Files
paperclip/doc/SECRETS-AWS-PROVIDER.md
Dotta 778e775c35 Add secrets provider vaults and remote import (#5429)
## Thinking Path

> - Paperclip orchestrates AI-agent companies and needs secrets handling
to work across local development, hosted operators, and governed agent
execution.
> - The affected subsystem is the company-scoped secrets control plane:
database schema, server services/routes, CLI workflows, and the Secrets
settings UI.
> - The gap was that secrets were local-only and operators could not
manage provider vaults or import existing remote references without
exposing plaintext.
> - This branch adds provider vault configuration plus an AWS Secrets
Manager remote-import path while preserving company boundaries, binding
context, and audit trails.
> - I kept the PR to a single branch PR, removed unrelated
lockfile/package drift, rebased the full branch onto the current
`public-gh/master`, and addressed fresh Greptile findings.
> - The benefit is a reviewable implementation of provider-backed
secrets with focused tests covering provider selection, import
conflicts, deleted secret reuse, rotation guards, and AWS signing
behavior.

## What Changed

- Added provider vault support for company secrets, including provider
config storage, default vault handling, health checks, binding usage,
access events, and remote import preview/commit.
- Added an AWS Secrets Manager provider using SigV4 request signing,
bounded request timeouts, namespace guardrails, cached runtime
credential resolution, and external-reference linking without plaintext
reads.
- Added Secrets UI surfaces for vault management and remote import, plus
CLI/API documentation for setup and operations.
- Stabilized routine webhook secret binding paths and SSH
environment-driver fixture bindings discovered during verification.
- Addressed Greptile and CI findings: no lockfile/package drift,
monotonic migration metadata, disabled-vault default races, soft-deleted
secret hiding/recreate behavior, remove behavior with disabled vaults,
soft-deleted external-reference re-import, non-active rotation guards,
managed-secret soft deletion through PATCH, and per-call AWS SDK
credential client churn.
- Rebased this branch onto `public-gh/master` at `0e1a5828` and
force-pushed with lease to keep this as the single PR for the branch.

## Verification

- `git fetch public-gh master`
- `git rebase public-gh/master`
- `git diff --name-only public-gh/master...HEAD | grep
'^pnpm-lock\.yaml$' || true` confirmed `pnpm-lock.yaml` is not in the PR
diff.
- Confirmed migration ordering: master ends at `0081_optimal_dormammu`;
this PR adds `0082_dry_vision` and
`0083_company_secret_provider_configs`.
- Inspected migrations for repeat safety: new tables/indexes use `IF NOT
EXISTS`; foreign keys are guarded by `DO $$ ... IF NOT EXISTS`; column
additions use `ADD COLUMN IF NOT EXISTS`.
- `pnpm -r typecheck` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits.
- `pnpm test:run` ran the full stable Vitest path before the Greptile
follow-up commits; it completed with 3 timing-related failures under
parallel load: `codex-local-execute.test.ts`,
`cursor-local-execute.test.ts`, and `environment-service.test.ts`.
- `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server exec vitest run
src/__tests__/codex-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/cursor-local-execute.test.ts
src/__tests__/environment-service.test.ts` passed on targeted rerun
(`24/24`).
- `pnpm build` passed before the Greptile follow-up commits. Vite
reported existing chunk-size/dynamic-import warnings.
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`26/26`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
exec vitest run src/__tests__/aws-secrets-manager-provider.test.ts
src/__tests__/secrets-service.test.ts` passed (`39/39`).
- After Greptile follow-up commits: `pnpm --filter @paperclipai/server
typecheck` passed.
- Captured Storybook screenshots from `ui/storybook-static` for visual
review.
- Latest PR checks on `5ca3a5cf`: `policy`, serialized server suites
1/4-4/4, `Canary Dry Run`, `e2e`, `security/snyk`, and `Greptile Review`
pass; aggregate `verify` is still registering the completed child
checks.
- Greptile review loop continued through the latest requested pass; all
Greptile review threads are resolved and the latest `Greptile Review`
check on `5ca3a5cf` passed with 0 comments added.

