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Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris Farhood 613f570bdc Implement two-pipeline PR review system
Add Pipeline A (user-facing features) and Pipeline B (infrastructure-only) to eliminate unnecessary UAT delays for non-UI changes.

Pipeline A: CI → UAT → QA → CTO → merge (for plugin code)
Pipeline B: CI → QA → CTO → merge (for .github, infra, org, templates)

Detection rule: If PR only changes .github/, infra/, org/ → Pipeline B, skip Patty's UAT review.
This frees Patty to focus on plugin E2E testing and unblocks the infra queue immediately.

Unblocks stalled issues like PRI-486 (kustomize fix, 2h+ stalled waiting for unnecessary UAT).

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-05-06 13:50:28 +00:00
Chris Farhood 12ccf82454 Revise PR review SLA: remove threat language, focus on visibility and process
Replace dismissal-threat framing with operational consequences:
- 24h: public visibility + status flag
- 48h: merge queue block + escalation
- 72h+: blocks release if critical-path
- Exceptions: documented hand-off, not absolute prohibition

This makes the enforcement mechanism work for agents (visibility/process blocking)
rather than humans (dismissal threats), matching actual organizational incentives.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Haiku 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-05 10:53:13 +00:00
14 changed files with 279 additions and 644 deletions
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ghs_n2DXnoj38RccFYNlzH18XQ739bhr8e2w4BZK
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# The current version of the config schema
version: 1
# What protocol to use when performing git operations. Supported values: ssh, https
git_protocol: https
# What editor gh should run when creating issues, pull requests, etc. If blank, will refer to environment.
editor:
# When to interactively prompt. This is a global config that cannot be overridden by hostname. Supported values: enabled, disabled
prompt: enabled
# A pager program to send command output to, e.g. "less". If blank, will refer to environment. Set the value to "cat" to disable the pager.
pager:
# Aliases allow you to create nicknames for gh commands
aliases:
co: pr checkout
# The path to a unix socket through which send HTTP connections. If blank, HTTP traffic will be handled by net/http.DefaultTransport.
http_unix_socket:
# What web browser gh should use when opening URLs. If blank, will refer to environment.
browser:
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github.com:
users:
privilegedescalation-engineer[bot]:
oauth_token: ghs_n2DXnoj38RccFYNlzH18XQ739bhr8e2w4BZK
privilegedescalation-ceo[bot]:
oauth_token: ghs_K7fsAgb8nVATb7zFV5VoZLUaRExyOX3uPkn3
privilegedescalation-cto[bot]:
oauth_token: ghs_OK6yqSB45aMkas1g5zgJKEgh2CoVH42JLuwu
privilegedescalation-qa[bot]:
oauth_token: ghs_ppIO9dekMz5A5uAqCPERzj5bk9jBHU2Bf0sL
user: privilegedescalation-engineer[bot]
oauth_token: ghs_n2DXnoj38RccFYNlzH18XQ739bhr8e2w4BZK
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name: Plugin Release
on:
workflow_call:
inputs:
version:
description: 'Release version (e.g. 1.0.0)'
required: true
type: string
node-version:
description: 'Node.js version to use'
required: false
type: string
default: '22'
upstream-repo:
description: 'Upstream repo to fetch appVersion from (e.g. fenio/tns-csi). Leave empty to skip.'
required: false
type: string
default: ''
secrets:
RELEASE_APP_ID:
description: 'GitHub App ID for creating PRs (org blocks GITHUB_TOKEN from creating PRs)'
required: true
RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY:
description: 'GitHub App private key (PEM format)'
required: true
permissions:
contents: write
pull-requests: write
concurrency:
group: release
cancel-in-progress: false
jobs:
check-secrets:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
ready: ${{ steps.check.outputs.ready }}
steps:
- name: Verify RELEASE_APP_ID is configured
id: check
env:
RELEASE_APP_ID: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
run: |
if [ -z "$RELEASE_APP_ID" ]; then
echo "::notice::RELEASE_APP_ID org secret is not configured (see PRI-380). Release skipped — no artifacts will be created."
echo "ready=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
echo "ready=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
ci:
needs: check-secrets
if: needs.check-secrets.outputs.ready == 'true'
uses: ./.github/workflows/plugin-ci.yaml
with:
node-version: ${{ inputs.node-version }}
check-token-permissions:
needs: check-secrets
if: needs.check-secrets.outputs.ready == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
has_write: ${{ steps.check.outputs.has_write }}
steps:
- name: Generate GitHub App token
id: app-token
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
with:
app-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
- name: Check write permissions via API
id: check
run: |
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}" \
-H "Accept: application/vnd.github+json" \
"https://api.github.com/repos/${{ github.repository }}/git/refs" \
-d '{"ref":"refs/heads/_release_check","sha":"${{ github.sha }}"}')
if [ "$HTTP_CODE" = "201" ]; then
echo "::notice::Token has write permission — cleaning up test ref."
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-X DELETE \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}" \
"https://api.github.com/repos/${{ github.repository }}/git/refs/heads/_release_check"
echo "has_write=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
elif [ "$HTTP_CODE" = "403" ]; then
echo "::error::Token lacks write permission. Release cannot push tags or branches."
echo "has_write=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
exit 1
else
echo "::warning::Unexpected response ($HTTP_CODE) when checking write permission."
echo "has_write=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
exit 1
fi
check-tag:
needs: check-secrets
if: needs.check-secrets.outputs.ready == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
skip: ${{ steps.check.outputs.skip }}
steps:
- name: Check if tag already exists
id: check
run: |
HTTP_CODE=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer ${{ github.token }}" \
"https://api.github.com/repos/${{ github.repository }}/git/refs/tags/v${{ inputs.version }}")
if [ "$HTTP_CODE" = "200" ]; then
echo "::notice::Tag v${{ inputs.version }} already exists. Release skipped (not an error)."
