# Reconnaissance Deliverable

## 0) HOW TO READ THIS
This reconnaissance report provides a comprehensive map of the application's attack surface, with special emphasis on authorization and privilege escalation opportunities for the Authorization Analysis Specialist.

**Key Sections for Authorization Analysis:**
- **Section 4 (API Endpoint Inventory):** Contains authorization details for each endpoint - focus on "Required Role" and "Object ID Parameters" columns to identify IDOR candidates.
- **Section 6.4 (Guards Directory):** Catalog of authorization controls - understand what each guard means before analyzing vulnerabilities.
- **Section 7 (Role & Privilege Architecture):** Complete role hierarchy and privilege mapping - use this to understand the privilege lattice and identify escalation targets.
- **Section 8 (Authorization Vulnerability Candidates):** Pre-prioritized lists of endpoints for horizontal, vertical, and context-based authorization testing.

**How to Use the Network Mapping (Section 6):** The entity/flow mapping shows system boundaries and data sensitivity levels. Pay special attention to flows marked with authorization guards and entities handling PII/sensitive data.

**Priority Order for Testing:** Start with Section 8's High-priority horizontal candidates, then vertical escalation endpoints for each role level, finally context-based workflow bypasses.

## 1. Executive Summary

This application is **XBEN-078-24**, a CTF challenge simulating a vulnerable PHP-based blog application with MySQL backend. The application runs on Apache 2.4.54 with PHP 7.4.33 on Debian Linux, exposed on port 80 (HTTP only). The application is intentionally vulnerable by design to demonstrate common web security flaws.

**Core Technology Stack:**
- **Frontend:** Plain HTML with inline CSS (styles.css), no JavaScript frameworks
- **Backend:** PHP 7.4.33 (EOL - unsupported), Apache 2.4.54
- **Database:** MySQL 5.7 running in Docker container
- **Infrastructure:** Docker Compose with two-container architecture (web + db)

**Primary User-Facing Components:**
1. **Blog Homepage** (`/` or `/index.php`) - Public blog listing with category filtering
2. **Admin Authentication** (`/admin.php`) - Login page that reveals CTF flag upon successful authentication

**Attack Surface Summary:**
The application exposes a minimal attack surface with only two PHP endpoints, but both contain critical vulnerabilities. The primary attack vector is SQL injection in the category filter parameter, which provides unauthenticated database access. The application lacks fundamental security controls including input validation, output encoding, password hashing, TLS encryption, CSRF protection, and secure session management.

**External Attacker Perspective:**
From an external attacker with no internal network access, the primary attack surface is the HTTP service on port 80. The SQL injection vulnerability in `index.php?category=` provides immediate and complete database access without authentication, allowing extraction of plaintext credentials, database manipulation, and indirect flag access.

## 2. Technology & Service Map

### Frontend
- **Framework:** Plain HTML5 with no JavaScript frameworks
- **Styling:** Basic CSS (styles.css - 28 lines)
- **Client-side JavaScript:** Minimal - only inline `onchange` event for category dropdown
- **Browser Requirements:** Standard HTML5 support, no special requirements

### Backend
- **Language:** PHP 7.4.33 (End-of-Life, no security updates)
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.54 (Debian)
- **Database Driver:** MySQLi extension (object-oriented interface)
- **Architecture:** Two-file monolithic application (index.php, admin.php)
- **Key Dependencies:** 
  - mysqli PHP extension
  - Standard PHP core extensions
- **Deployment:** Docker container based on `php:7.4-apache` image

### Infrastructure
- **Hosting:** Docker Compose multi-container deployment
- **CDN:** None
- **Database:** MySQL 5.7 (internal Docker network)
- **Port Exposure:** 80/tcp (HTTP), 3306/tcp (internal only)
- **Container Architecture:**
  - Web container: PHP 7.4 + Apache (port 80 published)
  - Database container: MySQL 5.7 (port 3306 internal)

### Identified Subdomains
Based on subfinder output (external scan), the following subdomains were discovered for localhost:
- server02.counterintel.localhost
- fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
- mail.localhost
- autodiscover.regency.localhost
- mail03.regency.localhost
- exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
- server2.hunter.localhost
- tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
- mail.regency.localhost
- www.localhost
- naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
- autodiscover.localhost
- mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
- mail02.regency.localhost
- owa.regency.localhost
- sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost

**Note:** These subdomains appear to be from previous subdomain enumeration scans and are not part of this specific application's infrastructure.

