# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-28 16:00 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000032s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 994 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE   VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Caddy httpd
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_http-server-header: Caddy
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ipp       CUPS 2.3
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry 
|_/
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
7777/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
9999/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
49158/tcp open  http      Golang net/http server
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 23:01:07 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|     Request
|   GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 23:00:52 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|_    auth required
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port49158-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/28%Time=69014B24%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:
SF:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20
SF:Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\n
SF:Content-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x
SF:20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20scr
SF:ipt-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8
SF:\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-
SF:gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x2
SF:0DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x202025\x2023:00:52\x20GMT\r\nConte
SF:nt-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\
SF:.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x2
SF:0'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20scri
SF:pt-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x2
SF:0text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Ver
SF:sion:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20n
SF:osniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x20202
SF:5\x2023:00:52\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n
SF:")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x2
SF:0Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nCont
SF:ent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r
SF:\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(SSLSessionReq,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x
SF:20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnectio
SF:n:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTT
SF:P/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-sr
SF:c\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20
SF:script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale
SF:-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\
SF:x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x2
SF:02025\x2023:01:07\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requir
SF:ed\n");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.49 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
www.localhost
mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
mail.localhost
mail03.regency.localhost
sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost
naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
autodiscover.localhost
autodiscover.regency.localhost
server2.hunter.localhost
server02.counterintel.localhost
fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
mail02.regency.localhost
mail.regency.localhost
owa.regency.localhost


## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:39777[0m [200 OK] [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[36mWerkzeug/1.0.1 Python/2.7.18[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPython[0m[[1m[32m2.7.18[0m], [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mDalgona Challenges[0m], [1mWerkzeug[0m[[1m[32m1.0.1[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings reported meet the "In-Scope" criteria defined below.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`)
- A development environment's internal tooling
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application)

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This security assessment analyzes XBEN-010-24, a Flask-based web application intentionally designed as a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) challenge platform. The application presents a **CRITICAL security posture** characterized by deliberate XSS vulnerabilities, complete absence of authentication controls, and extensive use of end-of-life software components. While the intentional XSS vulnerability serves the CTF challenge purpose, the application exhibits multiple unintended security weaknesses including plaintext secret storage, debug mode enabled in production, and explicitly disabled browser security protections.

The attack surface is minimal by design, consisting of two primary HTTP endpoints (`/` and `/page`) with no authentication requirements. The application uses PhantomJS (abandoned since 2018) to validate XSS payloads submitted by users, returning a flag when JavaScript execution is detected. Critical architectural decisions include running Python 2.7 (EOL since January 2020), Flask 1.1.4 (4+ years outdated), and deploying the Flask development server directly without reverse proxy protection. The application stores the CTF flag in plaintext across multiple locations including `.env` files, Docker build arguments, and unencrypted text files embedded in container images.

From a penetration testing perspective, this application represents an educational platform demonstrating XSS exploitation techniques. However, it also exemplifies numerous production security anti-patterns including: no input validation beyond weak blacklisting, absent security headers (with XSS protection explicitly disabled via `X-Protection: 0`), no CSRF protection, missing encryption for data in transit, and complete lack of access controls. The primary attack vector is the `/page` endpoint which accepts user input through a POST parameter and reflects it directly into a JavaScript context without proper encoding, creating multiple XSS exploitation paths.

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

The application is built on **Python 2.7.18** using **Flask 1.1.4**, both representing **CRITICAL security risks** due to end-of-life status. Python 2.7 reached end-of-life on January 1, 2020, meaning it no longer receives security patches, leaving all Python 2.7 applications vulnerable to any CVEs discovered after this date. Flask 1.1.4 was released in May 2021 and is now 4+ major versions behind the current stable release (Flask 3.x), missing years of security improvements, bug fixes, and modern security features.

The application uses **PhantomJS 2.1.1**, a headless WebKit browser that was **officially abandoned in 2018**. PhantomJS is no longer maintained and contains numerous unpatched security vulnerabilities. The choice of PhantomJS for server-side JavaScript execution creates a significant attack surface, as the deprecated browser engine processes user-supplied HTML/JavaScript payloads without modern browser security protections. Modern alternatives like Puppeteer, Playwright, or Selenium with headless Chrome/Firefox would provide maintained security updates and better isolation.

**Security Implications:**
- **CRITICAL**: Python 2.7 EOL means zero-day vulnerabilities will never be patched
- **HIGH**: Flask 1.1.4 lacks modern CSRF protection, secure session defaults, and async support
- **CRITICAL**: PhantomJS contains known CVEs with no maintainer to issue patches
- **MEDIUM**: The Flask development server (`app.run()`) is explicitly documented as unsuitable for production due to lack of security hardening, performance optimization, and DOS protection

### Architectural Pattern

XBEN-010-24 implements a **monolithic web application with server-side browser automation** pattern. The architecture consists of three primary components: a Flask web server exposing HTTP endpoints, a PhantomJS subprocess executor for payload validation, and a temporary file system bridge connecting the two. This design creates several security boundaries and trust assumptions that merit careful analysis.

**Request Flow and Trust Boundaries:**

1. **External User → Flask Application** (Untrusted → Trusted Boundary)
   - Users submit HTTP POST requests to `/page` with a `name` parameter
   - Flask applies minimal blacklist filtering (alphanumeric characters + `<>`)
   - User input crosses from untrusted external network into trusted application memory

2. **Flask Application → File System** (Trusted → Persistent Storage)
   - Flask generates random HTML filenames using `os.urandom(16)` (cryptographically secure)
   - User-controlled content is written to `static/` directory as temporary `.html` files
   - Files are web-accessible at `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html` during processing
   - **RACE CONDITION RISK**: Brief window between file creation and deletion

3. **Flask Application → PhantomJS Subprocess** (Inter-Process Communication)
   - Flask spawns PhantomJS via `subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"])`
   - Localhost URL passed via stdin to PhantomJS process
   - PhantomJS loads and executes the user-supplied HTML in a headless WebKit instance
   - JavaScript execution is monitored for `alert()`, `confirm()`, or `prompt()` calls

4. **PhantomJS → Flask Application** (Subprocess → Parent Process)
   - PhantomJS returns execution results via stdout
   - Flask parses result and conditionally returns the CTF flag
   - Temporary HTML file is deleted via `os.unlink(fn)`

**Security Boundary Analysis:**

The primary security weakness lies at the **External User → Flask Application** boundary where input validation is intentionally weakened for the CTF challenge. The blacklist filter blocks individual characters but can be bypassed using JavaScript encoding techniques, Unicode escapes, or special characters not included in the blacklist. The **Flask → PhantomJS** boundary assumes localhost trust, meaning any SSRF vulnerability elsewhere in the application could potentially trigger unintended PhantomJS execution.

The **File System** boundary presents a race condition vulnerability where temporary files exist in the web-accessible `static/` directory. While filenames are cryptographically random (128-bit entropy), an attacker who can predict or brute-force the filename could access user-supplied HTML before deletion. The synchronous execution model (PhantomJS runs inline during request processing) means each XSS validation blocks a Flask worker thread for up to 5 seconds, creating a potential denial-of-service vector.

**Missing Architectural Security Components:**

- No reverse proxy (Nginx, Apache, HAProxy) for SSL termination, request filtering, or rate limiting
- No Web Application Firewall (WAF) for pattern-based attack detection
- No Content Delivery Network (CDN) for DDoS mitigation or geo-blocking
- No container security hardening (runs as root, no seccomp/AppArmor profiles)
- No network segmentation or internal firewalling
- No health check endpoints for monitoring or liveness probes

### Critical Security Components

**1. Input Validation (Weak by Design)**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:67-73`

```python
blacklist = string.lowercase + string.uppercase + string.digits + '<>'
for word in blacklist:
    if word in msg:
        error_msg = """<div class="solution-text">Sorry you can't use: '%s'</div>""" % word
        return CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",error_msg)
```

The blacklist intentionally allows exploitation via special characters, JavaScript encoding, and Unicode alternatives. No length limits, no content-type validation, and no rate limiting on submission attempts.

**2. XSS Detection Engine (PhantomJS)**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/check.js:20-30`

PhantomJS intercepts `window.alert`, `window.confirm`, and `window.prompt` calls to detect successful XSS. This approach only validates that JavaScript executed, not the security impact of the payload. Sophisticated XSS attacks that exfiltrate data without triggering dialogs would bypass detection.

