forked from farhoodlabs/paperclip
778e775c35
## Thinking Path > - Paperclip orchestrates AI-agent companies and needs secrets handling to work across local development, hosted operators, and governed agent execution. > - The affected subsystem is the company-scoped secrets control plane: database schema, server services/routes, CLI workflows, and the Secrets settings UI. > - The gap was that secrets were local-only and operators could not manage provider vaults or import existing remote references without exposing plaintext. > - This branch adds provider vault configuration plus an AWS Secrets Manager remote-import path while preserving company boundaries, binding context, and audit trails. > - I kept the PR to a single branch PR, removed unrelated lockfile/package drift, rebased the full branch onto the current `public-gh/master`, and addressed fresh Greptile findings. > - The benefit is a reviewable implementation of provider-backed secrets with focused tests covering provider selection, import conflicts, deleted secret reuse, rotation guards, and AWS signing behavior. ## What Changed - Added provider vault support for company secrets, including provider config storage, default vault handling, health checks, binding usage, access events, and remote import preview/commit. - Added an AWS Secrets Manager provider using SigV4 request signing, bounded request timeouts, namespace guardrails, cached runtime credential resolution, and external-reference linking without plaintext reads. - Added Secrets UI surfaces for vault management and remote import, plus CLI/API documentation for setup and operations. - Stabilized routine webhook secret binding paths and SSH environment-driver fixture bindings discovered during verification. - Addressed Greptile and CI findings: no lockfile/package drift, monotonic migration metadata, disabled-vault default races, soft-deleted secret hiding/recreate behavior, remove behavior with disabled vaults, soft-deleted external-reference re-import, non-active rotation guards, managed-secret soft deletion through PATCH, and per-call AWS SDK credential client churn. - Rebased this branch onto `public-gh/master` at `0e1a5828` and force-pushed with lease to keep this as the single PR for the branch. ## Verification - `git fetch public-gh master` - `git rebase public-gh/master` - `git diff --name-only public-gh/master...HEAD | grep '^pnpm-lock\.yaml$' || true` confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not in the PR diff. - Confirmed migration ordering: master ends at `0081_optimal_dormammu`; this PR adds `0082_dry_vision` and `0083_company_secret_provider_configs`. - Inspected migrations for repeat safety: new tables/indexes use `IF NOT EXISTS`; foreign keys are guarded by `DO $$ ... IF NOT EXISTS`; column additions use `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`. - `pnpm -r typecheck` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits. - `pnpm test:run` ran the full stable Vitest path before the Greptile follow-up commits; it completed with 3 timing-related failures under parallel load: `codex-local-execute.test.ts`, `cursor-local-execute.test.ts`, and `environment-service.test.ts`. - `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/codex-local-execute.test.ts src/__tests__/cursor-local-execute.test.ts src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` passed on targeted rerun (`24/24`). - `pnpm build` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits. Vite reported existing chunk-size/dynamic-import warnings. - After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`26/26`). - After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run src/__tests__/aws-secrets-manager-provider.test.ts src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`39/39`). - After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server typecheck` passed. - Captured Storybook screenshots from `ui/storybook-static` for visual review. - Latest PR checks on `5ca3a5cf`: `policy`, serialized server suites 1/4-4/4, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, `security/snyk`, and `Greptile Review` pass; aggregate `verify` is still registering the completed child checks. - Greptile review loop continued through the latest requested pass; all Greptile review threads are resolved and the latest `Greptile Review` check on `5ca3a5cf` passed with 0 comments added. ## Screenshots Before: the provider-vault and remote-import surfaces did not exist on `master`; these are after-state screenshots from the Storybook fixtures.    ## Risks - Migration risk: this adds new secret provider tables and extends existing secret rows. The migrations were checked for monotonic ordering and idempotent guards, but reviewers should still inspect upgrade behavior carefully. - Provider risk: AWS support uses direct SigV4 requests. Automated tests cover signing, request timeouts, vault-config selection, namespace guardrails, pending-version archival, sanitized provider errors, and service-level cleanup paths. A real-vault AWS smoke test remains deployment validation for an operator with AWS credentials rather than an unverified merge blocker in this local branch. - UI risk: the Secrets page and import dialog are large new surfaces; screenshots are included above for reviewer inspection. - Verification risk: the full local stable test command hit parallel-load timing failures, although the exact failed files passed when rerun directly. - Operational risk: remote import intentionally avoids plaintext reads; operators must understand that imported external references resolve at runtime and may fail if AWS permissions change. > For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`. ## Model Used - OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with local shell/tool use in the Paperclip worktree. Exact context-window size was not exposed by the runtime. ## Checklist - [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context to this change - [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability details) - [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate planned core work - [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass - [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable - [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after screenshots - [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes - [x] I have considered and documented any risks above - [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before requesting merge --------- Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing> Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
239 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
239 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript
/**
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* Plugin secrets host-side handler — resolves secret references through the
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* Paperclip secret provider system.
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*
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* When a plugin worker calls `ctx.secrets.resolve(secretRef)`, the JSON-RPC
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* request arrives at the host with `{ secretRef }`. This module provides the
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* concrete `HostServices.secrets` adapter that:
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*
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* 1. Parses the `secretRef` string to identify the secret.
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* 2. Looks up the secret record and its latest version in the database.
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* 3. Delegates to the configured `SecretProviderModule` to decrypt /
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* resolve the raw value.
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* 4. Returns the resolved plaintext value to the worker.
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*
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* ## Secret Reference Format
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*
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* A `secretRef` is a **secret UUID** — the primary key (`id`) of a row in
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* the `company_secrets` table. Operators place these UUIDs into plugin
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* config values; plugin workers resolve them at execution time via
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* `ctx.secrets.resolve(secretId)`.
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*
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* ## Security Invariants
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*
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* - Resolved values are **never** logged, persisted, or included in error
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* messages (per PLUGIN_SPEC.md §22).
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* - The handler is capability-gated: only plugins with `secrets.read-ref`
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* declared in their manifest may call it (enforced by `host-client-factory`).
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* - The host handler itself does not cache resolved values. Each call goes
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* through the secret provider to honour rotation.
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*
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* @see PLUGIN_SPEC.md §22 — Secrets
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* @see host-client-factory.ts — capability gating
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* @see services/secrets.ts — secretService used by agent env bindings
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*/
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import type { Db } from "@paperclipai/db";
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import {
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collectSecretRefPaths,
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isUuidSecretRef,
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readConfigValueAtPath,
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} from "./json-schema-secret-refs.js";
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export const PLUGIN_SECRET_REFS_DISABLED_MESSAGE =
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"Plugin secret references are disabled until company-scoped plugin config lands";
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Error helpers
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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function invalidSecretRef(secretRef: string): Error {
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const err = new Error(`Invalid secret reference: ${secretRef}`);
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err.name = "InvalidSecretRefError";
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return err;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Validation
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Extract secret reference UUIDs from a plugin's configJson, scoped to only
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* the fields annotated with `format: "secret-ref"` in the schema.
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*
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* When no schema is provided, falls back to collecting all UUID-shaped strings
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* (backwards-compatible for plugins without a declared instanceConfigSchema).
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*/
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export function extractSecretRefsFromConfig(
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configJson: unknown,
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schema?: Record<string, unknown> | null,
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): Set<string> {
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return new Set(extractSecretRefPathsFromConfig(configJson, schema).keys());
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}
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export function extractSecretRefPathsFromConfig(
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configJson: unknown,
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schema?: Record<string, unknown> | null,
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): Map<string, Set<string>> {
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const refs = new Map<string, Set<string>>();
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const addRef = (secretRef: string, path: string) => {
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const existing = refs.get(secretRef) ?? new Set<string>();
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existing.add(path);
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refs.set(secretRef, existing);
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};
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if (configJson == null || typeof configJson !== "object") return new Map();
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const secretPaths = collectSecretRefPaths(schema);
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// If schema declares secret-ref paths, extract only those values.
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if (secretPaths.size > 0) {
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for (const dotPath of secretPaths) {
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const current = readConfigValueAtPath(configJson as Record<string, unknown>, dotPath);
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if (typeof current === "string" && isUuidSecretRef(current)) {
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addRef(current, dotPath);
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}
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}
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return refs;
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}
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// Fallback: no schema or no secret-ref annotations — collect all UUIDs.
