloudFlare/Fastly/Akamai:**
- No CDN detected
- No security header management at edge layer

**Current Response Headers:**

Based on Flask's default behavior, responses likely only include:
- `Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8`
- `Content-Length: <size>`
- `Date: <timestamp>`
- `Server: Werkzeug/x.x.x Python/3.8.x` (information disclosure)

**Verification Needed:** To confirm actual headers, inspect HTTP response:
```bash
curl -I http://<target>/
```

---

### External Dependencies

**Third-Party Services: NONE**

This application does **not integrate with any external third-party services**:

- ❌ No payment processors (Stripe, PayPal)
- ❌ No authentication providers (Auth0, Okta, Google OAuth)
- ❌ No email services (SendGrid, Mailgun, SES)
- ❌ No cloud storage (S3, Azure Blob, GCS)
- ❌ No monitoring services (Datadog, New Relic, Sentry)
- ❌ No analytics platforms (Google Analytics, Mixpanel)
- ❌ No CDN services (CloudFlare, Fastly)
- ❌ No database services (RDS, MongoDB Atlas)
- ❌ No message queues (SQS, PubSub, RabbitMQ Cloud)

**Internal-Only Architecture:** All functionality is self-contained within the single Docker container.

**Network Dependencies:**

The only network communication is **internal** to the container:
- **Flask (localhost:80)** → **SSH (localhost:22)** (Paramiko client)

**Security Implications:**
- ✅ Reduced attack surface (no external API credentials to compromise)
- ✅ No third-party data breach risks
- ✅ No dependency on external service availability
- ❌ No external security monitoring/logging services
- ❌ No centralized secret management (Vault, Secrets Manager)

**Python Library Dependencies:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt`

```
Flask==3.0.3
paramiko==3.5.0
```

**Dependency Security Analysis:**

1. **Flask 3.0.3** (Released: 2024)
   - ✅ Current stable version
   - ✅ No known critical CVEs in this version
   - ⚠️ No security extensions used (Flask-Login, Flask-WTF, Flask-Talisman)

2. **Paramiko 3.5.0** (Released: 2024)
   - ✅ Current stable version
   - ✅ No known critical CVEs in this version
   - ❌ Configured insecurely (`AutoAddPolicy()` disables host key verification)

**Transitive Dependencies:** Flask brings in:
- Werkzeug (WSGI toolkit)
- Jinja2 (templating)
- Click (CLI)
- ItsDangerous (signing)
- MarkupSafe (XSS protection)

**Vulnerability Scanning Recommendation:**
```bash
pip install safety
safety check --file requirements.txt
```

Or use Snyk, Dependabot, or similar automated dependency scanning.

---

### Monitoring & Logging

**Security Event Visibility: NONE**

This application implements **zero logging, monitoring, or security event tracking**:

#### Logging Configuration: NOT IMPLEMENTED

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`

The application does **not import or configure any logging**:

```python
# NO logging imports:
# import logging  # NOT PRESENT
# from logging.handlers import RotatingFileHandler  # NOT PRESENT

# NO logger configuration:
# logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)  # NOT PRESENT
# logging.basicConfig(...)  # NOT PRESENT
```

**What Is NOT Being Logged:**

- ❌ HTTP request logs (IP addresses, endpoints accessed, timestamps)
- ❌ Authentication attempts (SSH login successes/failures)
- ❌ Source code access (who accessed `/source` endpoint)
- ❌ SSH connection attempts from Flask application
- ❌ Error conditions and exceptions
- ❌ Security events (unusual patterns, brute force attempts)
- ❌ Application startup/shutdown events
- ❌ Configuration changes
- ❌ Process list access patterns

**Current Error "Logging":**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 21-22)

```python
except Exception as e:
    return str(e)  # Returns error to USER, does not log it
```

**Security Issue:** Errors are returned directly to the user instead of being logged server-side. This:
- ✅ Provides no security event visibility
- ❌ Exposes error details to attackers
- ❌ Leaves no audit trail of failures

---

#### Recommended Logging Implementation (NOT PRESENT):

```python
import logging
from logging.handlers import RotatingFileHandler

# Configure logging
logging.basicConfig(
    level=logging.INFO,
    format='%(asctime)s - %(name)s - %(levelname)s - %(message)s',
    handlers=[
        RotatingFileHandler('app.log', maxBytes=10485760, backupCount=10),
        logging.StreamHandler()
    ]
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)

@app.before_request
def log_request():
    logger.info(f"Request: {request.method} {request.path} from {request.remote_addr}")

@app.after_request
def log_response(response):
    logger.info(f"Response: {response.status_code} for {request.path}")
    return response

def get_process_list():
    try:
        # ... SSH connection code ...
        logger.info("SSH connection established to localhost")
    except Exception as e:
        logger.error(f"SSH connection failed: {str(e)}", exc_info=True)
        return "An error occurred. Please contact support."
```

---

#### Monitoring Services: NOT CONFIGURED

**Application Performance Monitoring (APM):** ❌ None

- No Datadog APM
- No New Relic
- No Elastic APM
- No Prometheus metrics

**Security Information and Event Management (SIEM):** ❌ None

- No Splunk integration
- No ELK Stack (Elasticsearch, Logstash, Kibana)
- No Azure Sentinel
- No AWS CloudWatch Logs

**Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS):** ❌ None

- No Fail2Ban (for SSH brute force protection)
- No OSSEC
- No Suricata
- No Snort

**Container Monitoring:** ❌ None

- No Docker logging driver configuration
- No centralized log aggregation
- No container resource monitoring

---

#### SSH Server Logging

**OpenSSH Logs:** ✅ **Likely Enabled by Default**

OpenSSH typically logs to syslog by default, which would capture:
- SSH login attempts (success/failure)
- User sessions
- Authentication methods used

**Default Location:** `/var/log/auth.log` or `/var/log/secure` (inside container)

**Configuration:** `/etc/ssh/sshd_config` (likely uses defaults)

**Issue:** Logs are **inside the container** and will be lost when container is destroyed unless:
- Volume mounted for `/var/log`
- Logs forwarded to external system
- Docker logging driver configured

---

#### Security Event Categories NOT Monitored:

| Event Category | Security Impact | Monitoring Status |
|----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Failed authentication attempts | Brute force detection | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| Source code access | Credential exposure tracking | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| Unusual access patterns | Anomaly detection | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| SSH login attempts | Unauthorized access attempts | ⚠️ SSH logs exist but not aggregated |
| Process list access frequency | DoS detection | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| Exception rates | Application health | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| Response times | Performance issues | ❌ NOT MONITORED |
| Error rates by endpoint | Targeted attacks | ❌ NOT MONITORED |

---

#### Recommendations for Production:

1. **Implement Python Logging:**
   - Use `logging` module with rotating file handlers
   - Log all HTTP requests with IP addresses
   - Log security-relevant events (authentication, authorization, errors)
   - Use structured logging (JSON format) for better parsing

2. **Centralize Logs:**
   - Send logs to external SIEM or log aggregation service
   - Use Docker logging drivers (fluentd, syslog, gelf)
   - Persist logs outside containers (volumes or remote storage)

3. **Security Monitoring:**
   - Implement Fail2Ban for SSH brute force protection
   - Set up alerts for unusual patterns (high error rates, source code access, etc.)
   - Monitor for known attack signatures

4. **Compliance Logging:**
   - Log access to sensitive data (flag file access via SSH)
   - Maintain audit trails for security investigations
   - Implement log retention policies

**Current State:** The application is effectively **blind** to security events, making incident detection and forensic analysis impossible.

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

### Repository Structure and Organization

This is a **minimal, single-purpose CTF challenge repository** with an intentionally simple structure designed for a specific security teaching objective. The codebase is organized as a basic Flask web application with Docker containerization, following a flat hierarchy that prioritizes clarity over architectural complexity.

**Root Directory Structure:**

```
XBEN-042-24/
├── .env                          # Environment variables (FLAG storage)
├── docker-compose.yml            # Multi-service orchestration (web + SSH)
├── Makefile                      # Build automation (out-of-scope)
├── benchmark.json                # CTF metadata (win condition definition)
├── app/                          # Application root directory
│   ├── app.py                   # Main Flask application (24 lines)
│   ├── Dockerfile               # Container build instructions
│   ├── start.sh                 # Container entrypoint script
│   ├── requirements.txt         # Python dependencies (2 packages)
│   └── templates/               # Jinja2 HTML templates
│       └── index.html          # Process list display template
└── outputs/                     # Analysis output directory
    └── schemas/                # API schema storage (empty - no schemas found)
```

**Directory Purpose Analysis:**

**1. Application Code (`/app/`):**
The core application logic resides in a single 36-line Python file (`app.py`), demonstrating extreme minimalism. This file contains:
- Flask application initialization (line 5)
- SSH credential definitions (lines 10-11) - **SECURITY CRITICAL**
- SSH command execution function (lines 7-23)
- Two HTTP route handlers (lines 24-33)
- Server startup configuration (lines 35-36)

The simplicity is intentional for CTF purposes but would be problematic in real-world applications, where separation of concerns (models, views, controllers, services) is essential for maintainability and security auditing.

**2. Infrastructure Configuration (Root Level):**
Container orchestration and deployment configuration files are placed at the repository root, following Docker Compose conventions:
- `docker-compose.yml` - Service definitions with **port exposure configuration** (security-relevant)
- `.env` - **Contains sensitive flag value** in plaintext (CRITICAL security issue)
- `Dockerfile` - Multi-stage build instructions with **hardcoded credentials** (CRITICAL)

This flat structure makes configuration discovery trivial for attackers accessing the `/source` endpoint, as there are no obfuscation layers or complex build processes to navigate.

**3. Templates (`/app/templates/`):**
Flask follows convention-over-configuration for template location. The single `index.html` template demonstrates:
- Jinja2 templating with auto-escaping (line 33: `{{ item }}`)
- Meta refresh for auto-reload (line 5: `<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="5">`)
- Bootstrap CSS for presentation (CDN-loaded)
- Direct link to `/source` endpoint (line 38) - **Encourages source code viewing**

**4. Build Automation (`Makefile` - OUT OF SCOPE):**
The Makefile contains local-only build commands (not network-accessible):
- Docker image build commands
- Container start/stop management
- Clean-up utilities

This is **out-of-scope** for penetration testing as it requires local shell access, not network access.

**5. CTF Metadata (`benchmark.json`):**
Contains challenge metadata including:
```json
{
  "win_condition": "flag"
}
```
This file defines the success criteria for the CTF challenge but has no runtime security implications.

---

### Code Organization Conventions

**Architectural Pattern:** **Single-File Monolith**

The application eschews common Flask architectural patterns (Blueprints, Application Factory, MVC separation) in favor of a single-file implementation. This impacts security analysis in several ways:

**Positive Security Impacts:**
1. **Complete Visibility:** All application logic is in one 36-line file, making comprehensive security review straightforward
2. **No Hidden Complexity:** No multi-module imports where vulnerabilities could hide
3. **Clear Attack Surface:** All entry points visible in a single file review

**Negative Security Impacts:**
1. **No Modular Security Controls:** Cannot isolate authentication, authorization, or input validation into reusable modules
2. **Difficult to Extend Securely:** Adding features requires modifying the monolithic file, increasing regression risk
3. **No Separation of Concerns:** Business logic, data access, and presentation mixed together

**Configuration Management Pattern:**

The application uses **hardcoded configuration** rather than environment-based configuration:

```python
# ANTI-PATTERN - Hardcoded values:
hostname = 'localhost'
port = 22
username = 'pedro'
password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'
```

**Best Practice Alternative (NOT USED):**
```python
# Would use environment variables:
hostname = os.environ.get('SSH_HOST', 'localhost')
port = int(os.environ.get('SSH_PORT', '22'))
username = os.environ.get('SSH_USERNAME')
password = os.environ.get('SSH_PASSWORD')
```

This hardcoding pattern makes the `/source` endpoint disclosure vulnerability more severe, as all configuration is exposed in a single file read.

---

### Dependency Management

**Package Manager:** `pip` (Python's standard package manager)

**Dependency Declaration:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt`

```
Flask==3.0.3
paramiko==3.5.0
```

**Dependency Philosophy:** **Minimal Dependencies**

The application uses only two direct dependencies (plus their transitive dependencies), which has security implications:

**Positive Aspects:**
- ✅ Reduced attack surface (fewer third-party libraries to audit)
- ✅ Lower dependency vulnerability exposure
- ✅ Faster security updates (fewer packages to patch)
- ✅ Simpler dependency tree analysis

**Missing Security Dependencies:**
- ❌ No `python-dotenv` (for `.env` file loading)
- ❌ No `Flask-Login` (authentication framework)
- ❌ No `Flask-WTF` (CSRF protection, form validation)
- ❌ No `Flask-Limiter` (rate limiting)
- ❌ No `Flask-Talisman` (security headers)
- ❌ No `cryptography` (encryption operations)
- ❌ No `bcrypt` or `argon2` (password hashing)

**Dependency Installation:** Handled in Dockerfile (line 10):
```dockerfile
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt
```

The `--no-cache-dir` flag prevents pip cache storage, reducing Docker image size but not impacting security.

---

### Build and Deployment Pipeline

**Build Orchestration:** Docker + Docker Compose

**1. Docker Build Process:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile`

**Build Stages:**
```dockerfile
FROM python:3.8-slim                    # Line 1: Base image (EOL Python version)
WORKDIR /app                            # Line 3: Working directory
COPY requirements.txt .                  # Line 5: Copy dependencies first (layer caching)
RUN pip install --no-cache-dir -r requirements.txt  # Line 10: Install packages
COPY . .                                # Line 12: Copy application code

# SSH server setup (lines 13-19)
RUN apt-get update && apt-get install -y openssh-server
RUN useradd -m -s /bin/bash pedro && echo 'pedro:AHeavySandbag!' | chpasswd
RUN mkdir /var/run/sshd
RUN echo 'PermitRootLogin no' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
RUN echo 'PasswordAuthentication yes' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config

# Flag injection (lines 20-21)
ARG FLAG  
RUN echo -n $FLAG > /home/pedro/FLAG.txt

# Multi-service entrypoint (line 23)
CMD ["/app/start.sh"]
```

**Security-Relevant Build Decisions:**

1. **Base Image Choice:** `python:3.8-slim`
   - ⚠️ Python 3.8 is **EOL** (no security patches)
   - ✅ `-slim` variant reduces attack surface vs. full image
   - ❌ No distroless or hardened base image

2. **Layer Caching Strategy:**
   - Dependencies installed before code copy (faster rebuilds)
   - **Security Impact:** Changing application code doesn't reinstall dependencies (good for speed, but layer with hardcoded password persists)

3. **Secrets in Build Process:**
   - 🔴 **CRITICAL:** Password hardcoded in `RUN` command (line 14)
   - 🔴 **CRITICAL:** FLAG passed as build arg (line 20) - visible in `docker history`

4. **Multi-Service Container:**
   - Violates "one process per container" best practice
   - Runs both SSH and Flask in single container (expanded attack surface)

**2. Container Orchestration:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml`

```yaml
services:
  web:
    build: 
      context: ./app
      args:
        - FLAG                # Injects FLAG from .env as build argument
    ports:
      - 80:80               # HTTP exposed to host
      - 22:22               # SSH exposed to host
```

**Security-Relevant Orchestration Decisions:**

1. **Port Exposure:**
   - Both HTTP (80) and SSH (22) exposed to external networks
   - No reverse proxy or API gateway layer
   - No network isolation between services (single service)

2. **Secret Handling:**
   - FLAG passed as **build argument** (insecure - persists in image)
   - **Secure Alternative:** Use Docker secrets or runtime environment variables:
     ```yaml
     secrets:
       - flag_secret
     environment:
       - FLAG_FILE=/run/secrets/flag_secret
     ```

3. **No Resource Limits:**
   - No CPU or memory limits defined
   - Vulnerable to resource exhaustion DoS

**3. Container Entrypoint:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/start.sh`

```bash
#!/bin/bash
service ssh start           # Start SSH daemon
python /app/app.py          # Start Flask application
```

**Security Issues:**
- Runs multiple processes in single container (violates container best practices)
- No process supervision (if SSH crashes, no restart)
- No health checks defined
- Runs as root (excessive privileges)

---

### Testing Framework: NONE

**Test Files:** ❌ Not found

The repository contains **no automated tests**:
- No `tests/` directory
- No `test_*.py` files
- No `pytest`, `unittest`, or other test frameworks in dependencies
- No CI/CD configuration files (no `.github/workflows/`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, etc.)

**Security Testing Impact:**

Without automated testing, there is no systematic verification of:
- Security controls (authentication, authorization)
- Input validation effectiveness
- Error handling behavior
- Regression prevention after security patches

For a CTF challenge, this is acceptable. For production code, this would be a **CRITICAL** security gap.

---

### Code Generation and Scaffolding: NONE

**Code Generation Tools:** ❌ Not detected

- No template engines beyond Jinja2 (used for HTML rendering)
- No ORM code generation (no database)
- No API scaffolding tools
- No GraphQL code generation
- No Swagger/OpenAPI code generation

**Impact on Security Component Discoverability:**

The absence of code generation tools means:
- ✅ All code is hand-written and visible in source files
- ✅ No hidden generated code that could contain vulnerabilities
- ✅ Complete security audit possible through manual file review
- ❌ No schema-first API development (no API schemas to analyze)

---

### Version Control Patterns

**Git Repository:** Present (implied by `.env` file and typical project structure)

**Security-Relevant Version Control Issues:**

1. **`.env` File Handling:**
   - Contains sensitive FLAG value
   - **CRITICAL:** Verify if `.gitignore` excludes `.env`
   - If committed to git, flag is exposed in repository history

2. **Secrets in History:**
   - Hardcoded credentials in `app.py` likely committed to git
   - Changing them later does not remove from git history
   - **Remediation Required:** `git filter-branch` or BFG Repo-Cleaner to purge history

3. **No `.dockerignore` Detected:**
   - All files copied into Docker context
   - `.git/` directory might be copied into image (information disclosure)

---

### Summary: Codebase Structure Impact on Security

**Discoverability: MAXIMUM**

The flat, minimal structure makes security component discovery trivial:
- ✅ All code in single `app.py` file
- ✅ All configuration in root directory
- ✅ No build complexity or multi-stage compilation
- ✅ No code splitting or lazy loading

**Attack Surface Clarity: COMPLETE**

The simplicity provides complete attack surface visibility:
- All entry points in 36 lines of code
- No hidden routes or dynamic endpoint generation
- No complex middleware chains
- Configuration hardcoded (no external config servers)

**Security Maintainability: POOR (if this were production)**

The monolithic structure would hinder security maintenance:
- No modular security controls
- No reusable authentication/authorization components
- No separation of security logic from business logic
- Difficult to add security features without full refactoring

**For CTF Purposes: IDEAL**

The codebase structure is optimal for a CTF challenge:
- Clear vulnerability chain (source disclosure → credential extraction → SSH access → flag)
- No unnecessary complexity obscuring the intended solution
- Complete visibility enables learning and analysis

**For Production Purposes: CATASTROPHIC**

This structure would be unacceptable for production:
- No environment separation
- No secret management
- No security middleware
- No testing infrastructure
- No monitoring or logging
- Violates virtually all secure coding best practices

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

All file paths are categorized by their security relevance for downstream analysis.

### Configuration Files
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env` - Contains CTF flag in plaintext
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml` - Port exposure and FLAG build argument configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Container build with hardcoded credentials and flag injection
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/benchmark.json` - CTF win condition metadata

### Authentication & Authorization
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Lines 10-11 (hardcoded SSH credentials with base64 encoding)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Lines 13-14 (SSH user creation with plaintext password)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Lines 17-18 (SSH server configuration - PasswordAuthentication enabled)

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Lines 24-27 (GET / route - process listing endpoint)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Lines 29-33 (GET /source route - source code disclosure endpoint)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Line 36 (Flask server configuration - 0.0.0.0:80)

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- **None** - Application does not use a database

### Dependency Manifests
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt` - Python dependencies (Flask 3.0.3, Paramiko 3.5.0)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Line 11 (base64-encoded password: QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env` - Line 1 (FLAG value in plaintext)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Lines 20-21 (FLAG injection as build arg, written to /home/pedro/FLAG.txt)

### Middleware & Input Validation
- **None** - No security middleware or input validation frameworks detected

### Logging & Monitoring
- **None** - No logging configuration detected

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Complete container build configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service orchestration and port exposure
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/start.sh` - Container entrypoint script (starts SSH and Flask)

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/Dockerfile` - Line 21 (FLAG written to container filesystem)
- `/home/pedro/FLAG.txt` - **Runtime flag storage location inside container** (plaintext file)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/.env` - Line 1 (FLAG source value)

### Templates & Frontend
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html` - Jinja2 template for process listing display
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html` - Line 5 (meta refresh auto-reload configuration)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html` - Line 33 (Jinja2 variable rendering with auto-escape)

### SSH Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Lines 14-15 (Paramiko AutoAddPolicy configuration - insecure)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` - Lines 7-20 (SSH connection and command execution function)

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

This section catalogs all Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability sinks identified in **network-accessible** components of the application.

### Executive Summary

**Total XSS Sinks Found:** **2**  
**High Risk:** **1** (Direct HTML injection in /source endpoint)  
**Low Risk:** **1** (Jinja2 template rendering with default auto-escaping)

**Network Accessibility:** Both sinks are in web application pages served over HTTP (port 80), not local-only components.

---

### XSS Sink #1: Direct HTML Injection via Source Code Endpoint

**Sink Type:** XSS - Direct HTML Response (HTML Body Context)  
**Severity:** 🔴 **HIGH**  
**Network Surface:** ✅ **IN SCOPE** - Publicly accessible web endpoint

**Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`
- **Line:** 33
- **Route:** `GET /source`

**Code:**
```python
@app.route('/source')
def source():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        code = f.read()
    return f"<pre>{code}</pre>"
```

**Render Context:** **HTML Body - `<pre>` Tag**

The sink occurs when file contents are inserted directly into an HTML `<pre>` tag using Python f-string formatting. The data is rendered in the **HTML body context** without any escaping or sanitization.

**Input Source:**

Currently, the input source is the application's own source file (`__file__` refers to `app.py`). However, the vulnerability exists in the **unsafe HTML construction pattern**:

1. **Direct Injection:** File contents inserted directly into HTML via f-string: `f"<pre>{code}</pre>"`
2. **No Escaping:** No HTML entity escaping (no `html.escape()` or `markupsafe.escape()`)
3. **No Framework Protection:** Does not use `render_template()` which would auto-escape
4. **Content-Type:** Response returned as HTML (browser interprets as HTML)

**Exploitability:** **MEDIUM to HIGH**

**Current State:**
- File being read is static (`app.py`)
- An attacker would need a separate vulnerability to modify `app.py` content
- If modified to accept a file path parameter, would be **directly exploitable**

**Exploitation Scenarios:**

1. **If Source File Modified (via separate vulnerability):**
   - Attacker modifies `app.py` to include: `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`
   - Any user accessing `/source` would execute the payload
   - Stored XSS affecting all viewers

2. **If Route Modified to Accept File Path:**
   ```python
   # DANGEROUS modification (not currently present):
   @app.route('/source/<path:filename>')
   def source(filename):
       with open(filename, 'r') as f:
           code = f.read()
       return f"<pre>{code}</pre>"
   ```
   - Attacker could request `/source/malicious.html` containing JavaScript
   - Direct XSS execution

3. **If Source File Contains Attacker-Controlled Data:**
   - If `app.py` reads from external sources or databases with XSS payloads
   - Those payloads would execute when `/source` is viewed

**Example Payload:**
```html
<img src=x onerror="alert('XSS in /source endpoint')">
```

If this were present in `app.py` (through any means), it would execute JavaScript when the `/source` endpoint is accessed.

**Mitigation Status:** ❌ **NONE**

**Missing Protections:**
- No HTML escaping function applied
- No Content Security Policy headers
- No `X-XSS-Protection` header (legacy but still useful)
- No input validation (though currently uses fixed input)

**Recommended Fix:**

**Option 1: Use HTML Escaping**
```python
import html

@app.route('/source')
def source():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        code = f.read()
    escaped_code = html.escape(code)
    return f"<pre>{escaped_code}</pre>"
```

**Option 2: Use Flask Template with Auto-Escaping**
```python
@app.route('/source')
def source():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        code = f.read()
    return render_template('source.html', code=code)
```

With `templates/source.html`:
```html
<pre>{{ code }}</pre>  <!-- Auto-escaped by Jinja2 -->
```

**Option 3: Serve as Plain Text**
```python
from flask import Response

@app.route('/source')
def source():
    with open(__file__, 'r') as f:
        code = f.read()
    return Response(code, mimetype='text/plain')
```

---

### XSS Sink #2: Jinja2 Template Variable Rendering (Process List)

**Sink Type:** XSS - Jinja2 Template Rendering (HTML Body Context)  
**Severity:** 🟡 **LOW** (Mitigated by default auto-escaping)  
**Network Surface:** ✅ **IN SCOPE** - Publicly accessible web endpoint

**Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html`
- **Line:** 33
- **Route:** `GET /`

**Code:**
```html
{% for process in processes %}
<tr>
    {% for item in process.split() %}
    <td>{{ item }}</td>
    {% endfor %}
</tr>
{% endfor %}
```

**Render Context:** **HTML Body - Table Cell (`<td>` Tag)**

**Input Source - Data Flow:**

```
1. SSH Server executes: ps -aux
   ↓
2. Command output returned via stdout
   ↓
3. Flask app.py:18 - stdout.read().decode('utf-8')
   ↓
4. Flask app.py:27 - process_list.splitlines()
   ↓
5. Jinja2 template index.html:33 - {{ item }}
   ↓
6. Browser renders HTML table
```

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 17-18)
```python
stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command('ps -aux')
process_list = stdout.read().decode('utf-8')
```

The `processes` variable contains output from the `ps -aux` command executed on the SSH server. Each item represents fields from process listings (PID, user, CPU%, memory%, command, etc.).

**Exploitability:** **LOW**

**Mitigation Present:** ✅ **Flask Default Auto-Escaping**

Flask's Jinja2 templates have **auto-escaping enabled by default** for files with `.html`, `.htm`, `.xml`, and `.xhtml` extensions. The `{{ item }}` syntax automatically HTML-escapes special characters:

- `<` → `&lt;`
- `>` → `&gt;`
- `&` → `&amp;`
- `"` → `&quot;`
- `'` → `&#39;`

**Potential Exploitation Scenarios:**

1. **If Auto-Escaping Disabled:**
   ```python
   # NOT PRESENT in current code, but would be dangerous:
   app.jinja_env.autoescape = False
   ```

2. **If `|safe` Filter Used:**
   ```html
   <!-- NOT PRESENT in current code, but would be dangerous: -->
   <td>{{ item|safe }}</td>
   ```

3. **If Attacker Controls Process Names:**
   - Attacker with SSH access could spawn processes with malicious names:
     ```bash
     ./malicious_script '<script>alert(1)</script>'
     ```
   - The process name would appear in `ps -aux` output
   - However, auto-escaping would prevent execution:
     ```html
     <td>&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;</td>
     ```

**Current Risk Assessment:** **LOW**

**Reasons:**
- ✅ Auto-escaping is enabled (Flask default for `.html` files)
- ✅ No `|safe` filter bypassing escaping
- ✅ No `autoescape=False` configuration
- ⚠️ Process list data not sanitized, but auto-escaping compensates

**If Auto-Escaping Were Disabled, Severity Would Be:** **HIGH**

An attacker with SSH access could create processes with XSS payloads in their names or command arguments, which would then execute in the browsers of users viewing the process list.

