# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings reported here meet the "In-Scope" criteria below.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints.
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms.
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code.

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`).
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE).
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions).
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities.
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities.
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application).

---

## 1. Executive Summary

The Springfield Portal is a **single-page PHP web application** with a **critically compromised security posture**. This CTF/benchmark challenge application demonstrates multiple severe vulnerabilities that render its authentication mechanism completely ineffective. The application runs on an **end-of-life technology stack** (PHP 5.6.40, Apache 2.4.25, Debian 9.6) with **zero security controls** and exhibits a **trivially exploitable authentication bypass vulnerability**.

**Critical Security Findings:**
The application's authentication logic contains an **undefined variable vulnerability** where the password validation references `$password` without defining it. When combined with PHP's type juggling behavior in `strcmp()`, this creates a **trivial authentication bypass** - any request with an array-type password parameter (`?username=admin&password[]=x`) completely bypasses authentication and exposes the protected flag. Additionally, credentials are transmitted via **GET parameters in plaintext URLs**, logging sensitive data in server logs, browser history, and proxy servers. The application has **no HTTPS enforcement**, **no input validation**, **no session management**, and **no defense-in-depth mechanisms**.

**Attack Surface Analysis:**
The network-accessible attack surface consists of 5 endpoints: the primary authentication endpoint (`/index.php`), three static image resources, and an inadvertently exposed Dockerfile that reveals the build process and flag injection mechanism. The exposed Dockerfile represents a **high-value intelligence leak**, documenting exactly how the flag is substituted during container build time via `sed` commands. There are no databases, no external service integrations, no WebSockets, and no complex API structures - the entire application logic resides in a single 81-line PHP file. Despite this simplicity, the architectural security decisions are fundamentally flawed: using GET instead of POST for authentication, running as root in the container, having world-writable webroot permissions (777), and embedding secrets in source code.

**Technology Stack Risk:**
The application runs on software that has been **end-of-life for 6+ years** (PHP 5.6 EOL: January 2019, Debian 9.6 EOL: July 2022), exposing it to hundreds of unpatched CVEs with no vendor support. This choice of deprecated technology, combined with insecure PHP configuration (dangerous functions not disabled, display_errors enabled, unlimited execution time), creates a compound risk scenario where vulnerabilities in the language runtime itself could be exploited alongside application-level flaws.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

**Primary Technology Stack:**
- **PHP 5.6.40** (Released: January 25, 2019 | **END-OF-LIFE**: January 1, 2019)
- **Apache 2.4.25 (Debian)** (Built: November 3, 2018 | Outdated by 7+ years)
- **Debian 9.6 (Stretch)** (Codename: Stretch | **END-OF-LIFE**: July 2022)
- **Containerization**: Docker with php:5-apache base image

**Security Implications:**
The choice of PHP 5.6.40 represents a **critical architectural security flaw** as this version has received zero security patches since January 2019, leaving it exposed to **6+ years of discovered vulnerabilities** including remote code execution vulnerabilities like CVE-2019-11043 (PHP-FPM RCE), CVE-2019-11042 (buffer over-read in exif), CVE-2018-19935 (XSS), and hundreds of other unpatched CVEs. The end-of-life Apache 2.4.25 and Debian 9.6 similarly lack security updates, creating a **compound vulnerability scenario** where exploits targeting the runtime environment could succeed regardless of application-level security.

PHP configuration analysis reveals dangerous settings: `display_errors = STDOUT` (exposes error details to attackers), `expose_php = On` (version disclosure via X-Powered-By header), `disable_functions = (none)` (dangerous functions like exec, shell_exec, system not disabled), `allow_url_fopen = On` (enables remote file access), and unlimited execution times (`max_execution_time = 0`, `max_input_time = -1`) creating DoS risk. Session configuration is equally problematic with `session.cookie_httponly = Off` and `session.cookie_secure = Off`, though sessions aren't actually implemented in the application code.

**File Locations:**
- Dockerfile: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (line 1: `FROM php:5-apache`)
- Docker Compose: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml`
- Apache Config: `/etc/apache2/` (inside container)
- PHP Config: Inherited from php:5-apache base image

### Architectural Pattern

**Pattern Classification:** **Monolithic Single-File Application**

This application follows an **anti-pattern** of embedding all logic (HTML, CSS, PHP) in a single file (`index.php`, 81 lines) with no separation of concerns, no MVC framework, no routing layer, and no modular architecture. The entire application lifecycle - from form rendering to input validation (minimal) to authentication logic to output generation - occurs linearly within a single PHP script execution.

**Trust Boundary Analysis:**
The application has exactly **two trust boundaries**, both critically weak:

1. **Network Perimeter Boundary** (External → Application):
   - Entry Point: HTTP GET request to port 80 (exposed as host port 36613)
   - Input Vector: URL query parameters `username` and `password`
   - Security Controls: **NONE** - No input validation, type checking, sanitization, or rate limiting
   - Vulnerability: Direct acceptance of any data type (strings, arrays, objects) without validation
   - Trust Decision: Application implicitly trusts all network input

2. **Authentication Boundary** (Application → Protected Resource):
   - Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` line 71
   - Logic: `if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0)`
   - Security Controls: **BROKEN** - Undefined `$password` variable makes comparison ineffective
   - Vulnerability: Type juggling in loose comparison `== 0` when strcmp() receives invalid input
   - Trust Decision: Any array input to password parameter bypasses authentication

**Architecture Security Impact:**
The monolithic design eliminates natural security boundaries that would exist in a properly architected system (controller validation layer, service authorization layer, data access layer). There is **no defense in depth** - bypassing the single authentication check grants complete access with no secondary verification, logging, or monitoring. The architecture provides no framework-level security features (CSRF protection, XSS filtering, SQL injection prevention) that modern frameworks provide by default.

**Component Structure:**
```
/var/www/html/          (World-writable: 777 permissions - CRITICAL)
├── index.php           (3,683 bytes) - All application logic
├── Dockerfile          (111 bytes)   - EXPOSED via HTTP (intelligence leak)
└── static/
    ├── homer_simpson.png              (38 KB)
    ├── springfield_background.jpg     (412 KB)
    └── springfield_background-2.jpg   (142 KB)
```

The webroot has **777 (world-writable) permissions**, allowing any process to modify web content, upload malicious files, or alter the application code. Additionally, the Dockerfile is **publicly accessible via HTTP** at `http://localhost:36613/Dockerfile`, exposing the complete build process including the flag substitution mechanism (`RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`).

### Critical Security Components

**Authentication Framework:** **NONE**

The application has **no formal authentication framework** and instead implements authentication via inline conditional logic in the main application file. Analysis of this critical code reveals:

**Authentication Logic (Lines 70-77 of index.php):**
```php
if (isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])) {
    if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0) {
        echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
        echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
    } else {
        echo "<center><h3>Oh Sorry but...you are not the admin :( </h3></center>";
    }
}
```

**Critical Vulnerability - Undefined Variable:**
The variable `$password` is **never defined** in the codebase. In PHP 5, referencing an undefined variable returns `NULL` and generates an `E_NOTICE` error (suppressed by default configuration). This means `strcmp($_GET['password'], NULL)` is executed.

**Critical Vulnerability - Type Juggling:**
When `strcmp()` receives a non-string type (like an array), it returns `NULL` and emits a warning. The comparison uses loose equality `== 0`. In PHP's type juggling: `NULL == 0` evaluates to `TRUE`. Attack vector: `?username=admin&password[]=anything` causes `strcmp(array, NULL)` → returns `NULL` → `NULL == 0` → evaluates `TRUE` → **authentication bypassed**.

**Authorization Framework:** **NONE**

No role-based access control (RBAC), no permission system, no attribute-based access control (ABAC). The application has a **binary authorization model**: either authenticated as "admin" (hardcoded string check) or not authenticated. No role hierarchy, no permission granularity, no resource-level access controls.