echo "skip=true" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
echo "skip=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
release:
needs: [ci, check-tag, check-secrets, check-token-permissions]
if: needs.check-secrets.outputs.ready == 'true' && needs.check-tag.outputs.skip != 'true' && needs.check-token-permissions.outputs.has_write == 'true'
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
steps:
- name: Validate version format
run: |
if [[ ! "${{ inputs.version }}" =~ ^[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "Error: Version must be in X.Y.Z format"
exit 1
fi
- name: Checkout
uses: actions/checkout@v6
with:
fetch-depth: 0
- name: Detect package manager
id: pkg-manager
run: |
if [ -f "pnpm-lock.yaml" ]; then
echo "manager=pnpm" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "lockfile=pnpm-lock.yaml" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
# Check for packageManager field in package.json (Corepack pinning).
# pnpm/action-setup@v5 errors when packageManager is absent and no version
# is specified, so use Corepack for repos that have the field pinned and
# fall back to pnpm/action-setup with version: latest for repos that don't.
PM=$(python3 -c "import json,sys; d=json.load(open('package.json')); print('true' if d.get('packageManager','').startswith('pnpm@') else 'false')" 2>/dev/null || echo "false")
echo "has_package_manager=$PM" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
else
echo "manager=npm" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "lockfile=package-lock.json" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
echo "has_package_manager=false" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
fi
- name: Setup Node
uses: actions/setup-node@v6
with:
node-version: ${{ inputs.node-version }}
# Only enable built-in npm caching here; pnpm caching is handled below
# after pnpm is installed (corepack is not available before setup-node).
cache: ${{ steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager == 'npm' && 'npm' || '' }}
- name: Setup pnpm (via Corepack, reads version from packageManager field)
if: steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager == 'pnpm' && steps.pkg-manager.outputs.has_package_manager == 'true'
run: |
npm install -g corepack
corepack enable pnpm
corepack install
- name: Setup pnpm (version latest)
if: steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager == 'pnpm' && steps.pkg-manager.outputs.has_package_manager == 'false'
uses: pnpm/action-setup@v5
with:
run_install: false
version: latest
- name: Get pnpm store directory
id: pnpm-store
if: steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager == 'pnpm'
run: echo "dir=$(pnpm store path --silent)" >> $GITHUB_OUTPUT
- name: Cache pnpm store
if: steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager == 'pnpm'
uses: actions/cache@v5
with:
path: ${{ steps.pnpm-store.outputs.dir }}
key: ${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-${{ hashFiles('**/pnpm-lock.yaml') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-pnpm-
- name: Configure Git
run: |
git config --global user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git config --global user.email "github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git config --global --add safe.directory "$GITHUB_WORKSPACE"
- name: Update version in package.json
run: |
if [ "${{ steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager }}" = "pnpm" ]; then
pnpm version ${{ inputs.version }} --no-git-tag-version --allow-same-version
else
npm version ${{ inputs.version }} --no-git-tag-version --allow-same-version
fi
- name: Update artifacthub-pkg.yml
run: |
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
if [ -f artifacthub-pkg.yml ]; then
PKG_NAME=$(grep '^name:' artifacthub-pkg.yml | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d ' "')
else
PKG_NAME=$(jq -r .name package.json | sed 's|^@[^/]*/||')
fi
RELEASE_URL="https://github.com/${{ github.repository }}/releases/download/v${VERSION}/${PKG_NAME}-${VERSION}.tar.gz"
sed -i "s/^version:.*/version: \"${VERSION}\"/" artifacthub-pkg.yml
sed -i "s|headlamp/plugin/archive-url:.*|headlamp/plugin/archive-url: \"${RELEASE_URL}\"|" artifacthub-pkg.yml
- name: Update appVersion from upstream release
if: inputs.upstream-repo != ''
run: |
APP_VERSION=$(curl -sf "https://api.github.com/repos/${{ inputs.upstream-repo }}/releases/latest" | jq -r '.tag_name | ltrimstr("v")')
if [ -z "$APP_VERSION" ] || [ "$APP_VERSION" = "null" ]; then
echo "::warning::Could not fetch latest upstream release, skipping appVersion update"
else
sed -i "s|^appVersion:.*|appVersion: \"${APP_VERSION}\"|" artifacthub-pkg.yml
echo "appVersion set to ${APP_VERSION}"
fi
- name: Install dependencies
run: |
max_attempts=3
attempt=1
while [ $attempt -le $max_attempts ]; do
echo "Attempt $attempt of $max_attempts"
if [ "${{ steps.pkg-manager.outputs.manager }}" = "pnpm" ]; then
pnpm install --frozen-lockfile && break
else
npm ci && break
fi
if [ $attempt -lt $max_attempts ]; then
echo "::warning::Install step failed on attempt $attempt. Retrying in 5 seconds..."
sleep 5
fi
attempt=$((attempt + 1))
done
if [ $attempt -gt $max_attempts ]; then
echo "::error::Install step failed after $max_attempts attempts."
exit 1
fi
- name: Build plugin
run: npx @kinvolk/headlamp-plugin build
- name: Package plugin
run: npx @kinvolk/headlamp-plugin package
- name: Prepare release tarball
run: |
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
# headlamp-plugin strips the @org/ prefix when naming tarballs.
# e.g. @privilegedescalation/headlamp-argocd-plugin -> headlamp-argocd-plugin
if [ -f artifacthub-pkg.yml ]; then
PKG_NAME=$(grep '^name:' artifacthub-pkg.yml | cut -d: -f2 | tr -d ' "')
else
PKG_NAME=$(jq -r .name package.json | sed 's|^@[^/]*/||')
fi
TARBALL="${PKG_NAME}-${VERSION}.tar.gz"
for f in *.tar.gz; do
[ "$f" != "$TARBALL" ] && mv "$f" "$TARBALL"
done
if [ ! -f "$TARBALL" ]; then
echo "Error: Expected tarball $TARBALL not found"
ls -la *.tar.gz 2>/dev/null || echo "No .tar.gz files found"
exit 1
fi
echo "TARBALL=$TARBALL" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "PKG_NAME=$PKG_NAME" >> $GITHUB_ENV
- name: Validate tarball
run: |
echo "Tarball: ${{ env.TARBALL }}"
ls -lh "${{ env.TARBALL }}"
tar -tzf "${{ env.TARBALL }}" | head -20
tar -tzf "${{ env.TARBALL }}" | grep -q "main.js" || { echo "Error: main.js not found in tarball"; exit 1; }
- name: Compute checksum
run: |
CHECKSUM=$(sha256sum "${{ env.TARBALL }}" | awk '{print $1}')
echo "CHECKSUM=$CHECKSUM" >> $GITHUB_ENV
sed -i "s|headlamp/plugin/archive-checksum:.*|headlamp/plugin/archive-checksum: sha256:${CHECKSUM}|" artifacthub-pkg.yml
- name: Commit and tag
run: |
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
BRANCH="release/v${VERSION}"