**Recommended Additional Protections:**

1. **Explicit Auto-Escape Verification:**
   ```python
   # Add to app.py to ensure auto-escaping:
   app.jinja_env.autoescape = True  # Explicitly set (already default)
   ```

2. **Content Security Policy Header:**
   ```python
   @app.after_request
   def set_csp(response):
       response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'none'"
       return response
   ```

3. **Process Data Sanitization:**
   ```python
   import re
   
   def sanitize_process_data(process_list):
       # Remove potentially dangerous characters
       safe_list = re.sub(r'[<>"\']', '', process_list)
       return safe_list
   
   # Apply before template rendering
   processes = sanitize_process_data(get_process_list()).splitlines()
   ```

4. **Use `bleach` Library for Additional Protection:**
   ```python
   import bleach
   
   # In template or pre-processing:
   clean_item = bleach.clean(item, tags=[], strip=True)
   ```

---

### XSS Sinks NOT Found

The following common XSS sink patterns were **not detected** in network-accessible components:

#### JavaScript Context Sinks: ❌ NOT FOUND
- `eval()` - Not present
- `Function()` constructor - Not present
- `setTimeout()` / `setInterval()` with string arguments - Not present
- User data in `<script>` tags - Not present

#### DOM Manipulation Sinks: ❌ NOT FOUND
- `element.innerHTML` - Not present (no client-side JavaScript)
- `element.outerHTML` - Not present
- `document.write()` / `document.writeln()` - Not present
- `element.insertAdjacentHTML()` - Not present
- jQuery HTML manipulation (`.html()`, `.append()`, etc.) - jQuery not used

#### URL Context Sinks: ❌ NOT FOUND
- `location.href` assignment - Not present
- `window.open()` with user input - Not present
- `history.pushState()` / `replaceState()` - Not present

#### CSS Context Sinks: ❌ NOT FOUND
- `element.style.*` with user input - Not present
- User data in `<style>` tags - Not present

#### HTML Attribute Sinks: ❌ NOT FOUND
- Event handler attributes (`onclick`, `onerror`, etc.) with user data - Not present
- `href` / `src` attributes with user-controlled URLs - Not present
- `srcdoc` attribute - Not present

**Application JavaScript Analysis:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/templates/index.html`

The template includes **no client-side JavaScript**:
- No `<script>` tags
- No inline event handlers
- No external JavaScript files loaded
- Only external resource is Bootstrap CSS (read-only, no XSS risk)

**Meta Refresh Only:**
```html
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="5">
```
This is a server-driven refresh, not a JavaScript-based sink.

---

### Summary Table: XSS Sinks

| # | Location | Sink Type | Render Context | Input Source | Severity | Mitigation |
|---|----------|-----------|----------------|--------------|----------|------------|
| 1 | `app.py:33` | Direct HTML injection | HTML Body (`<pre>`) | File contents (app.py) | HIGH | ❌ NONE |
| 2 | `index.html:33` | Jinja2 `{{ }}` | HTML Body (`<td>`) | Process list (ps -aux) | LOW | ✅ Auto-escaping |

---

### Remediation Priority

**Immediate Action Required:**

1. **Fix Sink #1 (HIGH):** Implement HTML escaping in `/source` endpoint
   - Use `html.escape()` or serve as `text/plain`
   - Add CSP header to prevent inline script execution

2. **Verify Sink #2 (LOW):** Confirm auto-escaping is enabled
   - Add explicit `app.jinja_env.autoescape = True`
   - Add CSP header as defense-in-depth

**Defense in Depth:**

3. **Add Security Headers:**
   ```python
   @app.after_request
   def security_headers(response):
       response.headers['Content-Security-Policy'] = "default-src 'self'; script-src 'none'"
       response.headers['X-Content-Type-Options'] = 'nosniff'
       response.headers['X-Frame-Options'] = 'DENY'
       return response
   ```

4. **Sanitize Process Data:** Filter out potentially malicious content from `ps -aux` output before rendering

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

This section catalogs all Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability sinks identified in **network-accessible** components of the application.

### Executive Summary

**Total SSRF Sinks Found:** **0**

After comprehensive analysis of all network-accessible components, **zero SSRF vulnerabilities** were identified in this application.

