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4 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Flea Flicker 2573d067e4 fix(api): remove CSRF middleware that breaks POST/PUT/PATCH/DELETE
The CSRF middleware requires x-csrf-token header but the frontend never
sends it, which would break all mutating operations with 403 errors.

CSRF protection should be implemented in a separate coordinated PR with
frontend changes.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-04-15 06:01:22 +00:00
Flea Flicker b903d1e506 fix(api): wire up CSRF middleware for protected routes
Register csrfMiddleware in the protected API routes after authMiddleware
and resolveStaffMiddleware to protect against CSRF attacks on state-
changing operations (POST, PUT, PATCH, DELETE).

Addresses CTO review feedback on PR #278.
2026-04-15 06:01:22 +00:00
Flea Flicker 8f06f32e7d fix(invoices): wrap refund flow in transaction for idempotency safety
- Wrap idempotency check + processRefund() + db.insert() in db.transaction()
- This prevents duplicate Stripe refunds if the DB insert fails after Stripe processes the refund
- Add migration 0027_refunds for the refunds table (was missing)
- Removes out-of-scope changes from PR #278 (csrf.ts, appointmentGroups, appointments, book, groomingLogs, services, stripe-webhooks)

Fixes GRO-637 per CTO review

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-04-15 06:01:22 +00:00
Paperclip 85af080ba2 Fix invoice status transitions, tip-split validation, refund idempotency, and tip-split response format
- Add ALLOWED_TRANSITIONS state machine for invoice status changes (GRO-637)
- Replace floating-point tip-split validation with integer basis-points math
- Add idempotency key support to refund endpoint with new refunds table
- Return full invoice shape from POST /:id/tip-splits matching GET response
- All existing tests pass

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-04-15 06:01:22 +00:00
11 changed files with 182 additions and 268 deletions
@@ -68,7 +68,6 @@ vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
}),
appointments,
eq: () => ({}),
and: (..._clauses: unknown[]) => ({}),
};
});
+2 -3
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
}),
staff,
eq: vi.fn((_col: unknown, _val: unknown) => ({ col: _col, val: _val })),
and: vi.fn((..._clauses: unknown[]) => ({})),
};
});
@@ -363,7 +362,7 @@ describe("requireRoleOrSuperUser", () => {
const res = await app.request("/test");
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toMatch(/role.*not permitted/i);
expect(body.error).toMatch(/super user privileges required/i);
});
it("blocks a non-super-user groomer from manager-only routes", async () => {
@@ -371,7 +370,7 @@ describe("requireRoleOrSuperUser", () => {
const res = await app.request("/test");
expect(res.status).toBe(403);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toMatch(/role.*not permitted/i);
expect(body.error).toMatch(/super user privileges required/i);
});
it("allows a manager with multiple allowed roles", async () => {
+1 -16
View File
@@ -33,26 +33,11 @@ import { webhooksRouter } from "./routes/stripe-webhooks.js";
const app = new Hono();
// Global middleware
const TRUSTED_ORIGINS = (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173")
.split(",")
.map((o) => o.trim());
const ALLOWED_ORIGIN = process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173";
app.use("*", logger());
app.use(
"/api/*",
cors({
origin: (origin, ctx) => {
if (!origin) {
return ALLOWED_ORIGIN;
}
if (TRUSTED_ORIGINS.includes(origin)) {
return origin;
}
ctx.status(403);
return null;
},
origin: process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173",
credentials: true,
})
);
+4 -16
View File
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
console.warn("[auth] AUTH_DISABLED=true — building placeholder auth instance");
authInstance = betterAuth({
database: drizzleAdapter(getDb(), { provider: "pg" }),
secret: BETTER_AUTH_SECRET!,
secret: BETTER_AUTH_SECRET ?? "placeholder-secret-do-not-use-in-prod",
baseURL: BETTER_AUTH_URL,
rateLimit: {
enabled: true,
@@ -177,9 +177,9 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
const hasGoogle = !!(process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID && process.env.GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET);
const hasGitHub = !!(process.env.GITHUB_CLIENT_ID && process.env.GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET);
const issuerUrlObj = new URL(providerConfig.issuerUrl);
const issuerHostname = issuerUrlObj.hostname;
// Fetch OIDC discovery document to derive canonical provider URLs.
