# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Critical authentication flaws were identified across transport security, session management, credential handling, and rate limiting. The application demonstrates fundamental security failures that enable multiple attack vectors including credential theft, session hijacking, brute force attacks, and authentication bypass.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant flaw patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Absent Transport Security (HTTP-Only)
- **Description:** The application runs exclusively over HTTP with no HTTPS/TLS configuration. Apache is configured to listen only on port 80, with no SSL/TLS directives, HSTS headers, or HTTP-to-HTTPS redirects.
- **Implication:** All authentication credentials (username, password, JWT tokens, session cookies) are transmitted in cleartext over the network. An attacker performing passive network monitoring or man-in-the-middle attacks can capture credentials and session tokens without any cryptographic protection.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-01` (HTTP-only transport), `AUTH-VULN-02` (Missing Secure cookie flags).
- **Code Evidence:** `trading_platform-httpd.conf:1` defines VirtualHost on port 80 only; no port 443 configuration exists.

### Pattern 2: Missing Cookie Security Flags
- **Description:** Both the Flask session cookie and JWT `auth_token` cookie lack critical security flags. The JWT cookie is set with zero security flags (`routes.py:63`), while the session cookie relies on Flask defaults without explicit secure configuration.
- **Implication:** The JWT cookie is accessible to JavaScript (no HttpOnly flag), enabling XSS-based token theft. Both cookies are transmitted over HTTP (no Secure flag), and neither has SameSite protection, enabling CSRF attacks.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-02` (Cookie misconfiguration), `AUTH-VULN-08` (Incomplete logout).
- **Code Evidence:** `routes.py:63` - `resp.set_cookie('auth_token', token)` with no flags; `__init__.py:11` has no SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE configuration.

### Pattern 3: Plaintext Password Storage
- **Description:** Passwords are stored in the database as plaintext VARCHAR(100) fields with no cryptographic hashing. Password validation performs direct plaintext comparison via SQL query (`routes.py:55`).
- **Implication:** Any database compromise (backup exposure, SQL injection, insider threat) immediately exposes all user passwords. This violates OWASP, NIST SP 800-63B, PCI-DSS Requirement 8.2.1, and GDPR Article 32.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-05` (Plaintext passwords).
- **Code Evidence:** `models.py:8` defines `password = db.Column(db.String(100), nullable=False)`; `routes.py:55` performs `User.query.filter_by(username=username, password=password).first()`.

### Pattern 4: No Rate Limiting or Abuse Defenses
- **Description:** The application has no rate limiting on authentication endpoints, no CAPTCHA, no account lockout after failed attempts, and no failed login logging. Unlimited authentication attempts are possible without throttling.
- **Implication:** Attackers can perform unrestricted brute force attacks, credential stuffing, and password spraying against user accounts. Combined with weak password policy and username enumeration, this enables trivial account compromise.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-03` (Missing rate limiting).
- **Code Evidence:** No rate limiting libraries in `requirements.txt`; no decorators on `routes.py:21` (POST /) or `routes.py:46` (POST /password/<username>); no Apache mod_ratelimit configuration in `trading_platform-httpd.conf`.

### Pattern 5: Critical JWT Signature Verification Bypass
- **Description:** JWT signature verification is explicitly disabled with `options={'verify_signature':False}` at `routes.py:81`. The application trusts the unverified `user_id` claim from the JWT to fetch user data, enabling horizontal privilege escalation.
- **Implication:** Any attacker can forge JWT tokens with arbitrary `user_id` values and access any user's account. This completely undermines the authentication system and enables trivial account takeover without credentials.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-06` (JWT signature bypass) - **NOTE:** This is an AUTHORIZATION vulnerability (IDOR/horizontal privilege escalation) and will be reported by the Authorization Analysis phase, not in this AUTH queue.
- **Code Evidence:** `routes.py:80-81` - `jwt.decode(token, app.config['AUTH_SECRET_KEY'], algorithms=['HS256'], options={'verify_signature':False})`.

### Pattern 6: Session Fixation Vulnerability
- **Description:** Session IDs are not regenerated after successful authentication. The application adds `user_id` to the existing session without clearing or recreating the session, enabling session fixation attacks.
- **Implication:** An attacker can set a session ID before authentication and hijack the session after the victim logs in.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-07` (Session fixation).
- **Code Evidence:** `routes.py:60` - `session['user_id'] = user.id` without session regeneration; no call to `session.clear()` or session ID rotation.

