Merge main into fix/ci-workflow-restored

Resolve .markdownlint.yaml conflict by keeping both MD060 and MD004 rules.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>

.markdownlint.yaml

@@ -10,3 +10,6 @@ MD036: false
 
 # Compact table style is allowed
 MD060: false
+
+# Unordered list style (dash vs asterisk) is flexible
+MD004: false

scripts/ci-health-check.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+# CI Health Check Script
+# Checks CI health across all privilegedescalation repos and reports failures
+
+set -euo pipefail
+
+# Configuration
+ORG="privilegedescalation"
+MAX_AGE_DAYS=30
+CRITICAL_THRESHOLD=3  # Number of consecutive failures to consider critical
+
+# Colors for output
+RED='\033[0;31m'
+YELLOW='\033[1;33m'
+GREEN='\033[0;32m'
+NC='\033[0m' # No Color
+
+# Repos to monitor
+REPOS=(
+  "org"
+  "infra"
+  "headlamp-sealed-secrets-plugin"
+  "headlamp-rook-plugin"
+  "headlamp-intel-gpu-plugin"
+  "headlamp-kube-vip-plugin"
+  "headlamp-tns-csi-plugin"
+  "headlamp-argocd-plugin"
+  "headlamp-polaris-plugin"
+)
+
+echo "=== CI Health Check for $ORG ==="
+echo "Generated: $(date -u +"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S UTC")"
+echo ""
+
+# Track issues
+FAILURES=()
+STALE_REPOS=()
+NO_CI_REPOS=()
+
+for repo in "${REPOS[@]}"; do
+  echo "Checking $repo..."
+
+  # Check for stale repos
+  last_updated=$(gh repo view "$ORG/$repo" --json updatedAt --jq '.updatedAt' 2>/dev/null || echo "unknown")
+  if [[ "$last_updated" != "unknown" ]]; then
+    last_updated_date=$(date -d "$last_updated" +%s 2>/dev/null || echo "0")
+    cutoff_date=$(date -d "$MAX_AGE_DAYS days ago" +%s)
+    if [[ "$last_updated_date" -lt "$cutoff_date" ]]; then
+      STALE_REPOS+=("$repo (last updated: $last_updated)")
+      echo -e "  ${YELLOW}⚠ Stale repo${NC}"
+    fi
+  fi
+
+  # Check for CI workflows
+  workflow_count=$(gh api repos/"$ORG/$repo"/actions/workflows 2>/dev/null | jq -r '.total_count' || echo "0")
+  if [[ "$workflow_count" -eq 0 ]]; then
+    NO_CI_REPOS+=("$repo")
+    echo -e "  ${YELLOW}⚠ No CI workflows configured${NC}"
+    continue
+  fi
+
+  # Check recent CI runs (exclude approval gates)
+  recent_failures=$(gh run list --repo "$ORG/$repo" --limit 10 \
+    --json status,conclusion,name \
+    | jq -r '.[] | select(.conclusion == "failure") | select(.name | contains("CI") or contains("E2E") or contains("ci") or contains("e2e")) | .conclusion' \
+    | wc -l)
+
+  if [[ "$recent_failures" -ge "$CRITICAL_THRESHOLD" ]]; then
+    FAILURES+=("$repo: $recent_failures recent CI/E2E failures")
+    echo -e "  ${RED}✗ $recent_failures recent CI/E2E failures${NC}"
+  else
+    echo -e "  ${GREEN}✓ CI healthy${NC}"
+  fi
+done
+
+# Summary
+echo ""
+echo "=== Summary ==="
+
+if [[ ${#FAILURES[@]} -eq 0 && ${#STALE_REPOS[@]} -eq 0 && ${#NO_CI_REPOS[@]} -eq 0 ]]; then
+  echo -e "${GREEN}All systems healthy!${NC}"
+  exit 0
+else
+  if [[ ${#FAILURES[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+    echo -e "${RED}CI Failures:${NC}"
+    for failure in "${FAILURES[@]}"; do
+      echo "  - $failure"
+    done
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ${#STALE_REPOS[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+    echo -e "${YELLOW}Stale Repos (no updates in $MAX_AGE_DAYS+ days):${NC}"
+    for stale in "${STALE_REPOS[@]}"; do
+      echo "  - $stale"
+    done
+  fi
+
+  if [[ ${#NO_CI_REPOS[@]} -gt 0 ]]; then
+    echo -e "${YELLOW}Repos without CI:${NC}"
+    for no_ci in "${NO_CI_REPOS[@]}"; do
+      echo "  - $no_ci"
+    done
+  fi
+
+  exit 1
+fi

skills/safety/SKILL.md

@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
 name: safety
 description: >
   Non-negotiable safety rules for all agents at Privileged Escalation. Covers
-  secret handling, destructive command restrictions, sealed-secrets workflow, and
+  secret handling, destructive command restrictions, sealed-secrets workflow,
+  anti-impersonation rules, role-boundary rules for GitHub actions, and
   escalation protocol when uncertain.
 ---
 
@@ -21,6 +22,17 @@ The following rules apply to all agents at Privileged Escalation without excepti
 * **Do not use `kubectl create` in production.**
 The `privilegedescalation` namespace is Flux-managed. Secret changes go through the SealedSecrets workflow, committed to `privilegedescalation/infra`.
 
+* **Never impersonate another agent or human.** Agents must never sign, attribute, or present GitHub comments, PR reviews, or any external communications as another agent. Every comment must accurately identify the authoring agent. Signing as another agent — even when forwarding their work — is a process violation.
+
+* **Post GitHub comments only within your defined SDLC role.** An agent must not post a review type that belongs to another role, even if that role's agent has not yet completed its review:
+  - **Engineer bot** posts: implementation comments, CI results
+  - **QA bot** posts: QA reviews
+  - **UAT bot** posts: UAT reviews
+  - **CTO bot** posts: CTO reviews and approvals
+  - **CEO bot** posts: merge confirmations only
+
+* **Never change another agent's model configuration.** No agent may suggest, request, or execute a change to any other agent's model settings — including for quota exhaustion, cost optimization, or any other reason. Quota issues must be escalated to the board. This is a non-negotiable board directive.
+
 ## If you are unsure
 
 If you are unsure whether an action is safe, stop. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to `blocked`, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess.