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api/src/__tests__/portalPets.test.ts
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fix(portal): drop writable photoKey from PATCH /portal/pets to close S3 key-hijack (GRO-2187 / GRO-2198)
Security gate FAIL (Barkley, CTO-ratified): the portal pet PATCH mapped
`body.photoUrl -> updateData.photoKey` with no validation. photoKey is a
trusted S3 object key consumed server-side by getPresignedGetUrl (read) and
deleteObject (destructive); the upload path (pets.ts) already guards keys with
a pets/{petId}/ prefix to prevent hijacking. The portal PATCH bypassed that
guard, letting an authenticated customer point their pet's photoKey at any
object key (cross-tenant disclosure/destruction on a later staff action).

Fix (per CTO directive — smallest safe surface):
- Remove `photoUrl` from portalPetUpdateSchema and delete the
  `updateData.photoKey = body.photoUrl` mapping. Photo changes already have a
  dedicated, key-validated flow (upload + /photo/confirm). The web form's
  round-trip of the GET-shaped photoUrl is a no-op (Zod strips the unknown key).
- LOW hardening: cap preferredCuts (string max 2000, array max 50),
  medicalAlerts (array max 50) and medicalAlert type/description (max 2000),
  mirroring the existing free-text max(2000) caps.

Tests:
- New regression: foreign photoUrl on portal PATCH returns 200 but leaves
  photoKey unchanged (gate evidence).
- New: over-long medicalAlert description rejected (400, zValidator).
- Updated the existing "persists mapped columns" test: photoKey is no longer
  written by the portal PATCH.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-08 12:36:56 +00:00

