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Flea Flicker 62c80ca8d0 fix(test): de-flake authProvider.test.ts OOBE test-connection (GRO-2745)
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2026-08-22 08:49:43 +00:00
Flea Flicker bb55c658a5 fix(test): de-flake authProvider.test.ts OOBE test-connection timeout (GRO-2745)
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Mock global.fetch in the test-connection test so it no longer hits the
real network. The route has a 10s fetch timeout, but the test used the
default 5s vitest timeout, causing intermittent failures when DNS/network
was slow. Add afterEach(vi.restoreAllMocks) to clean up between tests,
and reconcile the misleading "returns 400" test title to match the 200
assertion the route actually produces.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-22 08:39:25 +00:00
Flea Flicker 38380d0398 fix(db): GRO-2722 schema-safe reset — TRUNCATE, no DROP
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2026-08-16 13:16:59 +00:00
Flea Flicker 7c6346c799 docs(uat): add TC-API-3.30 schema-safe reset verification (GRO-2722)
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UAT_PLAYBOOK.md §3 — new test case TC-API-3.30:
trigger reset-demo-data CronJob manually, confirm job succeeds,
public tables/enums and drizzle schema survive, demo data reseeded,
/api/readyz stays 200.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-16 13:14:40 +00:00
Flea Flicker 7af16ee4e6 fix(db): replace DROP-based reset with TRUNCATE RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE
GRO-2722: packages/db/src/reset.ts and apps/api/src/db/reset.ts no longer
emit any DROP TABLE / DROP TYPE / DROP SCHEMA / DROP DATABASE DDL. The four
destructive DO-blocks are replaced with a single:

  TRUNCATE <all public tables> RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE

Table names are enumerated dynamically via pg_tables WHERE schemaname='public'
so new tables are picked up automatically. The drizzle schema and
__drizzle_migrations table are untouched (different schema), keeping
drizzle-kit migrate a no-op on an already-migrated DB.

Preserves: production guard (NODE_ENV=production && ALLOW_RESET!='true'),
advisory lock, migrations (drizzle-kit migrate), and seed (runSeedBody).

Fixes the GRO-2678 prod outage root cause.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-16 13:13:29 +00:00
Flea Flicker 413849f066 fix(auth): add /api/readyz to auth bypass list (GRO-2692)
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CI passed (run #4322). Self-merging Phase 1 per SDLC gate.
2026-08-09 10:15:45 +00:00
Flea Flicker 9227cf4883 fix(api): add /api/readyz to authMiddleware bypass (GRO-2687 UAT fix)
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2026-08-09 09:54:35 +00:00
Flea Flicker 7dfa1ad830 fix(auth): add /api/readyz to auth middleware bypass list (GRO-2692)
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/api/readyz is a public monitoring endpoint like /api/health.
app.basePath("/api") + api.use("*", authMiddleware) applies to all
/api/* paths regardless of route registration order (GRO-2692 UAT
failure: Hono basePath middleware bypass).

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-09 09:53:19 +00:00
Flea Flicker 8f5a069e77 fix(api): add /api/readyz to authMiddleware bypass list (GRO-2687)
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/api/readyz was returning 401 Unauthorized in UAT (GRO-2692 Shedward
regression). The authMiddleware for /api/* did not whitelist /api/readyz,
causing every unauthenticated probe request to be rejected.

Add /api/readyz to the bypass condition alongside /api/auth/* and
/api/health. Add readyz-auth-bypass.test.ts confirming the route passes
through the middleware without auth and that non-whitelisted paths still
block (503 when auth not configured).

Closes GRO-2692 regression (UAT fail).
2026-08-09 09:52:37 +00:00
Flea Flicker 07717afd01 revert(api): remove /health/ready — superseded by /api/readyz (GRO-2689)
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2026-08-09 09:50:43 +00:00
Flea Flicker d8f6981be1 revert(api): remove /health/ready — superseded by /api/readyz (GRO-2689)
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CTO architectural ruling (PR #235 review): K8s readiness/liveness probes
must remain DB-less to prevent transient DB blips from cycling pods. The
/api/readyz endpoint (GRO-2687) is the canonical DB-health signal for the
monitoring layer and satisfies the GRO-2678 detection-gap requirement.

Removes:
- GET /health/ready route from src/index.ts
- src/__tests__/health-ready.test.ts

Refs GRO-2689, GRO-2687, GRO-2678
2026-08-09 09:48:10 +00:00
Flea Flicker d7bb314087 feat(api): add DB-touching /health/ready readiness probe (GRO-2678)
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2026-08-09 09:26:17 +00:00
Flea Flicker 7679fada0a feat(api): add DB-touching /health/ready readiness probe (GRO-2678)
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Register GET /health/ready before the /api/* auth middleware so it is
public and reachable by K8s readinessProbe on port 3000 without auth.
On success → 200 {"status":"ready"}; on any DB/schema failure → 503
{"status":"degraded"}. Logs the pg error code; never leaks SQL in body.
A dropped schema (42P01) surfaces as non-200, closing the /health mask
that allowed the GRO-2678 incident to go undetected for ~43h.

Add health-ready.test.ts covering the 200 success path, 503 on schema
drop (42P01), and 503 on connection error; all assert no SQL leakage.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-09 09:21:56 +00:00
Flea Flicker a164c24e8e feat(api): add DB-touching /api/readyz so schema loss cannot hide behind /health (GRO-2678)
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2026-08-09 09:11:35 +00:00
Flea Flicker 6148ae6439 ci: retrigger after seed-image registry push flake
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Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-09 09:10:10 +00:00
Flea Flicker f54a13fc8a feat(api): add DB-touching /api/readyz so schema loss cannot hide behind /health (GRO-2678)
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- Register GET /api/readyz after /api/health in src/index.ts (before authMiddleware)
- Runs `getDb().select({id: staff.id}).from(staff).limit(1)` inside try/catch
- Success → 200 {"status":"ready"}; failure → 503 {"status":"degraded","check":"db"}
- Raw driver error is console.error'd but never leaked to the response body
- /health and /api/health are unchanged (K8s probes remain DB-less per CTO decision)
- New unit tests: mock getDb to resolve → assert 200/ready; throw → assert 503/degraded
- Updated UAT_PLAYBOOK.md §4.0 with TC-API-0.2 and TC-API-0.3

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-09 09:02:39 +00:00
Flea Flicker f7f90a71fc fix(GRO-2672): use drizzle-kit migrate in reset.ts to bypass HWM bug
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drizzle-orm's migrate() has a high-water-mark (HWM) bug: on a fresh DB,
migration 0000 sets the watermark to 2026-03-17. Migrations 0001, 0003,
0010, 0011 have stale 2025-era `when` timestamps and are silently
skipped. Migration 0003 (recurring_series) is the blocker — its skip
leaves `recurring_series`, `appointments.series_id`, and
`appointments.series_index` missing. A downstream migration inside
migrate()'s single Postgres transaction then fails, rolling back
everything including 0000's `staff` and `services` tables.

Replace the drizzle-orm migrate() call with `pnpm exec drizzle-kit
migrate` (hash-based). drizzle-kit applies every unhashed migration
regardless of `when` ordering, matching the K8s migrate Job exactly.
2026-08-06 09:14:55 +00:00
Flea Flicker f1b0a53520 test(GRO-2652): stub fetch in auth tests to fix OIDC discovery timeout flake
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AbortSignal.timeout(5000) in initAuth's discovery fetch races with
vitest's 5000ms default test timeout, causing intermittent failures on CI push
runs. Stub fetch to return ok:false instantly so tests complete in <1s.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 10:04:31 +00:00
Flea Flicker f32e9a6889 fix(GRO-2652): reset authInitPromise on failure so retry loop actually retries
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Merging Phase 1 fix — CI all green (lint, test, build all success). Resolves QA's retry-memoization concern from PR #223 review.
2026-08-05 10:00:12 +00:00
Flea Flicker a1b27b5501 fix(GRO-2652): reset authInitPromise on failure so retry loop actually retries
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Previously the initAuth() function set authInitPromise to the async IIFE's
Promise but never cleared it on rejection. The index.ts retry loop called
initAuth() up to 10 times, but on attempt 2+ the check
`if (authInitPromise) { await authInitPromise; return; }` would immediately
re-throw the original rejection without performing a real retry.

Fix: wrap the final `await authInitPromise` in try/catch and reset
authInitPromise = null on error. This allows the index.ts retry loop to
create a fresh attempt on each call after a failure.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 09:52:31 +00:00
Flea Flicker ae0ce3824f fix(GRO-2652): reset authInitPromise on failure so retry loop actually retries
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Previously the initAuth() function set authInitPromise to the async IIFE's
Promise but never cleared it on rejection. The index.ts retry loop called
initAuth() up to 10 times, but on attempt 2+ the check
`if (authInitPromise) { await authInitPromise; return; }` would immediately
re-throw the original rejection without performing a real retry.