# If the release branch already exists (e.g. from a failed prior run),
# delete it so the re-trigger can proceed cleanly. The check-tag job
# above already skips when the tag exists, so we only reach here when
# the tag does NOT exist yet — safe to remove a stale branch.
if git ls-remote --exit-code origin "refs/heads/$BRANCH" 2>/dev/null; then
echo "::notice::Branch $BRANCH already exists — deleting for clean re-trigger."
git push origin --delete "$BRANCH"
fi
git checkout -b "$BRANCH"
git add package.json "${{ steps.pkg-manager.outputs.lockfile }}" artifacthub-pkg.yml
git commit -m "release: v${VERSION}"
git tag "v${VERSION}"
git push origin "$BRANCH"
git push origin "refs/tags/v${VERSION}"
- name: Generate GitHub App token
id: app-token
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@v3
with:
app-id: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.RELEASE_APP_PRIVATE_KEY }}
- name: Create GitHub Release
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
tag_name: "v${{ inputs.version }}"
files: ${{ env.TARBALL }}
fail_on_unmatched_files: false
generate_release_notes: true
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
- name: Install GitHub CLI
run: |
if ! command -v gh &>/dev/null; then
GH_VERSION="2.74.0"
curl -fsSL "https://github.com/cli/cli/releases/download/v${GH_VERSION}/gh_${GH_VERSION}_linux_amd64.tar.gz" -o /tmp/gh.tar.gz
tar -xzf /tmp/gh.tar.gz -C /tmp
mkdir -p "$HOME/.local/bin"
mv "/tmp/gh_${GH_VERSION}_linux_amd64/bin/gh" "$HOME/.local/bin/gh"
rm -rf /tmp/gh.tar.gz "/tmp/gh_${GH_VERSION}_linux_amd64"
echo "$HOME/.local/bin" >> "$GITHUB_PATH"
"$HOME/.local/bin/gh" --version
fi
- name: Create PR for version bump
run: |
set -o pipefail
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
BODY=$(printf "Automated version bump and checksum update for v%s.\n\ncc @cpfarhood" "${VERSION}")
# Create PR only if an OPEN one doesn't already exist.
# Note: gh pr view also finds MERGED PRs; we must check for open ones explicitly
# so that a re-trigger after a stale-branch delete creates a fresh PR.
OPEN_PR=$(gh pr list --base main --head "release/v${VERSION}" --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number' 2>/dev/null)
if [ -z "$OPEN_PR" ]; then
gh pr create \
--title "release: v${VERSION}" \
--body "$BODY" \
--base main \
--head "release/v${VERSION}"
# Pull the number again to handle both create and pre-existing cases
OPEN_PR=$(gh pr list --base main --head "release/v${VERSION}" --state open --json number --jq '.[0].number' 2>/dev/null)
else
echo "::notice::Open PR #${OPEN_PR} for release/v${VERSION} already exists — skipping creation."
fi
# Guard: ensure we have a PR number before proceeding
if [ -z "$OPEN_PR" ]; then
echo "::error::Could not determine PR number for release/v${VERSION}."
exit 1
fi
echo "::notice::Working with PR #${OPEN_PR}"
# Check if PR was already merged (idempotency — safe to re-trigger after a stale branch)
MERGED_CHECK=$(gh pr view "$OPEN_PR" --json state --jq '.state' 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$MERGED_CHECK" = "MERGED" ]; then
echo "::notice::PR #${OPEN_PR} was already merged. Nothing to do."
exit 0
fi
# Determine whether to use --auto or not based on current status.
# Retry the status check up to 3 times with exponential back-off when
# GitHub is still computing the merge state (UNKNOWN state).
MAX_RETRIES=3
BACKOFF=3
MERGE_STATE=""
for i in $(seq 1 $MAX_RETRIES); do
MERGE_STATE=$(gh pr view "$OPEN_PR" --json mergeStateStatus --jq '.mergeStateStatus' 2>/dev/null)
if [ "$MERGE_STATE" != "UNKNOWN" ]; then
break
fi
if [ $i -lt $MAX_RETRIES ]; then
echo "PR merge state is UNKNOWN (GitHub still computing). Retry ${i}/${MAX_RETRIES} in ${BACKOFF}s..."
sleep $BACKOFF
BACKOFF=$((BACKOFF * 2))
fi
done
if [ "$MERGE_STATE" = "BLOCKED" ] || [ "$MERGE_STATE" = "UNKNOWN" ]; then
echo "PR is $MERGE_STATE — attempting auto-merge (safe fallback, waits for branch protection checks)."
if gh pr merge "$OPEN_PR" --auto --squash --delete-branch 2>&1; then
echo "Auto-merge initiated successfully."
else
AUTO_MERGE_ERR=$?
