feat(GRO-2319): dev→uat — live StatusBadge palette (web) (#70)

AGENTS.md

@@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
-# AGENTS.md
-
-This repository (`groombook/web`) is part of the GroomBook application stack. The
-authoritative process, quality bar, and safety rules live in the shared
-[`groombook/org`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org) skills repository. Read
-those first; this file is only a pointer.
-
-## Authoritative skills
-
-- **SDLC (branching, PRs, phases, handoffs):**
-  [`groombook/org/skills/sdlc/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/sdlc/SKILL.md)
-- **Coding standards (priority ordering, PR discipline, tests, no-hardcoded-values, CalVer):**
-  [`groombook/org/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md)
-- **Safety (no plaintext secrets, no direct `kubectl apply` to `groombook`, no self-merge, board approval for destructive actions):**
-  [`groombook/org/skills/safety/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/safety/SKILL.md)
-
-For human contributors and humans reviewing agent work, see
-[`CONTRIBUTING.md`](./CONTRIBUTING.md) in this repo for the phase-by-phase PR
-flow and the `uat→main` merge-gate policy summary.
-
-## Non-negotiable operational rules
-
-These mirror the org skills; they are restated here so any agent landing in
-this repo sees them without a cross-repo fetch.
-
-- **All changes go through a PR.** Never push directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`.
-- **Branch strategy:** `feature/<name>` → `dev` → `uat` → `main`. Engineers
-  always target `dev` first.
-- **No self-merge contract.** The engineer who opened a PR clicks merge only
-  after the named reviewer (CI / QA / UAT / Security / CTO per phase)
-  approves. Issue-thread QA / UAT / security approvals do **not** clear the
-  Gitea `required_approvals` gate on `uat→main` — only a Gitea **Approve**
-  click from a member of the `approvals_whitelist_username` does. On this
-  repo that whitelist is `["gb_flea", "gb_dogfather"]` (engineer team).
-  Board-level accounts cannot give the Approve click by policy.
-- **Always include `cc @cpfarhood`** at the bottom of every PR body for
-  board visibility (not as a reviewer).
-- **Secrets in code are forbidden.** Use Bitnami Sealed Secrets; never commit
-  plaintext. See the `safety` skill.
-- **Production (`groombook` namespace) is Flux-managed.** Never
-  `kubectl apply` directly. Infrastructure changes go through PRs in
-  `groombook/infra`.
-
-## Local development
-
-See the repo's own README, package scripts, and CI workflow. The
-authoritative pipeline (Gitea Actions, image build, deploy hooks) is the
-shared `groombook/infra` overlay; do not reimplement it here.
-
-## When uncertain
-
-If a task conflicts with the org skills, **the org skills win**. Open an
-issue in `groombook/org` to propose a change rather than encoding a local
-exception.