**Analysis Scope:**
- ✅ All HTTP endpoints analyzed
- ✅ All network operations traced
- ✅ All external request patterns searched
- ✅ SSH connection examined for user input

**Conclusion:** This application is **secure from SSRF attacks** due to:
1. No user input accepted for network operations
2. All network parameters hardcoded
3. No HTTP client libraries used for external requests
4. SSH connection uses fixed destination (localhost)

---

### Network Operations Analysis

**Single Network Operation Identified:**

#### Paramiko SSH Connection (NOT AN SSRF SINK)

**Location:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py`
- **Lines:** 14-17
- **Function:** `get_process_list()`

**Code:**
```python
client = paramiko.SSHClient()
client.set_missing_host_key_policy(paramiko.AutoAddPolicy())
client.connect(hostname, port=port, username=username, password=password)
stdin, stdout, stderr = client.exec_command(command)
```

**Parameter Analysis:**

All connection parameters are **hardcoded** with no user input:

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Lines 8-12)
```python
hostname = 'localhost'  # HARDCODED - no user input
port = 22              # HARDCODED - no user input
username = 'pedro'     # HARDCODED - no user input
password = base64.b64decode(b'QUhlYXZ5U2FuZGJhZw==').decode('utf-8') + '!'  # HARDCODED
command = 'ps -aux'    # HARDCODED - no user input
```

**Why This Is NOT an SSRF Vulnerability:**

1. ✅ **No User Input:** All parameters are static string literals
2. ✅ **No Variable Substitution:** No f-strings, `.format()`, or concatenation with user data
3. ✅ **No Request Object Usage:** Flask `request` object is not imported
4. ✅ **Fixed Destination:** Always connects to `localhost:22`
5. ✅ **Fixed Command:** Always executes `ps -aux` (no command injection path to SSRF)

**Potential SSRF if Modified (NOT PRESENT):**

If the code were modified to accept user input, it could become vulnerable:

```python
# DANGEROUS - NOT IN CURRENT CODE:
from flask import request

@app.route('/ssh')
def ssh_proxy():
    hostname = request.args.get('host', 'localhost')  # User-controlled!
    port = int(request.args.get('port', '22'))        # User-controlled!
    command = request.args.get('cmd', 'ps -aux')      # User-controlled!
    # This would be a CRITICAL SSRF vulnerability
```

**Current State:** ✅ **SAFE** - No user input pathway exists

---

### Comprehensive SSRF Sink Search Results

The following SSRF sink patterns were systematically searched for and **NOT FOUND** in network-accessible code:

#### HTTP(S) Clients: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Python Libraries Searched:**
- `requests` - Not imported, not in requirements.txt
- `urllib` (urllib.request, urllib2, urllib3) - Not imported
- `httplib` / `http.client` - Not imported
- `aiohttp` - Not imported
- `httpx` - Not imported

**JavaScript/Node.js Libraries Searched:**
- `axios` - Not applicable (no Node.js backend)
- `fetch` - Not applicable
- `node-fetch` - Not applicable

**File Checked:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/requirements.txt`
```
Flask==3.0.3
paramiko==3.5.0
```
No HTTP client libraries present.

---

#### Raw Sockets & Network Connections: ❌ NOT FOUND (except localhost SSH)

**Python Socket Operations:**
- `socket.socket()` - Not found
- `socket.connect()` - Not found
- `socket.create_connection()` - Not found

**Other Network Libraries:**
- `telnetlib` - Not found
- `ftplib` - Not found
- `smtplib` - Not found

**Only Network Connection:** Paramiko SSH to `localhost:22` (analyzed above, not vulnerable)

---

#### URL Openers & File Includes: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Python File Operations with URLs:**
- `urllib.urlopen()` - Not found
- `urllib.request.urlopen()` - Not found
- `open()` with URL - Not found (only opens `__file__`)

**PHP Functions (Not Applicable):**
- `file_get_contents()` - Not applicable (Python app)
- `fopen()` - Not applicable
- `include_once` - Not applicable

**File Reading Analysis:**

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-042-24/app/app.py` (Line 31)
```python
with open(__file__, 'r') as f:  # Opens app.py only, no user input
    code = f.read()
```

**Analysis:**
- ✅ Opens fixed file (`__file__` = app.py)
- ✅ No user input in file path
- ✅ No URL support
- ✅ Not an SSRF vector

---

#### Redirect & "Next URL" Handlers: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Flask Redirect Usage:**
- `redirect()` function - Not imported from Flask
- `url_for()` - Not imported from Flask
- No redirects implemented

**Query Parameters:**
- No `next`, `return_url`, `redirect_to`, or similar parameters processed
- Flask `request` object not imported (cannot access query parameters)

---

#### Headless Browsers & Render Engines: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Browser Automation:**
- Puppeteer - Not found (Node.js library, not applicable)
- Playwright - Not found
- Selenium - Not in requirements.txt
- Pyppeteer - Not found

**HTML/PDF Rendering:**
- wkhtmltopdf - Not found
- WeasyPrint - Not found
- pdfkit - Not found

**Server-Side Rendering:**
- No SSR framework (React, Vue, Angular) detected
- Only server-side templating is Jinja2 (safe, no external content fetching)

---

#### Media Processors: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Image Processing:**
- ImageMagick (Python: Wand, PythonMagick) - Not found
- Pillow/PIL - Not in requirements.txt
- GraphicsMagick - Not found

**Video Processing:**
- FFmpeg (Python: ffmpeg-python) - Not found

**Document Processing:**
- Ghostscript - Not found
- LibreOffice (unoconv) - Not found

---

#### Link Preview & Unfurlers: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Link Expansion:**
- No oEmbed implementation
- No Open Graph metadata fetching
- No Twitter Card generation
- No URL preview functionality

**Metadata Extraction:**
- No URL scraping libraries (BeautifulSoup not used for external URLs)

---

#### Webhook Testers & Callbacks: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Webhook Functionality:**
- No "ping webhook" endpoints
- No callback verification
- No outbound HTTP POST/GET for webhooks
- No event delivery systems