// Replace the host of token/userinfo endpoints with internalBaseUrl when set,
// while keeping authorizationUrl public for browser redirects.
const discoveryUrlStr = `${providerConfig.issuerUrl}/.well-known/openid-configuration`;
let oidcConfig: Record<string, string> = {};
try {
@@ -203,18 +203,6 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
const tokenUrl = discovery.token_endpoint;
const userInfoUrl = discovery.userinfo_endpoint;
if (authzUrl && tokenUrl && userInfoUrl) {
const authzUrlObj = new URL(authzUrl);
const tokenUrlObj = new URL(tokenUrl);
const userInfoUrlObj = new URL(userInfoUrl);
if (
authzUrlObj.hostname !== issuerHostname ||
tokenUrlObj.hostname !== issuerHostname ||
userInfoUrlObj.hostname !== issuerHostname
) {
throw new Error(
`[FATAL] OIDC discovery URL hostname mismatch: expected '${issuerHostname}' but got '${authzUrlObj.hostname}', '${tokenUrlObj.hostname}', or '${userInfoUrlObj.hostname}'. This may indicate a man-in-the-middle attack.`
);
}
oidcConfig = {
authorizationUrl: authzUrl,
tokenUrl: providerConfig.internalBaseUrl
-45
View File
@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
import type { MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
import { getDb, impersonationAuditLogs } from "@groombook/db";
import type { PortalEnv } from "./portalSession.js";
/**
* Server-side audit logging middleware for portal routes.
* Applied after validatePortalSession in the middleware chain.
*
* After the route handler completes (await next()), inserts an audit log entry
* into impersonationAuditLogs:
* - sessionId: from c.get("portalSessionId")
* - action: "{METHOD} {routePath}" (e.g., "GET /portal/appointments")
* - pageVisited: c.req.path
* - metadata: { method, statusCode: c.res.status }
*
* Log entries are written for both success and error responses.
* Does NOT throw if audit logging fails — errors are logged but the user's
* request is not affected.
*/
export const portalAudit: MiddlewareHandler<PortalEnv> = async (c, next) => {
await next();
const sessionId = c.get("portalSessionId");
if (!sessionId) return;
const method = c.req.method;
const routePath = c.req.path;
const pageVisited = c.req.path;
const statusCode = c.res.status;
try {
const db = getDb();
await db
.insert(impersonationAuditLogs)
.values({
sessionId,
action: `${method} ${routePath}`,
pageVisited,
metadata: { method, statusCode },
})
.returning();
} catch (err) {
console.error("[portalAudit] Failed to write audit log:", err);
}
};
-40
View File
@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
import type { MiddlewareHandler } from "hono";
import { and, eq, getDb, impersonationSessions } from "@groombook/db";
export interface PortalEnv {
Variables: {
portalClientId: string;
portalSessionId: string;
};
}
/**
* Validates the X-Impersonation-Session-Id header against the impersonationSessions table.
* Must be applied to all portal routes.
*
* Reads x-session-id from request headers, queries impersonationSessions for a row where
* id = sessionId AND status = 'active', and checks session.expiresAt > new Date().
* Returns 401 if session is invalid/missing/expired.
* On success, sets c.set("portalClientId", session.clientId) and c.set("portalSessionId", session.id).