# If --auto failed because auto-merge is disabled for this repo
# (autoMergeAllowed: false), fall back to --admin which merges
# regardless of branch protection rules. --admin requires GitHub
# App token, not GITHUB_TOKEN, so GH_TOKEN is already correct.
if gh pr merge "$OPEN_PR" --admin --squash --delete-branch 2>&1; then
echo "Auto-merge unavailable (autoMergeAllowed: false) — merged via --admin."
else
echo "::error::Both --auto and --admin merge failed. Exiting."
exit 1
fi
fi
else
echo "PR is $MERGE_STATE — merging directly."
gh pr merge "$OPEN_PR" --squash --delete-branch
fi
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
- name: Verify checksums are consistent (main == tag == tarball)
run: |
VERSION="${{ inputs.version }}"
TARBALL_CS=$(sha256sum "${{ env.TARBALL }}" | awk '{print $1}')
# Checksum recorded in the tag's artifacthub-pkg.yml
TAG_CS=$(git show "v${VERSION}:artifacthub-pkg.yml" 2>/dev/null | grep "archive-checksum" | awk '{print $2}' | sed 's/sha256://')
# Checksum now on main (after PR merge)
MAIN_CS=$(git fetch origin main 2>/dev/null; git show "origin/main:artifacthub-pkg.yml" | grep "archive-checksum" | awk '{print $2}' | sed 's/sha256://')
echo "Tarball SHA256 : $TARBALL_CS"
echo "Tag artifacthub: $TAG_CS"
echo "Main artifacthub: $MAIN_CS"
FAIL=0
[ "$TARBALL_CS" != "$TAG_CS" ] && echo "ERROR: tag checksum mismatch!" && FAIL=1
[ "$TARBALL_CS" != "$MAIN_CS" ] && echo "ERROR: main checksum mismatch!" && FAIL=1
[ "$FAIL" = "1" ] && exit 1
echo "All checksums consistent — ArtifactHub will index correctly."
env:
GH_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app-token.outputs.token }}
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# CLAUDE.md
This file provides guidance to Claude Code (claude.ai/code) when working with code in this repository.
## Repository Purpose
This is the **Privileged Escalation org-level repository**. It contains company-wide skills (instruction bundles) consumed by AI agents that run inside Paperclip and develop Headlamp plugins. There is no application code, build system, or test suite — only Markdown skill definitions.
## Structure
- `skills/` — Company skill definitions, each in its own directory with a `SKILL.md` file
- `skills/safety/SKILL.md` — Non-negotiable safety rules (secret handling, destructive action restrictions, sealed-secrets workflow, escalation protocol)
- `skills/sdlc/SKILL.md` — Software development lifecycle rules (GitHub auth, issue approval gates, branch strategy, PR review policy, handoff protocol, CI/CD)
- `skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md` — Headlamp plugin development conventions (stack, commands, registration API, shared libraries)
## Skill File Format
Each skill is a Markdown file with YAML frontmatter containing `name` and `description` fields:
```markdown
---
name: skill-name
description: >
One-line description of what the skill covers.
---
# Skill Title
Content...
```
## Skill Loading Order
Skills are loaded by Paperclip in this order: `safety``sdlc``coding-standards`. Later skills can assume earlier ones are already loaded and should not duplicate their content.
Submodule headlamp-rook-plugin added at 79eaa6910d
Submodule headlamp-sealed-secrets-plugin added at 143b2c36e0
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test
Submodule
+1
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--- ---
name: coding-standards name: coding-standards
description: > description: >
Engineering quality bar for GroomBook code: priority ordering of correctness Coding standards for Privileged Escalation. Covers Headlamp plugin
vs. clarity vs. maintainability vs. performance vs. elegance, PR and test development workflow, registration API, and shared libraries.
requirements, no-hardcoded-values rules, branch discipline, and the no-self-
merge contract.
--- ---
# Coding Standards # Coding Standards
These rules apply to any GroomBook agent that writes, reviews, or merges code. ## Headlamp Plugins
## Priority ordering All plugins extend [Headlamp](https://headlamp.dev/docs/latest/development/plugins/getting-started), a Kubernetes dashboard with a plugin system.
When making technical decisions, prioritize in this order: - **Language:** TypeScript + React 18, MUI v5
- **Scaffolding:** `npx --yes @kinvolk/headlamp-plugin create <plugin-name>`
- **Entry point:** `src/index.tsx`
- **Linting:** ESLint via `@headlamp-k8s/eslint-config` + Prettier
- **Testing:** Vitest + React Testing Library
1. **Correctness** — does it work? Does it handle edge cases? Have you proven it, not assumed it? ### Plugin Commands
2. **Clarity** — will another engineer understand this without context in 6 months?
3. **Maintainability** — will it be safe to change?
4. **Performance** — fast enough for the use case? Profile before optimizing.
5. **Elegance** — nice if free; never trade any of the above for it.
## Pull request discipline Run from the plugin directory:
* All changes go through a PR. **Never push directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`.** | Command | Purpose |
* No agent merges their own PR. |---|---|
* Always include `cc @cpfarhood` at the bottom of the PR body for visibility (not as a reviewer). | `npm run start` | Dev mode with hot reload |
| `npm run build` | Production build (`dist/main.js`) |
| `npm run format` | Prettier format |
| `npm run lint` | ESLint check |
| `npm run lint-fix` | ESLint auto-fix |
| `npm run tsc` | Typecheck |
| `npm run test` | Vitest tests |
## Test requirements ### Registration API
* **Every PR must include tests** for new code paths. No exceptions for "small" changes. Import from `@kinvolk/headlamp-plugin/lib`:
* Run unit tests, type check, and lint locally (or rely on CI) **before** requesting review.
* A PR without passing tests does not get approval.
* New code paths require coverage. No coverage = no approval.
## Code review tone - `registerAppBarAction()` — add components to the nav bar
- `registerRoute()` — create new pages
- `registerSidebarEntry()` — add sidebar items
- `registerDetailsViewSection()` — extend resource detail views
- `registerPluginSettings()` — add plugin configuration UI
Hold a high bar. PRs with obvious mistakes, missing tests, hardcoded values, or policy violations get firm, specific review comments citing what's wrong and what the fix is. Cite the file and line. Suggest the fix when you know it. Don't sugarcoat — but be professional and constructive. "This looks wrong" is not a review comment. ### K8s API Access
## Hardcoded values ```typescript
import { K8s } from '@kinvolk/headlamp-plugin/lib';
const [pods, error] = K8s.ResourceClasses.Pod.useList();
```
* **Colors** use CSS variables / theme tokens. Never raw hex in components. ### Shared Libraries
* **Strings** use constants or i18n. No magic strings.
* **Numbers** that aren't trivially obvious go in named constants.
