# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary

- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Multiple critical authentication vulnerabilities were identified across all authentication mechanisms. The application demonstrates fundamental failures in session management, transport security, password security, and rate limiting. Every authentication control examined contains exploitable flaws.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

**Critical Finding Summary:**
- **Transport Security:** No HTTPS enforcement; all credentials transmitted in plaintext over HTTP
- **Session Management:** No session ID rotation, incomplete logout, missing security flags, hardcoded secret key enables session forgery
- **Rate Limiting:** Zero rate limiting, CAPTCHA, or account lockout mechanisms across all authentication endpoints
- **Password Security:** Plaintext password storage, hardcoded default credentials, no password policy
- **2FA Implementation:** Completely broken with hardcoded bypass value `1234` in both server and client code
- **Session Fixation:** Vulnerable - no session regeneration after authentication
- **User Enumeration:** Error messages explicitly hint at valid usernames

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Absence of Rate Limiting and Abuse Prevention

**Description:** A catastrophic pattern exists where all authentication endpoints lack any form of rate limiting, CAPTCHA, account lockout, or monitoring. This enables unlimited brute-force attacks without detection or throttling.

**Implication:** Attackers can perform unlimited authentication attempts against any endpoint. The 2FA endpoint with hardcoded code `1234` can be brute-forced in under 2 minutes at moderate request rates (10,000 attempts with no throttling). Password brute-forcing is limited only by network bandwidth.

**Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-02` (rate limiting), `AUTH-VULN-07` (2FA brute-force)

**Affected Endpoints:**
- POST /login (line 67-100) - Primary authentication
- POST /admin/2fa (line 33-44) - Two-factor authentication
- All authentication flows lack monitoring or attempt tracking

### Pattern 2: Fundamentally Broken Session Management

**Description:** The application's session management violates every industry standard for secure session handling. Sessions are not regenerated after authentication, use hardcoded secret keys, lack proper security flags, and transmit over unencrypted channels.

**Implication:** Multiple attack vectors enable complete session compromise:
1. Session fixation attacks due to missing session ID rotation
2. Session forgery using the exposed secret key `'BIYQYU@*DG(*!@)BO#F_P'`
3. Session hijacking via network interception (no HTTPS)
4. CSRF attacks due to missing SameSite cookie protection
5. Indefinite session validity with no timeouts

**Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-03`, `AUTH-VULN-04`, `AUTH-VULN-05`, `AUTH-VULN-06`

**Code Evidence:**
- app.py:8 - Hardcoded secret key
- app.py:89 - Session creation without regeneration
- app.py:123 - Incomplete session clearing on logout
- No SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE, SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE, or PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME configuration

### Pattern 3: Plaintext Credential Storage and Transmission

**Description:** The application stores all passwords in plaintext in the database and transmits all credentials over unencrypted HTTP connections. No cryptographic protection exists at any layer.

**Implication:** Database compromise immediately exposes all user passwords. Network interception reveals credentials in transit. This violates fundamental security requirements and creates cascading compromise scenarios.

**Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-08`, `AUTH-VULN-01`

**Database Schema:**
```sql
CREATE TABLE users (
    username TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
    password TEXT NOT NULL,  -- PLAINTEXT STORAGE
    role TEXT NOT NULL
)
```

**Current Database Contents:**
- emp1:password1 (plaintext)
- admin:adminpassword (plaintext)
- emp:password1 (plaintext)

### Pattern 4: Hardcoded Security Bypasses

**Description:** Multiple security mechanisms are bypassed through hardcoded values committed to source code, including default credentials, 2FA codes, and cryptographic keys.

**Implication:** Anyone with repository access can authenticate as any user, forge sessions, and bypass 2FA. The hardcoded values are permanently exposed in Git history and cannot be remediated without rewriting history.

**Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-07`, `AUTH-VULN-09`

**Hardcoded Values:**
- Session secret: `'BIYQYU@*DG(*!@)BO#F_P'` (app.py:8)
- 2FA code: `'1234'` (app.py:38, 2fa.html:45)
- Admin credentials: `admin:adminpassword` (app.py:24)
- Employee credentials: `emp:emppassword` (app.py:23)

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method
- **Primary Mechanism:** Form-based username/password authentication via POST /login
- **Session Storage:** Client-side signed cookies using Flask's itsdangerous library
- **Transport:** HTTP only (port 5003), no HTTPS enforcement

### Session Token Details
- **Cookie Name:** `session`
- **Format:** Base64-encoded JSON + HMAC-SHA256 signature
- **Structure:** `eyJyb2xlIjoiZW1wbG95ZWUifQ.aQGUWA.oHpEnfZqNcVuD4Y8ub4z8G7z05k`
  - First segment: `{"role":"employee"}` (base64)
  - Second segment: Timestamp
  - Third segment: HMAC signature
- **Secret Key:** `'BIYQYU@*DG(*!@)BO#F_P'` (hardcoded at app.py:8)
- **Security Flags Observed (Live Testing):**
  - HttpOnly: YES (Flask 3.0.3 default)
  - Secure: NO (missing - cookies sent over HTTP)
  - SameSite: NO (missing - enables CSRF)
- **Session Content:** Contains only `{"role": "employee"}` or `{"role": "admin"}`
- **Expiration:** No timeout configured - sessions persist indefinitely until browser close

### Multi-Factor Authentication
- **Type:** OTP-based (hardcoded value)
- **Implementation:** Server checks if `code == '1234'` (app.py:38)
- **Client-Side Bypass:** JavaScript auto-submits `code: 1234` regardless of user input (2fa.html:45)
- **Binding:** No binding to user account - same code works for all admin users
- **Rate Limiting:** None - can be brute-forced in <2 minutes
- **Effective Security Value:** ZERO - provides no actual protection

### Password Policy
- **Minimum Length:** None enforced
- **Complexity Requirements:** None enforced
- **Common Password Checking:** None implemented
- **Server-Side Validation:** Only checks for `;`, `'`, `"` characters via is_safe_input()
- **Observed Weak Passwords:** `password1`, `emppassword`, `adminpassword` all accepted

### Default Credentials
The following credentials are hardcoded in app.py:23-24 and always present:
- **Employee:** `emp:emppassword`
- **Admin:** `admin:adminpassword`
- These credentials are embedded in database initialization and cannot be removed without code modification

### Authentication Flow Details

**Standard Login Flow:**
1. User visits /employee/login or /admin/login (GET)
2. Client submits credentials via AJAX POST to /login with: username, password, role
3. Server validates against database: `SELECT role FROM users WHERE username=? AND password=?`
4. **CRITICAL FLAW:** Server ignores database role and uses client-submitted role: `session['role'] = role`
5. Session cookie created and returned
6. If role=admin, redirects to /admin/2fa; otherwise redirects to /emp/dashboard
7. 2FA automatically submits hardcoded `1234` via JavaScript
8. Admin dashboard exposes FLAG via environment variable

**Session Fixation Attack Flow:**
1. Attacker obtains or creates a pre-authentication session cookie
2. Attacker tricks victim into authenticating with this session (via XSS, CSRF, etc.)
3. Victim authenticates successfully
4. Server does NOT regenerate session ID (app.py:89 only sets session['role'])
5. Attacker's pre-existing session cookie becomes authenticated
6. Attacker hijacks victim's authenticated session

**Session Forgery Attack Flow:**
1. Attacker uses exposed secret key: `'BIYQYU@*DG(*!@)BO#F_P'`
2. Attacker crafts session payload: `{"role": "admin"}`
3. Attacker uses itsdangerous library to sign cookie with known secret
4. Attacker sets forged cookie in browser
5. Attacker accesses /admin/dashboard directly without authentication
6. Application accepts forged session as valid

### Network Observations
- **Protocol:** HTTP only (no HTTPS)
- **Port:** 5003
- **Server Header:** `Werkzeug/3.0.3 Python/3.8.17`
- **Debug Mode:** Enabled (app.py:131 - `debug=True`)
- **Response Headers Missing:**
  - No Cache-Control on authentication responses
  - No Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)
  - No X-Frame-Options
  - No Content-Security-Policy
- **User Enumeration Vector:** Error message "Invalid credentials. If you are admin go to admin login" (app.py:98) explicitly reveals admin username existence

