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Author SHA1 Message Date
gb_flea af1af5c211 ci: trigger CI run for ignore-error=true cache-to fix 2026-08-05 08:56:30 +00:00
Flea Flicker 713e8bf415 ci: add ignore-error=true to all cache-to targets
Gitea OCI registry sporadically rejects cache blob writes with
"error writing layer blob: unknown" — this fails the build step
even though the image itself was pushed successfully. Adding
ignore-error=true makes cache write failures non-fatal so the
build proceeds regardless of registry-side cache issues.

Fixes recurring CI failure on Build and push Seed image step.
2026-08-05 08:54:00 +00:00
Flea Flicker 8d42bfffc9 test(GRO-2652): add boot resilience UAT test cases (TC-API-19.x)
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New section 4.19 verifies:
- /health available before initAuth completes
- auth routes return 503 (not crash) during init retry window
- pod restart count stays stable after deploy
- retry log lines emitted correctly
- auth recovers after transient DB hiccup

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:22:00 +00:00
Flea Flicker 095efb1cca fix(GRO-2652): start server before initAuth; retry auth init on ECONNRESET
Previously: await initAuth() was a top-level ESM await. Any boot-time
ECONNRESET from Postgres propagated as an uncaught module-evaluation
error and killed the process before the server even started.

Now:
- serve() starts immediately so /health and public routes are available
- initAuth() runs in a retry loop (up to 10 attempts, exponential
  500 ms → 30 s); a permanent failure degrades to 503 on auth routes
  (existing catch-to-503 in authRouter) rather than crashing the pod

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:21:14 +00:00
Flea Flicker 632dadd064 fix(GRO-2652): retry DB query in initAuth on transient ECONNRESET
The auth_provider_config DB query at boot has no error handling;
a transient ECONNRESET causes authInitPromise to reject, propagating
to the top-level await initAuth() and crashing the process (exit 1).

Add up to 5 retry attempts with exponential backoff (1 s, 2 s, 4 s, 8 s)
so a single connection reset does not abort initialization.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:17:31 +00:00
Flea Flicker dace2c4e66 fix(GRO-2586): enforce trusted-origins allowlist on Better Auth CORS responses (#219)
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fix(GRO-2586): enforce trusted-origins allowlist on Better Auth CORS responses

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-26 13:35:59 +00:00
Flea Flicker c01e4acf0a feat(GRO-2425): split CORS_ORIGIN on commas for multiple trusted auth origins (#216)
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feat(GRO-2425): split CORS_ORIGIN on commas for multiple trusted auth origins

Co-authored-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>
Co-committed-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>
2026-06-18 00:46:29 +00:00
Flea Flicker 10b78d810d Merge pull request 'feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE' (#212) from feature/2357-p2-portal-clients-from-auth into dev
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GRO-2359 (api): feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE (#212)
2026-06-11 16:34:34 +00:00
Flea Flicker cdeebec021 feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE (web)
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The OOBE flow on the web portal calls this endpoint to create a fresh
`clients` row bound to the Better Auth user's email when the SSO
bridge returns 404. Returns 201 on success, 409 if a client with that
email already exists (portal-selection case), 401/503 on auth issues,
400 on invalid body.

The OOBE success path navigates the user back to `/` and lets the
existing `session-from-auth` re-bridge; the new client is now
resolvable by email, so the bridge mints a real portal session.

Tests cover: 401 (no session), 400 (zod), 201 + persisted values
(name trimmed, optional fields normalized to null), 409 (existing
client or unique-constraint race), 503 (auth not configured).

