Files
paperclip/cli/src/checks/secrets-check.ts
T
Dotta 778e775c35 Add secrets provider vaults and remote import (#5429)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI-agent companies and needs secrets handling
to work across local development, hosted operators, and governed agent
execution.
> - The affected subsystem is the company-scoped secrets control plane:
database schema, server services/routes, CLI workflows, and the Secrets
settings UI.
> - The gap was that secrets were local-only and operators could not
manage provider vaults or import existing remote references without
exposing plaintext.
> - This branch adds provider vault configuration plus an AWS Secrets
Manager remote-import path while preserving company boundaries, binding
context, and audit trails.
> - I kept the PR to a single branch PR, removed unrelated
lockfile/package drift, rebased the full branch onto the current
`public-gh/master`, and addressed fresh Greptile findings.
> - The benefit is a reviewable implementation of provider-backed
secrets with focused tests covering provider selection, import
conflicts, deleted secret reuse, rotation guards, and AWS signing
behavior.

## What Changed

- Added provider vault support for company secrets, including provider
config storage, default vault handling, health checks, binding usage,
access events, and remote import preview/commit.
- Added an AWS Secrets Manager provider using SigV4 request signing,
bounded request timeouts, namespace guardrails, cached runtime
credential resolution, and external-reference linking without plaintext
reads.
- Added Secrets UI surfaces for vault management and remote import, plus
CLI/API documentation for setup and operations.
- Stabilized routine webhook secret binding paths and SSH
environment-driver fixture bindings discovered during verification.
- Addressed Greptile and CI findings: no lockfile/package drift,
monotonic migration metadata, disabled-vault default races, soft-deleted
secret hiding/recreate behavior, remove behavior with disabled vaults,
soft-deleted external-reference re-import, non-active rotation guards,
managed-secret soft deletion through PATCH, and per-call AWS SDK
credential client churn.
- Rebased this branch onto `public-gh/master` at `0e1a5828` and
force-pushed with lease to keep this as the single PR for the branch.

## Verification

- `git fetch public-gh master`
- `git rebase public-gh/master`
- `git diff --name-only public-gh/master...HEAD | grep
'^pnpm-lock\.yaml$' || true` confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not in the PR
diff.
- Confirmed migration ordering: master ends at `0081_optimal_dormammu`;
this PR adds `0082_dry_vision` and
`0083_company_secret_provider_configs`.
- Inspected migrations for repeat safety: new tables/indexes use `IF NOT
EXISTS`; foreign keys are guarded by `DO $$ ... IF NOT EXISTS`; column
additions use `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits.
- `pnpm test:run` ran the full stable Vitest path before the Greptile
follow-up commits; it completed with 3 timing-related failures under
parallel load: `codex-local-execute.test.ts`,
`cursor-local-execute.test.ts`, and `environment-service.test.ts`.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/codex-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/cursor-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` passed on targeted rerun
(`24/24`).
- `pnpm build` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits. Vite
reported existing chunk-size/dynamic-import warnings.
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`26/26`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/aws-secrets-manager-provider.test.ts
src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`39/39`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
typecheck` passed.
- Captured Storybook screenshots from `ui/storybook-static` for visual
review.
- Latest PR checks on `5ca3a5cf`: `policy`, serialized server suites
1/4-4/4, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, `security/snyk`, and `Greptile Review`
pass; aggregate `verify` is still registering the completed child
checks.
- Greptile review loop continued through the latest requested pass; all
Greptile review threads are resolved and the latest `Greptile Review`
check on `5ca3a5cf` passed with 0 comments added.

## Screenshots

Before: the provider-vault and remote-import surfaces did not exist on
`master`; these are after-state screenshots from the Storybook fixtures.

