GRO-2294: Route Optimization security hardening (geocode-batch limit cap + redact settings secret) (#193)
This commit was merged in pull request #193.
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@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ Geocoding turns a client's street address into `latitude`/`longitude` + `geocode
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| TC-API-2.11 | Geocode endpoint is manager-only | As **groomer** or **receptionist**, `POST /api/clients/{id}/geocode` | 403 Forbidden (role not permitted) |
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| TC-API-2.12 | Batch geocode un-geocoded clients | As manager, `POST /api/clients/geocode-batch?limit=10` on a DB with un-geocoded clients | 200 OK; body `{ provider, processed, geocoded, unresolved, errors, remaining, outcomes[] }`. `processed` ≤ 10; `remaining` reflects un-geocoded clients beyond this batch. Re-run while `remaining > 0` to finish (throttled to provider rate limit) |
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| TC-API-2.13 | Batch geocode — invalid limit | As manager, `POST /api/clients/geocode-batch?limit=0` (or non-numeric) | 400 `{ error: "limit must be a positive integer" }` |
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| TC-API-2.13a | Batch geocode — `?limit` cap enforced (GRO-2294) | As manager, `POST /api/clients/geocode-batch?limit=100000` on a DB with un-geocoded clients | 200 OK; the request is **clamped to the documented max of 500** — `processed` ≤ 500 (never the raw 100000). A fractional `?limit` (e.g. `49.9`) is floored to `49`. Confirms a manager cannot hold one synchronous request open / accrue unbounded Google API cost via an oversized limit |
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| TC-API-2.14 | Batch geocode — manager-only | As groomer/receptionist, `POST /api/clients/geocode-batch` | 403 Forbidden |
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| TC-API-2.15 | Auto-geocode on create | As manager/receptionist, `POST /api/clients` with a valid `address` | 201 Created; response includes a `geocoding` object (`status: "geocoded"` for a resolvable address) and the persisted client carries `latitude`/`longitude`/`geocodedAt`. Creating without an address succeeds with no `geocoding` field |
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| TC-API-2.16 | Auto-geocode on address update | As manager/receptionist, `PATCH /api/clients/{id}` changing `address` to a new valid value | 200 OK; response includes a `geocoding` object and refreshed coordinates. Patching unrelated fields (e.g. `name`) does NOT re-geocode (no `geocoding` field) |
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@@ -165,6 +166,8 @@ Geocoding turns a client's street address into `latitude`/`longitude` + `geocode
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| TC-API-3.19b | Get pet profile summary — customer cross-tenant blocked (GRO-2013) | Sign in as `uat-customer@groombook.dev`; reuse the customer's sessionId from TC-API-3.19a; `GET /api/pets/{otherClientPetId}/profile-summary` for a pet owned by a different client (`c0000002-...` or any non-customer pet) | 403 Forbidden (owner-bypass requires session.clientId === pet.clientId) |
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| TC-API-3.19c | Get pet profile summary — customer without portal session header | Same as TC-API-3.19a but omit the `X-Impersonation-Session-Id` header | 403 Forbidden (no owner-bypass without valid portal session) |
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| TC-API-3.19d | Get pet profile summary — owner-bypass writes audit row (GRO-2063) | Same setup as TC-API-3.19a (sign in as `uat-customer@groombook.dev`, establish a portal session for the customer's own clientId, call `GET /api/pets/{ownPetId}/profile-summary` with `X-Impersonation-Session-Id: {sessionId}` and a 200 OK response). Then call `GET /api/impersonation/sessions/{sessionId}/audit-log` and confirm there is exactly one entry with `action === "read_profile_summary"`, `pageVisited` matching the profile-summary path, and `metadata` containing `petId` and `actorStaffId` for the customer. Repeat TC-API-3.19b (cross-tenant attempt) and confirm NO new `read_profile_summary` row was written for the cross-tenant attempt. | 200 OK on the profile-summary call AND an audit log entry is present with the correct shape (defense-in-depth audit row; bypass attempts against other clients must NOT log) |
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| TC-UAT-2 | Groomer accesses linked pet profile summary (GRO-2100) | Sign in as `uat-groomer@groombook.dev`; `GET /api/pets/c0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000002/profile-summary` (UAT Pup Alpha — linked via deterministic completed appointment `a0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000001`, service `b0000001-…-0001` "Bath & Brush", `startTime` ~7 days ago) | 200 OK, `recentGroomingHistory[]` non-empty (>=1 entry), `visitCount >= 1`, `upcomingAppointment` null (the seeded appointment is in the past) |
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| TC-UAT-3 | Groomer blocked from unlinked pet profile summary (GRO-2100) | Sign in as `uat-groomer@groombook.dev`; `GET /api/pets/c0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000003/profile-summary` (UAT Pup Beta — intentionally UNLINKED; no appointment row references this pet's clientId+groomerId combo) | 403 Forbidden (RBAC `groomer` role lacks the appointment-linkage grant for this pet). NOTE: if 404 is returned instead of 403, file a separate RBAC defect (not against the seed) — see GRO-2100 verification note |
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| TC-API-3.29 | Get pet profile summary — unknown UUID returns 404 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/profile-summary while authenticated (any role) | 404 Not Found with body `{"error":"Not found"}` (was empty-body 500 in GRO-2014) |
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| TC-API-3.30 | Get pet profile summary — malformed UUID returns 404 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/not-a-uuid/profile-summary while authenticated | 404 Not Found with body `{"error":"Not found"}` (was empty-body 500 in GRO-2014 — Postgres uuid cast failure) |
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| TC-API-3.31 | Get pet profile summary — never empty-body 500 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/{anyId}/profile-summary across the test sweep | No response has status 500 with an empty body. Any 500 must include a JSON body `{"error":"Internal Server Error"}` |
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@@ -329,7 +332,7 @@ This means:
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| # | Scenario | Steps | Expected |
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|---|----------|-------|----------|
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| TC-API-13.1 | Get business settings | GET /api/admin/settings | 200 OK, business settings returned |
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| TC-API-13.1 | Get business settings | GET /api/admin/settings | 200 OK, business settings returned. Response body **must NOT include `googleMapsApiKey`** — the encrypted secret is redacted from the projection (GRO-2294, defense-in-depth); non-secret fields (`businessName`, colors, `routeOptimizationProvider`, etc.) are still present |
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| TC-API-13.2 | Update business settings | PATCH /api/admin/settings with updated values | 200 OK, settings updated |
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| TC-API-13.3 | Upload logo | POST /api/admin/settings/logo/upload with file | 200 OK, logo uploaded and stored |
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| TC-API-13.4 | View logo | GET /api/admin/settings/logo | 200 OK, logo image returned |
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