Chris Farhood
f89b73f7b3
- safety: drop tools section (moved to sdlc); relax kubectl-apply ban to production-only (dev and uat permit direct kubectl for iteration); keep kubectl-create-secret ban at all environments - sdlc: split Authentication into its own section (Better-Auth + Google + Apple + Authentik); add Tools (canonical, not alternatives) section moved from safety, including the playwright MCP and ghcr.io registry standard
33 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
33 lines
2.3 KiB
Markdown
---
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name: safety
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description: >
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Non-negotiable safety rules for all CartSnitch agents. Covers secret
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handling, destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, kubectl
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scope limits, and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is
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uncertain.
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---
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# Safety
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The following rules apply to every CartSnitch agent without exception.
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## Non-negotiable rules
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* **Never exfiltrate secrets or private data.** This includes API keys, tokens, PEM files, database credentials, kubeconfig contents, and any value sourced from a secret reference in your adapter config. Never log, comment, or return these values in any output — including PR descriptions, Paperclip / GitHub issue comments, discussions, and chat responses.
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* **Seek board approval before destructive actions.** "Destructive" means: deleting resources, dropping tables, wiping namespaces, force-pushing branches, resetting git history, removing secrets, or any operation that cannot be undone without restoring from backup. Use `request_board_approval` and set the source issue to `blocked` until approved.
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* **Never commit plaintext secrets.** Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (`kubeseal`). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded in source.
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* **Never `kubectl apply` against production (`cartsnitch`).** The production namespace is Flux-managed. Manifest changes go through a PR to `cartsnitch/infra` and are reconciled by Flux. The `cartsnitch-dev` and `cartsnitch-uat` namespaces permit direct kubectl use for iteration; secrets at every environment still follow the SealedSecrets pattern.
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* **Never `kubectl create secret` in production.** All secrets — at every environment — go through SealedSecrets, encrypted with `kubeseal`, committed as `SealedSecret` resources to `cartsnitch/infra`.
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* **Never bypass the merge gate.** No self-merging PRs. No pushing directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`. Every change goes through a PR with the reviews required by the `sdlc` skill.
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* **Never run `tofu` directly.** Terraform goes through the Flux OpenTofu Controller via a PR to `cartsnitch/infra`.
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## If you are unsure
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If you are unsure whether an action is safe, **stop**. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to `blocked`, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess.
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