![Secrets
inventory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secrets-inventory.png)

![Secret binding
picker](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secret-binding-picker.png)

![Environment editor with
secrets](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/env-editor-with-secrets.png)

## Risks

- Migration risk: this adds new secret provider tables and extends
existing secret rows. The migrations were checked for monotonic ordering
and idempotent guards, but reviewers should still inspect upgrade
behavior carefully.
- Provider risk: AWS support uses direct SigV4 requests. Automated tests
cover signing, request timeouts, vault-config selection, namespace
guardrails, pending-version archival, sanitized provider errors, and
service-level cleanup paths. A real-vault AWS smoke test remains
deployment validation for an operator with AWS credentials rather than
an unverified merge blocker in this local branch.
- UI risk: the Secrets page and import dialog are large new surfaces;
screenshots are included above for reviewer inspection.
- Verification risk: the full local stable test command hit
parallel-load timing failures, although the exact failed files passed
when rerun directly.
- Operational risk: remote import intentionally avoids plaintext reads;
operators must understand that imported external references resolve at
runtime and may fail if AWS permissions change.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with local shell/tool use in the
Paperclip worktree. Exact context-window size was not exposed by the
runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 18:22:17 -05:00

241 lines
8.1 KiB
TypeScript

import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import fs from "node:fs";
import path from "node:path";
import type { PaperclipConfig } from "../config/schema.js";
import type { CheckResult } from "./index.js";
import { resolveRuntimeLikePath } from "./path-resolver.js";
const AWS_CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_HINT =
"Provide AWS runtime credentials through the AWS SDK default credential chain: IAM role/workload identity, AWS_PROFILE/SSO/shared credentials, web identity, container/instance metadata, or short-lived shell credentials";
function decodeMasterKey(raw: string): Buffer | null {
const trimmed = raw.trim();
if (!trimmed) return null;
if (/^[A-Fa-f0-9]{64}$/.test(trimmed)) {
return Buffer.from(trimmed, "hex");
}
try {
const decoded = Buffer.from(trimmed, "base64");
if (decoded.length === 32) return decoded;
} catch {
// ignored
}
if (Buffer.byteLength(trimmed, "utf8") === 32) {
return Buffer.from(trimmed, "utf8");
}
return null;
}
function withStrictModeNote(
base: Pick<CheckResult, "name" | "status" | "message" | "canRepair" | "repair" | "repairHint">,
config: PaperclipConfig,
): CheckResult {
const strictModeDisabledInDeployedSetup =
config.database.mode === "postgres" && config.secrets.strictMode === false;
if (!strictModeDisabledInDeployedSetup) return base;
if (base.status === "fail") return base;
return {
...base,
status: "warn",
message: `${base.message}; strict secret mode is disabled for postgres deployment`,
repairHint: base.repairHint
? `${base.repairHint}. Consider enabling secrets.strictMode`
: "Consider enabling secrets.strictMode",
};
}
export function secretsCheck(config: PaperclipConfig, configPath?: string): CheckResult {
const provider = config.secrets.provider;
if (provider === "aws_secrets_manager") {
return withStrictModeNote(awsSecretsManagerCheck(), config);
}
if (provider !== "local_encrypted") {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "fail",
message: `${provider} is configured, but this build only supports local_encrypted and aws_secrets_manager`,
canRepair: false,
repairHint: "Run `paperclipai configure --section secrets` and choose local_encrypted or aws_secrets_manager",
};
}
const envMasterKey = process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY;
if (envMasterKey && envMasterKey.trim().length > 0) {
if (!decodeMasterKey(envMasterKey)) {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "fail",
message:
"PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY is invalid (expected 32-byte base64, 64-char hex, or raw 32-char string)",
canRepair: false,
repairHint: "Set PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY to a valid key or unset it to use a key file",
};
}
return withStrictModeNote(
{
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "pass",
message: "Local encrypted provider configured via PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY",
},
config,
);
}
const keyFileOverride = process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY_FILE;
const configuredPath =
keyFileOverride && keyFileOverride.trim().length > 0
? keyFileOverride.trim()
: config.secrets.localEncrypted.keyFilePath;