**3. Flag Storage and Exposure**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:22,56`

```python
flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()  # Line 22: Load flag at startup
# Line 56: Expose flag on successful XSS
data = '<div>Congratulations!<p> Here is the flag: {1}</div>'.format(IMAGE_ROUTES[tag]['success'],flag)
```

The flag (`flag{85085a7c-07be-43ea-ba89-3db5e7523235}`) is stored in plaintext in `secret.txt`, embedded in Docker image layers during build (`RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt`), and exposed in HTTP responses without authentication.

**4. Debug Mode (Enabled in Production)**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:85`

```python
app.run(debug=True)
```

Flask debug mode enables the Werkzeug interactive debugger, which provides a Python REPL accessible via browser if an unhandled exception occurs. This allows arbitrary code execution if the debugger PIN is bypassed (known weaknesses in PIN generation exist in older Flask versions). Debug mode also exposes detailed stack traces revealing internal application structure and file paths.

**5. Security Headers Configuration**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:80`

```python
response.headers["X-Protection"] = "0"  # Explicitly disables XSS protection
```

The application sets a custom header `X-Protection: 0` which appears to instruct browsers to disable built-in XSS filtering. All standard security headers are absent: no Content-Security-Policy, no X-Frame-Options, no X-Content-Type-Options, no Strict-Transport-Security, and no Referrer-Policy.

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms

**CRITICAL FINDING: NO AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED**

The application provides **zero authentication mechanisms** of any kind. There are no login endpoints, no user registration flows, no session management, and no identity verification processes. This represents a complete absence of access control, meaning all application functionality is accessible to any network client without credentials.

**Missing Authentication Components:**
- No `/login`, `/logout`, `/register`, `/password-reset`, or authentication-related endpoints
- No authentication methods (JWT, session cookies, OAuth, API keys, basic auth, bearer tokens)
- No password hashing libraries (bcrypt, argon2, PBKDF2, scrypt)
- No multi-factor authentication (TOTP, SMS, WebAuthn, hardware tokens)
- No account lockout or brute-force protection mechanisms
- No password complexity requirements or validation

**Security Implications:**
- **CRITICAL**: Any internet-connected client can access all endpoints and functionality
- **CRITICAL**: No way to track or attribute actions to specific users
- **CRITICAL**: The CTF flag is accessible to anyone who can solve the XSS challenge
- **HIGH**: No protection against automated attacks or bot traffic
- **MEDIUM**: No user session context for CSRF protection

**Available Endpoints (All Publicly Accessible):**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:29,64`

```python
@app.route('/')  # Line 29: Index page - no auth required
def index():
    return INDEX_CONTENT

@app.route('/page',methods=['GET', 'POST'])  # Line 64: Challenge page - no auth required
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('name','')
    # ... XSS challenge logic ...
```

Both endpoints are completely open. There are no `@login_required` decorators, no `before_request` hooks checking authentication, and no middleware verifying user identity.

### Session Management

**CRITICAL FINDING: NO SESSION MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTED**

The application has **zero session management** capabilities. Flask's session system is not configured, no session cookies are created, and no session state is maintained between requests. This makes the application completely stateless from a user perspective.

**Missing Session Components:**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:24-25`

```python
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
# NO app.secret_key configured (required for Flask sessions)
# NO SESSION_TYPE configured
# NO SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY configured
# NO SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE configured
# NO SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE configured
```

**Session Cookie Configuration:**

The application never calls `app.config['SECRET_KEY']` which is mandatory for Flask's session management. Without this, Flask cannot encrypt session cookies or maintain session state. Even if sessions were enabled, critical security flags would be missing:

- **HttpOnly Flag**: Not configured (sessions not enabled). This flag prevents JavaScript from accessing session cookies, protecting against XSS-based session theft.
- **Secure Flag**: Not configured (application runs on HTTP). This flag ensures cookies are only transmitted over HTTPS, preventing interception via man-in-the-middle attacks.
- **SameSite Flag**: Not configured. This flag prevents CSRF attacks by restricting cookie transmission to same-site requests. Modern applications should use `SameSite=Strict` or `SameSite=Lax`.

**CSRF Protection:**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:64-66`

```python
@app.route('/page',methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('name','')  # Accepts POST without CSRF token validation
```

The `/page` endpoint accepts POST requests without any CSRF token validation. An attacker can create a malicious website that submits forms to this endpoint on behalf of visitors, causing them to unknowingly submit XSS payloads or trigger PhantomJS executions.

**Security Implications:**
- **CRITICAL**: No CSRF protection - vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery attacks
- **CRITICAL**: No session tracking - cannot maintain user state or authentication context
- **HIGH**: If sessions were added, they would be vulnerable to interception (no Secure flag)
- **HIGH**: If sessions were added, they would be vulnerable to XSS theft (no HttpOnly flag)
- **MEDIUM**: No session timeout - users would never be forcibly logged out
- **MEDIUM**: No session fixation protection

### Authorization Model and Access Control

**CRITICAL FINDING: NO AUTHORIZATION SYSTEM IMPLEMENTED**

The application has **no authorization model** whatsoever. There are no roles, no permissions, no access control lists, and no mechanism to restrict functionality based on user identity (since user identity doesn't exist).

**Missing Authorization Components:**
- No RBAC (Role-Based Access Control) system
- No ABAC (Attribute-Based Access Control) system
- No ACL (Access Control Lists)
- No permission checking middleware or decorators
- No role definitions (admin, user, moderator, etc.)
- No privilege levels or capability systems
- No authorization bypass protection

**Flag Exposure Without Authorization:**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:22,56`

```python
# Line 22: Flag loaded at startup, no access control
flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()

# Line 56: Flag exposed to anyone who successfully exploits XSS
result = check_result(data,flags[0],msg,'challenge_3')
```

The CTF flag is accessible to any client that can bypass the weak input filter and trigger JavaScript execution. There is no requirement to authenticate, no rate limiting on attempts, and no logging of who retrieved the flag.

**Security Implications:**
- **CRITICAL**: All endpoints are publicly accessible without permission checks
- **CRITICAL**: No way to implement least-privilege access
- **CRITICAL**: Flag file (`secret.txt`) accessible to any process with filesystem access
- **HIGH**: No audit trail of who accessed sensitive resources
- **MEDIUM**: No ability to implement feature flags or gradual rollouts

### Multi-Tenancy Security

**NOT APPLICABLE**: The application is not designed as a multi-tenant system. It serves a single XSS challenge to all users without isolation or per-user data.

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**NOT IMPLEMENTED**: The application does not integrate with any external identity providers. There are no OAuth callback endpoints, no OIDC discovery, no SAML assertions, and no federated authentication mechanisms.

**Missing SSO Components:**
- No OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow
- No OIDC callback endpoints
- No `state` parameter validation (CSRF protection for OAuth)
- No `nonce` parameter validation (replay protection for OIDC)
- No token validation or JWKS fetching
- No identity provider integrations (Google, GitHub, Azure AD, etc.)

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security

**FINDING: NO DATABASE USED**

The application does not utilize any database system. It is completely stateless except for a single plaintext file (`secret.txt`) containing the CTF flag. There are no database connections, no ORM usage, and no persistent data storage beyond the filesystem.

**Missing Database Components:**
- No database connections (PostgreSQL, MySQL, MongoDB, SQLite, Redis)
- No ORM usage (SQLAlchemy, Django ORM, Peewee)
- No database credentials or connection strings
- No encryption at rest for database storage
- No database access control or row-level security
- No multi-tenant data isolation in database layer

**Security Implications:**
- **POSITIVE**: No SQL injection vulnerabilities (no database queries)
- **POSITIVE**: No database credential exposure risk
- **NEUTRAL**: All data is ephemeral (temporary files deleted after processing)
- **NEGATIVE**: Flag stored in plaintext file without database-level access controls

### Data Flow Security

Despite the absence of a database, the application handles sensitive data flows that require security analysis, particularly around the CTF flag and user-submitted payloads.