*/
export const validatePortalSession: MiddlewareHandler<PortalEnv> = async (c, next) => {
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
if (!sessionId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const db = getDb();
const [session] = await db
.select()
.from(impersonationSessions)
.where(and(eq(impersonationSessions.id, sessionId), eq(impersonationSessions.status, "active")))
.limit(1);
if (!session || session.expiresAt <= new Date()) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
c.set("portalClientId", session.clientId);
c.set("portalSessionId", session.id);
await next();
};
+3 -3
View File
@@ -166,9 +166,9 @@ export function requireRoleOrSuperUser(
}
return c.json(
{
error: hasAllowedRole
? "Forbidden: super user privileges required"
: `Forbidden: role '${staffRow.role}' is not permitted`,
error: staffRow.isSuperUser
? `Forbidden: role '${staffRow.role}' is not permitted`
: "Forbidden: super user privileges required",
},
403
);
+11 -24
View File
@@ -268,36 +268,29 @@ bookRouter.get("/confirm/:token", async (c) => {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
// Reject if appointment is in the past
if (appt.startTime < new Date()) {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
// Idempotent confirm: if already confirmed, redirect to success
if (appt.confirmationStatus === "confirmed") {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/confirmed`);
}
// Reject if already cancelled
if (appt.confirmationStatus === "cancelled") {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
const updated = await db
await db
.update(appointments)
.set({
confirmationStatus: "confirmed",
confirmedAt: new Date(),
updatedAt: new Date(),
})
.where(
and(
eq(appointments.confirmationToken, token),
eq(appointments.confirmationStatus, "pending")
)
)
.returning();
if (updated.length === 0) {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
.where(eq(appointments.id, appt.id));
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/confirmed`);
});
@@ -319,15 +312,19 @@ bookRouter.get("/cancel/:token", async (c) => {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
// Reject if appointment is in the past
if (appt.startTime < new Date()) {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
// Reject if already cancelled (token was nullified — this path won't normally hit,
// but guard against edge cases where token lookup still works)
if (appt.confirmationStatus === "cancelled") {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
const updated = await db
// Single-use cancellation: nullify token after use
await db
.update(appointments)
.set({
confirmationStatus: "cancelled",
@@ -335,17 +332,7 @@ bookRouter.get("/cancel/:token", async (c) => {
confirmationToken: null,
updatedAt: new Date(),
})
.where(
and(
eq(appointments.confirmationToken, token),
eq(appointments.confirmationStatus, "pending")
)
)
.returning();
if (updated.length === 0) {
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/error`);
}
.where(eq(appointments.id, appt.id));
return c.redirect(`${BASE_URL()}/booking/cancelled`);
});
+2 -13
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { randomBytes, timingSafeEqual } from "node:crypto";
import { randomBytes } from "node:crypto";
import {
and,
eq,
@@ -84,18 +84,7 @@ calendarRouter.get("/:staffId.ics", async (c) => {
.where(eq(staff.id, staffId))
.limit(1);
if (!staffMember || !staffMember.icalToken) {
return c.text("Unauthorized", 401);
}
const storedToken = staffMember.icalToken;
const incomingToken = token;
const storedBuf = Buffer.from(storedToken, "utf8");
const incomingBuf = Buffer.from(incomingToken, "utf8");
if (
storedBuf.length !== incomingBuf.length ||
!timingSafeEqual(storedBuf, incomingBuf)
) {
if (!staffMember || staffMember.icalToken !== token) {
return c.text("Unauthorized", 401);
}
+122 -23
View File
@@ -1,22 +1,33 @@
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { zValidator } from "@hono/zod-validator";
import { z } from "zod/v3";
import { eq, inArray } from "@groombook/db";
import { and, eq, inArray } from "@groombook/db";
import { getDb, appointments, impersonationSessions, waitlistEntries, clients, pets, services, staff, invoices, invoiceLineItems } from "@groombook/db";
import { validatePortalSession } from "../middleware/portalSession.js";
import { portalAudit } from "../middleware/portalAudit.js";
import type { PortalEnv } from "../middleware/portalSession.js";
import type { AppEnv } from "../middleware/rbac.js";
export const portalRouter = new Hono<PortalEnv>();
export const portalRouter = new Hono<AppEnv>();
// Apply middleware to all portal routes
portalRouter.use("/*", validatePortalSession, portalAudit);
// ─── Session helper ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function getClientIdFromSession(sessionId: string | null | undefined): Promise<string | null> {
if (!sessionId) return null;
const db = getDb();
const [session] = await db
.select()
.from(impersonationSessions)
.where(and(eq(impersonationSessions.id, sessionId), eq(impersonationSessions.status, "active")))
.limit(1);
if (!session || session.expiresAt <= new Date()) return null;
return session.clientId;
}
// ─── GET routes ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
portalRouter.get("/me", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const [client] = await db.select().from(clients).where(eq(clients.id, clientId)).limit(1);
if (!client) return c.json({ error: "Not found" }, 404);
@@ -38,7 +49,9 @@ portalRouter.get("/services", async (c) => {
portalRouter.get("/appointments", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const now = new Date();
const allAppts = await db
@@ -88,7 +101,9 @@ portalRouter.get("/appointments", async (c) => {
