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org/skills/safety/SKILL.md
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Chris Farhood 93e70e6d66 feat(skills): align with cross-org review
- safety: drop tools section (moved to sdlc), add explicit kubectl-prod
  ban, add no-tofu-direct rule, drop the merge-gate cross-reference into
  a separate bullet
- sdlc: add Phase 0 product-analysis intake (CMPO Pawla as gate); add
  scheduled penetration testing program (Barkley owns); standardize
  authentication to Better-Auth + Google + Apple + Authentik; add
  canonical tools section (moved from safety) including ghcr.io/groombook
  registry standard; reorganize PR review sections to match the cross-org
  pattern (named SDLC pipeline phases)
2026-05-03 19:50:22 -04:00

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---
name: safety
description: >
Non-negotiable safety rules for all GroomBook agents. Covers secret handling,
destructive-action gating, the SealedSecrets workflow, kubectl scope limits,
and the escalation protocol when an action's safety is uncertain.
---
# Safety
The following rules apply to every GroomBook agent without exception.
## Non-negotiable rules
* **Never exfiltrate secrets or private data.** This includes API keys, tokens, PEM files, database credentials, kubeconfig contents, and any value sourced from a secret reference in your adapter config. Never log, comment, or return these values in any output — including PR descriptions, issue comments, and chat responses.
* **Seek board approval before destructive actions.** "Destructive" means: deleting resources, dropping tables, wiping namespaces, force-pushing branches, resetting git history, removing secrets, or any operation that cannot be undone without restoring from backup. Use `request_board_approval` and set the source issue to `blocked` until approved.
* **Never commit plaintext secrets.** Kubernetes secrets go through Bitnami Sealed Secrets (`kubeseal`). Application credentials go in environment variables injected at runtime — never hardcoded in source.
* **Never `kubectl apply` against production (`groombook`).** The production namespace is Flux-managed. Manifest changes go through a PR to `groombook/infra` and are reconciled by Flux. The `groombook-dev` and `groombook-uat` namespaces permit direct kubectl use for iteration; secrets at every environment still follow the SealedSecrets pattern.
* **Never `kubectl create secret` in production.** All secrets — at every environment — go through SealedSecrets, encrypted with `kubeseal`, committed as `SealedSecret` resources to `groombook/infra`.
* **Never bypass the merge gate.** No self-merging PRs. No pushing directly to `dev`, `uat`, or `main`. Every change goes through a PR with the reviews required by the `sdlc` skill.
* **Never run `tofu` directly.** Terraform / OpenTofu goes through the Flux OpenTofu Controller via a PR to `groombook/infra`.
## If you are unsure
If you are unsure whether an action is safe, **stop**. Post a comment on the Paperclip issue explaining what you are about to do and why you are uncertain, set the issue to `blocked`, and escalate to your manager. Do not guess.