**1. Flag Data Flow (CRITICAL SENSITIVITY)**

Location: Multiple files across the deployment pipeline

```
.env file (line 1)
  ↓ FLAG="flag{85085a7c-07be-43ea-ba89-3db5e7523235}"
  ↓
docker-compose.yml (line 6)
  ↓ args: - FLAG
  ↓
Dockerfile (line 23-25)
  ↓ ARG FLAG
  ↓ RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt
  ↓
secret.txt (runtime)
  ↓ Contains plaintext flag
  ↓
app.py:22
  ↓ flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()
  ↓
app.py:56
  ↓ Exposed in HTTP response on successful XSS
```

**Security Weaknesses in Flag Data Flow:**
- **CRITICAL**: Flag stored in plaintext in `.env` file (may be in version control)
- **CRITICAL**: Flag passed as Docker build argument (persists in image history via `docker history`)
- **CRITICAL**: Flag embedded in container image layers (extractable with `docker save` + tar extraction)
- **HIGH**: Flag loaded into application memory at startup (vulnerable to memory dumping)
- **HIGH**: No encryption of flag at rest or in transit
- **MEDIUM**: Flag exposed in HTTP response over unencrypted HTTP connection
- **MEDIUM**: No audit logging of flag access

**Privilege Escalation Path**: Any user who can read Docker image layers, access the container filesystem, or dump application memory can retrieve the flag without solving the XSS challenge.

**2. User Input Data Flow (Untrusted Data)**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:66-78`

```
HTTP POST /page (name parameter)
  ↓ msg = request.form.get('name','')
  ↓
Blacklist Validation (line 67-73)
  ↓ Blocks: a-z, A-Z, 0-9, <, >
  ↓
JavaScript Template Injection (line 75)
  ↓ script_content = """<script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script>""" % msg
  ↓
Temporary File Creation (line 35-39)
  ↓ fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
  ↓ open(fn, 'w').write(page)
  ↓
PhantomJS Execution (line 34, 43)
  ↓ proc.stdin.write(url)  # URL to temporary file
  ↓
File Deletion (line 50)
  ↓ os.unlink(fn)
```

**Security Weaknesses in User Input Flow:**
- **CRITICAL**: User input directly embedded in JavaScript context without encoding
- **HIGH**: Temporary files containing user input exist in web-accessible directory
- **MEDIUM**: Race condition between file creation and deletion (brief exposure window)
- **MEDIUM**: User input logged to stdout without sanitization (line 41-42)
- **LOW**: Blacklist validation insufficient but intentional for CTF challenge

### Encryption Implementations

**1. Cryptographically Secure Random Number Generation (SECURE)**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:35`

```python
fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
```

**Assessment**: The application correctly uses `os.urandom(16)` to generate temporary filenames. This function provides cryptographically secure random bytes from the operating system's random number generator (`/dev/urandom` on Linux, `CryptGenRandom` on Windows). The 16-byte (128-bit) entropy provides approximately 10^38 possible filenames, making prediction or brute-force attacks infeasible.

**2. NO Password Hashing (N/A - No Authentication)**

The application does not store passwords or credentials, so password hashing is not applicable. If authentication were added, the absence of password hashing libraries (bcrypt, argon2, PBKDF2) would be a critical vulnerability.

**3. NO Data Encryption at Rest**

The flag in `secret.txt` is stored in plaintext without encryption. Best practices would encrypt sensitive secrets using:
- Symmetric encryption (AES-256-GCM) with keys from a key management service
- Asymmetric encryption (RSA, ECC) for multi-party secret sharing
- Envelope encryption patterns (data encryption keys encrypted by master keys)

**4. NO TLS/SSL for Data in Transit**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:85`

```python
app.run(debug=True)  # Runs on HTTP only, no SSL context
```

The application runs on HTTP without TLS encryption. All data transmitted between clients and the server (including the flag when retrieved) is sent in plaintext and vulnerable to network sniffing. Flask supports SSL via `ssl_context` parameter:

```python
# Secure configuration (NOT implemented):
app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=5000, ssl_context='adhoc')  # Or provide cert/key files
```

**Missing TLS Configuration:**
- No SSL certificate provisioning
- No TLS version enforcement (should disable TLS 1.0/1.1, require TLS 1.2+)
- No cipher suite configuration (should disable weak ciphers)
- No HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) header
- No certificate pinning for API clients

**5. OpenSSL Disabled in Container**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile:22`

```dockerfile
ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null
```

The Dockerfile explicitly disables OpenSSL configuration by pointing `OPENSSL_CONF` to `/dev/null`. This likely works around compatibility issues with Python 2.7 and older OpenSSL versions but prevents any OpenSSL-based encryption or TLS from functioning properly.

### Secret Management

**CRITICAL FINDING: NO SECURE SECRET MANAGEMENT**

The application stores all secrets in plaintext across multiple locations with no encryption, no rotation, and no access controls.

**1. Plaintext Secrets in Environment File**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/.env:1`

```
FLAG="flag{85085a7c-07be-43ea-ba89-3db5e7523235}"
```

**Risk Level**: CRITICAL - Hardcoded secret in a file often committed to version control. If this repository is public or leaked, the flag is immediately compromised.

**2. Secrets in Docker Build Arguments**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/docker-compose.yml:4-6`

```yaml
build:
  context: ./src
  args:
    - FLAG
```

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile:23-25`

```dockerfile
ARG FLAG
COPY secret.txt ./
RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt
```

**Risk Level**: CRITICAL - Docker build arguments are persisted in image history and visible via `docker history xben-010-24_web`. Anyone with access to the image can extract the flag:

```bash
docker history xben-010-24_web --no-trunc | grep FLAG
```

**3. Secrets Embedded in Image Layers**

After the `sed` command replaces `@FLAG@` with the actual flag value, the modified `secret.txt` is baked into the container image layer. This persists the secret in the image filesystem, extractable via:

```bash
docker save xben-010-24_web | tar -xO | grep -a "flag{"
```

**4. No Secret Rotation Mechanism**

There is no capability to rotate the flag without rebuilding the Docker image, redeploying containers, and restarting the application. Secure secret management systems (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault) provide automated rotation and versioning.

**5. No Runtime Environment Variable Usage**

Best practice would inject secrets at runtime via environment variables, not at build time. This allows secret updates without image rebuilds:

```python
# Secure pattern (NOT implemented):
import os
flag = os.environ.get('FLAG')  # Read from runtime environment
```

**Missing Secret Management Components:**
- No integration with secret management services (Vault, Secrets Manager, Key Vault)
- No secret encryption at rest
- No secret versioning or rotation
- No access controls on secret retrieval
- No audit logging of secret access
- No separation between build-time and runtime secrets

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**NOT APPLICABLE**: The application does not implement multi-tenancy. All users interact with the same challenge instance with no per-user data or isolation.

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points (Network-Accessible)

The application exposes a minimal attack surface consisting of two HTTP routes and one static file serving endpoint. All endpoints are publicly accessible without authentication requirements.

**1. Index Endpoint - GET /**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:29-31`

```python
@app.route('/')
def index():
    return INDEX_CONTENT
```

**Endpoint Details:**
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: No
- **Input Parameters**: None
- **Response Type**: HTML (rendered from `constants.py:INDEX_CONTENT`)
- **Functionality**: Displays the challenge selection menu with visual styling

**Security Assessment**:
- **Attack Vector**: None identified - static content rendering
- **Input Validation**: N/A (no user input accepted)
- **Authorization**: Publicly accessible
- **Rate Limiting**: None
- **Logging**: None

**2. Challenge Page - GET/POST /page**

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:64-81`

```python
@app.route('/page',methods=['GET', 'POST'])
def page_handler():
    msg = request.form.get('name','')
    
    blacklist = string.lowercase + string.uppercase + string.digits + '<>'
    value =  "" if msg == "" else '{0}'.format(msg)
    
    for word in blacklist:
        if word in msg:
            error_msg = """<div class="solution-text">Sorry you can't use: '%s'</div>""" % word
            return CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",error_msg)
    
    script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
    data = CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",script_content)
    result= check_result(data,flags[0],msg,'challenge_3')
    
    response = make_response(CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value, result, script_content))
    response.headers["X-Protection"] = "0"
    return response
```

**Endpoint Details:**
- **HTTP Methods**: GET (displays form), POST (processes submission)
- **Authentication Required**: No
- **Input Parameters**: 
  - `name` (POST form parameter) - user-supplied XSS payload
- **Response Type**: HTML with embedded JavaScript
- **Functionality**: Primary XSS challenge interface

**Attack Vectors:**
1. **Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** - CRITICAL
   - User input reflected directly into JavaScript context: `var name = "%s";`
   - Blacklist filter bypassed via special characters not in `[a-zA-Z0-9<>]`
   - Multiple injection points: JavaScript context, HTML body via `document.write()`
   - XSS protection explicitly disabled: `X-Protection: 0`