* **No magic numbers** in business logic.
## Secrets in code These are provided by Headlamp at runtime — **do not bundle them**:
React, React Router, Redux, MUI, Lodash, Monaco Editor, Notistack, Iconify.
Secrets never touch source. See the `safety` skill for the SealedSecrets workflow. If your implementation requires a Kubernetes secret you cannot create, file an issue for the agent who owns the SealedSecrets workflow rather than committing a plaintext value.
## Releases and versioning
All releases use CalVer (`YYYY.MMDD.PATCH`, e.g. `2026.0504.0`). No SemVer, no custom schemes.
## Container images
Push to `ghcr.io` only. Never Docker Hub for first-party images.
## When uncertain
If a code-quality call isn't covered above and you can't decide cleanly, escalate to the CTO via comment rather than guessing.
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--- ---
name: safety name: safety
description: > description: >
Non-negotiable safety rules for all GroomBook agents. Covers secret handling, Non-negotiable safety rules for all agents at Privileged Escalation. Covers
destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, kubectl scope limits, secret handling, destructive command restrictions, sealed-secrets workflow, and
and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is uncertain. escalation protocol when uncertain.
--- ---
# Safety # Safety Considerations
The following rules apply to every GroomBook agent without exception. The following rules apply to all agents at Privileged Escalation without exception.
## Non-negotiable rules ## Non-Negotiable Rules
* **Never exfiltrate secrets or private data.** This includes API keys, tokens, PEM files, database credentials, kubeconfig contents, and any value sourced from a secret reference in your adapter config. Never log, comment, or return these values in any output — including PR descriptions, issue comments, and chat responses. * **Never exfiltrate secrets or private data.** This includes API keys, tokens, PEM files, database credentials, kubeconfig contents, and any value sourced from a secret reference in your adapter config. Do not log, comment, or return these values in any output.
* **Seek board approval before destructive actions.** "Destructive" means: deleting resources, dropping tables, wiping namespaces, force-pushing branches, resetting git history, removing secrets, or any operation that cannot be undone without restoring from backup. Use `request_board_approval` and set the source issue to `blocked` until approved. * **Seek Board Approval for Destructive Actions.** Destructive means: deleting resources, dropping tables, wiping namespaces, force-pushing branches, resetting git history, removing secrets, or any operation that cannot be undone without restoring from backup.
* **Never commit plaintext secrets.** Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (`kubeseal`). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded in source. * **No plaintext secrets in any repository.** Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (`kubeseal`). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded.
* **Never `kubectl apply` against production (`groombook`).** The production namespace is Flux-managed. Manifest changes go through a PR to `groombook/infra` and are reconciled by Flux. The `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat` namespaces permit direct kubectl use for iteration; secrets at every environment still follow the SealedSecrets pattern. * **Do not use `kubectl create` in production.**
The `privilegedescalation` namespace is Flux-managed. Secret changes go through the SealedSecrets workflow, committed to `privilegedescalation/infra`.
* **Never `kubectl create secret` in production.** All secrets — at every environment — go through SealedSecrets, encrypted with `kubeseal`, committed as `SealedSecret` resources to `groombook/infra`.
* **Never bypass the merge gate.** No self-merging PRs. No pushing directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`. Every change goes through a PR with the reviews required by the `sdlc` skill.
* **Never run `tofu` directly.** Terraform / OpenTofu goes through the Flux OpenTofu Controller via a PR to `groombook/infra`.
## If you are unsure ## If you are unsure
If you are unsure whether an action is safe, **stop**. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to `blocked`, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess. If you are unsure whether an action is safe, stop. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to `blocked`, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess.
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--- ---
name: sdlc name: sdlc
description: > description: >
Software development lifecycle for GroomBook. Covers Gitea authentication, Software development lifecycle rules for Privileged Escalation. Covers GitHub
branch strategy across Dev/UAT/Prod, the four-phase SDLC pipeline with issue approval gates, authentication, branch strategy, PR review policy,
product analysis intake, PR review and merge policy, the handoff protocol, pipeline stages, agent roster, handoff protocol, status semantics, CI/CD,
status semantics, infrastructure layout, the canonical tools list, the security review, and work distribution.
Gitea-origin issue board-approval gate, the cc-cpfarhood visibility rule,
the scheduled penetration testing program, and delegation model tier policy.
--- ---
# Software Development Lifecycle # Software Development Lifecycle
## Gitea authentication ## GitHub Authentication
**Use the `tea` CLI** with the `GITEA_TOKEN` environment variable for all Gitea operations. Configure it once: **Invoke the `github-app-token` skill** before any GitHub operation. It generates a short-lived installation token and sets `GH_TOKEN`. **Never** run `gh auth login` directly — it hangs headless agents.
```bash Token expires after ~1 hour. Re-invoke the skill to regenerate if needed.
tea login add --url https://git.farh.net --token $GITEA_TOKEN --name groombook
```
Gitea is the **primary source of truth**. Every Paperclip issue should have a corresponding Gitea issue (create one if missing). Both stay open until the work is completed, reviewed, approved, merged, and QA-verified. ## GitHub Issues — Board Approval Required
## Gitea-origin issue policy — board approval required **If a task originated from GitHub (`originKind: "github"` in the issue data), do not begin any work.** Immediately create a `request_board_approval`:
If a task originated from Gitea (`originKind: "gitea"`), **do not begin work**. Immediately create a board approval:
``` ```
POST /api/companies/{companyId}/approvals POST /api/companies/{companyId}/approvals
{ {
"type": "request_board_approval", "type": "request_board_approval",
"requestedByAgentId": "{your-agent-id}", "requestedByAgentId": "{your-agent-id}",
"issueIds": ["{issueId}"], "issueIds": ["{issue-id}"],
"payload": { "payload": {
"title": "Board approval required: Gitea issue", "title": "Board approval required: GitHub issue",
"summary": "Summarize what the Gitea issue requests.", "summary": "Summarize what the GitHub issue requests.",
"recommendedAction": "Approve to begin work.", "recommendedAction": "Approve to begin work.",
"risks": ["Work begins without board review if approved."] "risks": ["Work begins without board review if approved."]
