Merge uat → main: portal pet PATCH + photoKey S3 key-hijack fix (GRO-2187) (#174)

Co-authored-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>
Co-committed-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>

.mcp.json

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+{
+  "mcpServers": {
+    "gitea": {
+      "type": "http",
+      "url": "https://git-mcp.farh.net/mcp",
+      "headers": {
+        "Authorization": "Bearer ${GITEA_TOKEN}"
+      }
+    }
+  }
+}

UAT_PLAYBOOK.md

@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ Geocoding turns a client's street address into `latitude`/`longitude` + `geocode
 | TC-API-3.19b | Get pet profile summary — customer cross-tenant blocked (GRO-2013) | Sign in as `uat-customer@groombook.dev`; reuse the customer's sessionId from TC-API-3.19a; `GET /api/pets/{otherClientPetId}/profile-summary` for a pet owned by a different client (`c0000002-...` or any non-customer pet) | 403 Forbidden (owner-bypass requires session.clientId === pet.clientId) |
 | TC-API-3.19c | Get pet profile summary — customer without portal session header | Same as TC-API-3.19a but omit the `X-Impersonation-Session-Id` header | 403 Forbidden (no owner-bypass without valid portal session) |
 | TC-API-3.19d | Get pet profile summary — owner-bypass writes audit row (GRO-2063) | Same setup as TC-API-3.19a (sign in as `uat-customer@groombook.dev`, establish a portal session for the customer's own clientId, call `GET /api/pets/{ownPetId}/profile-summary` with `X-Impersonation-Session-Id: {sessionId}` and a 200 OK response). Then call `GET /api/impersonation/sessions/{sessionId}/audit-log` and confirm there is exactly one entry with `action === "read_profile_summary"`, `pageVisited` matching the profile-summary path, and `metadata` containing `petId` and `actorStaffId` for the customer. Repeat TC-API-3.19b (cross-tenant attempt) and confirm NO new `read_profile_summary` row was written for the cross-tenant attempt. | 200 OK on the profile-summary call AND an audit log entry is present with the correct shape (defense-in-depth audit row; bypass attempts against other clients must NOT log) |
+| TC-UAT-2 | Groomer accesses linked pet profile summary (GRO-2100) | Sign in as `uat-groomer@groombook.dev`; `GET /api/pets/c0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000002/profile-summary` (UAT Pup Alpha — linked via deterministic completed appointment `a0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000001`, service `b0000001-…-0001` "Bath & Brush", `startTime` ~7 days ago) | 200 OK, `recentGroomingHistory[]` non-empty (>=1 entry), `visitCount >= 1`, `upcomingAppointment` null (the seeded appointment is in the past) |
+| TC-UAT-3 | Groomer blocked from unlinked pet profile summary (GRO-2100) | Sign in as `uat-groomer@groombook.dev`; `GET /api/pets/c0000001-0000-0000-0000-000000000003/profile-summary` (UAT Pup Beta — intentionally UNLINKED; no appointment row references this pet's clientId+groomerId combo) | 403 Forbidden (RBAC `groomer` role lacks the appointment-linkage grant for this pet). NOTE: if 404 is returned instead of 403, file a separate RBAC defect (not against the seed) — see GRO-2100 verification note |
 | TC-API-3.29 | Get pet profile summary — unknown UUID returns 404 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000001/profile-summary while authenticated (any role) | 404 Not Found with body `{"error":"Not found"}` (was empty-body 500 in GRO-2014) |
 | TC-API-3.30 | Get pet profile summary — malformed UUID returns 404 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/not-a-uuid/profile-summary while authenticated | 404 Not Found with body `{"error":"Not found"}` (was empty-body 500 in GRO-2014 — Postgres uuid cast failure) |
 | TC-API-3.31 | Get pet profile summary — never empty-body 500 (GRO-2014) | GET /api/pets/{anyId}/profile-summary across the test sweep | No response has status 500 with an empty body. Any 500 must include a JSON body `{"error":"Internal Server Error"}` |

src/__tests__/portalPets.test.ts

@@ -177,7 +177,10 @@ describe("PATCH /portal/pets/:petId", () => {
     expect(persisted.weightKg).toBe("18.25");
     expect(persisted.groomingNotes).toBe("old grooming notes");
     expect(persisted.healthAlerts).toBe("Allergic to oatmeal shampoo");
-    expect(persisted.photoKey).toBe("pets/rex.jpg");
+    // photoKey is NOT writable via portal PATCH (GRO-2187 S3 key-hijack fix):
+    // the web form round-trips the GET-shaped photoUrl, but the server must not
+    // persist it. Photo changes go through the key-validated upload flow.
+    expect(persisted.photoKey).toBeUndefined();
     expect(persisted.coatType).toBe("double");
     expect(persisted.petSizeCategory).toBe("extra_large");
     expect(persisted.preferredCuts).toEqual(["teddy bear", "puppy cut"]);
@@ -187,6 +190,55 @@ describe("PATCH /portal/pets/:petId", () => {
     expect(persisted.updatedAt).toBeInstanceOf(Date);
   });
 
+  // GRO-2187 security regression: a portal customer must not be able to set the
+  // S3 object key. photoKey is consumed server-side by getPresignedGetUrl /
+  // deleteObject; the upload path guards keys with a pets/{petId}/ prefix, and the
+  // portal PATCH must not offer a bypass. A foreign/arbitrary photoUrl is accepted
+  // (Zod strips the unknown key) but must leave photoKey untouched.
+  it("does not mutate photoKey when a foreign photoUrl is supplied (200)", async () => {
+    selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
+    const ownKey = `pets/${PET_ID}/original.jpg`;
+    selectPetRow = { ...PET, photoKey: ownKey };
+
+    const res = await jsonPatch(
+      `/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
+      {
+        name: "Rex",
+        // attacker-chosen key pointing at another tenant's object
+        photoUrl: "pets/00000000-0000-0000-0000-0000000000ff/victim-secret.jpg",
+      },
+      { "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
+    );
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+    const persisted = updatedValues[0]!;
+    // The attacker-supplied key never reaches the update payload.
+    expect(persisted.photoKey).toBeUndefined();
+    // And the stored key is unchanged from the pet's own value.
+    const body = await res.json();
+    expect(body.photoUrl).toBe(ownKey);
+  });
+
+  // The length/array caps live in the Zod schema, so violations are rejected by
+  // zValidator with 400 (in-handler enum checks are what return 422).
+  it("returns 400 when a medicalAlert description exceeds the length cap", async () => {
+    selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
+    selectPetRow = PET;
+
+    const res = await jsonPatch(
+      `/portal/pets/${PET_ID}`,
+      {
+        medicalAlerts: [
+          { type: "allergy", description: "x".repeat(2001), severity: "low" },
+        ],
+      },
+      { "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID }
+    );
+
+    expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+    expect(updatedValues).toHaveLength(0);
+  });
+
   it("falls back to the weight key when weightKg is absent", async () => {
     selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
     selectPetRow = PET;

src/routes/portal.ts

@@ -261,8 +261,8 @@ const PORTAL_PET_SIZE_ALIASES: Record<string, string> = { xlarge: "extra_large"
 
 const portalMedicalAlertSchema = z.object({
   id: z.string().optional(),
-  type: z.string(),
+  type: z.string().max(2000),
-  description: z.string(),
+  description: z.string().max(2000),
   severity: z.enum(["low", "medium", "high"]),
 });
 
@@ -275,12 +275,16 @@ const portalPetUpdateSchema = z.object({
   birthDate: z.string().nullable().optional(),
   notes: z.string().max(2000).nullable().optional(),
   healthAlerts: z.string().max(2000).nullable().optional(),
-  photoUrl: z.string().nullable().optional(),
+  // photoUrl/photoKey are intentionally NOT writable here: photoKey is a trusted
+  // S3 object key consumed server-side (getPresignedGetUrl / deleteObject), and the
+  // upload path (pets.ts) already enforces a pets/{petId}/ prefix guard against key
+  // hijacking. Photo changes go through the dedicated upload + /photo/confirm flow.
+  // The web form round-trips the GET-shaped photoUrl; Zod strips it as an unknown key.
   // coatType / petSizeCategory validated in-handler so bad values return 422.
   coatType: z.string().nullable().optional(),
   petSizeCategory: z.string().nullable().optional(),
-  preferredCuts: z.array(z.string()).nullable().optional(),
+  preferredCuts: z.array(z.string().max(2000)).max(50).nullable().optional(),
-  medicalAlerts: z.array(portalMedicalAlertSchema).nullable().optional(),
+  medicalAlerts: z.array(portalMedicalAlertSchema).max(50).nullable().optional(),
 });
 
 portalRouter.patch(
@@ -322,7 +326,8 @@ portalRouter.patch(
 
     if (body.notes !== undefined) updateData.groomingNotes = body.notes;
     if (body.healthAlerts !== undefined) updateData.healthAlerts = body.healthAlerts;
-    if (body.photoUrl !== undefined) updateData.photoKey = body.photoUrl;
+    // photoKey is intentionally not writable here — see portalPetUpdateSchema note.
+    // Photo changes go through the key-validated upload + /photo/confirm flow.
 
     if (body.coatType !== undefined) {
       if (body.coatType !== null && !PORTAL_COAT_TYPES.includes(body.coatType)) {