**Data Protection:** **NONE**

- **No encryption at rest**: Flag stored in plaintext in PHP source
- **No encryption in transit**: HTTP only, no HTTPS/TLS
- **No password hashing**: Direct password comparison (though password is undefined)
- **No input validation**: Raw $_GET parameters used directly
- **No output encoding**: No htmlspecialchars() or htmlentities() usage
- **No CSRF protection**: No token generation or validation
- **No XSS protection**: No Content Security Policy, no output sanitization

**Security Headers:** **COMPLETELY MISSING**

HTTP response analysis shows only default headers with version disclosure:
```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: Apache/2.4.25 (Debian)          # Version disclosure vulnerability
X-Powered-By: PHP/5.6.40                # Version disclosure vulnerability
Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8
```

**Missing Critical Headers:**
- `Content-Security-Policy` - No CSP, allowing inline scripts and any origin resources
- `X-Frame-Options` - No clickjacking protection
- `X-Content-Type-Options` - No MIME sniffing protection
- `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) - No HTTPS enforcement
- `Referrer-Policy` - Credentials leaked in Referer headers
- `Permissions-Policy` - No feature policy restrictions
- `X-XSS-Protection` - No browser XSS filter (deprecated but still useful for legacy browsers)

Apache configuration at `/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/security.conf` shows insecure settings:
```apache
ServerTokens OS          # Should be "Prod" - exposes OS information
ServerSignature On       # Should be "Off" - exposes server details
TraceEnable Off          # ✓ Correct - prevents HTTP TRACE attacks
```

**File Locations for Security Components:**
- Authentication: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (lines 70-77)
- Authorization: Same file, line 71 (hardcoded "admin" string comparison)
- Session Management: **Not implemented** (no session_start(), no $_SESSION usage)
- Security Headers: **Not configured** (no header() calls for security)
- Input Validation: Minimal isset() check only (line 70)
- CSRF Protection: **Not implemented**
- Rate Limiting: **Not implemented**

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms and Security Properties

**Authentication Architecture:**
The Springfield Portal implements a **single-point authentication system** with catastrophic security flaws. There is exactly **ONE authentication endpoint** - the primary `/index.php` route accepting GET parameters. No additional authentication mechanisms exist: no logout endpoint, no password reset, no account registration, no token refresh, no email verification, no multi-factor authentication, and no session validation.

**Complete Authentication Endpoint Catalog:**

| Endpoint | Method | File Location | Line Numbers | Purpose | Auth Required |
|----------|--------|---------------|--------------|---------|---------------|
| `/index.php` or `/` | GET | `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` | 62, 70-77 | Login form processing and authentication | No (Public) |

**Authentication Method Analysis:**
The application uses **basic credential comparison** without any cryptographic security:

```php
// Line 70-71 from index.php
if (isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])) {
    if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0) {
```

**Security Properties Breakdown:**

1. **Transport Security: FAILED**
   - **Protocol**: HTTP GET (line 62: `<form action="index.php" method="GET">`)
   - **Encryption**: None - credentials transmitted in plaintext
   - **Visibility**: Password visible in URL, browser address bar, server logs, proxy logs, and Referer headers
   - **File Reference**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:62`

2. **Password Storage: FAILED**
   - **Hashing Algorithm**: None - password is undefined, no password_hash() usage
   - **Salt**: Not applicable (no hashing)
   - **Expected Password**: Unknown - `$password` variable never defined anywhere in codebase
   - **File Reference**: Variable used at line 71 but never initialized

3. **Input Validation: MINIMAL**
   - **Type Checking**: None - accepts any data type (strings, arrays, objects)
   - **Length Validation**: None - unlimited input length accepted
   - **Character Whitelist**: None - any characters accepted
   - **Validation Present**: Only `isset()` check (line 70) verifying parameters exist
   - **File Reference**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70`

4. **Comparison Security: CRITICAL FAILURE**
   - **Username Comparison**: Loose equality `==` instead of strict `===` (type juggling risk)
   - **Password Comparison**: `strcmp($_GET['password'], $password)` with undefined `$password`
   - **Type Juggling Vulnerability**: `strcmp()` returns `NULL` when receiving array input, `NULL == 0` evaluates to `TRUE`
   - **File Reference**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:71`

**Critical Authentication Bypass Vulnerability:**

The authentication bypass occurs through a **multi-stage vulnerability chain**:

**Stage 1 - Undefined Variable:**
The `$password` variable is referenced on line 71 but never defined in the codebase (verified via complete file analysis). In PHP 5, undefined variables return `NULL` and generate `E_NOTICE` errors (suppressed in this configuration).

**Stage 2 - Type Confusion:**
When `strcmp()` receives a non-string type as its first parameter (e.g., an array), it returns `NULL` instead of performing comparison and emits a PHP warning: "strcmp() expects parameter 1 to be string, array given".

**Stage 3 - Type Juggling:**
The comparison uses loose equality `== 0` instead of strict equality `=== 0`. In PHP's type coercion rules:
- `NULL == 0` evaluates to `TRUE`
- `NULL === 0` evaluates to `FALSE`

**Exploitation Path:**
```http
GET /index.php?username=admin&password[]=arbitrary_value HTTP/1.1
Host: target.com
```

**Execution Flow:**
1. `$_GET['password']` is an array: `['arbitrary_value']`
2. `isset($_GET['password'])` returns `TRUE` (arrays satisfy isset)
3. `strcmp(['arbitrary_value'], NULL)` executes
4. `strcmp()` returns `NULL` (type mismatch warning)
5. `NULL == 0` evaluates to `TRUE`
6. Authentication bypassed → Flag displayed

**Alternative Bypass Vectors:**
- `?username=admin&password[]=` (empty array)
- `?username=admin&password[0]=x&password[1]=y` (multi-element array)
- `?username=admin&password[key]=value` (associative array)

All variants exploit the same core vulnerability.

### Session Management and Token Security

**Session Implementation Status: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

Comprehensive analysis reveals **complete absence of session management**:

**Evidence of No Session Management:**
- No `session_start()` calls found (verified via codebase search)
- No `$_SESSION` variable usage anywhere in code
- No session cookie generation or handling
- No session storage configuration (Redis, database, memory)
- No session timeout mechanisms
- No session fixation protections
- No session regeneration on authentication

**Session Cookie Flag Configuration: NOT APPLICABLE**

Since no sessions or cookies are implemented, the following security flags are not configured:

| Cookie Security Flag | Configuration Location | Status |
|---------------------|------------------------|--------|
| `HttpOnly` | Not configured | N/A - No cookies used |
| `Secure` | Not configured | N/A - No cookies used |
| `SameSite` | Not configured | N/A - No cookies used |

**File and Line Numbers Where Cookie Flags Should Be Set:**
```
NOT APPLICABLE - No session management or cookie usage found in application code.
No setcookie() calls, no session_set_cookie_params() calls, no cookie-related headers.
```

**PHP Session Configuration (From php.ini):**
While PHP has default session configuration, it's **unused by the application**:
```ini
session.cookie_httponly = Off  # ⚠️ Would be vulnerable if sessions were used
session.cookie_secure = Off    # ⚠️ Would be vulnerable if sessions were used
session.hash_function = 0      # Weak (MD5) - obsolete if used
```

These insecure defaults would create vulnerabilities if the application were to implement sessions without explicit configuration.

**Security Implications of No Session Management:**

**Positive Impacts:**
- **No session hijacking possible** - no session tokens to steal
- **No session fixation possible** - no session IDs to fix
- **No CSRF via session** - no session state to manipulate

**Negative Impacts:**
- **No persistent authentication** - users cannot remain logged in
- **No state management** - application cannot track user context
- **Poor user experience** - must re-authenticate for every operation
- **No logout functionality** - no session to invalidate
- **No "remember me" capability** - stateless design prevents persistent login

**Architectural Consequence:**
The stateless design means that if authentication were successful (which it always is due to the bypass), there would be no way to maintain that authenticated state across requests. This is consistent with the CTF challenge nature of the application - each request is independently processed.

### Authorization Model and Bypass Scenarios

**Authorization Model: Binary Access Control**

The application implements the **simplest possible authorization model**: a single hardcoded role check with no permission granularity, no role hierarchy, and no resource-level access controls.

**Authorization Implementation:**
```php
// Line 71 from index.php
if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0)
```

**Role Definition:**
- **Single Role**: "admin" (hardcoded string literal)
- **Role Assignment**: Via username parameter matching "admin"
- **Permission Model**: All-or-nothing (binary: authorized or not authorized)
- **No Role Hierarchy**: No concept of role inheritance or privilege levels
- **No Permission Granularity**: No action-based permissions (read/write/delete)

**Protected Resources:**
1. **Flag Value** (Line 68, 73):
   - Resource: `$flag = "@FLAG@"` (replaced at build time with actual flag)
   - Access Control: Single authentication check
   - File Location: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:73`

**Authorization Bypass Scenarios:**

**Primary Bypass Path: Type Juggling Authentication Bypass**
- **Mechanism**: Exploit undefined `$password` variable with array input
- **Attack Vector**: `GET /index.php?username=admin&password[]=x`
- **Success Criteria**: `strcmp()` returns `NULL`, `NULL == 0` evaluates to `TRUE`
- **Impact**: Complete authorization bypass, immediate flag disclosure
- **Difficulty**: Trivial (single HTTP request)
- **Defense Evasion**: No rate limiting, no account lockout, unlimited attempts

**Secondary Bypass Path: Username Type Juggling** (Theoretical)
- **Mechanism**: Loose comparison `$_GET['username'] == "admin"` could be vulnerable
- **Attack Vector**: Attempting integer 0 or boolean true to match "admin" via type coercion
- **Likelihood**: Low (string "admin" unlikely to match other types in PHP 5)
- **Impact**: Would bypass username check if successful
- **Practical Value**: Primary bypass is simpler and more reliable

**Privilege Escalation Paths:**

**Path 1: Direct Authentication Bypass → Admin Access**
```
Unauthenticated User 
    ↓ (send array password parameter)
Administrator Access
    ↓ (immediate)
Flag Disclosure
```
- **Privilege Levels Crossed**: Unauthenticated → Administrator (single step)
- **Barriers**: None (no rate limiting, no CAPTCHA, no monitoring)
- **Detection Risk**: Low (no logging of authentication attempts)

**Path 2: Information Disclosure → Credential Discovery** (Hypothetical)
```
Exposed Dockerfile (/Dockerfile accessible via HTTP)
    ↓ (reveals build process)
Understanding of flag substitution mechanism
    ↓ (but doesn't reveal password)
No actual escalation (password undefined anyway)
```
- **Value**: Intelligence gathering, understanding architecture
- **Direct Escalation**: No (doesn't provide password or bypass)

### Multi-Tenancy Security Implementation

**Multi-Tenancy Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

This application is a **single-tenant system** with no multi-tenancy architecture, no tenant isolation mechanisms, no tenant identification, and no cross-tenant access concerns.

**Evidence:**
- No tenant identifier fields in code
- No database with tenant_id columns (no database at all)
- No subdomain routing or tenant detection
- Single flag value for all users (not tenant-specific)
- No organization or workspace concepts

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**External Authentication Integration: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

The application has **no Single Sign-On (SSO), OAuth, or OpenID Connect (OIDC) integration**.

**Search Results:**
- **OAuth Endpoints**: None found
- **OIDC Discovery Endpoints**: None found
- **SAML Endpoints**: None found
- **Callback Endpoints**: None found
- **State Parameter Validation**: Not applicable
- **Nonce Parameter Validation**: Not applicable
- **PKCE Implementation**: Not applicable
- **Token Exchange Logic**: Not applicable

**File and Line Numbers for State/Nonce Validation:**
```
NOT APPLICABLE - No SSO/OAuth/OIDC implementation present in codebase.
No external authentication providers configured.
```

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security

**Database Implementation Status: NOT PRESENT**

The Springfield Portal application has **no database backend**. This was confirmed through comprehensive analysis:

**Evidence of No Database:**
- No database connection strings or configuration found
- No SQL queries anywhere in codebase
- No ORM (Object-Relational Mapping) usage
- No database driver initialization (mysqli, PDO, PostgreSQL, MongoDB, etc.)
- No migration files or schema definitions
- Docker Compose configuration shows no database service

**Database Modules Available (Unused):**
While PHP 5.6.40 has database extensions loaded (`mysqlnd`, `pdo_sqlite`, `PDO`), they are **never utilized** by the application code. The presence of these extensions in the PHP runtime does not indicate database usage.

**Security Implications:**
- **Positive**: No SQL injection vulnerabilities (no queries to inject)
- **Positive**: No database credential exposure
- **Positive**: No data at rest to protect or leak
- **Negative**: No persistent data storage for legitimate functionality
- **Negative**: No user account database (consistent with hardcoded authentication)

**Encryption at Rest: NOT APPLICABLE** (no database to encrypt)
**Access Controls: NOT APPLICABLE** (no database to control access to)
**Query Safety: NOT APPLICABLE** (no queries to secure)

### Data Flow Security

**Sensitive Data Identification:**

The application handles exactly **two categories of sensitive data**:

1. **Authentication Credentials (User-Submitted)**
   - **Username**: Submitted via GET parameter `?username=`
   - **Password**: Submitted via GET parameter `?password=`
   - **Classification**: Highly Sensitive (authentication material)
   - **Entry Point**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70`

2. **CTF Flag (Application Secret)**
   - **Flag Value**: `flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}` (from .env file)
   - **Alternate Flag**: `FLAG{3c8d37d2b7349c6124d67400ab817bed508eb3a155f2a0a1699732b1c120d86e}` (build-time substituted)
   - **Classification**: Highly Sensitive (challenge win condition)
   - **Storage Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:68`

**Data Flow Analysis - Authentication Credentials:**

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 1: Data Entry (User Browser)                          │
│                                                              │
│ User types password → Visible in browser input field        │
│                       ↓                                      │
│ Form submission (GET) → Password visible in URL bar         │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │ HTTP GET (No Encryption)
                        │ Plaintext Network Transmission
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 2: Network Transmission (NO PROTECTION)               │
│                                                              │
│ • HTTP (not HTTPS) → Man-in-the-middle interception possible│
│ • GET parameters → Logged in proxy servers                  │
│ • Referer header → Password leaked to third-party sites     │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 3: Server Reception (LOGGING EXPOSURE)                │
│                                                              │
│ Apache Access Log:                                           │
│ 127.0.0.1 - - [29/Oct/2025] "GET /index.php?username=admin  │
│ &password=secretpass123 HTTP/1.1" 200 3683                  │
│                                                              │
│ • Password permanently logged to disk                        │
│ • Accessible via docker logs command                         │
│ • Retained in log rotation archives                          │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 4: Application Processing (NO SANITIZATION)           │
│                                                              │
│ $_GET['password'] → No validation                            │
│                  → No type checking                          │
│                  → No sanitization                           │
│                  → No hashing                                │
│                  → Direct use in strcmp()                    │
│                                                              │
│ File: index.php:71                                           │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 5: Data Disposal (NO SECURE DELETION)                 │
│                                                              │
│ • No explicit unset() of password variable                   │
│ • Remains in PHP memory until script termination            │
│ • No secure memory wiping                                    │
│ • Password persists in Apache logs indefinitely              │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

**Data Flow Analysis - CTF Flag:**

```
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 1: Storage (Multiple Locations - CRITICAL EXPOSURE)   │
│                                                              │
│ 1. .env file (committed to Git):                             │
│    /Users/.../XBEN-055-24/.env:1                            │
│    FLAG="flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}"       │
│                                                              │
│ 2. Docker build argument:                                    │
│    docker-compose.yml passes FLAG to build                   │
│    Visible in image history: docker history <image>          │
│                                                              │
│ 3. Source code (post-build):                                 │
│    /var/www/html/index.php:68                               │
│    $flag = "FLAG{3c8d37d2...}";                             │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 2: Access Control (BROKEN)                            │
│                                                              │
│ Protected by authentication check on line 71                 │
│ if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" &&                          │
│     strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0)              │
│                                                              │
│ BYPASS: Password undefined → authentication bypassed        │
└───────────────────────┬─────────────────────────────────────┘
                        │
                        ↓
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ STAGE 3: Transmission (PLAINTEXT HTTP)                      │
│                                                              │
│ echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: "      │
│      . $flag . "</h3></center>";                            │
│                                                              │
│ • Sent over HTTP (no HTTPS)                                  │
│ • No output encoding                                         │
│ • Visible to network eavesdroppers                           │
│ • Logged in proxy servers                                    │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
```

**Data Protection Mechanisms (Comprehensive Absence):**

| Protection Type | Status | Evidence |
|----------------|--------|----------|
| **Encryption in Transit** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No HTTPS, HTTP only (docker-compose.yml:7-8) |
| **Encryption at Rest** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | Flag stored in plaintext in source code |
| **Password Hashing** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No password_hash() or password_verify() usage |
| **Input Sanitization** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No filter_input(), no validation functions |
| **Output Encoding** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No htmlspecialchars(), no htmlentities() |
| **Tokenization** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No token generation or handling |
| **Data Masking** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | Credentials fully visible in logs |
| **Data Minimization** | ⚠️ PARTIAL | Application collects minimal data, but logs excessively |
| **Secure Deletion** | ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED | No explicit memory clearing or secure erasure |

**Critical Data Flow Vulnerabilities:**

1. **Credential Exposure in URLs (CRITICAL)**
   - **Location**: Form method at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:62`
   - **Code**: `<form action="index.php" method="GET">`
   - **Impact**: Passwords visible in browser history, server logs, proxy logs, Referer headers
   - **Remediation**: Change method to POST

2. **Plaintext Network Transmission (CRITICAL)**
   - **Location**: Docker configuration at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml:7-8`
   - **Code**: `ports: - 80` (HTTP only)
   - **Impact**: Man-in-the-middle attacks, credential interception
   - **Remediation**: Implement HTTPS with TLS certificates

3. **Secret in Version Control (CRITICAL)**
   - **Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env:1`
   - **Code**: `FLAG="flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}"`
   - **Impact**: Secret visible in Git history, accessible to anyone with repository access
   - **Remediation**: Remove from Git, add to .gitignore, rewrite history

4. **Secret in Docker Image Layers (HIGH)**
   - **Location**: Docker build at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile:6-8`
   - **Code**: `ARG FLAG` followed by `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`
   - **Impact**: Flag visible in image history via `docker history` command
   - **Remediation**: Use runtime secrets, not build-time ARGs

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**Multi-Tenancy Status: NOT APPLICABLE**

This is a single-tenant application with no multi-tenant architecture or data isolation requirements.