CONTRIBUTING.md

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-# Contributing to `groombook/web`
-
-Thanks for contributing. This document is the human-facing companion to
-[`AGENTS.md`](./AGENTS.md) and the authoritative
-[`groombook/org`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org) skills. The org skills
-govern; this file is a quick-reference for the human/agent PR flow in this
-repo.
-
-## Branch strategy
-
-Three long-lived branches; one PR per promotion step.
-
-| Branch  | Environment | Who merges | Prerequisites for merge |
-|---------|-------------|-----------|-------------------------|
-| `dev`   | Dev         | Engineer  | CI passes               |
-| `uat`   | UAT         | Engineer  | QA code review approval |
-| `main`  | Production  | Engineer  | UAT validation + CTO Gitea Approve when the `uat→main` merge-gate policy applies (see below) |
-
-Engineers always target `dev` first. Feature branches: `<agent-name>/<short-description>`.
-
-## Phase-by-phase PR flow
-
-### Phase 1 — Dev
-
-1. Branch from `dev`: `git checkout -b <name>/<short-description> origin/dev`.
-2. Write code + tests. Run unit tests, type check, and lint locally (or rely on CI).
-3. Open a PR against `dev`:
-   ```bash
-   tea pr create --base dev --title "..." --body "..."
-   ```
-   Include `cc @cpfarhood` at the bottom of the body for board visibility.
-4. CI must pass. CI green → engineer self-merges.
-5. CI builds and deploys to Dev automatically.
-
-### Phase 2 — UAT promotion
-
-1. Open a PR from `dev` to `uat`.
-2. CI must pass.
-3. **QA (Lint Roller)** reviews and approves on the Gitea PR.
-4. QA approved → engineer self-merges.
-5. CI builds and deploys to UAT automatically.
-
-### Phase 3 — UAT regression + Security review
-
-1. **UAT (Shedward Scissorhands)** runs full regression against UAT — every
-   feature, old and new, no exceptions.
-2. **Security (Barkley Trimsworth)** reviews the changes.
-3. Failures in either gate bounce back to Phase 1.
-
-### Phase 4 — Production promotion (`uat → main`)
-
-This is the gate the org PR
-[`groombook/org#13`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/pulls/13) defines.
-The full rule is in
-[`groombook/org/skills/sdlc/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/sdlc/SKILL.md)
-and
-[`groombook/org/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md);
-the summary is below.
-
-**The CTO Gitea Approve click is NOT the default gate.** Once the four
-pre-gates (QA, UAT deploy, UAT regression, security) are green, the engineer
-self-merges.
-
-**A CTO Gitea Approve click IS required** only for PRs in one of three
-categories:
-
-1. **Novel auth / session paths** — login, OIDC, OOBE, session middleware,
-   token issuance, password reset, MFA, new auth provider integrations.
-   Routine auth-gated UI (button styling, error messages, form layout) is
-   **not** in this category.
-2. **Infra / prod-affecting merges** — deploys, infra manifests, secrets,
-   GitOps overlays, CI/CD, `main` branch protection, production
-   routing/ingress, prod state mutations. All Phase 5 infra overlay PRs in
-   `groombook/infra` require CTO Gitea Approve without exception.
-3. **Risk-flagged merges** — `risk:cto-approve` label, or explicit CTO/CEO
-   sign-off request in the PR or issue thread.
-
-The engineer opens the `uat→main` PR, classifies it against the three
-categories above, and adds `cc @cpfarhood`. If the PR is in scope, the CTO
-clicks Approve; once approved (and the four pre-gates are green), the
-engineer merges.
-
-### Phase 5 — Production deployment
-
-A separate PR in `groombook/infra` bumps the overlay image tag for prod.
-Handed to QA (Lint Roller) for review, then self-merged by the engineer.
-
-## The four pre-gates (uat→main)
-
-A `uat→main` PR is mergeable when **all four** are green:
-
-1. **QA code review** — done on the dev→uat promotion PR.
-2. **UAT deploy** — the UAT image built from the uat tip is live in UAT.
-3. **UAT regression** — Shedward's full-feature UAT pass is green (no
-   pre-existing defects, no new defects).
-4. **Security review** — Barkley's security code review is green.
-
-Issue-thread QA / UAT / security approvals do **not** clear the Gitea
-`required_approvals` gate. Only a Gitea **Approve** click from a member of
-the `approvals_whitelist_username` for `main` clears it. In this repo that
-whitelist is the engineer team (`gb_flea`, `gb_dogfather`).
-
-## Style, tests, and quality bar
-
-See
-[`groombook/org/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/coding-standards/SKILL.md)
-for the engineering priority ordering, test requirements, no-hardcoded-values
-rules, CalVer versioning policy, and the `git.farh.net` container registry
-policy.
-
-## Safety
-
-See
-[`groombook/org/skills/safety/SKILL.md`](https://git.farh.net/groombook/org/src/branch/main/skills/safety/SKILL.md)
-for the non-negotiable rules: no plaintext secrets, no `kubectl apply` to
-`groombook`, no self-merge, no direct `tofu` runs, board approval for
-destructive actions, escalation protocol.