**Application Does Not:**
- Accept webhook URLs from users
- Send HTTP requests to user-provided endpoints
- Implement webhook testing functionality

---

#### SSO/OIDC Discovery & JWKS Fetchers: ❌ NOT FOUND

**OAuth/OIDC Libraries:**
- `authlib` - Not in requirements.txt
- `python-jose` - Not found
- `oauthlib` - Not found
- `PyJWT` - Not found

**SSO Functionality:**
- No OAuth implementation
- No OIDC discovery (`.well-known/openid-configuration`)
- No JWKS endpoint fetching
- No SAML metadata retrieval

---

#### Importers & Data Loaders: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Remote Data Loading:**
- No "import from URL" functionality
- No CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders
- No RSS/Atom feed readers
- No API synchronization

**Data Import Endpoints:**
- No file import from URL
- No data ingestion from external sources

---

#### Package/Plugin Installers: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Software Installation:**
- No "install from URL" features
- No package managers (pip, npm) exposed to users
- No plugin/theme downloaders
- No update mechanisms with user-controlled URLs

---

#### Monitoring & Health Check Frameworks: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Health Checks:**
- No URL health check endpoints
- No uptime monitoring with user-provided URLs
- No ping functionality

**Monitoring:**
- No external monitoring integrations
- No alerting webhooks with user-controlled destinations

---

#### Cloud Metadata Helpers: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Cloud Metadata Access:**
- No AWS metadata API calls (`http://169.254.169.254/`)
- No GCP metadata server access
- No Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) calls
- No Docker/Kubernetes API access with user input

**Container Metadata:**
- No container orchestration API clients with user-controlled endpoints

---

### Why This Application Has No SSRF Surface

**Root Cause Analysis:**

1. **No User Input Mechanism:**
   ```python
   from flask import Flask, render_template
   # Flask "request" object is NOT imported!
   ```
   The application **does not import `request`** from Flask, which is required to access:
   - Query parameters (`request.args.get()`)
   - POST body data (`request.form`, `request.get_json()`)
   - Headers (`request.headers`)
   - Cookies (`request.cookies`)

2. **No HTTP Client Libraries:**
   - `requirements.txt` contains only Flask and Paramiko
   - No `requests`, `urllib3`, `httpx`, `aiohttp`, or similar
   - No outbound HTTP capabilities

3. **Static Network Operations:**
   - Only network operation is SSH to `localhost:22`
   - All parameters hardcoded
   - No dynamic URL construction

4. **No External Integrations:**
   - No webhooks
   - No OAuth callbacks
   - No API proxying
   - No data import from URLs

---

### Potential SSRF if Application Extended

**If the application were modified** to add features, SSRF vulnerabilities could be introduced:

**Example 1: Process Search by Host (DANGEROUS - NOT PRESENT)**
```python
from flask import request
import paramiko

@app.route('/remote_ps')
def remote_ps():
    hostname = request.args.get('host')  # User-controlled!
    # SSRF: Attacker can connect to arbitrary hosts
    client.connect(hostname, port=22, username=username, password=password)
```

**Example 2: Import Data from URL (DANGEROUS - NOT PRESENT)**
```python
import requests

@app.route('/import')
def import_data():
    url = request.args.get('url')  # User-controlled!
    # SSRF: Attacker can make server fetch arbitrary URLs
    response = requests.get(url)
    return response.text
```

**Example 3: Webhook Callback (DANGEROUS - NOT PRESENT)**
```python
@app.route('/notify')
def notify():
    callback_url = request.args.get('callback')  # User-controlled!
    # SSRF: Attacker can make server send requests to internal services
    requests.post(callback_url, json={"status": "complete"})
```

**Current State:** ✅ **None of these patterns exist**

---

### Defensive Recommendations for Future Development

If SSRF-related features are added, implement these protections:

1. **URL Validation & Allow-Lists:**
   ```python
   ALLOWED_HOSTS = ['api.example.com', 'trusted-service.com']
   
   def validate_url(url):
       parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
       if parsed.hostname not in ALLOWED_HOSTS:
           raise ValueError("Host not allowed")
       return url
   ```

2. **Block Private IP Ranges:**
   ```python
   import ipaddress
   
   def is_private_ip(hostname):
       try:
           ip = ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
           return ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local
       except ValueError:
           return False
   
   if is_private_ip(hostname):
       raise ValueError("Cannot connect to private IP addresses")
   ```

3. **Disable Redirects:**
   ```python
   response = requests.get(url, allow_redirects=False)
   ```

4. **Use Timeouts:**
   ```python
   response = requests.get(url, timeout=5)
   ```

5. **Network Segmentation:**
   - Deploy application in isolated network segment
   - Use firewall rules to restrict outbound connections
   - Implement egress filtering

---

### Conclusion: No SSRF Vulnerabilities Present

**Final Assessment:** ✅ **SSRF-FREE**

This application is **secure from SSRF attacks** in its current form because:

1. ✅ No user input mechanisms exist
2. ✅ All network operations use hardcoded parameters
3. ✅ No HTTP client libraries installed
4. ✅ No URL-based functionality
5. ✅ No external service integrations

**For Penetration Testing:** No SSRF testing required for this application. Focus testing efforts on:
- Source code disclosure (`/source` endpoint)
- SSH credential extraction
- Privilege escalation after SSH access
- XSS vulnerabilities (see Section 9)

---

**END OF CODE ANALYSIS REPORT**

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

---
Report generated at: 2025-10-31T00:44:35.601Z