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points

**Network-Accessible Endpoint Catalog:**

The Springfield Portal exposes **5 network-accessible endpoints**, all publicly available without authentication requirements:

**1. Primary Application Endpoint - Authentication Portal**

- **Route**: `/` or `/index.php`
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (lines 1-81)
- **HTTP Methods Accepted**: GET, POST, PUT, DELETE, OPTIONS (all methods return 200 OK - no method validation)
- **Authentication Required**: None (publicly accessible)
- **Parameters**:
  - `username` (GET parameter) - Expected: string "admin", Accepts: any type (string, array, object)
  - `password` (GET parameter) - Expected: string, Accepts: any type (string, array, object)
- **Functionality**: Login form processing, authentication validation, flag disclosure on successful authentication
- **Security Analysis**: 
  - **Critical Vulnerability**: Authentication bypass via type juggling (array password parameter)
  - **Credential Exposure**: GET method exposes passwords in URLs and logs
  - **No Rate Limiting**: Unlimited authentication attempts
  - **No CSRF Protection**: Form lacks anti-CSRF tokens
  - **Type Confusion**: Accepts array/object input without validation, enabling strcmp() bypass
- **Attack Vectors**:
  - Type juggling authentication bypass: `?username=admin&password[]=x`
  - Reflected XSS (potential if error handling echoes user input)
  - Credential harvesting from server logs
- **File Reference**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:62` (form), line 70 (parameter access), line 71 (vulnerable comparison)

**2. Static Asset - Springfield Background Image (Primary)**

- **Route**: `/static/springfield_background.jpg`
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background.jpg`
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: None (publicly accessible)
- **Content-Type**: image/jpeg
- **File Size**: 412,001 bytes
- **Functionality**: Background image for login page
- **Security Analysis**: Static image, no direct vulnerabilities, but check for:
  - Embedded metadata (EXIF data) that might leak information
  - Steganographic hidden data
  - Malicious polyglot file constructions
- **Attack Vectors**: Minimal (static content)

**3. Static Asset - Springfield Background Image (Alternate)**

- **Route**: `/static/springfield_background-2.jpg`
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background-2.jpg`
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: None (publicly accessible)
- **Content-Type**: image/jpeg
- **File Size**: 142,534 bytes
- **Functionality**: Alternate background image
- **Security Analysis**: Same as primary background image
- **Attack Vectors**: Minimal (static content)

**4. Static Asset - Homer Simpson Avatar**

- **Route**: `/static/homer_simpson.png`
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/homer_simpson.png`
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: None (publicly accessible)
- **Content-Type**: image/png
- **File Size**: 38,043 bytes
- **Functionality**: Avatar/profile image on login page
- **Security Analysis**: Static PNG image
- **Attack Vectors**: Minimal (static content)

**5. Exposed Build Artifact - Dockerfile (CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE LEAK)**

- **Route**: `/Dockerfile`
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 1-11)
- **HTTP Method**: GET
- **Authentication Required**: None (publicly accessible)
- **Content-Type**: text/plain
- **Deployed URL**: `http://localhost:36613/Dockerfile`
- **Functionality**: **UNINTENDED EXPOSURE** - Build configuration file
- **Security Analysis**:
  - **CRITICAL: Information Disclosure** - Reveals entire build process
  - Exposes technology stack (PHP 5, Apache)
  - Reveals flag injection mechanism: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php`
  - Shows base Docker image (php:5-apache)
  - Documents file structure and deployment process
  - **HIGH INTELLIGENCE VALUE** for attackers
- **Attack Vectors**:
  - Intelligence gathering about application architecture
  - Understanding flag storage mechanism
  - Identifying deprecated/vulnerable base images
  - Reconnaissance for container escape vulnerabilities
- **File Reference**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (all 11 lines exposed)
- **Remediation**: Remove Dockerfile from webroot, ensure build artifacts not deployed

**Endpoint Security Summary:**

| Endpoint | Public | Auth Required | Vulnerable | Severity |
|----------|--------|---------------|------------|----------|
| `/index.php` | Yes | No | **Yes** (Auth bypass, GET credentials) | **CRITICAL** |
| `/static/*.jpg` | Yes | No | No | Low |
| `/static/*.png` | Yes | No | No | Low |
| `/Dockerfile` | Yes | No | **Yes** (Info disclosure) | **HIGH** |

**Total Attack Surface**: 5 endpoints, 2 with security vulnerabilities (40% vulnerable)

### Internal Service Communication

**Service Architecture: Standalone Monolith**

The Springfield Portal is a **single-container, standalone service** with **no internal service communication**, no microservices architecture, no service mesh, and no inter-process communication beyond standard Apache/PHP request handling.

**Service Inventory:**
- **Web Service**: Apache + PHP 5.6.40 (single container)
- **Database Service**: None
- **Cache Service**: None (Redis/Memcached not present)
- **Message Queue**: None (RabbitMQ/Kafka not present)
- **Authentication Service**: None (no separate auth service)
- **API Gateway**: None

**Trust Relationships**: None (no services to establish trust with)

**Security Assumptions**: Not applicable (no inter-service trust to analyze)

**Network Segmentation**: Not applicable (single service, default Docker bridge network)

### Input Validation Patterns

**Input Validation Status: CRITICALLY INSUFFICIENT**

The application implements **minimal input validation** consisting solely of existence checks with **no type validation, no sanitization, no length limits, and no character whitelisting**.

**Validation Implementation Analysis:**

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70`

```php
if (isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])) {
    if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0) {
```

**Validation Layers Present:**

1. **Existence Check (Line 70)**:
   - Function: `isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])`
   - Purpose: Verify parameters exist in request
   - Strength: Minimal - only checks presence, not validity
   - Bypassed by: Any value including empty strings, arrays, objects
   - Effectiveness: ~5% (prevents only missing parameter errors)

**Validation Layers ABSENT:**

2. **Type Validation**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
   - No `is_string()`, `is_numeric()`, or type checks
   - Accepts: strings, integers, arrays, objects, booleans
   - Impact: Enables type juggling attacks
   - Missing function: `filter_input(INPUT_GET, 'username', FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING)`

3. **Length Validation**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
   - No `strlen()` checks
   - Accepts: Unlimited input length (subject to PHP limits: `post_max_size = 8M`)
   - Impact: Potential buffer exhaustion, DoS attacks
   - Missing function: `if (strlen($_GET['username']) > 255) { /* reject */ }`

4. **Character Whitelist**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
   - No regex validation
   - No character restrictions
   - Accepts: Any UTF-8 characters including special characters, SQL syntax, HTML tags, JavaScript
   - Impact: XSS, injection vulnerabilities
   - Missing function: `preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/', $_GET['username'])`

5. **Sanitization**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
   - No `filter_var()` usage
   - No `htmlspecialchars()` for output
   - No `mysql_real_escape_string()` (though no database exists)
   - Impact: Unsanitized data flows directly to comparison logic and potential output

6. **Input Normalization**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
   - No `trim()` to remove whitespace
   - No `strtolower()` for case normalization
   - Impact: Bypass via whitespace padding (though "admin" requires exact match)

**Input Validation by Endpoint:**

| Endpoint | Parameter | Type Check | Length Check | Sanitization | Whitelist | Security Rating |
|----------|-----------|------------|--------------|--------------|-----------|-----------------|
| `/index.php` | `username` | ❌ No | ❌ No | ❌ No | ❌ No | **CRITICAL** (0/4) |
| `/index.php` | `password` | ❌ No | ❌ No | ❌ No | ❌ No | **CRITICAL** (0/4) |

**Type Confusion Vulnerability Analysis:**

**Expected Input Types**: Strings
**Actual Accepted Types**: Any PHP type (string, integer, float, array, object, boolean, NULL)

**Exploitation via Type Confusion:**
```php
// Normal request (rejected due to undefined $password)
?username=admin&password=normalstring

// Type juggling attack (SUCCEEDS)
?username=admin&password[]=anything
// $_GET['password'] is now an array
// strcmp(array, NULL) returns NULL
// NULL == 0 evaluates to TRUE
// Authentication bypassed
```

**Missing Validation Functions:**

Should be implemented at `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70` (before line 71):

```php
// RECOMMENDED IMPLEMENTATION (not present in current code)
$username = filter_input(INPUT_GET, 'username', FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING);
$password = filter_input(INPUT_GET, 'password', FILTER_SANITIZE_STRING);

// Type validation
if (!is_string($username) || !is_string($password)) {
    die("Invalid input type");
}

// Length validation
if (strlen($username) > 255 || strlen($password) > 255) {
    die("Input too long");
}

// Character whitelist for username
if (!preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9_]+$/', $username)) {
    die("Invalid username characters");
}
```

**Current Implementation**: None of the above validation exists.

### Background Processing

**Background Job Architecture: NOT PRESENT**

The application has **no asynchronous background processing**, no job queues, no scheduled tasks, no cron jobs, and no worker processes.

**Evidence:**
- No queue systems (Redis, RabbitMQ, Beanstalkd, SQS) configured
- No worker processes in Docker Compose
- No cron configuration files
- No job scheduling libraries
- All processing is synchronous within HTTP request-response cycle

**Security Analysis**: Not applicable (no background jobs to secure)

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Secrets Management Approach: CRITICALLY INSECURE**

The application employs **multiple insecure secret storage mechanisms** that expose sensitive data across the entire development and deployment lifecycle:

**Secret Inventory:**

1. **CTF Flag Secret**
   - **Secret Type**: Application flag (CTF challenge win condition)
   - **Value**: `flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}` (from .env) / `FLAG{3c8d37d2b7349c6124d67400ab817bed508eb3a155f2a0a1699732b1c120d86e}` (build-time substituted)
   - **Storage Locations** (Multiple exposure points):
     - **Location 1**: Git repository (`.env` file committed)
       - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env:1`
       - Code: `FLAG="flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}"`
       - Risk: **CRITICAL** - Visible to anyone with repository access, persists in Git history
     - **Location 2**: Docker build arguments
       - File: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml:10-11`
       - Code: `args: - FLAG=${FLAG}`
       - Risk: **HIGH** - Visible in `docker history <image>` command output
     - **Location 3**: Application source code (post-build)
       - File: `/var/www/html/index.php:68` (inside container)
       - Code: `$flag = "FLAG{3c8d37d2...}";`
       - Risk: **HIGH** - Hardcoded in deployed application, visible via source code disclosure

2. **Authentication Password Secret**
   - **Secret Type**: Admin password
   - **Value**: **UNDEFINED** (variable `$password` never initialized)
   - **Storage Location**: None (critical vulnerability - password doesn't exist)
   - **Risk**: **CRITICAL** - Undefined variable enables authentication bypass

**Secret Rotation:**
- **Automated Rotation**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Manual Rotation Process**: ❌ NOT DOCUMENTED
- **Grace Period Handling**: ❌ NOT APPLICABLE
- **Rotation Frequency**: Never (static flag value)

**Secret Management Systems:**
- **HashiCorp Vault**: ❌ NOT USED
- **AWS Secrets Manager**: ❌ NOT USED
- **Azure Key Vault**: ❌ NOT USED
- **Kubernetes Secrets**: ❌ NOT USED
- **Environment Variables (Runtime)**: ⚠️ PARTIAL (used but sourced from insecure .env file)

**Critical Secret Exposure Paths:**

**Exposure Path 1: Git Repository Leak**
```bash
# Anyone with repository access can retrieve flag
git clone <repository>
cat .env
# Output: FLAG="flag{5a33e31a-7627-4044-964f-744917d6ca5f}"
```

**Exposure Path 2: Docker Image History**
```bash
# Anyone with access to built image can retrieve flag
docker history xben-055-24_web
# Output shows: RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php
# Flag value visible in build args
```

**Exposure Path 3: Container Filesystem**
```bash
# Anyone with container access can retrieve flag
docker exec xben-055-24_web_1 cat /var/www/html/index.php
# Output: $flag = "FLAG{3c8d37d2b7349c6124d67400ab817bed508eb3a155f2a0a1699732b1c120d86e}";
```

**Exposure Path 4: Network Interception**
Since the flag is transmitted via HTTP (not HTTPS), network eavesdroppers can capture it during successful authentication responses.

**File References for Secret Storage:**
- `.env` file: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env:1`
- Docker Compose: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml:10-11`
- Dockerfile: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile:6-8`
- Application Code: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:68`

### Configuration Security

**Environment Configuration: MINIMAL SEPARATION**

The application uses a **single-environment configuration** with no separation between development, staging, and production environments:

**Configuration Files:**

1. **Environment Variables File**: `.env`
   - **Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env`
   - **Contents**: Single FLAG variable
   - **Security Issues**:
     - Committed to Git repository (**CRITICAL** - violates security best practices)
     - No .gitignore entry to prevent accidental commit
     - No encryption of sensitive values
     - Plain text storage
   - **Environment Separation**: None (single .env file for all environments)

2. **Docker Configuration**: `docker-compose.yml`
   - **Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml`
   - **Secret Handling**: Passes .env variables as build arguments
   - **Security Issues**:
     - Build-time ARGs (not runtime ENV) leak secrets in image layers
     - No secret management service integration
     - Port mapping to all interfaces (0.0.0.0:36613)

3. **PHP Configuration**: `php.ini` (inherited from base image)
   - **Location**: `/usr/local/etc/php/` (inside container)
   - **Insecure Settings**:
     - `display_errors = STDOUT` (error disclosure)
     - `expose_php = On` (version disclosure)
     - `disable_functions = (none)` (dangerous functions enabled)
     - `allow_url_fopen = On` (remote file access enabled)

4. **Apache Configuration**: Multiple files in `/etc/apache2/`
   - **Security Configuration**: `/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/security.conf`
   - **Insecure Settings**:
     - `ServerTokens OS` (should be "Prod")
     - `ServerSignature On` (should be "Off")
   - **Positive Setting**:
     - `TraceEnable Off` ✓ (prevents HTTP TRACE attacks)

**Security Headers Configuration:**

**Infrastructure-Level Security Headers: NOT CONFIGURED**

Searched for infrastructure configuration files that might define security headers:

**Nginx Configuration**: Not applicable (Apache used instead)
**Kubernetes Ingress**: Not found (no Kubernetes deployment)
**CDN Settings**: Not found (no CDN configuration)
**Apache .htaccess**: Not found in webroot
**Apache VirtualHost**: Default configuration (no custom security headers)

**File Locations Checked:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/.htaccess` - NOT FOUND
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/nginx.conf` - NOT FOUND
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/kubernetes/` - NOT FOUND
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` - No HEADER configuration

**Specifically Searched Headers:**

| Header Type | Configuration Location | Status |
|-------------|------------------------|--------|
| **Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS)** | Not configured anywhere | ❌ MISSING |
| **Cache-Control** | Not configured (default Apache behavior) | ⚠️ DEFAULT ONLY |
| **Content-Security-Policy** | Not configured | ❌ MISSING |
| **X-Frame-Options** | Not configured | ❌ MISSING |
| **X-Content-Type-Options** | Not configured | ❌ MISSING |

**Result**: No infrastructure-level security headers configured. All security headers are absent from:
- Apache configuration files
- Application code (no header() calls for security)
- Reverse proxy configurations (none present)
- Ingress controllers (none present)

**Environment-Specific Configurations:**
- **Development**: Not separated (same .env used)
- **Staging**: Not present (no staging environment)
- **Production**: Not separated (same .env used)

**Secret Handling in Configuration:**
- **Encryption**: None (all values plain text)
- **Access Controls**: File system permissions only (default)
- **Audit Logging**: None (no logging of configuration access)

### External Dependencies

**Third-Party Service Dependencies: NONE**

The application has **zero external service dependencies**:

**Analysis Results:**
- ✅ No external APIs called
- ✅ No third-party authentication providers (OAuth, SAML, OIDC)
- ✅ No payment gateways (Stripe, PayPal, etc.)
- ✅ No email services (SendGrid, Mailgun, etc.)
- ✅ No cloud storage (S3, Azure Blob, GCS)
- ✅ No monitoring services (DataDog, New Relic, Sentry)
- ✅ No analytics services (Google Analytics, Mixpanel)
- ✅ No CDN services (Cloudflare, Fastly, Akamai)
- ✅ No database services (external MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB)

**PHP Extension Dependencies:**
While the PHP runtime includes extensions (curl, openssl), **none are actively used** by the application code.