## Screenshots

Before: the provider-vault and remote-import surfaces did not exist on
`master`; these are after-state screenshots from the Storybook fixtures.

![Secrets
inventory](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secrets-inventory.png)

![Secret binding
picker](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/secret-binding-picker.png)

![Environment editor with
secrets](https://raw.githubusercontent.com/paperclipai/paperclip/PAP-2339-secrets-make-a-plan/doc/pr/5429/env-editor-with-secrets.png)

## Risks

- Migration risk: this adds new secret provider tables and extends
existing secret rows. The migrations were checked for monotonic ordering
and idempotent guards, but reviewers should still inspect upgrade
behavior carefully.
- Provider risk: AWS support uses direct SigV4 requests. Automated tests
cover signing, request timeouts, vault-config selection, namespace
guardrails, pending-version archival, sanitized provider errors, and
service-level cleanup paths. A real-vault AWS smoke test remains
deployment validation for an operator with AWS credentials rather than
an unverified merge blocker in this local branch.
- UI risk: the Secrets page and import dialog are large new surfaces;
screenshots are included above for reviewer inspection.
- Verification risk: the full local stable test command hit
parallel-load timing failures, although the exact failed files passed
when rerun directly.
- Operational risk: remote import intentionally avoids plaintext reads;
operators must understand that imported external references resolve at
runtime and may fail if AWS permissions change.

> For core feature work, check [`ROADMAP.md`](ROADMAP.md) first and
discuss it in `#dev` before opening the PR. Feature PRs that overlap
with planned core work may need to be redirected — check the roadmap
first. See `CONTRIBUTING.md`.

## Model Used

- OpenAI Codex, GPT-5 coding agent with local shell/tool use in the
Paperclip worktree. Exact context-window size was not exposed by the
runtime.

## Checklist

- [x] I have included a thinking path that traces from project context
to this change
- [x] I have specified the model used (with version and capability
details)
- [x] I have checked ROADMAP.md and confirmed this PR does not duplicate
planned core work
- [ ] I have run tests locally and they pass
- [x] I have added or updated tests where applicable
- [x] If this change affects the UI, I have included before/after
screenshots
- [x] I have updated relevant documentation to reflect my changes
- [x] I have considered and documented any risks above
- [x] I will address all Greptile and reviewer comments before
requesting merge

---------

Co-authored-by: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-09 18:22:17 -05:00