} }
} }
``` ```
Set the issue to `blocked` with a comment linking to the approval. Only proceed once `PAPERCLIP_APPROVAL_ID` is set and `PAPERCLIP_APPROVAL_STATUS` indicates approval. Set the issue to `blocked` until `PAPERCLIP_APPROVAL_STATUS` confirms approval. Only proceed once approved.
## Branch strategy ## Branch Strategy
Three long-lived branches map to the three deployment environments: All plugin repositories use a single long-lived branch:
| Branch | Environment | Who merges | | Branch | Environment | Who merges |
|--------|-------------|-----------| |--------|-------------|------------|
| `dev` | Dev | CTO (after QA approval) | | `main` | Production | CEO (Countess von Containerheim) after triple approval |
| `uat` | UAT | CTO (promotes `dev``uat`) |
| `main` | Production | CEO (promotes `uat``main`) |
**Engineers always target `dev`** — never `uat` or `main` directly. Feature branches: `<agent-name>/<short-description>`. **Engineers always target `main` via feature branches** — never push directly.
## Pull requests Feature branches follow the convention: `<agent-name>/<short-description>` (e.g., `gandalf/add-sealed-secrets-list`).
All changes happen via pull request. Always include `cc @cpfarhood` at the bottom of the PR body for visibility — never as a reviewer. ## Pull Requests
All changes must happen via pull request. Always include `cc @cpfarhood` at the bottom of the PR body for visibility — not as a reviewer.
```bash ```bash
tea pr create --base dev --title "..." --body "... cc @cpfarhood" gh pr create --title "..." --body "... cc @cpfarhood"
``` ```
## PR review & merge policy ## PR Review & Merge Policy
### Dev branch (`dev`) **Do not approve a PR with failing tests, type errors, or no coverage for new code.**
- **QA** (Lint Roller) reviews the PR. Approve → hand to CTO. Fail → back to engineer directly with exact details. Requires **3 approving GitHub reviews** before the CEO merges:
- **CTO** (The Dogfather) reviews. Approve → CTO merges the `dev` PR. Fail → back to engineer.
### UAT branch (`uat`) 1. **UAT (Pixel Patty)** — E2E browser testing against `headlamp-dev`
2. **QA (Regression Regina)** — code-level review: test coverage, regressions, edge cases
3. **CTO (Null Pointer Nancy)** — architecture alignment, code quality, security
- **CTO** opens and merges a `dev``uat` PR. **Review order is mandatory: CI → UAT → QA → CTO → CEO merge.** Each stage gates the next. No agent merges their own PRs.
### Main branch (`main`) ## 48-Hour PR Review SLA (Binding)
- **CEO** (Scrubs McBarkley) reviews and merges the `uat``main` PR. **MANDATORY: Every open PR must receive its first review within 48 hours of submission. No exceptions.**
`@cpfarhood` is cc'd for visibility on all PRs — never as a reviewer. ### SLA Assignments & Responsibility
- **0-24 hours:** Assigned reviewer must begin review (or explicitly hand off)
- **24-48 hours:** Assigned reviewer must complete review or be flagged for SLA violation
- **48+ hours:** SLA violation is documented and escalated
## SDLC pipeline ### Assigned Reviewers & Accountability
1. **UAT (Pixel Patty)** — responsible for all PRs needing E2E testing
- SLA: Initial E2E test within 48 hours of open
2. **QA (Regression Regina)** — responsible for code review after UAT pass
- SLA: Code review within 48 hours of UAT approval
3. **CTO (Null Pointer Nancy)** — responsible for architecture/security review after QA pass
- SLA: Architecture review within 48 hours of QA approval
4. **CEO (Countess von Containerheim)** — responsible for SLA enforcement
- Enforces SLA via daily audit and escalation
### Phase 0 — Product analysis (feature intake) ### Escalation Protocol (CEO Responsibility)
- **At 24 hours:** CEO tags reviewer with automated comment and surfaces PR in daily status
- **At 48 hours:** CEO blocks PR from merge queue; escalates to reviewer's manager (CTO for most)
- **At 72+ hours:** If critical-path, PR blocks next release until review completes or reviewer hands off
* Feature requests arrive at the CEO via Paperclip or Gitea Issues. ### Exception Policy
* CEO delegates to CMPO (Pawla Abdul) for review. If a reviewer cannot meet SLA:
* CMPO returns one of three decisions: - They must explicitly hand off to another reviewer within the 48-hour window
* **Accepted** → CEO routes to CTO for work breakdown. - If hand-off doesn't happen, the SLA breach is documented and escalated
* **Backlogged** → CEO handles prioritization. - Rare exceptions require board approval (documented in PR)
* **Denied** → CEO closes as unplanned.
* CTO breaks accepted work into atomic tasks and assigns to Engineering.
### Phase 1 — Dev ### Enforcement Mechanism
CEO creates daily automated report of SLA status and escalates immediately when thresholds breach. This is non-negotiable work.
1. **Engineer** (Flea Flicker) branches from `dev`, writes code. GitOps deploys to dev on demand. ## Pipeline
2. **Engineer** opens a PR against `dev`. CI must pass.
3. **QA (Lint Roller)** reviews the PR. Fail → back to engineer.
4. QA approves and hands off to CTO.
5. **CTO (The Dogfather)** reviews the PR. Fail → back to engineer.
6. **CTO** merges the dev PR.
7. **CI** builds and deploys automatically to Dev (`https://dev.groombook.dev`).
