feat(skills): align with cross-org review

- safety: drop tools section (moved to sdlc), add explicit kubectl-prod
  ban, add no-tofu-direct rule, drop the merge-gate cross-reference into
  a separate bullet
- sdlc: add Phase 0 product-analysis intake (CMPO Pawla as gate); add
  scheduled penetration testing program (Barkley owns); standardize
  authentication to Better-Auth + Google + Apple + Authentik; add
  canonical tools section (moved from safety) including ghcr.io/groombook
  registry standard; reorganize PR review sections to match the cross-org
  pattern (named SDLC pipeline phases)

skills/safety/SKILL.md

@@ -2,9 +2,8 @@
 name: safety
 description: >
   Non-negotiable safety rules for all GroomBook agents. Covers secret handling,
-  destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, the tools we use vs.
+  destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, kubectl scope limits,
-  the ones we don't, and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is
+  and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is uncertain.
-  uncertain.
 ---
 
 # Safety
@@ -19,19 +18,13 @@ The following rules apply to every GroomBook agent without exception.
 
 * **Never commit plaintext secrets.** Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (`kubeseal`). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded in source.
 
-* **Never use `kubectl create secret` in production.** The `groombook` and `groombook-uat` namespaces are Flux-managed. Secret changes go through the SealedSecrets workflow, committed to `groombook/infra`. The `groombook-dev` namespace permits direct kubectl use for iteration but secrets there should also follow the same pattern when they reflect anything sensitive.
+* **Never `kubectl apply` against production (`groombook`).** The production namespace is Flux-managed. Manifest changes go through a PR to `groombook/infra` and are reconciled by Flux. The `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat` namespaces permit direct kubectl use for iteration; secrets at every environment still follow the SealedSecrets pattern.
+
+* **Never `kubectl create secret` in production.** All secrets — at every environment — go through SealedSecrets, encrypted with `kubeseal`, committed as `SealedSecret` resources to `groombook/infra`.
 
 * **Never bypass the merge gate.** No self-merging PRs. No pushing directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`. Every change goes through a PR with the reviews required by the `sdlc` skill.
 
-## Tools (canonical, not alternatives)
+* **Never run `tofu` directly.** Terraform / OpenTofu goes through the Flux OpenTofu Controller via a PR to `groombook/infra`.
-
-* **Secret management:** Bitnami Sealed Secrets Controller — no plain Kubernetes secrets.
-* **Database:** CloudNativePG Operator (Postgres) — no SQLite, MariaDB, or MySQL.
-* **Cache / pub-sub:** DragonflyDB Operator — no Redis.
-* **Dependency updates:** Mend Renovate — no Dependabot.
-* **Container registry:** `ghcr.io` — no Docker Hub for first-party images.
-
-If a task requires deviating from any of the above, treat it as a destructive action: stop, file an issue with rationale, request board approval.
 
 ## If you are unsure
 

skills/sdlc/SKILL.md

@@ -2,10 +2,11 @@
 name: sdlc
 description: >
   Software development lifecycle for GroomBook. Covers GitHub authentication,
-  branch strategy across Dev/UAT/Prod, PR review and merge policy, the SDLC
+  branch strategy across Dev/UAT/Prod, the four-phase SDLC pipeline with
-  pipeline and stage handoffs, status semantics, infrastructure layout, the
+  product analysis intake, PR review and merge policy, the handoff protocol,
-  GitHub-origin issue board-approval gate, and the cc-cpfarhood visibility
+  status semantics, infrastructure layout, the canonical tools list, the
-  rule.
+  GitHub-origin issue board-approval gate, the cc-cpfarhood visibility rule,
+  and the scheduled penetration testing program.
 ---
 
 # Software Development Lifecycle
@@ -14,6 +15,8 @@ description: >
 
 **Invoke the `github-app-token` skill** before any GitHub operation. It generates a short-lived installation token and sets `GH_TOKEN`. **Never** run `gh auth login` — it hangs headless agents. Token expires after ~1 hour; re-invoke to regenerate.
 
