# SSRF Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** No SSRF vulnerabilities identified. The application is architecturally immune to Server-Side Request Forgery attacks.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report documents the comprehensive analysis of the application's network request capabilities and confirms the complete absence of SSRF attack surface.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

**No SSRF Patterns Identified**

After exhaustive analysis of all network-accessible endpoints and server-side code paths, this Flask-based GraphQL application contains **zero SSRF vulnerabilities**. The application follows an inbound-only network architecture where it exclusively receives HTTP requests and queries an internal MongoDB database, with no functionality requiring outbound HTTP requests to user-controlled or external destinations.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

**Application Architecture:**
- **Framework:** Flask 3.0.3 with Flask-GraphQL 2.0.1
- **HTTP Client Libraries:** None present in codebase
- **URL Processing:** No URL parameters accepted at any endpoint
- **Network Model:** Inbound-only (HTTP requests → GraphQL API → MongoDB)
- **External Integrations:** None (no webhooks, SSO, file fetching, or third-party services)

**MongoDB Connection Analysis:**
- **Connection String:** Hardcoded as `db='appdb', host='mongo', port=27017`
- **User Control:** None - connection parameters are static and not influenced by user input
- **Location:** `/app/database.py`, lines 5-6
- **Conclusion:** Even with NoSQL injection capabilities, attackers cannot modify the database connection target

**PhantomJS Discovery:**
- **Installation:** Present in Docker image (`/app/Dockerfile`, lines 8-12)
- **Usage:** Never imported or executed in application code
- **Assessment:** Appears to be abandoned infrastructure or red herring - does not create SSRF attack surface

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

The following analysis confirms that all network-accessible endpoints are architecturally immune to SSRF:

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Web Interface | `GET /` (`/app/app.py:20-22`) | Static template rendering only, no outbound requests | SAFE |
| REST API Wrapper | `POST /api/users` (`/app/app.py:24-38`) | GraphQL execution against local MongoDB only | SAFE |
| GraphQL Endpoint | `GET/POST /graphql` (`/app/app.py:11-17`) | Internal database queries only, no HTTP client usage | SAFE |
| GraphQL Resolver | `/app/schema.py:8-29` | MongoEngine queries only (`User.objects()`, `.filter()`, `.skip()`, `.limit()`) | SAFE |
| Database Connection | `/app/database.py:5-6` | Hardcoded static connection string, no user control | SAFE |
| MongoDB Driver | MongoEngine 0.28.2 | Internal protocol to static hostname `mongo:27017` | SAFE |

## 5. Exhaustive Pattern Search Results

The following SSRF attack vectors were systematically searched across all Python source files with **ZERO matches found**:

### HTTP(S) Client Libraries
- ✓ No `requests` module usage
- ✓ No `urllib.request.urlopen()` or `urlretrieve()`
- ✓ No `httpx`, `aiohttp`, or `curl` libraries
- ✓ No `http.client.HTTPConnection` usage

### Raw Socket APIs
- ✓ No `socket.connect()` or `socket.create_connection()`
- ✓ MongoDB connection is driver-internal and non-user-controllable

### URL Processing Functions
- ✓ No `urlopen()` or URL file handling
- ✓ No remote path processing
- ✓ No URL parameter parsing for outbound requests

### Subprocess Execution
- ✓ No `subprocess.run()`, `Popen()`, or `os.system()`
- ✓ No shell commands (`curl`, `wget`, `fetch`) invoked

### Headless Browsers & Automation
- ✓ PhantomJS installed but never imported or executed
- ✓ No Selenium, Puppeteer, or Playwright usage

### Media Processors
- ✓ No ImageMagick, PIL/Pillow with URL inputs
- ✓ No FFmpeg, wkhtmltopdf, or PDF generators

### Webhook/Callback Handlers
- ✓ No outbound webhook POST requests
- ✓ No callback verification endpoints
- ✓ No "ping URL" functionality

### SSO/OIDC Discovery
- ✓ No OpenID Connect discovery endpoints
- ✓ No JWKS retrieval
- ✓ No OAuth/SAML metadata fetchers

### File Import/Download Features
- ✓ No "import from URL" functionality
- ✓ No RSS/feed readers
- ✓ No remote configuration fetchers