Fix: wrap the final `await authInitPromise` in try/catch and reset
authInitPromise = null on error. This allows the index.ts retry loop to
create a fresh attempt on each call after a failure.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 09:44:12 +00:00
Flea Flicker f98c5ccaf7 fix(GRO-2652): restore ci.yml from double-base64 corruption + UAT_PLAYBOOK §4.20 clients-from-auth
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2026-08-05 09:29:16 +00:00
Flea Flicker 61f23e47f1 docs(GRO-2359): add UAT_PLAYBOOK §4.20 clients-from-auth test cases
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Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 09:20:03 +00:00
Flea Flicker ab5f08e4c0 fix(GRO-2652): restore ci.yml from double-base64 corruption; fix outpuds typo
Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 09:19:55 +00:00
gb_flea 5accf73363 ci: trigger CI for dev branch (PR-223 dev→uat) 2026-08-05 09:04:17 +00:00
Flea Flicker 299a157561 fix(GRO-2652): boot ECONNRESET resilience — retry-with-backoff in initAuth, server-first startup
Merges feature/GRO-2652-boot-econnreset-resilience into dev. CI passed (run #440). Fixes PROD CrashLoopBackOff caused by bare top-level await initAuth() + unhandled ECONNRESET in auth_provider_config DB query.
2026-08-05 09:01:12 +00:00
gb_flea af1af5c211 ci: trigger CI run for ignore-error=true cache-to fix 2026-08-05 08:56:30 +00:00
Flea Flicker 713e8bf415 ci: add ignore-error=true to all cache-to targets
Gitea OCI registry sporadically rejects cache blob writes with
"error writing layer blob: unknown" — this fails the build step
even though the image itself was pushed successfully. Adding
ignore-error=true makes cache write failures non-fatal so the
build proceeds regardless of registry-side cache issues.

Fixes recurring CI failure on Build and push Seed image step.
2026-08-05 08:54:00 +00:00
Flea Flicker 8d42bfffc9 test(GRO-2652): add boot resilience UAT test cases (TC-API-19.x)
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New section 4.19 verifies:
- /health available before initAuth completes
- auth routes return 503 (not crash) during init retry window
- pod restart count stays stable after deploy
- retry log lines emitted correctly
- auth recovers after transient DB hiccup

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:22:00 +00:00
Flea Flicker 095efb1cca fix(GRO-2652): start server before initAuth; retry auth init on ECONNRESET
Previously: await initAuth() was a top-level ESM await. Any boot-time
ECONNRESET from Postgres propagated as an uncaught module-evaluation
error and killed the process before the server even started.

Now:
- serve() starts immediately so /health and public routes are available
- initAuth() runs in a retry loop (up to 10 attempts, exponential
  500 ms → 30 s); a permanent failure degrades to 503 on auth routes
  (existing catch-to-503 in authRouter) rather than crashing the pod

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:21:14 +00:00
Flea Flicker 632dadd064 fix(GRO-2652): retry DB query in initAuth on transient ECONNRESET
The auth_provider_config DB query at boot has no error handling;
a transient ECONNRESET causes authInitPromise to reject, propagating
to the top-level await initAuth() and crashing the process (exit 1).

Add up to 5 retry attempts with exponential backoff (1 s, 2 s, 4 s, 8 s)
so a single connection reset does not abort initialization.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-08-05 08:17:31 +00:00
Flea Flicker dace2c4e66 fix(GRO-2586): enforce trusted-origins allowlist on Better Auth CORS responses (#219)
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fix(GRO-2586): enforce trusted-origins allowlist on Better Auth CORS responses

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-26 13:35:59 +00:00
Flea Flicker c01e4acf0a feat(GRO-2425): split CORS_ORIGIN on commas for multiple trusted auth origins (#216)
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feat(GRO-2425): split CORS_ORIGIN on commas for multiple trusted auth origins

Co-authored-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>
Co-committed-by: Flea Flicker <flea@groombook.dev>
2026-06-18 00:46:29 +00:00
Flea Flicker 10b78d810d Merge pull request 'feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE' (#212) from feature/2357-p2-portal-clients-from-auth into dev
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GRO-2359 (api): feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE (#212)
2026-06-11 16:34:34 +00:00
Flea Flicker cdeebec021 feat(GRO-2359): add POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth for OOBE (web)
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The OOBE flow on the web portal calls this endpoint to create a fresh
`clients` row bound to the Better Auth user's email when the SSO
bridge returns 404. Returns 201 on success, 409 if a client with that
email already exists (portal-selection case), 401/503 on auth issues,
400 on invalid body.

The OOBE success path navigates the user back to `/` and lets the
existing `session-from-auth` re-bridge; the new client is now
resolvable by email, so the bridge mints a real portal session.

Tests cover: 401 (no session), 400 (zod), 201 + persisted values
(name trimmed, optional fields normalized to null), 409 (existing
client or unique-constraint race), 503 (auth not configured).

Paired with the web PR on `feature/2357-p2-sso-to-oobe-routing`.

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-11 16:17:16 +00:00
Flea Flicker 1d6b906202 Merge pull request 'fix(GRO-2342): portal waitlist card populates service {id, name}' (#208) from feat/GRO-2342-portal-waitlist-servicename into dev
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2026-06-10 09:13:55 +00:00
Flea Flicker 277f459237 fix(GRO-2342): portal waitlist card populates service {id, name}
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Cosmetic follow-up to GRO-2319 (Phase 4 review by CTO). The synthetic
waitlist card on GET /portal/appointments returned service: {id} only,
so the portal fell back to the literal 'Service' label. CMPO spec did
not call for a service name on the waitlist card, but populating the
real name is non-urgent and closes the cosmetic gap.

- src/routes/portal.ts: include a services SELECT (in addition to
  pets and staff) covering both appointment and waitlist serviceIds.
  serviceMap feeds a service.name lookup. The synthetic waitlist
  card's service object is now {id, name} — same shape the
  appointments join returns — so the portal renders the real name.
  The appointments join also gains a name (consistent shape, no
  regression for the existing path).
- src/__tests__/portal.test.ts: mock the services table and assert
  service: {id, name} on both the synthetic waitlist card and the
  appointment card.
- UAT_PLAYBOOK.md: TC-API-8.20 covering the waitlist card service
  name (TC-API-8.19 retained verbatim for the original GRO-2319
  surfacing contract).

Co-Authored-By: Paperclip <noreply@paperclip.ing>
2026-06-10 09:11:08 +00:00
Flea Flicker ef18ed7376 feat(GRO-2319): surface active waitlist entries on portal appointments + seed (#204)
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2026-06-09 10:41:08 +00:00
Flea Flicker d61607f4c5 feat(seed): seed upcoming appointments across statuses for UAT portal customer (GRO-2311) (#201)
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2026-06-09 09:53:04 +00:00
Flea Flicker 2853ce73a5 GRO-2172: add missing extended pet fields to create/update schemas (#199)
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2026-06-09 08:56:22 +00:00
Flea Flicker 1e0747324d fix(GRO-2139): serialize reset→migrate→seed under the seed advisory lock (#160)
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Serialize the entire db:reset chain (DROP → migrate → seed) inside one withSeedAdvisoryLock callback so a concurrent same-PRNG seeder cannot interleave and collide on invoices_pkey. Pool sized max:6 (1 reserved for the lock + work headroom) to avoid the connection-starvation deadlock the CTO caught. Verified with three end-to-end live db:reset runs against a throwaway Postgres.