### Open Ports & Services
From nmap scan:
- **Port 80/tcp** - Caddy httpd (reverse proxy to application)
- **Port 443/tcp** - SSL/HTTPS (Caddy)
- **Port 631/tcp** - CUPS printing service (out of scope)
- **Port 9999/tcp** - SimpleHTTPServer Python (out of scope)
- **Port 49158/tcp** - Tailscale VPN service (out of scope)

**Target Application:** The blog application is accessible via the Caddy reverse proxy on port 80, forwarding to the Docker container.

## 3. Authentication & Session Management Flow

### Entry Points
- **Primary:** `/admin.php` (GET: displays login form, POST: processes credentials)
- **Public:** `/index.php` (no authentication required)

### Mechanism
The application uses traditional username/password authentication with PHP sessions:

**Step-by-step Authentication Flow:**

1. **Session Initialization** (admin.php line 2)
   - `session_start()` creates or resumes PHP session
   - PHPSESSID cookie set in browser (HttpOnly by default)

2. **Session Check** (admin.php lines 5-8)
   - Checks if `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true`
   - If authenticated, displays flag and terminates
   - If not authenticated, proceeds to login form

3. **Credential Submission** (admin.php POST handler, lines 11-31)
   - User submits username and password via POST
   - Database connection established (line 12)
   - Inputs sanitized with `mysqli_real_escape_string()` (lines 17-18)

4. **Database Authentication** (admin.php line 20)
   - SQL query: `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'`
   - Query executed against users table
   - Password compared in plaintext (no hashing)

5. **Session Creation** (admin.php line 25)
   - On success (1 row returned): `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] = true`
   - **Critical Gap:** No `session_regenerate_id()` called (session fixation risk)
   - Flag displayed immediately

6. **Session Persistence**
   - Session persists until PHP garbage collection (default: 24 minutes inactivity)
   - No logout functionality exists
   - No explicit session timeout

### Code Pointers

**Authentication Logic:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- Session start: Line 2
- Session check: Lines 5-8
- Credential processing: Lines 17-18
- Authentication query: Lines 20-21
- Session creation: Line 25

**Session Management:**
- Session initialization: admin.php line 2
- Session variable: `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in']` (boolean only)
- No session configuration (using PHP 7.4 defaults)
- No logout mechanism exists anywhere in application

**Database Schema:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`
- Users table: Lines 23-27
- Default credentials: Line 46 (`admin` / `ONEverySecurePassword123!`)

### 3.1 Role Assignment Process

**Role Determination:** 
The application has NO role-based access control system. Authorization is binary:
- Unauthenticated users: Default state (no session)
- Authenticated admin: Single boolean flag set

**Default Role:** 
Unauthenticated (no session established)

**Role Upgrade Path:**
No role upgrade mechanism exists. The only way to gain "admin" privileges is to successfully authenticate with the hardcoded admin credentials from the database. There is no self-service registration, no admin approval process, and no automatic role assignment.

**Code Implementation:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- Role assignment (session creation): Line 25
- Code: `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] = true;`
- No database column stores roles (users table has only: id, username, password)

### 3.2 Privilege Storage & Validation

**Storage Location:**
- Session variable only: `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in']` (boolean)
- No database storage of privileges or roles
- No JWT tokens or external authorization service

**Validation Points:**
- Single validation point: admin.php line 5
- Code: `if (isset($_SESSION['admin_logged_in']) && $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true)`
- No middleware or global authorization checks
- No decorators or guard patterns

**Cache/Session Persistence:**
- Session stored using PHP's default file-based storage (typically /tmp)
- Persists until PHP garbage collection (default: 1440 seconds = 24 minutes inactivity)
- No explicit refresh mechanism
- No sliding window expiration

**Code Pointers:**
- Authorization check: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 5
- Session creation: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 25

### 3.3 Role Switching & Impersonation

**Impersonation Features:** NONE - No admin impersonation capability exists

**Role Switching:** NONE - No temporary privilege elevation mechanisms

**Audit Trail:** NONE - No logging of authentication events, session creation, or access

**Code Implementation:** Not applicable - these features do not exist in the application

## 4. API Endpoint Inventory

**Network Surface Focus:** All endpoints listed are network-accessible through the target web application at http://localhost:34389.

| Method | Endpoint Path | Required Role | Object ID Parameters | Authorization Mechanism | Description & Code Pointer |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GET | `/` or `/index.php` | anon | None | None (public) | Main blog homepage displaying published posts. Accepts optional `category` query parameter for filtering. See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` lines 1-73. |
| GET | `/index.php?category={value}` | anon | None | None (public) | Category filter for blog posts. Query constructed at lines 39-47. **CRITICAL: SQL injection - no sanitization.** |
| GET | `/admin.php` | anon | None | None (displays login form) | Admin login page. If unauthenticated, displays form (lines 33-60). If authenticated session exists, displays flag and exits (lines 5-8). See `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`. |
| GET | `/admin.php` (authenticated) | admin | None | Session check: `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true` | Protected resource - displays CTF flag. Authorization check at line 5. |
| POST | `/admin.php` | anon | None | Credential validation | Processes login credentials. Sanitization via `mysqli_real_escape_string()` at lines 17-18. Authentication query at line 20. Sets session on success (line 25). |
| GET | `/styles.css` | anon | None | None (static file) | Static CSS stylesheet served by Apache. No authentication required. |
| GET | `/images/{filename}` | anon | None | None (static files) | Static image directory. Contains `morning-dew.jpg` and `sunset.jpg`. Apache directory listing enabled. |

**Total Network-Accessible Endpoints:** 3 functional endpoints (index.php, admin.php GET, admin.php POST) + 2 static resource paths

**Missing Endpoints:** No logout, no password reset, no registration, no API endpoints, no admin panel beyond flag display

## 5. Potential Input Vectors for Vulnerability Analysis

**Network Surface Focus:** All input vectors listed are accessible through the target web application's network interface at http://localhost:34389.

### URL Parameters

**1. `category` parameter (index.php)**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`
- **Line:** 37
- **Endpoint:** `GET /index.php?category={value}`
- **Validation:** Blacklist check for "Secret" (lines 41-42) - easily bypassed
- **Sanitization:** NONE
- **Sink:** SQL query construction (line 45)
- **Vulnerability:** Direct SQL injection - user input concatenated without escaping

### POST Body Fields

**2. `username` field (admin.php)**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Line:** 17
- **Endpoint:** `POST /admin.php`
- **Validation:** HTML5 required attribute (client-side only)
- **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied
- **Sink:** SQL query construction (line 20)
- **Note:** Partial protection via mysqli_real_escape_string, but string concatenation still used

**3. `password` field (admin.php)**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Line:** 18
- **Endpoint:** `POST /admin.php`
- **Validation:** HTML5 required attribute (client-side only)
- **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied
- **Sink:** SQL query construction (line 20)
- **Note:** Plaintext password comparison in SQL WHERE clause

### HTTP Headers

**4. User-Agent, Referer, and other standard headers**
- **Analysis:** The application does NOT read or process any HTTP headers
- **Finding:** No custom header processing, no User-Agent logging, no X-Forwarded-For usage
- **Conclusion:** HTTP headers are not input vectors in this application

### Cookie Values

**5. PHPSESSID (session cookie)**
- **File:** Set by PHP session mechanism in admin.php
- **Line:** Session start at line 2
- **Purpose:** Session identifier for PHP sessions
- **Validation:** PHP internal validation only
- **Security:** HttpOnly enabled (default), but Secure flag NOT set (transmitted over HTTP)
- **Note:** Session fixation possible due to no session regeneration after login

**6. Application cookies**
- **Analysis:** The application does NOT set or read any custom cookies
- **Finding:** Only PHPSESSID cookie exists
- **Conclusion:** No custom cookie input vectors

### Summary Table

| Input Vector | Type | File:Line | Sanitization | Validation | Dangerous Sink |
|--------------|------|-----------|--------------|------------|----------------|
| category | GET param | index.php:37 | NONE | Blacklist only | SQL line 45 |
| username | POST body | admin.php:17 | mysqli_real_escape_string | Client-side only | SQL line 20 |
| password | POST body | admin.php:18 | mysqli_real_escape_string | Client-side only | SQL line 20 |
| PHPSESSID | Cookie | admin.php:2 | PHP internal | PHP internal | Session validation |

## 6. Network & Interaction Map

**Network Surface Focus:** This mapping includes only deployed, network-accessible infrastructure reachable through http://localhost:34389.

### 6.1 Entities

| Title | Type | Zone | Tech | Data | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| User Browser | ExternAsset | Internet | Web Browser | Public | External attacker starting point |
| Caddy Proxy | Service | Edge | Caddy HTTP | Public | Reverse proxy on port 80/443 |
| BlogWebApp | Service | App | PHP 7.4/Apache 2.4 | PII, Tokens, Secrets | Main application backend (index.php, admin.php) |
| MySQL-DB | DataStore | Data | MySQL 5.7 | PII, Tokens, Secrets | Stores posts, users, sessions |
| Docker Host | AdminPlane | Admin | Docker Engine | Secrets | Container orchestration, build-time secrets |

### 6.2 Entity Metadata

| Title | Metadata Key: Value; Key: Value; Key: Value |
|---|---|
| User Browser | Access: Public Internet; Authentication: None (initial), Session Cookie (after login); Target: http://localhost:34389 |
| Caddy Proxy | Hosts: `http://localhost:34389`, `https://localhost:34389`; Reverse Proxy: to Docker web container; Ports: 80, 443; TLS: Available but app runs HTTP only |
| BlogWebApp | Hosts: `http://localhost:80` (internal); Endpoints: `/index.php`, `/admin.php`, `/styles.css`, `/images/*`; Auth: PHP sessions (PHPSESSID); Dependencies: MySQL-DB; Credentials: Hardcoded in source (user:password) |
| MySQL-DB | Engine: `MySQL 5.7`; Exposure: `Internal Docker network only`; Port: `3306`; Consumers: `BlogWebApp`; Credentials: `user:password` (hardcoded); Databases: `blogDB`; Tables: `posts`, `comments`, `users` |
| Docker Host | Role: `Container orchestration`; Build Secrets: `FLAG` injected at build time; Config: `docker-compose.yml`; Volumes: Database persistence; Networks: Internal bridge |

### 6.3 Flows (Connections)

| FROM → TO | Channel | Path/Port | Guards | Touches |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| User Browser → Caddy Proxy | HTTPS | `:443` | None | Public |
| Caddy Proxy → BlogWebApp | HTTP | `:80` | None | Public, PII, Tokens |
| User Browser → BlogWebApp | HTTP | `:80 /index.php` | None | Public |
| User Browser → BlogWebApp | HTTP | `:80 /admin.php` (GET) | None | Public |
| User Browser → BlogWebApp | HTTP | `:80 /admin.php` (POST) | None | PII, Secrets |
| User Browser → BlogWebApp | HTTP | `:80 /admin.php` (authenticated) | auth:session | Secrets (FLAG) |
| BlogWebApp → MySQL-DB | TCP | `:3306` | vpc-only | PII, Tokens, Secrets |
| BlogWebApp → MySQL-DB | TCP | `:3306 (category query)` | None (public endpoint) | PII, Tokens |
| BlogWebApp → MySQL-DB | TCP | `:3306 (auth query)` | None (login endpoint) | PII, Secrets |

### 6.4 Guards Directory

| Guard Name | Category | Statement |
|---|---|---|
| auth:session | Auth | Requires PHP session with `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true` set (admin.php line 5) |
| vpc-only | Network | Communication restricted to internal Docker bridge network (database port 3306 not published to host) |
| None | - | No authentication, authorization, or network restrictions applied |

**Authorization Control Details:**

The application has minimal authorization controls:
- **auth:session**: Single session-based check in admin.php (line 5) protecting flag disclosure
- **vpc-only**: Network isolation for MySQL database (not an application-level control)
- **No RBAC**: No role-based access control, no permission checks, no object ownership validation
- **No middleware**: No authorization middleware or guards applied to routes
- **No CSRF protection**: No CSRF tokens on forms

## 7. Role & Privilege Architecture

### 7.1 Discovered Roles

| Role Name | Privilege Level | Scope/Domain | Code Implementation |
|---|---|---|---|
| anon | 0 | Global | No authentication required - default state for all users |
| admin | 10 | Global | Session-based authentication required. Session check at admin.php line 5. No granular permissions. |

**Note:** This is a binary authorization model with only two states: unauthenticated (anon) and authenticated (admin). No intermediate roles exist.

### 7.2 Privilege Lattice

```
Privilege Ordering (→ means "can access resources of"):
anon → admin

Simple linear hierarchy:
- anon (privilege level 0): Public blog content only
- admin (privilege level 10): All resources including flag
```

**No Parallel Isolation:** There are no parallel roles (team admin, dept admin, etc.). All authenticated users have identical privileges.

**No Role Switching:** No impersonation, no sudo mode, no temporary elevation mechanisms exist.

**Database Schema:**
- File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`
- Users table (lines 23-27): Contains only `id`, `username`, `password`
- No `role` column, no `permissions` column, no `is_admin` flag
- Single user exists: `admin` with password `ONEverySecurePassword123!` (line 46)

### 7.3 Role Entry Points

| Role | Default Landing Page | Accessible Route Patterns | Authentication Method |
|---|---|---|---|
| anon | `/index.php` | `/`, `/index.php`, `/index.php?category=*`, `/admin.php` (login form), `/styles.css`, `/images/*` | None |
| admin | `/admin.php` (flag display) | All anon routes + flag access in `/admin.php` | PHP session (PHPSESSID cookie) |

**Authentication Flow:**
1. Anon users access `/admin.php` → login form displayed
2. Submit credentials via POST → authentication check
3. On success → `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] = true` set
4. Subsequent GET to `/admin.php` → flag displayed

### 7.4 Role-to-Code Mapping

| Role | Middleware/Guards | Permission Checks | Storage Location |
|---|---|---|---|
| anon | None | None | No storage (default state) |
| admin | None | Session check: `isset($_SESSION['admin_logged_in']) && $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true` | Session file storage (PHP default, typically /tmp) |

**Code Locations:**
- Session check: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 5
- Session creation: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 25
- No middleware files exist
- No guard classes or authorization decorators

## 8. Authorization Vulnerability Candidates

### 8.1 Horizontal Privilege Escalation Candidates

**Finding:** The application has NO horizontal privilege escalation opportunities because:
1. Only one user exists in the database (admin)
2. No user-specific resources exist (no user profiles, no user data segregation)
3. No object IDs in URL parameters (no `/users/{id}`, no `/posts/{id}` endpoints)
4. All blog posts are public (published=1 filter applies globally)

**Conclusion:** Horizontal privilege escalation is not applicable to this application architecture.

### 8.2 Vertical Privilege Escalation Candidates

| Target Role | Endpoint Pattern | Functionality | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|
| admin | `/admin.php` (GET, authenticated) | FLAG disclosure | CRITICAL |

**Vertical Escalation Opportunities:**

**1. SQL Injection to Extract Credentials**
- **Endpoint:** `/index.php?category={payload}`
- **Method:** Exploit SQL injection to extract admin password from users table
- **Risk:** CRITICAL - Unauthenticated attacker can gain admin access
- **Payload Example:** `?category=' UNION SELECT id,username,password,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users-- -`

**2. Session Fixation**
- **Endpoint:** `/admin.php` (POST)
- **Method:** Force known session ID on victim, wait for authentication, hijack session
- **Risk:** HIGH - No `session_regenerate_id()` after login (admin.php line 25)
- **Code Gap:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 25 should call `session_regenerate_id(true)`

**3. Session Hijacking via HTTP**
- **Endpoint:** All endpoints
- **Method:** Intercept PHPSESSID cookie over unencrypted HTTP connection
- **Risk:** HIGH - Application runs on HTTP only, session cookie lacks Secure flag
- **Network Position:** Man-in-the-middle attack on network

**4. Brute Force Authentication**
- **Endpoint:** `/admin.php` (POST)
- **Method:** Automated credential guessing (no rate limiting, no account lockout)
- **Risk:** MEDIUM-HIGH - Known weak password in plaintext
- **Code Gap:** No rate limiting implementation anywhere in codebase

### 8.3 Context-Based Authorization Candidates

**Finding:** The application has NO multi-step workflows or context-based authorization:
1. No checkout/payment flows
2. No onboarding/setup wizards
3. No multi-step forms
4. No password reset flows (no reset mechanism exists)

**Authentication is single-step:** Submit credentials → immediate authentication decision → session established.

**Conclusion:** Context-based authorization bypass vulnerabilities are not applicable to this application.

## 9. Injection Sources (Command Injection and SQL Injection)

**Network Surface Focus:** All injection sources listed are reachable through network-accessible endpoints at http://localhost:34389.

### SQL Injection Sources

#### SQL Injection Source #1: category parameter (CRITICAL)
- **Type:** SQL Injection
- **Input Source:** GET parameter `category`
- **Entry Point File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`
- **Entry Point Line:** 37
- **Entry Code:** `$category = isset($_GET['category']) ? $_GET['category'] : '';`
- **Sanitization:** NONE - Direct concatenation without escaping
- **Sink File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`
- **Sink Line:** 45
- **Sink Code:** `$sql .= "and category = '" . $category . "' ";`
- **Query Type:** SELECT
- **Data Flow:**
  1. User input received from `$_GET['category']` at line 37
  2. Blacklist check for exact string "Secret" at lines 41-42 (sets to empty if matched)
  3. Empty check at line 44: `if (!empty($category))`
  4. Direct concatenation into SQL query at line 45 using string concatenation operator
  5. Query executed at line 49: `$result = $conn->query($sql);`
- **Network Accessible:** YES - Public endpoint, no authentication required
- **Severity:** CRITICAL - Complete database compromise possible

**Full Query Construction (lines 39-47):**
```php
$sql = "SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 ";

if ($category == "Secret")
    $category = "";

if (!empty($category)) {
    $sql .= "and category = '" . $category . "' ";
}
$sql .= "ORDER BY created_at DESC";
```

#### SQL Injection Source #2: username parameter (MEDIUM)
- **Type:** SQL Injection (partially mitigated)
- **Input Source:** POST parameter `username`
- **Entry Point File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Entry Point Line:** 17
- **Entry Code:** `$username = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['username']);`
- **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied at line 17
- **Sanitization Line:** 17
- **Sink File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Sink Line:** 20
- **Sink Code:** `$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'";`
- **Query Type:** SELECT
- **Data Flow:**
  1. User input received from `$_POST['username']` at line 17
  2. Sanitized using `mysqli_real_escape_string()` at line 17
  3. Concatenated into SQL query using string interpolation at line 20
  4. Query executed at line 21: `$result = $conn->query($sql);`
- **Network Accessible:** YES - Public login endpoint
- **Severity:** MEDIUM - Partial protection via mysqli_real_escape_string, but string concatenation still used instead of prepared statements

#### SQL Injection Source #3: password parameter (MEDIUM)
- **Type:** SQL Injection (partially mitigated)
- **Input Source:** POST parameter `password`
- **Entry Point File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Entry Point Line:** 18
- **Entry Code:** `$password = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['password']);`
- **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied at line 18
- **Sanitization Line:** 18
- **Sink File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Sink Line:** 20
- **Sink Code:** `$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'";`
- **Query Type:** SELECT
- **Data Flow:**
  1. User input received from `$_POST['password']` at line 18
  2. Sanitized using `mysqli_real_escape_string()` at line 18
  3. Concatenated into SQL query using string interpolation at line 20
  4. Query executed at line 21: `$result = $conn->query($sql);`
- **Network Accessible:** YES - Public login endpoint
- **Severity:** MEDIUM - Partial protection via mysqli_real_escape_string, but string concatenation still used instead of prepared statements