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses. They are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection Protection | POST /login (app.py:83) | Parameterized queries with prepared statements | SAFE |
| Input Validation (Basic) | POST /login (app.py:75) | is_safe_input() blocks `;`, `'`, `"` characters | LIMITED (prevents basic injection) |
| Command Injection | N/A - No system commands | No os.system(), subprocess usage in codebase | SAFE (by absence) |
| Template Injection | All template rendering | Uses render_template() with safe context variables | SAFE |

**Notes on "Safe" Components:**
- SQL injection is prevented through proper use of parameterized queries
- However, the authentication logic itself is flawed (role injection vulnerability)
- Input validation only prevents injection attacks, not logical attacks
- The absence of dangerous functions (eval, exec, os.system) prevents command injection
- No password reset functionality exists, eliminating that attack surface

## 5. Attack Surface Summary

**Total Authentication Endpoints:** 6
- POST /login - Primary authentication (CRITICAL vulnerabilities)
- GET /employee/login - Login page (information disclosure)
- GET /admin/login - Admin login page (information disclosure)
- GET /admin/2fa - 2FA page (no auth required - vulnerability)
- POST /admin/2fa - 2FA verification (hardcoded bypass)
- GET /logout - Session termination (incomplete cleanup)

**Not Implemented:** No password reset/recovery, no registration, no account management endpoints

**Primary Exploitation Paths:**
1. **Session Forgery** (no credentials required) - Use hardcoded secret key to forge admin session
2. **Brute Force** (unlimited attempts) - No rate limiting on any endpoint
3. **Session Fixation** (requires social engineering) - No session ID rotation
4. **2FA Bypass** (trivial) - Hardcoded code `1234` in server and client
5. **Default Credentials** (instant access) - `admin:adminpassword` always valid
6. **Session Hijacking** (network access) - HTTP transmission enables MITM

## 6. Recommendations for Exploitation Phase

**Priority 1 - Session Forgery (Highest Impact, No Prerequisites):**
- Use hardcoded secret key to forge admin session
- No authentication required
- Immediate admin access to FLAG
- Reference: AUTH-VULN-04

**Priority 2 - Default Credential Login:**
- Use `admin:adminpassword` or `emp:emppassword`
- Immediate authentication
- Reference: AUTH-VULN-09

**Priority 3 - Brute Force Attacks:**
- Exploit absent rate limiting on POST /login
- Test weak password enumeration
- Reference: AUTH-VULN-02

**Priority 4 - Session Fixation:**
- Requires victim interaction
- More complex attack chain
- Reference: AUTH-VULN-03

**Session Fixation Attack Prerequisites:**
- Ability to set victim's cookie (via XSS, CSRF, or network position)
- Victim must authenticate while using attacker-controlled session
- Useful when combined with other vulnerabilities

**Credential Enumeration Strategy:**
- Error message at app.py:98 reveals valid usernames
- Test common usernames to identify valid accounts
- Database contains only 2-3 users, making exhaustive enumeration trivial

## 7. Code Quality and Security Posture

**Security Library Audit:**
- No bcrypt, argon2, or password hashing libraries
- No Flask-Limiter or rate limiting extensions
- No Flask-WTF or CSRF protection
- No Flask-Login or session management extensions
- No security-focused middleware
- Only basic Flask and SQLite dependencies

**Configuration Security:**
- All secrets hardcoded in source code (app.py:8, lines 23-24)
- Debug mode enabled in production (app.py:131)
- No environment-based configuration
- No separation of dev/prod settings
- No .gitignore to prevent secret commits

**Logging and Monitoring:**
- No authentication event logging
- No failed login attempt tracking
- No session activity monitoring
- No security alerting mechanisms
- Debug mode may log to stdout but provides no security event tracking

This application represents a comprehensive failure of authentication security best practices across every analyzed dimension.