cc @cpfarhood
2026-06-09 08:44:58 +00:00
Flea Flicker b4b48f7b50 fix(GRO-2299): redact googleMapsApiKey from PATCH /api/admin/settings response (#195)
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2026-06-09 06:52:48 +00:00
Flea Flicker fe412933ea GRO-2294: Route Optimization security hardening (geocode-batch limit cap + redact settings secret) (#193)
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2026-06-09 06:17:42 +00:00
22 changed files with 903 additions and 110 deletions
+5 -4
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@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ jobs:
git.farh.net/groombook/api:${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && 'git.farh.net/groombook/api:latest' || '' }}
cache-from: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:api
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:api,mode=max
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:api,mode=max,ignore-error=true
- name: Build and push Migrate image
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ jobs:
git.farh.net/groombook/migrate:${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && 'git.farh.net/groombook/migrate:latest' || '' }}
cache-from: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:migrate
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:migrate,mode=max
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:migrate,mode=max,ignore-error=true
- name: Smoke test migrate image (blackhole npmjs.org)
run: |
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ jobs:
git.farh.net/groombook/seed:${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && 'git.farh.net/groombook/seed:latest' || '' }}
cache-from: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:seed
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:seed,mode=max
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:seed,mode=max,ignore-error=true
- name: Build and push Reset image
uses: docker/build-push-action@v6
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ jobs:
git.farh.net/groombook/reset:${{ steps.version.outputs.tag }}
${{ github.ref == 'refs/heads/main' && 'git.farh.net/groombook/reset:latest' || '' }}
cache-from: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:reset
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:reset,mode=max
cache-to: type=registry,ref=git.farh.net/groombook/cache:reset,mode=max,ignore-error=true
- name: Smoke test seed image (blackhole npmjs.org)
run: |
@@ -185,3 +185,4 @@ jobs:
"$IMAGE" \
sh -c 'set -e; test "$(which pnpm)" = "/usr/local/bin/pnpm"; echo "HOME=$HOME"; pnpm --version'
echo "reset image: pnpm resolves to /usr/local/bin/pnpm, HOME=/tmp, runs offline ✓"
+11
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
{
"mcpServers": {
"gitea": {
"type": "http",
"url": "https://git-mcp.farh.net/mcp",
"headers": {
"Authorization": "Bearer ${GITEA_TOKEN}"
}
}
}
}
+43
View File
@@ -65,8 +65,11 @@ Expected: one row, `role = 'groomer'`. If zero rows return, the request hit the
| # | Scenario | Steps | Expected |
|---|----------|-------|----------|
| TC-API-0.1 | Unauthenticated health check | GET /api/health | 200 OK, `{"status":"ok"}` |
| TC-API-0.2 | DB-touching readiness check — healthy (GRO-2678) | GET /api/readyz | 200 OK, `{"status":"ready"}` |
| TC-API-0.3 | DB-touching readiness check — response body safe | GET /api/readyz and inspect body | Body contains only `status` and (on error) `check` fields — no raw SQL, driver messages, or stack traces |
> **Note (GRO-1544):** Health endpoint registered on `api` basePath before auth middleware at `/api/health`. The old path `/health` was incorrect (routed to web pod via HTTPRoute `/*` rule).
> **Note (GRO-2678):** `/api/readyz` is a separate DB-touching endpoint for monitoring. It is intentionally NOT used for K8s liveness/readiness probes — those remain DB-less to avoid pod cycling on transient DB blips.
### 4.1 Authentication
@@ -108,6 +111,11 @@ Expected: one row, `role = 'groomer'`. If zero rows return, the request hit the
| TC-API-1.24 | Complete setup creates super user | POST /api/setup with business name (after TC-API-1.23) | First user becomes super user, setup completes | Setup errors, 403 on admin endpoints |
| TC-API-1.25 | Super user accesses admin features | After TC-API-1.24, GET /api/staff/me and verify isSuperUser: true | isSuperUser: true, admin endpoints accessible | 403 on admin, isSuperUser: false |
| TC-API-1.26 | Auto-provision skipped during OOBE | During fresh setup (needsSetup: true), complete OIDC login — verify no duplicate staff record created before setup completes | No duplicate staff, OOBE completes successfully | Duplicate staff record, 403 before setup, auto-provision interferes with OOBE |
| TC-API-1.27 | Multi-origin CORS — demo host sign-in | `POST /api/auth/sign-in/social` with `callbackURL=https://demo.groombook.dev` | 200 OK, no origin-mismatch error | 400/403 "Origin mismatch" |
| TC-API-1.28 | Multi-origin CORS — farh.net host sign-in | `POST /api/auth/sign-in/social` with `callbackURL=https://groombook.farh.net` | 200 OK, no origin-mismatch error | 400/403 "Origin mismatch" |
| TC-API-1.29 | CORS — untrusted origin blocked (GRO-2586) | POST /api/auth/sign-in/social with `Origin: https://evil.example.com` header | Response has **no** `Access-Control-Allow-Origin` header — attacker origin is not reflected | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.example.com` present in response |
| TC-API-1.30 | CORS — trusted origin allowed (GRO-2586) | POST /api/auth/sign-in/social with `Origin: https://uat.groombook.dev` header | `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://uat.groombook.dev` + `Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true` | CORS header absent or trusted origin rejected |
| TC-API-1.31 | CORS — untrusted preflight blocked (GRO-2586) | `curl -i -X OPTIONS https://uat.groombook.dev/api/auth/sign-in/social -H 'Origin: https://evil.example.com' -H 'Access-Control-Request-Method: POST'` | Response has **no** `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.example.com` | Preflight reflects attacker origin |
### 4.2 Client Management
@@ -188,6 +196,7 @@ Geocoding turns a client's street address into `latitude`/`longitude` + `geocode
| TC-API-3.27 | Verify coat_type enum has all seed values | After UAT seed completes, inspect the coat_type enum on the UAT DB — it must contain: short, medium, long, double, wire, silky, curly, hairless | UAT seed jobs (`reset-demo-data`, `seed-test-data`) complete 1/1 with no `enum_in` error; coat_type includes all 8 values used by seed.ts `coatTypePool` |
| TC-API-3.28 | Verify pet_size_category enum has all seed values | After UAT seed completes, inspect the pet_size_category enum on the UAT DB — it must contain: small, medium, large, extra_large | UAT seed jobs (`reset-demo-data`, `seed-test-data`) complete 1/1 with no `enum_in` error; pet_size_category includes all 4 values used by seed.ts `petSizeCategoryPool` (regression for GRO-1999, mirrors TC-API-3.27) |
| TC-API-3.29 | Verify `reset-demo-data` CronJob does not fail with FK 23503 on `invoice_tip_splits` (GRO-2123) | Trigger the CronJob manually: `kubectl create job --from=cronjob/reset-demo-data verify-gro2123 -n groombook-uat`. Wait for pod to terminate. Inspect logs: `kubectl logs -n groombook-uat -l job-name=verify-gro2123` | Pod reaches `Completed` state; logs show `✓ Acquired seed advisory lock` and `✓ Released seed advisory lock` from `seed.ts`; no `PostgresError: … violates foreign key constraint "invoice_tip_splits_invoice_id_invoices_id_fk"` (code 23503); final counts unchanged (500 clients, ~4000 invoices) |
| TC-API-3.30 | Verify `reset-demo-data` CronJob is schema-safe — TRUNCATE only, no DDL drops (GRO-2722) | 1. Trigger: `kubectl -n groombook-uat create job --from=cronjob/reset-demo-data reset-verify-$(date +%s) --dry-run=client -o name \| xargs kubectl -n groombook-uat apply -f -` or simply `kubectl -n groombook-uat create job --from=cronjob/reset-demo-data reset-verify-$(date +%s)`. 2. Wait for job completion: `kubectl -n groombook-uat wait job/reset-verify-<ts> --for=condition=complete --timeout=300s`. 3. Check logs: `kubectl -n groombook-uat logs job/reset-verify-<ts>`. 4. Verify schema survival: `kubectl -n groombook-uat exec deploy/api -- psql $DATABASE_URL -c "\dt public.*"` and `kubectl -n groombook-uat exec deploy/api -- psql $DATABASE_URL -c "\dt drizzle.*"`. 5. Verify readyz: `curl -s https://uat.groombook.dev/api/readyz` | Job reaches `Completed` (exit 0); logs show `✓ All public tables truncated, sequences reset` — no `DROP TABLE`/`DROP TYPE`/`DROP SCHEMA` in output; all `public.*` tables still present after reset; `drizzle.__drizzle_migrations` still populated (row count unchanged); `https://uat.groombook.dev/api/readyz` returns HTTP 200; demo data reseeded (500 clients visible via GET /api/clients) |
### 4.4 Appointment Scheduling
@@ -288,6 +297,7 @@ This means:
| TC-API-8.17 | SSO portal session slides on activity (GRO-2234) | Establish a portal session (TC-API-8.8). Note the returned `sessionId`. Make any authenticated portal call (e.g. `GET /api/portal/me`) several times spaced over ≥1 minute, each with `X-Impersonation-Session-Id: {sessionId}`. | Every call returns 200; the session's `expiresAt` is extended (slid forward to ~30 min from each request) so the session stays valid during continuous use — it does NOT lapse mid-session. SSO-bridge sessions mint with a 30-min idle TTL bounded by an 8h absolute cap from `startedAt`. |
| TC-API-8.18 | Slow-wizard Book New submit succeeds (GRO-2234) | Establish a portal session (TC-API-8.8). Wait >2 minutes while making at least one intervening authenticated portal call (mimicking the multi-step Book New wizard: pet/service/groomer/date GETs). Then `POST /api/portal/waitlist` with a valid pet+service payload and the same `X-Impersonation-Session-Id`. | 201 Created — the deliberately-paced wizard no longer 401s on submit because activity slid the session forward. (Regression guard for the GRO-2234 "session TTL too short → 401" defect.) |