Paired with the web PR on `feature/2357-p2-sso-to-oobe-routing`.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-11 16:17:16 +00:00
8 changed files with 464 additions and 199 deletions
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@@ -108,6 +108,11 @@ Expected: one row, `role = 'groomer'`. If zero rows return, the request hit the
| TC-API-1.24 | Complete setup creates super user | POST /api/setup with business name (after TC-API-1.23) | First user becomes super user, setup completes | Setup errors, 403 on admin endpoints |
| TC-API-1.25 | Super user accesses admin features | After TC-API-1.24, GET /api/staff/me and verify isSuperUser: true | isSuperUser: true, admin endpoints accessible | 403 on admin, isSuperUser: false |
| TC-API-1.26 | Auto-provision skipped during OOBE | During fresh setup (needsSetup: true), complete OIDC login — verify no duplicate staff record created before setup completes | No duplicate staff, OOBE completes successfully | Duplicate staff record, 403 before setup, auto-provision interferes with OOBE |
| TC-API-1.27 | Multi-origin CORS — demo host sign-in | `POST /api/auth/sign-in/social` with `callbackURL=https://demo.groombook.dev` | 200 OK, no origin-mismatch error | 400/403 "Origin mismatch" |
| TC-API-1.28 | Multi-origin CORS — farh.net host sign-in | `POST /api/auth/sign-in/social` with `callbackURL=https://groombook.farh.net` | 200 OK, no origin-mismatch error | 400/403 "Origin mismatch" |
| TC-API-1.29 | CORS — untrusted origin blocked (GRO-2586) | POST /api/auth/sign-in/social with `Origin: https://evil.example.com` header | Response has **no** `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header — attacker origin is not reflected | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.example.com` present in response |
| TC-API-1.30 | CORS — trusted origin allowed (GRO-2586) | POST /api/auth/sign-in/social with `Origin: https://uat.groombook.dev` header | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://uat.groombook.dev` + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` | CORS header absent or trusted origin rejected |
| TC-API-1.31 | CORS — untrusted preflight blocked (GRO-2586) | `curl -i -X OPTIONS https://uat.groombook.dev/api/auth/sign-in/social -H 'Origin: https://evil.example.com' -H 'Access-Control-Request-Method: POST'` | Response has **no** `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.example.com` | Preflight reflects attacker origin |
### 4.2 Client Management
@@ -434,6 +439,22 @@ Both use the stops' stored `latitude`/`longitude` in `stopOrder`: **origin = fir
| TC-API-18.10 | Groomer cannot export another's route | As groomer, export a route owned by a different groomer | 403 Forbidden (`groomers may only access their own route`) |
| TC-API-18.11 | Receptionist denied | As **receptionist**, export any route | 403 Forbidden (role not permitted) |
### 4.19 Boot Resilience — ECONNRESET Recovery (GRO-2652)
Verifies the API process does not crash on transient boot-time DB connection resets and that auth routes degrade gracefully until initialization succeeds.
| TC | Test Case | Steps | Expected Result |
|----|-----------|-------|-----------------|
| TC-API-19.1 | Health endpoint available before auth init | 1. Deploy the image (or restart the api pod)<br>2. `GET /health` immediately (within first 2 s of pod start) | 200 `{"status":"ok"}` — server accepts requests before `initAuth()` completes |
| TC-API-19.2 | Auth routes return 503 when auth not yet initialized | 1. Temporarily set `OIDC_ISSUER` to an unreachable host so `initAuth()` keeps retrying<br>2. `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` during the retry window | 503 `{"error":"Authentication not configured"}` — process stays alive, does not exit |
| TC-API-19.3 | Pod does not crash on first-attempt DB reset | 1. Review pod restart count after normal deployment<br>2. Confirm `kubectl get pod -n groombook` shows `RESTARTS: 0` (or same as before deploy) for the new pod | No new restarts — ECONNRESET causes retry, not process exit |
| TC-API-19.4 | DB query retry log lines visible | After deploy, `kubectl logs -n groombook <api-pod>` | If any DB retry occurred, log lines matching `[auth] DB query attempt N failed` are present; on clean boot no retry lines appear |
| TC-API-19.5 | Auth init retry log lines visible | When auth init fails and retries, check pod logs | Log lines matching `[auth] initAuth attempt N failed` present; process continues; no `process.exit` |
| TC-API-19.6 | Auth succeeds after transient DB hiccup | 1. Allow pod to retry until DB is available<br>2. `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` with valid credentials after init succeeds | 200 with session cookie — auth recovers without pod restart |
| TC-API-19.7 | Normal sign-in still works end-to-end | Follow TC-WEB-SSO-3 (SSO sign-in) on UAT | Successful sign-in, staff list visible — no regression from resilience changes |