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Markdown

# AWS Secrets Manager Provider
Operational contract for the hosted `aws_secrets_manager` secret provider used by Paperclip Cloud.
## Scope
- Hosted provider for Paperclip-managed secrets when Paperclip Cloud runs on AWS.
- Source of truth for secret values is AWS Secrets Manager, not Postgres.
- Paperclip stores only metadata needed for ownership, bindings, version selection, audit, and runtime resolution.
- AWS provider bootstrap credentials are deployment/runtime credentials, not Paperclip-managed company secrets.
- Remote import for existing AWS secrets is metadata-only. Preview/import uses
AWS inventory metadata and creates Paperclip external references; it does not
copy plaintext into Paperclip.
- Per-company AWS provider vaults (named instances of `aws_secrets_manager`
with their own region, namespace, prefix, KMS key id, and tags) are managed
in the board UI under `Company Settings → Secrets → Provider vaults`. See
[Provider Vaults](../docs/deploy/secrets.md#provider-vaults) for the operator
model and [Provider Vaults API](../docs/api/secrets.md#provider-vaults) for
the routes. The bootstrap trust model in this document still applies — vault
config carries non-sensitive routing metadata only, never AWS credentials.
## Bootstrap Trust Model
The AWS provider has a chicken-and-egg boundary: Paperclip cannot use
`company_secrets` to unlock the AWS provider that stores those secrets. The
initial AWS trust must exist before the Paperclip server starts.
Allowed bootstrap locations:
- Infrastructure IAM or workload identity attached to the Paperclip server
runtime.
- Process environment or orchestrator secret store used to start the Paperclip
server.
- Local AWS SDK sources such as `AWS_PROFILE`, AWS SSO/shared config, web
identity, container metadata, or instance metadata.
- Short-lived shell credentials for local development only.
Do not ask operators to paste AWS root credentials or long-lived IAM user access
keys into the Paperclip board UI. Do not store those bootstrap keys in
`company_secrets`.
## Paperclip Cloud Bootstrap
Paperclip Cloud must provision the AWS backing resources before any board user
can create AWS-backed company secrets:
1. Create or select the deployment KMS key.
2. Create the Paperclip server runtime role for the deployment.
3. Attach a minimum IAM policy scoped to the deployment Secrets Manager prefix
and the configured KMS key.
4. Configure the server runtime with the non-secret provider environment
variables below.
5. Run `paperclipai doctor` or the provider health endpoint from the deployed
runtime and confirm that the provider reports the expected region, prefix,
deployment id, KMS setting, and AWS SDK credential source.
Once this is in place, the board UI can create Paperclip-managed AWS secrets and
Paperclip will write them under the deployment/company namespace.
## Self-Hosted And Local Bootstrap
Self-hosted AWS deployments should use the AWS SDK default credential provider
chain. Preferred sources are role-based:
- EC2 instance profile.
- ECS task role.
- EKS IRSA or another OIDC web identity role.
- AWS SSO/shared config via `AWS_PROFILE`.
Local development can use:
```sh
aws sso login --profile paperclip-dev
AWS_PROFILE=paperclip-dev \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION=us-east-1 \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID=dev-local \
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abcd-... \
pnpm dev
```
Temporary `AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID`/`AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` environment credentials
are acceptable only as a local break-glass or short-lived test source. They
should not be written to Paperclip config, committed to `.env` files, stored in
`company_secrets`, or used as the default Paperclip Cloud bootstrap path.
## Deployment Config
Required environment variables:
```sh
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_REGION=us-east-1
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DEPLOYMENT_ID=prod-us-1
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID=arn:aws:kms:us-east-1:123456789012:key/abcd-...
```
Optional environment variables:
```sh
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_PREFIX=paperclip
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_ENVIRONMENT=production
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_PROVIDER_OWNER=paperclip
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_ENDPOINT=
PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_DELETE_RECOVERY_DAYS=30
```
Naming convention for Paperclip-managed secrets:
```text
paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}
```
Tag set for Paperclip-managed secrets:
- `paperclip:managed-by=paperclip`
- `paperclip:provider-owner=<owner tag>`