320 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
const CLIENT_ID = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440001";
const OTHER_CLIENT_ID = "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440099";
const PET_ID = "880e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440004";
const SESSION_ID = "770e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440003";
const futureDate = () => new Date(Date.now() + 30 * 60 * 1000);
const ACTIVE_SESSION = {
id: SESSION_ID,
clientId: CLIENT_ID,
status: "active" as const,
expiresAt: futureDate(),
createdAt: new Date(),
};
// A persisted pet owned by CLIENT_ID. weightKg is a string because the column is
// numeric (Drizzle serialises numeric to string).
const PET = {
id: PET_ID,
clientId: CLIENT_ID,
name: "Rex",
species: "dog",
breed: "Labrador",
weightKg: "12.50",
dateOfBirth: null,
healthAlerts: null,
groomingNotes: null,
coatType: null,
petSizeCategory: null,
preferredCuts: [],
medicalAlerts: [],
photoKey: null,
};
let selectSessionRow: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let selectPetRow: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let updatedValues: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
function resetMock() {
selectSessionRow = null;
selectPetRow = null;
updatedValues = [];
}
vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
function makeChainable(data: unknown[]): unknown {
const arr = [...data];
const chain = new Proxy(arr, {
get(target, prop) {
if (prop === "where" || prop === "orderBy" || prop === "limit") {
return () => chain;
}
// @ts-expect-error proxy
return target[prop];
},
});
return chain;
}
function tableProxy(name: string) {
return new Proxy(
{ _name: name },
{ get: (t, p) => (p === "_name" ? name : { table: name, column: p }) }
);
}
const impersonationSessions = tableProxy("impersonationSessions");
const pets = tableProxy("pets");
return {
getDb: () => ({
select: () => ({
from: (table: { _name: string }) => {
if (table._name === "impersonationSessions") {
return makeChainable(selectSessionRow ? [selectSessionRow] : []);
}
if (table._name === "pets") {
return makeChainable(selectPetRow ? [selectPetRow] : []);
}
return makeChainable([]);
},
}),
update: () => ({
set: (vals: Record<string, unknown>) => ({
where: () => ({
returning: () => {
if (selectPetRow) {
updatedValues.push(vals);
return [{ ...selectPetRow, ...vals }];
}
return [];
},
}),
}),
}),
// portalAudit inserts an audit row after the handler; make it a no-op so
// the middleware does not log a swallowed error during tests.
insert: () => ({ values: () => ({ returning: () => [] }) }),
}),
impersonationSessions,
pets,
// Other tables imported by the portal router but unused in these tests.
appointments: tableProxy("appointments"),
waitlistEntries: tableProxy("waitlistEntries"),
clients: tableProxy("clients"),
services: tableProxy("services"),
staff: tableProxy("staff"),
invoices: tableProxy("invoices"),
invoiceLineItems: tableProxy("invoiceLineItems"),
impersonationAuditLogs: tableProxy("impersonationAuditLogs"),
eq: vi.fn(),
and: vi.fn(),
inArray: vi.fn(),
};
});
const { portalRouter } = await import("../routes/portal.js");
const app = new Hono();
app.route("/portal", portalRouter);
function jsonPatch(path: string, body: unknown, headers?: Record<string, string>) {
return app.request(path, {
method: "PATCH",
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
...headers,
},
body: JSON.stringify(body),
});
}
beforeEach(() => resetMock());
describe("PATCH /portal/pets/:petId", () => {
it("updates an owned pet and persists the mapped columns (200)", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
// Mirrors the groombook/web PetForm payload: it spreads the GET-shaped pet
// (weight, notes, birthDate, photoUrl) and adds the form's edited keys
// (weightKg, healthAlerts, coatType, …). "xlarge" must map to "extra_large".
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{
id: PET_ID,
name: "Rex Updated",
breed: "Golden Retriever",
weight: "12.50",
weightKg: 18.25,
notes: "old grooming notes",
healthAlerts: "Allergic to oatmeal shampoo",
photoUrl: "pets/rex.jpg",
coatType: "double",
petSizeCategory: "xlarge",
preferredCuts: ["teddy bear", "puppy cut"],
medicalAlerts: [
{ id: "a1", type: "allergy", description: "oatmeal", severity: "medium" },
],
},
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.name).toBe("Rex Updated");
expect(body.petSizeCategory).toBe("extra_large");
expect(body.coatType).toBe("double");
const persisted = updatedValues[0]!;
expect(persisted.name).toBe("Rex Updated");
expect(persisted.breed).toBe("Golden Retriever");
// weightKg (form key) wins over weight (GET key) and is stored as a string.
expect(persisted.weightKg).toBe("18.25");
expect(persisted.groomingNotes).toBe("old grooming notes");
expect(persisted.healthAlerts).toBe("Allergic to oatmeal shampoo");
// photoKey is NOT writable via portal PATCH (GRO-2187 S3 key-hijack fix):
// the web form round-trips the GET-shaped photoUrl, but the server must not
// persist it. Photo changes go through the key-validated upload flow.
expect(persisted.photoKey).toBeUndefined();
expect(persisted.coatType).toBe("double");
expect(persisted.petSizeCategory).toBe("extra_large");
expect(persisted.preferredCuts).toEqual(["teddy bear", "puppy cut"]);
expect(persisted.medicalAlerts).toEqual([
{ id: "a1", type: "allergy", description: "oatmeal", severity: "medium" },
]);
expect(persisted.updatedAt).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
});
// GRO-2187 security regression: a portal customer must not be able to set the
// S3 object key. photoKey is consumed server-side by getPresignedGetUrl /
// deleteObject; the upload path guards keys with a pets/{petId}/ prefix, and the
// portal PATCH must not offer a bypass. A foreign/arbitrary photoUrl is accepted
// (Zod strips the unknown key) but must leave photoKey untouched.
it("does not mutate photoKey when a foreign photoUrl is supplied (200)", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
const ownKey = `pets/${PET_ID}/original.jpg`;
selectPetRow = { ...PET, photoKey: ownKey };
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{
name: "Rex",
// attacker-chosen key pointing at another tenant's object
photoUrl: "pets/00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000000000ff/victim-secret.jpg",
},
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const persisted = updatedValues[0]!;
// The attacker-supplied key never reaches the update payload.
expect(persisted.photoKey).toBeUndefined();
// And the stored key is unchanged from the pet's own value.
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.photoUrl).toBe(ownKey);
});
// The length/array caps live in the Zod schema, so violations are rejected by
// zValidator with 400 (in-handler enum checks are what return 422).
it("returns 400 when a medicalAlert description exceeds the length cap", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{
medicalAlerts: [
{ type: "allergy", description: "x".repeat(2001), severity: "low" },
],
},
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
expect(updatedValues).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("falls back to the weight key when weightKg is absent", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{ weight: "9.75" },
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(updatedValues[0]!.weightKg).toBe("9.75");
});
it("returns 403 when the pet belongs to a different client", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = { ...PET, clientId: OTHER_CLIENT_ID };
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{ name: "Hacker" },
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
expect(updatedValues).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("returns 404 when the pet does not exist", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = null;
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{ name: "Ghost" },
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(404);
});
it("returns 422 for an invalid coatType", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{ coatType: "fluffy" },
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(422);
expect(updatedValues).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("returns 422 for an invalid petSizeCategory", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
const res = await jsonPatch(
`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
{ petSizeCategory: "gigantic" },
{ "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
);
expect(res.status).toBe(422);
expect(updatedValues).toHaveLength(0);
});
it("returns 401 without an impersonation session header", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectPetRow = PET;
const res = await jsonPatch(`/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`, { name: "NoAuth" });
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
});
});