UAT_PLAYBOOK.md

@@ -447,8 +447,7 @@ These cases cover the `CustomerPortal` initialisation path that bridges an Authe
 | TC-WEB-5.25.3 | Subsequent portal calls use the bridged session ID | After TC-WEB-5.25.1 succeeds, navigate to **Appointments**, **My Pets**, **Billing**, **Settings**. Inspect any `/api/portal/*` request in DevTools → Network. | Each portal API call carries an `X-Impersonation-Session-Id` header whose value equals the `sessionId` returned by `session-from-auth` (not a URL-param value). Each call returns 200 (or 404 for genuinely empty collections), never 401. |
 | TC-WEB-5.25.4 | No impersonation chrome for the customer's own session | After TC-WEB-5.25.1, scan the portal UI. | No amber border around the page. No "STAFF VIEW" watermark. No "End Impersonation" button in the sidebar. The customer is themselves; only impersonation sessions started via `?sessionId=` show the banner. |
 | TC-WEB-5.25.5 | 404 fallback for authenticated user with no client record | 1. Sign in via SSO with an Authentik account whose email is **not** present in `clients`. 2. Land on `/`. | `POST /api/portal/session-from-auth` returns 404. The portal renders a centred card titled **"Portal access not configured"** with the message about contacting the groomer and a **Sign out** button. No redirect loop, no portal chrome. |
-| TC-WEB-5.25.6 | 404 fallback Sign-out escape hatch (GRO-2358) | From TC-WEB-5.25.5 click **Sign out**. | The shared `signOut()` from `lib/auth-client` fires (same handler as `AdminLayout`); browser navigates to `/login`; the Authentik session cookie is cleared. Reloading `/` no longer hits 404 (will show the login page). The handler always navigates to `/login` — even if the network call to `/api/auth/sign-out` fails — so a transient auth-server hiccup never leaves the user trapped on an authenticated screen. |
-| TC-WEB-5.25.6b | 404 fallback Sign-out on deep-link (GRO-2358) | From TC-WEB-5.25.5, instead of staying on `/`, navigate directly to a portal sub-route (e.g. `/appointments`, `/pets`, `/billing`). The no-access card renders. Click **Sign out**. | The same shared `signOut()` handler fires and the browser navigates to `/login`. The no-access screen must surface an escape hatch on every authenticated route — not just `/` — so a stale or deep link into a portal the user has no access to can never trap them. |
+| TC-WEB-5.25.6 | 404 fallback Sign-out escape hatch | From TC-WEB-5.25.5 click **Sign out**. | `POST /api/auth/sign-out` fires; browser navigates to `/login`; the Authentik session cookie is cleared. Reloading `/` no longer hits 404 (will show the login page). |
 | TC-WEB-5.25.7 | Bridge precedence — impersonation URL wins | 1. Sign in via SSO as a customer. 2. Open a new tab to `https://uat.groombook.dev/?sessionId=<a-valid-staff-impersonation-session-id>`. | The impersonation path runs; the amber banner appears for the impersonated client. The Better Auth bridge is **not** called on this load (`session-from-auth` absent in Network). |
 | TC-WEB-5.25.8 | Bridge precedence — dev user wins | In dev mode (e.g. local) with `localStorage["dev-user"]` set to a client persona, navigate to `/`. | The dev-session path runs (`POST /api/portal/dev-session`). The Better Auth bridge is **not** called (`session-from-auth` absent in Network). Staff dev users still redirect to `/admin`. |
 | TC-WEB-5.25.9 | Staff Better Auth session does not run the customer bridge | Sign in via SSO with a staff identity. Navigate to `/`. | `App.tsx` routing redirects to `/admin`. `POST /api/portal/session-from-auth` is **not** called. |

src/__tests__/portal.test.tsx

@@ -21,18 +21,6 @@ vi.mock("../portal/sections/Appointments.js", async () => {
   };
 });
 