| TC-API-19.8 | Public routes unaffected during auth retry | While auth is retrying (TC-API-19.2 setup), `GET /api/branding` | 200 with branding data — public routes bypass auth and serve normally |
## Pass/Fail Criteria
**Pass:**
+60
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@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { enforceAuthCors } from "../lib/auth-cors.js";
const TRUSTED = ["https://uat.groombook.dev", "https://dev.groombook.dev"];
/** Simulates Better Auth reflecting the request Origin (the pre-fix bug). */
function makeReflectedResponse(origin: string | null): Response {
return new Response('{"ok":true}', {
status: 200,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
...(origin
? {
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": origin,
"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials": "true",
}
: {}),
},
});
}
describe("enforceAuthCors (GRO-2586)", () => {
it("passes trusted origin through with credentials", () => {
const origin = "https://uat.groombook.dev";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBe(origin);
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBe("true");
});
it("strips ACAO for attacker origin (credentialed cross-origin read blocked)", () => {
const origin = "https://evil.example.com";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBeNull();
});
it("strips ACAO when no Origin header (undefined)", () => {
const res = enforceAuthCors(undefined, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(null));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBeNull();
});
it("preserves non-CORS response headers and status from Better Auth", () => {
const origin = "https://evil.example.com";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Content-Type")).toBe("application/json");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("second trusted origin is also allowed", () => {
const origin = "https://dev.groombook.dev";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBe(origin);
});
it("empty string origin is treated as untrusted", () => {
const res = enforceAuthCors("", TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(""));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
});
});
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@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { getAuth } from "../lib/auth.js";
const NEW_USER_EMAIL = "new-sso-user@example.com";
const NEW_USER_NAME = "New SSO User";
const NEW_USER_ID = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555";
const BETTER_AUTH_SESSION = {
user: {
id: "auth-user-new",
email: NEW_USER_EMAIL,
name: NEW_USER_NAME,
},
session: {
id: "ba-session-new",
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000),
},
};
let mockGetAuth: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
let mockGetSession: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
let existingClientRow: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let insertedClientValues: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let insertShouldThrow: { code?: string } | null = null;
function makeChainable(data: unknown[]): unknown {
const arr = [...data];
return new Proxy(arr, {
get(target, prop) {
if (prop === "where" || prop === "orderBy" || prop === "limit") {
return () => makeChainable(target);
}
// @ts-expect-error proxy
return target[prop];
},
});
}
vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
const clients = new Proxy(
{ _name: "clients" },
{ get: (t, p) => (p === "_name" ? "clients" : { table: "clients", column: p }) }
);
return {
getDb: () => ({
select: () => ({
from: (table: { _name: string }) => {
if (table._name === "clients") {
return makeChainable(existingClientRow ? [existingClientRow] : []);
}
return makeChainable([]);
},
}),
insert: (table: { _name: string }) => ({
values: (vals: Record<string, unknown>) => {
if (insertShouldThrow) {
const err = new Error("unique violation") as Error & { code?: string };
err.code = insertShouldThrow.code;
throw err;
}
return {
returning: () => {
if (table._name === "clients") {
insertedClientValues = { id: NEW_USER_ID, ...vals };
return [insertedClientValues];
}
return [];
},
};
},
}),
}),
clients,
eq: vi.fn(),
and: vi.fn(),
inArray: vi.fn(),
};
});
vi.mock("../lib/auth.js", () => ({
getAuth: vi.fn(),
}));
const { portalRouter } = await import("../routes/portal.js");
const app = new Hono();
app.route("/portal", portalRouter);
describe("POST /portal/clients-from-auth (GRO-2359)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
existingClientRow = null;
insertedClientValues = null;
insertShouldThrow = null;
mockGetSession = vi.fn();
mockGetAuth = vi.fn(() => ({
api: {
getSession: mockGetSession,
},
}));
vi.mocked(getAuth).mockImplementation(mockGetAuth);
});
it("returns 401 when no Better Auth session is present", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(null);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test User" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
});
it("returns 400 when body fails zod validation (empty name)", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it("creates a new client row bound to the auth user's email and returns 201", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
name: " New SSO User ",
phone: "555-1234",
address: "1 Main St",
notes: "test note",
}),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body).toMatchObject({
id: NEW_USER_ID,
name: "New SSO User",
email: NEW_USER_EMAIL,
});
// Trim must be applied to the persisted values.
expect(insertedClientValues).not.toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).name).toBe("New SSO User");
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).email).toBe(NEW_USER_EMAIL);
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).phone).toBe("555-1234");
});
it("normalizes empty optional fields to null on insert", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test", phone: "", address: " " }),
});
expect(insertedClientValues).not.toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).phone).toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).address).toBeNull();
});
it("returns 409 when a client row already exists for this email", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
existingClientRow = { id: "existing-client-id", email: NEW_USER_EMAIL };
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toMatch(/already exists/i);
expect(insertedClientValues).toBeNull();
});
it("returns 409 on unique constraint race (23505)", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
insertShouldThrow = { code: "23505" };
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it("returns 503 when auth is not configured", async () => {
mockGetAuth.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error("Auth not initialized");
});
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
});
});
+26 -4
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@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { Hono } from "hono";
import { logger } from "hono/logger";
import { cors } from "hono/cors";
import { getAuth, initAuth, getActiveProviders } from "./lib/auth.js";
import { enforceAuthCors } from "./lib/auth-cors.js";
import { clientsRouter } from "./routes/clients.js";
import { petsRouter } from "./routes/pets.js";
import { servicesRouter } from "./routes/services.js";
@@ -200,9 +201,10 @@ api.use("*", resolveStaffMiddleware);
// Better-Auth handler — mounted as sub-app to handle all /api/auth/* routes
// authMiddleware and resolveStaffMiddleware both skip /api/auth/ paths
const authRouter = new Hono();
authRouter.all("/*", (c) => {
authRouter.all("/*", async (c) => {
try {
return getAuth().handler(c.req.raw);
const res = await getAuth().handler(c.req.raw);
return enforceAuthCors(c.req.header("origin"), TRUSTED_ORIGINS, res);
} catch {
return c.json({ error: "Authentication not configured" }, 503);
}
@@ -290,14 +292,34 @@ api.route("/search", searchRouter);
api.route("/buffer-rules", bufferRulesRouter);
api.route("/routes", routesRouter);
// Start the HTTP server first so /health and public routes are available immediately.
// Auth initialization runs afterward with retry — a transient DB ECONNRESET at boot
// must not crash the process (GRO-2652). Auth routes return 503 until initAuth succeeds.
const port = Number(process.env.PORT ?? 3000);
await initAuth();
console.log(`API server listening on port ${port}`);
const server = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port });
console.log(`API server listening on port ${port}`);
// Start background reminder scheduler (runs every minute to check for upcoming appointments)
startReminderScheduler();
let initAttempt = 0;
while (true) {
try {
await initAuth();
break;
} catch (err) {
initAttempt++;
const delay = Math.min(2 ** initAttempt * 500, 30_000);
console.error(`[auth] initAuth attempt ${initAttempt} failed: ${err}`);
if (initAttempt >= 10) {
console.error("[auth] auth init permanently failed — auth endpoints will serve 503");
break;
}
console.error(`[auth] retrying in ${delay}ms`);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delay));
}
}
function shutdown() {
console.log("Shutting down gracefully...");
// SIGTERM/SIGINT → server.close() → callback → process.exit(0)
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
/**
* Enforces the trusted-origins CORS allowlist on a raw Response from Better Auth.
* Better Auth reflects the request Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin
* regardless of the trustedOrigins config, allowing credentialed cross-origin reads
* from arbitrary attacker origins. This wrapper strips CORS headers for any origin
* not in the allowlist. (GRO-2586)
*/
export function enforceAuthCors(
requestOrigin: string | undefined,
trustedOrigins: string[],
res: Response
): Response {
const headers = new Headers(res.headers);
if (requestOrigin && trustedOrigins.includes(requestOrigin)) {
