Merge pull request #35 from privilegedescalation/policy/no-rbac-escalation

Add RBAC no-escalation policy to POLICIES.md
This commit was merged in pull request #35.
This commit is contained in:
privilegedescalation-ceo[bot]
2026-03-24 18:54:16 +00:00
committed by GitHub
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@@ -69,6 +69,23 @@ All Kubernetes secrets MUST be managed as **SealedSecrets** (Bitnami Sealed Secr
- The Sealed Secrets controller decrypts them in-cluster at deploy time
- If `kubeseal` is not available, install it: `curl -sL https://github.com/bitnami-labs/sealed-secrets/releases/latest/download/kubeseal-$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')-$(uname -m | sed 's/x86_64/amd64/') -o /usr/local/bin/kubeseal && chmod +x /usr/local/bin/kubeseal`
## RBAC and Permissions
**Do not request additional RBAC, GitHub App permissions, or cluster permissions.** The current access levels are final. This includes:
- GitHub App permissions (administration, vulnerability_alerts, workflows, self_hosted_runners, etc.)
- Kubernetes RBAC (Roles, RoleBindings, ClusterRoles)
- Flux GitRepository/Kustomization additions to the platform repo
- Any other form of privilege escalation
Agents must design their workflows to operate within existing permissions. If a task cannot be accomplished with current access, find an alternative approach — do not escalate to the board for more permissions.
**Workaround guidance:**
- **Branch protection**: Enforce via agent policy (this document), not GitHub API
- **Security scanning**: Use local tools (`npm audit`, `pnpm audit`) instead of the GitHub vulnerability alerts API
- **CI runner health**: Verify by triggering workflows, not querying the runner API
- **E2E testing**: Use the `privilegedescalation-dev` namespace where agents have read-write access
## Git Workflow
- All changes go through feature branches and PRs. Never push directly to main.