**Security Implications:**
- **Positive**: No third-party API key exposure risk
- **Positive**: No external service compromise attack vector
- **Positive**: Reduced attack surface (no external dependencies to exploit)
- **Negative**: No external security services (WAF, monitoring, threat detection)

### Monitoring & Logging

**Monitoring Implementation: MINIMAL (Default Apache Logging Only)**

**Logging Mechanisms:**

1. **Apache Access Logs**
   - **Location**: `/var/log/apache2/access.log` (redirected to Docker stdout)
   - **Format**: Combined Log Format
   - **Contents**: All HTTP requests including **passwords in URLs** (critical exposure)
   - **Example Entry**:
     ```
     127.0.0.1 - - [29/Oct/2025:12:00:00 +0000] "GET /index.php?username=admin&password=secretpass HTTP/1.1" 200 3683
     ```
   - **Security Issue**: Credentials permanently logged in plaintext
   - **Retention**: Indefinite (subject to Docker log rotation)
   - **Access**: Via `docker logs xben-055-24_web_1` command

2. **Apache Error Logs**
   - **Location**: `/var/log/apache2/error.log` (redirected to Docker stderr)
   - **Format**: Apache error log format
   - **Contents**: Server errors, PHP warnings (if displayed)
   - **Security Relevance**: Low (minimal error handling in application)

3. **PHP Error Logging**
   - **Configuration**: `log_errors = Off` (errors not logged to file)
   - **Display Errors**: `display_errors = STDOUT` (errors shown to users - info disclosure)
   - **Error Reporting**: Not explicitly set (defaults to E_ALL)
   - **Security Issue**: Errors displayed to users reveal internal application details

**Security Event Visibility:**

| Event Type | Logged | Location | Accessible |
|------------|--------|----------|------------|
| **Authentication Attempts** | ⚠️ Partial | Access logs only | Yes (Docker logs) |
| **Authentication Failures** | ❌ No | Not logged distinctly | No |
| **Authentication Successes** | ⚠️ Partial | Access logs only | Yes (Docker logs) |
| **Authorization Failures** | ❌ No | Not implemented | No |
| **Input Validation Failures** | ❌ No | Not implemented | No |
| **Rate Limiting Violations** | ❌ No | Not implemented (no rate limiting) | No |
| **Suspicious Activity** | ❌ No | Not implemented | No |
| **Password in URL** | ✅ Yes | Access logs (CRITICAL ISSUE) | Yes (Docker logs) |
| **Undefined Variable Warnings** | ⚠️ Maybe | If error_reporting catches E_NOTICE | Conditional |
| **Type Juggling Warnings** | ⚠️ Maybe | strcmp() warnings if displayed | Conditional |

**Application-Level Security Logging: NOT IMPLEMENTED**

No security-specific logging code found:
- No logging of authentication events
- No logging of authorization decisions
- No logging of sensitive data access
- No anomaly detection
- No intrusion detection logging

**Monitoring Services:**
- **Application Performance Monitoring (APM)**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Security Information and Event Management (SIEM)**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Intrusion Detection System (IDS)**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED
- **Log Aggregation**: ⚠️ DEFAULT (Docker logs only)
- **Alerting**: ❌ NOT IMPLEMENTED

**Security Impact:**
- **Critical**: Password logging creates credential exposure risk
- **High**: No visibility into authentication bypass attempts
- **High**: No alerting on suspicious activity
- **Medium**: No centralized log management
- **Medium**: No log analysis or correlation

**File References:**
- Logging configuration: Inherited from Apache/PHP defaults (no custom logging code)
- Access to logs: `docker logs xben-055-24_web_1` (command, not file path)

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

**Directory Structure and Organization:**

The Springfield Portal demonstrates an **extremely minimalist codebase structure** characteristic of a CTF (Capture The Flag) challenge or security training exercise. The entire application consists of **4 source files** (excluding Git metadata and build artifacts) organized in a flat, single-directory structure with no architectural patterns, no separation of concerns, and no build conventions beyond basic Docker containerization.

**Complete Directory Tree:**
```
XBEN-055-24/
├── .env                          (2 lines)   - Environment variables (FLAG secret)
├── .git/                                      - Git version control metadata
├── benchmark.json                (10 lines)  - CTF benchmark metadata
├── docker-compose.yml            (13 lines)  - Docker composition configuration
├── Makefile                      (1 line)    - Build orchestration (references external common.mk)
└── src/                                       - Application source directory
    ├── Dockerfile                (11 lines)  - Container build instructions
    ├── index.php                 (81 lines)  - **ENTIRE APPLICATION LOGIC**
    └── static/                                - Static asset directory
        ├── homer_simpson.png     (38 KB)     - Avatar image
        ├── springfield_background.jpg (412 KB)
        └── springfield_background-2.jpg (142 KB)
```

**Organizational Analysis:**

The directory structure reveals several key architectural characteristics that significantly impact security discoverability and attack surface analysis:

**No Framework Structure**: Unlike modern PHP applications that typically use framework-imposed directory structures (e.g., Laravel's `app/`, `routes/`, `config/` organization or Symfony's `src/Controller/`, `src/Entity/` pattern), this application has no framework whatsoever. All functionality—HTML rendering, CSS styling, authentication logic, and output generation—resides in a single 81-line `index.php` file. This creates significant security review challenges because there are no conventional locations to search for authentication middleware, input validators, or authorization layers. Security components that would normally be separated into dedicated files or namespaces are intermingled in procedural code, making comprehensive analysis require line-by-line inspection of the single application file.

**Build Orchestration and Tools**: The codebase uses **Docker and Docker Compose** as its primary build and deployment mechanism, with a **Makefile** that references an external `common.mk` (not present in the working directory, suggesting a multi-challenge CTF framework). The Dockerfile employs a **template substitution pattern** (`sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g`) to inject the flag value at build time rather than runtime, which has significant security implications—secrets become embedded in Docker image layers and are visible via `docker history` commands. This build approach, while common in CTF challenges to prevent flag extraction via environment variables alone, creates a security anti-pattern that should never be used in production systems.

**Static Asset Organization**: The `static/` directory contains three image files with no subdirectory organization, no asset pipeline, no minification, and no CDN integration. The images are served directly by Apache with **directory listing disabled** (403 Forbidden on `/static/` without filename), which is a positive security control. However, the lack of asset versioning or cache-busting mechanisms means changes to these files would not invalidate cached versions in user browsers.

**Version Control and Secret Management**: The presence of `.git/` directory indicates Git version control is used, but critically, the `.env` file containing the FLAG secret is **committed to the repository**, violating fundamental secret management principles. There is no `.gitignore` file to prevent such accidental commits. The repository structure suggests this is intentional for a CTF challenge, but it demonstrates a critical anti-pattern.

**Testing and Quality Assurance Frameworks**: There are **no testing directories**, no test frameworks (PHPUnit, Codeception), no continuous integration configuration files (`.github/workflows/`, `.gitlab-ci.yml`, `Jenkinsfile`), and no code quality tools (PHPStan, Psalm, PHP_CodeSniffer). This complete absence of quality assurance infrastructure means there are no automated security checks, no static analysis tools to detect vulnerabilities, and no regression testing to prevent security regressions.

**Dependency Management**: While PHP projects typically use **Composer** for dependency management (with `composer.json` and `composer.lock` files) and many include `vendor/` directories with third-party libraries, this codebase has **zero external dependencies** beyond the base PHP 5.6 runtime. This is unusual for modern PHP applications but reduces the attack surface by eliminating supply chain vulnerabilities from third-party packages. However, it also means the application lacks security libraries that could provide input validation, output encoding, CSRF protection, or secure password hashing.

**Configuration and Environment Management**: The application uses a **single `.env` file** for all environments with no separation between development, staging, and production configurations. Modern PHP applications typically have `config/` directories with environment-specific files, but this application's configuration is limited to the single environment variable (FLAG) and inherited PHP/Apache defaults. This minimal configuration means there are no opportunities to enable environment-specific security controls (stricter validation in production, detailed error reporting in development).

**Impact on Security Component Discoverability:**

The minimalist structure creates unique challenges for security analysis:

1. **Authentication Components**: No dedicated `auth/` or `middleware/` directory means authentication logic is embedded in the main application flow. Security researchers must read through the entire `index.php` file rather than examining isolated authentication modules.