- `paperclip:deployment-id=<deployment id>`
- `paperclip:company-id=<company id>`
- `paperclip:secret-key=<secret key>`
- `paperclip:environment=<environment tag>`
## IAM And KMS Assumptions
Launch posture:
- One Paperclip app role per deployment.
- One deployment-scoped KMS key per deployment at launch.
- Future per-company KMS keys remain compatible because Paperclip stores provider refs and version metadata separately from values.
Minimum IAM boundary:
- Allow `secretsmanager:CreateSecret`, `PutSecretValue`, `GetSecretValue`, and `DeleteSecret`.
- Scope resources to the deployment prefix:
```text
arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:paperclip/<deployment-id>/*
```
- Allow `kms:Encrypt`, `kms:Decrypt`, `kms:GenerateDataKey`, and `kms:DescribeKey` for the configured deployment CMK.
- Deny wildcard access outside the deployment prefix.
- Prefer workload identity / role-based auth. Do not store AWS credentials inline in Paperclip config.
Example minimum policy shape:
```json
{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [
{
"Sid": "PaperclipDeploymentSecrets",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"secretsmanager:CreateSecret",
"secretsmanager:PutSecretValue",
"secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
"secretsmanager:DeleteSecret"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:paperclip/<deployment-id>/*"
},
{
"Sid": "PaperclipDeploymentKms",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": [
"kms:Encrypt",
"kms:Decrypt",
"kms:GenerateDataKey",
"kms:DescribeKey"
],
"Resource": "arn:aws:kms:<region>:<account-id>:key/<key-id>"
}
]
}
```
Operational expectation:
- Paperclip-managed secrets may be deleted only by Paperclip or an operator with equivalent break-glass access.
- External references may resolve through Paperclip runtime, but Paperclip should not delete the external secret resource.
## Remote Import Inventory IAM
Remote import preview needs one additional AWS permission:
```json
{
"Sid": "PaperclipRemoteSecretInventory",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "secretsmanager:ListSecrets",
"Resource": "*"
}
```
This is intentionally separate from the managed create/rotate/delete policy.
AWS treats `ListSecrets` as an account/Region inventory action; do not document
secret ARNs, names, tags, or AWS request filters as an IAM boundary for it. Use
`Resource: "*"` and decide whether inventory exposure is acceptable for the AWS
account and Region behind each provider vault.
Remote import preview/import must not call:
- `secretsmanager:GetSecretValue`
- `secretsmanager:BatchGetSecretValue`
- `kms:Decrypt`
Those permissions are only needed later when a bound runtime resolves an
imported external reference. For imported refs, scope read permissions to the
operator-approved external prefixes that Paperclip is allowed to consume:
```json
{
"Sid": "PaperclipResolveImportedExternalReferences",
"Effect": "Allow",
"Action": "secretsmanager:GetSecretValue",
"Resource": [
"arn:aws:secretsmanager:<region>:<account-id>:secret:<approved-external-prefix>/*"
]
}
```
If selected external secrets use customer-managed KMS keys, also grant
`kms:Decrypt` and `kms:DescribeKey` on those keys. Keep managed write/delete
permissions scoped to `paperclip/<deployment-id>/*`; do not broaden them for
remote import.
Safe scoping guidance:
- Prefer one Paperclip runtime role per environment/account.
- Point provider vaults at the intended AWS account and Region instead of a
broad central admin role.
- Enable `ListSecrets` only in accounts where inventory exposure is acceptable.
- Keep preview/import board-only; agent API keys must not call these routes.
- Treat AWS tag/name filters as search UX only, not permission enforcement.
Paperclip also blocks importing refs under its own managed namespace as
external references. Use the Paperclip-managed flow for
`paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}` resources.
## Existing AWS Secrets
V1 keeps existing AWS Secrets Manager entries as **linked external references**, not adopted
Paperclip-managed resources.
Use the Paperclip-managed flow when Paperclip should create and rotate the value. The AWS
secret name is derived from deployment and company scope:
```text
paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}
```
Use the external-reference flow when the secret already exists at an operator-owned path such
as:
```text
/paperclip-bench/anthropic_api_key
```
In that mode Paperclip stores only the path or ARN, resolves it at runtime, and records
redacted access events. Operators rotate the actual value in AWS. Update the Paperclip
reference only when the AWS path, ARN, or pinned provider version changes.
Paperclip does not currently offer an "adopt existing AWS secret" flow that takes over future