| TC-API-8.19 | Portal appointments surface active waitlist entries (GRO-2319) | As `uat-customer@groombook.dev`, establish a portal session, then `GET /api/portal/appointments`. | 200 OK. In addition to the customer's appointments, the response includes the seeded ACTIVE waitlist entry as a synthetic card: `status: "waitlisted"`, `id` prefixed `waitlist:`, `confirmationStatus: null`, a non-null derived `startTime` (from the entry's preferred date/time), and the entry's `pet`. Cancelled/notified/expired waitlist entries are NOT surfaced. |
| TC-API-8.20 | Portal waitlist card populates service {id, name} (GRO-2342) | As `uat-customer@groombook.dev`, establish a portal session, then `GET /api/portal/appointments`. | 200 OK. The synthetic `waitlisted` card returned for the active waitlist entry has `service: {id: "<serviceId>", name: "<serviceName>"}` (full service record, not just `{id}`), matching the shape the appointments join returns. The portal Upcoming list therefore renders the actual service name in place of the fallback "Service" label. |
### 4.9 Waitlist
@@ -433,6 +443,38 @@ Both use the stops' stored `latitude`/`longitude` in `stopOrder`: **origin = fir
| TC-API-18.10 | Groomer cannot export another's route | As groomer, export a route owned by a different groomer | 403 Forbidden (`groomers may only access their own route`) |
| TC-API-18.11 | Receptionist denied | As **receptionist**, export any route | 403 Forbidden (role not permitted) |
### 4.19 Boot Resilience — ECONNRESET Recovery (GRO-2652)
Verifies the API process does not crash on transient boot-time DB connection resets and that auth routes degrade gracefully until initialization succeeds.
| TC | Test Case | Steps | Expected Result |
|----|-----------|-------|-----------------|
| TC-API-19.1 | Health endpoint available before auth init | 1. Deploy the image (or restart the api pod)<br>2. `GET /health` immediately (within first 2 s of pod start) | 200 `{"status":"ok"}` — server accepts requests before `initAuth()` completes |
| TC-API-19.2 | Auth routes return 503 when auth not yet initialized | 1. Temporarily set `OIDC_ISSUER` to an unreachable host so `initAuth()` keeps retrying<br>2. `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` during the retry window | 503 `{"error":"Authentication not configured"}` — process stays alive, does not exit |
| TC-API-19.3 | Pod does not crash on first-attempt DB reset | 1. Review pod restart count after normal deployment<br>2. Confirm `kubectl get pod -n groombook` shows `RESTARTS: 0` (or same as before deploy) for the new pod | No new restarts — ECONNRESET causes retry, not process exit |
| TC-API-19.4 | DB query retry log lines visible | After deploy, `kubectl logs -n groombook <api-pod>` | If any DB retry occurred, log lines matching `[auth] DB query attempt N failed` are present; on clean boot no retry lines appear |
| TC-API-19.5 | Auth init retry log lines visible | When auth init fails and retries, check pod logs | Log lines matching `[auth] initAuth attempt N failed` present; process continues; no `process.exit` |
| TC-API-19.6 | Auth succeeds after transient DB hiccup | 1. Allow pod to retry until DB is available<br>2. `POST /api/auth/sign-in/email` with valid credentials after init succeeds | 200 with session cookie — auth recovers without pod restart |
| TC-API-19.7 | Normal sign-in still works end-to-end | Follow TC-WEB-SSO-3 (SSO sign-in) on UAT | Successful sign-in, staff list visible — no regression from resilience changes |
| TC-API-19.8 | Public routes unaffected during auth retry | While auth is retrying (TC-API-19.2 setup), `GET /api/branding` | 200 with branding data — public routes bypass auth and serve normally |
### 4.20 Portal OOBE — Create Client from Auth (GRO-2359)
Verifies the `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` endpoint that creates a new `clients` row for a first-time SSO user (out-of-box-experience registration). This endpoint requires a valid Better Auth session but does NOT require a portal session; it is the pre-portal step in the new-user OOBE flow.
| TC | Test Case | Steps | Expected Result |
|----|-----------|-------|-----------------|
| TC-API-20.1 | Successful client creation | 1. Sign in via SSO to obtain a Better Auth session<br>2. `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` with `{ "name": "Test User" }` | 201 `{ "id": "<uuid>", "name": "Test User", "email": "<sso-email>" }` — new `clients` row created |
| TC-API-20.2 | All optional fields accepted | `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` with `{ "name": "Test User", "phone": "555-1234", "address": "1 Main St", "notes": "VIP" }` (authenticated) | 201 with `id`, `name`, `email`; row in DB has all four fields |
| TC-API-20.3 | Invalid body — missing name | `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` with `{}` (authenticated) | 400 (Zod validation failure); no row created |
| TC-API-20.4 | Invalid body — empty name | `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` with `{ "name": "" }` (authenticated) | 400 — name must be at least 1 character |
| TC-API-20.5 | No session — 401 | `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` with a valid body but **no** Better Auth session cookie | 401 `{ "error": "Unauthorized" }` |
| TC-API-20.6 | Existing email — 409 | 1. Create a client row whose email matches the signed-in SSO user's email<br>2. `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` as that user | 409 `{ "error": "A customer record with this email already exists" }` — no duplicate row |
| TC-API-20.7 | Auth not configured — 503 | Temporarily disable auth (e.g., point `OIDC_ISSUER` to an invalid host) so `getAuth()` throws<br>2. `POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth` | 503 `{ "error": "Authentication not configured" }` — graceful degradation |
| TC-API-20.8 | Concurrent insert race — 409 | Simulate two near-simultaneous requests from the same SSO user (before any row exists) | At most one request returns 201; the other returns 409 — no duplicate row, no 500 |
## Pass/Fail Criteria
**Pass:**
@@ -454,3 +496,4 @@ Both use the stops' stored `latitude`/`longitude` in `stopOrder`: **origin = fir
## Update Policy
Any PR that changes user-facing behaviour MUST update this file. Test cases must be added, modified, or removed to reflect the new behaviour. The PR description must reference which playbook section was updated (e.g., "Updated UAT_PLAYBOOK.md §4.4 — new appointment rescheduling flow").
+5
View File
@@ -69,9 +69,14 @@ describe("auth init", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
dbSelectResult = [];
vi.clearAllMocks();
// Stub fetch so OIDC discovery requests resolve instantly during tests.
// Without this, AbortSignal.timeout(5000) in auth.ts races with vitest's
// 5000ms default test timeout and causes flaky failures.
vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: false, status: 503 }));
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
process.env = { ...originalEnv };
});
+9 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { authProviderRouter } from "../routes/authProvider.js";
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ describe("PUT /admin/auth-provider", () => {
describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
beforeEach(resetMock);
afterEach(() => vi.restoreAllMocks());
it("returns ok=false for unreachable issuer", async () => {
const app = makeApp(mockSuperUser);
@@ -242,7 +243,12 @@ describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
expect(body.error).toBeTruthy();
}, 15000); // timeout must exceed the 10s fetch timeout in the route handler
it("returns 400 for missing clientSecret (not required for test)", async () => {
it("returns 200 when clientSecret is omitted (not required by test-connection schema)", async () => {
// Mock fetch so the route does not make a real network request.
vi.spyOn(global, "fetch").mockResolvedValueOnce({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ issuer: "https://auth.example.com" }),
} as Response);
const app = makeApp(mockSuperUser);
const { status } = await post(app, "/admin/auth-provider/test", {
providerId: "authentik",
@@ -250,7 +256,7 @@ describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
issuerUrl: "https://auth.example.com",
clientId: "client",
}, mockSuperUser);
expect(status).toBe(200); // clientSecret omitted intentionally for test
expect(status).toBe(200);
});
});
+30 -36
View File
@@ -1,10 +1,17 @@
/**
* reset.ts — Drop all application tables and re-run migrations + seed.
* reset.ts — Truncate all public tables and restart identity sequences.
*
* Intended for local development only. Never run against production.
* Schema-safe: never issues destructive DDL against any schema.
* The drizzle schema and __drizzle_migrations table are preserved so
* drizzle-kit migrate remains a no-op on an already-migrated DB.
*
* NOTE: this file is NOT the deployed reset entrypoint — the reset image
* builds from packages/db and runs `pnpm --filter @groombook/db reset`.
* apps/api db:reset delegates there too (see apps/api/package.json).
* Keep in sync with packages/db/src/reset.ts (GRO-2722).
*
* Usage:
* DATABASE_URL=postgres://... npx tsx packages/db/src/reset.ts
* DATABASE_URL=postgres://... npx tsx apps/api/src/db/reset.ts
*/
import postgres from "postgres";
@@ -23,43 +30,30 @@ async function reset() {
const client = postgres(url, { max: 1 });
console.log("Dropping all application tables...\n");
console.log("Truncating all public tables...\n");
// Drop in dependency order (children before parents)
await client`
DO $$ DECLARE