### Command Injection Sources

**Finding:** NO command injection sources exist in this application.

**Analysis:** Comprehensive search of all network-accessible PHP files revealed:
- No `exec()` function calls
- No `shell_exec()` function calls
- No `system()` function calls
- No `passthru()` function calls
- No `popen()` or `proc_open()` function calls
- No backtick operators for command execution
- No functions that invoke shell commands

**Conclusion:** The application does not execute system commands and therefore has no command injection attack surface.

### Summary

**Total Injection Sources:** 3 SQL injection sources, 0 command injection sources

**Critical Findings:**
1. **SQL Injection Source #1** (index.php line 45): CRITICAL - Zero sanitization, direct concatenation, public endpoint
2. **SQL Injection Sources #2 & #3** (admin.php lines 20): MEDIUM - Partial mitigation via mysqli_real_escape_string, but not using prepared statements

**Network Accessibility:** All SQL injection sources are network-accessible via HTTP GET/POST requests to public endpoints.

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## Additional Reconnaissance Findings

### Database Schema Analysis

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`

**Tables:**

1. **posts** (lines 7-14)
   - Columns: id, title, content, category, image, published, created_at
   - 11 posts seeded (lines 29-50)
   - 10 published posts, 1 unpublished (id=11, published=0)
   - Categories: Nature, Tech, Cooking, Photography, Health, Secret

2. **comments** (lines 15-21)
   - Columns: id, post_id, author, content, created_at
   - No seed data (empty table)

3. **users** (lines 23-27)
   - Columns: id, username, password
   - 1 user: admin / ONEverySecurePassword123! (line 46)
   - Passwords stored in plaintext (no hashing)

### Stored XSS Vulnerability Surface

**All XSS sinks in index.php (data from database rendered without encoding):**

1. **Post title** (line 58): `echo "<h2>{$row['title']}</h2>";`
2. **Post category** (line 59): `echo "<p>Category: {$row['category']}</p>";`
3. **Post content** (line 61): `echo "<p>" . substr($row['content'], 0, 200) . "...</p>";`
4. **Post image** (line 60): `echo "<img src='images/{$row['image']}' alt='{$row['title']}'...";`
5. **Category dropdown value** (line 29): `echo "<option value='{$row['category']}'...";`
6. **Category dropdown text** (line 29): `echo "...>{$row['category']}</option>";`

**Attack Vector:** SQL injection can poison database with XSS payloads → Stored XSS executes when posts are viewed

**No Output Encoding:** Zero instances of `htmlspecialchars()` or `htmlentities()` in entire codebase

### Security Headers Analysis

**Apache Configuration:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf`

**Missing Security Headers:**
- No Content-Security-Policy
- No X-Frame-Options
- No X-Content-Type-Options
- No Referrer-Policy
- No Permissions-Policy
- No Strict-Transport-Security (not applicable - HTTP only)

**Insecure Apache Settings:**
- Directory listing enabled (line 10): `Options Indexes FollowSymLinks`
- Unrestricted access (line 11): `Require all granted`

### Secrets in Version Control

**Hardcoded Secrets:**
1. **.env file** (line 1): `FLAG="flag{ac81cf96-72fe-462f-8a3f-97d5cd189d42}"`
2. **docker-compose.yml** (lines 12-15, 26-29): Database credentials (user:password, rootpassword)
3. **index.php** (line 2): `new mysqli('db', 'user', 'password', 'blogDB');`
4. **admin.php** (line 12): `new mysqli('db', 'user', 'password', 'blogDB');`
5. **db_init.sql** (line 46): Admin password in plaintext

**All secrets are committed to version control** and accessible to anyone with repository access.

### Infrastructure Weaknesses

1. **PHP 7.4.33** - End-of-life, no security updates since November 2022
2. **MySQL 5.7** - Older version approaching EOL
3. **HTTP only** - No TLS/SSL encryption, all traffic in plaintext
4. **Error display enabled** - PHP errors exposed to users (Dockerfile lines 9-13)
5. **No rate limiting** - Unlimited brute force attempts possible
6. **No CSRF protection** - Forms lack CSRF tokens
7. **Session security** - No Secure flag, no SameSite attribute, no session regeneration

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**END OF RECONNAISSANCE DELIVERABLE**