const keyFilePath = resolveRuntimeLikePath(configuredPath, configPath);
if (!fs.existsSync(keyFilePath)) {
return withStrictModeNote(
{
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "warn",
message: `Secrets key file does not exist yet: ${keyFilePath}`,
canRepair: true,
repair: () => {
fs.mkdirSync(path.dirname(keyFilePath), { recursive: true });
fs.writeFileSync(keyFilePath, randomBytes(32).toString("base64"), {
encoding: "utf8",
mode: 0o600,
});
try {
fs.chmodSync(keyFilePath, 0o600);
} catch {
// best effort
}
},
repairHint: "Run with --repair to create a local encrypted secrets key file",
},
config,
);
}
let raw: string;
try {
raw = fs.readFileSync(keyFilePath, "utf8");
} catch (err) {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "fail",
message: `Could not read secrets key file: ${err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err)}`,
canRepair: false,
repairHint: "Check file permissions or set PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_MASTER_KEY",
};
}
if (!decodeMasterKey(raw)) {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "fail",
message: `Invalid key material in ${keyFilePath}`,
canRepair: false,
repairHint: "Replace with valid key material or delete it and run doctor --repair",
};
}
const keyMode = fs.statSync(keyFilePath).mode & 0o777;
const permissionWarning =
(keyMode & 0o077) !== 0
? `; key file permissions are ${keyMode.toString(8)} (run chmod 600 ${keyFilePath})`
: "";
return withStrictModeNote(
{
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: permissionWarning ? "warn" : "pass",
message: `Local encrypted provider configured with key file ${keyFilePath}${permissionWarning}`,
repairHint: permissionWarning
? "Restrict the local encrypted secrets key file to owner read/write permissions"
: undefined,
},
config,
);
}
function awsSecretsManagerCheck(): CheckResult {
const missingConfig = missingAwsSecretsManagerConfig();
if (missingConfig.length > 0) {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "fail",
message: `AWS Secrets Manager provider is missing non-secret config: ${missingConfig.join(", ")}`,
canRepair: false,
repairHint:
`Set ${missingConfig.join(", ")} in the Paperclip server runtime. ${AWS_CREDENTIAL_SOURCE_HINT}. Do not store AWS root credentials or long-lived IAM user keys in Paperclip secrets.`,
};
}
const staticEnvCredentials =
process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID?.trim() && process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY?.trim();
const credentialSource = detectedAwsCredentialSources().join(", ");
const message =
`AWS Secrets Manager provider configured for deployment ${process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID}; ` +
`runtime credentials source: ${credentialSource || "AWS SDK default credential chain"}`;
if (staticEnvCredentials) {
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "warn",
message,
canRepair: false,
repairHint:
"AWS static environment credentials are visible. Use only short-lived shell credentials locally; prefer IAM role/workload identity for hosted deployments and never store AWS access keys in Paperclip company secrets.",
};
}
return {
name: "Secrets adapter",
status: "pass",
message,
};
}
function missingAwsSecretsManagerConfig(): string[] {
const missing: string[] = [];
if (
!(
process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION?.trim() ||
process.env.AWS_REGION?.trim() ||
process.env.AWS_DEFAULT_REGION?.trim()
)
) {
missing.push("PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION or AWS_REGION/AWS_DEFAULT_REGION");
}
if (!process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID?.trim()) {
missing.push("PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID");
}
if (!process.env.PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID?.trim()) {
missing.push("PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID");
}
return missing;
}
function detectedAwsCredentialSources(): string[] {
const sources: string[] = [];
if (process.env.AWS_PROFILE?.trim()) sources.push("AWS_PROFILE/shared config");
if (process.env.AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID?.trim() && process.env.AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY?.trim()) {
sources.push("temporary AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID/AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY environment credentials");
}
if (process.env.AWS_WEB_IDENTITY_TOKEN_FILE?.trim() && process.env.AWS_ROLE_ARN?.trim()) {
sources.push("AWS web identity token");
}
if (
process.env.AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_RELATIVE_URI?.trim() ||
process.env.AWS_CONTAINER_CREDENTIALS_FULL_URI?.trim()
) {
sources.push("AWS container credentials endpoint");
}
if (process.env.AWS_SHARED_CREDENTIALS_FILE?.trim() || process.env.AWS_CONFIG_FILE?.trim()) {
sources.push("custom AWS shared credentials/config file");
}
return sources;
}