r RECORD;
BEGIN
FOR r IN (
SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables
WHERE schemaname = 'public'
) LOOP
EXECUTE 'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS public.' || quote_ident(r.tablename) || ' CASCADE';
END LOOP;
END $$;
// Enumerate all base tables in the public schema dynamically, then
// issue a single TRUNCATE with RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE so FK cycles
// are not a problem. The drizzle schema and __drizzle_migrations are
// intentionally excluded (different schema) so drizzle-kit migrate
// stays a no-op on an already-migrated DB.
const tables = await client<{ tablename: string }[]>`
SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables
WHERE schemaname = 'public'
`;
// Drop custom enums
await client`
DO $$ DECLARE
r RECORD;
BEGIN
FOR r IN (
SELECT typname FROM pg_type
WHERE typtype = 'e' AND typnamespace = (
SELECT oid FROM pg_namespace WHERE nspname = 'public'
)
) LOOP
EXECUTE 'DROP TYPE IF EXISTS ' || quote_ident(r.typname) || ' CASCADE';
END LOOP;
END $$;
`;
if (tables.length > 0) {
// Double-quote each identifier (escaping embedded quotes) to handle
// any table name safely without a pg-specific quote_ident helper.
const tableList = tables
.map((t) => `"${t.tablename.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)
.join(", ");
await client.unsafe(
`TRUNCATE ${tableList} RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE`,
);
}
// Drop the drizzle migrations tracking table
await client`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS drizzle.__drizzle_migrations CASCADE`;
await client`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS drizzle CASCADE`;
console.log("✓ All tables and enums dropped\n");
console.log("✓ All public tables truncated, sequences reset\n");
await client.end();
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
"wait-for-db": "node ./scripts/wait-for-db.mjs",
"migrate": "node ./scripts/wait-for-db.mjs && drizzle-kit migrate",
"seed": "node ./scripts/wait-for-db.mjs && tsx src/seed.ts",
"reset": "node ./scripts/wait-for-db.mjs && tsx src/reset.ts && drizzle-kit migrate && tsx src/seed.ts",
"reset": "node ./scripts/wait-for-db.mjs && tsx src/reset.ts",
"studio": "drizzle-kit studio",
"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit"
},
+112 -40
View File
@@ -1,13 +1,54 @@
/**
* reset.ts — Drop all application tables and re-run migrations + seed.
* reset.ts — Truncate all public tables and restart identity sequences.
*
* Intended for local development only. Never run against production.
* Schema-safe: never issues destructive DDL against any schema.
* The drizzle schema and __drizzle_migrations table are preserved so
* drizzle-kit migrate remains a no-op on an already-migrated DB.
*
* Usage:
* DATABASE_URL=postgres://... npx tsx packages/db/src/reset.ts
* GRO-2139: the entire truncate→migrate→seed chain runs inside a single
* Postgres advisory lock (SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY) so a concurrent
* `seed.ts` (e.g. the dev `seed-test-data-*` Job being recreated at
* the top of the hour) cannot interleave between `reset.ts` (TRUNCATE)
* and `seed.ts` (TRUNCATE+insert) and collide on `invoices_pkey`.
*
* Why this matters: `seed.ts` derives every primary key from a single
* shared Mulberry32 PRNG seeded with 42 (see `createPrng(42)` and
* `uuid()` in seed.ts). Two concurrent same-profile seeders therefore
* emit *identical* ids for the same logical row, and any moment
* between a concurrent `seed.ts` TRUNCATE and INSERT is exactly the
* window in which the second seeder's INSERT can hit a pkey already
* taken by the first. Pre-GRO-2123 this raced unconditionally;
* GRO-2123 added the advisory lock around `runSeedBody` but left
* `reset.ts` and `drizzle-kit migrate` outside the lock. This script
* now wraps the *whole* chain in the same lock: `withSeedAdvisoryLock`
* pins the lock to one reserved session and the TRUNCATE → migrate → seed
* work runs on the rest of the pool, so the lock guarantees mutual
* exclusion against any concurrent seeder for the entire chain.
*
* For a full local schema teardown (nuke tables, enums, drizzle schema)
* use `pnpm --filter @groombook/db db:nuke` instead — never change this
* script to be destructive (GRO-2722 / GRO-2678 prod incident).
*
* See: groombook/infra `apps/base/reset-cronjob.yaml` (CronJob) and
* `apps/base/seed-job.yaml` (one-shot Job) — both invoke the same
* `seed.ts` code path on the same database in `groombook-dev`.
*/
import postgres from "postgres";
import { drizzle } from "drizzle-orm/postgres-js";
import { execSync } from "node:child_process";
import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
import { dirname, resolve } from "node:path";
import * as schema from "./schema.js";
import {
SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY,
withSeedAdvisoryLock,
getProfile,
runSeedBody,
profiles,
} from "./seed.js";
const __filename = fileURLToPath(import.meta.url);
const __dirname = dirname(__filename);
async function reset() {
const url = process.env.DATABASE_URL;
@@ -16,52 +57,83 @@ async function reset() {
process.exit(1);
}
if (process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" && process.env.ALLOW_RESET !== "true") {
console.error("[FATAL] db:reset must not be run in production without ALLOW_RESET=true.");
if (
process.env.NODE_ENV === "production" &&
process.env.ALLOW_RESET !== "true"
) {
console.error(
"[FATAL] db:reset must not be run in production without ALLOW_RESET=true.",
);
process.exit(1);
}
const client = postgres(url, { max: 1 });
// Pool sizing is load-bearing here. `withSeedAdvisoryLock` does
// `pool.reserve()` to pin the advisory lock to one dedicated session
// (a session-level lock released on a *different* pooled connection is
// a no-op), and the TRUNCATE / migrate / seed work then runs on the
// *remaining* pooled connections. The lock provides mutual exclusion
// across processes regardless of how many connections the work uses —
// it does NOT require the work to share the lock's session.
//
// Therefore `max` must be >= 2: 1 reserved for the lock + >=1 free for
// the work. `max: 1` would let `reserve()` consume the only connection
// and every query inside the callback would block forever waiting for
// a connection that never frees (connection-starvation deadlock). We
// use `max: 6` to match `seed()`'s headroom (1 reserved + 5 work).
const client = postgres(url, { max: 6 });
const db = drizzle(client, { schema });
console.log("Dropping all application tables...\n");
try {
await withSeedAdvisoryLock(client, async () => {
console.log("Truncating all public tables...\n");
// Drop in dependency order (children before parents)
await client`
DO $$ DECLARE
r RECORD;
BEGIN
FOR r IN (
// Enumerate all base tables in the public schema dynamically, then
// issue a single TRUNCATE with RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE so FK cycles
// are not a problem. The drizzle schema and __drizzle_migrations are
// intentionally excluded (different schema) so drizzle-kit migrate
// stays a no-op on an already-migrated DB.
const tables = await client<{ tablename: string }[]>`
SELECT tablename FROM pg_tables
WHERE schemaname = 'public'
) LOOP
EXECUTE 'DROP TABLE IF EXISTS public.' || quote_ident(r.tablename) || ' CASCADE';
END LOOP;
END $$;
`;
`;
// Drop custom enums
await client`
DO $$ DECLARE
r RECORD;
BEGIN
FOR r IN (
SELECT typname FROM pg_type
WHERE typtype = 'e' AND typnamespace = (
SELECT oid FROM pg_namespace WHERE nspname = 'public'
)
) LOOP
EXECUTE 'DROP TYPE IF EXISTS ' || quote_ident(r.typname) || ' CASCADE';
END LOOP;
END $$;
`;
if (tables.length > 0) {
// Double-quote each identifier (escaping embedded quotes) to handle
// any table name safely without a pg-specific quote_ident helper.
const tableList = tables
.map((t) => `"${t.tablename.replace(/"/g, '""')}"`)
.join(", ");
await client.unsafe(
`TRUNCATE ${tableList} RESTART IDENTITY CASCADE`,
);
}
// Drop the drizzle migrations tracking table
await client`DROP TABLE IF EXISTS drizzle.__drizzle_migrations CASCADE`;
await client`DROP SCHEMA IF EXISTS drizzle CASCADE`;
console.log("✓ All public tables truncated, sequences reset\n");
console.log("✓ All tables and enums dropped\n");
console.log("Running migrations...");
// GRO-2672: drizzle-orm's migrate() has a high-water-mark bug that skips
// migrations with stale `when` timestamps (0001, 0003, 0010, 0011). Use
// drizzle-kit instead -- it applies migrations by hash, matching the K8s
// migrate Job behaviour exactly.
execSync("pnpm exec drizzle-kit migrate", {
stdio: "inherit",
env: { ...process.env },
cwd: resolve(__dirname, ".."),
});
console.log("✓ Migrations applied\n");
await client.end();
console.log("Seeding database...");
const profile = getProfile();
const cfg = profiles[profile];
await runSeedBody(client, db, profile, cfg);
});
console.log(
`\n✓ Reset complete (advisory lock key=0x${SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY.toString(16)})`,
);
} finally {
await client.end();
}
}
reset().catch((err) => {
+8 -6
View File
@@ -24,9 +24,9 @@ import type { MedicalAlert } from "@groombook/types";
// ── Seed profile configuration ─────────────────────────────────────────────
type SeedProfile = "dev" | "uat" | "demo";
export type SeedProfile = "dev" | "uat" | "demo";
interface ProfileConfig {
export interface ProfileConfig {
staffCount: { manager: number; receptionist: number; groomer: number; bather: number };
clientCount: number;
appointmentsBackDays: number;
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ interface ProfileConfig {
includeUatClients: boolean;
}
const profiles: Record<SeedProfile, ProfileConfig> = {
export const profiles: Record<SeedProfile, ProfileConfig> = {
dev: {
staffCount: { manager: 1, receptionist: 1, groomer: 2, bather: 0 },
clientCount: 100,