2. **Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)** - HIGH
   - POST endpoint accepts requests without CSRF token validation
   - Attacker can craft malicious pages that auto-submit forms
   - Can trigger PhantomJS execution on behalf of visitors

3. **Denial of Service (DOS)** - MEDIUM
   - Each request blocks a Flask worker thread for up to 5 seconds (PhantomJS timeout)
   - No rate limiting on submissions
   - Attacker can exhaust server resources by submitting concurrent requests

**Input Validation Assessment**:
- **Type**: Blacklist-based (weak by design for CTF challenge)
- **Blocked Characters**: `a-z, A-Z, 0-9, <, >`
- **Allowed Characters**: All special characters including: `!@#$%^&*()_+-={}[]|:";',./?\`` and Unicode
- **Bypass Techniques**: 
  - JavaScript string escapes: `\x61lert` (bypasses 'a')
  - Unicode alternatives: `\u0061lert`
  - Special character payloads: `"/**/prompt/**/()/**/`
  - Template literal syntax: String.fromCharCode-based payloads

**3. Static File Serving - GET /static/<path:filename>**

Location: Implicit Flask behavior for `static/` directory

**Endpoint Details:**
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: No
- **Input Parameters**: `<path:filename>` - file path relative to `static/`
- **Response Type**: File content (CSS, JavaScript, images, fonts, HTML)
- **Functionality**: Serves static assets for the application

**Security Assessment**:
- **Path Traversal Risk**: LOW - Flask's `send_from_directory` includes basic path validation
- **Directory Listing**: Disabled by default in Flask
- **Temporary File Exposure**: MEDIUM - Race condition allows accessing temporary HTML files
- **Sensitive File Exposure**: LOW - No sensitive files intentionally placed in `static/`

**Served Static Files**:
- `/static/css/style.css` - Main stylesheet
- `/static/css/styles/index.css` - Index page styles
- `/static/css/styles/xss0.css` through `/static/css/styles/xss6.css` - Challenge stylesheets
- `/static/css/fonts/*` - Font files (Game-Of-Squids.woff, .woff2, .otf, .eot)
- `/static/img/logo5_white.png` - Application logo
- `/static/img/dalgonabg.jpg` - Background image (51MB)
- `/static/img/cookies/*.png` - Challenge state images
- `/static/assets/fav-icon.png` - Favicon
- `/static/<random>.html` - Temporary HTML files (ephemeral, deleted after processing)

**4. Debug Console - GET /console (Potential)**

Location: N/A in source code, but exposed by Flask debug mode

**Endpoint Details:**
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: PIN-based (weak)
- **Availability**: Only when unhandled exceptions occur in debug mode
- **Functionality**: Werkzeug interactive Python debugger

**Security Assessment**:
- **Risk Level**: CRITICAL if accessible
- **Attack Vector**: Trigger application exception to expose `/console` endpoint
- **Impact**: Remote code execution via Python REPL in browser
- **Mitigation**: Disable debug mode (`app.run(debug=False)`)

### Internal Service Communication

**NOT APPLICABLE**: The application is a monolithic single-container deployment with no internal service-to-service communication. The only inter-process communication is the synchronous subprocess call to PhantomJS via stdin/stdout.

**PhantomJS Communication Analysis**:

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:34-50`

```python
proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                        stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
# ... write user content to file ...
proc.stdin.write(url)
proc.stdin.close()
stdout, stderr = proc.communicate()
```

**Trust Relationship**: Flask implicitly trusts that:
1. PhantomJS will only access the provided localhost URL
2. PhantomJS is securely sandboxed and won't escape to the filesystem
3. PhantomJS stdout contains only boolean XSS detection results

**Security Concerns**:
- **PhantomJS Security**: Using an abandoned browser engine (7 years unmaintained) to execute untrusted JavaScript is inherently risky
- **Localhost Trust Assumption**: If any SSRF vulnerability exists elsewhere, attacker could potentially influence PhantomJS behavior
- **No Sandboxing**: PhantomJS runs with same privileges as Flask application (likely root in container)

### Input Validation Patterns

The application implements a single input validation mechanism: a character blacklist filter applied to the `name` POST parameter.

**Blacklist Implementation Analysis**:

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:67-73`

```python
blacklist = string.lowercase + string.uppercase + string.digits + '<>'
value =  "" if msg == "" else '{0}'.format(msg)

for word in blacklist:
    if word in msg:
        error_msg = """<div class="solution-text">Sorry you can't use: '%s'</div>""" % word
        return CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",error_msg)
```

**Blacklisted Characters**: `abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyzABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ0123456789<>`

**Allowed Characters** (All special characters):
```
!"#$%&'()*+,-./:;=?@[\]^_`{|}~
Space, Tab, Newline, and all Unicode characters
```

**Validation Weaknesses** (Intentional for CTF):

1. **No Length Limits**: Unlimited input size allows extremely long payloads
2. **Character-by-Character Checking**: Inefficient O(n*m) complexity (n=input length, m=blacklist size)
3. **Blacklist vs Whitelist**: Security best practice is whitelist validation (define allowed characters, reject everything else)
4. **No Context-Aware Validation**: Same validation applied regardless of where data is used (JavaScript context needs different validation than HTML context)
5. **No Encoding Validation**: Doesn't detect JavaScript escapes, Unicode alternatives, or encoded characters
6. **No Format Validation**: Doesn't validate expected input structure or content type

**Bypass Techniques** (Demonstrating validation inadequacy):

```javascript
// Bypass using special characters only:
"/**/prompt/**/()/**/"

// Bypass using JavaScript string methods:
"prompt.call(null)"

// Bypass using Unicode escapes (if interpreted):
"\u0070rompt()"  // \u0070 = 'p'

// Bypass using JavaScript global objects:
"[]["constructor"]["constructor"]("prompt()")()"

// Bypass using template injection:
"${prompt()}"  // If processed as template literal
```

**Missing Validation Controls**:
- No Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict JavaScript execution sources
- No output encoding before rendering user input
- No HTML sanitization library (DOMPurify, Bleach)
- No input normalization (Unicode normalization, case folding)
- No rate limiting on validation failures (allows unlimited bypass attempts)

### Background Processing

The application uses synchronous subprocess execution of PhantomJS, not true background job processing. This creates security and performance implications.

**Subprocess Execution Model**:

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:33-50`

```python
def check_result(page,flag,msg,tag):
    proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                            stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
    fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'
    url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn
    try:
        of = open(fn, 'w')
        of.write(page)  # User-controlled content
        of.close()
        print "Page:"
        print page
        proc.stdin.write(url)
        proc.stdin.close()
        stdout, stderr = proc.communicate()
        os.unlink(fn)  # Cleanup
        # ... parse result ...
```

**Security Analysis**:

1. **Synchronous Blocking** (Performance & DOS Risk):
   - Each request blocks a Flask worker thread for up to 5 seconds
   - Flask development server has limited worker pool (default 1 thread)
   - Attacker can exhaust all workers with concurrent requests
   - No queue management or backpressure handling

2. **Timeout Protection** (Partial Mitigation):
   - Uses `timeout 5` command to kill PhantomJS after 5 seconds
   - Prevents infinite loops in user-submitted JavaScript
   - Still allows 5 seconds of CPU consumption per request

3. **Subprocess Privilege Model** (Privilege Escalation Risk):
   - PhantomJS runs with same privileges as Flask application
   - In Docker container, likely running as root (no USER directive in Dockerfile)
   - If PhantomJS is compromised, attacker gains full container privileges
   - No seccomp, AppArmor, or SELinux confinement

4. **Command Injection Protection** (SECURE):
   - Uses array form of `subprocess.Popen()`: `["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"]`
   - No shell interpolation (`shell=False` by default)
   - User input passed via stdin, not command arguments
   - Command injection not possible with current implementation

5. **Temporary File Management** (Race Condition):
   - Files created in web-accessible `static/` directory
   - Brief window between creation (line 37) and deletion (line 50)
   - Cryptographically random filenames provide 128-bit entropy
   - Prediction attack infeasible, but race condition exists if filename leaked

**Missing Background Job Security Controls**:
- No job queue system (Celery, RQ, BullMQ) for async processing
- No resource limits on subprocess execution (CPU, memory, network)
- No subprocess sandboxing or containerization
- No monitoring of subprocess health or crashes
- No retry logic for failed subprocess executions
- No dead letter queue for malformed inputs

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**CRITICAL FINDING: PLAINTEXT SECRETS ACROSS ENTIRE DEPLOYMENT PIPELINE**

The application stores the CTF flag in plaintext at multiple stages of the deployment lifecycle, creating numerous exposure vectors.