2. **Authorization Logic**: No `policies/`, `permissions/`, or `guards/` directories means authorization is implemented inline (in this case, a single hardcoded role check), making it easy to miss or overlook during security reviews.

3. **Input Validation**: No `validators/`, `requests/`, or `forms/` directories means input validation is scattered throughout code (or in this case, virtually absent). Comprehensive validation analysis requires examining every variable usage.

4. **Database Queries**: Typically found in `models/`, `repositories/`, or `database/` directories, but this application has no database, eliminating an entire class of SQL injection vulnerabilities.

5. **API Endpoints**: Modern applications organize endpoints in `routes/` or `controllers/` directories with route definition files, but this application has only a single endpoint defined by the form's `action` attribute.

6. **Security Headers**: Typically configured in middleware directories or web server configuration files, but this application has no such configuration, with security headers completely absent.

The flat, minimalist structure is both a security advantage (small attack surface, easy to audit completely) and a disadvantage (no framework security features, no separation of concerns, all code must be inspected manually). For penetration testers, this means the entire security assessment can focus on the single `index.php` file and its Docker deployment configuration, rather than navigating complex framework structures, but it also means there are no conventional security boundaries to test.

**Discoverability Tools and Conventions**: The codebase uses **no code generation tools** (no scaffolding commands, no code generators), **no documentation generators** (no PHPDoc comments, no API documentation), and **no IDE configuration files** (no `.vscode/`, `.idea/` directories with project-specific settings). This minimal tooling reflects the CTF challenge nature—designed for simplicity and focused exploitation rather than maintainability or development workflow efficiency.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

All file paths referenced in this security analysis, organized by security relevance:

### Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml` (lines 1-13, particularly 7-8 for port mapping, 10-11 for FLAG build arg)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 1-11, particularly line 1 for PHP version, lines 6-8 for flag injection)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env` (line 1 contains FLAG secret - CRITICAL EXPOSURE)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/Makefile` (build orchestration)
- `/etc/apache2/conf-enabled/security.conf` (inside container - Apache security settings)
- `/etc/apache2/sites-enabled/000-default.conf` (inside container - VirtualHost configuration)
- `/etc/apache2/` (inside container - Apache configuration directory)

### Authentication & Authorization
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (lines 70-77 - authentication logic)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (line 71 - CRITICAL authentication bypass vulnerability)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (line 62 - form definition with GET method)
- **No session configuration files** (session management not implemented)
- **No OAuth/SSO configuration** (external auth not implemented)

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (lines 1-81 - entire application, single endpoint)
- **No API schema files found** (no OpenAPI/Swagger, GraphQL, or Protocol Buffer definitions)
- **No routing configuration** (single-file application with no router)

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- **No database** (no models, migrations, or database interaction files)
- **No ORM configuration** (no database layer)

### Dependency Manifests
- **No dependency files** (no composer.json, package.json, requirements.txt, go.mod, or similar)
- **No third-party libraries** (zero external dependencies beyond PHP runtime)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (line 68 - flag variable definition, post-build contains actual flag)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env` (line 1 - FLAG secret in Git repository - CRITICAL)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml` (lines 10-11 - FLAG passed as build arg)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 6-8 - flag substitution mechanism)
- `/var/www/html/index.php` (inside container, line 68 - hardcoded flag after build)
- **No encryption libraries** (no dedicated cryptography implementation files)
- **No password hashing** (no password storage or hashing code)

### Middleware & Input Validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (line 70 - minimal isset() validation only)
- **No input validation middleware** (no dedicated validation layer)
- **No XSS protection middleware** (no output encoding implementation)
- **No CSRF protection** (no token generation or validation)

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/var/log/apache2/access.log` (inside container - logs passwords in URLs - CRITICAL EXPOSURE)
- `/var/log/apache2/error.log` (inside container - Apache error logs)
- **No application-level logging** (no security event logging implementation)
- **No monitoring configuration** (no APM, SIEM, or IDS integration)

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml` (entire file - deployment configuration)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (entire file - container build definition)
- **No Kubernetes configuration** (no k8s manifests)
- **No Nginx configuration** (Apache used instead)
- **No Ingress configuration** (no ingress controller)
- **No infrastructure as code** (no Terraform, Pulumi, CloudFormation)

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/.env` (line 1 - FLAG environment variable)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (line 68 - flag variable, template `@FLAG@` replaced during build)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/Dockerfile` (lines 6-8 - ARG FLAG and sed substitution)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/docker-compose.yml` (lines 10-11 - FLAG build argument)
- `/var/www/html/index.php` (inside deployed container, line 68 - hardcoded flag value post-build)
- **Accessible Dockerfile**: `http://localhost:36613/Dockerfile` (exposed via HTTP - reveals flag injection mechanism)

### Static Assets
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/homer_simpson.png` (38 KB avatar image)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background.jpg` (412 KB background)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/static/springfield_background-2.jpg` (142 KB alternate background)

### Metadata & Documentation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/benchmark.json` (CTF benchmark metadata)
- **No README** (no documentation files)
- **No API documentation** (no docs/ directory)

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

**XSS Vulnerability Assessment:**

The Springfield Portal contains **1 confirmed XSS vulnerability** and **1 potential XSS vulnerability** in network-accessible components. Both are in the **HTML Body Context**.

### Confirmed XSS Vulnerability - Unsanitized Input Flow

**Vulnerability Type**: Reflected XSS (Potential)  
**Render Context**: HTML Body Context  
**Sink Type**: Unsanitized GET parameter processing  
**Network Accessible**: Yes (publicly accessible endpoint)

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:70-71`

**Vulnerable Code**:
```php
<?php
    $flag = "@FLAG@";

    if (isset($_GET['username']) && isset($_GET['password'])) {
        if ($_GET['username'] == "admin" && strcmp($_GET['password'], $password) == 0) {
            echo "<center><h2>Welcome Admin</h2></center>";
            echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
        } else {
            echo "<center><h3>Oh Sorry but...you are not the admin :( </h3></center>";
        }
    }
?>
```

**Analysis**:

**Input Source**: 
- `$_GET['username']` - User-controlled input from URL parameter
- `$_GET['password']` - User-controlled input from URL parameter

**Dangerous Sink Pattern**:
While the current code does not **directly echo** the username or password in the visible output, the vulnerability exists because:

1. **No Output Encoding**: The application uses raw `echo` statements with no `htmlspecialchars()` or `htmlentities()` calls anywhere in the codebase.

2. **Input Processing Without Sanitization**: Both `$_GET['username']` and `$_GET['password']` are accessed and processed (line 71) without any sanitization, making them available for use in output contexts.

3. **Type Juggling Bypass**: The authentication bypass vulnerability (`?username=admin&password[]=x`) allows attackers to reach the success branch (lines 72-73), where the flag is displayed.

4. **Potential Error Output**: If PHP error reporting were configured to display notices (currently suppressed), error messages about the undefined `$password` variable could include unsanitized user input.

**Exploitation Assessment**:

**Current Direct Exploitability**: **LOW** (the username/password are not directly echoed in the existing code)

**Indirect Exploitability**: **MODERATE** (if error messages or future code modifications echo user input without sanitization)

**Potential Attack Vector** (if code were modified to echo username):
```
GET /index.php?username=<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>&password[]=x
```

If the code were to echo the username (e.g., "Welcome, {username}"), this would result in XSS execution.

**Missing Security Controls**:
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
- **Missing Function**: `htmlspecialchars($_GET['username'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')`
- **Missing Function**: `htmlspecialchars($_GET['password'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')`
- **Missing Header**: `Content-Security-Policy` header to restrict inline scripts

**Exploitability**: **MODERATE** (requires code modification or error disclosure to fully exploit)

### Potential XSS Vulnerability - Flag Output Without Encoding

**Vulnerability Type**: Stored/Build-Time XSS (Theoretical)  
**Render Context**: HTML Body Context  
**Sink Type**: Unencoded variable concatenation in HTML output  
**Network Accessible**: Yes (flag displayed on successful authentication)

**Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:73`

**Vulnerable Code**:
```php
echo "<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: " . $flag . "</h3></center>";
```

**Analysis**:

**Input Source**: 
- `$flag` variable (set from Docker build argument via sed substitution)
- Original template: `$flag = "@FLAG@";` (line 68)
- Build-time substitution: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g index.php` (Dockerfile line 8)

**Dangerous Sink Pattern**:
The flag value is directly concatenated into HTML output using the `.` operator with no output encoding. If an attacker could control the FLAG value during Docker build time, they could inject malicious JavaScript.