@@ -70,6 +70,8 @@ function getProfile(): SeedProfile {
return "uat";
}
export { getProfile };
// ── Deterministic PRNG (Mulberry32) ──────────────────────────────────────────
/**
@@ -1400,7 +1402,7 @@ async function seedKnownUsers() {
// from runbooks without ambiguity and binds to the single-argument
// `pg_advisory_lock(int)` form, which postgres-js serializes as a plain
// number (no bigint type plumbing required).
const SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY = 0x47524f4f; // "GROO" in ASCII — arbitrary, stable
export const SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY = 0x47524f4f; // "GROO" in ASCII — arbitrary, stable
/**
* Reserve a dedicated connection from `pool`, take the seed advisory lock
@@ -1413,7 +1415,7 @@ const SEED_ADVISORY_LOCK_KEY = 0x47524f4f; // "GROO" in ASCII — arbitrary, sta
* for the lock and release it from the same reserved connection. The
* seed work itself still runs on the pooled connections.
*/
async function withSeedAdvisoryLock<T>(
export async function withSeedAdvisoryLock<T>(
pool: ReturnType<typeof postgres>,
fn: () => Promise<T>,
): Promise<T> {
@@ -1471,7 +1473,7 @@ async function seed() {
await client.end();
}
async function runSeedBody(
export async function runSeedBody(
client: ReturnType<typeof postgres>,
db: ReturnType<typeof drizzle>,
profile: SeedProfile,
+5
View File
@@ -69,9 +69,14 @@ describe("auth init", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
dbSelectResult = [];
vi.clearAllMocks();
// Stub fetch so OIDC discovery requests resolve instantly during tests.
// Without this, AbortSignal.timeout(5000) in auth.ts races with vitest's
// 5000ms default test timeout and causes flaky failures.
vi.stubGlobal("fetch", vi.fn().mockResolvedValue({ ok: false, status: 503 }));
});
afterEach(() => {
vi.unstubAllGlobals();
process.env = { ...originalEnv };
});
+60
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest";
import { enforceAuthCors } from "../lib/auth-cors.js";
const TRUSTED = ["https://uat.groombook.dev", "https://dev.groombook.dev"];
/** Simulates Better Auth reflecting the request Origin (the pre-fix bug). */
function makeReflectedResponse(origin: string | null): Response {
return new Response('{"ok":true}', {
status: 200,
headers: {
"Content-Type": "application/json",
...(origin
? {
"Access-Control-Allow-Origin": origin,
"Access-Control-Allow-Credentials": "true",
}
: {}),
},
});
}
describe("enforceAuthCors (GRO-2586)", () => {
it("passes trusted origin through with credentials", () => {
const origin = "https://uat.groombook.dev";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBe(origin);
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBe("true");
});
it("strips ACAO for attacker origin (credentialed cross-origin read blocked)", () => {
const origin = "https://evil.example.com";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBeNull();
});
it("strips ACAO when no Origin header (undefined)", () => {
const res = enforceAuthCors(undefined, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(null));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials")).toBeNull();
});
it("preserves non-CORS response headers and status from Better Auth", () => {
const origin = "https://evil.example.com";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Content-Type")).toBe("application/json");
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
});
it("second trusted origin is also allowed", () => {
const origin = "https://dev.groombook.dev";
const res = enforceAuthCors(origin, TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(origin));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBe(origin);
});
it("empty string origin is treated as untrusted", () => {
const res = enforceAuthCors("", TRUSTED, makeReflectedResponse(""));
expect(res.headers.get("Access-Control-Allow-Origin")).toBeNull();
});
});
+9 -3
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach, afterEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { authProviderRouter } from "../routes/authProvider.js";
@@ -227,6 +227,7 @@ describe("PUT /admin/auth-provider", () => {
describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
beforeEach(resetMock);
afterEach(() => vi.restoreAllMocks());
it("returns ok=false for unreachable issuer", async () => {
const app = makeApp(mockSuperUser);
@@ -242,7 +243,12 @@ describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
expect(body.error).toBeTruthy();
}, 15000); // timeout must exceed the 10s fetch timeout in the route handler
it("returns 400 for missing clientSecret (not required for test)", async () => {
it("returns 200 when clientSecret is omitted (not required by test-connection schema)", async () => {
// Mock fetch so the route does not make a real network request.
vi.spyOn(global, "fetch").mockResolvedValueOnce({
ok: true,
json: async () => ({ issuer: "https://auth.example.com" }),
} as Response);
const app = makeApp(mockSuperUser);
const { status } = await post(app, "/admin/auth-provider/test", {
providerId: "authentik",
@@ -250,7 +256,7 @@ describe("POST /admin/auth-provider/test", () => {
issuerUrl: "https://auth.example.com",
clientId: "client",
}, mockSuperUser);
expect(status).toBe(200); // clientSecret omitted intentionally for test
expect(status).toBe(200);
});
});
+57
View File
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ let selectAppointmentRow: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let selectWaitlistRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
let selectPetRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
let selectStaffRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
let selectServiceRows: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
let updatedValues: Record<string, unknown>[] = [];
function resetMock() {
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ function resetMock() {
selectWaitlistRows = [];
selectPetRows = [];
selectStaffRows = [];
selectServiceRows = [];
updatedValues = [];
}
@@ -83,6 +85,7 @@ vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
const waitlistEntries = mkTable("waitlistEntries");
const pets = mkTable("pets");
const staff = mkTable("staff");
const services = mkTable("services");
return {
getDb: () => ({
@@ -103,6 +106,9 @@ vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
if (table._name === "staff") {
return makeChainable(selectStaffRows);
}
if (table._name === "services") {
return makeChainable(selectServiceRows);
}
return makeChainable([]);
},
}),
@@ -126,6 +132,7 @@ vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
waitlistEntries,
pets,
staff,
services,
eq: vi.fn(),
and: vi.fn(),
inArray: vi.fn(),
@@ -198,6 +205,56 @@ describe("GET /portal/appointments (waitlist surfacing — GRO-2319)", () => {
});
});
// GRO-2342: GET /portal/appointments must populate the synthetic waitlist
// card's `service` object with the full service record (id + name) — same
// shape the appointments join returns — so the portal renders the real
// service name in place of the fallback "Service" label.
describe("GET /portal/appointments (waitlist service name — GRO-2342)", () => {
it("returns service {id, name} on the synthetic waitlist card", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectAppointmentRow = { ...APPOINTMENT };
selectWaitlistRows = [
{
id: "22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222",
petId: "pet-1",
serviceId: "svc-1",
preferredDate: "2099-01-01",
preferredTime: "13:00:00",
},
];
selectPetRows = [{ id: "pet-1", name: "Rex", photoKey: null }];
selectServiceRows = [{ id: "svc-1", name: "Full Groom" }];
const res = await app.request("/portal/appointments", {
headers: { "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = await res.json();
const waitlistCard = body.appointments.find(
(a: { status: string }) => a.status === "waitlisted",
);
expect(waitlistCard).toBeTruthy();
expect(waitlistCard.service).toEqual({ id: "svc-1", name: "Full Groom" });
});
it("returns service {id, name} on the appointment card (same shape)", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
selectAppointmentRow = { ...APPOINTMENT, serviceId: "svc-appt" };
selectServiceRows = [{ id: "svc-appt", name: "Bath & Brush" }];
const res = await app.request("/portal/appointments", {
headers: { "X-Impersonation-Session-Id": SESSION_ID },
});
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = await res.json();
const apptCard = body.appointments.find(
(a: { status: string }) => a.status === "scheduled",
);
expect(apptCard).toBeTruthy();
expect(apptCard.service).toEqual({ id: "svc-appt", name: "Bath & Brush" });
});
});
describe("PATCH /portal/appointments/:id/notes", () => {
it("returns updated appointment with safe fields only", async () => {
selectSessionRow = ACTIVE_SESSION;
+201
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
import { getAuth } from "../lib/auth.js";
const NEW_USER_EMAIL = "new-sso-user@example.com";
const NEW_USER_NAME = "New SSO User";
const NEW_USER_ID = "11111111-2222-3333-4444-555555555555";
const BETTER_AUTH_SESSION = {
user: {
id: "auth-user-new",
email: NEW_USER_EMAIL,
name: NEW_USER_NAME,
},
session: {
id: "ba-session-new",
expiresAt: new Date(Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000),
},
};
let mockGetAuth: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
let mockGetSession: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
let existingClientRow: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let insertedClientValues: Record<string, unknown> | null = null;
let insertShouldThrow: { code?: string } | null = null;
function makeChainable(data: unknown[]): unknown {
const arr = [...data];
return new Proxy(arr, {
get(target, prop) {
if (prop === "where" || prop === "orderBy" || prop === "limit") {
return () => makeChainable(target);
}
// @ts-expect-error proxy
return target[prop];
},
});
}
vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
const clients = new Proxy(
{ _name: "clients" },
{ get: (t, p) => (p === "_name" ? "clients" : { table: "clients", column: p }) }
);
return {
getDb: () => ({
select: () => ({
from: (table: { _name: string }) => {
if (table._name === "clients") {
return makeChainable(existingClientRow ? [existingClientRow] : []);
}
return makeChainable([]);
},
}),
insert: (table: { _name: string }) => ({
values: (vals: Record<string, unknown>) => {
if (insertShouldThrow) {
const err = new Error("unique violation") as Error & { code?: string };
err.code = insertShouldThrow.code;
throw err;
}
return {
returning: () => {
if (table._name === "clients") {
insertedClientValues = { id: NEW_USER_ID, ...vals };
return [insertedClientValues];
}
return [];
},
};
},
}),
}),
clients,
eq: vi.fn(),
and: vi.fn(),
inArray: vi.fn(),
};
});
vi.mock("../lib/auth.js", () => ({
getAuth: vi.fn(),
}));
const { portalRouter } = await import("../routes/portal.js");
const app = new Hono();
app.route("/portal", portalRouter);
describe("POST /portal/clients-from-auth (GRO-2359)", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
existingClientRow = null;
insertedClientValues = null;
insertShouldThrow = null;
mockGetSession = vi.fn();
mockGetAuth = vi.fn(() => ({
api: {
getSession: mockGetSession,
},
}));
vi.mocked(getAuth).mockImplementation(mockGetAuth);
});
it("returns 401 when no Better Auth session is present", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(null);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test User" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(401);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toBe("Unauthorized");
});
it("returns 400 when body fails zod validation (empty name)", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(400);
});
it("creates a new client row bound to the auth user's email and returns 201", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({
name: " New SSO User ",
phone: "555-1234",
address: "1 Main St",
notes: "test note",
}),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(201);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body).toMatchObject({
id: NEW_USER_ID,
name: "New SSO User",
email: NEW_USER_EMAIL,
});
// Trim must be applied to the persisted values.
expect(insertedClientValues).not.toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).name).toBe("New SSO User");
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).email).toBe(NEW_USER_EMAIL);
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).phone).toBe("555-1234");
});
it("normalizes empty optional fields to null on insert", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test", phone: "", address: " " }),
});
expect(insertedClientValues).not.toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).phone).toBeNull();
expect((insertedClientValues as Record<string, unknown>).address).toBeNull();
});
it("returns 409 when a client row already exists for this email", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
existingClientRow = { id: "existing-client-id", email: NEW_USER_EMAIL };
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body.error).toMatch(/already exists/i);
expect(insertedClientValues).toBeNull();
});
it("returns 409 on unique constraint race (23505)", async () => {
mockGetSession.mockResolvedValue(BETTER_AUTH_SESSION);
insertShouldThrow = { code: "23505" };
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(409);
});
it("returns 503 when auth is not configured", async () => {
mockGetAuth.mockImplementation(() => {
throw new Error("Auth not initialized");
});
const res = await app.request("/portal/clients-from-auth", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ name: "Test" }),
});
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
});
});
+44
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
// Mock auth lib so getAuth() throws — non-bypass paths hit the 503 "not configured" guard.
vi.mock("../lib/auth.js", () => ({
getAuth: () => {
throw new Error("auth not configured");
},
initAuth: vi.fn(),
getActiveProviders: vi.fn(() => []),
}));
describe("authMiddleware bypass: /api/readyz", () => {
it("serves /api/readyz without auth (bypass before auth check)", async () => {
// Ensure AUTH_DISABLED is not set so the bypass is exercised, not AUTH_DISABLED shortcut.
const prev = process.env.AUTH_DISABLED;
delete process.env.AUTH_DISABLED;
const { authMiddleware } = await import("../middleware/auth.js");
const app = new Hono();
app.use("/api/*", authMiddleware);
app.get("/api/readyz", (c) => c.json({ status: "ok" }, 200));
const res = await app.request("/api/readyz", { method: "GET" });
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
if (prev !== undefined) process.env.AUTH_DISABLED = prev;
});
it("blocks non-whitelisted /api/* paths when auth is not configured", async () => {
const prev = process.env.AUTH_DISABLED;
delete process.env.AUTH_DISABLED;
const { authMiddleware } = await import("../middleware/auth.js");
const app = new Hono();
app.use("/api/*", authMiddleware);
app.get("/api/staff", (c) => c.json({ ok: true }, 200));
const res = await app.request("/api/staff", { method: "GET" });
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
if (prev !== undefined) process.env.AUTH_DISABLED = prev;
});
});
+87
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
import { describe, it, expect, vi, beforeEach } from "vitest";
import { Hono } from "hono";
// ─── Mock db module ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
let selectImpl: () => Promise<unknown>;
vi.mock("@groombook/db", () => {
const staff = new Proxy(
{ _name: "staff" },
{
get(_target, prop) {
if (prop === "_name") return "staff";
return { table: "staff", column: prop };
},
}
);
return {
getDb: () => ({
select: (_fields: unknown) => ({
from: (_table: unknown) => ({
limit: (_n: number) => selectImpl(),
}),
}),
}),
staff,
};
});
// ─── Build test app ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
async function makeApp() {
// Import after mocks are in place
const { getDb, staff } = await import("@groombook/db");
const app = new Hono();
app.get("/api/readyz", async (c) => {
try {
await getDb().select({ id: staff.id }).from(staff).limit(1);
return c.json({ status: "ready" }, 200);
} catch (err) {
console.error("[readyz] DB check failed:", err);
return c.json({ status: "degraded", check: "db" }, 503);
}
});
return app;
}
// ─── Tests ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
describe("GET /api/readyz", () => {
beforeEach(() => {
vi.restoreAllMocks();
});
it("returns 200 {status:'ready'} when DB query succeeds", async () => {
selectImpl = () => Promise.resolve([{ id: "staff-1" }]);
const app = await makeApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/readyz", { method: "GET" });
const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
expect(body.status).toBe("ready");
});
it("returns 503 {status:'degraded',check:'db'} when DB query throws", async () => {
selectImpl = () => Promise.reject(new Error("42P01: relation staff does not exist"));
const consoleSpy = vi.spyOn(console, "error").mockImplementation(() => {});
const app = await makeApp();
const res = await app.request("/api/readyz", { method: "GET" });
const body = (await res.json()) as Record<string, unknown>;
expect(res.status).toBe(503);
expect(body.status).toBe("degraded");
expect(body.check).toBe("db");
// Raw SQL / driver error must NOT appear in the response body
expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("42P01");
expect(JSON.stringify(body)).not.toContain("relation");
consoleSpy.mockRestore();
});
});
+37 -4
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { Hono } from "hono";
import { logger } from "hono/logger";
import { cors } from "hono/cors";
import { getAuth, initAuth, getActiveProviders } from "./lib/auth.js";
import { enforceAuthCors } from "./lib/auth-cors.js";
import { clientsRouter } from "./routes/clients.js";
import { petsRouter } from "./routes/pets.js";
import { servicesRouter } from "./routes/services.js";
@@ -64,6 +65,17 @@ app.use(
app.get("/health", (c) => c.json({ status: "ok" }));
// /api/health: used by Gateway HTTPRoute (/api/* → API pod)
app.get("/api/health", (c) => c.json({ status: "ok" }));
// /api/readyz: DB-touching deep health check consumed by monitoring (not K8s probes)
// Distinct from /health so a dropped schema triggers an alert without cycling pods (GRO-2678)
app.get("/api/readyz", async (c) => {
try {
await getDb().select({ id: staff.id }).from(staff).limit(1);
return c.json({ status: "ready" }, 200);
} catch (err) {
console.error("[readyz] DB check failed:", err);
return c.json({ status: "degraded", check: "db" }, 503);
}
});
// Public booking routes — no auth required, must be registered before auth middleware
app.route("/api/book", bookRouter);
@@ -200,9 +212,10 @@ api.use("*", resolveStaffMiddleware);
// Better-Auth handler — mounted as sub-app to handle all /api/auth/* routes
// authMiddleware and resolveStaffMiddleware both skip /api/auth/ paths
const authRouter = new Hono();
authRouter.all("/*", (c) => {
authRouter.all("/*", async (c) => {
try {
return getAuth().handler(c.req.raw);
const res = await getAuth().handler(c.req.raw);
return enforceAuthCors(c.req.header("origin"), TRUSTED_ORIGINS, res);
} catch {
return c.json({ error: "Authentication not configured" }, 503);
}
@@ -290,14 +303,34 @@ api.route("/search", searchRouter);
api.route("/buffer-rules", bufferRulesRouter);
api.route("/routes", routesRouter);
// Start the HTTP server first so /health and public routes are available immediately.
// Auth initialization runs afterward with retry — a transient DB ECONNRESET at boot
// must not crash the process (GRO-2652). Auth routes return 503 until initAuth succeeds.
const port = Number(process.env.PORT ?? 3000);
await initAuth();
console.log(`API server listening on port ${port}`);
const server = serve({ fetch: app.fetch, port });
console.log(`API server listening on port ${port}`);
// Start background reminder scheduler (runs every minute to check for upcoming appointments)
startReminderScheduler();
let initAttempt = 0;
while (true) {
try {
await initAuth();
break;
} catch (err) {
initAttempt++;
const delay = Math.min(2 ** initAttempt * 500, 30_000);
console.error(`[auth] initAuth attempt ${initAttempt} failed: ${err}`);
if (initAttempt >= 10) {
console.error("[auth] auth init permanently failed — auth endpoints will serve 503");
break;
}
console.error(`[auth] retrying in ${delay}ms`);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delay));
}
}
function shutdown() {
console.log("Shutting down gracefully...");
// SIGTERM/SIGINT → server.close() → callback → process.exit(0)
+22
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@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
/**
* Enforces the trusted-origins CORS allowlist on a raw Response from Better Auth.
* Better Auth reflects the request Origin into Access-Control-Allow-Origin
* regardless of the trustedOrigins config, allowing credentialed cross-origin reads
* from arbitrary attacker origins. This wrapper strips CORS headers for any origin
* not in the allowlist. (GRO-2586)
*/
export function enforceAuthCors(
requestOrigin: string | undefined,
trustedOrigins: string[],
res: Response
): Response {
const headers = new Headers(res.headers);
if (requestOrigin && trustedOrigins.includes(requestOrigin)) {
headers.set("Access-Control-Allow-Origin", requestOrigin);
headers.set("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials", "true");
} else {
headers.delete("Access-Control-Allow-Origin");
headers.delete("Access-Control-Allow-Credentials");
}
return new Response(res.body, { status: res.status, statusText: res.statusText, headers });
}
+31 -9
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@@ -118,18 +118,34 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
updateAge: 60 * 60 * 24,
cookieCache: { enabled: false },
},
trustedOrigins: [process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173"],
trustedOrigins: (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean),
});
return;
}
// Step 1: Try to load config from DB
// Step 1: Try to load config from DB, with retry-with-backoff for transient ECONNRESET (GRO-2652).
// A single connection reset during boot must not abort initialization.
const db = getDb();
const [dbConfig] = await db
.select()
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
let dbQueryRows: (typeof authProviderConfig.$inferSelect)[] = [];
let dbAttempt = 0;
while (true) {
try {
dbQueryRows = await db
.select()
.from(authProviderConfig)
.where(eq(authProviderConfig.enabled, true))
.limit(1);
break;
} catch (err) {
dbAttempt++;
if (dbAttempt >= 5) throw err;
const delay = Math.min(1000 * 2 ** (dbAttempt - 1), 8_000);
console.warn(`[auth] DB query attempt ${dbAttempt} failed (${err}), retrying in ${delay}ms`);
await new Promise((r) => setTimeout(r, delay));
}
}
const [dbConfig] = dbQueryRows;
let providerConfig: {
providerId: string;
@@ -308,9 +324,15 @@ export async function initAuth(): Promise<void> {
maxAge: 5 * 60, // 5 minutes
},
},
trustedOrigins: [process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173"],
trustedOrigins: (process.env.CORS_ORIGIN ?? "http://localhost:5173")
.split(",").map((s) => s.trim()).filter(Boolean),
});
})();
await authInitPromise;
try {
await authInitPromise;
} catch (err) {
authInitPromise = null; // allow retry on next call
throw err;
}
}
+1 -1
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@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ if (process.env.AUTH_DISABLED === "true") {
}
export const authMiddleware: MiddlewareHandler = async (c, next) => {
if (c.req.path.startsWith("/api/auth/") || c.req.path === "/api/health") {
if (c.req.path.startsWith("/api/auth/") || c.req.path === "/api/health" || c.req.path === "/api/readyz") {
await next();
return;
}
+125 -3
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@@ -147,6 +147,114 @@ portalRouter.post("/session-from-auth", async (c) => {
);
});
// GRO-2359 — register a brand-new SSO user. The post-auth handler in the
// web portal redirects here when `session-from-auth` returns 404, so the
// OOBE can complete a customer record for the new user. Auth is via the
// Better Auth session (same shape as `session-from-auth`), so this is
// registered BEFORE the `validatePortalSession` middleware.
//
// Contract:
// POST /api/portal/clients-from-auth
// Body: { name: string; phone?: string|null; address?: string|null; notes?: string|null }
// 201: { id, name, email }
// 400: invalid body (zod failure)
// 401: no Better Auth session
// 409: a `clients` row already exists for this email (portal selection case)
// 500: insert failed
//
// We do NOT auto-link the user's auth account to the new client row; the
// existing `session-from-auth` endpoint re-resolves the row by email on the
// next call, so the OOBE's success path just navigates the user back to
// `/` and lets the bridge mint a portal session.
const createClientFromAuthSchema = z.object({
name: z.string().min(1).max(200),
phone: z.string().max(50).nullish(),
address: z.string().max(500).nullish(),
notes: z.string().max(2000).nullish(),
});
portalRouter.post(
"/clients-from-auth",
zValidator("json", createClientFromAuthSchema),
async (c) => {
let auth;
try {
auth = getAuth();
} catch {
return c.json({ error: "Authentication not configured" }, 503);
}
const session = await auth.api.getSession({
headers: c.req.raw.headers,
});
if (!session) {
return c.json({ error: "Unauthorized" }, 401);
}
const body = c.req.valid("json");
const db = getDb();
// Pre-check: if a client already exists for this email, return 409 so
// the OOBE can render the "portal selection" message (the user needs
// to contact their groomer to link the new SSO identity to the
// pre-existing customer record). We don't return the existing row to
// avoid leaking PII about other accounts.
const [existing] = await db
.select({ id: clients.id })
.from(clients)
.where(eq(clients.email, session.user.email))
.limit(1);
if (existing) {
return c.json(
{ error: "A customer record with this email already exists" },
409,
);
}
let row;
try {
[row] = await db
.insert(clients)
.values({
name: body.name.trim(),
email: session.user.email,
phone: body.phone?.trim() || null,
address: body.address?.trim() || null,
notes: body.notes?.trim() || null,
})
.returning();
} catch (err) {
// Concurrent insert from a parallel OOBE submit — treat as 409.
if (
err instanceof Error &&
"code" in err &&
(err as { code?: string }).code === "23505"
) {
return c.json(
{ error: "A customer record with this email already exists" },
409,
);
}
throw err;
}
if (!row) {
return c.json({ error: "Failed to create client" }, 500);
}
return c.json(
{
id: row.id,
name: row.name,
email: row.email,
},
201,
);
},
);
// Apply middleware to all portal routes
portalRouter.use("/*", validatePortalSession, portalAudit);
@@ -219,12 +327,22 @@ portalRouter.get("/appointments", async (c) => {
...waitlistRows.map(w => w.petId),
];
const staffIds = allAppts.map(a => a.staffId).filter((id): id is string => id !== null);
// GRO-2342: services must be looked up for both appointment and waitlist cards
// so the portal can render `service.name` in place of the fallback "Service"
// label (CMPO sign-off on the GRO-2319 waitlist card explicitly excluded the
// service name; this follow-up closes the cosmetic gap).
const serviceIds = [
...allAppts.map(a => a.serviceId).filter((id): id is string => id !== null),
...waitlistRows.map(w => w.serviceId).filter((id): id is string => id !== null),
];
const petRows = petIds.length ? await db.select().from(pets).where(inArray(pets.id, petIds)) : [];
const staffRows = staffIds.length ? await db.select().from(staff).where(inArray(staff.id, staffIds)) : [];
const serviceRows = serviceIds.length ? await db.select().from(services).where(inArray(services.id, serviceIds)) : [];
const petMap = Object.fromEntries(petRows.map(p => [p.id, p]));
const staffMap = Object.fromEntries(staffRows.map(s => [s.id, s]));
const serviceMap = Object.fromEntries(serviceRows.map(s => [s.id, s]));
const appts = allAppts.map(a => ({
id: a.id,
@@ -235,13 +353,17 @@ portalRouter.get("/appointments", async (c) => {
customerNotes: a.customerNotes,
notes: a.notes,
pet: a.petId ? { id: petMap[a.petId]?.id, name: petMap[a.petId]?.name, photo: petMap[a.petId]?.photoKey } : null,
service: a.serviceId ? { id: a.serviceId } : null,
service: a.serviceId ? { id: a.serviceId, name: serviceMap[a.serviceId]?.name } : null,
staff: a.staffId ? { id: staffMap[a.staffId]?.id, name: staffMap[a.staffId]?.name } : null,
}));
// Derive a display `startTime` from the entry's preferred date/time so the
// portal can sort/classify the synthetic card (an invalid combination simply
// yields a null startTime, which the portal tolerates).
// yields a null startTime, which the portal tolerates). GRO-2342: also
// populate the synthetic card's `service` object with the full service
// record (id + name) — same shape the appointments join returns — so the
// portal renders the real service name in place of the fallback "Service"
// label.
const waitlistAppts = waitlistRows.map(w => {
const parsed = new Date(`${w.preferredDate}T${w.preferredTime}`);
const startTime = Number.isNaN(parsed.getTime()) ? null : parsed;
@@ -254,7 +376,7 @@ portalRouter.get("/appointments", async (c) => {
customerNotes: null,
notes: null,
pet: { id: petMap[w.petId]?.id, name: petMap[w.petId]?.name, photo: petMap[w.petId]?.photoKey },
service: { id: w.serviceId },
service: w.serviceId ? { id: w.serviceId, name: serviceMap[w.serviceId]?.name } : null,
staff: null,
};
});
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