-// Spy on the canonical `signOut()` from the shared auth-client so we can
-// assert the no-access screen's logout button uses the SAME handler as
-// `AdminLayout`. We mock at the module boundary — the no-access screen is
-// the one authenticated surface that renders without the portal chrome, so
-// a regression here would trap the user. We do NOT use `importActual`
-// because the real `createAuthClient()` requires a runtime `baseURL`
-// (Better Auth) that the JSDOM test environment can't supply.
-const signOutSpy = vi.hoisted(() => vi.fn(async () => undefined));
-vi.mock("../lib/auth-client.js", () => ({
-  signOut: signOutSpy,
-}));
-
 const SESSION: ImpersonationSession = {
   id: "sess-1",
   staffId: "staff-1",
@@ -348,8 +336,6 @@ describe("CustomerPortal SSO bridge", () => {
   beforeEach(() => {
     // Make sure no dev-user leaks across tests
     window.localStorage.clear();
-    // Reset shared signOut() spy so per-test counts are deterministic
-    signOutSpy.mockClear();
   });
 
   const brandingResponse = {
@@ -443,132 +429,6 @@ describe("CustomerPortal SSO bridge", () => {
     expect(screen.getByRole("button", { name: /Sign out/i })).toBeInTheDocument();
   });
 
-  it("calls the shared signOut() handler and navigates to /login from the no-access screen (GRO-2358)", async () => {
-    // Reset the spy so previous tests don't leak into this assertion.
-    signOutSpy.mockClear();
-
-    // JSDOM throws on window.location.href assignment by default; swap in a
-    // writable stub so the navigation is observable, then restore after.
-    const originalLocation = window.location;
-    Object.defineProperty(window, "location", {
-      value: { href: "" },
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: true,
-    });
-
-    global.fetch = vi.fn((input: RequestInfo) => {
-      const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input.toString();
-      if (url === "/api/branding") return Promise.resolve(brandingResponse);
-      if (url === "/api/auth/get-session") {
-        return Promise.resolve({
-          ok: true,
-          json: async () => ({ user: { email: "stranger@example.com", role: "customer" } }),
-        } as Response);
-      }
-      if (url === "/api/portal/session-from-auth") {
-        return Promise.resolve({
-          ok: false,
-          status: 404,
-          json: async () => ({ error: "No client record found for this user" }),
-        } as Response);
-      }
-      return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, json: async () => ({}) } as Response);
-    }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
-
-    const { CustomerPortal } = await import("../portal/CustomerPortal.js");
-    render(
-      <MemoryRouter initialEntries={["/"]}>
-        <CustomerPortal />
-      </MemoryRouter>
-    );
-
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(screen.getByText(/Portal access not configured/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
-    });
-
-    // Pre-condition: the shared signOut() must NOT have been called yet — the
-    // no-access screen is mounted because the bridge failed, not because the
-    // user clicked anything.
-    expect(signOutSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
-
-    // Drive the click. The handler is the SAME `signOut()` exported from
-    // auth-client that AdminLayout uses, so verifying this call is enough to
-    // prove the no-access screen reaches the canonical sign-out surface.
-    const signOutButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /Sign out/i });
-    fireEvent.click(signOutButton);
-
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(signOutSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    });
-
-    // The handler always navigates to /login — even if the network call to
-    // /api/auth/sign-out fails — so a transient auth-server hiccup never
-    // leaves the user trapped on an authenticated screen.
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(window.location.href).toBe("/login");
-    });
-
-    Object.defineProperty(window, "location", { value: originalLocation, configurable: true });
-  });
-
-  it("reaches the same shared signOut() on a deep-link no-access screen (GRO-2358)", async () => {
-    // AC requires verifying the SAME logout handler is reachable from at
-    // least one other authenticated surface — here a deep link to a portal
-    // sub-route (e.g. /appointments) for a user with a Better Auth session
-    // but no client record. The no-access screen is the only authenticated
-    // surface without a route guard, so the handler must fire identically.
-    signOutSpy.mockClear();
-
-    const originalLocation = window.location;
-    Object.defineProperty(window, "location", {
-      value: { href: "" },
-      writable: true,
-      configurable: true,
-    });
-
-    global.fetch = vi.fn((input: RequestInfo) => {
-      const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input.toString();
-      if (url === "/api/branding") return Promise.resolve(brandingResponse);
-      if (url === "/api/auth/get-session") {
-        return Promise.resolve({
-          ok: true,
-          json: async () => ({ user: { email: "stranger@example.com", role: "customer" } }),
-        } as Response);
-      }
-      if (url === "/api/portal/session-from-auth") {
-        return Promise.resolve({
-          ok: false,
-          status: 404,
-          json: async () => ({ error: "No client record found for this user" }),
-        } as Response);
-      }
-      return Promise.resolve({ ok: true, json: async () => ({}) } as Response);
-    }) as unknown as typeof fetch;
-
-    const { CustomerPortal } = await import("../portal/CustomerPortal.js");
-    render(
-      <MemoryRouter initialEntries={["/appointments"]}>
-        <CustomerPortal />
-      </MemoryRouter>
-    );
-
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(screen.getByText(/Portal access not configured/i)).toBeInTheDocument();
-    });
-
-    const signOutButton = screen.getByRole("button", { name: /Sign out/i });
-    fireEvent.click(signOutButton);
-
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(signOutSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
-    });
-    await waitFor(() => {
-      expect(window.location.href).toBe("/login");
-    });
-
-    Object.defineProperty(window, "location", { value: originalLocation, configurable: true });
-  });
-
   it("does not call session-from-auth when there is no Better Auth session", async () => {
     global.fetch = vi.fn((input: RequestInfo) => {
       const url = typeof input === "string" ? input : input.toString();