### Pattern 7: Incomplete Logout Implementation
- **Description:** The logout function only removes `user_id` from the session but does not clear the JWT `auth_token` cookie. The cookie remains in the browser after logout.
- **Implication:** After logout, the JWT token remains valid and accessible. An attacker with physical access or XSS can retrieve and reuse the token.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-08` (Incomplete logout).
- **Code Evidence:** `routes.py:38-42` - logout only calls `session.pop('user_id', None)` but does not set `resp.set_cookie('auth_token', '', expires=0)`.

### Pattern 8: Username Enumeration
- **Description:** The two-step login flow provides different responses for valid vs. invalid usernames. Valid usernames trigger a redirect to the password page, while invalid usernames render an error message.
- **Implication:** Attackers can enumerate valid usernames to build targeted attack lists for password guessing.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-04` (Username enumeration).
- **Code Evidence:** `routes.py:28-33` - different response patterns based on username existence.

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Method
The system uses a **hybrid JWT + Flask session authentication model**:
- **JWT Token:** Generated at `routes.py:57-58` using PyJWT 2.8.0 with HS256 algorithm
  - Stored in `auth_token` cookie (no security flags)
  - Contains claims: `username`, `user_id`, `user_type`
  - No expiration (`exp` claim missing)
  - **Signature verification disabled** at `routes.py:81`
- **Flask Session:** Server-side session using signed cookies
  - Stores `user_id` after successful authentication
  - Signed with hardcoded secret key `'your_secret_key'` (`__init__.py:11`)
  - No explicit security configuration (relies on Flask defaults)

### Session Token Details
- **JWT Cookie Name:** `auth_token`
  - Set at: `routes.py:63`
  - Flags: **NONE** (no HttpOnly, no Secure, no SameSite)
  - Format: `eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VybmFtZSI6InRlc3QiLCJ1c2VyX2lkIjoxMDAzMiwidXNlcl90eXBlIjoiY3VzdG9tZXIifQ.ubKxvL3U9FouYhgqbsNNfV7C6iaVCJ83foZ1bq8roEs`
  - Payload (decoded): `{"username":"test","user_id":10032,"user_type":"customer"}`
- **Session Cookie Name:** `session`
  - Set automatically by Flask at `routes.py:60` when `session['user_id'] = user.id` is called
  - Flags: `HttpOnly` (Flask default), no `Secure`, no `SameSite`
  - Signed but not encrypted

### Password Policy
- **Storage:** Plaintext in database (`models.py:8`)
- **Validation:** Direct string comparison in SQL query (`routes.py:55`)
- **Policy Enforcement:** **NONE**
  - No minimum length requirement
  - No complexity requirements (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, special characters)
  - No common password blacklist
  - Test account uses `test:test` (disclosed in HTML comment at `templates/login.html:1`)
- **Hashing Libraries:** None installed (no bcrypt, argon2, werkzeug.security usage)

### Rate Limiting & Abuse Prevention
- **Rate Limiting:** Not implemented (no flask-limiter library, no Apache mod_ratelimit)
- **CAPTCHA:** Not implemented (no reCAPTCHA, hCaptcha integration)
- **Account Lockout:** Not implemented (no tracking of failed attempts)
- **Failed Login Logging:** Not implemented (no logging statements in authentication flow)
- **Monitoring:** No security event monitoring (no Sentry, CloudWatch, etc.)

### Session Management
- **Timeout:** No explicit session timeout configured (no PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME)
- **Idle Timeout:** Not implemented
- **Absolute Timeout:** Not implemented
- **Session Rotation:** Not implemented (no session ID regeneration after login)
- **Logout Behavior:** Incomplete (JWT cookie not cleared)

### Transport Security
- **HTTPS:** Not configured (Apache VirtualHost on port 80 only)
- **HSTS:** Not configured (no Strict-Transport-Security header)
- **TLS Version:** N/A (no TLS configured)
- **Certificate:** N/A (no SSL certificate)

### Cache-Control Headers
- **Configuration:** Global `@app.after_request` handler at `routes.py:10-16`
- **Headers Set:** 
  - `Cache-Control: public, max-age=0` (contradictory - overwrites no-cache directive)
  - `Pragma: no-cache`
  - `Expires: 0`
- **Issue:** Broken implementation (modifies request headers instead of response headers, contradictory directives)
- **Observed Behavior:** `Cache-Control: public, max-age=0` is sent in responses (verified via `curl -I`)

### User Enumeration Vector
- **Two-Step Login Flow:**
  1. POST / with username → redirect to /password/<username> if valid OR error message if invalid
  2. POST /password/<username> with password → redirect to /dashboard if valid OR error message if invalid
- **Enumeration Method:** Different response patterns reveal username existence
- **Test Account:** `test:test` (disclosed in HTML comment)

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses or appropriate design for their context. They are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| SQL Injection Protection | All database queries in `routes.py` | SQLAlchemy ORM with automatic parameterization (`filter_by()`, `.get()`, `.first()`) | SAFE |
| XSS Protection (Template Rendering) | All templates (`login.html`, `password.html`, `dashboard.html`) | Jinja2 auto-escaping enabled by default for `.html` files | SAFE |
| Session Cookie HttpOnly (Default) | Flask session cookie | Flask default sets `HttpOnly=True` on session cookies | SAFE (but not explicitly configured) |
| Static File Serving | `GET /static/<path:filename>` | Flask built-in static file handler with path normalization | SAFE (no path traversal found) |

**Note:** While these components have appropriate protections, the overall application security posture is critically weak due to the vulnerabilities documented above. The presence of secure components does not mitigate the high-risk authentication flaws.

---

## 5. Out of Scope: Not Applicable Features

The following authentication features **do not exist** in this application and are therefore not applicable to this analysis:

- **OAuth/SSO/OIDC Flows:** No external identity provider integration
- **Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA/2FA):** Not implemented
- **Password Reset/Recovery:** No password reset endpoints or email verification
- **User Registration:** No signup/registration flow (users created during app initialization only)
- **Token Refresh:** No token refresh endpoint or mechanism
- **API Key Authentication:** Not implemented
- **Certificate-Based Authentication:** Not implemented
- **Biometric Authentication:** Not implemented

---

## 6. Testing Methodology Applied

This analysis followed the white-box vulnerability analysis procedure for Broken Authentication:

1. ✅ **Transport & Caching:** Analyzed Apache config, checked HTTPS/HSTS, verified cache-control headers
2. ✅ **Rate Limiting/CAPTCHA/Monitoring:** Searched for rate limiting libraries, CAPTCHA integration, logging configuration
3. ✅ **Session Management (Cookies):** Examined cookie security flags for both session and JWT cookies
4. ✅ **Token Properties:** Analyzed JWT token entropy, expiration, signature verification
5. ✅ **Session Fixation:** Checked for session ID regeneration after login
6. ✅ **Password Policy:** Analyzed password storage (hashing), complexity enforcement, default credentials
7. ✅ **Login/Signup Responses:** Checked for username enumeration, generic error messages
8. ✅ **Recovery & Logout:** Analyzed logout completeness, session invalidation
9. ⚠️ **SSO/OAuth:** N/A (not implemented)

**Live Application Testing Conducted:**
- Verified HTTP-only transport (no HTTPS redirect)
- Confirmed cache-control header behavior (`Cache-Control: public, max-age=0`)
- Captured session and JWT cookies to verify security flags:
  - `auth_token`: No HttpOnly, no Secure, no SameSite (confirmed via curl cookie file)
  - `session`: HttpOnly present (Flask default), no Secure, no SameSite
- Decoded JWT payload to confirm structure: `{"username":"test","user_id":10032,"user_type":"customer"}`
- Tested logout endpoint to confirm JWT cookie is NOT cleared (no Set-Cookie header in logout response)

---

## 7. Confidence Ratings Applied

All findings use the following confidence scoring criteria:

- **High** — The flaw is directly established and deterministic. Direct code evidence or single safe interaction confirms the vulnerability with no material alternate control. Scope is clear.
- **Medium** — The flaw is strongly indicated but has at least one material uncertainty (possible upstream control, conditional behavior, or partial coverage).
- **Low** — The flaw is plausible but unverified or weakly supported (indirect evidence, no reproduction, unclear scope, or inconsistent indicators).

All vulnerabilities in the exploitation queue have been assigned confidence ratings based on this criteria.