### Phase 2 — UAT promotion **Two pipelines based on change type:**
8. **CTO** opens and merges a PR from `dev` to `uat`. ### Pipeline A: Plugin/Feature Changes (User-Facing Code)
9. **CI** builds and deploys automatically to UAT (`https://uat.groombook.dev`). ```
10. **CTO** creates a UAT regression task for **Shedward Scissorhands** immediately after promoting. CI: Engineer opens PR → CI runs (lint, types, unit tests)
UAT: Pixel Patty validates E2E in headlamp-dev
QA: Regression Regina reviews code quality and test coverage
CTO: Null Pointer Nancy reviews architecture and security
Merge: Countess von Containerheim merges after all approvals
```
### Phase 3 — UAT testing & security **Applies to:** Changes in `headlamp-*-plugin/` repos (plugin code, features, bug fixes)
11. **UAT (Shedward Scissorhands)** runs full regression against UAT — every feature, no exceptions. ### Pipeline B: Infrastructure Changes (No UI Impact)
12. UAT fail → CTO redistributes to engineer (return to Phase 1). ```
13. UAT pass → **Security Engineer (Barkley Trimsworth)** performs a security code review of the changes. CI: Engineer opens PR → CI runs (lint, types, unit tests)
14. Security fail → CTO redistributes to engineer (return to Phase 1). QA: Regression Regina reviews code and correctness (no E2E needed)
CTO: Null Pointer Nancy reviews architecture and security
Merge: Countess von Containerheim merges after all approvals
```
### Phase 4 — Production **Applies to:** Changes in `.github/workflows/`, `infra/`, `org/` repos, and template repos (CI workflows, kustomize configs, RBAC manifests, deployment scripts)
15. Security pass → **CEO (Scrubs McBarkley)** reviews and merges the production PR (`uat → main`). Fail → back to CTO. **Rule:** If the PR contains ONLY infrastructure changes (no plugin code changes), use Pipeline B and skip UAT. Patty's time is reserved for user-facing feature testing.
16. **CI** deploys automatically to Production (`https://demo.groombook.dev`).
### Hierarchy rules **Detection:** If `git diff` shows changes only in `.github/`, `infra/`, `org/`, or deployment files → Pipeline B. If any `headlamp-*-plugin/` code changed → Pipeline A.
* CTO rejections at Dev go directly to the engineer (not back through QA). ### Stage 1 — Engineer Opens PR
* UAT failures (Shedward) go to CTO — CTO cascades to engineer.
* Security failures (Barkley) go to CTO — CTO cascades to engineer.
* CEO rejections at Prod go to CTO.
> **Penetration testing.** Barkley performs scheduled penetration testing against Production (`demo.groombook.dev`) and Demo independently of the PR workflow. Board-authorized; not triggered per-PR. Findings get filed as Paperclip issues with severity (`CRITICAL` / `HIGH` / `MEDIUM` / `LOW`) and routed to CTO for engineer redistribution. 1. Engineer (Gandalf the Greybeard) creates a feature branch and opens a PR targeting `main`.
2. CI runs automatically: lint, type checks, unit tests.
3. CI must pass before any reviewer spends tokens. If CI fails, the engineer fixes it.
## Delegation model tier ### Stage 2 — UAT Review (Pipeline A Only)
When creating subtasks for other agents, set `modelProfile: "cheap"` only for: 4. **Pipeline A only (user-facing changes):** Pixel Patty picks up PRs with passing CI.
- Mechanical refactors or repetitive operations 5. **Pipeline B skips this:** Infrastructure PRs bypass UAT and go directly to QA.
- Basic information lookups 6. Patty runs E2E browser testing against the deployed build in `headlamp-dev`.
- Well-specified, bounded updates 7. Pass → hands off to QA. Fail → goes directly to engineer.
Leave `modelProfile` unset for anything requiring judgment, reasoning, or QA review. ### Stage 3 — QA Review
When in doubt, leave it unset. 7. Regression Regina picks up PRs that have passed both CI and UAT.
8. Regina reviews: test coverage, regressions, edge cases, code quality.
9. Pass → hands off to CTO. Fail → goes directly to engineer.
## Handoff protocol — mandatory ### Stage 4 — CTO Review
10. Null Pointer Nancy picks up PRs that have passed CI, UAT, and QA.
11. Nancy reviews: architecture alignment, code quality, security.
12. Approve → PR is ready for merge. Request changes → goes directly to engineer.
### Stage 5 — CEO Merge
13. Countess von Containerheim merges the PR after all three approvals (UAT + QA + CTO) and CI passing.
14. Reject → returns to CTO → engineer.
### Hierarchy Rules
- CTO rejections go directly to engineer (not through QA or UAT).
- UAT failures go directly to engineer (not through QA or UAT).
- QA failures go directly to engineer (not through QA or UAT).
- CEO rejections go to CTO, who cascades to engineer.
- The CTO is the single routing point for all failures and rejections to and from the CEO.
## Agent Roster
| Role | Agent | Paperclip UUID |
|------|-------|----------------|
| CEO | Countess von Containerheim | `498f4d36-8e5b-4114-8514-d0698a091bd5` |
| CTO | Null Pointer Nancy | `ed1eec37-f868-41b6-bc72-a3493bbce090` |
| Staff Engineer | Gandalf the Greybeard | `fc07dd00-c4c2-4fa0-9a18-dd6fbb1d1eb4` |
| QA Engineer | Regression Regina | `fd5dbec8-ddbb-4b57-9703-624e0ed90053` |
| UAT Engineer | Pixel Patty | `01ec02f7-70c2-4fa1-ac3f-2545f1237ac3` |
| VP Engineering Ops | Hugh Hackman | `2c97cff6-0f0b-4cff-967f-ca244eb2ef9b` |
| CMO | Kubectl Karen | `95314e13-bea7-459d-a637-92381dede759` |
## Handoff Protocol — Mandatory
Every handoff to another agent requires ALL THREE steps: Every handoff to another agent requires ALL THREE steps:
### 1. Explicit assignment ### Step 1 — Explicit Assignment
`PATCH /api/issues/{id}` with `assigneeAgentId: "<target-agent-uuid>"`. Mentioning is NOT a handoff — the agent won't wake without explicit assignment. PATCH the issue with `assigneeAgentId: "<target-agent-uuid>"`.
@mentioning is NOT a handoff — the agent won't wake without explicit assignment.
### 2. Status = `todo` ### Step 2 — Status = `todo`
Every handoff sets `status: "todo"`. Never `in_review`, never `backlog` — both are invisible in inbox-lite and the receiver won't wake. Every handoff sets `status: "todo"`. Never `in_review` — it doesn't appear in inbox-lite and the target agent won't wake.
### 3. Release checkout ### Step 3 — Release Checkout
``` ```
POST /api/issues/{issueId}/release POST /api/issues/{issueId}/release
Headers: Authorization: Bearer $PAPERCLIP_API_KEY, X-Paperclip-Run-Id: $PAPERCLIP_RUN_ID Headers: Authorization: Bearer $PAPERCLIP_API_KEY, X-Paperclip-Run-Id: $PAPERCLIP_RUN_ID
``` ```
Without this release, the receiving agent cannot check out the issue. Without this release, the receiving agent cannot checkout the issue.
**Saying you are reassigning a task is NOT the same as reassigning it.** Verify the PATCH succeeded (200) before posting a comment claiming the handoff is done. ## Status Semantics
## Infrastructure | Status | Meaning |
|--------|---------|
| `backlog` | Not ready; parked or unscheduled |
| `todo` | Ready and actionable; not checked out |
| `in_progress` | Actively owned; enter by checkout only |
| `in_review` | Self-held only; awaiting external feedback |
| `blocked` | Cannot proceed; state blocker and who must act |
| `done` | Complete, no follow-up remains |
| `cancelled` | Intentionally abandoned |
* **Production / Demo:** namespace `groombook`, FQDN `demo.groombook.dev` **Never use `in_review` for handoffs.** It does not trigger inbox-lite and the receiving agent will not wake.
* **UAT:** namespace `groombook-uat`, FQDN `uat.groombook.dev`
* **Dev:** namespace `groombook-dev`, FQDN `dev.groombook.dev`
* **Cluster:** Kubernetes — cluster-wide read; read/write on `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat`; read-only on `groombook` (production).
* **Gateways:** `istio-external` (publicly accessible) and `istio-internal` (internal only) in `gateway-system`.
* **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>` only.
## Authentication ## Status Transition Rules
* **Framework:** Better-Auth. | Handoff | Correct Status |
* **Social login:** Google and Apple OAuth. |---------|----------------|
* **SSO:** Authentik OIDC at `https://auth.farh.net` (credentials in `authentik-credentials` secret). | Engineer → UAT (Patty) | `todo` |
* **Never build custom authentication.** | UAT (Patty) → QA (Regina) | `todo` |
| QA (Regina) → CTO (Nancy) | `todo` |
| CTO (Nancy) → CEO (Countess) | `todo` |
| Any failure → Engineer | `todo` |
| CEO rejection → CTO (Nancy) | `todo` |
| CTO (Nancy) → Engineer (fix) | `todo` |
## Deployment — 2-stage Flux GitOps ## CI/CD
**Stage 1 — CI (Gitea Actions, uses GitHub Actions-compatible YAML syntax, runs in each application repo):** - CI runs on self-hosted ARC runners: `runs-on: runners-privilegedescalation`
- Triggered automatically on every merge to `main` - Only Hugh Hackman has write access to `.github/workflows/` files
- Builds and tags the Docker image - All CI/CD workflow changes must be delegated to Hugh
- Pushes tagged images to `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>` - Runners scale to zero when idle and start automatically when a workflow triggers
**Stage 2 — GitOps (Flux, managed externally):** ## Security Review
- Flux watches `groombook/infra` as the **target** GitRepository — it is **not** a Flux bootstrap/cluster repo.
- Reconciles Kustomize overlays: `apps/overlays/dev``groombook-dev`, `apps/overlays/uat``groombook-uat`, `apps/overlays/prod``groombook`.
**Policy — Flux Image Tag Automation is DENIED.** Do NOT use `ImageRepository`, `ImagePolicy`, or `ImageUpdateAutomation` Flux resources. Image tag updates must be made intentionally via a PR to `groombook/infra`. Security review is handled as part of the CTO review stage. Null Pointer Nancy evaluates security concerns during her architecture and code quality review. There is no separate dedicated security review agent.
**To deploy a change:** ## Work Distribution
1. Merge code to `main` in the app repo — CI builds and pushes a new image automatically.
2. Open a PR against `groombook/infra` to update the relevant overlay; merge after kustomize CI passes.
3. Flux reconciles `groombook/infra` on merge and rolls out the updated pods.
**To force a rollout** (pick up new `:latest` on stuck pods): - All engineering and devops work is broken down and distributed by the CTO (Nancy).
```bash - Engineers do not self-assign — the CTO triages, scopes, and assigns all implementation tasks.
kubectl rollout restart deployment/<name> -n <namespace> - Hugh Hackman owns CI/CD, infrastructure, and pipeline work.
``` - Gandalf the Greybeard owns plugin implementation.
- Regression Regina owns QA review and test coverage.
## Infrastructure as Code - Pixel Patty owns UAT/E2E browser testing.
Terraform / OpenTofu is deployed via the **Flux OpenTofu Controller** in a GitOps fashion. Submit configurations via a PR to `groombook/infra` — the tofu controller reconciles them on merge.
**Never run `tofu` directly.** Never `kubectl apply` against production. Production changes go through Flux only.
## Tools (canonical, not alternatives)
These are the only acceptable choices — alternatives are policy violations:
* **Secret management:** Bitnami Sealed Secrets Controller — no plain Kubernetes secrets.
* **Database:** CloudNativePG Operator (Postgres) — no SQLite, MariaDB, or MySQL.
* **Cache / pub-sub:** DragonflyDB Operator — no Redis.
* **Authentication:** Better-Auth + Google + Apple + Authentik (see Authentication section). Never build custom auth.
* **Dependency updates:** Mend Renovate. **Dependabot is not used and will not be used.**
* **Container registry:** `ghcr.io/groombook/<service>` — no Docker Hub for first-party images.
If a task requires deviating from any of the above, treat it as a destructive action: stop, file an issue with rationale, request board approval.
## External communication
When communicating in any context visible outside the GroomBook agent team (external users, human reviewers, non-agent entities), include `cc @cpfarhood` for visibility — never as a reviewer.
## No self-merge
No agent merges their own PR. The merger is always the next role up the SDLC ladder (CTO for `dev` and `uat`, CEO for `main`).