src/portal/CustomerPortal.tsx

@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ import { ImpersonationBanner } from "./ImpersonationBanner.js";
 import { AuditLogViewer } from "./AuditLogViewer.js";
 import { useBranding } from "../BrandingContext.js";
 import { getDevUser } from "../pages/DevLoginSelector.js";
-import { signOut } from "../lib/auth-client.js";
 import type { ImpersonationSession } from "@groombook/types";
 import type { Appointment as PortalAppointment } from "./sections/Appointments.js";
 
@@ -194,19 +193,6 @@ export function CustomerPortal() {
     }
   }, [session]);
 
-  // Shared sign-out handler — wires the canonical Better Auth `signOut()` so
-  // every authenticated surface (no-access screen, portal chrome, etc.) uses
-  // the same implementation as `AdminLayout`. Failure to reach the server
-  // still leaves the SPA free to navigate to /login.
-  const handleSignOut = useCallback(async () => {
-    try {
-      await signOut();
-    } catch {
-      // Best-effort; navigate to /login regardless so the user is never trapped.
-    }
-    window.location.href = "/login";
-  }, []);
-
   const logPageView = useCallback((page: string) => {
     if (!session) return;
     void fetch(`/api/impersonation/sessions/${session.id}/log`, {
@@ -295,7 +281,14 @@ export function CustomerPortal() {
             <h1 className="text-lg font-semibold text-stone-800 mb-2">Portal access not configured</h1>
             <p className="text-sm text-stone-600 mb-6">{authError}</p>
             <button
-              onClick={() => { void handleSignOut(); }}
+              onClick={async () => {
+                try {
+                  await fetch("/api/auth/sign-out", { method: "POST", credentials: "include" });
+                } catch {
+                  // Best-effort sign-out; redirect to /login regardless.
+                }
+                window.location.href = "/login";
+              }}
               className="inline-flex items-center justify-center gap-2 px-4 py-2 rounded-lg text-sm font-medium text-stone-700 bg-stone-100 hover:bg-stone-200 transition-colors"
             >
               <LogOut size={14} />