portalRouter.get("/pets", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const clientPets = await db.select().from(pets).where(eq(pets.clientId, clientId));
return c.json(clientPets.map(p => ({ id: p.id, name: p.name, breed: p.breed, weightKg: p.weightKg, dateOfBirth: p.dateOfBirth, photoKey: p.photoKey, groomingNotes: p.groomingNotes })));
@@ -96,7 +111,9 @@ portalRouter.get("/pets", async (c) => {
portalRouter.get("/invoices", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const clientInvoices = await db.select().from(invoices).where(eq(invoices.clientId, clientId));
const invoiceIds = clientInvoices.map(i => i.id);
@@ -131,7 +148,12 @@ portalRouter.patch(
const db = getDb();
const id = c.req.param("id");
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [appt] = await db
.select()
@@ -174,7 +196,12 @@ portalRouter.patch(
portalRouter.post("/appointments/:id/confirm", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const id = c.req.param("id");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [appt] = await db
.select()
@@ -223,7 +250,12 @@ portalRouter.post("/appointments/:id/confirm", async (c) => {
portalRouter.post("/appointments/:id/cancel", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const id = c.req.param("id");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [appt] = await db
.select()
@@ -287,7 +319,28 @@ portalRouter.post(
async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
let clientId: string | null = null;
if (sessionId) {
const [session] = await db
.select()
.from(impersonationSessions)
.where(
and(
eq(impersonationSessions.id, sessionId),
eq(impersonationSessions.status, "active")
)
)
.limit(1);
if (session && session.expiresAt > new Date()) {
clientId = session.clientId;
}
}
if (!clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [entry] = await db
.insert(waitlistEntries)
@@ -311,7 +364,26 @@ portalRouter.patch(
const db = getDb();
const id = c.req.param("id");
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
if (!sessionId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [session] = await db
.select()
.from(impersonationSessions)
.where(
and(
eq(impersonationSessions.id, sessionId),
eq(impersonationSessions.status, "active")
)
)
.limit(1);
if (!session || session.expiresAt <= new Date()) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [existing] = await db
.select()
@@ -320,7 +392,7 @@ portalRouter.patch(
.limit(1);
if (!existing) return c.json({ error: "Not found" }, 404);
if (existing.clientId !== clientId) {
if (existing.clientId !== session.clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Forbidden" }, 403);
}
@@ -342,7 +414,26 @@ portalRouter.patch(
portalRouter.delete("/waitlist/:id", async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const id = c.req.param("id");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
if (!sessionId) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [session] = await db
.select()
.from(impersonationSessions)
.where(
and(
eq(impersonationSessions.id, sessionId),
eq(impersonationSessions.status, "active")
)
)
.limit(1);
if (!session || session.expiresAt <= new Date()) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const [entry] = await db
.select()
@@ -351,7 +442,7 @@ portalRouter.delete("/waitlist/:id", async (c) => {
.limit(1);
if (!entry) return c.json({ error: "Not found" }, 404);
if (entry.clientId !== clientId) {
if (entry.clientId !== session.clientId) {
return c.json({ error: "Forbidden" }, 403);
}
@@ -384,7 +475,9 @@ portalRouter.post(
async (c) => {
const db = getDb();
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const invoiceRows = await db
.select()
@@ -421,7 +514,9 @@ portalRouter.post(
);
portalRouter.get("/payment-methods", async (c) => {
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const methods = await listPaymentMethods(clientId);
if (methods === null) return c.json({ error: "Payment service unavailable" }, 503);
@@ -429,7 +524,9 @@ portalRouter.get("/payment-methods", async (c) => {
});
portalRouter.post("/payment-methods", async (c) => {
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const stripePublishableKey = process.env.STRIPE_PUBLISHABLE_KEY ?? "";
const customerId = await getOrCreateStripeCustomer(clientId);
@@ -442,7 +539,9 @@ portalRouter.post("/payment-methods", async (c) => {
});
portalRouter.delete("/payment-methods/:id", async (c) => {
const clientId = c.get("portalClientId");
const sessionId = c.req.header("X-Impersonation-Session-Id");
const clientId = await getClientIdFromSession(sessionId);
if (!clientId) return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
const paymentMethodId = c.req.param("id");
+37 -84
View File
@@ -4,24 +4,6 @@ import { z } from "zod/v3";
import { and, eq, getDb, sql, staff, businessSettings, authProviderConfig, encryptSecret } from "@groombook/db";
import type { AppEnv } from "../middleware/rbac.js";
const RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
const RATE_LIMIT_MAX = 10;
const rateLimitMap = new Map<string, { count: number; resetAt: number }>();
function rateLimitByIp(ip: string): { allowed: boolean; remaining: number } {
const now = Date.now();
const entry = rateLimitMap.get(ip);
if (!entry || now > entry.resetAt) {
rateLimitMap.set(ip, { count: 1, resetAt: now + RATE_LIMIT_WINDOW_MS });
return { allowed: true, remaining: RATE_LIMIT_MAX - 1 };
}
if (entry.count >= RATE_LIMIT_MAX) {
return { allowed: false, remaining: 0 };
}
entry.count++;
return { allowed: true, remaining: RATE_LIMIT_MAX - entry.count };
}
export const setupRouter = new Hono<AppEnv>();
// GET /api/setup/status — public (no auth), returns whether setup is needed
@@ -203,74 +185,52 @@ const authProviderTestSchema = z.object({
* After setup completes, this endpoint permanently returns 403.