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// This preserves backwards compatibility for plugins that omit
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// instanceConfigSchema.
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function walkAll(value: unknown): void {
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if (typeof value === "string") {
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if (isUuidSecretRef(value)) addRef(value, "$");
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} else if (Array.isArray(value)) {
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for (const item of value) walkAll(item);
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} else if (value !== null && typeof value === "object") {
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for (const v of Object.values(value as Record<string, unknown>)) walkAll(v);
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}
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}
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walkAll(configJson);
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return refs;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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// Handler factory
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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/**
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* Input shape for the `secrets.resolve` handler.
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*
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* Matches `WorkerToHostMethods["secrets.resolve"][0]` from `protocol.ts`.
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*/
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export interface PluginSecretsResolveParams {
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/** The secret reference string (a secret UUID). */
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secretRef: string;
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}
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/**
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* Options for creating the plugin secrets handler.
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*/
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export interface PluginSecretsHandlerOptions {
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/** Database connection. */
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db: Db;
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/**
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* The plugin ID using this handler.
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* Used for logging context only; never included in error payloads
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* that reach the plugin worker.
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*/
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pluginId: string;
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}
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/**
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* The `HostServices.secrets` adapter for the plugin host-client factory.
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*/
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export interface PluginSecretsService {
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/**
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* Resolve a secret reference to its current plaintext value.
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*
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* @param params - Contains the `secretRef` (UUID of the secret)
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* @returns The resolved secret value
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* @throws {Error} If the secret is not found, has no versions, or
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* the provider fails to resolve
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*/
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resolve(params: PluginSecretsResolveParams): Promise<string>;
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}
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/**
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* Create a `HostServices.secrets` adapter for a specific plugin.
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*
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* The returned service looks up secrets by UUID, fetches the latest version
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* material, and delegates to the appropriate `SecretProviderModule` for
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* decryption.
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*
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* @example
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* ```ts
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* const secretsHandler = createPluginSecretsHandler({ db, pluginId });
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* const handlers = createHostClientHandlers({
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* pluginId,
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* capabilities: manifest.capabilities,
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* services: {
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* secrets: secretsHandler,
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* // ...
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* },
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* });
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* ```
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*
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* @param options - Database connection and plugin identity
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* @returns A `PluginSecretsService` suitable for `HostServices.secrets`
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*/
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/** Simple sliding-window rate limiter for secret resolution attempts. */
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function createRateLimiter(maxAttempts: number, windowMs: number) {
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const attempts = new Map<string, number[]>();
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return {
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check(key: string): boolean {
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const now = Date.now();
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const windowStart = now - windowMs;
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const existing = (attempts.get(key) ?? []).filter((ts) => ts > windowStart);
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if (existing.length >= maxAttempts) return false;
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existing.push(now);
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attempts.set(key, existing);
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return true;
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},
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};
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}
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export function createPluginSecretsHandler(
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options: PluginSecretsHandlerOptions,
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): PluginSecretsService {
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const { pluginId } = options;
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// Rate limit: max 30 resolution attempts per plugin per minute
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const rateLimiter = createRateLimiter(30, 60_000);
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return {
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async resolve(params: PluginSecretsResolveParams): Promise<string> {
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const { secretRef } = params;
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------
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// 0. Rate limiting — prevent brute-force UUID enumeration
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------
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if (!rateLimiter.check(pluginId)) {
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const err = new Error("Rate limit exceeded for secret resolution");
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err.name = "RateLimitExceededError";
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throw err;
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}
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------
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// 1. Validate the ref format
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// ---------------------------------------------------------------
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if (!secretRef || typeof secretRef !== "string" || secretRef.trim().length === 0) {
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throw invalidSecretRef(secretRef ?? "<empty>");
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}
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const trimmedRef = secretRef.trim();
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if (!isUuidSecretRef(trimmedRef)) {
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throw invalidSecretRef(trimmedRef);
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}
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// Fail closed until plugin config and worker runtime both carry an
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// explicit company scope for secret bindings and resolution.
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throw new Error(PLUGIN_SECRET_REFS_DISABLED_MESSAGE);
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},
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};
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}
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