headers.set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", requestOrigin);
headers.set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true");
} else {
headers.delete("Access-Control-Allow-Origin");
headers.delete("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials");
}
return new Response(res.body, { status: res.status, statusText: res.statusText, headers });
}
+25 -8
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@@ -118,18 +118,34 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
updateAge: 60 * 60 * 24,
cookieCache: { enabled: false },
},
trustedOrigins: [process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173"],
trustedOrigins: (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean),
});
return;
}
// Step 1: Try to load config from DB
// Step 1: Try to load config from DB, with retry-with-backoff for transient ECONNRESET (GRO-2652).
// A single connection reset during boot must not abort initialization.
const db = getDb();
const [dbConfig] = await db
.select()
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
let dbQueryRows: (typeof authProviderConfig.$inferSelect)[] = [];
let dbAttempt = 0;
while (true) {
try {
dbQueryRows = await db
.select()
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
break;
} catch (err) {
dbAttempt++;
if (dbAttempt >= 5) throw err;
const delay = Math.min(1000 * 2 ** (dbAttempt - 1), 8_000);
console.warn(`[auth] DB query attempt ${dbAttempt} failed (${err}), retrying in ${delay}ms`);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delay));
}
}
const [dbConfig] = dbQueryRows;
let providerConfig: {
providerId: string;
@@ -308,7 +324,8 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
maxAge: 5 * 60, // 5 minutes
},
},
trustedOrigins: [process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173"],
trustedOrigins: (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean),
});
})();
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@@ -147,6 +147,114 @@ portalRouter.post("/session-from-auth", async (c) => {
);
});
// GRO-2359 — register a brand-new SSO user. The post-auth handler in the
// web portal redirects here when `session-from-auth` returns 404, so the
// OOBE can complete a customer record for the new user. Auth is via the
// Better Auth session (same shape as `session-from-auth`), so this is
// registered BEFORE the `validatePortalSession` middleware.
//
// Contract:
// POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth
// Body: { name: string; phone?: string|null; address?: string|null; notes?: string|null }
// 201: { id, name, email }
// 400: invalid body (zod failure)
// 401: no Better Auth session
// 409: a `clients` row already exists for this email (portal selection case)
// 500: insert failed
//
// We do NOT auto-link the user's auth account to the new client row; the
// existing `session-from-auth` endpoint re-resolves the row by email on the
// next call, so the OOBE's success path just navigates the user back to
// `/` and lets the bridge mint a portal session.
const createClientFromAuthSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().min(1).max(200),
phone: z.string().max(50).nullish(),
address: z.string().max(500).nullish(),
notes: z.string().max(2000).nullish(),
});
portalRouter.post(
"/clients-from-auth",
zValidator("json", createClientFromAuthSchema),
async (c) => {
let auth;
try {
auth = getAuth();
} catch {
return c.json({ error: "Authentication not configured" }, 503);
}
const session = await auth.api.getSession({
headers: c.req.raw.headers,
});
if (!session) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const db = getDb();
// Pre-check: if a client already exists for this email, return 409 so
// the OOBE can render the "portal selection" message (the user needs
// to contact their groomer to link the new SSO identity to the
// pre-existing customer record). We don't return the existing row to
// avoid leaking PII about other accounts.
const [existing] = await db
.select({ id: clients.id })
.from(clients)
.where(eq(clients.email, session.user.email))
.limit(1);
if (existing) {
return c.json(
{ error: "A customer record with this email already exists" },
409,
);
}
let row;
try {
[row] = await db
.insert(clients)
.values({
name: body.name.trim(),
email: session.user.email,
phone: body.phone?.trim() || null,
address: body.address?.trim() || null,
notes: body.notes?.trim() || null,
})
.returning();
} catch (err) {
// Concurrent insert from a parallel OOBE submit — treat as 409.
if (
err instanceof Error &&
"code" in err &&
(err as { code?: string }).code === "23505"
) {
return c.json(
{ error: "A customer record with this email already exists" },
409,
);
}
throw err;
}
if (!row) {
return c.json({ error: "Failed to create client" }, 500);
}
return c.json(
{
id: row.id,
name: row.name,
email: row.email,
},
201,
);
},
);
// Apply middleware to all portal routes
portalRouter.use("/*", validatePortalSession, portalAudit);