`PutSecretValue` writes for an arbitrary existing secret. Adding that later requires explicit
confirmation UX, scope validation, expected Paperclip tags, and security/cloud-ops review.
## Data Custody
- Paperclip stores `externalRef`, `providerVersionRef`, provider id, fingerprint hash, status, and binding metadata.
- Paperclip does not store AWS secret plaintext in `company_secret_versions.material`.
- Runtime resolution fetches the value from AWS only when a bound consumer needs it.
## Rotation Runbook
Manual Paperclip-managed rotation:
1. Write the new value through the Paperclip secret rotate flow.
2. Paperclip creates a new AWS secret version with `PutSecretValue`.
3. Paperclip records the new `providerVersionRef` in `company_secret_versions`.
4. Re-run or restart affected workloads that consume `latest`, or pin consumers to a specific Paperclip version before rollout when you need staged release safety.
Guidance:
- Prefer pinned Paperclip secret versions for risky rollouts.
- Treat provider-native automatic rotation as a later enhancement; current V1 flow is explicit create-new-version plus controlled rollout.
## Backup And Restore Runbook
What must survive:
- Paperclip database metadata for secret ownership, bindings, status, and provider version refs.
- AWS Secrets Manager namespace under the configured deployment prefix.
- The configured KMS key and its decrypt permissions.
Restore checklist:
1. Restore Paperclip database metadata.
2. Confirm the same AWS Secrets Manager namespace still exists.
3. Confirm the Paperclip runtime role can call `GetSecretValue` on the restored prefix.
4. Confirm the role still has decrypt access to the CMK referenced by `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_KMS_KEY_ID`.
5. Run the live smoke below or a targeted runtime secret resolution test.
## Provider Outage Runbook
Symptoms:
- Secret create/rotate/resolve operations fail with AWS provider errors.
- Agent runs fail before adapter invocation on required secret resolution.
- Remote import preview fails to list AWS inventory.
Immediate actions:
1. Confirm AWS regional health and Secrets Manager availability.
2. Confirm the runtime role still has `GetSecretValue` and KMS decrypt permissions.
3. Check for accidental prefix, region, deployment id, or KMS key config drift.
4. Retry a single resolution after AWS service health is green.
5. If outage persists, pause high-risk runs that require secret access rather than churning retries.
Remote import-specific actions:
- Missing list permission: add `secretsmanager:ListSecrets` with
`Resource: "*"` only when inventory import is approved for that vault's
AWS account and Region.
- Throttling: narrow the search, wait briefly, and retry with backoff. Avoid
full-account enumeration.
- Invalid or stale cursor: refresh the preview and discard the old
`NextToken`.
- Large account: load pages intentionally, keep one in-flight preview request
per vault/search, and do not run background full-account crawls.
- Runtime read failure after import: verify `GetSecretValue` and KMS decrypt
on the selected external secret. Visibility in `ListSecrets` does not prove
read permission.
## Incident Response Runbook
Potential incidents:
- Cross-company access caused by IAM scoping drift.
- KMS policy drift causing decrypt failures or over-broad access.
- Suspected secret exposure in logs, transcripts, or downstream agent output.
Response steps:
1. Stop or pause affected Paperclip runs.
2. Audit recent Paperclip secret access events for impacted secret ids and consumers.
3. Audit AWS CloudTrail for `ListSecrets`, `GetSecretValue`,
`PutSecretValue`, and `DeleteSecret` calls on the relevant vault account,
Region, deployment prefix, and approved external prefixes.
4. Rotate impacted secrets in AWS through Paperclip-managed versioning.
5. Re-scope IAM and KMS policies before resuming normal traffic.
6. If a value may have reached an agent transcript or external system, treat it as exposed and rotate immediately.
## Optional Live Smoke
This is safe to skip locally. Run it only against a dedicated AWS test namespace.
Prerequisites:
- AWS credentials or workload identity with the deployment-scoped IAM permissions above.
- `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_PROVIDER=aws_secrets_manager`
- The required `PAPERCLIP_SECRETS_AWS_*` environment variables set.
Suggested smoke:
1. Create a test secret through the Paperclip board or API under a throwaway company.
2. Confirm the resulting AWS secret name matches `paperclip/{deploymentId}/{companyId}/{secretKey}`.
3. Rotate the secret once and confirm a new `providerVersionRef` appears in Paperclip metadata.
4. Resolve the secret through a bound runtime path, not by adding a general-purpose reveal endpoint.
5. Delete the throwaway secret and confirm AWS schedules deletion with the configured recovery window.