**Exploitation Scenario** (Theoretical):

If the .env file or Docker build process were compromised, an attacker could set:
```
FLAG='<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>'
```

This would result in the following HTML output:
```html
<center><h3>Congratulations, here is the flag: <script>alert(document.cookie)</script></h3></center>
```

**Exploitability Assessment**:

**Current Direct Exploitability**: **LOW** (requires compromise of build process or .env file)

**Practical Exploitability**: **VERY LOW** (attacker would need write access to repository or build environment)

**Security Impact if Exploited**: **MODERATE to HIGH** (would execute in context of authenticated users who successfully bypass authentication)

**Missing Security Control**:
- **File**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php:73`
- **Missing Function**: Should be `htmlspecialchars($flag, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')` instead of raw `$flag`

**Exploitability**: **LOW** (requires build-time compromise)

### XSS Sinks NOT Found (Comprehensive Search)

The following XSS sink categories were searched and **NOT FOUND** in the application:

**JavaScript Context Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No `eval()` calls
- No `Function()` constructor usage
- No `setTimeout()` with string arguments
- No `setInterval()` with string arguments
- No `<script>` tags with user input
- **Reason**: Application has no client-side JavaScript

**HTML Attribute Context Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No dynamic `onclick`, `onerror`, `onload` event handlers
- No dynamic `href`, `src`, or `formaction` attributes with user input
- No dynamic `style` attribute manipulation
- No dynamic `srcdoc` attribute
- **Reason**: Application uses static HTML only

**CSS Context Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No `element.style` property manipulation
- No dynamic `<style>` tag generation with user input
- **Reason**: Application uses static inline CSS only

**URL Context Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No `location.href` assignments
- No `location.replace()` or `location.assign()` calls
- No `window.open()` with user input
- No `history.pushState()` or `history.replaceState()`
- **Reason**: Application has no client-side navigation logic

**jQuery Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No jQuery library loaded
- No `.html()`, `.append()`, `.prepend()`, `.after()`, `.before()` usage
- **Reason**: Application does not use jQuery

**DOM Manipulation Sinks**: ❌ NONE FOUND
- No `innerHTML` assignments
- No `outerHTML` assignments
- No `document.write()` or `document.writeln()` calls
- No `insertAdjacentHTML()` calls
- **Reason**: Application has no client-side DOM manipulation

### Summary of XSS Findings

**Total XSS Sinks Identified**: 2
- **Confirmed Exploitable**: 0 (current code doesn't directly echo user input)
- **Potentially Exploitable**: 2 (unsanitized input flow + unencoded flag output)

**Primary Risk**: The complete **absence of output encoding** throughout the application creates a systemic XSS risk. Any future code modification that echoes user input will immediately create an exploitable XSS vulnerability.

**Render Context Distribution**:
- **HTML Body Context**: 2 sinks
- **HTML Attribute Context**: 0 sinks
- **JavaScript Context**: 0 sinks
- **CSS Context**: 0 sinks
- **URL Context**: 0 sinks

**Critical Recommendations**:
1. Implement `htmlspecialchars($var, ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')` for **ALL** output in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php`
2. Add Content-Security-Policy header to prevent inline script execution
3. Encode flag output on line 73 even though it's from a trusted source (defense in depth)

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

**SSRF Vulnerability Assessment: NO SSRF SINKS FOUND**

After comprehensive analysis of the Springfield Portal application, **zero SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) vulnerabilities** were identified in network-accessible components.

### Comprehensive SSRF Sink Search Results

The following SSRF sink categories were systematically searched across all application code:

**1. HTTP(S) Client Libraries**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- PHP cURL: `curl_exec()`, `curl_setopt()`, `curl_init()`
- PHP file functions with URLs: `file_get_contents()` with HTTP/HTTPS
- PHP streams: `fopen()` with HTTP/HTTPS wrappers
- PHP URL fetchers: `readfile()`, `fpassthru()` with URLs

**Search Location**: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (all 81 lines)

**Result**: No HTTP client usage found. Application makes no outbound HTTP requests.

**2. Raw Sockets & Network Connections**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- `socket_connect()`, `socket_create()`
- `fsockopen()`, `pfsockopen()`
- `stream_socket_client()`
- Low-level network operations

**Result**: No socket operations found.

**3. URL Openers & File Includes**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- Remote includes: `include()`, `require()`, `include_once()`, `require_once()` with URLs
- `file_get_contents()` with remote URLs
- XML external entity loading: `simplexml_load_file()`, `DOMDocument::load()` with URLs

**Result**: No remote file operations found. Application uses no include statements and no XML processing.

**4. HTTP Redirects & Location Headers**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- `header("Location: ...")` with user input
- Redirect handlers with user-controlled URLs
- "Return URL" or "Next URL" parameters

**Result**: No redirect functionality found. Application does not set Location headers.

**5. Webhook Handlers & Callback Mechanisms**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- Webhook testing endpoints
- Callback URL validation
- Event notification systems
- API endpoint validators

**Result**: No webhook or callback functionality found.

**6. SSO/OAuth/OIDC Components**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetchers
- OpenID Connect discovery endpoints
- OAuth metadata retrievers
- SAML metadata fetchers

**Result**: No external authentication provider integration found.

**7. Data Import & External Content Loaders**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- "Import from URL" functionality
- CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders
- RSS/Atom feed readers
- External API data synchronization

**Result**: No data import functionality found.

**8. Media Processors & Converters**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- ImageMagick with URLs
- FFmpeg with network sources
- PDF generators (wkhtmltopdf, Puppeteer) with URLs
- Image optimization services with URL parameters

**Result**: No media processing functionality found.

**9. Link Preview & Metadata Fetchers**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- Link preview generators
- oEmbed endpoint fetchers
- Social media card generators
- URL metadata extractors

**Result**: No link preview functionality found.

**10. Monitoring & Health Check Systems**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- URL ping functionality
- Uptime checkers
- Health check endpoints that fetch external URLs
- Alert webhook senders

**Result**: No monitoring or health check functionality found.

**11. Cloud Metadata Access**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- AWS/GCP/Azure metadata API calls (e.g., `http://169.254.169.254/`)
- Instance metadata service access
- Container orchestration API clients

**Result**: No cloud metadata access found.

**12. Package/Plugin Installers**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- "Install from URL" functionality
- Plugin downloaders
- Theme installers
- Remote package fetchers

**Result**: No package installation functionality found.

**13. Headless Browsers & Rendering**: ❌ NOT FOUND

**Searched For**:
- Puppeteer `page.goto()`, `page.setContent()` with user input
- Playwright navigation with user input
- Selenium WebDriver navigation
- Server-side rendering with external content

**Result**: No headless browser usage found.

### Analysis Conclusion

**Application Architecture Prevents SSRF**:

The Springfield Portal is a **completely self-contained application** with no external service dependencies, no outbound HTTP requests, no network connections, and no URL-based operations. The entire application logic consists of:

1. Receiving GET parameters (`username`, `password`)
2. Performing local comparison operations (isset(), ==, strcmp())
3. Outputting HTML responses (echo statements)
4. Serving static image files (via Apache, not application code)

**User Input Flow**:
```
User Input ($_GET parameters) 
    → isset() validation
    → strcmp() comparison (local operation)
    → HTML output (echo)
```

**No Network Operations**: At no point in the application lifecycle does user input influence:
- Outbound HTTP requests
- Socket connections
- URL fetching
- External API calls
- File operations with remote resources

**PHP Configuration Check**:
While `allow_url_fopen = On` is enabled in PHP configuration (allowing functions like `file_get_contents()` to accept URLs), the application **never uses** these functions, making the configuration setting irrelevant for SSRF risk.

**File Reference**:
- Complete application code: `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-055-24/src/index.php` (81 lines - all analyzed)
- **SSRF Sinks Found**: 0
- **Network Operations**: 0
- **External Requests**: 0

### Recommendations

**Current State**: No SSRF vulnerabilities exist because no SSRF sinks are present.

**Future Development**: If the application is extended with any of the following features, SSRF protection will be required:
- Profile picture upload from URL
- Webhook testing functionality
- External authentication (OAuth callbacks)
- Link preview generation
- RSS feed integration
- Remote backup downloads
- API integrations

**Defense-in-Depth for Future**: If outbound HTTP functionality is added, implement:
- URL whitelist validation
- Protocol restrictions (only HTTPS)
- Private IP range blocking (RFC 1918: 10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12, 192.168.0.0/16)
- Localhost/loopback blocking (127.0.0.0/8, ::1)
- Metadata endpoint blocking (169.254.169.254, fd00:ec2::254)
- DNS rebinding protection
- Request timeout limits

---

**End of Code Analysis Deliverable**