+GitHub is the **primary source of truth**. Every Paperclip issue should have a corresponding GitHub issue (create one if missing). Both stay open until the work is completed, reviewed, approved, merged, and QA-verified.
+
 ## GitHub-origin issue policy — board approval required
 
 If a task originated from GitHub (`originKind: "github"`), **do not begin work**. Immediately create a board approval:
@@ -41,77 +44,85 @@ Three long-lived branches map to the three deployment environments:
 
 | Branch | Environment | Who merges |
 |--------|-------------|-----------|
-| `dev`  | Dev         | CTO (after QA + CTO approval) |
+| `dev`  | Dev         | CTO (after QA approval)            |
-| `uat`  | UAT         | CTO (promotes `dev` → `uat`)  |
+| `uat`  | UAT         | CTO (promotes `dev` → `uat`)        |
-| `main` | Production  | CEO (promotes `uat` → `main`) |
+| `main` | Production  | CEO (promotes `uat` → `main`)       |
 
-**Engineers always target `dev`** — never `uat` or `main` directly.
+**Engineers always target `dev`** — never `uat` or `main` directly. Feature branches: `<agent-name>/<short-description>`.
 
 ## Pull requests
 
 All changes happen via pull request. Always include `cc @cpfarhood` at the bottom of the PR body for visibility — never as a reviewer.
 
 ```bash
-gh pr create --title "..." --body "... cc @cpfarhood"
+gh pr create --base dev --title "..." --body "... cc @cpfarhood"
 ```
 
 ## PR review & merge policy
 
 ### Dev branch (`dev`)
 
-Requires **2 approving GitHub reviews** before merge:
+- **QA** (Lint Roller) reviews the PR. Approve → hand to CTO. Fail → back to engineer directly with exact details.
-
+- **CTO** (The Dogfather) reviews. Approve → CTO merges the `dev` PR. Fail → back to engineer.
-1. **QA** (Lint Roller) — code review, CI signal, test coverage
-2. **CTO** (The Dogfather) — architecture, security, correctness
-
-CTO review requires QA approval as a precondition.
 
 ### UAT branch (`uat`)
 
-Requires **1 approving GitHub review** before merge:
+- **CTO** opens and merges a `dev` → `uat` PR.
-
-* **CTO** (The Dogfather) — promotes `dev` → `uat`
 
 ### Main branch (`main`)
 
-Requires **1 approving GitHub review** before merge:
+- **CEO** (Scrubs McBarkley) reviews and merges the `uat` → `main` PR.
-
-* **CEO** (Scrubs McBarkley) — promotes `uat` → `main`
 
 `@cpfarhood` is cc'd for visibility on all PRs — never as a reviewer.
 
-## Pipeline
+## SDLC pipeline
 
-```
+### Phase 0 — Product analysis (feature intake)
-Dev stage:   Engineer → QA Review → CTO Review → CTO merges PR to dev → [auto deploy Dev]
-UAT stage:   CTO opens dev→uat PR → Shedward (regression) → Barkley (security) → CEO assigned
-Prod stage:  CEO merges uat→main PR → [auto deploy Production]
-```
 
-### Dev stage
+* Feature requests arrive at the CEO via Paperclip or GitHub Issues.
+* CEO delegates to CMPO (Pawla Abdul) for review.
+* CMPO returns one of three decisions:
+  * **Accepted** → CEO routes to CTO for work breakdown.
+  * **Backlogged** → CEO handles prioritization.
+  * **Denied** → CEO closes as unplanned.
+* CTO breaks accepted work into atomic tasks and assigns to Engineering.
 
-1. Engineer creates a PR targeting `dev`, hands off to QA (Lint Roller) with `status: "todo"`.
+### Phase 1 — Dev
-2. QA reviews code and CI. Pass → hand to CTO. Fail → hand back to engineer directly with exact failure details.
-3. CTO reviews. Approve → merge PR into `dev` (auto-deploys to Dev). Deny → hand back to engineer.
 
-### UAT stage
+1. **Engineer** (Flea Flicker) branches from `dev`, writes code. GitOps deploys to dev on demand.
+2. **Engineer** opens a PR against `dev`. CI must pass.
+3. **QA (Lint Roller)** reviews the PR. Fail → back to engineer.
+4. QA approves and hands off to CTO.
+5. **CTO (The Dogfather)** reviews the PR. Fail → back to engineer.
+6. **CTO** merges the dev PR.
+7. **CI** builds and deploys automatically to Dev (`https://dev.groombook.dev`).
 