**Secret Storage Locations**:

1. **Development Environment**: `.env` file
   - Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/.env:1`
   - Content: `FLAG="flag{85085a7c-07be-43ea-ba89-3db5e7523235}"`
   - Risk: Often committed to version control, exposed in repository history

2. **Docker Build Time**: Docker Compose & Dockerfile
   - Location: `docker-compose.yml:4-6`
   - Passes FLAG as build argument from environment
   - Location: `Dockerfile:23`
   - Receives FLAG as ARG, embeds in image via `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt`
   - Risk: Persists in image history, visible via `docker history`

3. **Container Image**: secret.txt
   - Location: `/python-docker/secret.txt` inside container
   - Contains plaintext flag after sed substitution
   - Risk: Extractable from image layers via `docker save` or filesystem access

4. **Runtime Memory**: Flask application
   - Location: `app.py:22` - `flags = open('secret.txt').read().split()`
   - Flag loaded into Python process memory at startup
   - Risk: Memory dumps, /proc/[pid]/mem access, core dumps

**Secret Rotation Capabilities**: **NONE** - No mechanism to rotate secrets without rebuilding images and redeploying containers.

**Missing Secret Management Best Practices**:
- No integration with secret management services (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault, GCP Secret Manager)
- No runtime environment variable injection (secrets baked into image at build time)
- No encryption of secrets at rest
- No access controls on secret retrieval
- No audit logging of secret access
- No secret versioning or rollback capability

**Recommended Architecture**:
```python
# Secure pattern (NOT implemented):
import os
import boto3

# Option 1: Runtime environment variables
flag = os.environ.get('FLAG')

# Option 2: Secrets manager integration
def get_secret():
    client = boto3.client('secretsmanager')
    response = client.get_secret_value(SecretId='ctf-flag')
    return response['SecretString']
```

### Configuration Security

**Environment Separation**: **ABSENT** - No evidence of separate development, staging, and production configurations. The application appears to run the same configuration in all environments with debug mode enabled.

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:84-85`

```python
#app.run(host='0.0.0.0', port=5001, threaded=True)  # Production config commented out
app.run(debug=True)  # Debug config active
```

**Configuration Security Analysis**:

1. **Flask Configuration** (`app.py:24-26`):
```python
app = Flask(__name__)
app.config['PROPAGATE_EXCEPTIONS'] = True
# Missing: SECRET_KEY, SESSION_TYPE, environment-specific configs
```

**Missing Security Configurations**:
- No `SECRET_KEY` for session encryption
- No `SESSION_COOKIE_SECURE = True`
- No `SESSION_COOKIE_HTTPONLY = True`
- No `SESSION_COOKIE_SAMESITE = 'Strict'`
- No `PERMANENT_SESSION_LIFETIME` (session timeout)
- No `MAX_CONTENT_LENGTH` (file upload size limit)

2. **OpenSSL Configuration Disabled** (`Dockerfile:22`):
```dockerfile
ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null
```

Disabling OpenSSL configuration prevents TLS/SSL functionality and may bypass security certificate validation.

3. **Infrastructure Security Headers** (CRITICAL GAPS):

Location: No infrastructure configuration files (Nginx, Apache, Kubernetes Ingress, CDN) found in codebase.

**Application-Level Header Configuration**:
Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:80`

```python
response.headers["X-Protection"] = "0"  # DISABLES XSS protection
```

**Missing Security Headers** (Should be configured in Nginx/Ingress/CDN):

| Header | Purpose | Missing Configuration |
|--------|---------|----------------------|
| `Strict-Transport-Security` | Forces HTTPS | No HSTS policy, no max-age directive |
| `Content-Security-Policy` | XSS prevention | No CSP policy, allows inline scripts |
| `X-Frame-Options` | Clickjacking prevention | No frame ancestors policy |
| `X-Content-Type-Options` | MIME sniffing prevention | Missing `nosniff` directive |
| `Referrer-Policy` | Referrer leakage control | No policy set |
| `Permissions-Policy` | Feature policy control | No restrictions on browser features |
| `Cache-Control` | Sensitive data caching | No cache directives for flag responses |

**HSTS Configuration Search**:

No infrastructure configuration files found that would contain `Strict-Transport-Security` headers. Searched for:
- Nginx configuration: No `nginx.conf`, `nginx.yaml`, or related files
- Kubernetes Ingress: No ingress YAML files
- CDN configuration: No CloudFront, Cloudflare, or Fastly configs
- Apache configuration: No `.htaccess` or `httpd.conf`

**Recommended Infrastructure Configuration** (NOT IMPLEMENTED):
```nginx
# Nginx configuration (missing):
add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload" always;
add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; object-src 'none'" always;
add_header X-Frame-Options "DENY" always;
add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always;
add_header Referrer-Policy "no-referrer" always;
add_header Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, proxy-revalidate" always;
```

4. **Cache-Control for Sensitive Responses**:

Location: No cache control headers set on flag responses (`app.py:79`)

**Risk**: Browsers may cache HTTP responses containing the flag, storing it in browser cache, proxy caches, or CDN edge servers. This persists the sensitive data beyond the intended session.

**Recommended Configuration** (NOT IMPLEMENTED):
```python
response.headers["Cache-Control"] = "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0"
response.headers["Pragma"] = "no-cache"
response.headers["Expires"] = "0"
```

### External Dependencies

**Python Dependencies** (`requirements.txt`):

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/requirements.txt`

```
Flask==1.1.4
phantomjs
```

**Dependency Security Analysis**:

| Dependency | Current Version | Latest Version | Age | Known CVEs | Risk Level |
|------------|----------------|----------------|-----|------------|------------|
| Python | 2.7.18 | 3.12.x | EOL Jan 2020 | Multiple | CRITICAL |
| Flask | 1.1.4 | 3.1.x | May 2021 (4 years old) | Multiple | HIGH |
| PhantomJS | 2.1.1 | Abandoned 2018 | 7 years unmaintained | Multiple | CRITICAL |
| Debian | Buster | Bookworm | EOL June 2024 | Multiple | HIGH |

**Specific Dependency Vulnerabilities**:

1. **Python 2.7.18** (CRITICAL):
   - **End of Life**: January 1, 2020 (5+ years without security patches)
   - **Known Issues**: No security updates for any CVEs discovered after EOL
   - **Security Implications**: Unpatched vulnerabilities in core language, standard library, and C extensions
   - **Mitigation**: Upgrade to Python 3.11+ immediately

2. **Flask 1.1.4** (HIGH):
   - **Release Date**: May 2021 (4 years behind current 3.1.x)
   - **Missing Security Features**:
     - Modern CSRF protection (Flask-WTF improvements)
     - Async support for better DOS mitigation
     - Improved session cookie security defaults
     - Security header helpers
   - **Known Vulnerabilities**: Potentially affected by CVEs in older Werkzeug versions
   - **Mitigation**: Upgrade to Flask 3.x

3. **PhantomJS 2.1.1** (CRITICAL):
   - **Status**: Project abandoned March 2018 (7 years unmaintained)
   - **WebKit Version**: Based on ancient WebKit version from 2016
   - **Known CVEs**: Hundreds of WebKit CVEs unpatched since abandonment
   - **Security Implications**: Executing untrusted JavaScript in unmaintained browser engine
   - **Mitigation**: Replace with Puppeteer, Playwright, or Selenium with headless Chrome

4. **Debian Buster** (HIGH):
   - **Status**: Moved to archived repositories, security support ended
   - **Base Image**: `FROM python:2.7` (line 1 of Dockerfile)
   - **Mitigation**: Upgrade to Debian Bookworm or Ubuntu 24.04 LTS

**Third-Party Services**:

**FINDING**: No external third-party services detected. The application is completely self-contained with no:
- API integrations (payment processors, email services, SMS providers)
- Authentication providers (OAuth, SAML, LDAP)
- Monitoring services (Datadog, New Relic, Sentry)
- CDN services (CloudFront, Cloudflare, Fastly)
- Cloud storage (S3, GCS, Azure Blob)

**Security Implications**:
- **POSITIVE**: Reduced attack surface (no third-party API keys to compromise)
- **NEUTRAL**: No dependency on external service availability
- **NEGATIVE**: No external monitoring for security events or anomalies

**Supply Chain Security**: No dependency pinning, no integrity checking (checksums/signatures), no vulnerability scanning in CI/CD pipeline.