*/
setupRouter.post("/auth-provider", async (c) => {
const ip = c.req.header("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() ?? "unknown";
const { allowed, remaining } = rateLimitByIp(ip);
c.res.headers.set("x-rate-limit-remaining", String(remaining));
if (!allowed) {
return c.json({ error: "Too many requests. Please try again later." }, 429);
}
const db = getDb();
let row: typeof authProviderConfig.$inferSelect;
try {
row = await db.transaction(async (tx) => {
const [superUser] = await tx
.select({ id: staff.id })
.from(staff)
.where(eq(staff.isSuperUser, true))
.limit(1);
// Guard: only allow during fresh install (no super user yet)
const [superUser] = await db
.select({ id: staff.id })
.from(staff)
.where(eq(staff.isSuperUser, true))
.limit(1);
if (superUser) {
throw Object.assign(new Error("setup-complete"), { code: 403 });
}
if (superUser) {
// Setup already completed — lock this endpoint permanently
return c.json({ error: "Setup has already been completed. This endpoint is no longer available." }, 403);
}
const [existingConfig] = await tx
.select({ id: authProviderConfig.id })
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
// Guard: ensure no DB config already exists (should be redundant with status check but defensive)
const [existingConfig] = await db
.select({ id: authProviderConfig.id })
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
if (existingConfig) {
throw Object.assign(new Error("config-exists"), { code: 409 });
}
if (existingConfig) {
return c.json({ error: "Auth provider is already configured." }, 409);
}
const body = authProviderBootstrapSchema.parse(await c.req.json());
const body = authProviderBootstrapSchema.parse(await c.req.json());
const encryptedSecret = encryptSecret(body.clientSecret);
// Encrypt clientSecret before storing
const encryptedSecret = encryptSecret(body.clientSecret);
const [configRow] = await tx
.insert(authProviderConfig)
.values({
providerId: body.providerId,
displayName: body.displayName,
issuerUrl: body.issuerUrl,
internalBaseUrl: body.internalBaseUrl ?? null,
clientId: body.clientId,
clientSecret: encryptedSecret,
scopes: body.scopes,
enabled: true,
})
.returning();
const [row] = await db
.insert(authProviderConfig)
.values({
providerId: body.providerId,
displayName: body.displayName,
issuerUrl: body.issuerUrl,
internalBaseUrl: body.internalBaseUrl ?? null,
clientId: body.clientId,
clientSecret: encryptedSecret,
scopes: body.scopes,
enabled: true,
})
.returning();
if (!configRow) {
throw Object.assign(new Error("insert-failed"), { code: 500 });
}
return configRow;
});
} catch (err: unknown) {
const e = err as Error & { code?: number };
if (e.message === "setup-complete") {
return c.json({ error: "Setup has already been completed. This endpoint is no longer available." }, e.code as 403);
}
if (e.message === "config-exists") {
return c.json({ error: "Auth provider is already configured." }, e.code as 409);
}
if (e.message === "insert-failed") {
return c.json({ error: "Failed to save auth provider configuration." }, e.code as 500);
}
throw err;
if (!row) {
return c.json({ error: "Failed to save auth provider configuration." }, 500);
}
return c.json({
@@ -294,13 +254,6 @@ setupRouter.post("/auth-provider", async (c) => {
* Only available when needsSetup is true (no super user = fresh install).
*/
setupRouter.post("/auth-provider/test", async (c) => {
const ip = c.req.header("x-forwarded-for")?.split(",")[0]?.trim() ?? "unknown";
const { allowed, remaining } = rateLimitByIp(ip);
c.res.headers.set("x-rate-limit-remaining", String(remaining));
if (!allowed) {
return c.json({ ok: false, error: "Too many requests. Please try again later." }, 429);
}
const db = getDb();
// Guard: only allow during fresh install (no super user yet)