-4. CTO opens a PR from `dev` → `uat` to promote the change, assigns Shedward Scissorhands for regression: `status: "todo"`.
+### Phase 2 — UAT promotion
-5. Shedward runs UAT in `uat.groombook.dev`. Pass → reports to CTO. Fail → reports to CTO (CTO cascades to engineer).
-6. CTO assigns Barkley Trimsworth for security review: `status: "todo"`.
-7. Barkley reviews. Pass → CTO assigns to CEO. Fail → CTO cascades to engineer.
 
-### Prod stage
+8. **CTO** opens and merges a PR from `dev` to `uat`.
+9. **CI** builds and deploys automatically to UAT (`https://uat.groombook.dev`).
+10. **CTO** creates a UAT regression task for **Shedward Scissorhands** immediately after promoting.
 
-8. CEO reviews and merges the `uat` → `main` PR → auto-deploys to Production.
+### Phase 3 — UAT testing & security
-9. CEO rejects → returns to CTO → engineer.
+
+11. **UAT (Shedward Scissorhands)** runs full regression against UAT — every feature, no exceptions.
+12. UAT fail → CTO redistributes to engineer (return to Phase 1).
+13. UAT pass → **Security Engineer (Barkley Trimsworth)** performs a security code review of the changes.
+14. Security fail → CTO redistributes to engineer (return to Phase 1).
+
+### Phase 4 — Production
+
+15. Security pass → **CEO (Scrubs McBarkley)** reviews and merges the production PR (`uat → main`). Fail → back to CTO.
+16. **CI** deploys automatically to Production (`https://demo.groombook.dev`).
 
 ### Hierarchy rules
 
-* CTO rejections go directly to the engineer (not through QA).
+* CTO rejections at Dev go directly to the engineer (not back through QA).
-* Shedward UAT failures go to CTO (not directly to the engineer).
+* UAT failures (Shedward) go to CTO — CTO cascades to engineer.
-* Barkley security failures go to CTO.
+* Security failures (Barkley) go to CTO — CTO cascades to engineer.
-* CEO rejections go to CTO.
+* CEO rejections at Prod go to CTO.
+
+> **Penetration testing.** Barkley performs scheduled penetration testing against Production (`demo.groombook.dev`) and Demo independently of the PR workflow. Board-authorized; not triggered per-PR. Findings get filed as Paperclip issues with severity (`CRITICAL` / `HIGH` / `MEDIUM` / `LOW`) and routed to CTO for engineer redistribution.
 
 ## Handoff protocol — mandatory
 
@@ -119,11 +130,11 @@ Every handoff to another agent requires ALL THREE steps:
 
 ### 1. Explicit assignment
 
-PATCH the issue with `assigneeAgentId: "<target-agent-uuid>"`. Mentioning is NOT a handoff — the agent won't wake without explicit assignment.
+`PATCH /api/issues/{id}` with `assigneeAgentId: "<target-agent-uuid>"`. Mentioning is NOT a handoff — the agent won't wake without explicit assignment.
 
 ### 2. Status = `todo`
 
-Every handoff sets `status: "todo"`. Never `in_review` for handoffs — it doesn't surface in the receiver's inbox.
+Every handoff sets `status: "todo"`. Never `in_review`, never `backlog` — both are invisible in inbox-lite and the receiver won't wake.
 
 ### 3. Release checkout
 
@@ -134,22 +145,70 @@ Headers: Authorization: Bearer $PAPERCLIP_API_KEY, X-Paperclip-Run-Id: $PAPERCLI
 
 Without this release, the receiving agent cannot check out the issue.
 