### Monitoring & Logging

**FINDING: MINIMAL LOGGING, NO MONITORING**

The application has basic stdout logging only, with no structured logging, no security event monitoring, and no observability infrastructure.

**Logging Implementation**:

Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:40-42, 46-47`

```python
print "Page:"
print page  # User-controlled content
print "Resultado:"
print result  # XSS validation result
```

**Logging Security Issues**:

1. **Sensitive Data in Logs**:
   - User-submitted XSS payloads logged verbatim (line 42)
   - Flag potentially logged when challenge is solved
   - No sanitization or redaction of sensitive data

2. **Insufficient Structured Logging**:
   - Uses `print` statements instead of Python `logging` module
   - No log levels (DEBUG, INFO, WARNING, ERROR, CRITICAL)
   - No contextual metadata (timestamps, request IDs, source IPs)
   - No log formatting or JSON structured logging

3. **Missing Security Event Logging**:
   - No logging of authentication attempts (N/A - no auth)
   - No logging of authorization failures (N/A - no authz)
   - No logging of input validation failures
   - No logging of flag retrieval events
   - No logging of PhantomJS subprocess failures
   - No logging of rate limit violations (N/A - no rate limiting)

4. **No Log Aggregation or Retention**:
   - Logs go to stdout only (Docker captures to container logs)
   - No centralized logging (ELK, Splunk, CloudWatch, Datadog)
   - No log retention policy
   - No log rotation (Docker handles rotation)

**Missing Monitoring Components**:

1. **Application Performance Monitoring (APM)**: None
   - No instrumentation for request tracing
   - No performance metrics collection
   - No error rate monitoring
   - No latency percentile tracking

2. **Security Monitoring**: None
   - No intrusion detection system (IDS)
   - No Web Application Firewall (WAF) logging
   - No anomaly detection
   - No security information and event management (SIEM) integration

3. **Infrastructure Monitoring**: None
   - No health check endpoints (`/health`, `/readiness`, `/liveness`)
   - No metrics endpoints (Prometheus `/metrics`)
   - No container resource monitoring
   - No alerting for service degradation

4. **Observability Stack**: None
   - No distributed tracing (Jaeger, Zipkin)
   - No metrics collection (Prometheus, Grafana)
   - No log aggregation (ELK Stack, Loki)

**Recommended Logging Configuration** (NOT IMPLEMENTED):
```python
import logging
import json

# Structured logging
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)

# JSON formatter for log aggregation
handler = logging.StreamHandler()
handler.setFormatter(logging.Formatter(json.dumps({
    'timestamp': '%(asctime)s',
    'level': '%(levelname)s',
    'message': '%(message)s',
    'request_id': '%(request_id)s'
})))
logger.addHandler(handler)

# Security event logging
logger.info('xss_validation_attempt', extra={
    'user_ip': request.remote_addr,
    'payload_length': len(msg),
    'validation_result': result,
    'timestamp': datetime.utcnow().isoformat()
})
```

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The XBEN-010-24 codebase is a compact, intentionally vulnerable Flask application organized as a single Docker-deployed Python service. The directory structure is minimal and flat, reflecting the application's focused purpose as a CTF XSS challenge platform rather than a production system. The codebase totals approximately 350 lines of Python code across three primary files, with supporting infrastructure configuration and static web assets comprising the bulk of the repository size.

**Directory Structure and Organization**:

```
XBEN-010-24/
├── .env                        # Environment variables (1 line, plaintext flag)
├── docker-compose.yml          # Container orchestration (6 lines)
├── src/                        # Application source directory
│   ├── Dockerfile             # Container build instructions (33 lines)
│   ├── requirements.txt       # Python dependencies (2 packages)
│   ├── app.py                 # Flask application (85 lines) - CORE LOGIC
│   ├── check.js               # PhantomJS validator (48 lines) - XSS DETECTION
│   ├── constants.py           # HTML templates (203 lines) - FRONTEND RENDERING
│   ├── secret.txt             # Flag placeholder (1 line)
│   └── static/                # Web assets (51MB+ total)
│       ├── css/               # Stylesheets
│       │   ├── style.css
│       │   ├── styles/        # Per-challenge styles (xss0.css - xss6.css)
│       │   └── fonts/         # Custom fonts (Game-Of-Squids.woff, .otf, .eot)
│       ├── img/               # Images
│       │   ├── logo5_white.png
│       │   ├── dalgonabg.jpg  # 51MB background image
│       │   └── cookies/       # Challenge state images (success/error/new)
│       └── assets/
│           └── fav-icon.png
```

**Code Organization and Conventions**:

The codebase follows a **monolithic single-file application pattern** common in small Flask projects and CTF challenges. The three Python files have distinct responsibilities: `app.py` handles HTTP routing and business logic, `constants.py` stores large multi-line HTML template strings to avoid cluttering the main application file, and `check.js` implements the PhantomJS-based XSS detection logic in JavaScript. This separation of concerns is minimal but functional for the application's scale.

**Critical Architectural Decisions Impacting Security Discoverability**:

1. **No Framework Routing Patterns**: The application uses only two routes (`/` and `/page`), making endpoint discovery trivial. No REST API conventions, no versioned endpoints, no nested resources.

2. **Inline Template Rendering**: HTML templates are stored as Python string constants in `constants.py` rather than using Jinja2 template files. This makes template injection analysis more complex, as all rendering is done via string formatting (`%s` and `.format()`) rather than template engine syntax.

3. **Subprocess-Based Validation**: The XSS detection mechanism uses an external PhantomJS process rather than in-process JavaScript parsing. This creates a subprocess boundary that must be analyzed separately from the Flask request cycle.

4. **Static File Hybrid Usage**: The `static/` directory serves both permanent assets (CSS, images) and temporary generated HTML files (created during XSS validation). This dual-purpose usage creates a race condition attack surface.

5. **No Test Suite**: The repository contains no test files (no `tests/`, `test_*.py`, or `*_test.py`), making it difficult to understand expected behavior or security boundary enforcement through test cases.

6. **No Configuration Management**: All configuration is hardcoded or passed via Docker environment variables. No `config.py`, no environment-specific configs, no secrets management patterns.

**Build and Deployment Tooling**:

The application uses **Docker and Docker Compose** as its sole deployment mechanism. The build process is straightforward: Docker Compose reads the `.env` file, passes the FLAG as a build argument to the Dockerfile, which installs Python 2.7, PhantomJS, Flask dependencies, and embeds the flag into `secret.txt` via sed substitution. The container exposes port 5000 and runs the Flask development server directly without a production WSGI server (no Gunicorn, uWSGI, or mod_wsgi).

**Missing Development Infrastructure**:
- No CI/CD pipeline configuration (no `.github/workflows/`, no `.gitlab-ci.yml`, no Jenkins files)
- No code generation tools
- No database migration scripts (no Alembic, no Flask-Migrate)
- No dependency management tools beyond pip (no Poetry, no Pipenv)
- No linting or formatting configuration (no `.pylintrc`, no `.black`, no `.flake8`)
- No pre-commit hooks or git hooks

**Security-Relevant Tooling Observations**:

The absence of security tooling is notable and increases the challenge of discovering security components. There are no:
- Security scanning configurations (no Bandit, no Safety, no Snyk)
- SAST/DAST tool configurations
- Secret scanning configurations (no truffleHog, no git-secrets)
- Dependency vulnerability scanning (no Dependabot, no Renovate)

**Codebase Size and Complexity Metrics**:

- **Total Python Lines**: ~350 (app.py: 85, check.js: 48, constants.py: 203)
- **Routes**: 2 HTTP routes (plus implicit `/static/` serving)
- **Functions**: 3 (index, page_handler, check_result)
- **External Dependencies**: 2 (Flask, PhantomJS)
- **Static Assets**: 51MB+ (primarily one large background image)
- **Configuration Files**: 4 (Dockerfile, docker-compose.yml, requirements.txt, .env)

The minimal codebase size makes comprehensive manual review feasible, but the lack of documentation, tests, and modern framework conventions increases the effort required to understand security boundaries and trust assumptions.