## 6. Endpoint-by-Endpoint SSRF Analysis

### Endpoint 1: `GET /`
- **Location:** `/app/app.py:20-22`
- **Functionality:** Renders static HTML template (`index.html`)
- **User Input:** None
- **Outbound Requests:** None
- **SSRF Risk:** None - static template rendering only
- **Verdict:** SAFE

### Endpoint 2: `POST /api/users`
- **Location:** `/app/app.py:24-38`
- **Functionality:** Executes GraphQL query string against local schema
- **User Input:** `query` parameter (GraphQL query string)
- **Processing Chain:** `request.json.get('query')` → `schema.execute(query)` → GraphQL resolver → MongoDB query
- **Outbound Requests:** None - only internal GraphQL execution
- **SSRF Risk:** None - no URL parameters, no HTTP client usage
- **Verdict:** SAFE

### Endpoint 3: `GET/POST /graphql`
- **Location:** `/app/app.py:11-17`
- **Functionality:** GraphQL endpoint with GraphiQL interface
- **User Input:** GraphQL query parameters (`search`, `options`, `dummy`, `is_admin`)
- **Processing Chain:** GraphQL query → `resolve_users()` function → MongoDB queries
- **Outbound Requests:** None - resolver only performs database operations
- **SSRF Risk:** None - all parameters are JSON strings/booleans for database filtering
- **Verdict:** SAFE

### GraphQL Resolver Deep Dive: `resolve_users()`
- **Location:** `/app/schema.py:8-29`
- **Operations Performed:**
  - `User.objects()` - MongoEngine query initialization
  - `query.filter(**search_criteria)` - Database filter (NoSQL injection risk, not SSRF)
  - `query.skip(options_criteria['skip'])` - Pagination
  - `query.limit(options_criteria['limit'])` - Result limiting
- **Network Operations:** None - all operations are local database queries
- **SSRF Risk:** None
- **Verdict:** SAFE

## 7. Architecture Analysis: Why SSRF is Impossible

### Inbound-Only Network Model
The application exclusively operates as a data query interface:
- **Inbound:** HTTP requests from clients to Flask on port 5003
- **Internal:** Flask to MongoDB on `mongo:27017` (static, non-user-controllable)
- **Outbound:** None - no external service calls

### No URL-Accepting Parameters
Comprehensive search of all endpoint parameters:
- `/` - No parameters
- `/api/users` - `query` parameter (GraphQL string, not URL)
- `/graphql` - `search` (JSON string), `options` (JSON string), `dummy` (string), `is_admin` (boolean)
- **Result:** Zero URL parameters across entire application

### No External Service Dependencies
The application has no integration with:
- Payment gateways (Stripe, PayPal)
- Email services (SendGrid, SMTP)
- Cloud storage (S3, GCS, Azure Blob)
- Authentication providers (Auth0, Okta, OAuth)
- Webhooks or callback services
- Media processing services
- CDNs or external APIs

### Code-Level Evidence
**Complete import analysis of all Python files:**
```python
# app.py imports:
from flask import Flask, render_template, request, jsonify
from flask_graphql import GraphQLView
from schema import schema
from database import db
from models import User

# schema.py imports:
import graphene
from models import User
import json

# models.py imports:
from mongoengine import Document, StringField, BooleanField

# database.py imports:
from mongoengine import connect
import os
```

**Analysis:** No HTTP client libraries (`requests`, `urllib`, `httpx`, `httplib2`, `aiohttp`) imported anywhere in the codebase.

## 8. Conclusion

**SSRF Attack Surface: ZERO**

This application is fundamentally incompatible with Server-Side Request Forgery vulnerabilities due to its architecture as a simple CRUD API with no outbound request functionality. The application:

1. Does not import any HTTP client libraries
2. Does not accept URL parameters from users
3. Does not perform server-side fetching, downloading, or HTTP requests
4. Contains only database query logic with static connection strings
5. Has no features requiring external resource retrieval

**Recommendation for Future Development:**

If future features require outbound HTTP requests (webhooks, avatar fetching, SSO integration), developers must implement:
- Strict URL allowlisting (protocol, domain, port)
- Protocol restrictions (allow only `https://`)
- CIDR/IP blocklisting (block internal ranges: 127.0.0.0/8, 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.0.0/16)
- Cloud metadata endpoint blocking (169.254.169.254)
- Redirect following disabled or validated
- Network-level egress filtering
- Request timeout controls

**Current Status:** No SSRF vulnerabilities exist, and no exploitation queue entries are warranted.