+**Saying you are reassigning a task is NOT the same as reassigning it.** Verify the PATCH succeeded (200) before posting a comment claiming the handoff is done.
+
 ## Infrastructure
 
 * **Production / Demo:** namespace `groombook`, FQDN `demo.groombook.dev`
 * **UAT:** namespace `groombook-uat`, FQDN `uat.groombook.dev`
 * **Dev:** namespace `groombook-dev`, FQDN `dev.groombook.dev`
-* **Auth:** Better-Auth + OAuth2 via Authentik OIDC at `https://auth.farh.net` (credentials in `authentik-credentials` secret)
+* **Cluster:** Kubernetes — cluster-wide read; read/write on `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat`; read-only on `groombook` (production).
-* **Cluster:** Kubernetes — cluster-wide read; read/write on `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat`.
+* **Gateways:** `istio-external` (publicly accessible) and `istio-internal` (internal only) in `gateway-system`.
-* **Gateways:** `istio-external` and `istio-internal` in `gateway-system`.
+* **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>` only.
-* **Deployment:** 2-stage Flux GitOps — CI builds images → updates tags in `groombook/infra` → Flux applies. Never `kubectl apply` for app manifests. No Flux Image Automation.
+
-* **Infra provisioning:** Commit OpenTofu HCL to `groombook/infra`. Never run `tofu` directly.
+## Authentication
-* **Dependency updates:** Mend Renovate only. Never Dependabot.
+
+* **Framework:** Better-Auth.
+* **Social login:** Google and Apple OAuth.
+* **SSO:** Authentik OIDC at `https://auth.farh.net` (credentials in `authentik-credentials` secret).
+* **Never build custom authentication.**
+
+## Deployment — 2-stage Flux GitOps
+
+**Stage 1 — CI (GitHub Actions, runs in each application repo):**
+- Triggered automatically on every merge to `main`
+- Builds and tags the Docker image
+- Pushes tagged images to `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>`
+
+**Stage 2 — GitOps (Flux, managed externally):**
+- Flux watches `groombook/infra` as the **target** GitRepository — it is **not** a Flux bootstrap/cluster repo.
+- Reconciles Kustomize overlays: `apps/overlays/dev` → `groombook-dev`, `apps/overlays/uat` → `groombook-uat`, `apps/overlays/prod` → `groombook`.
+
+**Policy — Flux Image Tag Automation is DENIED.** Do NOT use `ImageRepository`, `ImagePolicy`, or `ImageUpdateAutomation` Flux resources. Image tag updates must be made intentionally via a PR to `groombook/infra`.
+
+**To deploy a change:**
+1. Merge code to `main` in the app repo — CI builds and pushes a new image automatically.
+2. Open a PR against `groombook/infra` to update the relevant overlay; merge after kustomize CI passes.
+3. Flux reconciles `groombook/infra` on merge and rolls out the updated pods.
+
+**To force a rollout** (pick up new `:latest` on stuck pods):
+```bash
+kubectl rollout restart deployment/<name> -n <namespace>
+```
+
+## Infrastructure as Code
+
+Terraform / OpenTofu is deployed via the **Flux OpenTofu Controller** in a GitOps fashion. Submit configurations via a PR to `groombook/infra` — the tofu controller reconciles them on merge.
+
+**Never run `tofu` directly.** Never `kubectl apply` against production. Production changes go through Flux only.
+
+## Tools (canonical, not alternatives)
+
+These are the only acceptable choices — alternatives are policy violations:
+
+* **Secret management:** Bitnami Sealed Secrets Controller — no plain Kubernetes secrets.
+* **Database:** CloudNativePG Operator (Postgres) — no SQLite, MariaDB, or MySQL.
+* **Cache / pub-sub:** DragonflyDB Operator — no Redis.
+* **Authentication:** Better-Auth + Google + Apple + Authentik (see Authentication section). Never build custom auth.
+* **Dependency updates:** Mend Renovate. **Dependabot is not used and will not be used.**
+* **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>` — no Docker Hub for first-party images.
+
+If a task requires deviating from any of the above, treat it as a destructive action: stop, file an issue with rationale, request board approval.
 
 ## External communication
 
-When communicating in any context visible outside the GroomBook agent team (external users, human reviewers, non-agent entities), include `cc @cpfarhood` for visibility.
+When communicating in any context visible outside the GroomBook agent team (external users, human reviewers, non-agent entities), include `cc @cpfarhood` for visibility — never as a reviewer.
 
 ## No self-merge
 
-No agent merges their own PR. The merger is always the next role up the SDLC ladder (CTO for `dev`/`uat`, CEO for `main`).
+No agent merges their own PR. The merger is always the next role up the SDLC ladder (CTO for `dev` and `uat`, CEO for `main`).