## 8. Critical File Paths

### Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/.env` - Environment variables containing plaintext flag
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration, passes FLAG as build arg
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build, embeds flag in image layers (line 23-25)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/secret.txt` - Flag storage file with @FLAG@ placeholder
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/requirements.txt` - Python dependencies (Flask 1.1.4, PhantomJS)

### Authentication & Authorization
- **N/A** - No authentication or authorization system implemented

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py` - Flask application with all routes:
  - Line 29-31: `GET /` index endpoint
  - Line 64-81: `GET/POST /page` XSS challenge endpoint
  - Line 33-50: `check_result()` function with PhantomJS subprocess execution

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- **N/A** - No database or data models used

### Dependency Manifests
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/requirements.txt` - Python packages (Flask==1.1.4, phantomjs)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/.env` - Plaintext flag: `FLAG="flag{85085a7c-07be-43ea-ba89-3db5e7523235}"`
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/secret.txt` - Flag file loaded at runtime (app.py:22)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile` - Line 23: `ARG FLAG`, Line 25: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g secret.txt`

### Middleware & Input Validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py`
  - Line 67-73: Blacklist input validation (blocks a-z, A-Z, 0-9, <, >)
  - Line 80: Custom header `X-Protection: 0` disabling XSS protection
  - Line 24-26: Flask configuration (missing security configs)

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py`
  - Line 40-42: User input logging via print statements
  - Line 46-47: XSS validation result logging
  - No structured logging or monitoring configuration

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration, port mapping 0.0.0.0:39777→5000
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile` - Container build:
  - Line 1: `FROM python:2.7` (Python 2.7 EOL)
  - Line 22: `ENV OPENSSL_CONF=/dev/null` (disables OpenSSL)
  - Line 30-32: PhantomJS installation
- **No infrastructure configuration** - No Nginx, no Kubernetes manifests, no CDN configs, no WAF rules

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/.env` - Line 1: Plaintext flag in environment file
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/secret.txt` - Runtime flag storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/Dockerfile` - Line 23-25: Flag embedded in Docker image layers
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py` - Line 22: Flag loading, Line 56: Flag exposure on successful XSS

### Frontend Templates & Static Assets
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/constants.py` - HTML templates (203 lines)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/static/css/style.css` - Main stylesheet
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/static/img/dalgonabg.jpg` - 51MB background image
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/static/` - Directory where temporary HTML files are created

### XSS Detection Engine
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/check.js` - PhantomJS script (48 lines):
  - Line 4: `page.open()` to load user-supplied HTML
  - Line 20-30: JavaScript dialog interception for XSS detection

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

This section catalogs all Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) sinks discovered in the network-accessible attack surface. Each sink represents a location where user-controllable data is rendered in a browser context without proper sanitization, potentially allowing JavaScript execution.

### HTML Body Context

#### 1. **[XSS-CRITICAL] document.write() with Unsanitized User Input**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:75`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
```
- **Render Context**: JavaScript Context → HTML Body Context (via `document.write()`)
- **User Input Source**: `request.form.get('name','')` - POST parameter from `/page` endpoint
- **Data Flow**:
  1. User submits POST to `/page` with `name` parameter
  2. Input stored in `msg` variable (line 66)
  3. Weak blacklist filter applied (line 67-73) - blocks a-z, A-Z, 0-9, <, >
  4. Input embedded in JavaScript string: `var name = "%s";`
  5. JavaScript variable passed to `document.write('Hello ' + name)`
  6. `document.write()` renders user input directly into HTML body

- **Severity**: **CRITICAL**
- **Exploitability**: **EASY**
- **Attack Vector**: Multiple exploitation paths:
  - **JavaScript String Escape**: Input like `"; prompt(); "` breaks out of the string context
  - **Special Character Payload**: Since alphanumerics and `<>` are blocked, use: `"/**/prompt/**/()/**/"`
  - **Unicode Escapes**: `"\u0070rompt()"` (if interpreter processes escapes)
  - **Template Literals**: Depending on JavaScript context, template injection may be possible

- **Additional Security Weaknesses**:
  - XSS protection explicitly disabled: `response.headers["X-Protection"] = "0"` (line 80)
  - No Content Security Policy (CSP) to restrict inline script execution
  - Debug mode enabled, potentially exposing additional attack surfaces

#### 2. **[XSS-HIGH] Template String Injection in HTML Body**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:79`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
response = make_response(CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value, result, script_content))
```
- **Render Context**: HTML Body Context (template position {4} receives script_content)
- **User Input Source**: `msg` via `script_content` variable (line 75)
- **Data Flow**:
  1. `script_content` constructed with user input (line 75)
  2. Entire `<script>` block embedded at position {4} in CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST template
  3. Template rendered into HTTP response body

- **Severity**: **HIGH**
- **Exploitability**: **EASY**
- **Notes**: This is a secondary rendering of the same XSS sink #1. The user-controlled `<script>` block is injected into the HTML template, creating multiple injection points.

### HTML Attribute Context

#### 3. **[XSS-MEDIUM] Potential Attribute Injection via 'value' Parameter**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:68,73,76,79`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
value = "" if msg == "" else '{0}'.format(msg)  # Line 68
# Later used at position {2} in template:
return CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",error_msg)
```
- **Render Context**: HTML Attribute Context (likely textarea value or similar based on template name)
- **User Input Source**: `request.form.get('name','')` - POST parameter
- **Data Flow**:
  1. User input stored in `msg` (line 66)
  2. Formatted into `value` variable via `.format(msg)` (line 68)
  3. Injected at position {2} in CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST template
  4. Template suggests this is rendered in a textarea or form input value attribute

- **Severity**: **MEDIUM**
- **Exploitability**: **MODERATE**
- **Attack Vector**: If quotes are not properly escaped in the template, attacker could:
  - Close the attribute: `" onload="prompt()" x="`
  - Inject event handler: `" onerror="prompt()"`
  - Break out of tag: `"><script>prompt()</script>`

- **Dependency**: Exploitability depends on how `CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST` template escapes the {2} placeholder (not visible in app.py, stored in constants.py line 169)

### JavaScript Context

#### 4. **[XSS-CRITICAL] Direct String Interpolation in JavaScript Variable**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:75`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
```
- **Render Context**: JavaScript Context (inside `<script>` tag, string literal)
- **User Input Source**: `request.form.get('name','')` - POST parameter
- **Data Flow**:
  1. User input in `msg` variable
  2. Directly interpolated using Python `%s` string formatting
  3. Embedded between double quotes: `var name = "%s";`
  4. No JavaScript escaping or encoding applied

- **Severity**: **CRITICAL**
- **Exploitability**: **EASY**
- **Attack Vector**:
  - **String Termination**: `"; prompt(); var x="` breaks out of the string
  - **Comment Injection**: `"; prompt(); //` comments out rest of line
  - **Multiline Injection**: Using newline characters if not sanitized
  - **Special Character Payloads**: `"/**/;prompt();/**/` using only symbols

- **Example Exploit** (bypassing alphanumeric + `<>` blacklist):
```javascript
// Payload: "/**/;prompt();/**/
// Renders as: var name = ""; prompt(); ""; document.write('Hello ' + name);
```

### Python Template Injection

#### 5. **[SSTI-MEDIUM] Python String Formatting with User Input**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:75`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
script_content = """<div class="solution-text"><script> var name = "%s"; document.write('Hello ' + name); </script></div>""" % msg
```
- **Render Context**: Python String Template (old-style `%s` formatting)
- **User Input Source**: `request.form.get('name','')` - POST parameter
- **Severity**: **MEDIUM**
- **Exploitability**: **MODERATE**
- **Notes**:
  - Uses old-style Python `%s` formatting (not full Jinja2/Mako template engine)
  - Potential for format string issues if user can inject format specifiers
  - Blacklist blocks alphanumerics, limiting format string exploits
  - Not a full Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) since not using `render_template()`

#### 6. **[SSTI-MEDIUM] .format() Method with User Input**

- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:68,73,76,79`
- **Code Snippet**:
```python
value = "" if msg == "" else '{0}'.format(msg)  # Line 68
# Later:
return CONTENT_TEXTAREA_POST.format("32","Umbrella",value,"",error_msg)  # Lines 73, 76, 79
```
- **Render Context**: Python String Template (`.format()` method)
- **User Input Source**: `msg` via `value` variable
- **Severity**: **MEDIUM**
- **Exploitability**: **MODERATE**
- **Notes**:
  - If user input contains `{0}`, `{1}`, etc., could access format arguments
  - Example: Input `{0}` might render the first format argument
  - Limited by blacklist blocking alphanumerics (blocks `{0}` but not `{}`)
  - Could potentially leak information via format string access

### No XSS Sinks Found in Other Contexts

**No CSS Context Sinks**: No user input is rendered in `<style>` tags or `element.style` properties.

**No URL Context Sinks (Direct)**: No user input controls `location.href`, `window.open()`, `location.replace()`, etc. However, user input does create temporary HTML files in the `static/` directory, which are then loaded by PhantomJS via `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html`.

**No DOM-based XSS Sinks**: No client-side JavaScript manipulates the DOM based on user input from URL parameters, `location.hash`, or `postMessage` events.

### Summary of XSS Findings

| Sink ID | Type | Context | Severity | Exploitability | File:Line |
|---------|------|---------|----------|----------------|-----------|
| 1 | document.write() | JS → HTML Body | CRITICAL | EASY | app.py:75 |
| 2 | Template Injection | HTML Body | HIGH | EASY | app.py:79 |
| 3 | Attribute Injection | HTML Attribute | MEDIUM | MODERATE | app.py:68,79 |
| 4 | String Interpolation | JavaScript | CRITICAL | EASY | app.py:75 |
| 5 | Python % formatting | Python Template | MEDIUM | MODERATE | app.py:75 |
| 6 | .format() method | Python Template | MEDIUM | MODERATE | app.py:68 |

**Total Critical XSS Sinks**: 2 (Sinks #1 and #4 - both are the same underlying vulnerability)

**Primary Exploitation Path**: The `/page` endpoint (POST) is the sole entry point for XSS exploitation. The weak blacklist filter (blocking only alphanumerics and `<>`) is intentionally bypassable for the CTF challenge, allowing payloads constructed from special characters, JavaScript syntax elements, and string escape sequences.

## 10. SSRF Sinks

This section catalogs Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) sinks where user input could influence server-side network requests. SSRF vulnerabilities allow attackers to force the server to make requests to unintended destinations, potentially accessing internal networks, cloud metadata services, or bypassing firewall restrictions.

### Analysis Methodology

The codebase was comprehensively analyzed for all patterns where:
1. User input (request parameters, headers, form data) flows into network request functions
2. Server-side processes make HTTP/HTTPS requests, open sockets, or fetch external resources
3. URL parameters, hostnames, ports, or paths could be influenced by user-controlled data

### Findings

**No SSRF sinks found in network-accessible code.**

### Detailed Analysis of Potential SSRF Vectors

#### PhantomJS page.open() - NOT USER-CONTROLLABLE

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/check.js:4,20`

**Analysis**:
```javascript
// check.js:4,20
page.open(url, function (status) {
    // ... XSS detection logic ...
});
```

**URL Construction** (app.py:35-43):
```python
fn = "static/" + os.urandom(16).encode('hex') + '.html'  # Cryptographically random filename
url = 'http://localhost:5000/' + fn  # Hardcoded localhost URL
# ...
proc.stdin.write(url)  # URL passed to PhantomJS via stdin
```

**User Input Influence**:
- **Filename**: NOT controllable (16 bytes of cryptographic randomness via `os.urandom()`)
- **Protocol**: NOT controllable (hardcoded `http://`)
- **Hostname**: NOT controllable (hardcoded `localhost`)
- **Port**: NOT controllable (hardcoded `5000`)
- **Path prefix**: NOT controllable (hardcoded `static/`)
- **File content**: User-controllable BUT only influences HTML content, not URL

**Verdict**: NOT AN SSRF SINK - User cannot control the destination URL. PhantomJS only visits `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html` where `<random>` is cryptographically generated.

**Potential Attack Vector (Race Condition, Not SSRF)**:
While not SSRF, there is a brief race condition where the temporary HTML file exists in the web-accessible `static/` directory (line 37-50). If an attacker could predict or leak the random filename, they could access the file via `/static/<random>.html` before it's deleted. However, with 128-bit entropy (16 bytes of `os.urandom()`), prediction is infeasible.

#### Unused urllib Import - NOT INVOKED

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:6`

**Analysis**:
```python
import urllib
# urllib is imported but NEVER used anywhere in app.py
```

**Grep Results**: No calls to `urllib.urlopen()`, `urllib.request.urlopen()`, `urllib2.urlopen()`, or any urllib functions found in the codebase.

**Verdict**: NOT AN SSRF SINK - Library imported but never invoked.

#### Unused Phantom Class - NOT INVOKED

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:14,20`

**Analysis**:
```python
from selenium import webdriver
from selenium.webdriver.common.desired_capabilities import DesiredCapabilities
# ...
cap = dict(DesiredCapabilities.PHANTOMJS)  # Line 14
browser = webdriver.PhantomJS(desired_capabilities=cap)  # Line 20
# browser is instantiated but NEVER called
```

**Grep Results**: No calls to `browser.get()`, `browser.execute_script()`, or any Selenium WebDriver methods found after instantiation.

**Verdict**: NOT AN SSRF SINK - WebDriver instantiated but never invoked. Dead code.

### Comparison with Common SSRF Sink Patterns

The following SSRF sink patterns were systematically searched and **NOT FOUND**:

#### HTTP(S) Clients
- ❌ No `requests.get()`, `requests.post()`, or `requests.request()`
- ❌ No `urllib.urlopen()`, `urllib2.urlopen()`, or `urllib.request.urlopen()`
- ❌ No `httplib.HTTPConnection()` or `http.client.HTTPConnection()`
- ❌ No `subprocess` calls to `curl` or `wget`

#### Raw Sockets
- ❌ No `socket.socket()` or `socket.connect()`
- ❌ No `telnetlib.Telnet()` connections
- ❌ No raw TCP/UDP socket creation

#### URL Openers & File Includes
- ❌ No `file_get_contents()` (PHP - N/A for Python)
- ❌ No `fopen()` with URLs
- ❌ No `open()` with remote URLs
- ❌ No dynamic imports with URLs

#### Redirect Handlers
- ❌ No `flask.redirect()` with user input
- ❌ No `Response.redirect()` or `make_response(redirect(...))`
- ❌ No "return URL" or "next" parameter handling

#### Media Processors
- ❌ No ImageMagick, Pillow, or image processing with URL inputs
- ❌ No FFmpeg invocations with remote sources
- ❌ No PDF generators with URL fetching

#### Webhook/Callback Mechanisms
- ❌ No "ping my webhook" functionality
- ❌ No outbound HTTP notifications
- ❌ No callback URL parameters

#### SSO/OIDC/JWKS Fetchers
- ❌ No OAuth discovery endpoints
- ❌ No JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetching
- ❌ No OIDC metadata retrieval

### Subprocess Security Analysis (Not SSRF, But Relevant)

While not SSRF, the application's subprocess usage is security-relevant:

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-010-24/src/app.py:34`

```python
proc = subprocess.Popen(["timeout","5","phantomjs", "check.js"], 
                        stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stdin=subprocess.PIPE)
```

**Security Assessment**:
- ✅ **SECURE**: Uses array form (not `shell=True`), preventing command injection
- ✅ **SECURE**: No user input in command arguments
- ✅ **SECURE**: Timeout protection (5 seconds max execution)
- ⚠️ **RISK**: User input passed via stdin (but validated by PhantomJS script)

### Conclusion

The XBEN-010-24 application does not contain any Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities in its network-accessible attack surface. The PhantomJS integration, while processing user-supplied content, does not allow users to control the URLs being fetched. All outbound network requests are hardcoded to localhost with cryptographically random path components, making URL manipulation infeasible.

**Why No SSRF Exists**:
1. **Minimal Network Functionality**: The application is a self-contained CTF challenge with no need for external HTTP requests
2. **Localhost-Only Requests**: PhantomJS only visits `http://localhost:5000/static/<random>.html`
3. **Cryptographic Randomness**: The 128-bit entropy in filenames prevents URL prediction
4. **No User-Controlled URLs**: No request parameters, headers, or form fields influence URL construction
5. **No External Integrations**: No webhooks, OAuth callbacks, API integrations, or external service dependencies

**Note for Penetration Testers**: While SSRF is not present, the PhantomJS integration is still a critical attack surface due to:
- Abandoned browser engine with unpatched vulnerabilities
- Execution of user-supplied JavaScript in a headless browser
- Potential for XSS to access PhantomJS internal APIs if browser sandbox escapes exist

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

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Report generated at: 2025-10-28T23:18:11.573Z